Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
comparison summa/bilingual/FP_ix.html @ 82:05ec843700ca
needs more corrections: good only through Q77
| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 20 Mar 2011 14:02:18 +0000 |
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| children | dd8a8c8eb56d |
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| 2 <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> | |
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| 4 <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> | |
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| 11 orphans: 2; widows: 2; | |
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| 15 </head> | |
| 16 <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ix" class="div2"> | |
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| 19 <h2 id="FP.ix-p0.1">TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q75">Q. 75. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE | |
| 20 OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES) | |
| 21 </a><br/><a href="#FP_Q76">Q. 76. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q77">Q. 77. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q78">Q. 78. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q79">Q. 79. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q80">Q. 80. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q81">Q. 81. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q82">Q. 82. OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q83">Q. 83. OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q84">Q. 84. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q85">Q. 85. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q86">Q. 86. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q87">Q. 87. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q88">Q. 88. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q89">Q. 89. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q90">Q. 90. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q91">Q. 91. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q92">Q. 92. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q93">Q. 93. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q94">Q. 94. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q95">Q. 95. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q96">Q. 96. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q97">Q. 97. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q98">Q. 98. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q99">Q. 99. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q100">Q. 100. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q101">Q. 101. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q102">Q. 102. OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> | |
| 22 <div id="FP_Q75" class="div3"> | |
| 23 <h3 id="FP_Q75-p0.1">Q. 75. OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE | |
| 24 OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES) | |
| 25 </h3> | |
| 26 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 27 <p id="FP_Q75-p2"> Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual | |
| 28 and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers | |
| 29 the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the | |
| 30 soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says | |
| 31 that three things are to be found in spiritual substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of what belongs | |
| 32 to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation. | |
| 33 </p><p id="FP_Q75-p3"> Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second | |
| 34 is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry. | |
| 35 </p><p id="FP_Q75-p4"><a href="#FP_Q75_A1"> (1) Whether the soul is a body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p5"><a href="#FP_Q75_A2"> (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p6"><a href="#FP_Q75_A3"> (3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p7"><a href="#FP_Q75_A4"> (4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p8"><a href="#FP_Q75_A5"> (5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p9"><a href="#FP_Q75_A6"> (6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?</a></p><p id="FP_Q75-p10"><a href="#FP_Q75_A7"> (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?</a></p> | |
| 36 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 pr."><a name="31447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31447] | |
| 37 Iª q. 75 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem creaturae | |
| 38 spiritualis et corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex | |
| 39 spirituali et corporali substantia componitur. Et primo, de natura | |
| 40 ipsius hominis; secundo, de eius productione. Naturam autem hominis | |
| 41 considerare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex | |
| 42 parte corporis, nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad | |
| 43 animam. Et ideo prima consideratio circa animam versabitur. Et | |
| 44 quia, secundum Dionysium, XI cap. Angel. Hier., tria inveniuntur in | |
| 45 substantiis spiritualibus, scilicet essentia, virtus et operatio; | |
| 46 primo considerabimus ea quae pertinent ad essentiam animae; | |
| 47 secundo, ea quae pertinent ad virtutem sive potentias eius; tertio, | |
| 48 ea quae pertinent ad operationem eius. Circa primum duplex occurrit | |
| 49 consideratio, quarum prima est de ipsa anima secundum se; secunda, | |
| 50 de unione eius ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur septem. Primo, | |
| 51 utrum anima sit corpus. Secundo, utrum anima humana sit aliquid | |
| 52 subsistens. Tertio, utrum animae brutorum sint subsistentes. | |
| 53 Quarto, utrum anima sit homo; vel magis homo sit aliquid compositum | |
| 54 ex anima et corpore. Quinto, utrum sit composita ex materia et | |
| 55 forma. Sexto, utrum anima humana sit incorruptibilis. Septimo, | |
| 56 utrum anima sit eiusdem speciei cum Angelo.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 57 <div id="FP_Q75_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A1-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 1. Whether the soul is a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p2"> | |
| 58 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, | |
| 59 because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not | |
| 60 hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, | |
| 61 unchanging movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be | |
| 62 the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved | |
| 63 is a body. Therefore the soul is a body. | |
| 64 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31448] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 65 proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit corpus. Anima enim est motor | |
| 66 corporis. Non autem est movens non motum. Tum quia videtur quod | |
| 67 nihil possit movere nisi moveatur, quia nihil dat alteri quod non | |
| 68 habet, sicut quod non est calidum non calefacit. Tum quia, si | |
| 69 aliquid est movens non motum, causat motum sempiternum et eodem | |
| 70 modo se habentem, ut probatur in VIII Physic., quod non apparet in | |
| 71 motu animalis, qui est ab anima. Ergo anima est movens motum. Sed | |
| 72 omne movens motum est corpus. Ergo anima est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p3"> | |
| 73 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. | |
| 74 If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things. | |
| 75 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31449] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 76 cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Non potest autem esse | |
| 77 similitudo corporis ad rem incorpoream. Si igitur anima non esset | |
| 78 corpus, non posset cognoscere res corporeas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p4"> | |
| 79 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the | |
| 80 soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body. | |
| 81 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31450] Iª q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 82 moventis ad motum oportet esse aliquem contactum. Contactus autem | |
| 83 non est nisi corporum. Cum igitur anima moveat corpus, videtur quod | |
| 84 anima sit corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p5"> | |
| 85 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space | |
| 86 by its bulk." | |
| 87 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31451] Iª q. 75 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 88 quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod <i>anima simplex dicitur | |
| 89 respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium | |
| 90 loci</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A1-p6"> | |
| 91 <b>I answer that,</b> To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which | |
| 92 live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life | |
| 93 is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, | |
| 94 supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for | |
| 95 they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the | |
| 96 soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, | |
| 97 based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body. | |
| 98 </p><p id="FP_Q75_A1-p7"> It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle | |
| 99 of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which | |
| 100 we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life | |
| 101 in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a | |
| 102 principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would | |
| 103 be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, | |
| 104 as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, | |
| 105 which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of | |
| 106 calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body. | |
| 107 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 co."><a name="31452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31452] Iª q. 75 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 108 quod ad inquirendum de natura animae, oportet praesupponere quod | |
| 109 anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos | |
| 110 vivunt animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita | |
| 111 carentes. Vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet | |
| 112 cognitionis et motus. Horum autem principium antiqui philosophi, | |
| 113 imaginationem transcendere non valentes, aliquod corpus ponebant; | |
| 114 sola corpora res esse dicentes, et quod non est corpus, nihil esse. | |
| 115 Et secundum hoc, animam aliquod corpus esse dicebant. Huius autem | |
| 116 opinionis falsitas licet multipliciter ostendi possit tamen uno | |
| 117 utemur, quo et communius et certius patet animam corpus non esse. | |
| 118 Manifestum est enim quod non quodcumque vitalis operationis | |
| 119 principium est anima, sic enim oculus esset anima, cum sit quoddam | |
| 120 principium visionis; et idem esset dicendum de aliis animae | |
| 121 instrumentis. Sed primum principium vitae dicimus esse animam. | |
| 122 Quamvis autem aliquod corpus possit esse quoddam principium vitae, | |
| 123 sicut cor est principium vitae in animali; tamen non potest esse | |
| 124 primum principium vitae aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod | |
| 125 esse principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod | |
| 126 est corpus, alioquin omne corpus esset vivens, aut principium | |
| 127 vitae. Convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam | |
| 128 principium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu | |
| 129 tale, habet hoc ab aliquo principio quod dicitur actus eius. Anima | |
| 130 igitur, quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus, sed | |
| 131 corporis actus, sicut calor, qui est principium calefactionis, non | |
| 132 est corpus, sed quidam corporis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p8"> | |
| 133 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must | |
| 134 allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what | |
| 135 it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which | |
| 136 is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and | |
| 137 such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, | |
| 138 is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, | |
| 139 again, another mover, which is moved essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing | |
| 140 existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body. | |
| 141 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31453] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 142 dicendum quod, cum omne quod movetur ab alio moveatur, quod non | |
| 143 potest in infinitum procedere, necesse est dicere quod non omne | |
| 144 movens movetur. Cum enim moveri sit exire de potentia in actum, | |
| 145 movens dat id quod habet mobili, inquantum facit ipsum esse in | |
| 146 actu. Sed sicut ostenditur in VIII Physic., est quoddam movens | |
| 147 penitus immobile, quod nec per se nec per accidens movetur, et tale | |
| 148 movens potest movere motum semper uniformem. Est autem aliud | |
| 149 movens, quod non movetur per se, sed movetur per accidens, et | |
| 150 propter hoc non movet motum semper uniformem. Et tale movens est | |
| 151 anima. Est autem aliud movens, quod per se movetur, scilicet | |
| 152 corpus. Et quia antiqui naturales nihil esse credebant nisi | |
| 153 corpora, posuerunt quod omne movens movetur, et quod anima per se | |
| 154 movetur, et est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p9"> | |
| 155 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, | |
| 156 and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only | |
| 157 potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the | |
| 158 likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but | |
| 159 that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between | |
| 160 actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it | |
| 161 must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies. | |
| 162 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31454] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 163 dicendum quod non est necessarium quod similitudo rei cognitae sit | |
| 164 actu in natura cognoscentis, sed si aliquid sit quod prius est | |
| 165 cognoscens in potentia et postea in actu, oportet quod similitudo | |
| 166 cogniti non sit actu in natura cognoscentis, sed in potentia | |
| 167 tantum; sicut color non est actu in pupilla, sed in potentia | |
| 168 tantum. Unde non oportet quod in natura animae sit similitudo rerum | |
| 169 corporearum in actu; sed quod sit in potentia ad huiusmodi | |
| 170 similitudines. Sed quia antiqui naturales nesciebant distinguere | |
| 171 inter actum et potentiam, ponebant animam esse corpus, ad hoc quod | |
| 172 cognosceret corpus; et ad hoc quod cognosceret omnia corpora, quod | |
| 173 esset composita ex principiis omnium corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A1-p10"> | |
| 174 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the | |
| 175 latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body. | |
| 176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31455] Iª q. 75 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 177 dicendum quod est duplex contactus, quantitatis et virtutis. Primo | |
| 178 modo, corpus non tangitur nisi a corpore. Secundo modo, corpus | |
| 179 potest tangi a re incorporea quae movet corpus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A2-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 2. Whether the human soul is something subsistent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p2"> | |
| 180 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." | |
| 181 Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is | |
| 182 not something subsistent. | |
| 183 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31456] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 184 proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens. | |
| 185 Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est | |
| 186 hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est | |
| 187 aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p3"> | |
| 188 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to | |
| 189 say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent. | |
| 190 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31457] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 191 quod est subsistens, potest dici operari. Sed anima non dicitur | |
| 192 operari, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, <i>dicere animam sentire | |
| 193 aut intelligere, simile est ac si dicat eam aliquis texere vel | |
| 194 aedificare</i>. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p4"> | |
| 195 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from | |
| 196 the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot | |
| 197 exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent. | |
| 198 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31458] Iª q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 199 anima esset aliquid subsistens, esset aliqua eius operatio sine | |
| 200 corpore. Sed nulla est eius operatio sine corpore, nec etiam | |
| 201 intelligere, quia non contingit intelligere sine phantasmate, | |
| 202 phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo anima humana non est | |
| 203 aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p5"> | |
| 204 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, | |
| 205 will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those | |
| 206 things without which they are unable to think of any nature---i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things." Therefore the | |
| 207 nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, | |
| 208 something subsistent. | |
| 209 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31459] Iª q. 75 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 210 quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. <i>Quisquis videt mentis naturam | |
| 211 et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, videt eos qui opinantur | |
| 212 eam esse corpoream, ob hoc errare, quod adiungunt ei ea sine quibus | |
| 213 nullam possunt cogitare naturam, scilicet corporum phantasias</i>. | |
| 214 Natura ergo mentis humanae non solum est incorporea, sed etiam | |
| 215 substantia, scilicet aliquid subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A2-p6"> | |
| 216 <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal | |
| 217 and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever | |
| 218 knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge | |
| 219 of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by | |
| 220 a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual | |
| 221 principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. | |
| 222 Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by | |
| 223 means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a | |
| 224 certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be | |
| 225 of that same color. | |
| 226 </p><p id="FP_Q75_A2-p7"> Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. | |
| 227 Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason | |
| 228 we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which | |
| 229 is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent. | |
| 230 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 co."><a name="31460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31460] Iª q. 75 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 231 quod necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis | |
| 232 operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium | |
| 233 incorporeum et subsistens. Manifestum est enim quod homo per | |
| 234 intellectum cognoscere potest naturas omnium corporum. Quod autem | |
| 235 potest cognoscere aliqua, oportet ut nihil eorum habeat in sua | |
| 236 natura, quia illud quod inesset ei naturaliter impediret | |
| 237 cognitionem aliorum; sicut videmus quod lingua infirmi quae infecta | |
| 238 est cholerico et amaro humore, non potest percipere aliquid dulce, | |
| 239 sed omnia videntur ei amara. Si igitur principium intellectuale | |
| 240 haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora | |
| 241 cognoscere. Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. | |
| 242 Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et | |
| 243 similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, | |
| 244 quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet | |
| 245 cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color | |
| 246 sit non solum in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus | |
| 247 eiusdem coloris videtur. Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, | |
| 248 quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui | |
| 249 non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod | |
| 250 per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu, unde eo | |
| 251 modo aliquid operatur, quo est. Propter quod non dicimus quod calor | |
| 252 calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae | |
| 253 dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et | |
| 254 subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p8"> | |
| 255 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, | |
| 256 and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter | |
| 257 excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not | |
| 258 in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can | |
| 259 indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in | |
| 260 this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing." | |
| 261 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31461] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 262 dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo, pro | |
| 263 quocumque subsistente, alio modo, pro subsistente completo in | |
| 264 natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam | |
| 265 accidentis et formae materialis, secundo modo, excludit etiam | |
| 266 imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo | |
| 267 modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars | |
| 268 speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi | |
| 269 subsistens, sed non secundo modo, sic enim compositum ex anima et | |
| 270 corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p9"> | |
| 271 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to | |
| 272 be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate "per se" belongs to what exists "per se." But for | |
| 273 a thing to exist "per se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it | |
| 274 be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is | |
| 275 neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist | |
| 276 "per se"; nor can it for that reason be said to operate "per se." Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed | |
| 277 to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that | |
| 278 what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul | |
| 279 understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul. | |
| 280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31462] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 281 dicendum quod verba illa Aristoteles dicit non secundum propriam | |
| 282 sententiam, sed secundum opinionem illorum qui dicebant quod | |
| 283 intelligere est moveri; ut patet ex iis quae ibi praemittit. Vel | |
| 284 dicendum quod per se agere convenit per se existenti. Sed per se | |
| 285 existens quandoque potest dici aliquid si non sit inhaerens ut | |
| 286 accidens vel ut forma materialis, etiam si sit pars. Sed proprie et | |
| 287 per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhaerens, | |
| 288 neque est pars. Secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non posset | |
| 289 dici per se subsistens; et per consequens nec per se operans. Unde | |
| 290 et operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes. Dicimus enim | |
| 291 quod homo videt per oculum, et palpat per manum, aliter quam | |
| 292 calidum calefacit per calorem, quia calor nullo modo calefacit, | |
| 293 proprie loquendo. Potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit, sicut | |
| 294 oculus videt, sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per | |
| 295 animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A2-p10"> | |
| 296 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the | |
| 297 phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to | |
| 298 be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses | |
| 299 in order to perform its act of perception. | |
| 300 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31463] Iª q. 75 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 301 dicendum quod corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut | |
| 302 organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma | |
| 303 enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem | |
| 304 indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem, | |
| 305 alioquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat | |
| 306 exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A3-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 3. Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p2"> | |
| 307 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we | |
| 308 have just shown | |
| 309 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q75_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent. | |
| 310 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31464] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 311 proceditur. Videtur quod animae brutorum animalium sint | |
| 312 subsistentes. Homo enim convenit in genere cum aliis animalibus. | |
| 313 Sed anima hominis est aliquid subsistens, ut ostensum est. Ergo et | |
| 314 animae aliorum animalium sunt subsistentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p3"> | |
| 315 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible | |
| 316 objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from | |
| 317 the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are | |
| 318 subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent. | |
| 319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31465] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 320 similiter se habet sensitivum ad sensibilia, sicut intellectivum et | |
| 321 intelligibilia. Sed intellectus intelligit intelligibilia sine | |
| 322 corpore. Ergo et sensus apprehendit sensibilia sine corpore. Animae | |
| 323 autem brutorum animalium sunt sensitivae. Ergo sunt subsistentes, | |
| 324 pari ratione qua et anima hominis, quae est intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p4"> | |
| 325 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute | |
| 326 animals has an operation apart from the body. | |
| 327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31466] Iª q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 328 brutorum animalium anima movet corpus. Corpus autem non movet, sed | |
| 329 movetur. Anima ergo bruti animalis habet aliquam operationem sine | |
| 330 corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p5"> | |
| 331 <b>On the contrary,</b> Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls | |
| 332 of animals are not subsistent." | |
| 333 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31467] Iª q. 75 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 334 quod dicitur in libro de Eccl. Dogmat., <i>solum hominem credimus | |
| 335 habere animam substantivam; animalium vero animae non sunt | |
| 336 substantivae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p6"> | |
| 337 <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has | |
| 338 been said | |
| 339 <a href="#FP_Q75_A1" id="FP_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining | |
| 340 that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals | |
| 341 are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the | |
| 342 operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent | |
| 343 operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of | |
| 344 the eye is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has | |
| 345 no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we | |
| 346 conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything | |
| 347 follows the mode of its being. | |
| 348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 co."><a name="31468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31468] Iª q. 75 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 349 quod antiqui philosophi nullam distinctionem ponebant inter sensum | |
| 350 et intellectum, et utrumque corporeo principio attribuebant, ut | |
| 351 dictum est. Plato autem distinxit inter intellectum et sensum; | |
| 352 utrumque tamen attribuit principio incorporeo, ponens quod, sicut | |
| 353 intelligere, ita et sentire convenit animae secundum seipsam. Et ex | |
| 354 hoc sequebatur quod etiam animae brutorum animalium sint | |
| 355 subsistentes. Sed Aristoteles posuit quod solum intelligere, inter | |
| 356 opera animae, sine organo corporeo exercetur. Sentire vero, et | |
| 357 consequentes operationes animae sensitivae, manifeste accidunt cum | |
| 358 aliqua corporis immutatione; sicut in videndo immutatur pupilla per | |
| 359 speciem coloris; et idem apparet in aliis. Et sic manifestum est | |
| 360 quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per | |
| 361 seipsam, sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est coniuncti. Ex quo | |
| 362 relinquitur quod, cum animae brutorum animalium per se non | |
| 363 operentur, non sint subsistentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet | |
| 364 esse et operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p7"> | |
| 365 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although man is of the same "genus" as other animals, he is of a different "species." Specific difference is derived from | |
| 366 the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of "genus." | |
| 367 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31469] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 368 dicendum quod homo, etsi conveniat in genere cum aliis animalibus, | |
| 369 specie tamen differt, differentia autem speciei attenditur secundum | |
| 370 differentiam formae. Nec oportet quod omnis differentia formae | |
| 371 faciat generis diversitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p8"> | |
| 372 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to | |
| 373 the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch | |
| 374 as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible | |
| 375 corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For | |
| 376 an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. | |
| 377 If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect | |
| 378 requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms. | |
| 379 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31470] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 380 dicendum quod sensitivum quodammodo se habet ad sensibilia sicut | |
| 381 intellectivum ad intelligibilia, inquantum scilicet utrumque est in | |
| 382 potentia ad sua obiecta. Sed quodammodo dissimiliter se habent, | |
| 383 inquantum sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione, | |
| 384 unde excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum. Quod in intellectu | |
| 385 non contingit, nam intellectus intelligens maxima intelligibilium, | |
| 386 magis potest postmodum intelligere minora. Si vero in intelligendo | |
| 387 fatigetur corpus, hoc est per accidens, in quantum intellectus | |
| 388 indiget operatione virium sensitivarum, per quas ei phantasmata | |
| 389 praeparantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A3-p9"> | |
| 390 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive soul | |
| 391 is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other | |
| 392 motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does | |
| 393 not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not | |
| 394 an act of the sensitive soul without the body. | |
| 395 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31471] Iª q. 75 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 396 dicendum quod vis motiva est duplex. Una quae imperat motum, | |
| 397 scilicet appetitiva. Et huius operatio in anima sensitiva non est | |
| 398 sine corpore; sed ira et gaudium et omnes huiusmodi passiones sunt | |
| 399 cum aliqua corporis immutatione. Alia vis motiva est exequens | |
| 400 motum, per quam membra redduntur habilia ad obediendum appetitui, | |
| 401 cuius actus non est movere, sed moveri. Unde patet quod movere non | |
| 402 est actus animae sensitivae sine corpore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A4-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 4. Whether the soul is man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p2"> | |
| 403 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written ( | |
| 404 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.16" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:16</a>): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul. | |
| 405 Therefore the soul is the inward man. | |
| 406 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31472] Iª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 407 proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit homo. Dicitur enim II ad Cor. | |
| 408 IV, <i>licet is qui foris est noster homo corrumpatur, tamen is qui | |
| 409 intus est, renovatur de die in diem</i>. Sed id quod est intus in | |
| 410 homine, est anima. Ergo anima est homo interior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p3"> | |
| 411 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore | |
| 412 it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man. | |
| 413 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31473] Iª q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 414 humana est substantia quaedam. Non autem est substantia | |
| 415 universalis. Ergo est substantia particularis. Ergo est hypostasis | |
| 416 vel persona. Sed non nisi humana. Ergo anima est homo, nam persona | |
| 417 humana est homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p4"> | |
| 418 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and | |
| 419 body." | |
| 420 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31474] Iª q. 75 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 421 quod Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, commendat Varronem, <i>qui | |
| 422 hominem nec animam solam, nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et | |
| 423 corpus esse arbitrabatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A4-p5"> | |
| 424 <b>I answer that,</b> The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, | |
| 425 for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs | |
| 426 to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the | |
| 427 species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does | |
| 428 not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, | |
| 429 signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular | |
| 430 man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, | |
| 431 flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given | |
| 432 species, must belong to the substance of the species. | |
| 433 </p><p id="FP_Q75_A4-p6"> It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the | |
| 434 operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are | |
| 435 attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore | |
| 436 that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above | |
| 437 <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, | |
| 438 it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation | |
| 439 was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body. | |
| 440 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 co."><a name="31475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31475] Iª q. 75 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 441 quod animam esse hominem dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, | |
| 442 quod homo sit anima, sed hic homo non sit anima, sed compositum ex | |
| 443 anima et corpore, puta Socrates. Quod ideo dico, quia quidam | |
| 444 posuerunt solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse | |
| 445 partem individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse | |
| 446 verum. Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat | |
| 447 definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat | |
| 448 formam tantum, sed formam et materiam. Unde materia est pars | |
| 449 speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est | |
| 450 principium individuationis; sed materia communis. Sicut enim de | |
| 451 ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et | |
| 452 his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et | |
| 453 carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse | |
| 454 quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub | |
| 455 specie contentorum. Alio vero modo potest intelligi sic, quod etiam | |
| 456 haec anima sit hic homo. Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si | |
| 457 poneretur quod animae sensitivae operatio esset eius propria sine | |
| 458 corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, | |
| 459 convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod | |
| 460 operatur operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur | |
| 461 operationes hominis. Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est | |
| 462 operatio animae tantum. Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio | |
| 463 hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima | |
| 464 tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore. Plato vero, | |
| 465 ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset | |
| 466 anima utens corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p7"> | |
| 467 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the governor | |
| 468 of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, | |
| 469 the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the | |
| 470 body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond | |
| 471 the senses. And this is called the "outward" man. | |
| 472 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31476] Iª q. 75 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 473 dicendum quod, secundum philosophum in IX Ethic., illud potissime | |
| 474 videtur esse unumquodque, quod est principale in ipso, sicut quod | |
| 475 facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas facere. Et hoc modo | |
| 476 aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo, aliquando | |
| 477 quidem pars intellectiva, secundum rei veritatem, quae dicitur homo | |
| 478 interior; aliquando vero pars sensitiva cum corpore, secundum | |
| 479 aestimationem quorundam, qui solum circa sensibilia detinentur. Et | |
| 480 hic dicitur homo exterior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A4-p8"> | |
| 481 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence | |
| 482 a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part | |
| 483 of the human species. | |
| 484 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31477] Iª q. 75 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 485 dicendum quod non quaelibet substantia particularis est hypostasis | |
| 486 vel persona, sed quae habet completam naturam speciei. Unde manus | |
| 487 vel pes non potest dici hypostasis vel persona. Et similiter nec | |
| 488 anima, cum sit pars speciei humanae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A5-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 5. Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p2"> | |
| 489 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things | |
| 490 are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and | |
| 491 are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality | |
| 492 participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. | |
| 493 Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially | |
| 494 understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as part of itself. | |
| 495 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31478] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 496 proceditur. Videtur quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma. | |
| 497 Potentia enim contra actum dividitur. Sed omnia quaecumque sunt in | |
| 498 actu, participant primum actum, qui Deus est; per cuius | |
| 499 participationem omnia sunt et bona et entia et viventia, ut patet | |
| 500 per doctrinam Dionysii in libro de Div. Nom. Ergo quaecumque sunt | |
| 501 in potentia, participant primam potentiam. Sed prima potentia est | |
| 502 materia prima. Cum ergo anima humana sit quodammodo in potentia, | |
| 503 quod apparet ex hoc quod homo quandoque est intelligens in | |
| 504 potentia; videtur quod anima humana participet materiam primam | |
| 505 tanquam partem sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p3"> | |
| 506 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul---namely, | |
| 507 to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge | |
| 508 and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul. | |
| 509 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31479] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 510 quocumque inveniuntur proprietates materiae, ibi invenitur materia. | |
| 511 Sed in anima inveniuntur proprietates materiae, quae sunt subiici | |
| 512 et transmutari, subiicitur enim scientiae et virtuti, et mutatur de | |
| 513 ignorantia ad scientiam, et de vitio ad virtutem. Ergo in anima est | |
| 514 materia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p4"> | |
| 515 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). | |
| 516 But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter. | |
| 517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31480] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illa | |
| 518 quae non habent materiam, non habent causam sui esse, ut dicitur in | |
| 519 VIII Metaphys. Sed anima habet causam sui esse, quia creatur a Deo. | |
| 520 Ergo anima habet materiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p5"> | |
| 521 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore | |
| 522 the soul has matter. | |
| 523 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="31481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31481] Iª q. 75 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 524 non habet materiam, sed est forma tantum, est actus purus et | |
| 525 infinitus. Hoc autem solius Dei est. Ergo anima habet materiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p6"> | |
| 526 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter. | |
| 527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31482] Iª q. 75 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 528 quod Augustinus probat, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima non | |
| 529 est facta nec ex materia corporali, nec ex materia spirituali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A5-p7"> | |
| 530 <b>I answer that,</b> The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs | |
| 531 to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue | |
| 532 of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, | |
| 533 if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an | |
| 534 act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being | |
| 535 opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, | |
| 536 which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate." | |
| 537 </p><p id="FP_Q75_A5-p8"> Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that | |
| 538 whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far | |
| 539 as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone | |
| 540 absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the | |
| 541 intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. | |
| 542 For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, | |
| 543 and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal | |
| 544 organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, | |
| 545 and | |
| 546 every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form. | |
| 547 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 co."><a name="31483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31483] Iª q. 75 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 548 quod anima non habet materiam. Et hoc potest considerari | |
| 549 dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex ratione animae in communi. Est enim de | |
| 550 ratione animae, quod sit forma alicuius corporis. Aut igitur est | |
| 551 forma secundum se totam; aut secundum aliquam partem sui. Si | |
| 552 secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars eius sit materia, si | |
| 553 dicatur materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum, quia forma, | |
| 554 inquantum forma, est actus; id autem quod est in potentia tantum, | |
| 555 non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote | |
| 556 contra actum divisa. Si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem | |
| 557 sui, illam partem, dicemus esse animam, et illam materiam cuius | |
| 558 primo est actus, dicemus esse primum animatum. Secundo, specialiter | |
| 559 ex ratione humanae animae, inquantum est intellectiva. Manifestum | |
| 560 est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per | |
| 561 modum recipientis. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma | |
| 562 eius est in cognoscente anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem | |
| 563 aliquam in sua natura absolute, puta lapidem inquantum est lapis | |
| 564 absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam | |
| 565 rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva. Anima igitur intellectiva | |
| 566 est forma absoluta, non autem aliquid compositum ex materia et | |
| 567 forma. Si enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et | |
| 568 forma, formae rerum reciperentur in ea ut individuales, et sic non | |
| 569 cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, | |
| 570 quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali, materia enim est | |
| 571 principium individuationis formarum. Relinquitur ergo quod anima | |
| 572 intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas | |
| 573 absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p9"> | |
| 574 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as Dionysius | |
| 575 says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now | |
| 576 as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite | |
| 577 Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot | |
| 578 be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the | |
| 579 receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual | |
| 580 soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. | |
| 581 For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of | |
| 582 such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form. | |
| 583 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31484] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 584 dicendum quod primus actus est universale principium omnium actuum, | |
| 585 quia est infinitum, virtualiter in se omnia praehabens, ut dicit | |
| 586 Dionysius. Unde participatur a rebus, non sicut pars, sed secundum | |
| 587 diffusionem processionis ipsius. Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva | |
| 588 actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, qui | |
| 589 procedunt a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes | |
| 590 eius, sunt diversi. Unde non potest esse potentia una quae recipiat | |
| 591 omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens omnes actus | |
| 592 participatos, alioquin potentia receptiva adaequaret potentiam | |
| 593 activam primi actus. Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima | |
| 594 intellectiva, a potentia receptiva materiae primae, ut patet ex | |
| 595 diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas | |
| 596 individuales, intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas. Unde | |
| 597 talis potentia in anima intellectiva existens, non ostendit quod | |
| 598 anima sit composita ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p10"> | |
| 599 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality | |
| 600 of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of | |
| 601 subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason | |
| 602 of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species. | |
| 603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31485] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 604 dicendum quod subiici et transmutari convenit materiae secundum | |
| 605 quod est in potentia. Sicut ergo est alia potentia intellectus, et | |
| 606 alia potentia materiae primae, ita est alia ratio subiiciendi et | |
| 607 transmutandi. Secundum hoc enim intellectus subiicitur scientiae, | |
| 608 et transmutatur de ignorantia ad scientiam, secundum quod est in | |
| 609 potentia ad species intelligibiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p11"> | |
| 610 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it | |
| 611 by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor | |
| 612 has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in | |
| 613 things composed of matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from | |
| 614 potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once." [*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter | |
| 615 sunt quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam | |
| 616 est . . . et ens quiddam."] | |
| 617 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31486] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 618 dicendum quod forma est causa essendi materiae, et agens, unde | |
| 619 agens, inquantum reducit materiam in actum formae transmutando, est | |
| 620 ei causa essendi. Si quid autem est forma subsistens, non habet | |
| 621 esse per aliquod formale principium, nec habet causam transmutantem | |
| 622 de potentia in actum. Unde post verba praemissa, philosophus | |
| 623 concludit quod in his quae sunt composita ex materia et forma, | |
| 624 <i>nulla est alia causa nisi movens ex potestate ad actum, | |
| 625 quaecumque vero non habent materiam, omnia simpliciter sunt quod | |
| 626 vere entia aliquid</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A5-p12"> | |
| 627 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per | |
| 628 se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as | |
| 629 Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, | |
| 630 Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances | |
| 631 there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. | |
| 632 Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that | |
| 633 by which a thing is. | |
| 634 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="31487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31487] Iª q. 75 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 635 dicendum quod omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus | |
| 636 eius. Quaecumque autem forma creata per se subsistens ponatur, | |
| 637 oportet quod participet esse, quia etiam ipsa vita, vel quidquid | |
| 638 sic diceretur, participat ipsum esse, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de | |
| 639 Div. Nom. Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem | |
| 640 participantis. Unde solus Deus, qui est ipsum suum esse, est actus | |
| 641 purus et infinitus. In substantiis vero intellectualibus est | |
| 642 compositio ex actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed | |
| 643 ex forma et esse participato. Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex | |
| 644 quo est et quod est, ipsum enim esse est quo aliquid est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A6-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 6. Whether the human soul is incorruptible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p2"> | |
| 645 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have | |
| 646 a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process | |
| 647 of life is alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast," as it is written ( | |
| 648 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv">Eccles. 3:19</a>). Therefore, as the same text concludes, "the death of man | |
| 649 and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the | |
| 650 human soul is corruptible. | |
| 651 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31488] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 652 proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana sit corruptibilis. Quorum | |
| 653 enim est simile principium et similis processus, videtur esse | |
| 654 similis finis. Sed simile est principium generationis hominum et | |
| 655 iumentorum, quia de terra facta sunt. Similis est etiam vitae | |
| 656 processus in utrisque, quia <i>similiter spirant omnia, et nihil | |
| 657 habet homo iumento amplius</i>, ut dicitur Eccle. III. Ergo, ut | |
| 658 ibidem concluditur, <i>unus est interitus hominis et iumentorum, et | |
| 659 aequa utriusque conditio</i>. Sed anima brutorum animalium est | |
| 660 corruptibilis. Ergo et anima humana est corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p3"> | |
| 661 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as | |
| 662 it is written ( | |
| 663 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.2" target="asv">Wis. 2:2</a>), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the | |
| 664 same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even as to our soul. | |
| 665 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31489] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 666 quod est ex nihilo, vertibile est in nihilum, quia finis debet | |
| 667 respondere principio. Sed sicut dicitur Sap. II, <i>ex nihilo nati | |
| 668 sumus</i>, quod verum est non solum quantum ad corpus, sed etiam | |
| 669 quantum ad animam. Ergo ut ibidem concluditur, post hoc erimus | |
| 670 tanquam non fuerimus, etiam secundum animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p4"> | |
| 671 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through | |
| 672 a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without | |
| 673 the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body. | |
| 674 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31490] Iª q. 75 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulla | |
| 675 res est sine propria operatione. Sed propria operatio animae, quae | |
| 676 est intelligere cum phantasmate, non potest esse sine corpore, | |
| 677 nihil enim sine phantasmate intelligit anima; phantasma autem non | |
| 678 est sine corpore, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo anima non | |
| 679 potest remanere, destructo corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p5"> | |
| 680 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an | |
| 681 incorruptible substantial life." | |
| 682 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31491] Iª q. 75 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 683 quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod animae humanae | |
| 684 habent ex bonitate divina quod sint intellectuales et quod habeant | |
| 685 substantialem vitam inconsumptibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q75_A6-p6"> | |
| 686 <b>I answer that,</b> We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted | |
| 687 in two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, | |
| 688 that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence | |
| 689 belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, | |
| 690 whatever has existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se'; while things which do not subsist, such | |
| 691 as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now | |
| 692 it was shown above ( | |
| 693 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q75_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, | |
| 694 when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted | |
| 695 unless it were corrupted "per se." This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything | |
| 696 subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; | |
| 697 but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires | |
| 698 the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be | |
| 699 separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist. | |
| 700 </p><p id="FP_Q75_A6-p7"> Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that | |
| 701 it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries | |
| 702 and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now | |
| 703 there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its | |
| 704 existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves | |
| 705 contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. | |
| 706 Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, | |
| 707 in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the | |
| 708 conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything | |
| 709 that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual | |
| 710 substance is incorruptible. | |
| 711 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 co."><a name="31492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31492] Iª q. 75 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 712 quod necesse est dicere animam humanam, quam dicimus intellectivum | |
| 713 principium, esse incorruptibilem. Dupliciter enim aliquid | |
| 714 corrumpitur, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Impossibile | |
| 715 est autem aliquid subsistens generari aut corrumpi per accidens, | |
| 716 idest aliquo generato vel corrupto. Sic enim competit alicui | |
| 717 generari et corrumpi, sicut et esse, quod per generationem | |
| 718 acquiritur et per corruptionem amittitur. Unde quod per se habet | |
| 719 esse, non potest generari vel corrumpi nisi per se, quae vero non | |
| 720 subsistunt, ut accidentia et formae materiales, dicuntur fieri et | |
| 721 corrumpi per generationem et corruptionem compositorum. Ostensum | |
| 722 est autem supra quod animae brutorum non sunt per se subsistentes, | |
| 723 sed sola anima humana. Unde animae brutorum corrumpuntur, corruptis | |
| 724 corporibus, anima autem humana non posset corrumpi, nisi per se | |
| 725 corrumperetur. Quod quidem omnino est impossibile non solum de | |
| 726 ipsa, sed de quolibet subsistente quod est forma tantum. Manifestum | |
| 727 est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparabile | |
| 728 ab ipso. Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde | |
| 729 materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam, | |
| 730 secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab | |
| 731 ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa. Unde | |
| 732 impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse. Dato etiam quod | |
| 733 anima esset ex materia et forma composita, ut quidam dicunt, adhuc | |
| 734 oporteret ponere eam incorruptibilem. Non enim invenitur corruptio | |
| 735 nisi ubi invenitur contrarietas, generationes enim et corruptiones | |
| 736 ex contrariis et in contraria sunt; unde corpora caelestia, quia | |
| 737 non habent materiam contrarietati subiectam, incorruptibilia sunt. | |
| 738 In anima autem intellectiva non potest esse aliqua contrarietas. | |
| 739 Recipit enim secundum modum sui esse, ea vero quae in ipsa | |
| 740 recipiuntur, sunt absque contrarietate; quia etiam rationes | |
| 741 contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, sed est una | |
| 742 scientia contrariorum. Impossibile est ergo quod anima intellectiva | |
| 743 sit corruptibilis. Potest etiam huius rei accipi signum ex hoc, | |
| 744 quod unumquodque naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium | |
| 745 autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Sensus autem | |
| 746 non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc, sed intellectus | |
| 747 apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne | |
| 748 habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper. Naturale | |
| 749 autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur intellectualis | |
| 750 substantia est incorruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8"> | |
| 751 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of | |
| 752 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2" target="asv">Wisdom 2</a>. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike | |
| 753 are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas | |
| 754 the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the | |
| 755 living soul" ( | |
| 756 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.24" target="asv">Gn. 1:24</a>): while of man it is written ( | |
| 757 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>) that "He breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: | |
| 758 "(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it." Again the process | |
| 759 of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written ( | |
| 760 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv">Eccles. 3:19</a>): "All things breathe alike," and ( | |
| 761 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.2" target="asv">Wis. | |
| 762 2:2 | |
| 763 </a>), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals | |
| 764 are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not | |
| 765 as to the soul. | |
| 766 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31493] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 767 dicendum quod Salomon inducit rationem illam ex persona | |
| 768 insipientium, ut exprimitur Sap. II. Quod ergo dicitur quod homo et | |
| 769 alia animalia habent simile generationis principium, verum est | |
| 770 quantum ad corpus, similiter enim de terra facta sunt omnia | |
| 771 animalia. Non autem quantum ad animam, nam anima brutorum | |
| 772 producitur ex virtute aliqua corporea, anima vero humana a Deo. Et | |
| 773 ad hoc significandum dicitur Gen., quantum ad alia animalia, | |
| 774 producat terra animam viventem, quantum vero ad hominem, dicitur | |
| 775 quod inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae. Et ideo | |
| 776 concluditur Eccle. ult., <i>revertatur pulvis in terram suam, unde | |
| 777 erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum qui dedit illum</i>. Similiter | |
| 778 processus vitae est similis quantum ad corpus; ad quod pertinet | |
| 779 quod dicitur in Eccle., <i>similiter spirant omnia</i>; et Sap. II, | |
| 780 <i>fumus et flatus est in naribus nostris</i> et cetera. Sed non | |
| 781 est similis processus quantum ad animam, quia homo intelligit, non | |
| 782 autem animalia bruta. Unde falsum est quod dicitur, nihil habet | |
| 783 homo iumento amplius. Et ideo similis est interitus quantum ad | |
| 784 corpus, sed non quantum ad animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p9"> | |
| 785 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who | |
| 786 can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature | |
| 787 a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible | |
| 788 because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence. | |
| 789 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31494] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 790 dicendum quod, sicut posse creari dicitur aliquid non per potentiam | |
| 791 passivam, sed solum per potentiam activam creantis, qui ex nihilo | |
| 792 potest aliquid producere; ita cum dicitur aliquid vertibile in | |
| 793 nihil, non importatur in creatura potentia ad non esse, sed in | |
| 794 creatore potentia ad hoc quod esse non influat. Dicitur autem | |
| 795 aliquid corruptibile per hoc, quod inest ei potentia ad non | |
| 796 esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A6-p10"> | |
| 797 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation | |
| 798 from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear | |
| 799 later on ( | |
| 800 <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q75_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[89], A[1]</a>). | |
| 801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31495] Iª q. 75 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 802 dicendum quod intelligere cum phantasmate est propria operatio | |
| 803 animae secundum quod corpori est unita. Separata autem a corpore | |
| 804 habebit alium modum intelligendi, similem aliis substantiis a | |
| 805 corpore separatis, ut infra melius patebit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q75_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q75_A7-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 7. Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p2"> | |
| 806 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature | |
| 807 of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel---namely, | |
| 808 eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species. | |
| 809 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31496] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 810 proceditur. Videtur quod anima et Angelus sint unius speciei. | |
| 811 Unumquodque enim ordinatur ad proprium finem per naturam suae | |
| 812 speciei, per quam habet inclinationem ad finem. Sed idem est finis | |
| 813 animae et Angeli, scilicet beatitudo aeterna. Ergo sunt unius | |
| 814 speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p3"> | |
| 815 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing | |
| 816 nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate | |
| 817 specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species. | |
| 818 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31497] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 819 ultima differentia specifica est nobilissima, quia complet rationem | |
| 820 speciei. Sed nihil est nobilius in Angelo et anima quam | |
| 821 intellectuale esse. Ergo conveniunt anima et Angelus in ultima | |
| 822 differentia specifica. Ergo sunt unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p4"> | |
| 823 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside | |
| 824 the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species. | |
| 825 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31498] Iª q. 75 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 826 ab Angelo differre non videtur nisi per hoc, quod est corpori | |
| 827 unita. Corpus autem, cum sit extra essentiam animae, non videtur ad | |
| 828 eius speciem pertinere. Ergo anima et Angelus sunt unius | |
| 829 speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p5"> | |
| 830 <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an | |
| 831 angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), "Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering | |
| 832 their knowledge of Divine things from visible things." Subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the | |
| 833 soul and an angel are not of the same species. | |
| 834 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31499] Iª q. 75 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 835 quorum sunt diversae operationes naturales, ipsa differunt specie. | |
| 836 Sed animae et Angeli sunt diversae operationes naturales, quia ut | |
| 837 dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., <i>mentes angelicae | |
| 838 simplices et beatos intellectus habent, non de visibilibus | |
| 839 congregantes divinam cognitionem</i>; cuius contrarium postmodum de | |
| 840 anima dicit. Anima igitur et Angelus non sunt unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6"> | |
| 841 <b>I answer that,</b> Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that | |
| 842 in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above ( | |
| 843 <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and | |
| 844 inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of | |
| 845 matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a | |
| 846 separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, | |
| 847 it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity | |
| 848 of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and | |
| 849 the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a "genus" are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, | |
| 850 are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the "principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," | |
| 851 as is written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. | |
| 852 For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of | |
| 853 the distinction of matter---that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even | |
| 854 then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction | |
| 855 of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these | |
| 856 incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the | |
| 857 same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later ( | |
| 858 <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q75_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>, ad 1). | |
| 859 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 co."><a name="31500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31500] Iª q. 75 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 860 quod Origenes posuit omnes animas humanas et Angelos esse unius | |
| 861 speciei. Et hoc ideo, quia posuit diversitatem gradus in huiusmodi | |
| 862 substantiis inventam, accidentalem, utpote ex libero arbitrio | |
| 863 provenientem, ut supra dictum est. Quod non potest esse, quia in | |
| 864 substantiis incorporeis non potest esse diversitas secundum numerum | |
| 865 absque diversitate secundum speciem, et absque naturali | |
| 866 inaequalitate. Quia si non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sed | |
| 867 sint formae subsistentes, manifestum est quod necesse erit in eis | |
| 868 esse diversitatem in specie. Non enim potest intelligi quod aliqua | |
| 869 forma separata sit nisi una unius speciei, sicut si esset albedo | |
| 870 separata, non posset esse nisi una tantum; haec enim albedo non | |
| 871 differt ab illa nisi per hoc, quod est huius vel illius. Diversitas | |
| 872 autem secundum speciem semper habet diversitatem naturalem | |
| 873 concomitantem, sicut in speciebus colorum unus est perfectior | |
| 874 altero, et similiter in aliis. Et hoc ideo, quia differentiae | |
| 875 dividentes genus sunt contrariae; contraria autem se habent | |
| 876 secundum perfectum et imperfectum, quia principium contrarietatis | |
| 877 est privatio et habitus ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Idem etiam | |
| 878 sequeretur, si huiusmodi substantiae essent compositae ex materia | |
| 879 et forma. Si enim materia huius distinguitur a materia illius, | |
| 880 necesse est quod vel forma sit principium distinctionis materiae, | |
| 881 ut scilicet materiae sint diversae propter habitudinem ad diversas | |
| 882 formas, et tunc sequitur adhuc diversitas secundum speciem et | |
| 883 inaequalitas naturalis. Vel materia erit principium distinctionis | |
| 884 formarum; nec poterit dici materia haec alia ab illa, nisi secundum | |
| 885 divisionem quantitativam, quae non habet locum in substantiis | |
| 886 incorporeis, cuiusmodi sunt Angelus et anima. Unde non potest esse | |
| 887 quod Angelus et anima sint unius speciei. Quomodo autem sint plures | |
| 888 animae unius speciei infra ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p7"> | |
| 889 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end. | |
| 890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31501] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 891 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fine proximo et naturali. | |
| 892 Beatitudo autem aeterna est finis ultimus et supernaturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p8"> | |
| 893 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler | |
| 894 than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many | |
| 895 degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible | |
| 896 things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one | |
| 897 species. | |
| 898 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31502] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 899 dicendum quod differentia specifica ultima est nobilissima, | |
| 900 inquantum est maxime determinata, per modum quo actus est nobilior | |
| 901 potentia. Sic autem intellectuale non est nobilissimum, quia est | |
| 902 indeterminatum et commune ad multos intellectualitatis gradus, | |
| 903 sicut sensibile ad multos gradus in esse sensibili. Unde sicut non | |
| 904 omnia sensibilia sunt unius speciei, ita nec omnia | |
| 905 intellectualia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q75_A7-p9"> | |
| 906 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, | |
| 907 properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way | |
| 908 requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an | |
| 909 angel, who is not united to a body. | |
| 910 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 75 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31503] Iª q. 75 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 911 dicendum quod corpus non est de essentia animae, sed anima ex | |
| 912 natura suae essentiae habet quod sit corpori unibilis. Unde nec | |
| 913 proprie anima est in specie; sed compositum. Et hoc ipsum quod | |
| 914 anima quodammodo indiget corpore ad suam operationem, ostendit quod | |
| 915 anima tenet inferiorem gradum intellectualitatis quam Angelus, qui | |
| 916 corpori non unitur.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 917 <div id="FP_Q76" class="div3"> | |
| 918 <h3 id="FP_Q76-p0.1">Q. 76. OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 919 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 920 <p id="FP_Q76-p2"> We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q76-p3"><a href="#FP_Q76_A1"> (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p4"><a href="#FP_Q76_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence | |
| 921 for all men? | |
| 922 </a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p5"><a href="#FP_Q76_A3"> (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p6"><a href="#FP_Q76_A4"> (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p7"><a href="#FP_Q76_A5"> (5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p8"><a href="#FP_Q76_A6"> (6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p9"><a href="#FP_Q76_A7"> (7) Whether by means of an accident?</a></p><p id="FP_Q76-p10"><a href="#FP_Q76_A8"> (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?</a></p> | |
| 923 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 pr."><a name="31504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31504] | |
| 924 Iª q. 76 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de unione | |
| 925 animae ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum | |
| 926 intellectivum principium uniatur corpori ut forma. Secundo, utrum | |
| 927 intellectivum principium numero multiplicetur secundum | |
| 928 multiplicationem corporum; vel sit unus intellectus omnium hominum. | |
| 929 Tertio, utrum in corpore cuius forma est principium intellectivum, | |
| 930 sit aliqua alia anima. Quarto, utrum sit in eo aliqua alia forma | |
| 931 substantialis. Quinto, quale debeat esse corpus cuius intellectivum | |
| 932 principium est forma. Sexto, utrum tali corpori uniatur mediante | |
| 933 aliquo alio corpore. Septimo, utrum mediante aliquo accidente. | |
| 934 Octavo, utrum anima sit tota in qualibet parte corporis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 935 <div id="FP_Q76_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A1-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 1. Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p2"> | |
| 936 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) | |
| 937 that the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. | |
| 938 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31505] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 939 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectivum principium non uniatur | |
| 940 corpori ut forma. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod | |
| 941 intellectus est separatus, et quod nullius corporis est actus. Non | |
| 942 ergo unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p3"> | |
| 943 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion | |
| 944 would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body | |
| 945 has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of | |
| 946 knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said ( | |
| 947 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>); | |
| 948 which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. | |
| 949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31506] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 950 forma determinatur secundum naturam materiae cuius est forma, | |
| 951 alioquin non requireretur proportio inter materiam et formam. Si | |
| 952 ergo intellectus uniretur corpori ut forma, cum omne corpus habeat | |
| 953 determinatam naturam, sequeretur quod intellectus haberet | |
| 954 determinatam naturam. Et sic non esset omnium cognoscitivus, ut ex | |
| 955 superioribus patet, quod est contra rationem intellectus. Non ergo | |
| 956 intellectus unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p4"> | |
| 957 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received | |
| 958 must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the | |
| 959 intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable | |
| 960 of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. | |
| 961 Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. | |
| 962 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31507] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 963 quaecumque potentia receptiva est actus alicuius corporis, recipit | |
| 964 formam materialiter et individualiter, quia receptum est in | |
| 965 recipiente secundum modum recipientis. Sed forma rei intellectae | |
| 966 non recipitur in intellectu materialiter et individualiter, sed | |
| 967 magis immaterialiter et universaliter, alioquin intellectus non | |
| 968 esset cognoscitivus immaterialium et universalium, sed singularium | |
| 969 tantum, sicut et sensus. Intellectus ergo non unitur corpori ut | |
| 970 forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p5"> | |
| 971 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action | |
| 972 is not the action of a body, as appears from above ( | |
| 973 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more | |
| 974 simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the | |
| 975 form | |
| 976 of a body. | |
| 977 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31508] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 978 eiusdem est potentia et actio, idem enim est quod potest agere, et | |
| 979 quod agit. Sed actio intellectualis non est alicuius corporis, ut | |
| 980 ex superioribus patet. Ergo nec potentia intellectiva est alicuius | |
| 981 corporis potentia. Sed virtus sive potentia non potest esse | |
| 982 abstractior vel simplicior quam essentia a qua virtus vel potentia | |
| 983 derivatur. Ergo nec substantia intellectus est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p6"> | |
| 984 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever has "per se" existence is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: | |
| 985 so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intellectual principle has "per se" existence | |
| 986 and is subsistent, as was said above ( | |
| 987 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q76_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. | |
| 988 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31509] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 989 quod per se habet esse, non unitur corpori ut forma, quia forma est | |
| 990 quo aliquid est; et sic ipsum esse formae non est ipsius formae | |
| 991 secundum se. Sed intellectivum principium habet secundum se esse, | |
| 992 et est subsistens, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo unitur corpori ut | |
| 993 forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p7"> | |
| 994 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the | |
| 995 form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise | |
| 996 matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its | |
| 997 own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was | |
| 998 shown above ( | |
| 999 <a href="#FP_Q75_A6" id="FP_Q76_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[6]</a>), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to | |
| 1000 the body as its form. | |
| 1001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="31510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31510] Iª q. 76 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 1002 quod inest alicui rei secundum se, semper inest ei. Sed formae | |
| 1003 secundum se inest uniri materiae, non enim per accidens aliquod, | |
| 1004 sed per essentiam suam est actus materiae; alioquin ex materia et | |
| 1005 forma non fieret unum substantialiter, sed accidentaliter. Forma | |
| 1006 ergo non potest esse sine propria materia. Sed intellectivum | |
| 1007 principium, cum sit incorruptibile, ut supra ostensum est, remanet | |
| 1008 corpori non unitum, corpore corrupto. Ergo intellectivum principium | |
| 1009 non unitur corpori ut forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p8"> | |
| 1010 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes | |
| 1011 man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle | |
| 1012 is the form of man. | |
| 1013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31511] Iª q. 76 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 1014 secundum philosophum, in VIII Metaphys., differentia sumitur a | |
| 1015 forma rei. Sed differentia constitutiva hominis est rationale; quod | |
| 1016 dicitur de homine ratione intellectivi principii. Intellectivum | |
| 1017 ergo principium est forma hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p9"> | |
| 1018 <b>I answer that,</b> We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that | |
| 1019 whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a | |
| 1020 body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the | |
| 1021 body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as | |
| 1022 it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body | |
| 1023 lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily | |
| 1024 perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, | |
| 1025 and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether | |
| 1026 it | |
| 1027 be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De | |
| 1028 Anima ii, 2). | |
| 1029 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p10"> But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action | |
| 1030 of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an | |
| 1031 action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move | |
| 1032 or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a | |
| 1033 man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental | |
| 1034 to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to | |
| 1035 him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either | |
| 1036 that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or | |
| 1037 that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above ( | |
| 1038 <a href="#FP_Q75_A4" id="FP_Q76_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one | |
| 1039 cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which | |
| 1040 Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. | |
| 1041 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p11"> The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, | |
| 1042 and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked | |
| 1043 to the body of this or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of | |
| 1044 the intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive | |
| 1045 faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the | |
| 1046 intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of | |
| 1047 colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colors, | |
| 1048 the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say | |
| 1049 that | |
| 1050 the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, | |
| 1051 it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood. | |
| 1052 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p12"> Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and | |
| 1053 body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. | |
| 1054 First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation | |
| 1055 of the intellect. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his | |
| 1056 intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly, because since Socrates | |
| 1057 is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that | |
| 1058 it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act | |
| 1059 of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action | |
| 1060 of | |
| 1061 understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action | |
| 1062 of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore | |
| 1063 if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to | |
| 1064 an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a | |
| 1065 corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the | |
| 1066 action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do | |
| 1067 not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the | |
| 1068 action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect | |
| 1069 with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows | |
| 1070 that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is | |
| 1071 one. | |
| 1072 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p13"> There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle---namely, that this particular man understands, | |
| 1073 because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual | |
| 1074 principle is united to the body as its form. | |
| 1075 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p14"> The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. | |
| 1076 Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle | |
| 1077 concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man | |
| 1078 must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything | |
| 1079 is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man. | |
| 1080 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p15"> But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, | |
| 1081 and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation | |
| 1082 not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power | |
| 1083 of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the | |
| 1084 sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal | |
| 1085 matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This | |
| 1086 power is called the intellect. | |
| 1087 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A1-p16"> It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could | |
| 1088 the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed | |
| 1089 of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part | |
| 1090 of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the | |
| 1091 "primary animate," as was said above ( | |
| 1092 <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q76_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). | |
| 1093 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 co."><a name="31512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31512] Iª q. 76 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1094 quod necesse est dicere quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis | |
| 1095 operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma. Illud enim quo | |
| 1096 primo aliquid operatur, est forma eius cui operatio attribuitur, | |
| 1097 sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et quo primo scit | |
| 1098 anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma corporis, et scientia | |
| 1099 animae. Et huius ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est | |
| 1100 actu, unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Manifestum est autem quod | |
| 1101 primum quo corpus vivit, est anima. Et cum vita manifestetur | |
| 1102 secundum diversas operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id | |
| 1103 quo primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima, anima | |
| 1104 enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et movemur secundum | |
| 1105 locum; et similiter quo primo intelligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo | |
| 1106 primo intelligimus, sive dicatur intellectus sive anima | |
| 1107 intellectiva, est forma corporis. Et haec est demonstratio | |
| 1108 Aristotelis in II de anima. Si quis autem velit dicere animam | |
| 1109 intellectivam non esse corporis formam, oportet quod inveniat modum | |
| 1110 quo ista actio quae est intelligere, sit huius hominis actio, | |
| 1111 experitur enim unusquisque seipsum esse qui intelligit. Attribuitur | |
| 1112 autem aliqua actio alicui tripliciter, ut patet per philosophum, V | |
| 1113 Physic., dicitur enim movere aliquid aut agere vel secundum se | |
| 1114 totum, sicut medicus sanat; aut secundum partem, sicut homo videt | |
| 1115 per oculum; aut per accidens, sicut dicitur quod album aedificat, | |
| 1116 quia accidit aedificatori esse album. Cum igitur dicimus Socratem | |
| 1117 aut Platonem intelligere, manifestum est quod non attribuitur ei | |
| 1118 per accidens, attribuitur enim ei inquantum est homo, quod | |
| 1119 essentialiter praedicatur de ipso. Aut ergo oportet dicere quod | |
| 1120 Socrates intelligit secundum se totum, sicut Plato posuit, dicens | |
| 1121 hominem esse animam intellectivam, aut oportet dicere quod | |
| 1122 intellectus sit aliqua pars Socratis. Et primum quidem stare non | |
| 1123 potest, ut supra ostensum est, propter hoc quod ipse idem homo est | |
| 1124 qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire, sentire autem non est | |
| 1125 sine corpore, unde oportet corpus aliquam esse hominis partem. | |
| 1126 Relinquitur ergo quod intellectus quo Socrates intelligit, est | |
| 1127 aliqua pars Socratis ita quod intellectus aliquo modo corpori | |
| 1128 Socratis uniatur. Hanc autem unionem Commentator, in III de anima, | |
| 1129 dicit esse per speciem intelligibilem. Quae quidem habet duplex | |
| 1130 subiectum, unum scilicet intellectum possibilem; et aliud ipsa | |
| 1131 phantasmata quae sunt in organis corporeis. Et sic per speciem | |
| 1132 intelligibilem continuatur intellectus possibilis corpori huius vel | |
| 1133 illius hominis. Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit ad hoc | |
| 1134 quod actio intellectus sit actio Socratis. Et hoc patet per | |
| 1135 similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit ad | |
| 1136 considerandum ea quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se habent | |
| 1137 phantasmata ad intellectum, ut dicitur in III de anima, sicut | |
| 1138 colores ad visum. Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita | |
| 1139 species phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod | |
| 1140 ex hoc quod colores sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt in | |
| 1141 visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti, non enim dicimus quod | |
| 1142 paries videat, sed magis quod videatur. Ex hoc ergo quod species | |
| 1143 phantasmatum sunt in intellectu possibili, non sequitur quod | |
| 1144 Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat; sed quod ipse, vel | |
| 1145 eius phantasmata intelligantur. Quidam autem dicere voluerunt quod | |
| 1146 intellectus unitur corpori ut motor; et sic ex intellectu et | |
| 1147 corpore fit unum, ut actio intellectus toti attribui possit. Sed | |
| 1148 hoc est multipliciter vanum. Primo quidem, quia intellectus non | |
| 1149 movet corpus nisi per appetitum, cuius motus praesupponit | |
| 1150 operationem intellectus. Non ergo quia movetur Socrates ab | |
| 1151 intellectu, ideo intelligit, sed potius e converso, quia | |
| 1152 intelligit, ideo ab intellectu movetur Socrates. Secundo quia, cum | |
| 1153 Socrates sit quoddam individuum in natura cuius essentia est una, | |
| 1154 composita ex materia et forma; si intellectus non sit forma eius, | |
| 1155 sequitur quod sit praeter essentiam eius; et sic intellectus | |
| 1156 comparabitur ad totum Socratem sicut motor ad motum. Intelligere | |
| 1157 autem est actio quiescens in agente, non autem transiens in | |
| 1158 alterum, sicut calefactio. Non ergo intelligere potest attribui | |
| 1159 Socrati propter hoc quod est motus ab intellectu. Tertio, quia | |
| 1160 actio motoris nunquam attribuitur moto nisi sicut instrumento, | |
| 1161 sicut actio carpentarii serrae. Si igitur intelligere attribuitur | |
| 1162 Socrati quia est actio motoris eius, sequitur quod attribuatur ei | |
| 1163 sicut instrumento. Quod est contra philosophum, qui vult quod | |
| 1164 intelligere non sit per instrumentum corporeum. Quarto quia, licet | |
| 1165 actio partis attribuatur toti, ut actio oculi homini; nunquam tamen | |
| 1166 attribuitur alii parti, nisi forte per accidens, non enim dicimus | |
| 1167 quod manus videat, propter hoc quod oculus videt. Si ergo ex | |
| 1168 intellectu et Socrate dicto modo fit unum, actio intellectus non | |
| 1169 potest attribui Socrati. Si vero Socrates est totum quod componitur | |
| 1170 ex unione intellectus ad reliqua quae sunt Socratis, et tamen | |
| 1171 intellectus non unitur aliis quae sunt Socratis nisi sicut motor; | |
| 1172 sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter, et per consequens | |
| 1173 nec ens simpliciter; sic enim aliquid est ens, quomodo et unum. | |
| 1174 Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit, quod hic homo | |
| 1175 intelligit, quia principium intellectivum est forma ipsius. Sic | |
| 1176 ergo ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparet quod intellectivum | |
| 1177 principium unitur corpori ut forma. Potest etiam idem manifestari | |
| 1178 ex ratione speciei humanae. Natura enim uniuscuiusque rei ex eius | |
| 1179 operatione ostenditur. Propria autem operatio hominis, inquantum | |
| 1180 est homo, est intelligere, per hanc enim omnia animalia | |
| 1181 transcendit. Unde et Aristoteles, in libro Ethic., in hac | |
| 1182 operatione, sicut in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem | |
| 1183 constituit. Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem | |
| 1184 sortiatur, quod est huius operationis principium. Sortitur autem | |
| 1185 unumquodque speciem per propriam formam. Relinquitur ergo quod | |
| 1186 intellectivum principium sit propria hominis forma. Sed | |
| 1187 considerandum est quod, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto magis | |
| 1188 dominatur materiae corporali, et minus ei immergitur, et magis sua | |
| 1189 operatione vel virtute excedit eam. Unde videmus quod forma mixti | |
| 1190 corporis habet aliquam operationem quae non causatur ex | |
| 1191 qualitatibus elementaribus. Et quanto magis proceditur in | |
| 1192 nobilitate formarum, tanto magis invenitur virtus formae materiam | |
| 1193 elementarem excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus quam forma | |
| 1194 metalli, et anima sensibilis plus quam anima vegetabilis. Anima | |
| 1195 autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde intantum sua | |
| 1196 virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod habet aliquam operationem | |
| 1197 et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis. Et | |
| 1198 haec virtus dicitur intellectus. Est autem attendendum quod, si | |
| 1199 quis poneret animam componi ex materia et forma, nullo modo posset | |
| 1200 dicere animam esse formam corporis. Cum enim forma sit actus, | |
| 1201 materia vero sit ens in potentia tantum; nullo modo id quod est ex | |
| 1202 materia et forma compositum, potest esse alterius forma secundum se | |
| 1203 totum. Si autem secundum aliquid sui sit forma, id quod est forma | |
| 1204 dicimus animam, et id cuius est forma dicimus primum animatum, ut | |
| 1205 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p17"> | |
| 1206 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is | |
| 1207 directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from | |
| 1208 matter." It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal | |
| 1209 organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act | |
| 1210 which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, | |
| 1211 to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima | |
| 1212 iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. | |
| 1213 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31513] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1214 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Physic., ultima | |
| 1215 formarum naturalium, ad quam terminatur consideratio philosophi | |
| 1216 naturalis, scilicet anima humana, est quidem separata, sed tamen in | |
| 1217 materia; quod ex hoc probat, quia homo ex materia generat hominem, | |
| 1218 et sol. Separata quidem est secundum virtutem intellectivam, quia | |
| 1219 virtus intellectiva non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis, | |
| 1220 sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi intelligere enim est actus qui | |
| 1221 non potest exerceri per organum corporale, sicut exercetur visio. | |
| 1222 Sed in materia est inquantum ipsa anima cuius est haec virtus, est | |
| 1223 corporis forma, et terminus generationis humanae. Sic ergo | |
| 1224 philosophus dicit in III de anima quod intellectus est separatus, | |
| 1225 quia non est virtus alicuius organi corporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p18"> <b>Reply to Objections 2 | |
| 1226 & 3:</b> From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all | |
| 1227 things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient | |
| 1228 that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. | |
| 1229 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31514] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 1230 responsio ad secundum et tertium. Sufficit enim ad hoc quod homo | |
| 1231 possit intelligere omnia per intellectum, et ad hoc quod | |
| 1232 intellectus intelligat immaterialia et universalia, quod virtus | |
| 1233 intellectiva non est corporis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p19"> | |
| 1234 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there | |
| 1235 is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body. | |
| 1236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31515] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1237 dicendum quod humana anima non est forma in materia corporali | |
| 1238 immersa, vel ab ea totaliter comprehensa, propter suam | |
| 1239 perfectionem. Et ideo nihil prohibet aliquam eius virtutem non esse | |
| 1240 corporis actum; quamvis anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis | |
| 1241 forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p20"> | |
| 1242 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul | |
| 1243 there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is | |
| 1244 not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution | |
| 1245 of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms. | |
| 1246 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31516] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 1247 dicendum quod anima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat | |
| 1248 materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod | |
| 1249 illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae. Quod | |
| 1250 non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter | |
| 1251 hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore, non autem | |
| 1252 aliae formae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A1-p21"> | |
| 1253 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be | |
| 1254 raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination | |
| 1255 for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and | |
| 1256 a natural inclination to be united to the body. | |
| 1257 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="31517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31517] Iª q. 76 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 1258 quod secundum se convenit animae corpori uniri, sicut secundum se | |
| 1259 convenit corpori levi esse sursum. Et sicut corpus leve manet | |
| 1260 quidem leve cum a loco proprio fuerit separatum, cum aptitudine | |
| 1261 tamen et inclinatione ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in | |
| 1262 suo esse cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et | |
| 1263 inclinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A2-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 2. Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p2"> | |
| 1264 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one | |
| 1265 intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an | |
| 1266 immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown above ( | |
| 1267 <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one species. | |
| 1268 Therefore there is but one intellect in all men. | |
| 1269 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31518] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 1270 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectivum principium non multiplicetur | |
| 1271 secundum multiplicationem corporum, sed sit unus intellectus in | |
| 1272 omnibus hominibus. Nulla enim substantia immaterialis multiplicatur | |
| 1273 secundum numerum in una specie. Anima autem humana est substantia | |
| 1274 immaterialis, non enim est composita ex materia et forma, ut supra | |
| 1275 ostensum est. Non ergo sunt multae in una specie. Sed omnes homines | |
| 1276 sunt unius speciei. Est ergo unus intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p3"> | |
| 1277 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the | |
| 1278 number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there | |
| 1279 would be but a single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments. | |
| 1280 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31519] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1281 remota causa, removetur effectus. Si ergo secundum multiplicationem | |
| 1282 corporum multiplicarentur animae humanae, consequens videretur | |
| 1283 quod, remotis corporibus, multitudo animarum non remaneret, sed ex | |
| 1284 omnibus animabus remaneret aliquod unum solum. Quod est haereticum, | |
| 1285 periret enim differentia praemiorum et poenarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p4"> | |
| 1286 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals | |
| 1287 are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according | |
| 1288 to the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also | |
| 1289 into yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals. | |
| 1290 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31520] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 1291 intellectus meus est alius ab intellectu tuo, intellectus meus est | |
| 1292 quoddam individuum, et similiter intellectus tuus, particularia | |
| 1293 enim sunt quae differunt numero et conveniunt in una specie. Sed | |
| 1294 omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. | |
| 1295 Ergo species rerum in intellectu meo et tuo reciperentur | |
| 1296 individualiter, quod est contra rationem intellectus, qui est | |
| 1297 cognoscitivus universalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p5"> | |
| 1298 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, | |
| 1299 what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something | |
| 1300 individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; | |
| 1301 since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is | |
| 1302 contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, | |
| 1303 therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men. | |
| 1304 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="31521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31521] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1305 intellectum est in intellectu intelligente. Si ergo intellectus | |
| 1306 meus est alius ab intellectu tuo, oportet quod aliud sit | |
| 1307 intellectum a me, et aliud sit intellectum a te. Et ita erit | |
| 1308 individualiter numeratum, et intellectum in potentia tantum, et | |
| 1309 oportebit abstrahere intentionem communem ab utroque, quia a | |
| 1310 quibuslibet diversis contingit abstrahere aliquod commune | |
| 1311 intelligibile. Quod est contra rationem intellectus, quia sic non | |
| 1312 videretur distingui intellectus a virtute imaginativa. Videtur ergo | |
| 1313 relinqui quod sit unus intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p6"> | |
| 1314 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge | |
| 1315 in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, | |
| 1316 that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is | |
| 1317 one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and | |
| 1318 master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men. | |
| 1319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="31522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31522] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, cum | |
| 1320 discipulus accipit scientiam a magistro, non potest dici quod | |
| 1321 scientia magistri generet scientiam in discipulo, quia sic etiam | |
| 1322 scientia esset forma activa, sicut calor; quod patet esse falsum. | |
| 1323 Videtur ergo quod eadem numero scientia quae est in magistro, | |
| 1324 communicetur discipulo. Quod esse non potest, nisi sit unus | |
| 1325 intellectus utriusque. Videtur ergo quod sit unus intellectus | |
| 1326 discipuli et magistri; et per consequens omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p7"> | |
| 1327 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself." | |
| 1328 But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect of all men. | |
| 1329 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 arg. 6"><a name="31523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31523] Iª q. 76 a. 2 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1330 Augustinus dicit, in libro de quantitate animae, <i>si plures | |
| 1331 tantum animas humanas dixerim, ipse me ridebo</i>. Sed maxime | |
| 1332 videtur anima esse una quantum ad intellectum. Ergo est unus | |
| 1333 intellectus omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p8"> | |
| 1334 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular | |
| 1335 causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of different species. Therefore | |
| 1336 it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals. | |
| 1337 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31524] Iª q. 76 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1338 quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod sicut se habent causae | |
| 1339 universales ad universalia, ita se habent causae particulares ad | |
| 1340 particularia. Sed impossibile est quod una anima secundum speciem, | |
| 1341 sit diversorum animalium secundum speciem. Ergo impossibile est | |
| 1342 quod anima intellectiva una numero, sit diversorum secundum | |
| 1343 numerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p9"> | |
| 1344 <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect | |
| 1345 itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by | |
| 1346 something outside the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with | |
| 1347 a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. | |
| 1348 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p10"> It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that | |
| 1349 the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct individuals | |
| 1350 to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence. | |
| 1351 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p11"> Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. | |
| 1352 For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, | |
| 1353 but several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. | |
| 1354 If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that | |
| 1355 there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many | |
| 1356 drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one | |
| 1357 action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how | |
| 1358 the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain | |
| 1359 to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several | |
| 1360 intellects and one sense---for instance, if two men had one eye---there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there | |
| 1361 is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way | |
| 1362 is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to | |
| 1363 understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further | |
| 1364 follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one | |
| 1365 act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object. | |
| 1366 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A2-p12"> However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasms---that | |
| 1367 is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you---if the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me | |
| 1368 and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers | |
| 1369 actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the | |
| 1370 phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that | |
| 1371 is a form. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; | |
| 1372 as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species | |
| 1373 of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, | |
| 1374 notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms | |
| 1375 which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, | |
| 1376 therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men. | |
| 1377 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 co."><a name="31525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31525] Iª q. 76 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1378 quod intellectum esse unum omnium hominum, omnino est impossibile. | |
| 1379 Et hoc quidem patet, si, secundum Platonis sententiam homo sit ipse | |
| 1380 intellectus. Sequeretur enim, si Socratis et Platonis est unus | |
| 1381 intellectus tantum, quod Socrates et Plato sint unus homo; et quod | |
| 1382 non distinguantur ab invicem nisi per hoc quod est extra essentiam | |
| 1383 utriusque. Et erit tunc distinctio Socratis et Platonis non alia | |
| 1384 quam hominis tunicati et cappati, quod est omnino absurdum. | |
| 1385 Similiter etiam patet hoc esse impossibile, si, secundum sententiam | |
| 1386 Aristotelis, intellectus ponatur pars, seu potentia, animae quae | |
| 1387 est hominis forma. Impossibile est enim plurium numero diversorum | |
| 1388 esse unam formam, sicut impossibile est quod eorum sit unum esse, | |
| 1389 nam forma est essendi principium. Similiter etiam patet hoc esse | |
| 1390 impossibile quocumque modo quis ponat unionem intellectus ad hunc | |
| 1391 et ad illum hominem. Manifestum est enim quod, si sit unum | |
| 1392 principale agens et duo instrumenta, dici poterit unum agens | |
| 1393 simpliciter, sed plures actiones, sicut si unus homo tangat diversa | |
| 1394 duabus manibus, erit unus tangens, sed duo tactus. Si vero e | |
| 1395 converso instrumentum sit unum et principales agentes diversi, | |
| 1396 dicentur quidem plures agentes, sed una actio, sicut si multi uno | |
| 1397 fune trahant navem, erunt multi trahentes, sed unus tractus. Si | |
| 1398 vero agens principale sit unum et instrumentum unum, dicetur unum | |
| 1399 agens et una actio, sicut cum faber uno martello percutit, est unus | |
| 1400 percutiens et una percussio. Manifestum est autem quod, | |
| 1401 qualitercumque intellectus seu uniatur seu copuletur huic vel illi | |
| 1402 homini, intellectus inter cetera quae ad hominem pertinent, | |
| 1403 principalitatem habet, obediunt enim vires sensitivae intellectui, | |
| 1404 et ei deserviunt. Si ergo poneretur quod essent plures intellectus | |
| 1405 et sensus unus duorum hominum, puta si duo homines haberent unum | |
| 1406 oculum; essent quidem plures videntes, sed una visio. Si vero | |
| 1407 intellectus est unus, quantumcumque diversificentur alia quibus | |
| 1408 omnibus intellectus utitur quasi instrumentis, nullo modo Socrates | |
| 1409 et Plato poterunt dici nisi unus intelligens. Et si addamus quod | |
| 1410 ipsum intelligere, quod est actio intellectus, non fit per aliquod | |
| 1411 aliud organum, nisi per ipsum intellectum; sequetur ulterius quod | |
| 1412 sit et agens unum et actio una; idest quod omnes homines sint unus | |
| 1413 intelligens, et unum intelligere; dico autem respectu eiusdem | |
| 1414 intelligibilis. Posset autem diversificari actio intellectualis mea | |
| 1415 et tua per diversitatem phantasmatum, quia scilicet aliud est | |
| 1416 phantasma lapidis in me et aliud in te, si ipsum phantasma, | |
| 1417 secundum quod est aliud in me et aliud in te, esset forma | |
| 1418 intellectus possibilis, quia idem agens secundum diversas formas | |
| 1419 producit diversas actiones, sicut secundum diversas formas rerum | |
| 1420 respectu eiusdem oculi sunt diversae visiones. Sed ipsum phantasma | |
| 1421 non est forma intellectus possibilis, sed species intelligibilis | |
| 1422 quae a phantasmatibus abstrahitur. In uno autem intellectu a | |
| 1423 phantasmatibus diversis eiusdem speciei non abstrahitur nisi una | |
| 1424 species intelligibilis. Sicut in uno homine apparet, in quo possunt | |
| 1425 esse diversa phantasmata lapidis, et tamen ab omnibus eis | |
| 1426 abstrahitur una species intelligibilis lapidis, per quam | |
| 1427 intellectus unius hominis operatione una intelligit naturam | |
| 1428 lapidis, non obstante diversitate phantasmatum. Si ergo unus | |
| 1429 intellectus esset omnium hominum, diversitas phantasmatum quae sunt | |
| 1430 in hoc et in illo, non posset causare diversitatem intellectualis | |
| 1431 operationis huius et illius hominis, ut Commentator fingit in III | |
| 1432 de anima. Relinquitur ergo quod omnino impossibile et inconveniens | |
| 1433 est ponere unum intellectum omnium hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p13"> | |
| 1434 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; | |
| 1435 in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while | |
| 1436 it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species. | |
| 1437 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31526] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1438 dicendum quod, licet anima intellectiva non habeat materiam ex qua | |
| 1439 sit, sicut nec Angelus, tamen est forma materiae alicuius; quod | |
| 1440 Angelo non convenit. Et ideo secundum divisionem materiae sunt | |
| 1441 multae animae unius speciei, multi autem Angeli unius speciei | |
| 1442 omnino esse non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p14"> | |
| 1443 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Everything has unity in the same way that it has being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge | |
| 1444 of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; | |
| 1445 yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. In like manner the multiplicity of souls | |
| 1446 is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of | |
| 1447 the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. | |
| 1448 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31527] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1449 dicendum quod unumquodque hoc modo habet unitatem, quo habet esse, | |
| 1450 et per consequens idem est iudicium de multiplicatione rei, et de | |
| 1451 esse ipsius. Manifestum est autem quod anima intellectualis, | |
| 1452 secundum suum esse, unitur corpori ut forma; et tamen, destructo | |
| 1453 corpore, remanet anima intellectualis in suo esse. Et eadem ratione | |
| 1454 multitudo animarum est secundum multitudinem corporum; et tamen, | |
| 1455 destructis corporibus, remanent animae in suo esse | |
| 1456 multiplicatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p15"> | |
| 1457 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; | |
| 1458 otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. | |
| 1459 But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every | |
| 1460 action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent | |
| 1461 acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower | |
| 1462 knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which | |
| 1463 come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material---that is, not abstracted from material | |
| 1464 conditions---its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication | |
| 1465 of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. | |
| 1466 But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without | |
| 1467 those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as | |
| 1468 to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily | |
| 1469 be | |
| 1470 an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species. | |
| 1471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31528] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1472 dicendum quod individuatio intelligentis, aut speciei per quam | |
| 1473 intelligit, non excludit intelligentiam universalium, alioquin, cum | |
| 1474 intellectus separati sint quaedam substantiae subsistentes, et per | |
| 1475 consequens particulares, non possent universalia intelligere. Sed | |
| 1476 materialitas cognoscentis et speciei per quam cognoscitur, | |
| 1477 universalis cognitionem impedit. Sicut enim omnis actio est | |
| 1478 secundum modum formae qua agens agit, ut calefactio secundum modum | |
| 1479 caloris; ita cognitio est secundum modum speciei qua cognoscens | |
| 1480 cognoscit. Manifestum est autem quod natura communis distinguitur | |
| 1481 et multiplicatur secundum principia individuantia, quae sunt ex | |
| 1482 parte materiae. Si ergo forma per quam fit cognitio, sit | |
| 1483 materialis, non abstracta a conditionibus materiae, erit similitudo | |
| 1484 naturae speciei aut generis, secundum quod est distincta et | |
| 1485 multiplicata per principia individuantia, et ita non poterit | |
| 1486 cognosci natura rei in sua communitate. Si vero species sit | |
| 1487 abstracta a conditionibus materiae individualis, erit similitudo | |
| 1488 naturae absque iis quae ipsam distinguunt et multiplicant, et ita | |
| 1489 cognoscetur universale. Nec refert, quantum ad hoc, utrum sit unus | |
| 1490 intellectus vel plures, quia si etiam esset unus tantum, oporteret | |
| 1491 ipsum esse aliquem quendam, et speciem per quam intelligit esse | |
| 1492 aliquam quandam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p16"> | |
| 1493 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according | |
| 1494 to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De | |
| 1495 Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect | |
| 1496 on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only | |
| 1497 intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And | |
| 1498 since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing | |
| 1499 may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according | |
| 1500 to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there is this difference, | |
| 1501 according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence---that a thing is perceived by the sense according | |
| 1502 to the disposition which it has outside the soul ---that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood | |
| 1503 is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which | |
| 1504 it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its | |
| 1505 mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in | |
| 1506 the same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter. | |
| 1507 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="31529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31529] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1508 dicendum quod, sive intellectus sit unus sive plures, id quod | |
| 1509 intelligitur est unum. Id enim quod intelligitur non est in | |
| 1510 intellectu secundum se, sed secundum suam similitudinem, <i>lapis | |
| 1511 enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis</i>, ut dicitur in III | |
| 1512 de anima. Et tamen lapis est id quod intelligitur, non autem | |
| 1513 species lapidis, nisi per reflexionem intellectus supra seipsum, | |
| 1514 alioquin scientiae non essent de rebus, sed de speciebus | |
| 1515 intelligibilibus. Contingit autem eidem rei diversa secundum | |
| 1516 diversas formas assimilari. Et quia cognitio fit secundum | |
| 1517 assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, sequitur quod idem a | |
| 1518 diversis cognoscentibus cognosci contingit, ut patet in sensu, nam | |
| 1519 plures vident eundem colorem, secundum diversas similitudines. Et | |
| 1520 similiter plures intellectus intelligunt unam rem intellectam. Sed | |
| 1521 hoc tantum interest inter sensum et intellectum, secundum | |
| 1522 sententiam Aristotelis, quod res sentitur secundum illam | |
| 1523 dispositionem quam extra animam habet, in sua particularitate, | |
| 1524 natura autem rei quae intelligitur, est quidem extra animam, sed | |
| 1525 non habet illum modum essendi extra animam, secundum quem | |
| 1526 intelligitur. Intelligitur enim natura communis seclusis principiis | |
| 1527 individuantibus; non autem hunc modum essendi habet extra animam. | |
| 1528 Sed secundum sententiam Platonis, res intellecta eo modo est extra | |
| 1529 animam quo intelligitur, posuit enim naturas rerum a materia | |
| 1530 separatas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p17"> | |
| 1531 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on ( | |
| 1532 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q117_A1" id="FP_Q76_A2-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[117], A[1]</a>). | |
| 1533 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="31530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31530] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 1534 dicendum quod scientia alia est in discipulo, et alia in magistro. | |
| 1535 Quomodo autem causetur, in sequentibus ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A2-p18"> | |
| 1536 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. | |
| 1537 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 2 ad 6"><a name="31531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31531] Iª q. 76 a. 2 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 1538 quod Augustinus intelligit animas non esse plures tantum, quin | |
| 1539 uniantur in una ratione speciei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A3-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 3. Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p2"> | |
| 1540 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such | |
| 1541 as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual | |
| 1542 soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above ( | |
| 1543 <a href="#FP_Q75_A6" id="FP_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[6]</a>). Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual | |
| 1544 soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same. | |
| 1545 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31532] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 1546 proceditur. Videtur quod praeter animam intellectivam sint in | |
| 1547 homine aliae animae per essentiam differentes, scilicet sensitiva | |
| 1548 et nutritiva. Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile non sunt unius | |
| 1549 substantiae. Sed anima intellectiva est incorruptibilis; aliae vero | |
| 1550 animae, scilicet sensitiva et nutritiva, sunt corruptibiles, ut ex | |
| 1551 superioribus patet. Ergo in homine non potest esse una essentia | |
| 1552 animae intellectivae et sensitivae et nutritivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p3"> | |
| 1553 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ | |
| 1554 generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute | |
| 1555 animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be | |
| 1556 of the same "genus." Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, | |
| 1557 therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd. | |
| 1558 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31533] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod | |
| 1559 anima sensitiva in homine est incorruptibilis, <i>contra, | |
| 1560 corruptibile et incorruptibile differunt secundum genus</i>, ut | |
| 1561 dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed anima sensitiva in equo et leone et | |
| 1562 aliis brutis animalibus est corruptibilis. Si igitur in homine sit | |
| 1563 incorruptibilis, non erit eiusdem generis anima sensitiva in homine | |
| 1564 et bruto. Animal autem dicitur ex eo quod habet animam sensitivam. | |
| 1565 Neque ergo animal erit unum genus commune hominis et aliorum | |
| 1566 animalium. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div | |
| 1567 class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p3a"><!-- Added by HST, missing | |
| 1568 in original, copied from | |
| 1569 http://www.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques76.pdf --><b>Objection 3:</b> In <i>De Generatione Animalium</i> the Philosopher claims that the embryo is an animal | |
| 1570 before being a man. But this cannot be the case if the same essence belongs to both the sentient soul and | |
| 1571 the intellective soul, since something is an animal through the sentient soul and a man through the | |
| 1572 intellective soul. Therefore, it is not the case that in a man the sentient and intellective souls have a | |
| 1573 single essence.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31534] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1574 philosophus dicit, in libro de Generat. Animal., quod embryo prius | |
| 1575 est animal quam homo. Sed hoc esse non posset, si esset eadem | |
| 1576 essentia animae sensitivae et intellectivae, est enim animal per | |
| 1577 animam sensitivam, homo vero per animam intellectivam. Non ergo in | |
| 1578 homine est una essentia animae sensitivae et intellectivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p4"><!-- labelled Objection 3 in | |
| 1579 the original --> | |
| 1580 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the | |
| 1581 form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" | |
| 1582 by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated | |
| 1583 by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is | |
| 1584 not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject. | |
| 1585 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31535] Iª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1586 philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod genus sumitur a materia, | |
| 1587 differentia vero a forma. Sed rationale, quod est differentia | |
| 1588 constitutiva hominis, sumitur ab anima intellectiva; animal vero | |
| 1589 dicitur ex hoc quod habet corpus animatum anima sensitiva. Anima | |
| 1590 ergo intellectiva comparatur ad corpus animatum anima sensitiva, | |
| 1591 sicut forma ad materiam. Non ergo anima intellectiva est eadem per | |
| 1592 essentiam cum anima sensitiva in homine; sed praesupponit eam sicut | |
| 1593 materiale suppositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p5"> | |
| 1594 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and | |
| 1595 other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, | |
| 1596 which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united | |
| 1597 to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning." | |
| 1598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31536] Iª q. 76 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1599 quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., <i>neque duas animas esse | |
| 1600 dicimus in homine uno, sicut Iacobus et alii Syrorum scribunt, unam | |
| 1601 animalem, qua animatur corpus, et immixta sit sanguini, et alteram | |
| 1602 spiritualem, quae rationi ministret, sed dicimus unam et eandem | |
| 1603 esse animam in homine, quae et corpus sua societate vivificat, et | |
| 1604 semetipsam sua ratione disponit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p6"> | |
| 1605 <b>I answer that,</b> Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different | |
| 1606 vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge | |
| 1607 in the brain. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal | |
| 1608 organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have | |
| 1609 been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if | |
| 1610 the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. | |
| 1611 But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only logically" distinct from the other | |
| 1612 parts of the soul, "or also locally." | |
| 1613 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p7"> The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, | |
| 1614 but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less | |
| 1615 if it be moved according to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it | |
| 1616 is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three | |
| 1617 different reasons. | |
| 1618 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p8"> In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one | |
| 1619 except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and | |
| 1620 therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, "a white man." If, therefore, | |
| 1621 man were 'living' by one form, the vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the sensitive soul, and | |
| 1622 "man" by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. | |
| 1623 viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal | |
| 1624 is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima | |
| 1625 i, 5), "what contains them?"---that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because | |
| 1626 rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. | |
| 1627 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p9"> Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things which are | |
| 1628 derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, | |
| 1629 as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms | |
| 1630 are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is | |
| 1631 presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) | |
| 1632 Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows either that | |
| 1633 one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered | |
| 1634 to one another---or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential | |
| 1635 predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal" is | |
| 1636 predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way | |
| 1637 about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which | |
| 1638 is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man. | |
| 1639 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p10"> Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which | |
| 1640 could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one. | |
| 1641 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A3-p11"> We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically | |
| 1642 one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species | |
| 1643 and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more | |
| 1644 perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these | |
| 1645 genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to | |
| 1646 numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls | |
| 1647 to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual | |
| 1648 soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. | |
| 1649 Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another---since | |
| 1650 a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal---so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal | |
| 1651 by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man. | |
| 1652 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 co."><a name="31537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31537] Iª q. 76 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1653 quod Plato posuit diversas animas esse in corpore uno, etiam | |
| 1654 secundum organa distinctas, quibus diversa opera vitae attribuebat; | |
| 1655 dicens vim nutritivam esse in hepate, concupiscibilem in corde, | |
| 1656 cognoscitivam in cerebro. Quam quidem opinionem Aristoteles | |
| 1657 reprobat, in libro de anima, quantum ad illas animae partes quae | |
| 1658 corporeis organis in suis operibus utuntur, ex hoc quod in | |
| 1659 animalibus quae decisa vivunt, in qualibet parte inveniuntur | |
| 1660 diversae operationes animae, sicut sensus et appetitus. Hoc autem | |
| 1661 non esset, si diversa principia operationum animae, tanquam per | |
| 1662 essentiam diversae, diversis partibus corporis distributa essent. | |
| 1663 Sed de intellectiva sub dubio videtur relinquere utrum sit separata | |
| 1664 ab aliis partibus animae solum ratione, an etiam loco. Opinio autem | |
| 1665 Platonis sustineri utique posset, si poneretur quod anima unitur | |
| 1666 corpori, non ut forma, sed ut motor, ut posuit Plato. Nihil enim | |
| 1667 inconveniens sequitur, si idem mobile a diversis motoribus | |
| 1668 moveatur, praecipue secundum diversas partes. Sed si ponamus animam | |
| 1669 corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossibile videtur plures | |
| 1670 animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. Quod quidem | |
| 1671 triplici ratione manifestari potest. Primo quidem, quia animal non | |
| 1672 esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae plures. Nihil enim est | |
| 1673 simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab | |
| 1674 eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae | |
| 1675 denominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut | |
| 1676 homo albus. Si igitur homo ab alia forma haberet quod sit vivum, | |
| 1677 scilicet ab anima vegetabili; et ab alia forma quod sit animal, | |
| 1678 scilicet ab anima sensibili; et ab alia quod sit homo, scilicet ab | |
| 1679 anima rationali; sequeretur quod homo non esset unum simpliciter, | |
| 1680 sicut et Aristoteles argumentatur contra Platonem, in VIII | |
| 1681 Metaphys., quod si alia esset idea animalis, et alia bipedis, non | |
| 1682 esset unum simpliciter animal bipes. Et propter hoc, in I de anima, | |
| 1683 contra ponentes diversas animas in corpore, inquirit quid contineat | |
| 1684 illas, idest quid faciat ex eis unum. Et non potest dici quod | |
| 1685 uniantur per corporis unitatem, quia magis anima continet corpus, | |
| 1686 et facit ipsum esse unum, quam e converso. Secundo, hoc apparet | |
| 1687 impossibile ex modo praedicationis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis | |
| 1688 formis, praedicantur ad invicem vel per accidens, si formae non | |
| 1689 sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus quod album est dulce, | |
| 1690 vel, si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se, | |
| 1691 in secundo modo dicendi per se, quia subiectum ponitur in | |
| 1692 definitione praedicati. Sicut superficies praeambula est ad | |
| 1693 colorem, si ergo dicamus quod corpus superficiatum est coloratum, | |
| 1694 erit secundus modus praedicationis per se. Si ergo alia forma sit a | |
| 1695 qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo, | |
| 1696 sequeretur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi | |
| 1697 per accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent; | |
| 1698 vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una | |
| 1699 animarum sit ad aliam praeambula. Utrumque autem horum est | |
| 1700 manifeste falsum, quia animal per se de homine praedicatur, non per | |
| 1701 accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis, sed e | |
| 1702 converso. Ergo oportet eandem formam esse per quam aliquid est | |
| 1703 animal, et per quam aliquid est homo, alioquin homo non vere esset | |
| 1704 id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur. | |
| 1705 Tertio, apparet hoc esse impossibile per hoc, quod una operatio | |
| 1706 animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam. Quod nullo modo | |
| 1707 contingeret, nisi principium actionum esset per essentiam unum. Sic | |
| 1708 ergo dicendum quod eadem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et | |
| 1709 intellectiva et nutritiva. Quomodo autem hoc contingat, de facili | |
| 1710 considerari potest, si quis differentias specierum et formarum | |
| 1711 attendat. Inveniuntur enim rerum species et formae differre ab | |
| 1712 invicem secundum perfectius et minus perfectum, sicut in rerum | |
| 1713 ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et | |
| 1714 homines animalibus brutis, et in singulis horum generum sunt gradus | |
| 1715 diversi. Et ideo Aristoteles, in VIII Metaphys., assimilat species | |
| 1716 rerum numeris, qui differunt specie secundum additionem vel | |
| 1717 subtractionem unitatis. Et in II de anima, comparat diversas animas | |
| 1718 speciebus figurarum, quarum una continet aliam; sicut pentagonum | |
| 1719 continet tetragonum, et excedit. Sic igitur anima intellectiva | |
| 1720 continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, et | |
| 1721 nutritiva plantarum. Sicut ergo superficies quae habet figuram | |
| 1722 pentagonam, non per aliam figuram est tetragona, et per aliam | |
| 1723 pentagona; quia superflueret figura tetragona, ex quo in pentagona | |
| 1724 continetur; ita nec per aliam animam Socrates est homo, et per | |
| 1725 aliam animal, sed per unam et eandem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p12"> | |
| 1726 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, | |
| 1727 therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. | |
| 1728 For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility. | |
| 1729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31538] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1730 dicendum quod anima sensitiva non habet incorruptibilitatem ex hoc | |
| 1731 quod est sensitiva, sed ex hoc quod est intellectiva, ei | |
| 1732 incorruptibilitas debetur. Quando ergo anima est sensitiva tantum, | |
| 1733 corruptibilis est, quando vero cum sensitivo intellectivum habet, | |
| 1734 est incorruptibilis. Licet enim sensitivum incorruptionem non det, | |
| 1735 tamen incorruptionem intellectivo auferre non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p13"> | |
| 1736 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals. | |
| 1737 And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference | |
| 1738 between man and the other animals. | |
| 1739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31539] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1740 dicendum quod formae non collocantur in genere vel in specie, sed | |
| 1741 composita. Homo autem corruptibilis est, sicut et alia animalia. | |
| 1742 Unde differentia secundum corruptibile et incorruptibile, quae est | |
| 1743 ex parte formarum, non facit hominem secundum genus ab aliis | |
| 1744 animalibus differre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p14"> | |
| 1745 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect | |
| 1746 soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on ( | |
| 1747 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A2" id="FP_Q76_A3-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[118], A[2]</a>, ad 2). | |
| 1748 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31540] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1749 dicendum quod prius embryo habet animam quae est sensitiva tantum; | |
| 1750 qua abiecta, advenit perfectior anima, quae est simul sensitiva et | |
| 1751 intellectiva; ut infra plenius ostendetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A3-p15"> | |
| 1752 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which | |
| 1753 flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, | |
| 1754 as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can | |
| 1755 consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something | |
| 1756 imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence | |
| 1757 the notion of the "genus"; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; | |
| 1758 thence it gathers the "difference" of man. | |
| 1759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31541] Iª q. 76 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1760 dicendum quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel | |
| 1761 intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, | |
| 1762 diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere, quia ratio unum et idem | |
| 1763 secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur, ut dictum | |
| 1764 est, anima intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet, | |
| 1765 et adhuc amplius; potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad | |
| 1766 virtutem sensitivae, quasi quoddam imperfectum et materiale. Et | |
| 1767 quia hoc invenit commune homini et aliis animalibus, ex hoc | |
| 1768 rationem generis format. Id vero in quo anima intellectiva | |
| 1769 sensitiva excedit, accipit quasi formale et completivum, et ex eo | |
| 1770 format differentiam hominis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A4-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 4. Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p2"> | |
| 1771 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), | |
| 1772 that "the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially." Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. | |
| 1773 But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the | |
| 1774 soul. | |
| 1775 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31542] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 1776 proceditur. Videtur quod in homine sit alia forma praeter animam | |
| 1777 intellectivam. Dicit enim philosophus, in II de anima, quod | |
| 1778 <i>anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis</i>. | |
| 1779 Comparatur igitur anima ad corpus, sicut forma ad materiam. Sed | |
| 1780 corpus habet aliquam formam substantialem per quam est corpus. Ergo | |
| 1781 ante animam praecedit in corpore aliqua forma substantialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p3"> | |
| 1782 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one | |
| 1783 moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore | |
| 1784 the other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only | |
| 1785 potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal | |
| 1786 there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted. | |
| 1787 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31543] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, homo | |
| 1788 et quodlibet animal est movens seipsum. Omne autem movens seipsum | |
| 1789 dividitur in duas partes, quarum una est movens, et alia est mota, | |
| 1790 ut probatur in VIII Physic. Pars autem movens est anima. Ergo | |
| 1791 oportet quod alia pars sit talis quae possit esse mota. Sed materia | |
| 1792 prima non potest moveri, ut dicitur in V Physic., cum sit ens solum | |
| 1793 in potentia, quinimmo omne quod movetur est corpus. Ergo oportet | |
| 1794 quod in homine et in quolibet animali sit alia forma substantialis, | |
| 1795 per quam constituatur corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p4"> | |
| 1796 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to | |
| 1797 some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were | |
| 1798 to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter | |
| 1799 immediately. | |
| 1800 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31544] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ordo | |
| 1801 in formis attenditur secundum habitudinem ad materiam primam, prius | |
| 1802 enim et posterius dicitur per comparationem ad aliquod principium. | |
| 1803 Si ergo non esset in homine alia forma substantialis praeter animam | |
| 1804 rationalem, sed immediate materiae primae inhaereret; sequeretur | |
| 1805 quod esset in ordine imperfectissimarum formarum, quae immediate | |
| 1806 inhaerent materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p5"> | |
| 1807 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. | |
| 1808 Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body | |
| 1809 there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul. | |
| 1810 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31545] Iª q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1811 corpus humanum est corpus mixtum. Mixtio autem non fit secundum | |
| 1812 materiam tantum, quia tunc esset corruptio sola. Oportet ergo quod | |
| 1813 remaneant formae elementorum in corpore mixto, quae sunt formae | |
| 1814 substantiales. Ergo in corpore humano sunt aliae formae | |
| 1815 substantiales praeter animam intellectivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p6"> | |
| 1816 <b>On the contrary,</b> Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing | |
| 1817 there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be | |
| 1818 in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul. | |
| 1819 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31546] Iª q. 76 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, unius | |
| 1820 rei est unum esse substantiale. Sed forma substantialis dat esse | |
| 1821 substantiale. Ergo unius rei est una tantum forma substantialis. | |
| 1822 Anima autem est forma substantialis hominis. Ergo impossibile est | |
| 1823 quod in homine sit aliqua alia forma substantialis quam anima | |
| 1824 intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p7"> | |
| 1825 <b>I answer that,</b> If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists | |
| 1826 maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its | |
| 1827 being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have | |
| 1828 said above | |
| 1829 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for another substantial form | |
| 1830 besides the intellectual soul to be found in man. | |
| 1831 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p8"> In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that | |
| 1832 the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but | |
| 1833 only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to | |
| 1834 be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing | |
| 1835 is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming | |
| 1836 a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, | |
| 1837 who held that primary matter was some actual being---for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort---maintained that | |
| 1838 nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we | |
| 1839 read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which | |
| 1840 the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently | |
| 1841 that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal | |
| 1842 simple corruption, all of which is clearly false. | |
| 1843 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p9"> Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, | |
| 1844 as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone | |
| 1845 does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of | |
| 1846 the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect. | |
| 1847 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 co."><a name="31547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31547] Iª q. 76 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1848 quod, si poneretur anima intellectiva non uniri corpori ut forma, | |
| 1849 sed solum ut motor, ut Platonici posuerunt; necesse esset dicere | |
| 1850 quod in homine esset alia forma substantialis, per quam corpus ab | |
| 1851 anima mobile in suo esse constitueretur. Sed si anima intellectiva | |
| 1852 unitur corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut supra iam diximus, | |
| 1853 impossibile est quod aliqua alia forma substantialis praeter eam | |
| 1854 inveniatur in homine. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod | |
| 1855 forma substantialis in hoc a forma accidentali differt quia forma | |
| 1856 accidentalis non dat esse simpliciter, sed esse tale, sicut calor | |
| 1857 facit suum subiectum non simpliciter esse, sed esse calidum. Et | |
| 1858 ideo cum advenit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid fieri vel | |
| 1859 generari simpliciter, sed fieri tale aut aliquo modo se habens, et | |
| 1860 similiter cum recedit forma accidentalis, non dicitur aliquid | |
| 1861 corrumpi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Forma autem substantialis | |
| 1862 dat esse simpliciter, et ideo per eius adventum dicitur aliquid | |
| 1863 simpliciter generari, et per eius recessum simpliciter corrumpi. Et | |
| 1864 propter hoc antiqui naturales, qui posuerunt materiam primam esse | |
| 1865 aliquod ens actu, puta ignem aut aerem aut aliquid huiusmodi, | |
| 1866 dixerunt quod nihil generatur aut corrumpitur simpliciter, sed omne | |
| 1867 fieri statuerunt alterari, ut dicitur in I Physic. Si igitur ita | |
| 1868 esset, quod praeter animam intellectivam praeexisteret quaecumque | |
| 1869 alia forma substantialis in materia, per quam subiectum animae | |
| 1870 esset ens actu; sequeretur quod anima non daret esse simpliciter; | |
| 1871 et per consequens quod non esset forma substantialis; et quod per | |
| 1872 adventum animae non esset generatio simpliciter, neque per eius | |
| 1873 abscessum corruptio simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid. Quae sunt | |
| 1874 manifeste falsa. Unde dicendum est quod nulla alia forma | |
| 1875 substantialis est in homine, nisi sola anima intellectiva; et quod | |
| 1876 ipsa, sicut virtute continet animam sensitivam et nutritivam, ita | |
| 1877 virtute continet omnes inferiores formas, et facit ipsa sola | |
| 1878 quidquid imperfectiores formae in aliis faciunt. Et similiter est | |
| 1879 dicendum de anima sensitiva in brutis, et de nutritiva in plantis, | |
| 1880 et universaliter de omnibus formis perfectioribus respectu | |
| 1881 imperfectiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p10"> | |
| 1882 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially"; | |
| 1883 and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul." Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself | |
| 1884 is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light | |
| 1885 were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the | |
| 1886 light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, | |
| 1887 and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such | |
| 1888 a potentiality "does not reject"---that is, does not exclude---the soul. | |
| 1889 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31548] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1890 dicendum quod Aristoteles non dicit animam esse actum corporis | |
| 1891 tantum, sed actum corporis physici organici potentia vitam | |
| 1892 habentis, et quod talis potentia non abiicit animam. Unde | |
| 1893 manifestum est quod in eo cuius anima dicitur actus, etiam anima | |
| 1894 includitur; eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod calor est actus | |
| 1895 calidi, et lumen est actus lucidi; non quod seorsum sit lucidum | |
| 1896 sine luce, sed quia est lucidum per lucem. Et similiter dicitur | |
| 1897 quod anima est actus corporis etc., quia per animam et est corpus, | |
| 1898 et est organicum, et est potentia vitam habens. Sed actus primus | |
| 1899 dicitur in potentia respectu actus secundi, qui est operatio. Talis | |
| 1900 enim potentia est non abiiciens, idest non excludens, animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p11"> | |
| 1901 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes | |
| 1902 the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate | |
| 1903 body is the part moved. | |
| 1904 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31549] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1905 dicendum quod anima non movet corpus per esse suum, secundum quod | |
| 1906 unitur corpori ut forma; sed per potentiam motivam, cuius actus | |
| 1907 praesupponit iam corpus effectum in actu per animam; ut sic anima | |
| 1908 secundum vim motivam sit pars movens, et corpus animatum sit pars | |
| 1909 mota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A4-p12"> | |
| 1910 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is | |
| 1911 always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while | |
| 1912 that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately. | |
| 1913 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31550] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1914 dicendum quod in materia considerantur diversi gradus perfectionis, | |
| 1915 sicut esse, vivere sentire et intelligere. Semper autem secundum | |
| 1916 superveniens priori, perfectius est. Forma ergo quae dat solum | |
| 1917 primum gradum perfectionis materiae, est imperfectissima, sed forma | |
| 1918 quae dat primum et secundum, et tertium, et sic deinceps, est | |
| 1919 perfectissima; et tamen materiae immediata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p13"> | |
| 1920 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by | |
| 1921 the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the | |
| 1922 elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without | |
| 1923 which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found | |
| 1924 except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would | |
| 1925 be distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture | |
| 1926 apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles. | |
| 1927 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p14"> Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial | |
| 1928 forms, and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one | |
| 1929 form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of each thing consists in something | |
| 1930 indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. | |
| 1931 viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less | |
| 1932 impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident. | |
| 1933 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A4-p15"> Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the | |
| 1934 mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the | |
| 1935 power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed | |
| 1936 body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul. | |
| 1937 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31551] Iª q. 76 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1938 dicendum quod Avicenna posuit formas substantiales elementorum | |
| 1939 integras remanere in mixto, mixtionem autem fieri secundum quod | |
| 1940 contrariae qualitates elementorum reducuntur ad medium. Sed hoc est | |
| 1941 impossibile. Quia diversae formae elementorum non possunt esse nisi | |
| 1942 in diversis partibus materiae; ad quarum diversitatem oportet | |
| 1943 intelligi dimensiones, sine quibus materia divisibilis esse non | |
| 1944 potest. Materia autem dimensioni subiecta non invenitur nisi in | |
| 1945 corpore. Diversa autem corpora non possunt esse in eodem loco. Unde | |
| 1946 sequitur quod elementa sint in mixto distincta secundum situm. Et | |
| 1947 ita non erit vera mixtio, quae est secundum totum, sed mixtio ad | |
| 1948 sensum, quae est secundum minima iuxta se posita. Averroes autem | |
| 1949 posuit, in III de caelo, quod formae elementorum, propter sui | |
| 1950 imperfectionem, sunt mediae inter formas accidentales et | |
| 1951 substantiales; et ideo recipiunt magis et minus; et ideo | |
| 1952 remittuntur in mixtione et ad medium reducuntur, et conflatur ex | |
| 1953 eis una forma. Sed hoc est etiam magis impossibile. Nam esse | |
| 1954 substantiale cuiuslibet rei in indivisibili consistit; et omnis | |
| 1955 additio et subtractio variat speciem, sicut in numeris, ut dicitur | |
| 1956 in VIII Metaphys. Unde impossibile est quod forma substantialis | |
| 1957 quaecumque recipiat magis et minus. Nec minus est impossibile | |
| 1958 aliquid esse medium inter substantiam et accidens. Et ideo dicendum | |
| 1959 est, secundum philosophum in I de Generat., quod formae elementorum | |
| 1960 manent in mixto non actu, sed virtute. Manent enim qualitates | |
| 1961 propriae elementorum, licet remissae, in quibus est virtus formarum | |
| 1962 elementarium. Et huiusmodi qualitas mixtionis est propria | |
| 1963 dispositio ad formam substantialem corporis mixti, puta formam | |
| 1964 lapidis, vel animae cuiuscumque.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A5-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 5. Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p2"> | |
| 1965 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. | |
| 1966 But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body. | |
| 1967 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31552] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 1968 proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva inconvenienter tali | |
| 1969 corpori uniatur. Materia enim debet esse proportionata formae. Sed | |
| 1970 anima intellectiva est forma incorruptibilis. Non ergo convenienter | |
| 1971 unitur corpori corruptibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p3"> | |
| 1972 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter | |
| 1973 does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most | |
| 1974 subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body. | |
| 1975 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31553] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 1976 intellectiva est forma maxime immaterialis, cuius signum est, quod | |
| 1977 habet operationem in qua non communicat materia corporalis. Sed | |
| 1978 quanto corpus est subtilius, tanto minus habet de materia. Ergo | |
| 1979 anima deberet subtilissimo corpori uniri, puta igni; et non corpori | |
| 1980 mixto, et terrestri magis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p4"> | |
| 1981 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual | |
| 1982 soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species. | |
| 1983 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31554] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum | |
| 1984 forma sit principium speciei, ab una forma non proveniunt diversae | |
| 1985 species. Sed anima intellectiva est una forma. Ergo non debet uniri | |
| 1986 corpori quod componitur ex partibus dissimilium specierum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p5"> | |
| 1987 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most | |
| 1988 perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair | |
| 1989 instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; | |
| 1990 it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect | |
| 1991 as being deprived of the above means of protection. | |
| 1992 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="31555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31555] Iª q. 76 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1993 perfectioris formae debet esse perfectius susceptibile. Sed anima | |
| 1994 intellectiva est perfectissima animarum. Cum igitur aliorum | |
| 1995 animalium corpora habeant naturaliter insita tegumenta, puta | |
| 1996 pilorum loco vestium, et unguium loco calceamentorum; habeant etiam | |
| 1997 arma naturaliter sibi data, sicut ungues, dentes et cornua, ergo | |
| 1998 videtur quod anima intellectiva non debuerit uniri corpori | |
| 1999 imperfecto tanquam talibus auxiliis privato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p6"> | |
| 2000 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially." | |
| 2001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31556] Iª q. 76 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2002 quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, quod <i>anima est actus | |
| 2003 corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p7"> | |
| 2004 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the | |
| 2005 matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above ( | |
| 2006 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q76_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with | |
| 2007 the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from | |
| 2008 individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore | |
| 2009 the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now | |
| 2010 the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be | |
| 2011 united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense. | |
| 2012 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p8"> Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, | |
| 2013 such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality | |
| 2014 with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, | |
| 2015 the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its | |
| 2016 completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. | |
| 2017 Nom. v). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most | |
| 2018 equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best | |
| 2019 sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed | |
| 2020 in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9. | |
| 2021 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 co."><a name="31557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31557] Iª q. 76 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2022 quod, cum forma non sit propter materiam, sed potius materia | |
| 2023 propter formam; ex forma oportet rationem accipere quare materia | |
| 2024 sit talis, et non e converso. Anima autem intellectiva, sicut supra | |
| 2025 habitum est, secundum naturae ordinem, infimum gradum in | |
| 2026 substantiis intellectualibus tenet; intantum quod non habet | |
| 2027 naturaliter sibi inditam notitiam veritatis, sicut Angeli, sed | |
| 2028 oportet quod eam colligat ex rebus divisibilibus per viam sensus, | |
| 2029 ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Natura autem nulli deest | |
| 2030 in necessariis, unde oportuit quod anima intellectiva non solum | |
| 2031 haberet virtutem intelligendi, sed etiam virtutem sentiendi. Actio | |
| 2032 autem sensus non fit sine corporeo instrumento. Oportuit igitur | |
| 2033 animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, quod possit esse | |
| 2034 conveniens organum sensus. Omnes autem alii sensus fundantur supra | |
| 2035 tactum. Ad organum autem tactus requiritur quod sit medium inter | |
| 2036 contraria, quae sunt calidum et frigidum, humidum et siccum, et | |
| 2037 similia, quorum est tactus apprehensivus, sic enim est in potentia | |
| 2038 ad contraria, et potest ea sentire. Unde quanto organum tactus | |
| 2039 fuerit magis reductum ad aequalitatem complexionis, tanto | |
| 2040 perceptibilior erit tactus. Anima autem intellectiva habet | |
| 2041 completissime virtutem sensitivam, quia quod est inferioris | |
| 2042 praeexistit perfectius in superiori ut dicit Dionysius in libro de | |
| 2043 Div. Nom. Unde oportuit corpus cui unitur anima intellectiva, esse | |
| 2044 corpus mixtum, inter omnia alia magis reductum ad aequalitatem | |
| 2045 complexionis. Et propter hoc homo inter omnia animalia melioris est | |
| 2046 tactus. Et inter ipsos homines, qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt | |
| 2047 melioris intellectus. Cuius signum est, quod molles carne bene | |
| 2048 aptos mente videmus, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p9"> | |
| 2049 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does | |
| 2050 not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise | |
| 2051 its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil. | |
| 2052 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A5-p10"> Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that | |
| 2053 the matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, | |
| 2054 for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt | |
| 2055 and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable | |
| 2056 complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer | |
| 2057 that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, | |
| 2058 as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift | |
| 2059 of grace. | |
| 2060 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31558] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2061 dicendum quod hanc obiectionem aliquis forte vellet evadere per | |
| 2062 hoc, quod diceret corpus hominis ante peccatum incorruptibile | |
| 2063 fuisse. Sed haec responsio non videtur sufficiens, quia corpus | |
| 2064 hominis ante peccatum immortale fuit non per naturam, sed per | |
| 2065 gratiae divinae donum; alioquin immortalitas eius per peccatum | |
| 2066 sublata non esset, sicut nec immortalitas Daemonis. Et ideo aliter | |
| 2067 dicendum est, quod in materia duplex conditio invenitur, una quae | |
| 2068 eligitur ad hoc quod sit conveniens formae; alia quae ex | |
| 2069 necessitate consequitur prioris dispositionis. Sicut artifex ad | |
| 2070 formam serrae eligit materiam ferream, aptam ad secandum dura; sed | |
| 2071 quod dentes serrae hebetari possint et rubiginem contrahere, | |
| 2072 sequitur ex necessitate materiae. Sic igitur et animae | |
| 2073 intellectivae debetur corpus quod sit aequalis complexionis, ex hoc | |
| 2074 autem de necessitate materiae sequitur quod sit corruptibile. Si | |
| 2075 quis vero dicat quod Deus potuit hanc necessitatem vitare, dicendum | |
| 2076 est quod in constitutione rerum naturalium non consideratur quid | |
| 2077 Deus facere possit, sed quid naturae rerum conveniat, ut Augustinus | |
| 2078 dicit, II super Gen. ad Litt. Providit tamen Deus adhibendo | |
| 2079 remedium contra mortem per gratiae donum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p11"> | |
| 2080 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account | |
| 2081 of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to | |
| 2082 such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not | |
| 2083 be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a | |
| 2084 dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body. | |
| 2085 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31559] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2086 dicendum quod animae intellectivae non debetur corpus propter ipsam | |
| 2087 intellectualem operationem secundum se; sed propter sensitivam | |
| 2088 virtutem, quae requirit organum aequaliter complexionatum. Et ideo | |
| 2089 oportuit animam intellectivam tali corpori uniri, et non simplici | |
| 2090 elemento, vel corpori mixto in quo excederet ignis secundum | |
| 2091 quantitatem, quia non posset esse aequalitas complexionis, propter | |
| 2092 excedentem ignis activam virtutem. Habet autem hoc corpus | |
| 2093 aequaliter complexionatum quandam dignitatem, per hoc quod est | |
| 2094 remotum a contrariis; in quo quodammodo assimilatur corpori | |
| 2095 caelesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p12"> | |
| 2096 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole | |
| 2097 does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions. | |
| 2098 This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is | |
| 2099 manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires | |
| 2100 various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety | |
| 2101 of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants. | |
| 2102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31560] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2103 dicendum quod partes animalis, ut oculus, manus, caro et os, et | |
| 2104 huiusmodi, non sunt in specie, sed totum, et ideo non potest dici, | |
| 2105 proprie loquendo, quod sint diversarum specierum, sed quod sint | |
| 2106 diversarum dispositionum. Et hoc competit animae intellectivae, | |
| 2107 quae quamvis sit una secundum essentiam, tamen propter sui | |
| 2108 perfectionem est multiplex in virtute; et ideo, ad diversas | |
| 2109 operationes, indiget diversis dispositionibus in partibus corporis | |
| 2110 cui unitur. Et propter hoc videmus quod maior est diversitas | |
| 2111 partium in animalibus perfectis quam in imperfectis, et in his quam | |
| 2112 in plantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A5-p13"> | |
| 2113 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited | |
| 2114 by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case | |
| 2115 with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead | |
| 2116 of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of | |
| 2117 organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number | |
| 2118 of purposes. | |
| 2119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="31561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31561] Iª q. 76 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 2120 dicendum quod anima intellectiva, quia est universalium | |
| 2121 comprehensiva, habet virtutem ad infinita. Et ideo non potuerunt | |
| 2122 sibi determinari a natura vel determinatae existimationes | |
| 2123 naturales, vel etiam determinata auxilia vel defensionum vel | |
| 2124 tegumentorum; sicut aliis animalibus, quorum animae habent | |
| 2125 apprehensionem et virtutem ad aliqua particularia determinata. Sed | |
| 2126 loco horum omnium, homo habet naturaliter rationem, et manus, quae | |
| 2127 sunt organa organorum, quia per eas homo potest sibi praeparare | |
| 2128 instrumenta infinitorum modorum, et ad infinitos effectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A6-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 6. Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p2"> | |
| 2129 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form | |
| 2130 exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to | |
| 2131 be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form. | |
| 2132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31562] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 2133 proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva uniatur corpori | |
| 2134 mediantibus aliquibus dispositionibus accidentalibus. Omnis enim | |
| 2135 forma est in materia sibi propria et disposita. Sed dispositiones | |
| 2136 ad formam sunt accidentia quaedam. Ergo oportet praeintelligi | |
| 2137 accidentia aliqua in materia ante formam substantialem, et ita ante | |
| 2138 animam, cum anima sit quaedam substantialis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p3"> | |
| 2139 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without | |
| 2140 division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are | |
| 2141 many belonging to one species. | |
| 2142 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31563] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2143 diversae formae unius speciei requirunt diversas materiae partes. | |
| 2144 Partes autem materiae diversae non possunt intelligi nisi secundum | |
| 2145 divisionem dimensivarum quantitatum. Ergo oportet intelligere | |
| 2146 dimensiones in materia ante formas substantiales, quae sunt multae | |
| 2147 unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p4"> | |
| 2148 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. | |
| 2149 Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. | |
| 2150 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31564] Iª q. 76 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2151 spirituale applicatur corporali per contactum virtutis. Virtus | |
| 2152 autem animae est eius potentia. Ergo videtur quod anima unitur | |
| 2153 corpori mediante potentia, quae est quoddam accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p5"> | |
| 2154 <b>On the contrary,</b> Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. | |
| 2155 vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial | |
| 2156 form. | |
| 2157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31565] Iª q. 76 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2158 quod accidens est posterius substantia et tempore et ratione, ut | |
| 2159 dicitur in VII Metaphys. Non ergo forma accidentalis aliqua potest | |
| 2160 intelligi in materia ante animam, quae est forma substantialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A6-p6"> | |
| 2161 <b>I answer that,</b> If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions | |
| 2162 mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required | |
| 2163 the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul. | |
| 2164 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A6-p7"> If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above | |
| 2165 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever | |
| 2166 and its matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely | |
| 2167 first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first | |
| 2168 among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before | |
| 2169 it is actual. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said | |
| 2170 above | |
| 2171 <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q76_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently | |
| 2172 before the soul. | |
| 2173 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 co."><a name="31566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31566] Iª q. 76 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2174 quod, si anima uniretur corpori solum ut motor, nihil prohiberet, | |
| 2175 immo magis necessarium esset esse aliquas dispositiones medias | |
| 2176 inter animam et corpus, potentiam scilicet ex parte animae, per | |
| 2177 quam moveret corpus; et aliquam habilitatem ex parte corporis, per | |
| 2178 quam corpus esset ab anima mobile. Sed si anima intellectiva unitur | |
| 2179 corpori ut forma substantialis, sicut iam supra dictum est, | |
| 2180 impossibile est quod aliqua dispositio accidentalis cadat media | |
| 2181 inter corpus et animam, vel inter quamcumque formam substantialem | |
| 2182 et materiam suam. Et huius ratio est quia, cum materia sit in | |
| 2183 potentia ad omnes actus ordine quodam, oportet quod id quod est | |
| 2184 primum simpliciter in actibus, primo in materia intelligatur. | |
| 2185 Primum autem inter omnes actus est esse. Impossibile est ergo | |
| 2186 intelligere materiam prius esse calidam vel quantam, quam esse in | |
| 2187 actu. Esse autem in actu habet per formam substantialem, quae facit | |
| 2188 esse simpliciter, ut iam dictum est. Unde impossibile est quod | |
| 2189 quaecumque dispositiones accidentales praeexistant in materia ante | |
| 2190 formam substantialem; et per consequens neque ante animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p8"> | |
| 2191 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As appears from what has been already said | |
| 2192 <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q76_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, | |
| 2193 it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, | |
| 2194 a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore | |
| 2195 as | |
| 2196 matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which | |
| 2197 belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, | |
| 2198 not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect. | |
| 2199 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31567] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2200 dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, forma perfectior virtute | |
| 2201 continet quidquid est inferiorum formarum. Et ideo una et eadem | |
| 2202 existens, perficit materiam secundum diversos perfectionis gradus. | |
| 2203 Una enim et eadem forma est per essentiam, per quam homo est ens | |
| 2204 actu, et per quam est corpus, et per quam est vivum, et per quam | |
| 2205 est animal, et per quam est homo. Manifestum est autem quod | |
| 2206 unumquodque genus consequuntur propria accidentia. Sicut ergo | |
| 2207 materia praeintelligitur perfecta secundum esse ante intellectum | |
| 2208 corporeitatis, et sic de aliis; ita praeintelliguntur accidentia | |
| 2209 quae sunt propria entis, ante corporeitatem. Et sic | |
| 2210 praeintelliguntur dispositiones in materia ante formam, non quantum | |
| 2211 ad omnem eius effectum, sed quantum ad posteriorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p9"> | |
| 2212 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once | |
| 2213 understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different | |
| 2214 forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the | |
| 2215 various degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as | |
| 2216 different when brought under the observation of reason. | |
| 2217 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31568] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2218 dicendum quod dimensiones quantitativae sunt accidentia | |
| 2219 consequentia corporeitatem, quae toti materiae convenit. Unde | |
| 2220 materia iam intellecta sub corporeitate et dimensionibus, potest | |
| 2221 intelligi ut distincta in diversas partes, ut sic accipiat diversas | |
| 2222 formas secundum ulteriores perfectionis gradus. Quamvis enim eadem | |
| 2223 forma sit secundum essentiam quae diversos perfectionis gradus | |
| 2224 materiae attribuit, ut dictum est; tamen secundum considerationem | |
| 2225 rationis differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A6-p10"> | |
| 2226 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual | |
| 2227 soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue. | |
| 2228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31569] Iª q. 76 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2229 dicendum quod substantia spiritualis quae unitur corpori solum ut | |
| 2230 motor, unitur ei per potentiam vel virtutem. Sed anima intellectiva | |
| 2231 corpori unitur ut forma per suum esse. Administrat tamen ipsum et | |
| 2232 movet per suam potentiam et virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A7-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 7. Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p2"> | |
| 2233 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the | |
| 2234 soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are | |
| 2235 bodies. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body. | |
| 2236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31570] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 2237 proceditur. Videtur quod anima uniatur corpori animalis mediante | |
| 2238 aliquo corpore. Dicit enim Augustinus, VII super Gen. ad Litt., | |
| 2239 quod anima per lucem, idest ignem, et aerem, <i>quae sunt similiora | |
| 2240 spiritui, corpus administrat</i>. Ignis autem et aer sunt corpora. | |
| 2241 Ergo anima unitur corpori humano mediante aliquo corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p3"> | |
| 2242 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But | |
| 2243 when breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of | |
| 2244 union between soul and body. | |
| 2245 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31571] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 2246 quo subtracto solvitur unio aliquorum unitorum, videtur esse medium | |
| 2247 inter ea. Sed deficiente spiritu, anima a corpore separatur. Ergo | |
| 2248 spiritus, qui est quoddam corpus subtile, medium est in unione | |
| 2249 corporis et animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p4"> | |
| 2250 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual | |
| 2251 soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to | |
| 2252 be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the | |
| 2253 elements, and unite them together. | |
| 2254 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31572] Iª q. 76 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea | |
| 2255 quae sunt multum distantia, non uniuntur nisi per medium. Sed anima | |
| 2256 intellectiva distat a corpore et quia est incorporea, et quia est | |
| 2257 incorruptibilis. Ergo videtur quod uniatur ei mediante aliquo quod | |
| 2258 sit corpus incorruptibile. Et hoc videtur esse aliqua lux | |
| 2259 caelestis, quae conciliat elementa et redigit in unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p5"> | |
| 2260 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its | |
| 2261 shape are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the | |
| 2262 body. | |
| 2263 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31573] Iª q. 76 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2264 quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod <i>non oportet | |
| 2265 quaerere si unum est anima et corpus, sicut neque ceram et | |
| 2266 figuram</i>. Sed figura unitur cerae nullo corpore mediante. Ergo | |
| 2267 et anima corpori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p6"> | |
| 2268 <b>I answer that,</b> If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other | |
| 2269 bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant | |
| 2270 from it by means of something nearer. | |
| 2271 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p7"> If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said | |
| 2272 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q76_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it | |
| 2273 is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give | |
| 2274 existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form | |
| 2275 itself, | |
| 2276 which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent, | |
| 2277 which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). | |
| 2278 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A7-p8"> From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the | |
| 2279 soul and body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united | |
| 2280 to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others said that | |
| 2281 the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of | |
| 2282 light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the | |
| 2283 body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the | |
| 2284 intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictious and ridiculous: for light is not | |
| 2285 a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but | |
| 2286 only | |
| 2287 virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter. | |
| 2288 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 co."><a name="31574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31574] Iª q. 76 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2289 quod si anima, secundum Platonicos, corpori uniretur solum ut | |
| 2290 motor, conveniens esset dicere quod inter animam hominis, vel | |
| 2291 cuiuscumque animalis, et corpus aliqua alia corpora media | |
| 2292 intervenirent, convenit enim motori aliquid distans per media magis | |
| 2293 propinqua movere. Si vero anima unitur corpori ut forma, sicut iam | |
| 2294 dictum est, impossibile est quod uniatur ei aliquo corpore | |
| 2295 mediante. Cuius ratio est, quia sic dicitur aliquid unum, quomodo | |
| 2296 et ens. Forma autem per seipsam facit rem esse in actu, cum per | |
| 2297 essentiam suam sit actus; nec dat esse per aliquod medium. Unde | |
| 2298 unitas rei compositae ex materia et forma est per ipsam formam, | |
| 2299 quae secundum seipsam unitur materiae ut actus eius. Nec est | |
| 2300 aliquid aliud uniens nisi agens, quod facit materiam esse in actu, | |
| 2301 ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Unde patet esse falsas opiniones eorum | |
| 2302 qui posuerunt aliqua corpora esse media inter animam et corpus | |
| 2303 hominis. Quorum quidam Platonici dixerunt quod anima intellectiva | |
| 2304 habet corpus incorruptibile sibi naturaliter unitum, a quo nunquam | |
| 2305 separatur, et eo mediante unitur corpori hominis corruptibili. | |
| 2306 Quidam vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante spiritu corporeo. | |
| 2307 Alii vero dixerunt quod unitur corpori mediante luce, quam dicunt | |
| 2308 esse corpus, et de natura quintae essentiae, ita quod anima | |
| 2309 vegetabilis unitur corpori mediante luce caeli siderei; anima vero | |
| 2310 sensibilis, mediante luce caeli crystallini; anima vero | |
| 2311 intellectualis, mediante luce caeli Empyrei. Quod fictitium et | |
| 2312 derisibile apparet, tum quia lux non est corpus; tum quia quinta | |
| 2313 essentia non venit materialiter in compositionem corporis mixti, | |
| 2314 cum sit inalterabilis, sed virtualiter tantum; tum etiam quia anima | |
| 2315 immediate corpori unitur ut forma materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p9"> | |
| 2316 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it moves | |
| 2317 the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, | |
| 2318 as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x). | |
| 2319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31575] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2320 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de anima inquantum movet corpus, | |
| 2321 unde utitur verbo administrationis. Et verum est quod partes | |
| 2322 grossiores corporis per subtiliores movet. Et primum instrumentum | |
| 2323 virtutis motivae est spiritus, ut dicit philosophus in libro de | |
| 2324 causa motus animalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p10"> | |
| 2325 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the | |
| 2326 removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, | |
| 2327 as the first instrument of motion. | |
| 2328 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31576] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2329 dicendum quod, subtracto spiritu, deficit unio animae ad corpus, | |
| 2330 non quia sit medium; sed quia tollitur dispositio per quam corpus | |
| 2331 est dispositum ad talem unionem. Est tamen spiritus medium in | |
| 2332 movendo, sicut primum instrumentum motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A7-p11"> | |
| 2333 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate | |
| 2334 existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not | |
| 2335 an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. This is the | |
| 2336 case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, | |
| 2337 which is a being only in potentiality. | |
| 2338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31577] Iª q. 76 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2339 dicendum quod anima distat quidem a corpore plurimum, si utriusque | |
| 2340 conditiones seorsum considerentur, unde si utrumque ipsorum | |
| 2341 separatim esse haberet, oporteret quod multa media intervenirent. | |
| 2342 Sed inquantum anima est forma corporis, non habet esse seorsum ab | |
| 2343 esse corporis; sed per suum esse corpori unitur immediate. Sic enim | |
| 2344 et quaelibet forma, si consideretur ut actus, habet magnam | |
| 2345 distantiam a materia, quae est ens in potentia tantum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q76_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q76_A8-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 8. Whether the soul is in each part of the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p2"> | |
| 2346 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De | |
| 2347 mot. animal. x): "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle | |
| 2348 of the body causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own." | |
| 2349 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31578] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 2350 proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit tota in qualibet parte | |
| 2351 corporis. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de causa motus | |
| 2352 animalium, <i>non opus est in unaquaque corporis parte esse animam; | |
| 2353 sed in quodam principio corporis existente, alia vivere; eo quod | |
| 2354 simul nata sunt facere proprium motum per naturam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p3"> | |
| 2355 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in | |
| 2356 an organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part. | |
| 2357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31579] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 2358 est in corpore cuius est actus. Sed est actus corporis organici. | |
| 2359 Ergo non est nisi in corpore organico. Sed non quaelibet pars | |
| 2360 corporis hominis est corpus organicum. Ergo anima non est in | |
| 2361 qualibet parte corporis tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p4"> | |
| 2362 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the | |
| 2363 sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the | |
| 2364 whole soul is in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal. | |
| 2365 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31580] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in II | |
| 2366 de anima dicitur quod sicut se habet pars animae ad partem | |
| 2367 corporis, ut visus ad pupillam, ita anima tota ad totum corpus | |
| 2368 animalis. Si igitur tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis, | |
| 2369 sequitur quod quaelibet pars corporis sit animal.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p5"> | |
| 2370 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part | |
| 2371 of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and | |
| 2372 hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. | |
| 2373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="31581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31581] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omnes | |
| 2374 potentiae animae in ipsa essentia animae fundantur. Si igitur anima | |
| 2375 tota est in qualibet parte corporis, sequitur quod omnes potentiae | |
| 2376 animae sint in qualibet corporis parte, et ita visus erit in aure, | |
| 2377 et auditus in oculo. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p6"> | |
| 2378 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus | |
| 2379 one part would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul | |
| 2380 is not in each part of the body. | |
| 2381 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="31582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31582] Iª q. 76 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si in | |
| 2382 qualibet parte corporis esset tota anima, quaelibet pars corporis | |
| 2383 immediate dependeret ab anima. Non ergo una pars dependeret ab | |
| 2384 alia, nec una pars esset principalior quam alia, quod est manifeste | |
| 2385 falsum. Non ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p7"> | |
| 2386 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire." | |
| 2387 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31583] Iª q. 76 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2388 quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod <i>anima in quocumque | |
| 2389 corpore et in toto est tota, et in qualibet eius parte tota | |
| 2390 est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p8"> | |
| 2391 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said, if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the | |
| 2392 body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it | |
| 2393 must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form | |
| 2394 of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the | |
| 2395 whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the | |
| 2396 body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul | |
| 2397 is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, | |
| 2398 on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal | |
| 2399 or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof | |
| 2400 of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains | |
| 2401 its species, retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole | |
| 2402 body, and in each part thereof. | |
| 2403 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p9"> That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, | |
| 2404 there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided into parts | |
| 2405 of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as | |
| 2406 a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, | |
| 2407 further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to | |
| 2408 forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative | |
| 2409 whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface and | |
| 2410 in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form | |
| 2411 which | |
| 2412 requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole | |
| 2413 and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be | |
| 2414 attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and | |
| 2415 essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the | |
| 2416 principle of operation. | |
| 2417 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p10"> Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to | |
| 2418 distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part | |
| 2419 of the surface. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight | |
| 2420 more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, | |
| 2421 then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface. | |
| 2422 </p><p id="FP_Q76_A8-p11"> Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough | |
| 2423 to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. | |
| 2424 For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and | |
| 2425 with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul | |
| 2426 requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is | |
| 2427 compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch | |
| 2428 as they are ordained to the whole. | |
| 2429 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 co."><a name="31584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31584] Iª q. 76 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2430 quod, sicut in aliis iam dictum est, si anima uniretur corpori | |
| 2431 solum ut motor, posset dici quod non esset in qualibet parte | |
| 2432 corporis, sed in una tantum, per quam alias moveret. Sed quia anima | |
| 2433 unitur corpori ut forma, necesse est quod sit in toto, et in | |
| 2434 qualibet parte corporis. Non enim est forma corporis accidentalis, | |
| 2435 sed substantialis. Substantialis autem forma non solum est | |
| 2436 perfectio totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Cum enim totum consistat | |
| 2437 ex partibus, forma totius quae non dat esse singulis partibus | |
| 2438 corporis, est forma quae est compositio et ordo, sicut forma domus, | |
| 2439 et talis forma est accidentalis. Anima vero est forma | |
| 2440 substantialis, unde oportet quod sit forma et actus non solum | |
| 2441 totius, sed cuiuslibet partis. Et ideo, recedente anima, sicut non | |
| 2442 dicitur animal et homo nisi aequivoce, quemadmodum et animal pictum | |
| 2443 vel lapideum; ita est de manu et oculo, aut carne et osse, ut | |
| 2444 philosophus dicit. Cuius signum est, quod nulla pars corporis habet | |
| 2445 proprium opus, anima recedente, cum tamen omne quod retinet | |
| 2446 speciem, retineat operationem speciei. Actus autem est in eo cuius | |
| 2447 est actus. Unde oportet animam esse in toto corpore, et in qualibet | |
| 2448 eius parte. Et quod tota sit in qualibet parte eius, hinc | |
| 2449 considerari potest, quia, cum totum sit quod dividitur in partes, | |
| 2450 secundum triplicem divisionem est triplex totalitas. Est enim | |
| 2451 quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, sicut tota | |
| 2452 linea vel totum corpus. Est etiam quoddam totum quod dividitur in | |
| 2453 partes rationis et essentiae; sicut definitum in partes | |
| 2454 definitionis, et compositum resolvitur in materiam et formam. | |
| 2455 Tertium autem totum est potentiale, quod dividitur in partes | |
| 2456 virtutis. Primus autem totalitatis modus non convenit formis, nisi | |
| 2457 forte per accidens; et illis solis formis, quae habent | |
| 2458 indifferentem habitudinem ad totum quantitativum et partes eius. | |
| 2459 Sicut albedo, quantum est de sui ratione, aequaliter se habet ut | |
| 2460 sit in tota superficie et in qualibet superficiei parte; et ideo, | |
| 2461 divisa superficie, dividitur albedo per accidens. Sed forma quae | |
| 2462 requirit diversitatem in partibus, sicut est anima, et praecipue | |
| 2463 animalium perfectorum, non aequaliter se habet ad totum et partes, | |
| 2464 unde non dividitur per accidens per divisionem quantitatis. Sic | |
| 2465 ergo totalitas quantitativa non potest attribui animae nec per se | |
| 2466 nec per accidens. Sed totalitas secunda, quae attenditur secundum | |
| 2467 rationis et essentiae perfectionem, proprie et per se convenit | |
| 2468 formis. Similiter autem et totalitas virtutis, quia forma est | |
| 2469 operationis principium. Si ergo quaereretur de albedine, utrum | |
| 2470 esset tota in tota superficie et in qualibet eius parte, | |
| 2471 distinguere oporteret. Quia si fiat mentio de totalitate | |
| 2472 quantitativa, quam habet albedo per accidens, non tota esset in | |
| 2473 qualibet parte superficiei. Et similiter dicendum est de totalitate | |
| 2474 virtutis magis enim potest movere visum albedo quae est in tota | |
| 2475 superficie, quam albedo quae est in aliqua eius particula. Sed si | |
| 2476 fiat mentio de totalitate speciei et essentiae, tota albedo est in | |
| 2477 qualibet superficiei parte. Sed quia anima totalitatem | |
| 2478 quantitativam non habet, nec per se nec per accidens, ut dictum | |
| 2479 est; sufficit dicere quod anima tota est in qualibet parte corporis | |
| 2480 secundum totalitatem perfectionis et essentiae; non autem secundum | |
| 2481 totalitatem virtutis. Quia non secundum quamlibet suam potentiam | |
| 2482 est in qualibet parte corporis; sed secundum visum in oculo, | |
| 2483 secundum auditum in aure, et sic de aliis. Tamen attendendum est | |
| 2484 quod, quia anima requirit diversitatem in partibus, non eodem modo | |
| 2485 comparatur ad totum et ad partes, sed ad totum quidem primo et per | |
| 2486 se, sicut ad proprium et proportionatum perfectibile; ad partes | |
| 2487 autem per posterius, secundum quod habent ordinem ad totum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p12"> | |
| 2488 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul. | |
| 2489 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31585] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2490 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de potentia motiva animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p13"> | |
| 2491 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible. | |
| 2492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31586] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2493 dicendum quod anima est actus corporis organici, sicut primi et | |
| 2494 proportionati perfectibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p14"> | |
| 2495 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible. | |
| 2496 Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. | |
| 2497 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31587] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2498 dicendum quod animal est quod componitur ex anima et corpore toto, | |
| 2499 quod est primum et proportionatum eius perfectibile. Sic autem | |
| 2500 anima non est in parte. Unde non oportet quod pars animalis sit | |
| 2501 animal.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p15"> | |
| 2502 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and | |
| 2503 the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore | |
| 2504 each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation | |
| 2505 of such a power. | |
| 2506 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="31588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31588] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 2507 dicendum quod potentiarum animae quaedam sunt in ea secundum quod | |
| 2508 excedit totam corporis capacitatem, scilicet intellectus et | |
| 2509 voluntas, unde huiusmodi potentiae in nulla parte corporis esse | |
| 2510 dicuntur. Aliae vero potentiae sunt communes animae et corpori, | |
| 2511 unde talium potentiarum non oportet quod quaelibet sit in quocumque | |
| 2512 est anima; sed solum in illa parte corporis quae est proportionata | |
| 2513 ad talis potentiae operationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q76_A8-p16"> | |
| 2514 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body | |
| 2515 are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which | |
| 2516 serves the same power in a nobler manner. | |
| 2517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 76 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="31589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31589] Iª q. 76 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 2518 dicendum quod una pars corporis dicitur esse principalior quam | |
| 2519 alia, propter potentias diversas quarum sunt organa partes | |
| 2520 corporis. Quae enim est principalioris potentiae organum, est | |
| 2521 principalior pars corporis, vel quae etiam eidem potentiae | |
| 2522 principalius deservit.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 2523 <div id="FP_Q77" class="div3"> | |
| 2524 <h3 id="FP_Q77-p0.1">Q. 77. OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2525 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 2526 <p id="FP_Q77-p2"> We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under | |
| 2527 the first head there are eight points of inquiry: | |
| 2528 </p><p id="FP_Q77-p3"><a href="#FP_Q77_A1"> (1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p4"><a href="#FP_Q77_A2"> (2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p5"><a href="#FP_Q77_A3"> (3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p6"><a href="#FP_Q77_A4"> (4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p7"><a href="#FP_Q77_A5"> (5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p8"><a href="#FP_Q77_A6"> (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p9"><a href="#FP_Q77_A7"> (7) Whether one power rises from another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q77-p10"><a href="#FP_Q77_A8"> (8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?</a></p> | |
| 2529 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 pr."><a name="31590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31590] | |
| 2530 Iª q. 77 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae | |
| 2531 pertinent ad potentias animae. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in | |
| 2532 speciali. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum essentia | |
| 2533 animae sit eius potentia. Secundo, utrum sit una tantum potentia | |
| 2534 animae, vel plures. Tertio, quomodo potentiae animae distinguantur. | |
| 2535 Quarto, de ordine ipsarum ad invicem. Quinto, utrum anima sit | |
| 2536 subiectum omnium potentiarum. Sexto, utrum potentiae fluant ab | |
| 2537 essentia animae. Septimo, utrum potentia una oriatur ex alia. | |
| 2538 Octavo, utrum omnes potentiae animae remaneant in ea post | |
| 2539 mortem.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 2540 <div id="FP_Q77_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A1-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 1. Whether the essence of the soul is its power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p2"> | |
| 2541 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and | |
| 2542 love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, | |
| 2543 and will are one life, one mind, one essence." | |
| 2544 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31591] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 2545 proceditur. Videtur quod ipsa essentia animae sit eius potentia. | |
| 2546 Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., quod <i>mens, notitia et | |
| 2547 amor sunt substantialiter in anima, vel, ut idem dicam, | |
| 2548 essentialiter</i>. Et in X dicit quod <i>memoria, intelligentia et | |
| 2549 voluntas sunt una vita, una mens, una essentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p3"> | |
| 2550 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul | |
| 2551 its own power. | |
| 2552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31592] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 2553 est nobilior quam materia prima. Sed materia prima est sua | |
| 2554 potentia. Ergo multo magis anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p4"> | |
| 2555 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified | |
| 2556 or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which | |
| 2557 is the soul. | |
| 2558 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31593] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, forma | |
| 2559 substantialis est simplicior quam accidentalis, cuius signum est, | |
| 2560 quod forma substantialis non intenditur vel remittitur, sed in | |
| 2561 indivisibili consistit. Forma autem accidentalis est ipsa sua | |
| 2562 virtus. Ergo multo magis forma substantialis, quae est anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p5"> | |
| 2563 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and | |
| 2564 understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the soul is its own power. | |
| 2565 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31594] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2566 potentia sensitiva est qua sentimus, et potentia intellectiva qua | |
| 2567 intelligimus. Sed id quo primo sentimus et intelligimus est anima, | |
| 2568 secundum philosophum, in II de anima. Ergo anima est suae | |
| 2569 potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p6"> | |
| 2570 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides | |
| 2571 the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see OBJ 1) "are not in | |
| 2572 the soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not | |
| 2573 exceed the subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other things" (De | |
| 2574 Trin. ix, 4). | |
| 2575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31595] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 2576 quod non est de essentia rei, est accidens. Si ergo potentia animae | |
| 2577 est praeter essentiam eius, sequitur quod sit accidens. Quod est | |
| 2578 contra Augustinum, in IX de Trin., ubi dicit quod <i>praedicta non | |
| 2579 sunt in anima sicut in subiecto, ut color aut figura in corpore, | |
| 2580 aut ulla alia qualitas aut quantitas, quidquid enim tale est, non | |
| 2581 excedit subiectum in quo est; mens autem potest etiam alia amare et | |
| 2582 cognoscere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p7"> | |
| 2583 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, " a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, | |
| 2584 as we have said above ( | |
| 2585 <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q77_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject. | |
| 2586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="31596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31596] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, forma | |
| 2587 simplex subiectum esse non potest. Anima autem est forma simplex, | |
| 2588 cum non sit composita ex materia et forma, ut supra dictum est. Non | |
| 2589 ergo potentia animae potest esse in ipsa sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p8"> | |
| 2590 <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; | |
| 2591 and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; | |
| 2592 and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence. | |
| 2593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 arg. 7"><a name="31597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31597] Iª q. 77 a. 1 arg. 7</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2594 accidens non est principium substantialis differentiae. Sed | |
| 2595 sensibile et rationale sunt substantiales differentiae, et sumuntur | |
| 2596 a sensu et ratione, quae sunt potentiae animae. Ergo potentiae | |
| 2597 animae non sunt accidentia. Et ita videtur quod potentia animae sit | |
| 2598 eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p9"> | |
| 2599 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more, then, | |
| 2600 in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power. | |
| 2601 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31598] Iª q. 77 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2602 quod Dionysius dicit, XI cap. Caelest. Hier., quod <i>caelestes | |
| 2603 spiritus dividuntur in essentiam, virtutem et operationem</i>. | |
| 2604 Multo igitur magis in anima aliud est essentia, et aliud virtus | |
| 2605 sive potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p10"> | |
| 2606 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose | |
| 2607 this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a | |
| 2608 power and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the power directed to that act | |
| 2609 cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of | |
| 2610 substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle | |
| 2611 of His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said | |
| 2612 above when speaking of the angels ( | |
| 2613 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q54_A3" id="FP_Q77_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>). Secondly, this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if | |
| 2614 the very essence of the soul were the immediate | |
| 2615 principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an | |
| 2616 actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. | |
| 2617 Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according | |
| 2618 to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the | |
| 2619 second act. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations; whence also it | |
| 2620 is said in the definition of the soul, that it is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which potentiality, however, | |
| 2621 "does not exclude the soul." Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality | |
| 2622 by reason of an act, as act. | |
| 2623 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 co."><a name="31599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31599] Iª q. 77 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2624 quod impossibile est dicere quod essentia animae sit eius potentia; | |
| 2625 licet hoc quidam posuerint. Et hoc dupliciter ostenditur, quantum | |
| 2626 ad praesens. Primo quia, cum potentia et actus dividant ens et | |
| 2627 quodlibet genus entis, oportet quod ad idem genus referatur | |
| 2628 potentia et actus. Et ideo, si actus non est in genere substantiae, | |
| 2629 potentia quae dicitur ad illum actum, non potest esse in genere | |
| 2630 substantiae. Operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae; | |
| 2631 sed in solo Deo, cuius operatio est eius substantia. Unde Dei | |
| 2632 potentia, quae est operationis principium, est ipsa Dei essentia. | |
| 2633 Quod non potest esse verum neque in anima, neque in aliqua | |
| 2634 creatura; ut supra etiam de Angelo dictum est. Secundo, hoc etiam | |
| 2635 impossibile apparet in anima. Nam anima secundum suam essentiam est | |
| 2636 actus. Si ergo ipsa essentia animae esset immediatum operationis | |
| 2637 principium, semper habens animam actu haberet opera vitae; sicut | |
| 2638 semper habens animam actu est vivum. Non enim, inquantum est forma, | |
| 2639 est actus ordinatus ad ulteriorem actum, sed est ultimus terminus | |
| 2640 generationis. Unde quod sit in potentia adhuc ad alium actum, hoc | |
| 2641 non competit ei secundum suam essentiam, inquantum est forma; sed | |
| 2642 secundum suam potentiam. Et sic ipsa anima, secundum quod subest | |
| 2643 suae potentiae, dicitur actus primus, ordinatus ad actum secundum. | |
| 2644 Invenitur autem habens animam non semper esse in actu operum vitae. | |
| 2645 Unde etiam in definitione animae dicitur quod est actus corporis | |
| 2646 potentia vitam habentis, quae tamen potentia non abiicit animam. | |
| 2647 Relinquitur ergo quod essentia animae non est eius potentia. Nihil | |
| 2648 enim est in potentia secundum actum, inquantum est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p11"> | |
| 2649 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known | |
| 2650 and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. | |
| 2651 In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are "one life, one mind, one essence." | |
| 2652 Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is | |
| 2653 predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each | |
| 2654 part according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated | |
| 2655 of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole | |
| 2656 power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the | |
| 2657 parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each | |
| 2658 part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of | |
| 2659 each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the | |
| 2660 will are the one essence of the soul. | |
| 2661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31600] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2662 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de mente secundum quod noscit se | |
| 2663 et amat se. Sic ergo notitia et amor, inquantum referuntur ad ipsam | |
| 2664 ut cognitam et amatam, substantialiter vel essentialiter sunt in | |
| 2665 anima, quia ipsa substantia vel essentia animae cognoscitur et | |
| 2666 amatur. Et similiter intelligendum est quod alibi dicit, quod sunt | |
| 2667 una vita, una mens, una essentia. Vel, sicut quidam dicunt, haec | |
| 2668 locutio verificatur secundum modum quo totum potestativum | |
| 2669 praedicatur de suis partibus, quod medium est inter totum | |
| 2670 universale et totum integrale. Totum enim universale adest cuilibet | |
| 2671 parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini | |
| 2672 et equo, et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur. Totum | |
| 2673 vero integrale non est in qualibet parte, neque secundum totam | |
| 2674 essentiam, neque secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo nullo modo de | |
| 2675 singulis partibus praedicatur; sed aliquo modo, licet improprie, | |
| 2676 praedicatur de omnibus simul, ut si dicamus quod paries, tectum et | |
| 2677 fundamentum sunt domus. Totum vero potentiale adest singulis | |
| 2678 partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam | |
| 2679 virtutem. Et ideo quodammodo potest praedicari de qualibet parte; | |
| 2680 sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale. Et per hunc modum | |
| 2681 Augustinus dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una | |
| 2682 animae essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p12"> | |
| 2683 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing | |
| 2684 else but its essence. | |
| 2685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31601] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2686 dicendum quod actus ad quem est in potentia materia prima, est | |
| 2687 substantialis forma. Et ideo potentia materiae non est aliud quam | |
| 2688 eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p13"> | |
| 2689 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial | |
| 2690 existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active | |
| 2691 accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of | |
| 2692 the soul is to the soul. | |
| 2693 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31602] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2694 dicendum quod actio est compositi, sicut et esse, existentis enim | |
| 2695 est agere. Compositum autem per formam substantialem habet esse | |
| 2696 substantialiter; per virtutem autem quae consequitur formam | |
| 2697 substantialem, operatur. Unde sic se habet forma accidentalis | |
| 2698 activa ad formam substantialem agentis (ut calor ad formam ignis), | |
| 2699 sicut se habet potentia animae ad animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p14"> | |
| 2700 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first | |
| 2701 principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we | |
| 2702 understand and sense." | |
| 2703 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31603] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 2704 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis | |
| 2705 principium, habet a forma substantiali. Et ideo forma substantialis | |
| 2706 est primum actionis principium, sed non proximum. Et secundum hoc | |
| 2707 philosophus dicit quod <i>id quo intelligimus et sentimus, est | |
| 2708 anima</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p15"> | |
| 2709 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident; | |
| 2710 because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a | |
| 2711 subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second | |
| 2712 species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five | |
| 2713 universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence | |
| 2714 of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not | |
| 2715 caused by the essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused | |
| 2716 by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood. In | |
| 2717 this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of | |
| 2718 the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood | |
| 2719 in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His | |
| 2720 argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident | |
| 2721 transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul. | |
| 2722 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31604] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 2723 dicendum quod, si accidens accipiatur secundum quod dividitur | |
| 2724 contra substantiam, sic nihil potest esse medium inter substantiam | |
| 2725 et accidens, quia dividuntur secundum affirmationem et negationem, | |
| 2726 scilicet secundum esse in subiecto et non esse in subiecto. Et hoc | |
| 2727 modo, cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit | |
| 2728 accidens, et est in secunda specie qualitatis. Si vero accipiatur | |
| 2729 accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic | |
| 2730 aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens. Quia ad | |
| 2731 substantiam pertinet quidquid est essentiale rei, non autem | |
| 2732 quidquid est extra essentiam, potest sic dici accidens, sed solum | |
| 2733 id quod non causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei. Proprium | |
| 2734 enim non est de essentia rei, sed ex principiis essentialibus | |
| 2735 speciei causatur, unde medium est inter essentiam et accidens sic | |
| 2736 dictum. Et hoc modo potentiae animae possunt dici mediae inter | |
| 2737 substantiam et accidens, quasi proprietates animae naturales. Quod | |
| 2738 autem Augustinus dicit, quod notitia et amor non sunt in anima | |
| 2739 sicut accidentia in subiecto, intelligitur secundum modum | |
| 2740 praedictum, prout comparantur ad animam, non sicut ad amantem et | |
| 2741 cognoscentem; sed prout comparantur ad eam sicut ad amatam et | |
| 2742 cognitam. Et hoc modo procedit sua probatio, quia si amor esset in | |
| 2743 anima amata sicut in subiecto, sequeretur quod accidens | |
| 2744 transcenderet suum subiectum; cum etiam alia sint amata per | |
| 2745 animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p16"> | |
| 2746 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above ( | |
| 2747 <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q77_A1-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure | |
| 2748 Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i). | |
| 2749 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="31605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31605] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 2750 quod anima, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, habet | |
| 2751 tamen aliquid de potentialitate admixtum ut supra dictum est. Et | |
| 2752 ideo potest esse subiectum accidentis. Propositio autem inducta | |
| 2753 locum habet in Deo, qui est actus purus, in qua materia Boetius eam | |
| 2754 introducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A1-p17"> | |
| 2755 <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational | |
| 2756 soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents | |
| 2757 us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences. | |
| 2758 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 1 ad 7"><a name="31606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31606] Iª q. 77 a. 1 ad 7</span></a> Ad septimum | |
| 2759 dicendum quod rationale et sensibile, prout sunt differentiae, non | |
| 2760 sumuntur a potentiis sensus et rationis; sed ab ipsa anima | |
| 2761 sensitiva et rationali. Quia tamen formae substantiales, quae | |
| 2762 secundum se sunt nobis ignotae, innotescunt per accidentia; nihil | |
| 2763 prohibet interdum accidentia loco differentiarum substantialium | |
| 2764 poni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A2-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 2. Whether there are several powers of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p2"> | |
| 2765 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness | |
| 2766 of God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul. | |
| 2767 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31607] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 2768 proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures potentiae animae. Anima | |
| 2769 enim intellectiva maxime ad divinam similitudinem accedit. Sed in | |
| 2770 Deo est una et simplex potentia. Ergo et in anima intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p3"> | |
| 2771 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore | |
| 2772 above all others it has one virtue or power. | |
| 2773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31608] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2774 quanto virtus est superior, tanto est magis unita. Sed anima | |
| 2775 intellectiva excedit omnes alias formas in virtute. Ergo maxime | |
| 2776 debet habere unam virtutem seu potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p4"> | |
| 2777 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different | |
| 2778 degrees of perfection, as we have seen above ( | |
| 2779 <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q77_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[76], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees. | |
| 2780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31609] Iª q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2781 operari est existentis in actu. Sed per eandem essentiam animae | |
| 2782 homo habet esse secundum diversos gradus perfectionis, ut supra | |
| 2783 habitum est. Ergo per eandem potentiam animae operatur diversas | |
| 2784 operationes diversorum graduum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p5"> | |
| 2785 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3). | |
| 2786 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31610] Iª q. 77 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2787 quod philosophus, in II de anima ponit plures animae potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A2-p6"> | |
| 2788 <b>I answer that,</b> Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De | |
| 2789 Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, | |
| 2790 by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher | |
| 2791 acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things | |
| 2792 which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire | |
| 2793 imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; | |
| 2794 and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, | |
| 2795 therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations | |
| 2796 and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, | |
| 2797 according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations | |
| 2798 and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence. | |
| 2799 </p><p id="FP_Q77_A2-p7"> There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers---because it is on the confines of spiritual | |
| 2800 and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul. | |
| 2801 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 co."><a name="31611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31611] Iª q. 77 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2802 quod necesse est ponere plures animae potentias. Ad cuius | |
| 2803 evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II | |
| 2804 de caelo, quae sunt in rebus infima, non possunt consequi perfectam | |
| 2805 bonitatem, sed aliquam imperfectam consequuntur paucis motibus; | |
| 2806 superiora vero his adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem motibus multis; | |
| 2807 his autem superiora sunt quae adipiscuntur perfectam bonitatem | |
| 2808 motibus paucis; summa vero perfectio invenitur in his quae absque | |
| 2809 motu perfectam possident bonitatem. Sicut infime est ad sanitatem | |
| 2810 dispositus qui non potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed aliquam | |
| 2811 modicam consequitur paucis remediis; melius autem dispositus est | |
| 2812 qui potest perfectam consequi sanitatem, sed remediis multis; et | |
| 2813 adhuc melius, qui remediis paucis; optime autem, qui absque remedio | |
| 2814 perfectam sanitatem habet. Dicendum est ergo quod res quae sunt | |
| 2815 infra hominem, quaedam particularia bona consequuntur, et ideo | |
| 2816 quasdam paucas et determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo | |
| 2817 autem potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem, quia | |
| 2818 potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est tamen in ultimo gradu, secundum | |
| 2819 naturam, eorum quibus competit beatitudo, et ideo multis et | |
| 2820 diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget anima humana. Angelis | |
| 2821 vero minor diversitas potentiarum competit. In Deo vero non est | |
| 2822 aliqua potentia vel actio, praeter eius essentiam. Est et alia | |
| 2823 ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate potentiarum, videlicet | |
| 2824 quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum, et | |
| 2825 ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p8"> | |
| 2826 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; | |
| 2827 although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures. | |
| 2828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31612] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2829 dicendum quod in hoc ipso magis ad similitudinem Dei accedit anima | |
| 2830 intellectiva quam creaturae inferiores, quod perfectam bonitatem | |
| 2831 consequi potest; licet per multa et diversa; in quo deficit a | |
| 2832 superioribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p9"> | |
| 2833 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things. | |
| 2834 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31613] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2835 dicendum quod virtus unita est superior, si ad aequalia se | |
| 2836 extendat. Sed virtus multiplicata est superior, si plura ei | |
| 2837 subiiciantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A2-p10"> | |
| 2838 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several | |
| 2839 powers. | |
| 2840 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31614] Iª q. 77 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2841 dicendum quod unius rei est unum esse substantiale, sed possunt | |
| 2842 esse operationes plures. Et ideo est una essentia animae, sed | |
| 2843 potentiae plures.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A3-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 3. Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p2"> | |
| 2844 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species | |
| 2845 by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore | |
| 2846 the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects. | |
| 2847 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31615] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 2848 proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae non distinguantur per actus et | |
| 2849 obiecta. Nihil enim determinatur ad speciem per illud quod | |
| 2850 posterius, vel extrinsecum est. Actus autem est posterior potentia; | |
| 2851 obiectum autem est extrinsecum. Ergo per ea potentiae non | |
| 2852 distinguuntur secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p3"> | |
| 2853 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it | |
| 2854 follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power | |
| 2855 of vision extends to white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter. | |
| 2856 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31616] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2857 contraria sunt quae maxime differunt. Si igitur potentiae | |
| 2858 distinguerentur penes obiecta, sequeretur quod contrariorum non | |
| 2859 esset eadem potentia. Quod patet esse falsum fere in omnibus, nam | |
| 2860 potentia visiva eadem est albi et nigri, et gustus idem est dulcis | |
| 2861 et amari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p4"> | |
| 2862 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, | |
| 2863 the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive | |
| 2864 power, and desired by the appetitive. | |
| 2865 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31617] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2866 remota causa, removetur effectus. Si igitur potentiarum differentia | |
| 2867 esset ex differentia obiectorum, idem obiectum non pertineret ad | |
| 2868 diversas potentias. Quod patet esse falsum, nam idem est quod | |
| 2869 potentia cognoscitiva cognoscit, et appetitiva appetit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p5"> | |
| 2870 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong | |
| 2871 to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, | |
| 2872 yet they come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference | |
| 2873 of their objects. | |
| 2874 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31618] Iª q. 77 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 2875 quod per se est causa alicuius, in omnibus causat illud. Sed | |
| 2876 quaedam obiecta diversa, quae pertinent ad diversas potentias, | |
| 2877 pertinent etiam ad aliquam unam potentiam, sicut sonus et color | |
| 2878 pertinent ad visum et auditum, quae sunt diversae potentiae; et | |
| 2879 tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam sensus communis. Non ergo | |
| 2880 potentiae distinguuntur secundum differentiam obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p6"> | |
| 2881 <b>On the contrary,</b> Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts and operations | |
| 2882 precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites," that is their objects. Therefore | |
| 2883 the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects. | |
| 2884 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31619] Iª q. 77 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 2885 posteriora distinguuntur secundum priora. Sed philosophus dicit II | |
| 2886 de anima, quod <i>priores potentiis actus et operationes secundum | |
| 2887 rationem sunt</i>; et adhuc his priora sunt opposita, sive obiecta. | |
| 2888 Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum actus et obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A3-p7"> | |
| 2889 <b>I answer that,</b> A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, | |
| 2890 and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is | |
| 2891 diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. | |
| 2892 Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: | |
| 2893 for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the | |
| 2894 object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from | |
| 2895 these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating | |
| 2896 differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; | |
| 2897 the | |
| 2898 latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by | |
| 2899 their acts and objects. | |
| 2900 </p><p id="FP_Q77_A3-p8"> Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be colored is accidental | |
| 2901 to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature | |
| 2902 of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. | |
| 2903 Hence "rational" and "irrational" are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like | |
| 2904 manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power | |
| 2905 of its very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is | |
| 2906 divided into color, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color, namely, the sight, | |
| 2907 and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something | |
| 2908 colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers | |
| 2909 of the soul are not distinct. | |
| 2910 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 co."><a name="31620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31620] Iª q. 77 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2911 quod potentia, secundum illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad | |
| 2912 actum. Unde oportet rationem potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem | |
| 2913 ordinatur, et per consequens oportet quod ratio potentiae | |
| 2914 diversificetur, ut diversificatur ratio actus. Ratio autem actus | |
| 2915 diversificatur secundum diversam rationem obiecti. Omnis enim actio | |
| 2916 vel est potentiae activae, vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur | |
| 2917 ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, | |
| 2918 color enim inquantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum | |
| 2919 autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis, | |
| 2920 sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod | |
| 2921 est finis augmenti. Ex his autem duobus actio speciem recipit, | |
| 2922 scilicet ex principio, vel ex fine seu termino, differt enim | |
| 2923 calefactio ab infrigidatione, secundum quod haec quidem a calido, | |
| 2924 scilicet activo, ad calidum; illa autem a frigido ad frigidum | |
| 2925 procedit. Unde necesse est quod potentiae diversificentur secundum | |
| 2926 actus et obiecta. Sed tamen considerandum est quod ea quae sunt per | |
| 2927 accidens, non diversificant speciem. Quia enim coloratum accidit | |
| 2928 animali, non diversificantur species animalis per differentiam | |
| 2929 coloris, sed per differentiam eius quod per se accidit animali, per | |
| 2930 differentiam scilicet animae sensitivae, quae quandoque invenitur | |
| 2931 cum ratione, quandoque sine ratione. Unde rationale et irrationale | |
| 2932 sunt differentiae divisivae animalis, diversas eius species | |
| 2933 constituentes. Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas obiectorum | |
| 2934 diversificat potentias animae; sed differentia eius ad quod per se | |
| 2935 potentia respicit. Sicut sensus per se respicit passibilem | |
| 2936 qualitatem, quae per se dividitur in colorem, sonum et huiusmodi, | |
| 2937 et ideo alia potentia sensitiva est coloris, scilicet visus, et | |
| 2938 alia soni, scilicet auditus. Sed passibili qualitati, ut colorato | |
| 2939 accidit esse musicum vel grammaticum, vel magnum et parvum, aut | |
| 2940 hominem vel lapidem. Et ideo penes huiusmodi differentias potentiae | |
| 2941 animae non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p9"> | |
| 2942 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with | |
| 2943 regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions | |
| 2944 which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and end. | |
| 2945 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31621] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2946 dicendum quod actus, licet sit posterior potentia in esse, est | |
| 2947 tamen prior in intentione et secundum rationem, sicut finis agente. | |
| 2948 Obiectum autem, licet sit extrinsecum, est tamen principium vel | |
| 2949 finis actionis. Principio autem et fini proportionantur ea quae | |
| 2950 sunt intrinseca rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p10"> | |
| 2951 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. | |
| 2952 But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; | |
| 2953 as sight does not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea | |
| 2954 of the other, since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect. | |
| 2955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31622] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2956 dicendum quod, si potentia aliqua per se respiceret unum | |
| 2957 contrariorum sicut obiectum, oporteret quod contrarium ad aliam | |
| 2958 potentiam pertineret. Sed potentia animae non per se respicit | |
| 2959 propriam rationem contrarii, sed communem rationem utriusque | |
| 2960 contrariorum, sicut visus non respicit per se rationem albi, sed | |
| 2961 rationem coloris. Et hoc ideo, quia unum contrariorum est | |
| 2962 quodammodo ratio alterius, cum se habeant sicut perfectum et | |
| 2963 imperfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p11"> | |
| 2964 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong | |
| 2965 to various powers of the soul. | |
| 2966 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31623] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 2967 dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est subiecto idem esse | |
| 2968 diversum secundum rationem. Et ideo potest ad diversas potentias | |
| 2969 animae pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A3-p12"> | |
| 2970 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power | |
| 2971 is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which | |
| 2972 the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus | |
| 2973 it is that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, | |
| 2974 however, are subject to one higher power. | |
| 2975 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31624] Iª q. 77 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 2976 dicendum quod potentia superior per se respicit universaliorem | |
| 2977 rationem obiecti, quam potentia inferior, quia quanto potentia est | |
| 2978 superior, tanto ad plura se extendit. Et ideo multa conveniunt in | |
| 2979 una ratione obiecti, quam per se respicit superior potentia, quae | |
| 2980 tamen differunt secundum rationes quas per se respiciunt inferiores | |
| 2981 potentiae. Et inde est quod diversa obiecta pertinent ad diversas | |
| 2982 inferiores potentias, quae tamen uni superiori potentiae | |
| 2983 subduntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A4-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 4. Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p2"> | |
| 2984 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there | |
| 2985 is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. | |
| 2986 Therefore there is no order among them. | |
| 2987 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31625] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 2988 proceditur. Videtur quod in potentiis animae non sit ordo. In his | |
| 2989 enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, non est prius et posterius, sed | |
| 2990 sunt naturaliter simul. Sed potentiae animae contra se invicem | |
| 2991 dividuntur. Ergo inter eas non est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p3"> | |
| 2992 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not | |
| 2993 order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore | |
| 2994 there is no order among the powers of the soul. | |
| 2995 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31626] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2996 potentiae animae comparantur ad obiecta, et ad ipsam animam. Sed ex | |
| 2997 parte animae, inter eas non est ordo, quia anima est una. Similiter | |
| 2998 etiam nec ex parte obiectorum, cum sint diversa et penitus | |
| 2999 disparata, ut patet de colore et sono. In potentiis ergo animae non | |
| 3000 est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p4"> | |
| 3001 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the | |
| 3002 action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. | |
| 3003 Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul. | |
| 3004 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31627] Iª q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 3005 potentiis ordinatis hoc invenitur, quod operatio unius dependet ab | |
| 3006 operatione alterius. Sed actus unius potentiae animae non dependet | |
| 3007 ab actu alterius, potest enim visus exire in actum absque auditu, | |
| 3008 et e converso. Non ergo inter potentias animae est ordo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p5"> | |
| 3009 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among themselves. | |
| 3010 Therefore the powers of the soul have order. | |
| 3011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31628] Iª q. 77 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3012 quod philosophus, in II de anima, comparat partes sive potentias | |
| 3013 animae figuris. Sed figurae habent ordinem ad invicem. Ergo et | |
| 3014 potentiae animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A4-p6"> | |
| 3015 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain | |
| 3016 order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of | |
| 3017 which correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the | |
| 3018 dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of | |
| 3019 nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to the order of generation | |
| 3020 and time; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among | |
| 3021 the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise | |
| 3022 the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul. | |
| 3023 </p><p id="FP_Q77_A4-p7"> In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation | |
| 3024 to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive | |
| 3025 powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, | |
| 3026 namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and | |
| 3027 lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the | |
| 3028 result. | |
| 3029 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 co."><a name="31629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31629] Iª q. 77 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3030 quod, cum anima sit una, potentiae vero plures; ordine autem quodam | |
| 3031 ab uno in multitudinem procedatur; necesse est inter potentias | |
| 3032 animae ordinem esse. Triplex autem ordo inter eas attenditur. | |
| 3033 Quorum duo considerantur secundum dependentiam unius potentiae ab | |
| 3034 altera, tertius autem accipitur secundum ordinem obiectorum. | |
| 3035 Dependentia autem unius potentiae ab altera dupliciter accipi | |
| 3036 potest, uno modo, secundum naturae ordinem, prout perfecta sunt | |
| 3037 naturaliter imperfectis priora; alio modo, secundum ordinem | |
| 3038 generationis et temporis, prout ex imperfecto ad perfectum venitur. | |
| 3039 Secundum igitur primum potentiarum ordinem, potentiae intellectivae | |
| 3040 sunt priores potentiis sensitivis, unde dirigunt eas et imperant | |
| 3041 eis. Et similiter potentiae sensitivae hoc ordine sunt priores | |
| 3042 potentiis animae nutritivae. Secundum vero ordinem secundum, e | |
| 3043 converso se habet. Nam potentiae animae nutritivae sunt priores, in | |
| 3044 via generationis, potentiis animae sensitivae, unde ad earum | |
| 3045 actiones praeparant corpus. Et similiter est de potentiis | |
| 3046 sensitivis respectu intellectivarum. Secundum autem ordinem | |
| 3047 tertium, ordinantur quaedam vires sensitivae ad invicem, scilicet | |
| 3048 visus, auditus et olfactus. Nam visibile est prius naturaliter, | |
| 3049 quia est commune superioribus et inferioribus corporibus. Sonus | |
| 3050 autem audibilis fit in aere, qui est naturaliter prior commixtione | |
| 3051 elementorum, quam consequitur odor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p8"> | |
| 3052 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature; | |
| 3053 although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus. | |
| 3054 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31630] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3055 dicendum quod alicuius generis species se habent secundum prius et | |
| 3056 posterius, sicut numeri et figurae, quantum ad esse; licet simul | |
| 3057 esse dicantur inquantum suscipiunt communis generis | |
| 3058 praedicationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p9"> | |
| 3059 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, | |
| 3060 has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of | |
| 3061 the acts, as we have said above. | |
| 3062 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31631] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3063 dicendum quod ordo iste potentiarum animae est et ex parte animae, | |
| 3064 quae secundum ordinem quendam habet aptitudinem ad diversos actus, | |
| 3065 licet sit una secundum essentiam; et ex parte obiectorum; et etiam | |
| 3066 ex parte actuum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A4-p10"> | |
| 3067 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the | |
| 3068 two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another. | |
| 3069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31632] Iª q. 77 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3070 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de illis potentiis in quibus | |
| 3071 attenditur ordo solum secundum tertium modum. Illae autem potentiae | |
| 3072 quae ordinantur secundum alios duos modos, ita se habent quod actus | |
| 3073 unius dependet ab altera.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A5-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 5. Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p2"> | |
| 3074 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the | |
| 3075 body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is | |
| 3076 the subject of the powers of the soul. | |
| 3077 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31633] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 3078 proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae sint in anima sicut | |
| 3079 in subiecto. Sicut enim se habent potentiae corporis ad corpus, ita | |
| 3080 se habent potentiae animae ad animam. Sed corpus est subiectum | |
| 3081 corporalium potentiarum. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiarum | |
| 3082 animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p3"> | |
| 3083 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher | |
| 3084 says (De Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily." But the natural principles of the operations | |
| 3085 of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul. | |
| 3086 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31634] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3087 operationes potentiarum animae attribuuntur corpori propter animam, | |
| 3088 quia, ut dicitur in II de anima, <i>anima est quo sentimus et | |
| 3089 intelligimus primum</i>. Sed propria principia operationum animae | |
| 3090 sunt potentiae. Ergo potentiae per prius sunt in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p4"> | |
| 3091 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without | |
| 3092 the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone | |
| 3093 as their subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; | |
| 3094 and for a similar reason, of all the other powers. | |
| 3095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31635] Iª q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3096 Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima quaedam | |
| 3097 sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et | |
| 3098 huiusmodi; quaedam vero sentit per corpus. Sed si potentia | |
| 3099 sensitiva non esset in sola anima sicut in subiecto, nihil posset | |
| 3100 sine corpore sentire. Ergo anima est subiectum potentiae | |
| 3101 sensitivae; et pari ratione, omnium aliarum potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p5"> | |
| 3102 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that "sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite." | |
| 3103 Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the | |
| 3104 powers. | |
| 3105 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31636] Iª q. 77 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3106 quod philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod | |
| 3107 <i>sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed | |
| 3108 coniuncti</i>. Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto sicut in | |
| 3109 subiecto. Non ergo sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum | |
| 3110 suarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6"> | |
| 3111 <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the | |
| 3112 same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the | |
| 3113 subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we | |
| 3114 have said above ( | |
| 3115 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], AA[2]</a>,3; | |
| 3116 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q77_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], | |
| 3117 A[1] | |
| 3118 </a>, ad 1), that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers | |
| 3119 of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal | |
| 3120 organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive | |
| 3121 parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and | |
| 3122 not in the soul alone. | |
| 3123 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 co."><a name="31637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31637] Iª q. 77 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3124 quod illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens | |
| 3125 operari, omne enim accidens denominat proprium subiectum. Idem | |
| 3126 autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod | |
| 3127 eius sit potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam | |
| 3128 philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia. Manifestum est | |
| 3129 autem ex supra dictis quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae | |
| 3130 exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde | |
| 3131 potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima | |
| 3132 sicut in subiecto. Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae | |
| 3133 exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et | |
| 3134 auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus | |
| 3135 nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium | |
| 3136 operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non | |
| 3137 in anima sola.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p7"> | |
| 3138 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that | |
| 3139 the composite has the power to perform such operations. | |
| 3140 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31638] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3141 dicendum quod omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut | |
| 3142 subiecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet | |
| 3143 quod tales operationes operari possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p8"> | |
| 3144 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle. | |
| 3145 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31639] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3146 dicendum quod omnes huiusmodi potentiae per prius sunt in anima | |
| 3147 quam in coniuncto, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in | |
| 3148 principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A5-p9"> | |
| 3149 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating | |
| 3150 to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far | |
| 3151 as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the | |
| 3152 body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words "with the body or without | |
| 3153 the body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without | |
| 3154 the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be | |
| 3155 understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, | |
| 3156 that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without | |
| 3157 the | |
| 3158 body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on | |
| 3159 hearing something. | |
| 3160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31640] Iª q. 77 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3161 dicendum quod opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae | |
| 3162 propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam | |
| 3163 pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, | |
| 3164 sed recitando. Tamen, quantum ad praesens pertinet, hoc quod | |
| 3165 dicitur anima quaedam sentire cum corpore et quaedam sine corpore, | |
| 3166 dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod hoc quod dico cum | |
| 3167 corpore vel sine corpore, determinet actum sentiendi secundum quod | |
| 3168 exit a sentiente. Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio | |
| 3169 sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale. | |
| 3170 Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod praedicta determinent actum | |
| 3171 sentiendi ex parte obiecti quod sentitur. Et sic quaedam sentit cum | |
| 3172 corpore, idest in corpore existentia, sicut cum sentit vulnus vel | |
| 3173 aliquid huiusmodi, quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, idest non | |
| 3174 existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut cum | |
| 3175 sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A6-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 6. Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p2"> | |
| 3176 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple | |
| 3177 thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they | |
| 3178 cannot proceed from its essence. | |
| 3179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31641] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 3180 proceditur. Videtur quod potentiae animae non fluant ab eius | |
| 3181 essentia. Ab uno enim simplici non procedunt diversa. Essentia | |
| 3182 autem animae est una et simplex. Cum ergo potentiae animae sint | |
| 3183 multae et diversae, non possunt procedere ab eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p3"> | |
| 3184 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the | |
| 3185 powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its | |
| 3186 essence. | |
| 3187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31642] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud | |
| 3188 a quo aliud procedit, est causa eius. Sed essentia animae non | |
| 3189 potest dici causa potentiarum; ut patet discurrenti per singula | |
| 3190 causarum genera. Ergo potentiae animae non fluunt ab eius | |
| 3191 essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p4"> | |
| 3192 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, | |
| 3193 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof | |
| 3194 moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does | |
| 3195 not produce its powers within itself. | |
| 3196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31643] Iª q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3197 emanatio quendam motum nominat. Sed nihil movetur a seipso, ut | |
| 3198 probatur in VII libro Physic.; nisi forte ratione partis, sicut | |
| 3199 animal dicitur moveri a seipso, quia una pars eius est movens et | |
| 3200 alia mota. Neque etiam anima movetur, ut probatur in I de anima. | |
| 3201 Non ergo anima causat in se suas potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p5"> | |
| 3202 <b>On the contrary,</b> The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is | |
| 3203 included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed | |
| 3204 from its essence as their cause. | |
| 3205 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31644] Iª q. 77 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 3206 potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed | |
| 3207 subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in | |
| 3208 definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Ergo potentiae | |
| 3209 animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A6-p6"> | |
| 3210 <b>I answer that,</b> The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that | |
| 3211 by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial | |
| 3212 form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make | |
| 3213 a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for | |
| 3214 its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed | |
| 3215 in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence | |
| 3216 in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed | |
| 3217 in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the | |
| 3218 subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces | |
| 3219 it. This I say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, | |
| 3220 the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which | |
| 3221 is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the | |
| 3222 substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. | |
| 3223 </p><p id="FP_Q77_A6-p7"> Now it is clear, from what has been said | |
| 3224 <a href="#FP_Q77_A5" id="FP_Q77_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch | |
| 3225 as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (A[1], ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite | |
| 3226 is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the | |
| 3227 composite, flow from the essence | |
| 3228 of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according | |
| 3229 as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality. | |
| 3230 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 co."><a name="31645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31645] Iª q. 77 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3231 quod forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et | |
| 3232 partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, | |
| 3233 et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt | |
| 3234 autem in duobus. Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse | |
| 3235 simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum. Forma | |
| 3236 autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut | |
| 3237 tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in | |
| 3238 actu. Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma | |
| 3239 substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in | |
| 3240 quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo | |
| 3241 subiecto. Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in | |
| 3242 subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde | |
| 3243 actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. | |
| 3244 Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum | |
| 3245 formae accidentalis, inquantum autem est in actu, est eius | |
| 3246 productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente, nam | |
| 3247 respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; | |
| 3248 productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum. Secundo | |
| 3249 autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum | |
| 3250 minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter | |
| 3251 formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est | |
| 3252 propter completionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod | |
| 3253 potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest | |
| 3254 esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid | |
| 3255 potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum. Compositum | |
| 3256 autem est in actu per animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes | |
| 3257 potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive | |
| 3258 compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio, quia iam | |
| 3259 dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est | |
| 3260 actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p8"> | |
| 3261 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. | |
| 3262 Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and | |
| 3263 also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs. | |
| 3264 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31646] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3265 dicendum quod ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere | |
| 3266 ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium. Sic | |
| 3267 igitur ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae | |
| 3268 potentiae, tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum | |
| 3269 diversitatem organorum corporalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p9"> | |
| 3270 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material | |
| 3271 cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all | |
| 3272 its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof. | |
| 3273 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31647] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3274 dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et | |
| 3275 quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est | |
| 3276 susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia | |
| 3277 animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium | |
| 3278 activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A6-p10"> | |
| 3279 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; | |
| 3280 thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light. | |
| 3281 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31648] Iª q. 77 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3282 dicendum quod emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est | |
| 3283 per aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem | |
| 3284 resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce | |
| 3285 color.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A7-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 7. Whether one power of the soul arises from another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p2"> | |
| 3286 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does | |
| 3287 not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does | |
| 3288 not arise from another. | |
| 3289 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31649] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 3290 proceditur. Videtur quod una potentia animae non oriatur ab alia. | |
| 3291 Eorum enim quae simul esse incipiunt, unum non oritur ab alio. Sed | |
| 3292 omnes potentiae animae sunt simul animae concreatae. Ergo una earum | |
| 3293 ab alia non oritur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p3"> | |
| 3294 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be | |
| 3295 the subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another. | |
| 3296 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31650] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3297 potentia animae oritur ab anima sicut accidens a subiecto. Sed una | |
| 3298 potentia animae non potest esse subiectum alterius, quia accidentis | |
| 3299 non est accidens. Ergo una potentia non oritur ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p4"> | |
| 3300 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. | |
| 3301 Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another. | |
| 3302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31651] Iª q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3303 oppositum non oritur a suo opposito, sed unumquodque oritur ex | |
| 3304 simili secundum speciem. Potentiae autem animae ex opposito | |
| 3305 dividuntur, sicut diversae species. Ergo una earum non procedit ab | |
| 3306 alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p5"> | |
| 3307 <b>On the contrary,</b> Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of | |
| 3308 the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another. | |
| 3309 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31652] Iª q. 77 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 3310 potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed actus unius potentiae | |
| 3311 causatur ab alio; sicut actus phantasiae ab actu sensus. Ergo una | |
| 3312 potentia animae causatur ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p6"> | |
| 3313 <b>I answer that,</b> In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer | |
| 3314 to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above | |
| 3315 <a href="#FP_Q77_A4" id="FP_Q77_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence | |
| 3316 of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is | |
| 3317 compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or | |
| 3318 together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less | |
| 3319 perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the | |
| 3320 principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of | |
| 3321 the | |
| 3322 intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; | |
| 3323 wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered | |
| 3324 as receptive principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it | |
| 3325 has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this | |
| 3326 account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man. | |
| 3327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 co."><a name="31653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31653] Iª q. 77 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3328 quod in his quae secundum ordinem naturalem procedunt ab uno, sicut | |
| 3329 primum est causa omnium, ita quod est primo propinquius, est | |
| 3330 quodammodo causa eorum quae sunt magis remota. Ostensum est autem | |
| 3331 supra quod inter potentias animae est multiplex ordo. Et ideo una | |
| 3332 potentia animae ab essentia animae procedit mediante alia. Sed quia | |
| 3333 essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum | |
| 3334 et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel | |
| 3335 simul cum corpore; agens autem et finis est perfectius, susceptivum | |
| 3336 autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum, | |
| 3337 consequens est quod potentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum | |
| 3338 ordinem perfectionis et naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum | |
| 3339 finis et activi principii. Videmus enim quod sensus est propter | |
| 3340 intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens | |
| 3341 participatio intellectus, unde secundum naturalem originem | |
| 3342 quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto. Sed | |
| 3343 secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae | |
| 3344 imperfectiores inveniuntur principia respectu aliarum, sicut anima, | |
| 3345 secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, consideratur sicut | |
| 3346 subiectum et materiale quoddam respectu intellectus. Et propter | |
| 3347 hoc, imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis, | |
| 3348 prius enim animal generatur quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p7"> | |
| 3349 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous | |
| 3350 with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another. | |
| 3351 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31654] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3352 dicendum quod, sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per | |
| 3353 transmutationem, sed per naturalem quandam resultationem, et est | |
| 3354 simul cum anima; ita est etiam de una potentia respectu | |
| 3355 alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p8"> | |
| 3356 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, | |
| 3357 as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch | |
| 3358 as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul. | |
| 3359 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31655] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3360 dicendum quod accidens per se non potest esse subiectum accidentis; | |
| 3361 sed unum accidens per prius recipitur in substantia quam aliud, | |
| 3362 sicut quantitas quam qualitas. Et hoc modo unum accidens dicitur | |
| 3363 esse subiectum alterius, ut superficies coloris, inquantum | |
| 3364 substantia uno accidente mediante recipit aliud. Et similiter | |
| 3365 potest dici de potentiis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A7-p9"> | |
| 3366 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. | |
| 3367 But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect | |
| 3368 things. | |
| 3369 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31656] Iª q. 77 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3370 dicendum quod potentiae animae opponuntur ad invicem oppositione | |
| 3371 perfecti et imperfecti; sicut etiam species numerorum et figurarum. | |
| 3372 Haec autem oppositio non impedit originem unius ab alio, quia | |
| 3373 imperfecta naturaliter a perfectis procedunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q77_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q77_A8-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 8. Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p2"> | |
| 3374 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu | |
| 3375 et Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility | |
| 3376 and irascibility." | |
| 3377 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31657] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 3378 proceditur. Videtur quod omnes potentiae animae remaneant in anima | |
| 3379 a corpore separata. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod | |
| 3380 <i>anima recedit a corpore, secum trahens sensum et imaginationem, | |
| 3381 rationem et intellectum et intelligentiam, concupiscibilitatem et | |
| 3382 irascibilitatem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p3"> | |
| 3383 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are | |
| 3384 never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death. | |
| 3385 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31658] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3386 potentiae animae sunt eius naturales proprietates. Sed proprium | |
| 3387 semper inest, et nunquam separatur ab eo cuius est proprium. Ergo | |
| 3388 potentiae animae sunt in ea etiam post mortem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p4"> | |
| 3389 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says | |
| 3390 (De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man." But weakness | |
| 3391 is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the | |
| 3392 separated soul. | |
| 3393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31659] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3394 potentiae animae, etiam sensitivae, non debilitantur debilitato | |
| 3395 corpore, quia, ut dicitur in I de anima, <i>si senex accipiat | |
| 3396 oculum iuvenis, videbit utique sicut et iuvenis</i>. Sed debilitas | |
| 3397 est via ad corruptionem. Ergo potentiae animae non corrumpuntur | |
| 3398 corrupto corpore, sed manent in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p5"> | |
| 3399 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in | |
| 3400 the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things | |
| 3401 during thy lifetime" ( | |
| 3402 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part. | |
| 3403 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="31660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31660] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3404 memoria est potentia animae sensitivae, ut philosophus probat. Sed | |
| 3405 memoria manet in anima separata, dicitur enim, Luc. XVI, diviti | |
| 3406 epuloni in Inferno secundum animam existenti, <i>recordare quia | |
| 3407 recepisti bona in vita tua</i>. Ergo memoria manet in anima | |
| 3408 separata; et per consequens aliae potentiae sensitivae partis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p6"> | |
| 3409 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate | |
| 3410 souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate | |
| 3411 soul. | |
| 3412 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="31661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31661] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3413 gaudium et tristitia sunt in concupiscibili, quae est potentia | |
| 3414 sensitivae partis. Manifestum est autem animas separatas tristari | |
| 3415 et gaudere de praemiis vel poenis quas habent. Ergo vis | |
| 3416 concupiscibilis manet in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p7"> | |
| 3417 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees | |
| 3418 some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a | |
| 3419 power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all | |
| 3420 the other powers. | |
| 3421 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 arg. 6"><a name="31662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31662] Iª q. 77 a. 8 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3422 Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod sicut anima, cum | |
| 3423 corpus iacet sine sensu nondum penitus mortuum, videt quaedam | |
| 3424 secundum imaginariam visionem; ita cum fuerit a corpore penitus | |
| 3425 separata per mortem. Sed imaginatio est potentia sensitivae partis. | |
| 3426 Ergo potentia sensitivae partis manet in anima separata; et per | |
| 3427 consequens omnes aliae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p8"> | |
| 3428 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with | |
| 3429 its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain. | |
| 3430 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31663] Iª q. 77 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3431 quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., <i>ex duabus tantum | |
| 3432 substantiis constat homo, anima cum ratione sua, et carne cum | |
| 3433 sensibus suis</i>. Ergo, defuncta carne, potentiae sensitivae non | |
| 3434 manent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q77_A8-p9"> | |
| 3435 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already ( | |
| 3436 <a href="#FP_Q77_A5" id="FP_Q77_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">AA[5]</a>,6,7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as | |
| 3437 their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. | |
| 3438 But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot | |
| 3439 remain after the destruction of the | |
| 3440 subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, | |
| 3441 as in their principle or root. | |
| 3442 </p><p id="FP_Q77_A8-p10"> So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more | |
| 3443 false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart | |
| 3444 from the corporeal organ. | |
| 3445 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 co."><a name="31664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31664] Iª q. 77 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3446 quod, sicut iam dictum est, omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad | |
| 3447 animam solam sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur | |
| 3448 ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et | |
| 3449 huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore | |
| 3450 destructo. Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in | |
| 3451 subiecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae. | |
| 3452 Destructo autem subiecto, non potest accidens remanere. Unde, | |
| 3453 corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed | |
| 3454 virtute tantum manent in anima, sicut in principio vel radice. Et | |
| 3455 sic falsum est, quod quidam dicunt huiusmodi potentias in anima | |
| 3456 remanere etiam corpore corrupto. Et multo falsius, quod dicunt | |
| 3457 etiam actus harum potentiarum remanere in anima separata, quia | |
| 3458 talium potentiarum nulla est actio nisi per organum corporeum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p11"> | |
| 3459 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although | |
| 3460 we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually. | |
| 3461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31665] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3462 dicendum quod liber ille auctoritatem non habet. Unde quod ibi | |
| 3463 scriptum est, eadem facilitate contemnitur, qua dicitur. Tamen | |
| 3464 potest dici quod trahit secum anima huiusmodi potentias, non actu, | |
| 3465 sed virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p12"> | |
| 3466 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of | |
| 3467 the composite. | |
| 3468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31666] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3469 dicendum quod huiusmodi potentiae quas dicimus actu in anima | |
| 3470 separata non manere, non sunt proprietates solius animae, sed | |
| 3471 coniuncti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p13"> | |
| 3472 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual | |
| 3473 principle of these powers. | |
| 3474 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31667] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3475 dicendum quod dicuntur non debilitari huiusmodi potentiae | |
| 3476 debilitato corpore, quia anima manet immutabilis, quae est virtuale | |
| 3477 principium huiusmodi potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p14"> | |
| 3478 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the | |
| 3479 mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul. | |
| 3480 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="31668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31668] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 3481 dicendum quod illa recordatio accipitur eo modo quo Augustinus | |
| 3482 ponit memoriam in mente; non eo modo quo ponitur pars animae | |
| 3483 sensitivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p15"> | |
| 3484 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels. | |
| 3485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="31669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31669] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 3486 dicendum quod tristitia et gaudium sunt in anima separata, non | |
| 3487 secundum appetitum sensitivum, sed secundum appetitum | |
| 3488 intellectivum; sicut etiam in Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q77_A8-p16"> | |
| 3489 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said | |
| 3490 there (Retrac. ii, 24). | |
| 3491 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 77 a. 8 ad 6"><a name="31670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31670] Iª q. 77 a. 8 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 3492 quod Augustinus loquitur ibi inquirendo, non asserendo. Unde | |
| 3493 quaedam ibi dicta retractat.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 3494 <div id="FP_Q78" class="div3"> | |
| 3495 <h3 id="FP_Q78-p0.1">Q. 78. OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 3496 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 3497 <p id="FP_Q78-p2"> We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning | |
| 3498 the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a | |
| 3499 certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three | |
| 3500 parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual | |
| 3501 powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers. | |
| 3502 </p><p id="FP_Q78-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q78-p4"><a href="#FP_Q78_A1"> (1) The powers of the soul considered generally;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p5"><a href="#FP_Q78_A2"> (2) The various species of the vegetative part;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p6"><a href="#FP_Q78_A3"> (3) The exterior senses;</a></p><p id="FP_Q78-p7"><a href="#FP_Q78_A4"> (4) The interior senses.</a></p> | |
| 3503 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 pr."><a name="31671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31671] | |
| 3504 Iª q. 78 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de potentiis | |
| 3505 animae in speciali. Ad considerationem autem theologi pertinet | |
| 3506 inquirere specialiter solum de potentiis intellectivis et | |
| 3507 appetitivis, in quibus virtutes inveniuntur. Sed quia cognitio | |
| 3508 harum potentiarum quodammodo dependet ex aliis, ideo nostra | |
| 3509 consideratio de potentiis animae in speciali erit tripartita, primo | |
| 3510 namque considerandum est de his quae sunt praeambula ad | |
| 3511 intellectum; secundo, de potentiis intellectivis; tertio, de | |
| 3512 potentiis appetitivis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, de | |
| 3513 generibus potentiarum animae. Secundo, de speciebus vegetativae | |
| 3514 partis. Tertio, de sensibus exterioribus. Quarto, de sensibus | |
| 3515 interioribus.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 3516 <div id="FP_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p2"> | |
| 3517 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described---namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and | |
| 3518 generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should | |
| 3519 not class the above forces as powers of the soul. | |
| 3520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31681] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 3521 proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter partes vegetativae | |
| 3522 assignentur, scilicet nutritivum, augmentativum, et generativum. | |
| 3523 Huiusmodi enim vires dicuntur naturales. Sed potentiae animae sunt | |
| 3524 supra vires naturales. Ergo huiusmodi vires non debent poni | |
| 3525 potentiae animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p3"> | |
| 3526 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But | |
| 3527 generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative | |
| 3528 force should not be classed as a power of the soul. | |
| 3529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31682] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad id | |
| 3530 quod est commune viventibus et non viventibus, non debet aliqua | |
| 3531 potentia animae deputari. Sed generatio est communis omnibus | |
| 3532 generabilibus et corruptibilibus, tam viventibus quam non | |
| 3533 viventibus. Ergo vis generativa non debet poni potentia animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p4"> | |
| 3534 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, | |
| 3535 does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power. | |
| 3536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31683] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 3537 potentior est quam natura corporea. Sed natura corporea eadem | |
| 3538 virtute activa dat speciem et debitam quantitatem. Ergo multo magis | |
| 3539 anima. Non est ergo alia potentia animae augmentativa a | |
| 3540 generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p5"> | |
| 3541 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing | |
| 3542 exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation | |
| 3543 of the living thing (De Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it." Therefore we should | |
| 3544 not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. | |
| 3545 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="31684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31684] Iª q. 78 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3546 unaquaeque res conservatur in esse per id per quod esse habet. Sed | |
| 3547 potentia generativa est per quam acquiritur esse viventis. Ergo per | |
| 3548 eandem res viva conservatur. Sed ad conservationem rei viventis | |
| 3549 ordinatur vis nutritiva, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim | |
| 3550 potentia potens salvare suscipiens ipsam. Non debet ergo distingui | |
| 3551 nutritiva potentia a generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p6"> | |
| 3552 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf. De Anima | |
| 3553 iii, 9) "growth." | |
| 3554 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31685] Iª q. 78 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3555 quod philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod opera huius animae | |
| 3556 sunt generare, et alimento uti, et iterum augmentum facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A2-p7"> | |
| 3557 <b>I answer that,</b> The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said | |
| 3558 <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q78_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is | |
| 3559 whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the "generative" power. Another is whereby the living body acquires | |
| 3560 its due quantity; to this is directed the "augmentative" power. Another is whereby the body of a living | |
| 3561 thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the "nutritive" power. | |
| 3562 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A2-p8"> We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they | |
| 3563 exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist | |
| 3564 in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing | |
| 3565 cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive | |
| 3566 soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that | |
| 3567 which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius | |
| 3568 (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the | |
| 3569 Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce another like unto | |
| 3570 itself." And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive. | |
| 3571 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 co."><a name="31686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31686] Iª q. 78 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3572 quod tres sunt potentiae vegetativae partis. Vegetativum enim, ut | |
| 3573 dictum est, habet pro obiecto ipsum corpus vivens per animam, ad | |
| 3574 quod quidem corpus triplex animae operatio est necessaria. Una | |
| 3575 quidem, per quam esse acquirat, et ad hoc ordinatur potentia | |
| 3576 generativa. Alia vero, per quam corpus vivum acquirit debitam | |
| 3577 quantitatem, et ad hoc ordinatur vis augmentativa. Alia vero, per | |
| 3578 quam corpus viventis salvatur et in esse, et in quantitate debita, | |
| 3579 et ad hoc ordinatur vis nutritiva. Est tamen quaedam differentia | |
| 3580 attendenda inter has potentias. Nam nutritiva et augmentativa | |
| 3581 habent suum effectum in eo in quo sunt, quia ipsum corpus unitum | |
| 3582 animae augetur et conservatur per vim augmentativam et nutritivam | |
| 3583 in eadem anima existentem. Sed vis generativa habet effectum suum, | |
| 3584 non in eodem corpore, sed in alio, quia nihil est generativum sui | |
| 3585 ipsius. Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquat ad | |
| 3586 dignitatem animae sensitivae, quae habet operationem in res | |
| 3587 exteriores, licet excellentiori modo et universaliori, supremum | |
| 3588 enim inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris, ut | |
| 3589 patet per Dionysium, in VII cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo inter istas | |
| 3590 tres potentias finalior et principalior et perfectior est | |
| 3591 generativa, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim rei iam perfectae | |
| 3592 facere alteram qualis ipsa est. Generativae autem deserviunt et | |
| 3593 augmentativa et nutritiva, augmentativae vero nutritiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p9"> | |
| 3594 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity | |
| 3595 and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform | |
| 3596 their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions. | |
| 3597 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31687] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3598 dicendum quod huiusmodi vires dicuntur naturales, tum quia habent | |
| 3599 effectum similem naturae, quae etiam dat esse et quantitatem et | |
| 3600 conservationem (licet hae vires habeant hoc altiori modo), tum quia | |
| 3601 hae vires exercent suas actiones instrumentaliter per qualitates | |
| 3602 activas et passivas, quae sunt naturalium actionum principia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p10"> | |
| 3603 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher | |
| 3604 way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore | |
| 3605 there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power. | |
| 3606 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31688] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3607 dicendum quod generatio in rebus inanimatis est totaliter ab | |
| 3608 extrinseco. Sed generatio viventium est quodam altiori modo, per | |
| 3609 aliquid ipsius viventis, quod est semen, in quo est aliquod | |
| 3610 principium corporis formativum. Et ideo oportet esse aliquam | |
| 3611 potentiam rei viventis, per quam semen huiusmodi praeparetur, et | |
| 3612 haec est vis generativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p11"> | |
| 3613 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. | |
| 3614 For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is | |
| 3615 generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according | |
| 3616 to the condition of the matter. | |
| 3617 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31689] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3618 dicendum quod, quia generatio viventium est ex aliquo semine, | |
| 3619 oportet quod in principio animal generetur parvae quantitatis. Et | |
| 3620 propter hoc necesse est quod habeat potentiam animae, per quam ad | |
| 3621 debitam quantitatem perducatur. Sed corpus inanimatum generatur ex | |
| 3622 materia determinata ab agente extrinseco, et ideo simul recipit | |
| 3623 speciem et quantitatem secundum materiae conditionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A2-p12"> | |
| 3624 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As we have said above | |
| 3625 <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q78_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, | |
| 3626 in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance | |
| 3627 of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers. | |
| 3628 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="31690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31690] Iª q. 78 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 3629 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, operatio vegetativi principii | |
| 3630 completur mediante calore, cuius est humidum consumere. Et ideo, ad | |
| 3631 restaurationem humidi deperditi, necesse est habere potentiam | |
| 3632 nutritivam, per quam alimentum convertatur in substantiam corporis. | |
| 3633 Quod etiam est necessarium ad actum virtutis augmentativae et | |
| 3634 generativae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q78_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A3-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 3. Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p2"> | |
| 3635 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers | |
| 3636 are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents. | |
| 3637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31691] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 3638 proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur quinque | |
| 3639 sensus exteriores. Sensus enim est cognoscitivus accidentium. Sunt | |
| 3640 autem multa genera accidentium. Cum ergo potentiae distinguantur | |
| 3641 per obiecta, videtur quod sensus multiplicentur secundum numerum | |
| 3642 qui est in generibus accidentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p3"> | |
| 3643 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called "common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but | |
| 3644 are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies | |
| 3645 the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it seems that there is much more need | |
| 3646 for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color | |
| 3647 or sound. | |
| 3648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31692] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3649 magnitudo et figura, et alia quae dicuntur sensibilia communia, non | |
| 3650 sunt sensibilia per accidens, sed contra ea dividuntur in II de | |
| 3651 anima. Diversitas autem per se obiectorum diversificat potentias. | |
| 3652 Cum ergo plus differant magnitudo et figura a colore quam sonus; | |
| 3653 videtur quod multo magis debeat esse alia potentia sensitiva | |
| 3654 cognoscitiva magnitudinis aut figurae, quam coloris et soni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p4"> | |
| 3655 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; | |
| 3656 such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than | |
| 3657 five senses. | |
| 3658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31693] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unus | |
| 3659 sensus est unius contrarietatis; sicut visus albi et nigri. Sed | |
| 3660 tactus est cognoscitivus plurium contrarietatum, scilicet calidi et | |
| 3661 frigidi, humidi et sicci, et huiusmodi. Ergo non est sensus unus, | |
| 3662 sed plures. Ergo plures sensus sunt quam quinque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p5"> | |
| 3663 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as | |
| 3664 a distinct sense of touch. | |
| 3665 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="31694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31694] Iª q. 78 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3666 species non dividitur contra genus. Sed gustus est tactus quidam. | |
| 3667 Ergo non debet poni alter sensus praeter tactum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p6"> | |
| 3668 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is no other besides the five senses." | |
| 3669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31695] Iª q. 78 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3670 quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>non est alter | |
| 3671 sensus praeter quinque</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p7"> | |
| 3672 <b>I answer that,</b> The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the | |
| 3673 elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction | |
| 3674 or extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, | |
| 3675 according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. | |
| 3676 But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there | |
| 3677 are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety | |
| 3678 of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, | |
| 3679 according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does | |
| 3680 not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect. | |
| 3681 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p8"> The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses | |
| 3682 properly and "per se." Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior | |
| 3683 cause of such immutation is what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause | |
| 3684 are the sensitive powers diversified. | |
| 3685 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p9"> Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter | |
| 3686 being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas | |
| 3687 spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into | |
| 3688 the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. | |
| 3689 Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected | |
| 3690 in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel | |
| 3691 when they undergo alteration. | |
| 3692 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p10"> But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in "sight" while in others we find not only spiritual but also a | |
| 3693 natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object | |
| 3694 we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of "hearing"; for sound is caused by percussion and | |
| 3695 commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of "smelling"; for in | |
| 3696 order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place | |
| 3697 in "touch" and "taste"; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity | |
| 3698 of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural | |
| 3699 immutation unless indirectly. | |
| 3700 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A3-p11"> Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most | |
| 3701 perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural | |
| 3702 immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, | |
| 3703 as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction | |
| 3704 of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united | |
| 3705 to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses. | |
| 3706 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 co."><a name="31696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31696] Iª q. 78 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3707 quod rationem distinctionis et numeri sensuum exteriorum quidam | |
| 3708 accipere voluerunt ex parte organorum, in quibus aliquod | |
| 3709 elementorum dominatur, vel aqua, vel aer, vel aliquid huiusmodi. | |
| 3710 Quidam autem ex parte medii, quod est vel coniunctum, vel | |
| 3711 extrinsecum; et hoc vel aer, vel aqua, vel aliquid huiusmodi. | |
| 3712 Quidam autem ex diversa natura sensibilium qualitatum, secundum | |
| 3713 quod est qualitas simplicis corporis, vel sequens complexionem. Sed | |
| 3714 nihil istorum conveniens est. Non enim potentiae sunt propter | |
| 3715 organa, sed organa propter potentias, unde non propter hoc sunt | |
| 3716 diversae potentiae, quia sunt diversa organa; sed ideo natura | |
| 3717 instituit diversitatem in organis, ut congruerent diversitati | |
| 3718 potentiarum. Et similiter diversa media diversis sensibus | |
| 3719 attribuit, secundum quod erat conveniens ad actus potentiarum. | |
| 3720 Naturas autem sensibilium qualitatum cognoscere non est sensus, sed | |
| 3721 intellectus. Accipienda est ergo ratio numeri et distinctionis | |
| 3722 exteriorum sensuum, secundum illud quod proprie et per se ad sensum | |
| 3723 pertinet. Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est | |
| 3724 immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod | |
| 3725 per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cuius diversitatem | |
| 3726 sensitivae potentiae distinguuntur. Est autem duplex immutatio, una | |
| 3727 naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod | |
| 3728 forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, | |
| 3729 sicut calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma | |
| 3730 immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma | |
| 3731 coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem | |
| 3732 autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio | |
| 3733 formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola | |
| 3734 immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora | |
| 3735 naturalia sentirent dum alterantur. Sed in quibusdam sensibus | |
| 3736 invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in visu. In quibusdam | |
| 3737 autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte | |
| 3738 obiecti tantum, vel etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte autem obiecti, | |
| 3739 invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in sono, | |
| 3740 qui est obiectum auditus, nam sonus ex percussione causatur et | |
| 3741 aeris commotione. Secundum alterationem vero, in odore, qui est | |
| 3742 obiectum olfactus, oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo | |
| 3743 corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi, est | |
| 3744 immutatio naturalis in tactu et gustu, nam et manus tangens calida | |
| 3745 calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero | |
| 3746 olfactus aut auditus nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in | |
| 3747 sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque | |
| 3748 immutatione naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, | |
| 3749 et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et communior. Et post hoc | |
| 3750 auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex | |
| 3751 parte obiecti. Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter | |
| 3752 prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Tactus | |
| 3753 autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales, de quorum distinctione post | |
| 3754 dicetur. Et inde est quod alii tres sensus non fiunt per medium | |
| 3755 coniunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, | |
| 3756 ut accidit in his duobus sensibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p12"> | |
| 3757 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles | |
| 3758 of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because "the senses are affected by the same | |
| 3759 things whereby inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2. | |
| 3760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31697] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3761 dicendum quod non omnia accidentia habent vim immutativam secundum | |
| 3762 se; sed solae qualitates tertiae speciei, secundum quas contingit | |
| 3763 alteratio. Et ideo solae huiusmodi qualitates sunt obiecta sensuum, | |
| 3764 quia, ut dicitur in VII Physic., <i>secundum eadem alteratur | |
| 3765 sensus, secundum quae alterantur corpora inanimata</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p13"> | |
| 3766 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper sensibles," | |
| 3767 which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they | |
| 3768 are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is | |
| 3769 clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. | |
| 3770 Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest | |
| 3771 are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, | |
| 3772 as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the | |
| 3773 movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the | |
| 3774 proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move | |
| 3775 the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they | |
| 3776 are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently | |
| 3777 by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided | |
| 3778 according to its proper subject. | |
| 3779 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31698] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3780 dicendum quod magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur | |
| 3781 communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et | |
| 3782 sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia | |
| 3783 propria primo et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualitates | |
| 3784 alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad | |
| 3785 quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt | |
| 3786 species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; | |
| 3787 cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus | |
| 3788 autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subiectum uno modo vel | |
| 3789 pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel localis | |
| 3790 distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam | |
| 3791 secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis, et sic | |
| 3792 sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa. | |
| 3793 Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativae, ut | |
| 3794 superficies coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum | |
| 3795 primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis; ut superficies | |
| 3796 ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia | |
| 3797 huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione | |
| 3798 sensus. Alio enim modo immutatur sensus a magna superficie, et a | |
| 3799 parva, quia etiam ipsa albedo dicitur magna vel parva, et ideo | |
| 3800 dividitur secundum proprium subiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p14"> | |
| 3801 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific | |
| 3802 senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another | |
| 3803 in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives | |
| 3804 the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole | |
| 3805 body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate | |
| 3806 genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, | |
| 3807 just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed. | |
| 3808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31699] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3809 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus videtur dicere in II de anima, | |
| 3810 sensus tactus est unus genere, sed dividitur in multos sensus | |
| 3811 secundum speciem; et propter hoc est diversarum contrarietatum. Qui | |
| 3812 tamen non separantur ab invicem secundum organum, sed per totum | |
| 3813 corpus se concomitantur; et ideo eorum distinctio non apparet. | |
| 3814 Gustus autem, qui est perceptivus dulcis et amari, concomitatur | |
| 3815 tactum in lingua, non autem per totum corpus; et ideo de facili a | |
| 3816 tactu distinguitur. Posset tamen dici quod omnes illae | |
| 3817 contrarietates, et singulae conveniunt in uno genere proximo, et | |
| 3818 omnes in uno genere communi, quod est obiectum tactus secundum | |
| 3819 rationem communem. Sed illud genus commune est innominatum; sicut | |
| 3820 etiam genus proximum calidi et frigidi est innominatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A3-p15"> | |
| 3821 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue | |
| 3822 only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is | |
| 3823 one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason | |
| 3824 of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only | |
| 3825 a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily | |
| 3826 immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet | |
| 3827 and bitter: but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, | |
| 3828 the object of touch. | |
| 3829 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="31700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31700] Iª q. 78 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 3830 dicendum quod sensus gustus, secundum dictum philosophi, est | |
| 3831 quaedam species tactus quae est in lingua tantum. Non autem | |
| 3832 distinguitur a tactu in genere, sed a tactu quantum ad illas | |
| 3833 species quae per totum corpus diffunduntur. Si vero tactus sit unus | |
| 3834 sensus tantum, propter unam rationem communem obiecti, dicendum | |
| 3835 erit quod secundum rationem diversam immutationis, distinguitur | |
| 3836 gustus a tactu. Nam tactus immutatur naturali immutatione, et non | |
| 3837 solum spirituali, quantum ad organum suum, secundum qualitatem quae | |
| 3838 ei proprie obiicitur. Gustus autem organum non immutatur de | |
| 3839 necessitate naturali immutatione secundum qualitatem quae ei | |
| 3840 proprie obiicitur, ut scilicet lingua fiat dulcis vel amara; sed | |
| 3841 secundum praeambulam qualitatem, in qua fundatur sapor, scilicet | |
| 3842 secundum humorem, qui est obiectum tactus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q78_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q78_A4-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 4. Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p2"> | |
| 3843 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. | |
| 3844 Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior | |
| 3845 senses. | |
| 3846 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31701] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 3847 proceditur. Videtur quod interiores sensus inconvenienter | |
| 3848 distinguantur. Commune enim non dividitur contra proprium. Ergo | |
| 3849 sensus communis non debet enumerari inter vires interiores | |
| 3850 sensitivas, praeter sensus exteriores proprios.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p3"> | |
| 3851 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the | |
| 3852 proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like | |
| 3853 manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between | |
| 3854 the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own | |
| 3855 vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need | |
| 3856 to assign an interior power, called the common sense. | |
| 3857 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31702] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad id | |
| 3858 ad quod sufficit sensus proprius et exterior, non oportet ponere | |
| 3859 aliquam vim apprehensivam interiorem. Sed ad iudicandum de | |
| 3860 sensibilibus, sufficiunt sensus proprii et exteriores, unusquisque | |
| 3861 enim sensus iudicat de proprio obiecto. Similiter etiam videntur | |
| 3862 sufficere ad hoc quod percipiant suos actus, quia cum actio sensus | |
| 3863 sit quodammodo medium inter potentiam et obiectum, videtur quod | |
| 3864 multo magis visus possit suam visionem, tanquam sibi propinquiorem, | |
| 3865 percipere, quam colorem; et sic de aliis. Non ergo necessarium fuit | |
| 3866 ad hoc ponere interiorem potentiam, quae dicatur sensus | |
| 3867 communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p4"> | |
| 3868 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first | |
| 3869 sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers | |
| 3870 distinct from the senses. | |
| 3871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31703] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3872 secundum philosophum, phantasticum et memorativum sunt passiones | |
| 3873 primi sensitivi. Sed passio non dividitur contra subiectum. Ergo | |
| 3874 memoria et phantasia non debent poni aliae potentiae praeter | |
| 3875 sensum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p5"> | |
| 3876 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but | |
| 3877 what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that "those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." | |
| 3878 Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the "estimative" power, for the perception | |
| 3879 of intentions which the sense does not perceive. | |
| 3880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31704] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3881 intellectus minus dependet a sensu, quam quaecumque potentia | |
| 3882 sensitivae partis. Sed intellectus nihil cognoscit nisi accipiendo | |
| 3883 a sensu, unde dicitur in I posteriorum, quod <i>quibus deest unus | |
| 3884 sensus, deficit una scientia</i>. Ergo multo minus debet poni una | |
| 3885 potentia sensitivae partis ad percipiendum intentiones quas non | |
| 3886 percipit sensus, quam vocant aestimativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p6"> | |
| 3887 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, | |
| 3888 which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative | |
| 3889 and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add | |
| 3890 the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the | |
| 3891 estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination. | |
| 3892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="31705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31705] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, actus | |
| 3893 cogitativae, qui est conferre et componere et dividere, et actus | |
| 3894 reminiscitivae, qui est quodam syllogismo uti ad inquirendum, non | |
| 3895 minus distant ab actu aestimativae et memorativae, quam actus | |
| 3896 aestimativae ab actu phantasiae. Debent ergo vel cogitativa et | |
| 3897 reminiscitiva poni aliae vires praeter aestimativam et memorativam; | |
| 3898 vel aestimativa et memorativa non debent poni aliae vires praeter | |
| 3899 phantasiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p7"> | |
| 3900 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of | |
| 3901 the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. | |
| 3902 Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination. | |
| 3903 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="31706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31706] Iª q. 78 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3904 Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ponit tria genera visionum, | |
| 3905 scilicet corporalem, quae fit per sensum; et spiritualem, quae fit | |
| 3906 per imaginationem sive phantasiam; et intellectualem, quae fit per | |
| 3907 intellectum. Non est ergo aliqua vis interior quae sit media inter | |
| 3908 sensum et intellectum, nisi imaginativa tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p8"> | |
| 3909 <b>On the contrary,</b> Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative | |
| 3910 and memorative powers." | |
| 3911 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31707] Iª q. 78 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3912 quod Avicenna, in suo libro de anima, ponit quinque potentias | |
| 3913 sensitivas interiores, scilicet sensum communem, phantasiam, | |
| 3914 imaginativam, aestimativam, et memorativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p9"> | |
| 3915 <b>I answer that,</b> As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for | |
| 3916 the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to | |
| 3917 diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation. | |
| 3918 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p10"> Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time | |
| 3919 of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not | |
| 3920 be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, | |
| 3921 for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the | |
| 3922 sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also | |
| 3923 retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things | |
| 3924 are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power | |
| 3925 is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct | |
| 3926 from the power which preserves them. | |
| 3927 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p11"> Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there | |
| 3928 would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, | |
| 3929 and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain | |
| 3930 things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages | |
| 3931 and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as | |
| 3932 a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are | |
| 3933 useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. | |
| 3934 And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by | |
| 3935 the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions. | |
| 3936 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p12"> Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper sense" and the "common sense" are appointed, and of their | |
| 3937 distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" | |
| 3938 is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. | |
| 3939 Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the | |
| 3940 "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like | |
| 3941 intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for | |
| 3942 instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned | |
| 3943 among these intentions. | |
| 3944 </p><p id="FP_Q78_A4-p13"> Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly | |
| 3945 immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these | |
| 3946 intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power by | |
| 3947 which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some sort of | |
| 3948 collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain | |
| 3949 particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason | |
| 3950 compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection | |
| 3951 of the past; but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by | |
| 3952 the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, | |
| 3953 which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we | |
| 3954 compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other | |
| 3955 than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De | |
| 3956 sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part---namely, | |
| 3957 the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers. | |
| 3958 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 co."><a name="31708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31708] Iª q. 78 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3959 quod, cum natura non deficiat in necessariis, oportet esse tot | |
| 3960 actiones animae sensitivae, quot sufficiant ad vitam animalis | |
| 3961 perfecti. Et quaecumque harum actionum non possunt reduci in unum | |
| 3962 principium, requirunt diversas potentias, cum potentia animae nihil | |
| 3963 aliud sit quam proximum principium operationis animae. Est autem | |
| 3964 considerandum quod ad vitam animalis perfecti requiritur quod non | |
| 3965 solum apprehendat rem apud praesentiam sensibilis, sed etiam apud | |
| 3966 eius absentiam. Alioquin, cum animalis motus et actio sequantur | |
| 3967 apprehensionem, non moveretur animal ad inquirendum aliquid absens; | |
| 3968 cuius contrarium apparet maxime in animalibus perfectis, quae | |
| 3969 moventur motu processivo; moventur enim ad aliquid absens | |
| 3970 apprehensum. Oportet ergo quod animal per animam sensitivam non | |
| 3971 solum recipiat species sensibilium, cum praesentialiter immutatur | |
| 3972 ab eis; sed etiam eas retineat et conservet. Recipere autem et | |
| 3973 retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa principia, nam | |
| 3974 humida bene recipiunt, et male retinent; e contrario autem est de | |
| 3975 siccis. Unde, cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, | |
| 3976 oportet esse aliam potentiam quae recipiat species sensibilium, et | |
| 3977 quae conservet. Rursus considerandum est quod, si animal moveretur | |
| 3978 solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non | |
| 3979 esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum | |
| 3980 quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed | |
| 3981 necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum | |
| 3982 quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed | |
| 3983 etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive | |
| 3984 nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter | |
| 3985 indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et | |
| 3986 similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia | |
| 3987 est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est ergo animali quod | |
| 3988 percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. | |
| 3989 Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum | |
| 3990 perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non | |
| 3991 autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum. Sic ergo ad receptionem | |
| 3992 formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis, de | |
| 3993 quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum | |
| 3994 retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive | |
| 3995 imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio | |
| 3996 quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad | |
| 3997 apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, | |
| 3998 ordinatur vis aestimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis | |
| 3999 memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius | |
| 4000 signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua | |
| 4001 huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens. Et ipsa | |
| 4002 ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi | |
| 4003 intentiones computatur. Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad | |
| 4004 formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia | |
| 4005 animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. | |
| 4006 Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia | |
| 4007 animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam | |
| 4008 instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et ideo quae | |
| 4009 in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine | |
| 4010 dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi | |
| 4011 intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui | |
| 4012 medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem | |
| 4013 capitis, est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio | |
| 4014 intellectiva intentionum universalium. Ex parte autem memorativae, | |
| 4015 non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita | |
| 4016 recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi | |
| 4017 syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum | |
| 4018 individuales intentiones. Avicenna vero ponit quintam potentiam, | |
| 4019 mediam inter aestimativam et imaginativam, quae componit et dividit | |
| 4020 formas imaginatas; ut patet cum ex forma imaginata auri et forma | |
| 4021 imaginata montis componimus unam formam montis aurei, quem nunquam | |
| 4022 vidimus. Sed ista operatio non apparet in aliis animalibus ab | |
| 4023 homine, in quo ad hoc sufficit virtus imaginativa. Cui etiam hanc | |
| 4024 actionem attribuit Averroes, in libro quodam quem fecit de sensu et | |
| 4025 sensibilibus. Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires | |
| 4026 interiores sensitivae partis, scilicet sensum communem et | |
| 4027 imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p14"> | |
| 4028 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of | |
| 4029 the exterior senses. | |
| 4030 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31709] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4031 dicendum quod sensus interior non dicitur communis per | |
| 4032 praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium | |
| 4033 exteriorum sensuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p15"> | |
| 4034 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, | |
| 4035 by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between | |
| 4036 two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common | |
| 4037 term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, | |
| 4038 again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper | |
| 4039 sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, | |
| 4040 and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision. | |
| 4041 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31710] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4042 dicendum quod sensus proprius iudicat de sensibili proprio, | |
| 4043 discernendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut | |
| 4044 discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a | |
| 4045 dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui | |
| 4046 inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat. Unde oportet ad sensum | |
| 4047 communem pertinere discretionis iudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut | |
| 4048 ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam | |
| 4049 percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se | |
| 4050 videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non | |
| 4051 cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua | |
| 4052 immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia | |
| 4053 immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p16"> | |
| 4054 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above ( | |
| 4055 <a href="#FP_Q77_A7" id="FP_Q78_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[7]</a>), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions | |
| 4056 of the "first sensitive." | |
| 4057 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31711] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4058 dicendum quod, sicut una potentia oritur ab anima, alia mediante, | |
| 4059 ut supra dictum est; ita etiam anima subiicitur alii potentiae, | |
| 4060 mediante alia. Et secundum hunc modum, phantasticum et memorativum | |
| 4061 dicuntur passiones primi sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p17"> | |
| 4062 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the | |
| 4063 intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect | |
| 4064 manner. | |
| 4065 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31712] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4066 dicendum quod, licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in | |
| 4067 re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus | |
| 4068 percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori | |
| 4069 modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p18"> | |
| 4070 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to | |
| 4071 a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not | |
| 4072 distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals. | |
| 4073 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="31713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31713] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 4074 dicendum quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in | |
| 4075 homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis; sed per | |
| 4076 aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, | |
| 4077 secundum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed | |
| 4078 eaedem, perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q78_A4-p19"> | |
| 4079 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear | |
| 4080 that it is common to all interior apprehensions. | |
| 4081 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 78 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="31714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31714] Iª q. 78 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 4082 quod Augustinus spiritualem visionem dicit esse, quae fit per | |
| 4083 similitudines corporum in absentia corporum. Unde patet quod | |
| 4084 communis est omnibus interioribus apprehensionibus.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 4085 <div id="FP_Q79" class="div3"> | |
| 4086 <h3 id="FP_Q79-p0.1">Q. 79. OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 4087 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 4088 <p id="FP_Q79-p2"> The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q79-p3"><a href="#FP_Q79_A1"> (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p4"><a href="#FP_Q79_A2"> (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p5"><a href="#FP_Q79_A3"> (3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p6"><a href="#FP_Q79_A4"> (4) Whether it is something in the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p7"><a href="#FP_Q79_A5"> (5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p8"><a href="#FP_Q79_A6"> (6) Whether memory is in the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p9"><a href="#FP_Q79_A7"> (7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p10"><a href="#FP_Q79_A8"> (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p11"><a href="#FP_Q79_A9"> (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p12"><a href="#FP_Q79_A10"> (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p13"><a href="#FP_Q79_A11"> (11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p14"><a href="#FP_Q79_A12"> (12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?</a></p><p id="FP_Q79-p15"><a href="#FP_Q79_A13"> (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?</a></p> | |
| 4089 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 pr."><a name="31715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31715] | |
| 4090 Iª q. 79 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de potentiis | |
| 4091 intellectivis. Circa quod quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum | |
| 4092 intellectus sit potentia animae, vel eius essentia. Secundo, si est | |
| 4093 potentia, utrum sit potentia passiva. Tertio, si est potentia | |
| 4094 passiva, utrum sit ponere aliquem intellectum agentem. Quarto, | |
| 4095 utrum sit aliquid animae. Quinto, utrum intellectus agens sit unus | |
| 4096 omnium. Sexto, utrum memoria sit in intellectu. Septimo, utrum sit | |
| 4097 alia potentia ab intellectu. Octavo, utrum ratio sit alia potentia | |
| 4098 ab intellectu. Nono, utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae | |
| 4099 potentiae. Decimo, utrum intelligentia sit alia potentia praeter | |
| 4100 intellectum. Undecimo, utrum intellectus speculativus et practicus | |
| 4101 sint diversae potentiae. Duodecimo, utrum synderesis sit aliqua | |
| 4102 potentia intellectivae partis. Tertiodecimo, utrum conscientia sit | |
| 4103 aliqua potentia intellectivae partis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 4104 <div id="FP_Q79_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A1-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 1. Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p2"> | |
| 4105 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the | |
| 4106 same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and | |
| 4107 spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul. | |
| 4108 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31716] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 4109 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit aliqua potentia | |
| 4110 animae, sed sit ipsa eius essentia. Intellectus idem enim videtur | |
| 4111 esse quod mens. Sed mens non est potentia animae sed essentia, | |
| 4112 dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., <i>mens et spiritus non | |
| 4113 relative dicuntur, sed essentiam demonstrant</i>. Ergo intellectus | |
| 4114 est ipsa essentia animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p3"> | |
| 4115 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now | |
| 4116 the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but | |
| 4117 they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind | |
| 4118 and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof. | |
| 4119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31717] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4120 diversa genera potentiarum animae non uniuntur in aliqua potentia | |
| 4121 una, sed in sola essentia animae. Appetitivum autem et | |
| 4122 intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae, ut dicitur in | |
| 4123 II de anima; conveniunt autem in mente, quia Augustinus, X de | |
| 4124 Trin., ponit intelligentiam et voluntatem in mente. Ergo mens et | |
| 4125 intellectus est ipsa essentia animae, et non aliqua eius | |
| 4126 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p4"> | |
| 4127 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels | |
| 4128 are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself. | |
| 4129 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31718] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4130 secundum Gregorium, in homilia ascensionis, homo intelligit cum | |
| 4131 Angelis. Sed Angeli dicuntur mentes et intellectus. Ergo mens et | |
| 4132 intellectus hominis non est aliqua potentia animae, sed ipsa | |
| 4133 anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p5"> | |
| 4134 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore | |
| 4135 it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence. | |
| 4136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31719] Iª q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ex | |
| 4137 hoc convenit alicui substantiae quod sit intellectiva, quia est | |
| 4138 immaterialis. Sed anima est immaterialis per suam essentiam. Ergo | |
| 4139 videtur quod anima per suam essentiam sit intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p6"> | |
| 4140 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3). | |
| 4141 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31720] Iª q. 79 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4142 quod philosophus ponit intellectivum potentiam animae, ut patet in | |
| 4143 II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7"> | |
| 4144 <b>I answer that,</b> In accordance with what has been already shown ( | |
| 4145 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q54_A3" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>; | |
| 4146 <a href="#FP_Q77_A1" id="FP_Q79_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[77], A[1]</a>) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the | |
| 4147 essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is | |
| 4148 to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of | |
| 4149 understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, | |
| 4150 the intellect is power. | |
| 4151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 co."><a name="31721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31721] Iª q. 79 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4152 quod necesse est dicere, secundum praemissa, quod intellectus sit | |
| 4153 aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia. Tunc enim | |
| 4154 solum immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei | |
| 4155 operantis, quando ipsa operatio est eius esse, sicut enim potentia | |
| 4156 se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad | |
| 4157 esse. In solo Deo autem idem est intelligere quod suum esse. Unde | |
| 4158 in solo Deo intellectus est eius essentia, in aliis autem creaturis | |
| 4159 intellectualibus intellectus est quaedam potentia | |
| 4160 intelligentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p8"> | |
| 4161 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from | |
| 4162 its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief | |
| 4163 power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the | |
| 4164 mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16). | |
| 4165 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31722] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4166 dicendum quod sensus accipitur aliquando pro potentia, aliquando | |
| 4167 vero pro ipsa anima sensitiva, denominatur enim anima sensitiva | |
| 4168 nomine principalioris suae potentiae, quae est sensus. Et similiter | |
| 4169 anima intellectiva quandoque nominatur nomine intellectus, quasi a | |
| 4170 principaliori sua virtute; sicut dicitur in I de anima, quod | |
| 4171 intellectus est substantia quaedam. Et etiam hoc modo Augustinus | |
| 4172 dicit quod mens est spiritus, vel essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p9"> | |
| 4173 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities | |
| 4174 of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its | |
| 4175 mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine | |
| 4176 puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9). | |
| 4177 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31723] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4178 dicendum quod appetitivum et intellectivum sunt diversa genera | |
| 4179 potentiarum animae, secundum diversas rationes obiectorum. Sed | |
| 4180 appetitivum partim convenit cum intellectivo, et partim cum | |
| 4181 sensitivo, quantum ad modum operandi per organum corporale, vel | |
| 4182 sine huiusmodi organo, nam appetitus sequitur apprehensionem. Et | |
| 4183 secundum hoc Augustinus ponit voluntatem in mente, et philosophus | |
| 4184 in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p10"> | |
| 4185 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason | |
| 4186 an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, | |
| 4187 such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails. | |
| 4188 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31724] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4189 dicendum quod in Angelis non est alia vis nisi intellectiva, et | |
| 4190 voluntas, quae ad intellectum consequitur. Et propter hoc Angelus | |
| 4191 dicitur mens vel intellectus, quia tota virtus sua in hoc | |
| 4192 consistit. Anima autem habet multas alias vires, sicut sensitivas | |
| 4193 et nutritivas, et ideo non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A1-p11"> | |
| 4194 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power | |
| 4195 of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power. | |
| 4196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31725] Iª q. 79 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4197 dicendum quod ipsa immaterialitas substantiae intelligentis creatae | |
| 4198 non est eius intellectus; sed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad | |
| 4199 intelligendum. Unde non oportet quod intellectus sit substantia | |
| 4200 animae, sed eius virtus et potentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A2-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 2. Whether the intellect is a passive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p2"> | |
| 4201 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But | |
| 4202 the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect | |
| 4203 is not a passive power. | |
| 4204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31726] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 4205 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit potentia passiva. | |
| 4206 Patitur enim unumquodque secundum materiam; sed agit ratione | |
| 4207 formae. Sed virtus intellectiva consequitur immaterialitatem | |
| 4208 substantiae intelligentis. Ergo videtur quod intellectus non sit | |
| 4209 potentia passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p3"> | |
| 4210 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above ( | |
| 4211 <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive. | |
| 4212 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31727] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4213 potentia intellectiva est incorruptibilis, ut supra dictum est. Sed | |
| 4214 intellectus si est passivus, est corruptibilis, ut dicitur in III | |
| 4215 de anima. Ergo potentia intellectiva non est passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p4"> | |
| 4216 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. | |
| 4217 But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, | |
| 4218 all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active. | |
| 4219 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31728] Iª q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, agens | |
| 4220 est nobilius patiente, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt., | |
| 4221 et Aristoteles in III de anima. Potentiae autem vegetativae partis | |
| 4222 omnes sunt activae, quae tamen sunt infimae inter potentias animae. | |
| 4223 Ergo multo magis potentiae intellectivae, quae sunt supremae, omnes | |
| 4224 sunt activae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p5"> | |
| 4225 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is in a way to be passive." | |
| 4226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31729] Iª q. 79 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4227 quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>intelligere est | |
| 4228 pati quoddam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A2-p6"> | |
| 4229 <b>I answer that,</b> To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs | |
| 4230 to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a | |
| 4231 man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, | |
| 4232 is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be | |
| 4233 passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or | |
| 4234 moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something | |
| 4235 receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality | |
| 4236 to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is | |
| 4237 clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above ( | |
| 4238 <a href="#FP_Q78_A1" id="FP_Q79_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[1]</a>), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by | |
| 4239 observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation | |
| 4240 to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which | |
| 4241 originally and | |
| 4242 virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure | |
| 4243 act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite | |
| 4244 being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is | |
| 4245 compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act. | |
| 4246 </p><p id="FP_Q79_A2-p7"> Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter | |
| 4247 of the heavenly bodies ( | |
| 4248 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A1" id="FP_Q79_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[1]</a>). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things | |
| 4249 that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, | |
| 4250 by reason of its proximity to the first | |
| 4251 intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence | |
| 4252 and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is | |
| 4253 at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear | |
| 4254 from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. | |
| 4255 And | |
| 4256 so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently | |
| 4257 the intellect is a passive power. | |
| 4258 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 co."><a name="31730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31730] Iª q. 79 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4259 quod pati tripliciter dicitur. Uno modo, propriissime, scilicet | |
| 4260 quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi secundum naturam, | |
| 4261 aut secundum propriam inclinationem; sicut cum aqua frigiditatem | |
| 4262 amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur. | |
| 4263 Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid | |
| 4264 ab ipso abiicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens. Et | |
| 4265 secundum hoc dicitur pati non solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui | |
| 4266 sanatur; non solum qui tristatur, sed etiam qui laetatur; vel | |
| 4267 quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel moveatur. Tertio modo, dicitur | |
| 4268 aliquid pati communiter, ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia | |
| 4269 ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod | |
| 4270 aliquid abiiciatur. Secundum quem modum, omne quod exit de potentia | |
| 4271 in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic | |
| 4272 intelligere nostrum est pati. Quod quidem hac ratione apparet. | |
| 4273 Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa | |
| 4274 ens in universali. Considerari ergo potest utrum intellectus sit in | |
| 4275 actu vel potentia, ex hoc quod consideratur quomodo intellectus se | |
| 4276 habeat ad ens universale. Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus qui ad | |
| 4277 ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis, et talis est | |
| 4278 intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et | |
| 4279 virtualiter totum ens praeexistit sicut in prima causa. Et ideo | |
| 4280 intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed est actus purus. | |
| 4281 Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu | |
| 4282 totius entis universalis, quia sic oporteret quod esset ens | |
| 4283 infinitum. Unde omnis intellectus creatus, per hoc ipsum quod est, | |
| 4284 non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ipsa | |
| 4285 intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum. Potentia autem dupliciter | |
| 4286 se habet ad actum. Est enim quaedam potentia quae semper est | |
| 4287 perfecta per actum; sicut diximus de materia corporum caelestium. | |
| 4288 Quaedam autem potentia est, quae non semper est in actu, sed de | |
| 4289 potentia procedit in actum; sicut invenitur in generabilibus et | |
| 4290 corruptibilibus. Intellectus igitur angelicus semper est in actu | |
| 4291 suorum intelligibilium, propter propinquitatem ad primum | |
| 4292 intellectum, qui est actus purus, ut supra dictum est. Intellectus | |
| 4293 autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime | |
| 4294 remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu | |
| 4295 intelligibilium, et in principio est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil | |
| 4296 est scriptum, ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Quod manifeste | |
| 4297 apparet ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in | |
| 4298 potentia, postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu. Sic | |
| 4299 igitur patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati, secundum | |
| 4300 tertium modum passionis. Et per consequens intellectus est potentia | |
| 4301 passiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p8"> | |
| 4302 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense | |
| 4303 passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act. | |
| 4304 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31731] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4305 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de primo et secundo modo | |
| 4306 passionis, qui sunt proprii materiae primae. Tertius autem modus | |
| 4307 passionis est cuiuscumque in potentia existentis quod in actum | |
| 4308 reducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p9"> | |
| 4309 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite | |
| 4310 is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive | |
| 4311 intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the | |
| 4312 two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal | |
| 4313 organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" | |
| 4314 intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it | |
| 4315 is incorruptible. | |
| 4316 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31732] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4317 dicendum quod intellectus passivus secundum quosdam dicitur | |
| 4318 appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animae passiones; qui etiam in I | |
| 4319 Ethic. dicitur rationalis per participationem, quia obedit rationi. | |
| 4320 Secundum alios autem intellectus passivus dicitur virtus | |
| 4321 cogitativa, quae nominatur ratio particularis. Et utroque modo | |
| 4322 passivum accipi potest secundum primos duos modos passionis, | |
| 4323 inquantum talis intellectus sic dictus, est actus alicuius organi | |
| 4324 corporalis. Sed intellectus qui est in potentia ad intelligibilia, | |
| 4325 quem Aristoteles ob hoc nominat intellectum possibilem, non est | |
| 4326 passivus nisi tertio modo, quia non est actus organi corporalis. Et | |
| 4327 ideo est incorruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A2-p10"> | |
| 4328 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they | |
| 4329 refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative | |
| 4330 power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such | |
| 4331 a passive force being nobler than such an active one. | |
| 4332 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31733] Iª q. 79 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4333 dicendum quod agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et | |
| 4334 passio referantur, non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus | |
| 4335 autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. | |
| 4336 Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, | |
| 4337 scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi passivum | |
| 4338 esse nobilius tali activo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A3-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 3. Whether there is an active intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p2"> | |
| 4339 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things | |
| 4340 intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. | |
| 4341 Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is | |
| 4342 active, but only that it is passive. | |
| 4343 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31734] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 4344 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit ponere intellectum agentem. Sicut | |
| 4345 enim se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus noster | |
| 4346 ad intelligibilia. Sed quia sensus est in potentia ad sensibilia | |
| 4347 non ponitur sensus agens, sed sensus patiens tantum. Ergo, cum | |
| 4348 intellectus noster sit in potentia ad intelligibilia, videtur quod | |
| 4349 non debeat poni intellectus agens, sed possibilis tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p3"> | |
| 4350 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for | |
| 4351 sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But | |
| 4352 in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity | |
| 4353 for an active intellect. | |
| 4354 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31735] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 4355 dicatur quod in sensu etiam est aliquod agens, sicut lumen, contra, | |
| 4356 lumen requiritur ad visum inquantum facit medium lucidum in actu, | |
| 4357 nam color ipse secundum se est motivus lucidi. Sed in operatione | |
| 4358 intellectus non ponitur aliquod medium quod necesse sit fieri in | |
| 4359 actu. Ergo non est necessarium ponere intellectum agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p4"> | |
| 4360 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect | |
| 4361 is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form | |
| 4362 is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make | |
| 4363 the species actually intelligible. | |
| 4364 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31736] Iª q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4365 similitudo agentis recipitur in patiente secundum modum patientis. | |
| 4366 Sed intellectus possibilis est virtus immaterialis. Ergo | |
| 4367 immaterialitas eius sufficit ad hoc quod recipiantur in eo formae | |
| 4368 immaterialiter. Sed ex hoc ipso aliqua forma est intelligibilis in | |
| 4369 actu, quod est immaterialis. Ergo nulla necessitas est ponere | |
| 4370 intellectum agentem, ad hoc quod faciat species intelligibiles in | |
| 4371 actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p5"> | |
| 4372 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, | |
| 4373 and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an active intellect. | |
| 4374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31737] Iª q. 79 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4375 quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>sicut in omni | |
| 4376 natura ita et in anima est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid | |
| 4377 quo est omnia facere</i>. Est ergo ponere intellectum agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p6"> | |
| 4378 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; | |
| 4379 but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on | |
| 4380 <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q79_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: | |
| 4381 since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is | |
| 4382 immaterial. And he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter | |
| 4383 was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect | |
| 4384 was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not | |
| 4385 allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; | |
| 4386 it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing | |
| 4387 is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. | |
| 4388 We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the | |
| 4389 species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect. | |
| 4390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 co."><a name="31738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31738] Iª q. 79 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4391 quod, secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere | |
| 4392 intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu; sed forte | |
| 4393 ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti, ut infra dicetur. | |
| 4394 Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, | |
| 4395 et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid | |
| 4396 intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale. Et huiusmodi vocabat | |
| 4397 species, sive ideas, ex quarum participatione dicebat etiam | |
| 4398 materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua naturaliter | |
| 4399 constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus | |
| 4400 nostros, ad hoc quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam | |
| 4401 haberent. Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium | |
| 4402 subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non | |
| 4403 sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum | |
| 4404 sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. | |
| 4405 Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens | |
| 4406 actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat | |
| 4407 igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret | |
| 4408 intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus | |
| 4409 materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum | |
| 4410 agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p7"> | |
| 4411 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear | |
| 4412 that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual | |
| 4413 part, there is something active and something passive. | |
| 4414 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31739] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4415 dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non | |
| 4416 oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte | |
| 4417 nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, | |
| 4418 omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et | |
| 4419 aliquid passivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p8"> | |
| 4420 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors | |
| 4421 actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same | |
| 4422 reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become | |
| 4423 actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as | |
| 4424 the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified | |
| 4425 in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason. | |
| 4426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31740] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4427 dicendum quod circa effectum luminis est duplex opinio. Quidam enim | |
| 4428 dicunt quod lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu | |
| 4429 visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter idem, | |
| 4430 intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum. | |
| 4431 Secundum alios vero, lumen requiritur ad videndum, non propter | |
| 4432 colores, ut fiant actu visibiles; sed ut medium fiat actu lucidum, | |
| 4433 ut Commentator dicit in II de anima. Et secundum hoc, similitudo | |
| 4434 qua Aristoteles assimilat intellectum agentem lumini, attenditur | |
| 4435 quantum ad hoc, quod sicut hoc est necessarium ad videndum, ita | |
| 4436 illud ad intelligendum; sed non propter idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A3-p9"> | |
| 4437 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their | |
| 4438 dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now | |
| 4439 the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist | |
| 4440 apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial | |
| 4441 nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually | |
| 4442 intelligible by way of abstraction. | |
| 4443 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31741] Iª q. 79 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4444 dicendum quod, supposito agente, bene contingit diversimode recipi | |
| 4445 eius similitudinem in diversis propter eorum dispositionem | |
| 4446 diversam. Sed si agens non praeexistit, nihil ad hoc faciet | |
| 4447 dispositio recipientis. Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid | |
| 4448 existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, | |
| 4449 quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non | |
| 4450 sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset | |
| 4451 intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum | |
| 4452 abstractionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A4-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 4. Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p2"> | |
| 4453 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light | |
| 4454 for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to | |
| 4455 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9, </a> "He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active intellect is not something | |
| 4456 in the soul. | |
| 4457 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31742] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 4458 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens non sit aliquid animae | |
| 4459 nostrae. Intellectus enim agentis effectus est illuminare ad | |
| 4460 intelligendum. Sed hoc fit per aliquid quod est altius anima; | |
| 4461 secundum illud Ioan. I, <i>erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem | |
| 4462 hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>. Ergo videtur quod intellectus | |
| 4463 agens non sit aliquid animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p3"> | |
| 4464 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes | |
| 4465 not understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore | |
| 4466 the active intellect is not something in our soul. | |
| 4467 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31743] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4468 philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit intellectui agenti quod non | |
| 4469 aliquando intelligit et aliquando non intelligit. Sed anima nostra | |
| 4470 non semper intelligit; sed aliquando intelligit et aliquando non | |
| 4471 intelligit. Ergo intellectus agens non est aliquid animae | |
| 4472 nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p4"> | |
| 4473 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something | |
| 4474 belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a man would always be able | |
| 4475 to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. | |
| 4476 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31744] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, agens | |
| 4477 et patiens sufficiunt ad agendum. Si igitur intellectus possibilis | |
| 4478 est aliquid animae nostrae, qui est virtus passiva, et similiter | |
| 4479 intellectus agens, qui est virtus activa; sequitur quod homo semper | |
| 4480 poterit intelligere cum voluerit, quod patet esse falsum. Non est | |
| 4481 ergo intellectus agens aliquid animae nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p5"> | |
| 4482 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can | |
| 4483 be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality | |
| 4484 to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in | |
| 4485 our soul. | |
| 4486 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="31745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31745] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4487 philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est | |
| 4488 substantia actu ens. Nihil autem est respectu eiusdem in actu et in | |
| 4489 potentia. Si ergo intellectus possibilis, qui est in potentia ad | |
| 4490 omnia intelligibilia, est aliquid animae nostrae; videtur | |
| 4491 impossibile quod intellectus agens sit aliquid animae nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p6"> | |
| 4492 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since | |
| 4493 habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very | |
| 4494 action of the passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the | |
| 4495 soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the | |
| 4496 soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore | |
| 4497 the active intellect is not something in our soul. | |
| 4498 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="31746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31746] Iª q. 79 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 4499 intellectus agens est aliquid animae nostrae, oportet quod sit | |
| 4500 aliqua potentia. Non est enim nec passio nec habitus, nam habitus | |
| 4501 et passiones non habent rationem agentis respectu passionum animae; | |
| 4502 sed magis passio est ipsa actio potentiae passivae, habitus autem | |
| 4503 est aliquid quod ex actibus consequitur. Omnis autem potentia fluit | |
| 4504 ab essentia animae. Sequeretur ergo quod intellectus agens ab | |
| 4505 essentia animae procederet. Et sic non inesset animae per | |
| 4506 participationem ab aliquo superiori intellectu, quod est | |
| 4507 inconveniens. Non ergo intellectus agens est aliquid animae | |
| 4508 nostrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p7"> | |
| 4509 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active intellect, | |
| 4510 "to be in the soul." | |
| 4511 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31747] Iª q. 79 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4512 quod philosophus dicit, III de anima quod <i>necesse est in anima | |
| 4513 has esse differentias</i>, scilicet intellectum possibilem, et | |
| 4514 agentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A4-p8"> | |
| 4515 <b>I answer that,</b> The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe | |
| 4516 that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power | |
| 4517 of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence | |
| 4518 of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called | |
| 4519 intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but | |
| 4520 only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. | |
| 4521 Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which | |
| 4522 it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the | |
| 4523 soul | |
| 4524 is helped to understand. | |
| 4525 </p><p id="FP_Q79_A4-p9"> Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms | |
| 4526 as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, | |
| 4527 it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power | |
| 4528 the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the | |
| 4529 universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone | |
| 4530 does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among | |
| 4531 these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived | |
| 4532 from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that | |
| 4533 we | |
| 4534 abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs | |
| 4535 to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect ( | |
| 4536 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De | |
| 4537 Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: | |
| 4538 while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima | |
| 4539 iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only | |
| 4540 beatitude; as will be shown later on ( | |
| 4541 <a href="#FP_Q90_A3" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[90], A[3]</a>; FS, | |
| 4542 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.3" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to | |
| 4543 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv"> Ps. 4:7, </a> "The light of Thy | |
| 4544 countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." | |
| 4545 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 co."><a name="31748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31748] Iª q. 79 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4546 quod intellectus agens de quo philosophus loquitur, est aliquid | |
| 4547 animae. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod supra animam | |
| 4548 intellectivam humanam necesse est ponere aliquem superiorem | |
| 4549 intellectum, a quo anima virtutem intelligendi obtineat. Semper | |
| 4550 enim quod participat aliquid, et quod est mobile, et quod est | |
| 4551 imperfectum, praeexigit ante se aliquid quod est per essentiam suam | |
| 4552 tale, et quod est immobile et perfectum. Anima autem humana | |
| 4553 intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, | |
| 4554 cuius signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum | |
| 4555 aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum | |
| 4556 quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam | |
| 4557 intelligentiam, tum quia non omnia intelligit; tum quia in his quae | |
| 4558 intelligit, de potentia procedit ad actum. Oportet ergo esse | |
| 4559 aliquem altiorem intellectum, quo anima iuvetur ad intelligendum. | |
| 4560 Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum secundum substantiam | |
| 4561 separatum, esse intellectum agentem, qui quasi illustrando | |
| 4562 phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia actu. Sed, dato quod sit | |
| 4563 aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen | |
| 4564 oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo | |
| 4565 intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit | |
| 4566 intelligibilia in actu. Sicut et in aliis rebus naturalibus | |
| 4567 perfectis, praeter universales causas agentes, sunt propriae | |
| 4568 virtutes inditae singulis rebus perfectis, ab universalibus | |
| 4569 agentibus derivatae, non enim solus sol generat hominem, sed est in | |
| 4570 homine virtus generativa hominis; et similiter in aliis animalibus | |
| 4571 perfectis. Nihil autem est perfectius in inferioribus rebus anima | |
| 4572 humana. Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata | |
| 4573 a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare. Et | |
| 4574 hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas | |
| 4575 universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu | |
| 4576 intelligibilia. Nulla autem actio convenit alicui rei, nisi per | |
| 4577 aliquod principium formaliter ei inhaerens; ut supra dictum est, | |
| 4578 cum de intellectu possibili ageretur. Ergo oportet virtutem quae | |
| 4579 est principium huius actionis, esse aliquid in anima. Et ideo | |
| 4580 Aristoteles comparavit intellectum agentem lumini, quod est aliquid | |
| 4581 receptum in aere. Plato autem intellectum separatum imprimentem in | |
| 4582 animas nostras, comparavit soli; ut Themistius dicit in commentario | |
| 4583 tertii de anima. Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei | |
| 4584 documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo | |
| 4585 beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen | |
| 4586 intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>signatum est | |
| 4587 super nos lumen vultus tui, domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p10"> | |
| 4588 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained. | |
| 4589 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31749] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4590 dicendum quod illa lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis, a | |
| 4591 qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem, ut | |
| 4592 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p11"> | |
| 4593 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: | |
| 4594 "Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because | |
| 4595 it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which | |
| 4596 is in potentiality. | |
| 4597 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31750] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4598 dicendum quod philosophus illa verba non dicit de intellectu | |
| 4599 agente, sed de intellectu in actu. Unde supra de ipso praemiserat, | |
| 4600 idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei. Vel, si intelligatur de | |
| 4601 intellectu agente, hoc dicitur quia non est ex parte intellectus | |
| 4602 agentis hoc quod quandoque intelligimus et quandoque non | |
| 4603 intelligimus; sed ex parte intellectus qui est in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p12"> | |
| 4604 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the | |
| 4605 visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is | |
| 4606 that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects | |
| 4607 are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we | |
| 4608 require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since | |
| 4609 through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, | |
| 4610 conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something | |
| 4611 separate from the soul. | |
| 4612 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31751] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4613 dicendum quod, si intellectus agens compararetur ad intellectum | |
| 4614 possibilem ut obiectum agens ad potentiam, sicut visibile in actu | |
| 4615 ad visum; sequeretur quod statim omnia intelligeremus, cum | |
| 4616 intellectus agens sit quo est omnia facere. Nunc autem non se habet | |
| 4617 ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur, | |
| 4618 praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentia phantasmatum, | |
| 4619 et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi | |
| 4620 opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut | |
| 4621 per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones. Et | |
| 4622 quantum ad hoc, non differt utrum intellectus agens sit aliquid | |
| 4623 animae, vel aliquid separatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p13"> | |
| 4624 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms | |
| 4625 are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, | |
| 4626 inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from | |
| 4627 the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active | |
| 4628 intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in | |
| 4629 potentiality to such species. | |
| 4630 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="31752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31752] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4631 dicendum quod anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed | |
| 4632 est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum. Phantasmata autem, e | |
| 4633 converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed | |
| 4634 sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem | |
| 4635 animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem | |
| 4636 per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus | |
| 4637 individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus | |
| 4638 agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae | |
| 4639 dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad | |
| 4640 huiusmodi species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A4-p14"> | |
| 4641 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives | |
| 4642 from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as | |
| 4643 its other powers. | |
| 4644 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="31753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31753] Iª q. 79 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 4645 dicendum quod, cum essentia animae sit immaterialis, a supremo | |
| 4646 intellectu creata, nihil prohibet virtutem quae a supremo | |
| 4647 intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahit a materia, ab essentia | |
| 4648 ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A5-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 5. Whether the active intellect is one in all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p2"> | |
| 4649 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to | |
| 4650 the number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not | |
| 4651 multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men. | |
| 4652 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31754] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 4653 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus agens sit unus in omnibus. | |
| 4654 Nihil enim quod est separatum a corpore, multiplicatur secundum | |
| 4655 multiplicationem corporum. Sed intellectus agens est separatus, ut | |
| 4656 dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non multiplicatur in multis | |
| 4657 corporibus hominum, sed est unus in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p3"> | |
| 4658 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is | |
| 4659 still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all. | |
| 4660 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31755] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4661 intellectus agens facit universale, quod est unum in multis. Sed | |
| 4662 illud quod est causa unitatis, magis est unum. Ergo intellectus | |
| 4663 agens est unus in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p4"> | |
| 4664 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all | |
| 4665 agree in one active intellect. | |
| 4666 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31756] Iª q. 79 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnes | |
| 4667 homines conveniunt in primis conceptionibus intellectus. His autem | |
| 4668 assentiunt per intellectum agentem. Ergo conveniunt omnes in uno | |
| 4669 intellectu agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p5"> | |
| 4670 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various | |
| 4671 things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men. | |
| 4672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31757] Iª q. 79 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4673 quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est | |
| 4674 sicut lumen. Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis. Ergo | |
| 4675 non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6"> | |
| 4676 <b>I answer that,</b> The truth about this question depends on what we have already said | |
| 4677 <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one | |
| 4678 active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active | |
| 4679 intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many | |
| 4680 active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above ( | |
| 4681 <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q79_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances. | |
| 4682 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 co."><a name="31758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31758] Iª q. 79 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4683 quod veritas huius quaestionis dependet ex praemissis. Si enim | |
| 4684 intellectus agens non esset aliquid animae, sed esset quaedam | |
| 4685 substantia separata, unus esset intellectus agens omnium hominum. | |
| 4686 Et hoc intelligunt qui ponunt unitatem intellectus agentis. Si | |
| 4687 autem intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, ut quaedam virtus | |
| 4688 ipsius, necesse est dicere quod sint plures intellectus agentes, | |
| 4689 secundum pluralitatem animarum, quae multiplicantur secundum | |
| 4690 multiplicationem hominum, ut supra dictum est. Non enim potest esse | |
| 4691 quod una et eadem virtus numero sit diversarum substantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p7"> | |
| 4692 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, | |
| 4693 as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, | |
| 4694 because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but | |
| 4695 not as a separate substance. | |
| 4696 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31759] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4697 dicendum quod philosophus probat intellectum agentem esse | |
| 4698 separatum, per hoc quod possibilis est separatus; quia, ut ipse | |
| 4699 dicit, agens est honorabilius patiente. Intellectus autem | |
| 4700 possibilis dicitur separatus, quia non est actus alicuius organi | |
| 4701 corporalis. Et secundum hunc modum etiam intellectus agens dicitur | |
| 4702 separatus, non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p8"> | |
| 4703 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the | |
| 4704 same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts | |
| 4705 the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial. | |
| 4706 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31760] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4707 dicendum quod intellectus agens causat universale abstrahendo a | |
| 4708 materia. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod sit unus in omnibus | |
| 4709 habentibus intellectum, sed quod sit unus in omnibus secundum | |
| 4710 habitudinem ad omnia a quibus abstrahit universale, respectu quorum | |
| 4711 universale est unum. Et hoc competit intellectui agenti inquantum | |
| 4712 est immaterialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A5-p9"> | |
| 4713 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently | |
| 4714 the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible | |
| 4715 principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle | |
| 4716 of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need | |
| 4717 for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common | |
| 4718 of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of | |
| 4719 the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light. | |
| 4720 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31761] Iª q. 79 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4721 dicendum quod omnia quae sunt unius speciei, communicant in actione | |
| 4722 consequente naturam speciei, et per consequens in virtute, quae est | |
| 4723 actionis principium, non quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. | |
| 4724 Cognoscere autem prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem | |
| 4725 humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute | |
| 4726 quae est principium huius actionis, et haec est virtus intellectus | |
| 4727 agentis. Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. | |
| 4728 Oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic | |
| 4729 illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus, demonstrat | |
| 4730 unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli; non autem | |
| 4731 unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A6-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 6. Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p2"> | |
| 4732 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the | |
| 4733 higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast, | |
| 4734 for he says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them | |
| 4735 to memory." Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. | |
| 4736 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31762] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 4737 proceditur. Videtur quod memoria non sit in parte intellectiva | |
| 4738 animae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod ad partem | |
| 4739 superiorem animae pertinent quae non sunt hominibus pecoribusque | |
| 4740 communia. Sed memoria est hominibus pecoribusque communis, dicit | |
| 4741 enim ibidem quod <i>possunt pecora sentire per corporis sensus | |
| 4742 corporalia, et ea mandare memoriae</i>. Ergo memoria non pertinet | |
| 4743 ad partem animae intellectivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p3"> | |
| 4744 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a | |
| 4745 thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not | |
| 4746 the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive. | |
| 4747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31763] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4748 memoria praeteritorum est. Sed praeteritum dicitur secundum aliquod | |
| 4749 determinatum tempus. Memoria igitur est cognoscitiva alicuius sub | |
| 4750 determinato tempore; quod est cognoscere aliquid sub hic et nunc. | |
| 4751 Hoc autem non est intellectus, sed sensus. Memoria igitur non est | |
| 4752 in parte intellectiva, sed solum in parte sensitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p4"> | |
| 4753 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen | |
| 4754 in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. | |
| 4755 Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which | |
| 4756 it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part. | |
| 4757 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31764] Iª q. 79 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 4758 memoria conservantur species rerum quae actu non cogitantur. Sed | |
| 4759 hoc non est possibile accidere in intellectu, quia intellectus fit | |
| 4760 in actu per hoc quod informatur specie intelligibili; intellectum | |
| 4761 autem esse in actu, est ipsum intelligere in actu; et sic | |
| 4762 intellectus omnia intelligit in actu, quorum species apud se habet. | |
| 4763 Non ergo memoria est in parte intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p5"> | |
| 4764 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind." | |
| 4765 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31765] Iª q. 79 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4766 quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., quod <i>memoria, intelligentia | |
| 4767 et voluntas sunt una mens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p6"> | |
| 4768 <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must | |
| 4769 first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that | |
| 4770 this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are | |
| 4771 acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual | |
| 4772 apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every | |
| 4773 thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon | |
| 4774 as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand | |
| 4775 that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the | |
| 4776 intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active | |
| 4777 intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; | |
| 4778 which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual | |
| 4779 part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual | |
| 4780 part. | |
| 4781 </p><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p7"> But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect | |
| 4782 "is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. | |
| 4783 And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Now, the passive intellect | |
| 4784 is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the | |
| 4785 fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but | |
| 4786 not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the | |
| 4787 act of understanding---namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration. | |
| 4788 </p><p id="FP_Q79_A6-p8"> The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions | |
| 4789 of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, | |
| 4790 corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after | |
| 4791 ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species | |
| 4792 unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, | |
| 4793 therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But | |
| 4794 if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in | |
| 4795 the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed | |
| 4796 time, is something individual. | |
| 4797 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 co."><a name="31766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31766] Iª q. 79 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4798 quod, cum de ratione memoriae sit conservare species rerum quae | |
| 4799 actu non apprehenduntur, hoc primum considerari oportet, utrum | |
| 4800 species intelligibiles sic in intellectu conservari possint. Posuit | |
| 4801 enim Avicenna hoc esse impossibile. In parte enim sensitiva dicebat | |
| 4802 hoc accidere, quantum ad aliquas potentias, inquantum sunt actus | |
| 4803 organorum corporalium, in quibus conservari possunt aliquae species | |
| 4804 absque actuali apprehensione. In intellectu autem, qui caret organo | |
| 4805 corporali, nihil existit nisi intelligibiliter. Unde oportet | |
| 4806 intelligi in actu illud cuius similitudo in intellectu existit. Sic | |
| 4807 ergo, secundum ipsum, quam cito aliquis actu desinit intelligere | |
| 4808 aliquam rem, desinit esse illius rei species in intellectu, sed | |
| 4809 oportet, si denuo vult illam rem intelligere, quod convertat se ad | |
| 4810 intellectum agentem, quem ponit substantiam separatam, ut ab illo | |
| 4811 effluant species intelligibiles in intellectum possibilem. Et ex | |
| 4812 exercitio et usu convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, | |
| 4813 relinquitur, secundum ipsum, quaedam habilitas in intellectu | |
| 4814 possibili convertendi se ad intellectum agentem, quam dicebat esse | |
| 4815 habitum scientiae. Secundum igitur hanc positionem, nihil | |
| 4816 conservatur in parte intellectiva, quod non actu intelligatur. Unde | |
| 4817 non poterit poni memoria in parte intellectiva, secundum hunc | |
| 4818 modum. Sed haec opinio manifeste repugnat dictis Aristotelis. Dicit | |
| 4819 enim, in III de anima, quod, cum intellectus possibilis <i>sic fiat | |
| 4820 singula ut sciens, dicitur qui secundum actum; et quod hoc accidit | |
| 4821 cum possit operari per seipsum. Est quidem igitur et tunc potentia | |
| 4822 quodammodo; non tamen similiter ut ante addiscere aut invenire</i>. | |
| 4823 Dicitur autem intellectus possibilis fieri singula, secundum quod | |
| 4824 recipit species singulorum. Ex hoc ergo quod recipit species | |
| 4825 intelligibilium, habet quod possit operari cum voluerit, non autem | |
| 4826 quod semper operetur, quia et tunc est quodammodo in potentia, | |
| 4827 licet aliter quam ante intelligere; eo scilicet modo quo sciens in | |
| 4828 habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu. Repugnat etiam | |
| 4829 praedicta positio rationi. Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur | |
| 4830 in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis | |
| 4831 stabilis naturae et immobilis, quam materia corporalis. Si ergo | |
| 4832 materia corporalis formas quas recipit, non solum tenet dum per eas | |
| 4833 agit in actu, sed etiam postquam agere per eas cessaverit; multo | |
| 4834 fortius intellectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species | |
| 4835 intelligibiles, sive a sensibilibus acceptas, sive etiam ab aliquo | |
| 4836 superiori intellectu effluxas. Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur | |
| 4837 solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse | |
| 4838 in intellectiva parte. Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod eius | |
| 4839 obiectum sit praeteritum, ut praeteritum; memoria in parte | |
| 4840 intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quae est apprehensiva | |
| 4841 particularium. Praeteritum enim, ut praeteritum, cum significet | |
| 4842 esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis | |
| 4843 pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p9"> | |
| 4844 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the | |
| 4845 sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. | |
| 4846 But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher | |
| 4847 says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole | |
| 4848 soul, but the intellect." | |
| 4849 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31767] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4850 dicendum quod memoria, secundum quod est conservativa specierum, | |
| 4851 non est nobis pecoribusque communis. Species enim conservantur non | |
| 4852 in parte animae sensitiva tantum, sed magis in coniuncto; cum vis | |
| 4853 memorativa sit actus organi cuiusdam. Sed intellectus secundum | |
| 4854 seipsum est conservativus specierum, praeter concomitantiam organi | |
| 4855 corporalis. Unde philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>anima | |
| 4856 est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p10"> | |
| 4857 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition of past may be referred to two things---namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. | |
| 4858 These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present | |
| 4859 sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible | |
| 4860 thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is | |
| 4861 not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is | |
| 4862 accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, | |
| 4863 may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual | |
| 4864 act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not | |
| 4865 incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial | |
| 4866 act, as we have said above of the intellect ( | |
| 4867 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q79_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands | |
| 4868 its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, | |
| 4869 in as far as it regards past events, is | |
| 4870 preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands | |
| 4871 the past as something "here" and "now." | |
| 4872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31768] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4873 dicendum quod praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad | |
| 4874 obiectum quod cognoscitur; et ad cognitionis actum. Quae quidem duo | |
| 4875 simul coniunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva | |
| 4876 alicuius per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili, unde simul | |
| 4877 animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse | |
| 4878 quoddam praeteritum sensibile. Sed quantum ad partem intellectivam | |
| 4879 pertinet, praeteritio accidit, et non per se convenit, ex parte | |
| 4880 obiecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum | |
| 4881 est homo, homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in | |
| 4882 praesenti vel in praeterito vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero | |
| 4883 actus, praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut | |
| 4884 in sensu. Quia intelligere animae nostrae est quidam particularis | |
| 4885 actus, in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur | |
| 4886 homo intelligere nunc vel heri vel cras. Et hoc non repugnat | |
| 4887 intellectualitati, quia huiusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam | |
| 4888 particulare, tamen est immaterialis actus, ut supra de intellectu | |
| 4889 dictum est; et ideo sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis | |
| 4890 ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus, ita intelligit suum | |
| 4891 intelligere, quod est singularis actus vel in praeterito vel in | |
| 4892 praesenti vel in futuro existens. Sic igitur salvatur ratio | |
| 4893 memoriae, quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum, in intellectu, | |
| 4894 secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum | |
| 4895 quod intelligit praeteritum, prout est hic et nunc.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A6-p11"> | |
| 4896 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. | |
| 4897 Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands | |
| 4898 in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual | |
| 4899 knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it | |
| 4900 does not understand in act. | |
| 4901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31769] Iª q. 79 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4902 dicendum quod species intelligibilis aliquando est in intellectu in | |
| 4903 potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia. | |
| 4904 Aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc | |
| 4905 intelligit actu. Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentiam et | |
| 4906 actum, et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc | |
| 4907 modum intellectus conservat species, etiam quando actu non | |
| 4908 intelligit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A7-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 7. Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p2"> | |
| 4909 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the | |
| 4910 soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also | |
| 4911 distinct from the intellect. | |
| 4912 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31770] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 4913 proceditur. Videtur quod alia potentia sit memoria intellectiva, et | |
| 4914 alia intellectus. Augustinus enim, in X de Trin., ponit in mente | |
| 4915 memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Manifestum est autem quod | |
| 4916 memoria est alia potentia a voluntate. Ergo similiter est alia ab | |
| 4917 intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p3"> | |
| 4918 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory | |
| 4919 in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said ( | |
| 4920 <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect. | |
| 4921 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31771] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eadem | |
| 4922 ratio distinctionis est potentiarum sensitivae partis et | |
| 4923 intellectivae. Sed memoria in parte sensitiva est alia potentia a | |
| 4924 sensu, ut supra dictum est. Ergo memoria partis intellectivae est | |
| 4925 alia potentia ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p4"> | |
| 4926 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one | |
| 4927 flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power. | |
| 4928 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31772] Iª q. 79 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4929 secundum Augustinum, memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt sibi | |
| 4930 invicem aequalia, et unum eorum ab alio oritur. Hoc autem esse non | |
| 4931 posset, si memoria esset eadem potentia cum intellectu. Non est | |
| 4932 ergo eadem potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p5"> | |
| 4933 <b>On the contrary,</b> From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to | |
| 4934 the intellect, as we have said (A[6], ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect. | |
| 4935 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31773] Iª q. 79 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, de | |
| 4936 ratione memoriae est, quod sit thesaurus vel locus conservativus | |
| 4937 specierum. Hoc autem philosophus, in III de anima, attribuit | |
| 4938 intellectui, ut dictum est. Non ergo in parte intellectiva est alia | |
| 4939 potentia memoria ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6"> | |
| 4940 <b>I answer that,</b> As has been said above ( | |
| 4941 <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined | |
| 4942 in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above ( | |
| 4943 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A4" id="FP_Q79_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not | |
| 4944 be | |
| 4945 differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object | |
| 4946 under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object | |
| 4947 under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality." Wherefore the passive | |
| 4948 intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the | |
| 4949 active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object | |
| 4950 to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power | |
| 4951 is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is | |
| 4952 compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers | |
| 4953 in the | |
| 4954 intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for | |
| 4955 it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive. | |
| 4956 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 co."><a name="31774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31774] Iª q. 79 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4957 quod, sicut supra dictum est, potentiae animae distinguuntur | |
| 4958 secundum diversas rationes obiectorum; eo quod ratio cuiuslibet | |
| 4959 potentiae consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est eius | |
| 4960 obiectum. Dictum est etiam supra quod, si aliqua potentia secundum | |
| 4961 propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem | |
| 4962 rationem obiecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum | |
| 4963 diversitates particularium differentiarum, sicut potentia visiva, | |
| 4964 quae respicit suum obiectum secundum rationem colorati, non | |
| 4965 diversificatur per diversitatem albi et nigri. Intellectus autem | |
| 4966 respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis; eo quod | |
| 4967 intellectus possibilis est quo est omnia fieri. Unde secundum | |
| 4968 nullam differentiam entium, diversificatur differentia intellectus | |
| 4969 possibilis. Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et | |
| 4970 intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud | |
| 4971 principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse | |
| 4972 in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in | |
| 4973 actu existente. Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, | |
| 4974 ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, potentia autem passiva | |
| 4975 comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens | |
| 4976 in actu. Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in | |
| 4977 intellectu esse potest, nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod | |
| 4978 memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu, ad rationem enim | |
| 4979 potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p7"> | |
| 4980 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the | |
| 4981 meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present | |
| 4982 in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean | |
| 4983 that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or | |
| 4984 affection which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three | |
| 4985 powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, | |
| 4986 the act of the will. | |
| 4987 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="31775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31775] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4988 dicendum quod, quamvis in III dist. I Sent. dicatur quod memoria, | |
| 4989 intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires; tamen hoc non est | |
| 4990 secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit in XIV de Trin., | |
| 4991 quod <i>si accipiatur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum | |
| 4992 quod semper praesto sunt animae, sive cogitentur sive non | |
| 4993 cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam | |
| 4994 autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, | |
| 4995 sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque | |
| 4996 coniungit</i>. Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus | |
| 4997 pro tribus potentiis; sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animae | |
| 4998 retentione, intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus, voluntatem | |
| 4999 autem pro actu voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p8"> | |
| 5000 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above. | |
| 5001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="31776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31776] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5002 dicendum quod praeteritum et praesens possunt esse propriae | |
| 5003 differentiae potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativae; non autem | |
| 5004 potentiarum intellectivarum, ratione supra dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A7-p9"> | |
| 5005 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power. | |
| 5006 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="31777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31777] Iª q. 79 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5007 dicendum quod intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex | |
| 5008 habitu. Et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei; non autem sicut potentia | |
| 5009 potentiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A8-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 8. Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p2"> | |
| 5010 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when | |
| 5011 we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." | |
| 5012 Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense. | |
| 5013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="31778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31778] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 5014 proceditur. Videtur quod ratio sit alia potentia ab intellectu. In | |
| 5015 libro enim de spiritu et anima dicitur, <i>cum ab inferioribus ad | |
| 5016 superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit nobis sensus, deinde | |
| 5017 imaginatio, deinde ratio, deinde intellectus</i>. Est ergo alia | |
| 5018 potentia ratio ab intellectu, sicut imaginatio a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p3"> | |
| 5019 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong | |
| 5020 to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power. | |
| 5021 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="31779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31779] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5022 Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., quod intellectus comparatur ad | |
| 5023 rationem sicut aeternitas ad tempus. Sed non est eiusdem virtutis | |
| 5024 esse in aeternitate et esse in tempore. Ergo non est eadem potentia | |
| 5025 ratio et intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p4"> | |
| 5026 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to | |
| 5027 man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is | |
| 5028 distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual. | |
| 5029 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="31780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31780] Iª q. 79 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, homo | |
| 5030 communicat cum Angelis in intellectu, cum brutis vero in sensu. Sed | |
| 5031 ratio, quae est propria hominis, qua animal rationale dicitur, est | |
| 5032 alia potentia a sensu. Ergo pari ratione est alia potentia ab | |
| 5033 intellectu, qui proprie convenit Angelis, unde et intellectuales | |
| 5034 dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p5"> | |
| 5035 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence | |
| 5036 or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power. | |
| 5037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 s. c."><a name="31781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31781] Iª q. 79 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5038 quod Augustinus dicit, III super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>illud quo | |
| 5039 homo irrationabilibus animalibus antecellit, est ratio, vel mens, | |
| 5040 vel intelligentia, vel si quo alio vocabulo commodius | |
| 5041 appellatur</i>. Ratio ergo et intellectus et mens sunt una | |
| 5042 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p6"> | |
| 5043 <b>I answer that,</b> Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. | |
| 5044 For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, | |
| 5045 so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible | |
| 5046 truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend | |
| 5047 the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible | |
| 5048 truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, | |
| 5049 as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And | |
| 5050 since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that | |
| 5051 human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood---namely, the first principles; | |
| 5052 and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. | |
| 5053 Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural | |
| 5054 things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we | |
| 5055 understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power. | |
| 5056 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 co."><a name="31782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31782] Iª q. 79 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5057 quod ratio et intellectus in homine non possunt esse diversae | |
| 5058 potentiae. Quod manifeste cognoscitur, si utriusque actus | |
| 5059 consideretur. Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem | |
| 5060 intelligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno | |
| 5061 intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam. Et | |
| 5062 ideo Angeli, qui perfecte possident, secundum modum suae naturae, | |
| 5063 cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis, non habent necesse procedere | |
| 5064 de uno ad aliud; sed simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum | |
| 5065 apprehendunt, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Homines | |
| 5066 autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt, | |
| 5067 procedendo de uno ad aliud, ut ibidem dicitur, et ideo rationales | |
| 5068 dicuntur. Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere | |
| 5069 sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est | |
| 5070 perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili | |
| 5071 procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod | |
| 5072 ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, | |
| 5073 procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima | |
| 5074 principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima | |
| 5075 principia, ad quae inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod | |
| 5076 quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad | |
| 5077 unam et eandem, etiam in naturalibus rebus, quia per eandem naturam | |
| 5078 aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. Multo ergo magis per | |
| 5079 eandem potentiam intelligimus et ratiocinamur. Et sic patet quod in | |
| 5080 homine eadem potentia est ratio et intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p7"> | |
| 5081 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book | |
| 5082 is not of great authority. | |
| 5083 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="31783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31783] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5084 dicendum quod illa enumeratio fit secundum ordinem actuum, non | |
| 5085 secundum distinctionem potentiarum. Quamvis liber ille non sit | |
| 5086 magnae auctoritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p8"> | |
| 5087 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared | |
| 5088 the intellect to eternity, and reason to time. | |
| 5089 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="31784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31784] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum patet | |
| 5090 responsio ex dictis. Aeternitas enim comparatur ad tempus, sicut | |
| 5091 immobile ad mobile. Et ideo Boetius comparavit intellectum | |
| 5092 aeternitati, rationem vero tempori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A8-p9"> | |
| 5093 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, | |
| 5094 although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge | |
| 5095 is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect. | |
| 5096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="31785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31785] Iª q. 79 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5097 dicendum quod alia animalia sunt ita infra hominem, quod non | |
| 5098 possunt attingere ad cognoscendam veritatem, quam ratio inquirit. | |
| 5099 Homo vero attingit ad cognoscendam intelligibilem veritatem, quam | |
| 5100 Angeli cognoscunt; sed imperfecte. Et ideo vis cognoscitiva | |
| 5101 Angelorum non est alterius generis a vi cognoscitiva rationis, sed | |
| 5102 comparatur ad ipsam ut perfectum ad imperfectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A9-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 9. Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p2"> | |
| 5103 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image | |
| 5104 of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore | |
| 5105 the higher and lower reason are two powers. | |
| 5106 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="31786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31786] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 5107 proceditur. Videtur quod ratio superior et inferior sint diversae | |
| 5108 potentiae. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod imago | |
| 5109 Trinitatis est in superiori parte rationis, non autem in inferiori. | |
| 5110 Sed partes animae sunt ipsae eius potentiae. Ergo duae potentiae | |
| 5111 sunt ratio superior et inferior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p3"> | |
| 5112 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore | |
| 5113 the higher reason is another power from the lower. | |
| 5114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="31787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31787] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil | |
| 5115 oritur a seipso. Sed ratio inferior oritur a superiori, et ab ea | |
| 5116 regulatur et dirigitur. Ergo ratio superior est alia potentia ab | |
| 5117 inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p4"> | |
| 5118 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, | |
| 5119 is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And | |
| 5120 he proves this from the principle that for those things which are "generically different, generically different parts of the | |
| 5121 soul are ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as | |
| 5122 corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it | |
| 5123 seems that what the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine | |
| 5124 (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the Philosopher calls | |
| 5125 the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the | |
| 5126 disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower. | |
| 5127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="31788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31788] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5128 philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod scientificum animae quo | |
| 5129 cognoscit anima necessaria, est aliud principium et alia pars | |
| 5130 animae ab opinativo et ratiocinativo, quo cognoscit contingentia. | |
| 5131 Et hoc probat per hoc, quia <i>ad ea quae sunt genere altera, | |
| 5132 altera genere particula animae</i> ordinatur; contingens autem et | |
| 5133 necessarium sunt altera genere, sicut corruptibile et | |
| 5134 incorruptibile. Cum autem idem sit necessarium quod aeternum, et | |
| 5135 temporale idem quod contingens; videtur quod idem sit quod | |
| 5136 philosophus vocat scientificum, et superior pars rationis, quae | |
| 5137 secundum Augustinum intendit aeternis conspiciendis et consulendis; | |
| 5138 et quod idem sit quod philosophus vocat ratiocinativum vel | |
| 5139 opinativum, et inferior ratio, quae secundum Augustinum intendit | |
| 5140 temporalibus disponendis. Est ergo alia potentia animae ratio | |
| 5141 superior, et ratio inferior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p5"> | |
| 5142 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth | |
| 5143 or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the | |
| 5144 intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision." Therefore the opinionative power, | |
| 5145 which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may | |
| 5146 understand the higher reason. | |
| 5147 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 arg. 4"><a name="31789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31789] Iª q. 79 a. 9 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5148 Damascenus dicit quod <i>ex imaginatione fit opinio; deinde mens, | |
| 5149 diiudicans opinionem sive vera sit sive falsa, diiudicat veritatem; | |
| 5150 unde et mens dicitur a metiendo. De quibus igitur iudicatum est iam | |
| 5151 et determinatum vere, dicitur intellectus</i>. Sic igitur | |
| 5152 opinativum, quod est ratio inferior, est aliud a mente et | |
| 5153 intellectu, per quod potest intelligi ratio superior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p6"> | |
| 5154 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they | |
| 5155 are not two powers. | |
| 5156 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 s. c."><a name="31790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31790] Iª q. 79 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5157 quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod ratio superior et | |
| 5158 inferior non nisi per officia distinguuntur. Non ergo sunt duae | |
| 5159 potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A9-p7"> | |
| 5160 <b>I answer that,</b> The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that | |
| 5161 "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation | |
| 5162 it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that | |
| 5163 which "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two---namely, | |
| 5164 eternal and temporal ---are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For | |
| 5165 by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the | |
| 5166 Apostle ( | |
| 5167 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made": while by way of judgment, | |
| 5168 from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of | |
| 5169 things eternal we dispose of temporal things. | |
| 5170 </p><p id="FP_Q79_A9-p8"> But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles | |
| 5171 belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And | |
| 5172 so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science---for example, perspective. But | |
| 5173 the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it | |
| 5174 were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore | |
| 5175 the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions | |
| 5176 of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower. | |
| 5177 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 co."><a name="31791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31791] Iª q. 79 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5178 quod ratio superior et inferior, secundum quod ab Augustino | |
| 5179 accipiuntur, nullo modo duae potentiae animae esse possunt. Dicit | |
| 5180 enim quod ratio superior est quae intendit aeternis conspiciendis | |
| 5181 aut consulendis, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod ea in seipsis | |
| 5182 speculatur; consulendis vero, secundum quod ex eis accipit regulas | |
| 5183 agendorum. Ratio vero inferior ab ipso dicitur, quae intendit | |
| 5184 temporalibus rebus. Haec autem duo, scilicet temporalia et aeterna, | |
| 5185 comparantur ad cognitionem nostram hoc modo, quod unum eorum est | |
| 5186 medium ad cognoscendum alterum. Nam secundum viam inventionis, per | |
| 5187 res temporales in cognitionem devenimus aeternorum, secundum illud | |
| 5188 apostoli, ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, | |
| 5189 intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>, in via vero iudicii, per aeterna iam | |
| 5190 cognita de temporalibus iudicamus, et secundum rationes aeternorum | |
| 5191 temporalia disponimus. Potest autem contingere quod medium, et id | |
| 5192 ad quod per medium pervenitur, ad diversos habitus pertineant, | |
| 5193 sicut principia prima indemonstrabilia pertinent ad habitum | |
| 5194 intellectus, conclusiones vero ex his deductae ad habitum | |
| 5195 scientiae. Et ideo ex principiis geometriae contingit aliquid | |
| 5196 concludere in alia scientia, puta in perspectiva. Sed eadem | |
| 5197 potentia rationis est, ad quam pertinet et medium et ultimum. Est | |
| 5198 enim actus rationis quasi quidam motus de uno in aliud perveniens, | |
| 5199 idem autem est mobile quod pertransiens medium pertingit ad | |
| 5200 terminum. Unde una et eadem potentia rationis est ratio superior et | |
| 5201 inferior. Sed distinguuntur, secundum Augustinum, per officia | |
| 5202 actuum, et secundum diversos habitus, nam superiori rationi | |
| 5203 attribuitur sapientia, inferiori vero scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p9"> | |
| 5204 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the | |
| 5205 higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers. | |
| 5206 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="31792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31792] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5207 dicendum quod secundum quamcumque rationem partitionis potest pars | |
| 5208 dici. Inquantum ergo ratio dividitur secundum diversa officia, | |
| 5209 ratio superior et inferior partitiones dicuntur, et non quia sunt | |
| 5210 diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p10"> | |
| 5211 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower | |
| 5212 reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason. | |
| 5213 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="31793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31793] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5214 dicendum quod ratio inferior dicitur a superiori deduci, vel ab ea | |
| 5215 regulari, inquantum principia quibus utitur inferior ratio, | |
| 5216 deducuntur et diriguntur a principiis superioris rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p11"> | |
| 5217 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found | |
| 5218 even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part | |
| 5219 is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, | |
| 5220 that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a | |
| 5221 power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect---namely, under the aspect | |
| 5222 of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to | |
| 5223 their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but | |
| 5224 imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the | |
| 5225 power, | |
| 5226 but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. | |
| 5227 And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul---namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," | |
| 5228 not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, | |
| 5229 concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper | |
| 5230 genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared | |
| 5231 as perfect and imperfect. | |
| 5232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="31794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31794] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5233 dicendum quod scientificum de quo philosophus loquitur non est idem | |
| 5234 quod ratio superior, nam necessaria scibilia inveniuntur etiam in | |
| 5235 rebus temporalibus, de quibus est scientia naturalis et | |
| 5236 mathematica. Opinativum autem et ratiocinativum in minus est quam | |
| 5237 ratio inferior, quia est contingentium tantum. Nec tamen est | |
| 5238 simpliciter dicendum quod sit alia potentia qua intellectus | |
| 5239 cognoscit necessaria, et alia qua cognoscit contingentia, quia | |
| 5240 utraque cognoscit secundum eandem rationem obiecti, scilicet | |
| 5241 secundum rationem entis et veri. Unde et necessaria, quae habent | |
| 5242 perfectum esse in veritate, perfecte cognoscit; utpote ad eorum | |
| 5243 quidditatem pertingens, per quam propria accidentia de his | |
| 5244 demonstrat. Contingentia vero imperfecte cognoscit; sicut et habent | |
| 5245 imperfectum esse et veritatem. Perfectum autem et imperfectum in | |
| 5246 actu non diversificant potentiam; sed diversificant actus quantum | |
| 5247 ad modum agendi, et per consequens principia actuum et ipsos | |
| 5248 habitus. Et ideo philosophus posuit duas particulas animae, | |
| 5249 scientificum et ratiocinativum, non quia sunt duae potentiae; sed | |
| 5250 quia distinguuntur secundum diversam aptitudinem ad recipiendum | |
| 5251 diversos habitus, quorum diversitatem ibi inquirere intendit. | |
| 5252 Contingentia enim et necessaria, etsi differant secundum propria | |
| 5253 genera, conveniunt tamen in communi ratione entis, quam respicit | |
| 5254 intellectus, ad quam diversimode se habent secundum perfectum et | |
| 5255 imperfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A9-p12"> | |
| 5256 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For "opinion" | |
| 5257 signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" | |
| 5258 or "measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken | |
| 5259 the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed | |
| 5260 judgment with approval. | |
| 5261 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 9 ad 4"><a name="31795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31795] Iª q. 79 a. 9 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 5262 dicendum quod illa distinctio Damasceni est secundum diversitatem | |
| 5263 actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Opinio enim | |
| 5264 significat actum intellectus qui fertur in unam partem | |
| 5265 contradictionis cum formidine alterius. Diiudicare vero, vel | |
| 5266 mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad | |
| 5267 examinationem propositorum. Et ex hoc sumitur nomen mentis. | |
| 5268 Intelligere autem est cum quadam approbatione diiudicatis | |
| 5269 inhaerere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A10-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 10. Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p2"> | |
| 5270 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we | |
| 5271 wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, | |
| 5272 and afterwards intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are | |
| 5273 distinct. | |
| 5274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="31796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31796] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic | |
| 5275 proceditur. Videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia ab | |
| 5276 intellectu. Dicitur enim in libro de spiritu et anima, quod <i>cum | |
| 5277 ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendere volumus, prius occurrit | |
| 5278 nobis sensus, deinde imaginatio, deinde ratio, postea intellectus, | |
| 5279 et postea intelligentia</i>. Sed imaginatio et sensus sunt diversae | |
| 5280 potentiae. Ergo et intellectus et intelligentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p3"> | |
| 5281 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, | |
| 5282 intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power | |
| 5283 from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense. | |
| 5284 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="31797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31797] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5285 Boetius dicit, in V de Consol., quod <i>ipsum hominem aliter | |
| 5286 sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia | |
| 5287 intuetur</i>. Sed intellectus est eadem potentia cum ratione. Ergo | |
| 5288 videtur quod intelligentia sit alia potentia quam intellectus; | |
| 5289 sicut ratio est alia potentia quam imaginatio et sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p4"> | |
| 5290 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from | |
| 5291 others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; | |
| 5292 but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that | |
| 5293 which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, | |
| 5294 examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly | |
| 5295 internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some | |
| 5296 special power. | |
| 5297 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="31798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31798] Iª q. 79 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5298 actus sunt praevii potentiis, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed | |
| 5299 intelligentia est quidam actus ab aliis actibus qui attribuuntur | |
| 5300 intellectui divisus. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>primus motus | |
| 5301 intelligentia dicitur; quae vero circa aliquid est intelligentia, | |
| 5302 intentio vocatur; quae permanens et figurans animam ad id quod | |
| 5303 intelligitur, excogitatio dicitur; excogitatio vero in eodem | |
| 5304 manens, et seipsam examinans et diiudicans, phronesis dicitur</i> | |
| 5305 (idest sapientia); <i>phronesis autem dilatata facit cogitationem, | |
| 5306 idest interius dispositum sermonem; ex quo aiunt provenire sermonem | |
| 5307 per linguam enarratum</i>. Ergo videtur quod intelligentia sit | |
| 5308 quaedam specialis potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p5"> | |
| 5309 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that "intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false." But | |
| 5310 the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect. | |
| 5311 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 s. c."><a name="31799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31799] Iª q. 79 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5312 quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>intelligentia | |
| 5313 indivisibilium est, in quibus non est falsum</i>. Sed huiusmodi | |
| 5314 cognoscere pertinet ad intellectum. Ergo intelligentia non est alia | |
| 5315 potentia praeter intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p6"> | |
| 5316 <b>I answer that,</b> This word "intelligence" properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated | |
| 5317 from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that | |
| 5318 such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or | |
| 5319 "minds." Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but | |
| 5320 as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects---namely, | |
| 5321 the "active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the active and | |
| 5322 passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of | |
| 5323 these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is | |
| 5324 called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes | |
| 5325 it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect. | |
| 5326 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 co."><a name="31800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31800] Iª q. 79 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5327 quod hoc nomen intelligentia proprie significat ipsum actum | |
| 5328 intellectus qui est intelligere. In quibusdam tamen libris de | |
| 5329 Arabico translatis, substantiae separatae quas nos Angelos dicimus, | |
| 5330 intelligentiae vocantur; forte propter hoc, quod huiusmodi | |
| 5331 substantiae semper actu intelligunt. In libris tamen de Graeco | |
| 5332 translatis, dicuntur intellectus seu mentes. Sic ergo intelligentia | |
| 5333 ab intellectu non distinguitur sicut potentia a potentia; sed sicut | |
| 5334 actus a potentia. Invenitur enim talis divisio etiam a philosophis. | |
| 5335 Quandoque enim ponunt quatuor intellectus, scilicet intellectum | |
| 5336 agentem, possibilem, et in habitu, et adeptum. Quorum quatuor | |
| 5337 intellectus agens et possibilis sunt diversae potentiae; sicut et | |
| 5338 in omnibus est alia potentia activa, et alia passiva. Alia vero | |
| 5339 tria distinguuntur secundum tres status intellectus possibilis, qui | |
| 5340 quandoque est in potentia tantum, et sic dicitur possibilis; | |
| 5341 quandoque autem in actu primo, qui est scientia, et sic dicitur | |
| 5342 intellectus in habitu; quandoque autem in actu secundo, qui est | |
| 5343 considerare, et sic dicitur intellectus in actu, sive intellectus | |
| 5344 adeptus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p7"> | |
| 5345 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect | |
| 5346 as act against power. | |
| 5347 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="31801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31801] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5348 dicendum quod, si recipi debet illa auctoritas, intelligentia | |
| 5349 ponitur pro actu intellectus. Et sic dividitur contra intellectum, | |
| 5350 sicut actus contra potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p8"> | |
| 5351 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also | |
| 5352 says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand | |
| 5353 all things without any investigation. | |
| 5354 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="31802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31802] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5355 dicendum quod Boetius accipit intelligentiam pro actu intellectus | |
| 5356 qui transcendit actum rationis. Unde ibidem dicit quod <i>ratio | |
| 5357 tantum humani generis est, sicut intelligentia sola divini</i>, | |
| 5358 proprium enim Dei est quod absque omni investigatione omnia | |
| 5359 intelligat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A10-p9"> | |
| 5360 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power---namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all | |
| 5361 only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence." Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge | |
| 5362 of something else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search of what it "intends," | |
| 5363 it is called "invention." When, by reference to something known for certain, it | |
| 5364 examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to | |
| 5365 the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being | |
| 5366 fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from | |
| 5367 which proceeds "external speech." For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced | |
| 5368 to the one same principle, as we have said above ( | |
| 5369 <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A10-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). | |
| 5370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="31803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31803] Iª q. 79 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5371 dicendum quod omnes illi actus quos Damascenus enumerat, sunt unius | |
| 5372 potentiae, scilicet intellectivae. Quae primo quidem simpliciter | |
| 5373 aliquid apprehendit, et hic actus dicitur intelligentia. Secundo | |
| 5374 vero, id quod apprehendit, ordinat ad aliquid aliud cognoscendum | |
| 5375 vel operandum, et hic vocatur intentio. Dum vero persistit in | |
| 5376 inquisitione illius quod intendit, vocatur excogitatio. Dum vero id | |
| 5377 quod est excogitatum examinat ad aliqua certa, dicitur scire vel | |
| 5378 sapere; quod est phronesis, vel sapientiae, nam sapientiae est | |
| 5379 iudicare, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Ex quo autem habet aliquid pro | |
| 5380 certo, quasi examinatum, cogitat quomodo possit illud aliis | |
| 5381 manifestare, et haec est dispositio interioris sermonis; ex qua | |
| 5382 procedit exterior locutio. Non enim omnis differentia actuum | |
| 5383 potentias diversificat; sed solum illa quae non potest reduci in | |
| 5384 idem principium, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A11-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 11. Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p2"> | |
| 5385 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different | |
| 5386 kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the | |
| 5387 practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers. | |
| 5388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="31804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31804] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum | |
| 5389 sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus speculativus et practicus | |
| 5390 sint diversae potentiae. Apprehensivum enim et motivum sunt diversa | |
| 5391 genera potentiarum, ut patet in II de anima. Sed intellectus | |
| 5392 speculativus est apprehensivus tantum, intellectus autem practicus | |
| 5393 est motivus. Ergo sunt diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p3"> | |
| 5394 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," | |
| 5395 and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers. | |
| 5396 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="31805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31805] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5397 diversa ratio obiecti diversificat potentiam. Sed obiectum | |
| 5398 speculativi intellectus est verum, practici autem bonum; quae | |
| 5399 differunt ratione. Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus sunt | |
| 5400 diversae potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p4"> | |
| 5401 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative | |
| 5402 power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above ( | |
| 5403 <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q79_A11-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical. | |
| 5404 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="31806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31806] Iª q. 79 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 5405 parte intellectiva intellectus practicus comparatur ad | |
| 5406 speculativum, sicut aestimativa ad imaginativam in parte sensitiva. | |
| 5407 Sed aestimativa differt ab imaginativa sicut potentia a potentia, | |
| 5408 ut supra dictum est. Ergo et intellectus practicus a | |
| 5409 speculativo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p5"> | |
| 5410 <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore | |
| 5411 the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. | |
| 5412 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 s. c."><a name="31807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31807] Iª q. 79 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5413 quod dicitur in III de anima, quod intellectus speculativus per | |
| 5414 extensionem fit practicus. Una autem potentia non mutatur in aliam. | |
| 5415 Ergo intellectus speculativus et practicus non sunt diversae | |
| 5416 potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p6"> | |
| 5417 <b>I answer that,</b> The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above ( | |
| 5418 <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a | |
| 5419 thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to | |
| 5420 a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental | |
| 5421 whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it | |
| 5422 is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while | |
| 5423 the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima | |
| 5424 iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, | |
| 5425 the other practical---i.e. operative. | |
| 5426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 co."><a name="31808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31808] Iª q. 79 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5427 quod intellectus practicus et speculativus non sunt diversae | |
| 5428 potentiae. Cuius ratio est quia, ut supra dictum est, id quod | |
| 5429 accidentaliter se habet ad obiecti rationem quam respicit aliqua | |
| 5430 potentia, non diversificat potentiam, accidit enim colorato quod | |
| 5431 sit homo, aut magnum aut parvum; unde omnia huiusmodi eadem visiva | |
| 5432 potentia apprehenduntur. Accidit autem alicui apprehenso per | |
| 5433 intellectum, quod ordinetur ad opus, vel non ordinetur. Secundum | |
| 5434 hoc autem differunt intellectus speculativus et practicus. Nam | |
| 5435 intellectus speculativus est, qui quod apprehendit, non ordinat ad | |
| 5436 opus, sed ad solam veritatis considerationem, practicus vero | |
| 5437 intellectus dicitur, qui hoc quod apprehendit, ordinat ad opus. Et | |
| 5438 hoc est quod philosophus dicit in III de anima, quod | |
| 5439 <i>speculativus differt a practico, fine</i>. Unde et a fine | |
| 5440 denominatur uterque, hic quidem speculativus, ille vero practicus, | |
| 5441 idest operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p7"> | |
| 5442 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it | |
| 5443 according to its mode of apprehension. | |
| 5444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="31809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31809] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5445 dicendum quod intellectus practicus est motivus, non quasi exequens | |
| 5446 motum, sed quasi dirigens ad motum. Quod convenit ei secundum modum | |
| 5447 suae apprehensionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p8"> | |
| 5448 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something | |
| 5449 true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the | |
| 5450 aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed | |
| 5451 to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect | |
| 5452 knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation. | |
| 5453 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="31810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31810] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5454 dicendum quod verum et bonum se invicem includunt, nam verum est | |
| 5455 quoddam bonum, alioquin non esset appetibile; et bonum est quoddam | |
| 5456 verum, alioquin non esset intelligibile. Sicut igitur obiectum | |
| 5457 appetitus potest esse verum, inquantum habet rationem boni, sicut | |
| 5458 cum aliquis appetit veritatem cognoscere; ita obiectum intellectus | |
| 5459 practici est bonum ordinabile ad opus, sub ratione veri. | |
| 5460 Intellectus enim practicus veritatem cognoscit, sicut et | |
| 5461 speculativus; sed veritatem cognitam ordinat ad opus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A11-p9"> | |
| 5462 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said | |
| 5463 above (A[7] , ad 2; | |
| 5464 <a href="#FP_Q77_A3" id="FP_Q79_A11-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>, ad 4). | |
| 5465 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="31811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31811] Iª q. 79 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5466 dicendum quod multae differentiae diversificant sensitivas | |
| 5467 potentias, quae non diversificant potentias intellectivas, ut supra | |
| 5468 dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A12-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 12. Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p2"> | |
| 5469 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, | |
| 5470 seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on | |
| 5471 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A12-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:6, </a> "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore "synderesis" | |
| 5472 is a power. | |
| 5473 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="31812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31812] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum | |
| 5474 sic proceditur. Videtur quod synderesis sit quaedam specialis | |
| 5475 potentia ab aliis distincta. Ea enim quae cadunt sub una divisione, | |
| 5476 videntur esse unius generis. Sed in Glossa Hieronymi Ezech. I, | |
| 5477 dividitur synderesis contra irascibilem et concupiscibilem et | |
| 5478 rationalem; quae sunt quaedam potentiae. Ergo synderesis est | |
| 5479 quaedam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p3"> | |
| 5480 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But "synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because | |
| 5481 "synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is | |
| 5482 clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that 'synderesis' is a power just as sensuality is. | |
| 5483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="31813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31813] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5484 opposita sunt unius generis. Sed synderesis et sensualitas opponi | |
| 5485 videntur, quia synderesis semper inclinat ad bonum, sensualitas | |
| 5486 autem semper ad malum; unde per serpentem significatur, ut patet | |
| 5487 per Augustinum, XII de Trin. Videtur ergo quod synderesis sit | |
| 5488 potentia, sicut et sensualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p4"> | |
| 5489 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of | |
| 5490 virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide | |
| 5491 our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is | |
| 5492 the same as reason: and thus it is a power. | |
| 5493 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="31814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31814] Iª q. 79 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5494 Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod in naturali | |
| 5495 iudicatorio adsunt quaedam <i>regulae et semina virtutum et vera et | |
| 5496 incommutabilia</i>, haec autem dicimus synderesim. Cum ergo regulae | |
| 5497 incommutabiles quibus iudicamus, pertineant ad rationem secundum | |
| 5498 sui superiorem partem, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin.; videtur | |
| 5499 quod synderesis sit idem quod ratio. Et ita est quaedam | |
| 5500 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p5"> | |
| 5501 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), "rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not regard | |
| 5502 opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational | |
| 5503 power, since it is not found in brute animals. | |
| 5504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 s. c."><a name="31815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31815] Iª q. 79 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> <i>Sed contra, | |
| 5505 potentiae rationales se habent ad opposita</i>, secundum | |
| 5506 philosophum. Synderesis autem non se habet ad opposita, sed ad | |
| 5507 bonum tantum inclinat. Ergo synderesis non est potentia. Si enim | |
| 5508 esset potentia, oporteret quod esset rationalis potentia, non enim | |
| 5509 invenitur in brutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p6"> | |
| 5510 <b>I answer that,</b> "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf. Alexander | |
| 5511 of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q[73]] said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear | |
| 5512 we must observe that, as we have said above | |
| 5513 <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q79_A12-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things---namely, those | |
| 5514 which are | |
| 5515 naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle---and ends also at the understanding, | |
| 5516 inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. | |
| 5517 Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical | |
| 5518 things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical | |
| 5519 principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special | |
| 5520 habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first | |
| 5521 practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we | |
| 5522 call "synderesis." Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles | |
| 5523 we | |
| 5524 proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural | |
| 5525 habit. | |
| 5526 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 co."><a name="31816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31816] Iª q. 79 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5527 quod synderesis non est potentia, sed habitus, licet quidam | |
| 5528 posuerint synderesim esse quandam potentiam ratione altiorem; | |
| 5529 quidam vero dixerint eam esse ipsam rationem, non ut est ratio, sed | |
| 5530 ut est natura. Ad huius autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod, | |
| 5531 sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit quidam motus, | |
| 5532 ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum | |
| 5533 absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili, | |
| 5534 et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum iudicamus per | |
| 5535 principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando | |
| 5536 invenimus. Constat autem quod, sicut ratio speculativa ratiocinatur | |
| 5537 de speculativis, ita ratio practica ratiocinatur de operabilibus. | |
| 5538 Oportet igitur naturaliter nobis esse indita, sicut principia | |
| 5539 speculabilium, ita et principia operabilium. Prima autem principia | |
| 5540 speculabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad aliquam | |
| 5541 specialem potentiam; sed ad quendam specialem habitum, qui dicitur | |
| 5542 intellectus principiorum, ut patet in VI Ethic. Unde et principia | |
| 5543 operabilium nobis naturaliter indita, non pertinent ad specialem | |
| 5544 potentiam; sed ad specialem habitum naturalem, quem dicimus | |
| 5545 synderesim. Unde et synderesis dicitur instigare ad bonum, et | |
| 5546 murmurare de malo, inquantum per prima principia procedimus ad | |
| 5547 inveniendum, et iudicamus inventa. Patet ergo quod synderesis non | |
| 5548 est potentia, sed habitus naturalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p7"> | |
| 5549 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can | |
| 5550 belong to one power. | |
| 5551 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="31817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31817] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5552 dicendum quod illa divisio Hieronymi attenditur secundum | |
| 5553 diversitatem actuum, non secundum diversitatem potentiarum. Diversi | |
| 5554 autem actus possunt esse unius potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p8"> | |
| 5555 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to "syneresis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of | |
| 5556 one genus. | |
| 5557 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="31818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31818] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5558 dicendum quod similiter oppositio sensualitatis et synderesis | |
| 5559 attenditur secundum oppositionem actuum; non sicut diversarum | |
| 5560 specierum unius generis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A12-p9"> | |
| 5561 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason | |
| 5562 as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis." | |
| 5563 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="31819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31819] Iª q. 79 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5564 dicendum quod huiusmodi incommutabiles rationes sunt prima | |
| 5565 principia operabilium, circa quae non contingit errare; et | |
| 5566 attribuuntur rationi sicut potentiae, et synderesi sicut habitui. | |
| 5567 Unde et utroque, scilicet ratione et synderesi, naturaliter | |
| 5568 iudicamus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q79_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q79_A13-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 13. Whether conscience be a power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2"> | |
| 5569 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says [*Commentary on | |
| 5570 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.15" target="asv"> Rom. 2:15</a>] that "conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to | |
| 5571 cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a power---either the mind itself, according to the text ( | |
| 5572 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.13" target="asv">Eph. 4:13</a>), "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"---or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is | |
| 5573 called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power. | |
| 5574 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="31820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31820] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 5575 tertiumdecimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod conscientia sit quaedam | |
| 5576 potentia. Dicit enim Origenes quod <i>conscientia est spiritus | |
| 5577 corrector et paedagogus animae sociatus, quo separatur a malis et | |
| 5578 adhaeret bonis</i>. Sed spiritus in anima nominat potentiam | |
| 5579 aliquam, vel ipsam mentem, secundum illud Ephes. IV, <i>renovamini | |
| 5580 spiritu mentis vestrae</i>; vel ipsam imaginationem; unde et | |
| 5581 imaginaria visio spiritualis vocatur, ut patet per Augustinum, XII | |
| 5582 super Gen. ad Litt. Est ergo conscientia quaedam potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p3"> | |
| 5583 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some | |
| 5584 that "their mind and conscience are defiled" ( | |
| 5585 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.15" target="asv">Titus 1:15</a>). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power. | |
| 5586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="31821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31821] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5587 nihil est peccati subiectum nisi potentia animae. Sed conscientia | |
| 5588 est subiectum peccati, dicitur enim ad Tit. I, de quibusdam, quod | |
| 5589 <i>inquinatae sunt eorum mens et conscientia</i>. Ergo videtur quod | |
| 5590 conscientia sit potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p4"> | |
| 5591 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not | |
| 5592 always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by | |
| 5593 many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power. | |
| 5594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="31822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31822] Iª q. 79 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5595 necesse est quod conscientia sit vel actus, vel habitus, vel | |
| 5596 potentia. Sed non est actus, quia non semper maneret in homine. Nec | |
| 5597 est habitus, non enim esset unum quid conscientia, sed multa; per | |
| 5598 multos enim habitus cognoscitivos dirigimur in agendis. Ergo | |
| 5599 conscientia est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p5"> | |
| 5600 <b>On the contrary,</b> Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power. | |
| 5601 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 s. c."><a name="31823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31823] Iª q. 79 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 5602 conscientia deponi potest, non autem potentia. Ergo conscientia non | |
| 5603 est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q79_A13-p6"> | |
| 5604 <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which | |
| 5605 in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies | |
| 5606 the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to | |
| 5607 an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. | |
| 5608 Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. | |
| 5609 </p><p id="FP_Q79_A13-p7"> The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or | |
| 5610 incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: | |
| 5611 which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; "Thy conscience | |
| 5612 knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others" ( | |
| 5613 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.23" target="asv">Eccles. 7:23</a>), and according to | |
| 5614 this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done | |
| 5615 or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge | |
| 5616 that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it | |
| 5617 is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, | |
| 5618 conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first | |
| 5619 natural habit---namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls 'synderesis' conscience (Gloss. | |
| 5620 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:6</a>); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22] says that it is | |
| 5621 the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another. | |
| 5622 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 co."><a name="31824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31824] Iª q. 79 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5623 quod conscientia, proprie loquendo, non est potentia, sed actus. Et | |
| 5624 hoc patet tum ex ratione nominis, tum etiam ex his quae secundum | |
| 5625 communem usum loquendi, conscientiae attribuuntur. Conscientia | |
| 5626 enim, secundum proprietatem vocabuli, importat ordinem scientiae ad | |
| 5627 aliquid, nam conscientia dicitur cum alio scientia. Applicatio | |
| 5628 autem scientiae ad aliquid fit per aliquem actum. Unde ex ista | |
| 5629 ratione nominis patet quod conscientia sit actus. Idem autem | |
| 5630 apparet ex his quae conscientiae attribuuntur. Dicitur enim | |
| 5631 conscientia testificari, ligare vel instigare, et etiam accusare | |
| 5632 vel remordere sive reprehendere. Et haec omnia consequuntur | |
| 5633 applicationem alicuius nostrae cognitionis vel scientiae ad ea quae | |
| 5634 agimus. Quae quidem applicatio fit tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum | |
| 5635 quod recognoscimus aliquid nos fecisse vel non fecisse, secundum | |
| 5636 illud Eccle. VII, <i>scit conscientia tua te crebro maledixisse | |
| 5637 aliis</i>, et secundum hoc, conscientia dicitur testificari. Alio | |
| 5638 modo applicatur secundum quod per nostram conscientiam iudicamus | |
| 5639 aliquid esse faciendum vel non faciendum, et secundum hoc, dicitur | |
| 5640 conscientia instigare vel ligare. Tertio modo applicatur secundum | |
| 5641 quod per conscientiam iudicamus quod aliquid quod est factum, sit | |
| 5642 bene factum vel non bene factum, et secundum hoc, conscientia | |
| 5643 dicitur excusare vel accusare, seu remordere. Patet autem quod | |
| 5644 omnia haec consequuntur actualem applicationem scientiae ad ea quae | |
| 5645 agimus. Unde proprie loquendo, conscientia nominat actum. Quia | |
| 5646 tamen habitus est principium actus, quandoque nomen conscientiae | |
| 5647 attribuitur primo habitui naturali, scilicet synderesi, sicut | |
| 5648 Hieronymus, in Glossa Ezech. I, synderesim conscientiam nominat; et | |
| 5649 Basilius naturale iudicatorium; et Damascenus dicit quod est lex | |
| 5650 intellectus nostri. Consuetum enim est quod causae et effectus per | |
| 5651 invicem nominentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p8"> | |
| 5652 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the | |
| 5653 mind. | |
| 5654 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="31825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31825] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5655 dicendum quod conscientia dicitur spiritus, secundum quod spiritus | |
| 5656 pro mente ponitur, quia est quoddam mentis dictamen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p9"> | |
| 5657 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he | |
| 5658 is defiled. | |
| 5659 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="31826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31826] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5660 dicendum quod inquinatio dicitur esse in conscientia, non sicut in | |
| 5661 subiecto, sed sicut cognitum in cognitione, inquantum scilicet | |
| 5662 aliquis scit se esse inquinatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q79_A13-p10"> | |
| 5663 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the | |
| 5664 habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first | |
| 5665 principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have | |
| 5666 said above. | |
| 5667 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 79 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="31827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31827] Iª q. 79 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5668 dicendum quod actus, etsi non semper maneat in se, semper tamen | |
| 5669 manet in sua causa, quae est potentia et habitus. Habitus autem ex | |
| 5670 quibus conscientia informatur, etsi multi sint, omnes tamen | |
| 5671 efficaciam habent ab uno primo, scilicet ab habitu primorum | |
| 5672 principiorum, qui dicitur synderesis. Unde specialiter hic habitus | |
| 5673 interdum conscientia nominatur, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 5674 <div id="FP_Q80" class="div3"> | |
| 5675 <h3 id="FP_Q80-p0.1">Q. 80. OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 5676 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 5677 <p id="FP_Q80-p2"> Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers | |
| 5678 in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry: | |
| 5679 </p><p id="FP_Q80-p3"><a href="#FP_Q80_A1"> (1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q80-p4"><a href="#FP_Q80_A2"> (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?</a></p> | |
| 5680 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 pr."><a name="31828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31828] | |
| 5681 Iª q. 80 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de potentiis | |
| 5682 appetitivis. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de | |
| 5683 appetitivo in communi; secundo, de sensualitate; tertio, de | |
| 5684 voluntate; quarto, de libero arbitrio. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. | |
| 5685 Primo, utrum debeat poni appetitus aliqua specialis potentia | |
| 5686 animae. Secundo, utrum appetitus dividatur in appetitum sensitivum | |
| 5687 et intellectivum, sicut in potentias diversas.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 5688 <div id="FP_Q80_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q80_A1-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 1. Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p2"> | |
| 5689 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those | |
| 5690 things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since | |
| 5691 "all desire good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul. | |
| 5692 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31829] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 5693 proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus non sit aliqua specialis animae | |
| 5694 potentia. Ad ea enim quae sunt communia animatis et inanimatis, non | |
| 5695 est aliqua potentia animae assignanda. Sed appetere est commune | |
| 5696 animatis et inanimatis quia bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut | |
| 5697 dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo appetitus non est specialis potentia | |
| 5698 animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p3"> | |
| 5699 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive | |
| 5700 power is not distinct from the apprehensive power. | |
| 5701 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31830] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5702 potentiae distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed idem est quod | |
| 5703 cognoscimus et appetimus. Ergo vim appetitivam non oportet esse | |
| 5704 aliam praeter vim apprehensivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p4"> | |
| 5705 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing---namely | |
| 5706 its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some | |
| 5707 particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power. | |
| 5708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31831] Iª q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5709 commune non distinguitur contra proprium. Sed quaelibet potentia | |
| 5710 animae appetit quoddam particulare appetibile, scilicet obiectum | |
| 5711 sibi conveniens. Ergo respectu huius obiecti quod est appetibile in | |
| 5712 communi, non oportet accipi aliquam potentiam ab aliis distinctam, | |
| 5713 quae appetitiva dicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p5"> | |
| 5714 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) | |
| 5715 distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers. | |
| 5716 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31832] Iª q. 80 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5717 quod philosophus, in II de anima, distinguit appetitivum ab aliis | |
| 5718 potentiis. Damascenus etiam, in II libro distinguit vires | |
| 5719 appetitivas a cognitivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q80_A1-p6"> | |
| 5720 <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows | |
| 5721 every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have | |
| 5722 a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which | |
| 5723 lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being---that | |
| 5724 is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. | |
| 5725 But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner | |
| 5726 that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, | |
| 5727 and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and | |
| 5728 intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," | |
| 5729 as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). | |
| 5730 </p><p id="FP_Q80_A1-p7"> Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so | |
| 5731 must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior | |
| 5732 inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and | |
| 5733 not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive | |
| 5734 power to the soul. | |
| 5735 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 co."><a name="31833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31833] Iª q. 80 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5736 quod necesse est ponere quandam potentiam animae appetitivam. Ad | |
| 5737 cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quamlibet formam sequitur | |
| 5738 aliqua inclinatio, sicut ignis ex sua forma inclinatur in | |
| 5739 superiorem locum, et ad hoc quod generet sibi simile. Forma autem | |
| 5740 in his quae cognitionem participant, altiori modo invenitur quam in | |
| 5741 his quae cognitione carent. In his enim quae cognitione carent, | |
| 5742 invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans | |
| 5743 unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur | |
| 5744 formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus | |
| 5745 naturalis vocatur. In habentibus autem cognitionem, sic | |
| 5746 determinatur unumquodque ad proprium esse naturale per formam | |
| 5747 naturalem, quod tamen est receptivum specierum aliarum rerum, sicut | |
| 5748 sensus recipit species omnium sensibilium, et intellectus omnium | |
| 5749 intelligibilium, ut sic anima hominis sit omnia quodammodo secundum | |
| 5750 sensum et intellectum, in quo quodammodo cognitionem habentia ad | |
| 5751 Dei similitudinem appropinquant, in quo omnia praeexistunt, sicut | |
| 5752 Dionysius dicit. Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in | |
| 5753 habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet | |
| 5754 quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, | |
| 5755 quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio | |
| 5756 pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam, per quam animal appetere potest | |
| 5757 ea quae apprehendit, non solum ea ad quae inclinatur ex forma | |
| 5758 naturali. Sic igitur necesse est ponere aliquam potentiam animae | |
| 5759 appetitivam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p8"> | |
| 5760 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have | |
| 5761 said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power. | |
| 5762 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31834] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5763 dicendum quod appetere invenitur in habentibus cognitionem, supra | |
| 5764 modum communem quo invenitur in omnibus, ut dictum est. Et ideo | |
| 5765 oportet ad hoc determinari aliquam potentiam animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p9"> | |
| 5766 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something | |
| 5767 sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not | |
| 5768 material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers. | |
| 5769 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31835] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5770 dicendum quod id quod apprehenditur et appetitur, est idem | |
| 5771 subiecto, sed differt ratione, apprehenditur enim ut est ens | |
| 5772 sensibile vel intelligibile; appetitur vero ut est conveniens aut | |
| 5773 bonum. Diversitas autem rationum in obiectis requiritur ad | |
| 5774 diversitatem potentiarum; non autem materialis diversitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q80_A1-p10"> | |
| 5775 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the | |
| 5776 natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows | |
| 5777 the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound | |
| 5778 for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal. | |
| 5779 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 80 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31836] Iª q. 80 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5780 dicendum quod unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu | |
| 5781 natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde | |
| 5782 unaquaeque appetit obiectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu. | |
| 5783 Supra quem est appetitus animalis consequens apprehensionem, quo | |
| 5784 appetitur aliquid non ea ratione qua est conveniens ad actum huius | |
| 5785 vel illius potentiae, utpote visio ad videndum et auditio ad | |
| 5786 audiendum; sed quia est conveniens simpliciter animali.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 5787 <div id="FP_Q81" class="div3"> | |
| 5788 <h3 id="FP_Q81-p0.1">Q. 81. OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 5789 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 5790 <p id="FP_Q81-p2"> Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q81-p3"><a href="#FP_Q81_A1"> (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?</a></p><p id="FP_Q81-p4"><a href="#FP_Q81_A2"> (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</a></p><p id="FP_Q81-p5"><a href="#FP_Q81_A3"> (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?</a></p> | |
| 5791 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 pr."><a name="31845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31845] | |
| 5792 Iª q. 81 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 5793 sensualitate. Circa quam quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum sensualitas | |
| 5794 sit vis appetitiva tantum. Secundo, utrum dividatur sensualitas in | |
| 5795 irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in diversas potentias. | |
| 5796 Tertio, utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediant rationi.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 5797 <div id="FP_Q81_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A1-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 1. Whether sensuality is only appetitive?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p2"> | |
| 5798 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the | |
| 5799 sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong | |
| 5800 to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. | |
| 5801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31846] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 5802 proceditur. Videtur quod sensualitas non solum sit appetitiva, sed | |
| 5803 etiam cognitiva. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Trin., quod | |
| 5804 <i>sensualis animae motus, qui in corporis sensus intenditur, nobis | |
| 5805 pecoribusque communis est</i>. Sed corporis sensus sub vi cognitiva | |
| 5806 continentur. Ergo sensualitas est vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p3"> | |
| 5807 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality | |
| 5808 against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive. | |
| 5809 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31847] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quae | |
| 5810 cadunt sub una divisione, videntur esse unius generis. Sed | |
| 5811 Augustinus, in XII de Trin., dividit sensualitatem contra rationem | |
| 5812 superiorem et inferiorem; quae ad cognitionem pertinent. Ergo | |
| 5813 sensualitas etiam est vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p4"> | |
| 5814 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, | |
| 5815 the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore | |
| 5816 sensuality is a cognitive power. | |
| 5817 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31848] Iª q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5818 sensualitas in tentatione hominis tenet locum serpentis. Sed | |
| 5819 serpens in tentatione primorum parentum se habuit ut nuntians et | |
| 5820 proponens peccatum; quod est vis cognitivae. Ergo sensualitas est | |
| 5821 vis cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p5"> | |
| 5822 <b>On the contrary,</b> Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body." | |
| 5823 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31849] Iª q. 81 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5824 quod sensualitas definitur esse <i>appetitus rerum ad corpus | |
| 5825 pertinentium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p6"> | |
| 5826 <b>I answer that,</b> The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as | |
| 5827 the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following | |
| 5828 sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: | |
| 5829 since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the | |
| 5830 thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that | |
| 5831 he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: | |
| 5832 whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the | |
| 5833 operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite. | |
| 5834 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 co."><a name="31850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31850] Iª q. 81 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5835 quod nomen sensualitatis sumptum videtur a sensuali motu, de quo | |
| 5836 Augustinus loquitur XII de Trin., sicut ab actu sumitur nomen | |
| 5837 potentiae, ut a visione visus. Motus autem sensualis est appetitus | |
| 5838 apprehensionem sensitivam consequens. Actus enim apprehensivae | |
| 5839 virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus, nam | |
| 5840 operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res | |
| 5841 apprehensae sunt in apprehendente; operatio autem virtutis | |
| 5842 appetitivae perficitur in hoc, quod appetens inclinatur in rem | |
| 5843 appetibilem. Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur | |
| 5844 quieti, operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur | |
| 5845 motui. Unde per sensualem motum intelligitur operatio appetitivae | |
| 5846 virtutis. Et sic sensualitas est nomen appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p7"> | |
| 5847 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand | |
| 5848 that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to | |
| 5849 the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain | |
| 5850 to sensuality as a preamble. | |
| 5851 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31851] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5852 dicendum quod per hoc quod dicit Augustinus quod sensualis animae | |
| 5853 motus intenditur in corporis sensus, non datur intelligi quod | |
| 5854 corporis sensus sub sensualitate comprehendantur, sed magis quod | |
| 5855 motus sensualitatis sit inclinatio quaedam ad sensus corporis, dum | |
| 5856 scilicet appetimus ea quae per corporis sensus apprehenduntur. Et | |
| 5857 sic corporis sensus pertinent ad sensualitatem quasi | |
| 5858 praeambuli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p8"> | |
| 5859 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive | |
| 5860 power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality. | |
| 5861 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31852] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5862 dicendum quod sensualitas dividitur contra rationem superiorem et | |
| 5863 inferiorem, inquantum communicant in actu motionis, vis enim | |
| 5864 cognitiva, ad quam pertinet ratio superior et inferior, est motiva, | |
| 5865 sicut et appetitiva, ad quam pertinet sensualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A1-p9"> | |
| 5866 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified | |
| 5867 by the serpent. | |
| 5868 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31853] Iª q. 81 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5869 dicendum quod serpens non solum ostendit et proposuit peccatum, sed | |
| 5870 etiam, inclinavit in effectum peccati. Et quantum ad hoc, | |
| 5871 sensualitas per serpentem significatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q81_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A2-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 2. Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p2"> | |
| 5872 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the | |
| 5873 same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher | |
| 5874 (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, | |
| 5875 while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and | |
| 5876 concupiscible are the same power in the soul. | |
| 5877 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31854] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 5878 proceditur. Videtur quod appetitus sensitivus non distinguatur in | |
| 5879 irascibilem et concupiscibilem, sicut in potentias diversas. Eadem | |
| 5880 enim potentia animae est unius contrarietatis, ut visus albi et | |
| 5881 nigri, ut dicitur in II de anima. Sed conveniens et nocivum sunt | |
| 5882 contraria. Cum ergo concupiscibilis respiciat conveniens, | |
| 5883 irascibilis vero nocivum, videtur quod eadem potentia animae sit | |
| 5884 irascibilis et concupiscibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p3"> | |
| 5885 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible | |
| 5886 power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible. | |
| 5887 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31855] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5888 appetitus sensitivus non est nisi convenientium secundum sensum. | |
| 5889 Sed conveniens secundum sensum est obiectum concupiscibilis. Ergo | |
| 5890 nullus appetitus sensitivus est a concupiscibili differens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p4"> | |
| 5891 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on | |
| 5892 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv">Mat. 13:33</a>: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible | |
| 5893 part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. | |
| 5894 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31856] Iª q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, odium | |
| 5895 est in irascibili, dicit enim Hieronymus, super Matth., | |
| 5896 <i>possideamus in irascibili odium vitiorum</i>. Sed odium, cum | |
| 5897 contrarietur amori, est in concupiscibili. Ergo eadem vis est | |
| 5898 concupiscibilis et irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p5"> | |
| 5899 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, | |
| 5900 the irascible and the concupiscible. | |
| 5901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31857] Iª q. 81 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5902 quod Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus ponunt duas vires, | |
| 5903 irascibilem et concupiscibilem, partes appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p6"> | |
| 5904 <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species | |
| 5905 of the sensitive appetite---the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural | |
| 5906 corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what | |
| 5907 is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are | |
| 5908 a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, | |
| 5909 not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to | |
| 5910 resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive | |
| 5911 apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part | |
| 5912 two appetitive powers---one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and | |
| 5913 to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that | |
| 5914 hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, | |
| 5915 because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for | |
| 5916 sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, | |
| 5917 following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible | |
| 5918 appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; | |
| 5919 and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, | |
| 5920 as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable | |
| 5921 things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason | |
| 5922 all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for | |
| 5923 instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels | |
| 5924 of animals are about things concupiscible---namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.]. | |
| 5925 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 co."><a name="31858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31858] Iª q. 81 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5926 quod appetitus sensitivus est una vis in genere, quae sensualitas | |
| 5927 dicitur; sed dividitur in duas potentias, quae sunt species | |
| 5928 appetitus sensitivi, scilicet in irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Ad | |
| 5929 cuius evidentiam, considerari oportet quod in rebus naturalibus | |
| 5930 corruptibilibus, non solum oportet esse inclinationem ad | |
| 5931 consequendum convenientia et refugiendum nociva; sed etiam ad | |
| 5932 resistendum corrumpentibus et contrariis, quae convenientibus | |
| 5933 impedimentum praebent et ingerunt nocumenta. Sicut ignis habet | |
| 5934 naturalem inclinationem non solum ut recedat ab inferiori loco, qui | |
| 5935 sibi non convenit, et tendat in locum superiorem sibi convenientem; | |
| 5936 sed etiam quod resistat corrumpentibus et impedientibus. Quia | |
| 5937 igitur appetitus sensitivus est inclinatio consequens | |
| 5938 apprehensionem sensitivam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio | |
| 5939 consequens formam naturalem; necesse est quod in parte sensitiva | |
| 5940 sint duae appetitivae potentiae. Una, per quam anima simpliciter | |
| 5941 inclinatur ad prosequendum ea quae sunt convenientia secundum | |
| 5942 sensum, et ad refugiendum nociva, et haec dicitur concupiscibilis. | |
| 5943 Alia vero, per quam animal resistit impugnantibus, quae | |
| 5944 convenientia impugnant et nocumenta inferunt, et haec vis vocatur | |
| 5945 irascibilis. Unde dicitur quod eius obiectum est arduum, quia | |
| 5946 scilicet tendit ad hoc quod superet contraria, et superemineat eis. | |
| 5947 Hae autem duae inclinationes non reducuntur in unum principium, | |
| 5948 quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit, contra inclinationem | |
| 5949 concupiscibilis, ut secundum inclinationem irascibilis impugnet | |
| 5950 contraria. Unde etiam passiones irascibilis repugnare videntur | |
| 5951 passionibus concupiscibilis, nam concupiscentia accensa minuit | |
| 5952 iram, et ira accensa minuit concupiscentiam, ut in pluribus. Patet | |
| 5953 etiam ex hoc, quod irascibilis est quasi propugnatrix et | |
| 5954 defensatrix concupiscibilis, dum insurgit contra ea quae impediunt | |
| 5955 convenientia, quae concupiscibilis appetit, et ingerunt nociva, | |
| 5956 quae concupiscibilis refugit. Et propter hoc, omnes passiones | |
| 5957 irascibilis incipiunt a passionibus concupiscibilis, et in eas | |
| 5958 terminantur; sicut ira nascitur ex illata tristitia, et vindictam | |
| 5959 inferens, in laetitiam terminatur. Propter hoc etiam pugnae | |
| 5960 animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de cibis et venereis, | |
| 5961 ut dicitur in VIII de animalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p7"> | |
| 5962 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to | |
| 5963 resist the onslaught of the unsuitable. | |
| 5964 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31859] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5965 dicendum quod vis concupiscibilis est et convenientis et | |
| 5966 inconvenientis. Sed irascibilis est ad resistendum inconvenienti | |
| 5967 quod impugnat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p8"> | |
| 5968 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not | |
| 5969 impress the senses, as we have said above ( | |
| 5970 <a href="#FP_Q78_A2" id="FP_Q81_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[2]</a>); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because | |
| 5971 it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power. | |
| 5972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31860] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5973 dicendum quod, sicut in apprehensivis virtutibus in parte sensitiva | |
| 5974 est aliqua vis aestimativa, scilicet quae est perceptiva eorum quae | |
| 5975 sensum non immutant, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam in appetitu | |
| 5976 sensitivo est aliqua vis appetens aliquid quod non est conveniens | |
| 5977 secundum delectationem sensus, sed secundum quod est utile animali | |
| 5978 ad suam defensionem. Et haec est vis irascibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A2-p9"> | |
| 5979 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong | |
| 5980 to the irascible appetite. | |
| 5981 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31861] Iª q. 81 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5982 dicendum quod odium simpliciter pertinet ad concupiscibilem; sed | |
| 5983 ratione impugnationis quae ex odio causatur, potest ad irascibilem | |
| 5984 pertinere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q81_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q81_A3-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 3. Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p2"> | |
| 5985 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts | |
| 5986 of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. | |
| 5987 xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. | |
| 5988 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31862] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 5989 proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non | |
| 5990 obediant rationi. Irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis sunt partes | |
| 5991 sensualitatis. Sed sensualitas non obedit rationi, unde per | |
| 5992 serpentem significatur, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Trin. Ergo | |
| 5993 irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p3"> | |
| 5994 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according | |
| 5995 to the Apostle ( | |
| 5996 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q81_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites | |
| 5997 do not obey reason. | |
| 5998 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31863] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 5999 obedit alicui, non repugnat ei. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis | |
| 6000 repugnant rationi; secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VII, <i>video | |
| 6001 aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Ergo | |
| 6002 irascibilis et concupiscibilis non obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p4"> | |
| 6003 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive | |
| 6004 part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do | |
| 6005 the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey reason. | |
| 6006 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31864] Iª q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 6007 rationali parte animae inferior est vis appetitiva, ita etiam et | |
| 6008 vis sensitiva. Sed sensitiva pars animae non obedit rationi, non | |
| 6009 enim audimus nec videmus quando volumus. Ergo similiter neque vires | |
| 6010 sensitivi appetitus, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis, | |
| 6011 obediunt rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p5"> | |
| 6012 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into | |
| 6013 concupiscence and anger." | |
| 6014 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31865] Iª q. 81 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6015 quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>obediens et persuasibile rationi | |
| 6016 dividitur in concupiscentiam et iram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q81_A3-p6"> | |
| 6017 <b>I answer that,</b> In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; | |
| 6018 first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive | |
| 6019 appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In | |
| 6020 man the estimative power, as we have said above ( | |
| 6021 <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>), is | |
| 6022 replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions. | |
| 6023 Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally | |
| 6024 guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from | |
| 6025 universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is | |
| 6026 divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal | |
| 6027 principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible | |
| 6028 are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain | |
| 6029 universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited. | |
| 6030 </p><p id="FP_Q81_A3-p7"> To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other | |
| 6031 animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees | |
| 6032 at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible | |
| 6033 and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For | |
| 6034 wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower | |
| 6035 appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De | |
| 6036 Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, | |
| 6037 the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason. | |
| 6038 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 co."><a name="31866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31866] Iª q. 81 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6039 quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis obediunt superiori parti, in | |
| 6040 qua est intellectus sive ratio et voluntas, dupliciter, uno modo | |
| 6041 quidem, quantum ad rationem; alio vero modo, quantum ad voluntatem. | |
| 6042 Rationi quidem obediunt quantum ad ipsos suos actus. Cuius ratio | |
| 6043 est, quia appetitus sensitivus in aliis quidem animalibus natus est | |
| 6044 moveri ab aestimativa virtute; sicut ovis aestimans lupum inimicum, | |
| 6045 timet. Loco autem aestimativae virtutis est in homine, sicut supra | |
| 6046 dictum est, vis cogitativa; quae dicitur a quibusdam ratio | |
| 6047 particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium. Unde | |
| 6048 ab ea natus est moveri in homine appetitus sensitivus. Ipsa autem | |
| 6049 ratio particularis nata est moveri et dirigi secundum rationem | |
| 6050 universalem, unde in syllogisticis ex universalibus propositionibus | |
| 6051 concluduntur conclusiones singulares. Et ideo patet quod ratio | |
| 6052 universalis imperat appetitui sensitivo, qui distinguitur per | |
| 6053 concupiscibilem et irascibilem, et hic appetitus ei obedit. Et quia | |
| 6054 deducere universalia principia in conclusiones singulares, non est | |
| 6055 opus simplicis intellectus, sed rationis; ideo irascibilis et | |
| 6056 concupiscibilis magis dicuntur obedire rationi, quam intellectui. | |
| 6057 Hoc etiam quilibet experiri potest in seipso, applicando enim | |
| 6058 aliquas universales considerationes, mitigatur ira aut timor aut | |
| 6059 aliquid huiusmodi, vel etiam instigatur. Voluntati etiam subiacet | |
| 6060 appetitus sensitivus, quantum ad executionem, quae fit per vim | |
| 6061 motivam. In aliis enim animalibus statim ad appetitum | |
| 6062 concupiscibilis et irascibilis sequitur motus sicut ovis, timens | |
| 6063 lupum statim fugit, quia non est in eis aliquis superior appetitus | |
| 6064 qui repugnet. Sed homo non statim movetur secundum appetitum | |
| 6065 irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed expectatur imperium voluntatis, | |
| 6066 quod est appetitus superior. In omnibus enim potentiis motivis | |
| 6067 ordinatis, secundum movens non movet nisi virtute primi moventis, | |
| 6068 unde appetitus inferior non sufficit movere, nisi appetitus | |
| 6069 superior consentiat. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in III de | |
| 6070 anima, quod <i>appetitus superior movet appetitum inferiorem, sicut | |
| 6071 sphaera superior inferiorem</i>. Hoc ergo modo irascibilis et | |
| 6072 concupiscibilis rationi subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p8"> | |
| 6073 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible | |
| 6074 powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said. | |
| 6075 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31867] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6076 dicendum quod sensualitas significatur per serpentem, quantum ad id | |
| 6077 quod est proprium sibi ex parte sensitivae partis. Irascibilis | |
| 6078 autem et concupiscibilis magis nominant sensitivum appetitum ex | |
| 6079 parte actus, ad quem inducuntur ex ratione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p9"> | |
| 6080 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates | |
| 6081 the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called | |
| 6082 despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, | |
| 6083 since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal | |
| 6084 by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of | |
| 6085 their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by | |
| 6086 a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command | |
| 6087 both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or | |
| 6088 reason | |
| 6089 is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, | |
| 6090 by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative | |
| 6091 power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination | |
| 6092 and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we | |
| 6093 sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that | |
| 6094 the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey. | |
| 6095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31868] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6096 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I politicorum, <i>est | |
| 6097 quidem in animali contemplari et despoticum principatum, et | |
| 6098 politicum, anima quidem enim corpori dominatur despotico | |
| 6099 principatu; intellectus autem appetitui, politico et regali</i>. | |
| 6100 Dicitur enim despoticus principatus, quo aliquis principatur | |
| 6101 servis, qui non habent facultatem in aliquo resistendi imperio | |
| 6102 praecipientis, quia nihil sui habent. Principatus autem politicus | |
| 6103 et regalis dicitur, quo aliquis principatur liberis, qui, etsi | |
| 6104 subdantur regimini praesidentis, tamen habent aliquid proprium, ex | |
| 6105 quo possunt reniti praecipientis imperio. Sic igitur anima dicitur | |
| 6106 dominari corpori despotico principatu, quia corporis membra in | |
| 6107 nullo resistere possunt imperio animae, sed statim ad appetitum | |
| 6108 animae movetur manus et pes, et quodlibet membrum quod natum est | |
| 6109 moveri voluntario motu. Intellectus autem, seu ratio, dicitur | |
| 6110 principari irascibili et concupiscibili politico principatu, quia | |
| 6111 appetitus sensibilis habet aliquid proprium, unde potest reniti | |
| 6112 imperio rationis. Natus est enim moveri appetitus sensitivus, non | |
| 6113 solum ab aestimativa in aliis animalibus, et cogitativa in homine, | |
| 6114 quam dirigit universalis ratio; sed etiam ab imaginativa et sensu. | |
| 6115 Unde experimur irascibilem vel concupiscibilem rationi repugnare, | |
| 6116 per hoc quod sentimus vel imaginamur aliquod delectabile quod ratio | |
| 6117 vetat, vel triste quod ratio praecipit. Et sic per hoc quod | |
| 6118 irascibilis et concupiscibilis in aliquo rationi repugnant, non | |
| 6119 excluditur quin ei obediant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q81_A3-p10"> | |
| 6120 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is | |
| 6121 not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore | |
| 6122 they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but | |
| 6123 can also form the phantasms of the imagination. | |
| 6124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 81 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31869] Iª q. 81 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6125 dicendum quod sensus exteriores indigent ad suos actus exterioribus | |
| 6126 sensibilibus, quibus immutentur, quorum praesentia non est in | |
| 6127 potestate rationis. Sed vires interiores, tam appetitivae quam | |
| 6128 apprehensivae, non indigent exterioribus rebus. Et ideo subduntur | |
| 6129 imperio rationis, quae potest non solum instigare vel mitigare | |
| 6130 affectus appetitivae virtutis, sed etiam formare imaginativae | |
| 6131 virtutis phantasmata.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 6132 <div id="FP_Q82" class="div3"> | |
| 6133 <h3 id="FP_Q82-p0.1">Q. 82. OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 6134 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 6135 <p id="FP_Q82-p2"> We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q82-p3"><a href="#FP_Q82_A1"> (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p4"><a href="#FP_Q82_A2"> (2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p5"><a href="#FP_Q82_A3"> (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p6"><a href="#FP_Q82_A4"> (4) Whether the will moves the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q82-p7"><a href="#FP_Q82_A5"> (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?</a></p> | |
| 6136 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 pr."><a name="31870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31870] | |
| 6137 Iª q. 82 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de voluntate. | |
| 6138 Circa quam quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum voluntas aliquid ex | |
| 6139 necessitate appetat. Secundo, utrum omnia ex necessitate appetat. | |
| 6140 Tertio, utrum sit eminentior potentia quam intellectus. Quarto, | |
| 6141 utrum voluntas moveat intellectum. Quinto, utrum voluntas | |
| 6142 distinguatur per irascibilem et concupiscibilem.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 6143 <div id="FP_Q82_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A1-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 1. Whether the will desires something of necessity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p2"> | |
| 6144 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is | |
| 6145 not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity. | |
| 6146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31871] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 6147 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas nihil ex necessitate appetat. | |
| 6148 Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid est | |
| 6149 necessarium, non est voluntarium. Sed omne quod voluntas appetit, | |
| 6150 est voluntarium. Ergo nihil quod voluntas appetit, est necessario | |
| 6151 desideratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p3"> | |
| 6152 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is | |
| 6153 a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite | |
| 6154 things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity. | |
| 6155 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31872] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6156 potestates rationales, secundum philosophum, se habent ad opposita. | |
| 6157 Sed voluntas est potestas rationalis, quia, ut dicitur in III de | |
| 6158 anima, voluntas in ratione est. Ergo voluntas se habet ad opposita. | |
| 6159 Ad nihil ergo de necessitate determinatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p4"> | |
| 6160 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the | |
| 6161 act of the will cannot be necessitated. | |
| 6162 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31873] Iª q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6163 secundum voluntatem sumus domini nostrorum actuum. Sed eius quod ex | |
| 6164 necessitate est, non sumus domini. Ergo actus voluntatis non potest | |
| 6165 de necessitate esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p5"> | |
| 6166 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, | |
| 6167 there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity. | |
| 6168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31874] Iª q. 82 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6169 quod Augustinus dicit, in XIII de Trin., quod <i>beatitudinem omnes | |
| 6170 una voluntate appetunt</i>. Si autem non esset necessarium sed | |
| 6171 contingens, deficeret ad minus in paucioribus. Ergo voluntas ex | |
| 6172 necessitate aliquid vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p6"> | |
| 6173 <b>I answer that,</b> The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to | |
| 6174 it by an intrinsic principle---either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible---or | |
| 6175 formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is | |
| 6176 "natural" and "absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, | |
| 6177 belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without | |
| 6178 it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is | |
| 6179 necessary for a journey. This is called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part of the agent, a thing | |
| 6180 must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity of | |
| 6181 coercion." | |
| 6182 </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p7"> Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination | |
| 6183 of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because | |
| 6184 it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of | |
| 6185 the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it | |
| 6186 is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary. | |
| 6187 </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p8"> But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will | |
| 6188 to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship. | |
| 6189 </p><p id="FP_Q82_A1-p9"> In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity | |
| 6190 adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in | |
| 6191 practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the | |
| 6192 root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, | |
| 6193 and every movement arises from something immovable. | |
| 6194 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 co."><a name="31875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31875] Iª q. 82 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6195 quod necessitas dicitur multipliciter. Necesse est enim quod non | |
| 6196 potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit alicui, uno modo ex principio | |
| 6197 intrinseco, sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum | |
| 6198 ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi; sive formali, sicut cum dicimus | |
| 6199 quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus | |
| 6200 rectis. Et haec est necessitas naturalis et absoluta. Alio modo | |
| 6201 convenit alicui quod non possit non esse, ex aliquo extrinseco, vel | |
| 6202 fine vel agente. Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc | |
| 6203 consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem, ut cibus dicitur | |
| 6204 necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter. Et haec vocatur necessitas | |
| 6205 finis; quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur. Ex agente autem hoc | |
| 6206 alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita | |
| 6207 quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur necessitas | |
| 6208 coactionis. Haec igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat | |
| 6209 voluntati. Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra | |
| 6210 inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclinatio | |
| 6211 quaedam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid naturale quia est | |
| 6212 secundum inclinationem naturae, ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium | |
| 6213 quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossibile | |
| 6214 est quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale; ita impossibile | |
| 6215 est quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum sive violentum, et | |
| 6216 voluntarium. Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando | |
| 6217 ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo, sicut ex voluntate | |
| 6218 transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem. | |
| 6219 Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati. | |
| 6220 Quinimmo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate | |
| 6221 inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhaereat | |
| 6222 ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo, finis enim se habet in operativis | |
| 6223 sicut principium in speculativis, ut dicitur in II Physic. Oportet | |
| 6224 enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, | |
| 6225 sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum, quia natura rei est | |
| 6226 primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo | |
| 6227 immobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p10"> | |
| 6228 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away the liberty | |
| 6229 of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10). | |
| 6230 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31876] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6231 dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum de necessario | |
| 6232 necessitate coactionis. Necessitas autem naturalis non aufert | |
| 6233 libertatem voluntatis, ut ipsemet in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p11"> | |
| 6234 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than | |
| 6235 to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power. | |
| 6236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31877] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6237 dicendum quod voluntas secundum quod aliquid naturaliter vult, | |
| 6238 magis respondet intellectui naturalium principiorum, quam rationi, | |
| 6239 quae ad opposita se habet. Unde secundum hoc, magis est | |
| 6240 intellectualis quam rationalis potestas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A1-p12"> | |
| 6241 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but | |
| 6242 "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard | |
| 6243 those actions of which we are masters. | |
| 6244 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31878] Iª q. 82 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6245 dicendum quod sumus domini nostrorum actuum secundum quod possumus | |
| 6246 hoc vel illud eligere. Electio autem non est de fine, sed de his | |
| 6247 quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde appetitus ultimi | |
| 6248 finis non est de his quorum domini sumus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A2-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 2. Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p2"> | |
| 6249 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that | |
| 6250 "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it. | |
| 6251 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31879] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 6252 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas ex necessitate omnia velit | |
| 6253 quaecumque vult. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV de Div. Nom., quod malum | |
| 6254 est praeter voluntatem. Ex necessitate ergo voluntas tendit in | |
| 6255 bonum sibi propositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p3"> | |
| 6256 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable | |
| 6257 necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity. | |
| 6258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31880] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6259 obiectum voluntatis comparatur ad ipsam sicut movens ad mobile. Sed | |
| 6260 motus mobilis necessario consequitur ex movente. Ergo videtur quod | |
| 6261 obiectum voluntatis ex necessitate moveat ipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p4"> | |
| 6262 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect | |
| 6263 is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive | |
| 6264 appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems | |
| 6265 that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity. | |
| 6266 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31881] Iª q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 6267 apprehensum secundum sensum est obiectum appetitus sensitivi, ita | |
| 6268 apprehensum secundum intellectum est obiectum intellectivi | |
| 6269 appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Sed apprehensum secundum sensum ex | |
| 6270 necessitate movet appetitum sensitivum, dicit enim Augustinus, | |
| 6271 super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur visis. Ergo videtur | |
| 6272 quod apprehensum secundum intellectum ex necessitate moveat | |
| 6273 voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p5"> | |
| 6274 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things. | |
| 6275 Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires. | |
| 6276 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31882] Iª q. 82 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6277 quod Augustinus dicit, quod <i>voluntas est qua peccatur et recte | |
| 6278 vivitur</i>, et sic se habet ad opposita. Non ergo ex necessitate | |
| 6279 vult quaecumque vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p6"> | |
| 6280 <b>I answer that,</b> The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect | |
| 6281 naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already | |
| 6282 <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent | |
| 6283 propositions, the denial of which does not involve a | |
| 6284 denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which | |
| 6285 have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial | |
| 6286 of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection | |
| 6287 of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes | |
| 6288 the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary | |
| 6289 connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But | |
| 6290 there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom | |
| 6291 alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such | |
| 6292 connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the | |
| 6293 man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore | |
| 6294 clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires. | |
| 6295 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 co."><a name="31883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31883] Iª q. 82 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6296 quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque vult. Ad cuius | |
| 6297 evidentiam, considerandum est quod sicut intellectus naturaliter et | |
| 6298 ex necessitate inhaeret primis principiis, ita voluntas ultimo | |
| 6299 fini, ut iam dictum est. Sunt autem quaedam intelligibilia quae non | |
| 6300 habent necessariam connexionem ad prima principia; sicut | |
| 6301 contingentes propositiones, ad quarum remotionem non sequitur | |
| 6302 remotio primorum principiorum. Et talibus non ex necessitate | |
| 6303 assentit intellectus. Quaedam autem propositiones sunt necessariae, | |
| 6304 quae habent connexionem necessariam cum primis principiis; sicut | |
| 6305 conclusiones demonstrabiles, ad quarum remotionem sequitur remotio | |
| 6306 primorum principiorum. Et his intellectus ex necessitate assentit, | |
| 6307 cognita connexione necessaria conclusionum ad principia per | |
| 6308 demonstrationis deductionem, non autem ex necessitate assentit | |
| 6309 antequam huiusmodi necessitatem connexionis per demonstrationem | |
| 6310 cognoscat. Similiter etiam est ex parte voluntatis. Sunt enim | |
| 6311 quaedam particularia bona, quae non habent necessariam connexionem | |
| 6312 ad beatitudinem, quia sine his potest aliquis esse beatus, et | |
| 6313 huiusmodi voluntas non de necessitate inhaeret. Sunt autem quaedam | |
| 6314 habentia necessariam connexionem ad beatitudinem, quibus scilicet | |
| 6315 homo Deo inhaeret, in quo solo vera beatitudo consistit. Sed tamen | |
| 6316 antequam per certitudinem divinae visionis necessitas huiusmodi | |
| 6317 connexionis demonstretur, voluntas non ex necessitate Deo inhaeret, | |
| 6318 nec his quae Dei sunt. Sed voluntas videntis Deum per essentiam, de | |
| 6319 necessitate inhaeret Deo, sicut nunc ex necessitate volumus esse | |
| 6320 beati. Patet ergo quod voluntas non ex necessitate vult quaecumque | |
| 6321 vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p7"> | |
| 6322 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will | |
| 6323 is not of necessity determined to one. | |
| 6324 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31884] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6325 dicendum quod voluntas in nihil potest tendere nisi sub ratione | |
| 6326 boni. Sed quia bonum est multiplex, propter hoc non ex necessitate | |
| 6327 determinatur ad unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p8"> | |
| 6328 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, | |
| 6329 so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, | |
| 6330 its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it. | |
| 6331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31885] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6332 dicendum quod movens tunc ex necessitate causat motum in mobili, | |
| 6333 quando potestas moventis excedit mobile, ita quod tota eius | |
| 6334 possibilitas moventi subdatur. Cum autem possibilitas voluntatis | |
| 6335 sit respectu boni universalis et perfecti, non subiicitur eius | |
| 6336 possibilitas tota alicui particulari bono. Et ideo non ex | |
| 6337 necessitate movetur ab illo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A2-p9"> | |
| 6338 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one | |
| 6339 thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power | |
| 6340 that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appetite---that is, the will---may be | |
| 6341 moved; but not of necessity from one thing. | |
| 6342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31886] Iª q. 82 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6343 dicendum quod vis sensitiva non est vis collativa diversorum, sicut | |
| 6344 ratio, sed simpliciter aliquid unum apprehendit. Et ideo secundum | |
| 6345 illud unum determinate movet appetitum sensitivum. Sed ratio est | |
| 6346 collativa plurium, et ideo ex pluribus moveri potest appetitus | |
| 6347 intellectivus, scilicet voluntas, et non ex uno ex necessitate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A3-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 3. Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p2"> | |
| 6348 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the | |
| 6349 end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power. | |
| 6350 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31887] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 6351 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas sit altior potentia quam | |
| 6352 intellectus. Bonum enim et finis est obiectum voluntatis. Sed finis | |
| 6353 est prima et altissima causarum. Ergo voluntas est prima et | |
| 6354 altissima potentiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p3"> | |
| 6355 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in | |
| 6356 the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, | |
| 6357 follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect. | |
| 6358 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31888] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res | |
| 6359 naturales inveniuntur procedere de imperfectis ad perfecta. Et hoc | |
| 6360 etiam in potentiis animae apparet, proceditur enim de sensu ad | |
| 6361 intellectum, qui est nobilior. Sed naturalis processus est de actu | |
| 6362 intellectus in actum voluntatis. Ergo voluntas est perfectior et | |
| 6363 nobilior potentia quam intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p4"> | |
| 6364 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects | |
| 6365 the will---namely, charity---is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written ( | |
| 6366 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>): "If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will | |
| 6367 is a higher power than the intellect. | |
| 6368 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31889] Iª q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6369 habitus sunt proportionati potentiis, sicut perfectiones | |
| 6370 perfectibilibus. Sed habitus quo perficitur voluntas, scilicet | |
| 6371 caritas, est nobilior habitibus quibus perficitur intellectus, | |
| 6372 dicitur enim I ad Cor. XIII, <i>si noverim mysteria omnia, et si | |
| 6373 habuero omnem fidem, caritatem autem non habeam, nihil sum</i>. | |
| 6374 Ergo voluntas est altior potentia quam intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p5"> | |
| 6375 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect. | |
| 6376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31890] Iª q. 82 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6377 quod philosophus, in X Ethic., ponit altissimam potentiam animae | |
| 6378 esse intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6"> | |
| 6379 <b>I answer that,</b> The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is considered | |
| 6380 to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore | |
| 6381 the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear | |
| 6382 if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the | |
| 6383 intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea | |
| 6384 of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more | |
| 6385 simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect | |
| 6386 is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows | |
| 6387 that | |
| 6388 the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something | |
| 6389 else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something | |
| 6390 higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler | |
| 6391 than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though | |
| 6392 color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above ( | |
| 6393 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[1]</a>; | |
| 6394 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27_A4" id="FP_Q82_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a>), the action of the intellect consists in this---that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while | |
| 6395 the act of the will consists in this---that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore | |
| 6396 the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in | |
| 6397 things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which | |
| 6398 there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is | |
| 6399 higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that | |
| 6400 thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, | |
| 6401 the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will. | |
| 6402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 co."><a name="31891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31891] Iª q. 82 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6403 quod eminentia alicuius ad alterum potest attendi dupliciter, uno | |
| 6404 modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Consideratur autem | |
| 6405 aliquid tale simpliciter, prout est secundum seipsum tale, secundum | |
| 6406 quid autem, prout dicitur tale secundum respectum ad alterum. Si | |
| 6407 ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic | |
| 6408 intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione | |
| 6409 obiectorum ad invicem. Obiectum enim intellectus est simplicius et | |
| 6410 magis absolutum quam obiectum voluntatis, nam obiectum intellectus | |
| 6411 est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem appetibile, cuius | |
| 6412 ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. Quanto autem | |
| 6413 aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est | |
| 6414 nobilius et altius. Et ideo obiectum intellectus est altius quam | |
| 6415 obiectum voluntatis. Cum ergo propria ratio potentiae sit secundum | |
| 6416 ordinem ad obiectum, sequitur quod secundum se et simpliciter | |
| 6417 intellectus sit altior et nobilior voluntate. Secundum quid autem, | |
| 6418 et per comparationem ad alterum, voluntas invenitur interdum altior | |
| 6419 intellectu; ex eo scilicet quod obiectum voluntatis in altiori re | |
| 6420 invenitur quam obiectum intellectus. Sicut si dicerem auditum esse | |
| 6421 secundum quid nobiliorem visu, inquantum res aliqua cuius est | |
| 6422 sonus, nobilior est aliqua re cuius est color, quamvis color sit | |
| 6423 nobilior et simplicior sono. Ut enim supra dictum est, actio | |
| 6424 intellectus consistit in hoc quod ratio rei intellectae est in | |
| 6425 intelligente; actus vero voluntatis perficitur in hoc quod voluntas | |
| 6426 inclinatur ad ipsam rem prout in se est. Et ideo philosophus dicit, | |
| 6427 in VI Metaphys., quod bonum et malum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis, | |
| 6428 sunt in rebus; verum et falsum, quae sunt obiecta intellectus, sunt | |
| 6429 in mente. Quando igitur res in qua est bonum, est nobilior ipsa | |
| 6430 anima, in qua est ratio intellecta; per comparationem ad talem rem, | |
| 6431 voluntas est altior intellectu. Quando vero res in qua est bonum, | |
| 6432 est infra animam; tunc etiam per comparationem ad talem rem, | |
| 6433 intellectus est altior voluntate. Unde melior est amor Dei quam | |
| 6434 cognitio, e contrario autem melior est cognitio rerum corporalium | |
| 6435 quam amor. Simpliciter tamen intellectus est nobilior quam | |
| 6436 voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p7"> | |
| 6437 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found | |
| 6438 to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is | |
| 6439 something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other | |
| 6440 ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other | |
| 6441 powers. | |
| 6442 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31892] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6443 dicendum quod ratio causae accipitur secundum comparationem unius | |
| 6444 ad alterum, et in tali comparatione ratio boni principalior | |
| 6445 invenitur, sed verum dicitur magis absolute, et ipsius boni | |
| 6446 rationem significat. Unde et bonum quoddam verum est. Sed rursus et | |
| 6447 ipsum verum est quoddam bonum; secundum quod intellectus res | |
| 6448 quaedam est, et verum finis ipsius. Et inter alios fines iste finis | |
| 6449 est excellentior; sicut intellectus inter alias potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p8"> | |
| 6450 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, | |
| 6451 and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act | |
| 6452 precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and | |
| 6453 as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will. | |
| 6454 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31893] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6455 dicendum quod illud quod est prius generatione et tempore, est | |
| 6456 imperfectius, quia in uno et eodem potentia tempore praecedit | |
| 6457 actum, et imperfectio perfectionem. Sed illud quod est prius | |
| 6458 simpliciter et secundum naturae ordinem, est perfectius, sic enim | |
| 6459 actus est prior potentia. Et hoc modo intellectus est prior | |
| 6460 voluntate, sicut motivum mobili, et activum passivo, bonum enim | |
| 6461 intellectum movet voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A3-p9"> | |
| 6462 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God. | |
| 6463 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31894] Iª q. 82 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6464 dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de voluntate secundum | |
| 6465 comparationem ad id quod supra animam est. Virtus enim caritatis | |
| 6466 est qua Deum amamus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A4-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 4. Whether the will moves the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p2"> | |
| 6467 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves | |
| 6468 is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De | |
| 6469 Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above | |
| 6470 <a href="#FP_Q82_A3" id="FP_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. | |
| 6471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31895] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 6472 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveat intellectum. Movens | |
| 6473 enim est nobilius et prius moto, quia movens est agens; agens autem | |
| 6474 est nobilius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Gen. ad Litt., | |
| 6475 et philosophus in III de anima. Sed intellectus est prior et | |
| 6476 nobilior voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas non movet | |
| 6477 intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p3"> | |
| 6478 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because | |
| 6479 the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect | |
| 6480 is not moved by the will. | |
| 6481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31896] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6482 movens non movetur a moto, nisi forte per accidens. Sed intellectus | |
| 6483 movet voluntatem, quia appetibile apprehensum per intellectum est | |
| 6484 movens non motum; appetitus autem movens motum. Ergo intellectus | |
| 6485 non movetur a voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p4"> | |
| 6486 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to | |
| 6487 understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another | |
| 6488 act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. | |
| 6489 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31897] Iª q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nihil | |
| 6490 velle possumus nisi sit intellectum. Si igitur ad intelligendum | |
| 6491 movet voluntas volendo intelligere, oportebit quod etiam illud | |
| 6492 velle praecedat aliud intelligere, et illud intelligere aliud | |
| 6493 velle, et sic in infinitum, quod est impossibile. Non ergo voluntas | |
| 6494 movet intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p5"> | |
| 6495 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power | |
| 6496 by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect. | |
| 6497 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31898] Iª q. 82 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6498 quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>in nobis est percipere quamcumque | |
| 6499 volumus artem, et non percipere</i>. In nobis autem est aliquid per | |
| 6500 voluntatem; percipimus autem artes per intellectum. Voluntas ergo | |
| 6501 movet intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p6"> | |
| 6502 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way | |
| 6503 the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing | |
| 6504 is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the | |
| 6505 will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De | |
| 6506 Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards | |
| 6507 the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. | |
| 6508 For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior | |
| 6509 bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common | |
| 6510 good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. | |
| 6511 Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, | |
| 6512 as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent | |
| 6513 moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not | |
| 6514 subject | |
| 6515 to our will. | |
| 6516 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 co."><a name="31899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31899] Iª q. 82 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6517 quod aliquid dicitur movere dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum finis; | |
| 6518 sicut dicitur quod finis movet efficientem. Et hoc modo intellectus | |
| 6519 movet voluntatem, quia bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, | |
| 6520 et movet ipsam ut finis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid movere per modum | |
| 6521 agentis; sicut alterans movet alteratum, et impellens movet | |
| 6522 impulsum. Et hoc modo voluntas movet intellectum, et omnes animae | |
| 6523 vires; ut Anselmus dicit in libro de similitudinibus. Cuius ratio | |
| 6524 est, quia in omnibus potentiis activis ordinatis, illa potentia | |
| 6525 quae respicit finem universalem, movet potentias quae respiciunt | |
| 6526 fines particulares. Et hoc apparet tam in naturalibus quam in | |
| 6527 politicis. Caelum enim, quod agit ad universalem conservationem | |
| 6528 generabilium et corruptibilium, movet omnia inferiora corpora, | |
| 6529 quorum unumquodque agit ad conservationem propriae speciei, vel | |
| 6530 etiam individui. Rex etiam, qui intendit bonum commune totius | |
| 6531 regni, movet per suum imperium singulos praepositos civitatum, qui | |
| 6532 singulis civitatibus curam regiminis impendunt. Obiectum autem | |
| 6533 voluntatis est bonum et finis in communi. Quaelibet autem potentia | |
| 6534 comparatur ad aliquod bonum proprium sibi conveniens; sicut visus | |
| 6535 ad perceptionem coloris, intellectus ad cognitionem veri. Et ideo | |
| 6536 voluntas per modum agentis movet omnes animae potentias ad suos | |
| 6537 actus, praeter vires naturales vegetativae partis, quae nostro | |
| 6538 arbitrio non subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p7"> | |
| 6539 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular | |
| 6540 power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature | |
| 6541 of its object---that is to say, as appetitive of universal good---and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate | |
| 6542 act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another | |
| 6543 according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above | |
| 6544 <a href="#FP_Q82_A3" id="FP_Q82_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature | |
| 6545 of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under | |
| 6546 the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands | |
| 6547 the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained | |
| 6548 in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is | |
| 6549 good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, | |
| 6550 each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher | |
| 6551 than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, | |
| 6552 because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good | |
| 6553 is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good. | |
| 6554 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31900] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6555 dicendum quod intellectus dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, | |
| 6556 secundum quod intellectus est apprehensivus entis et veri | |
| 6557 universalis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam res, et | |
| 6558 particularis potentia habens determinatum actum. Et similiter | |
| 6559 voluntas dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo, secundum | |
| 6560 communitatem sui obiecti, prout scilicet est appetitiva boni | |
| 6561 communis; alio modo, secundum quod est quaedam determinata animae | |
| 6562 potentia habens determinatum actum. Si ergo comparentur intellectus | |
| 6563 et voluntas secundum rationem communitatis obiectorum utriusque, | |
| 6564 sic dictum est supra quod intellectus est simpliciter altior et | |
| 6565 nobilior voluntate. Si autem consideretur intellectus secundum | |
| 6566 communitatem sui obiecti, et voluntas secundum quod est quaedam | |
| 6567 determinata potentia, sic iterum intellectus est altior et prior | |
| 6568 voluntate, quia sub ratione entis et veri, quam apprehendit | |
| 6569 intellectus, continetur voluntas ipsa, et actus eius, et obiectum | |
| 6570 ipsius. Unde intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et actum eius, et | |
| 6571 obiectum ipsius, sicut et alia specialia intellecta, ut lapidem aut | |
| 6572 lignum, quae continentur sub communi ratione entis et veri. Si vero | |
| 6573 consideretur voluntas secundum communem rationem sui obiecti, quod | |
| 6574 est bonum, intellectus autem secundum quod est quaedam res et | |
| 6575 potentia specialis; sic sub communi ratione boni continetur, velut | |
| 6576 quoddam speciale, et intellectus ipse, et ipsum intelligere, et | |
| 6577 obiectum eius, quod est verum, quorum quodlibet est quoddam | |
| 6578 speciale bonum. Et secundum hoc voluntas est altior intellectu, et | |
| 6579 potest ipsum movere. Ex his ergo apparet ratio quare hae potentiae | |
| 6580 suis actibus invicem se includunt, quia intellectus intelligit | |
| 6581 voluntatem velle, et voluntas vult intellectum intelligere. Et | |
| 6582 simili ratione bonum continetur sub vero, inquantum est quoddam | |
| 6583 verum intellectum; et verum continetur sub bono, inquantum est | |
| 6584 quoddam bonum desideratum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p8"> | |
| 6585 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above. | |
| 6586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31901] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6587 dicendum quod intellectus alio modo movet voluntatem, quam voluntas | |
| 6588 intellectum, ut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A4-p9"> | |
| 6589 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of | |
| 6590 the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle | |
| 6591 of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect ---namely, God---as also Aristotle | |
| 6592 says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to | |
| 6593 proceed indefinitely. | |
| 6594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31902] Iª q. 82 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6595 dicendum quod non oportet procedere in infinitum, sed statur in | |
| 6596 intellectu sicut in primo. Omnem enim voluntatis motum necesse est | |
| 6597 quod praecedat apprehensio, sed non omnem apprehensionem praecedit | |
| 6598 motus voluntatis; sed principium consiliandi et intelligendi est | |
| 6599 aliquod intellectivum principium altius intellectu nostro, quod est | |
| 6600 Deus, ut etiam Aristoteles dicit in VII Ethicae Eudemicae, et per | |
| 6601 hunc modum ostendit quod non est procedere in infinitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q82_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q82_A5-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 5. Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2"> | |
| 6602 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. | |
| 6603 For the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to desire], and the irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. | |
| 6604 But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; | |
| 6605 as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said ( | |
| 6606 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv">Wis. 6:21</a>): "The | |
| 6607 concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive | |
| 6608 appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on | |
| 6609 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv"> Mat. 13:33 </a>warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts | |
| 6610 of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive. | |
| 6611 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="31903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31903] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 6612 proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis distingui | |
| 6613 debeant in appetitu superiori, qui est voluntas. Vis enim | |
| 6614 concupiscibilis dicitur a concupiscendo; et irascibilis ab | |
| 6615 irascendo. Sed aliqua concupiscentia est quae non potest pertinere | |
| 6616 ad appetitum sensitivum, sed solum ad intellectivum, qui est | |
| 6617 voluntas; sicut concupiscentia sapientiae, de qua dicitur Sap. VI, | |
| 6618 <i>concupiscentia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum</i>. Est | |
| 6619 etiam quaedam ira quae non potest pertinere ad appetitum | |
| 6620 sensitivum, sed intellectivum tantum; sicut cum irascimur contra | |
| 6621 vitia. Unde et Hieronymus, super Matth., monet ut <i>odium vitiorum | |
| 6622 possideamus in irascibili</i>. Ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis | |
| 6623 distingui debent in appetitu intellectivo, sicut et in | |
| 6624 sensitivo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p3"> | |
| 6625 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the | |
| 6626 sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible | |
| 6627 power to the intellectual part. | |
| 6628 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="31904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31904] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6629 secundum quod communiter dicitur, caritas est in concupiscibili, | |
| 6630 spes autem in irascibili. Non autem possunt esse in appetitu | |
| 6631 sensitivo, quia non sunt sensibilium obiectorum, sed | |
| 6632 intelligibilium. Ergo concupiscibilis et irascibilis sunt ponenda | |
| 6633 in parte intellectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p4"> | |
| 6634 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul has these powers"---namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational---"before | |
| 6635 it is united to the body." But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, | |
| 6636 as we have said above ( | |
| 6637 <a href="#FP_Q78_A5" id="FP_Q82_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[78], AA[5]</a>,8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite. | |
| 6638 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="31905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31905] Iª q. 82 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 6639 libro de spiritu et anima dicitur quod has potentias (scilicet | |
| 6640 irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et rationalem) <i>habet anima | |
| 6641 antequam corpori misceatur</i>. Sed nulla potentia sensitivae | |
| 6642 partis est animae tantum, sed coniuncti, ut supra dictum est. Ergo | |
| 6643 irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt in voluntate, quae est | |
| 6644 appetitus intellectivus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p5"> | |
| 6645 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and | |
| 6646 irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is | |
| 6647 in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus." | |
| 6648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 s. c."><a name="31906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31906] Iª q. 82 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6649 quod Gregorius Nyssenus, dicit, quod irrationalis pars animae | |
| 6650 dividitur in desiderativum et irascitivum; et idem dicit | |
| 6651 Damascenus, in libro II. Et philosophus dicit, in III de anima quod | |
| 6652 <i>voluntas in ratione est, in irrationali autem parte animae | |
| 6653 concupiscentia et ira, vel desiderium et animus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6"> | |
| 6654 <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said | |
| 6655 above ( | |
| 6656 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A4" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>; | |
| 6657 <a href="#FP_Q79_A7" id="FP_Q82_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[7]</a>), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which | |
| 6658 are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something | |
| 6659 colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding | |
| 6660 white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black. | |
| 6661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 co."><a name="31907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31907] Iª q. 82 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6662 quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non sunt partes intellectivi | |
| 6663 appetitus, qui dicitur voluntas. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, | |
| 6664 potentia quae ordinatur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem | |
| 6665 rationem, non diversificatur per differentias speciales sub illa | |
| 6666 ratione communi contentas. Sicut quia visus respicit visibile | |
| 6667 secundum rationem colorati, non multiplicantur visivae potentiae | |
| 6668 secundum diversas species colorum, si autem esset aliqua potentia | |
| 6669 quae esset albi inquantum est album, et non inquantum est | |
| 6670 coloratum, diversificaretur a potentia quae esset nigri inquantum | |
| 6671 est nigrum. Appetitus autem sensitivus non respicit communem | |
| 6672 rationem boni, quia nec sensus apprehendit universale. Et ideo | |
| 6673 secundum diversas rationes particularium bonorum, diversificantur | |
| 6674 partes appetitus sensitivi, nam concupiscibilis respicit propriam | |
| 6675 rationem boni, inquantum est delectabile secundum sensum, et | |
| 6676 conveniens naturae; irascibilis autem respicit rationem boni, | |
| 6677 secundum quod est repulsivum et impugnativum eius quod infert | |
| 6678 nocumentum. Sed voluntas respicit bonum sub communi ratione boni. | |
| 6679 Et ideo non diversificantur in ipsa, quae est appetitus | |
| 6680 intellectivus, aliquae potentiae appetitivae, ut sit in appetitu | |
| 6681 intellectivo alia potentia irascibilis, et alia concupiscibilis, | |
| 6682 sicut etiam ex parte intellectus non multiplicantur vires | |
| 6683 apprehensivae, licet multiplicentur ex parte sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p7"> Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. | |
| 6684 And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the | |
| 6685 concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas | |
| 6686 the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the | |
| 6687 will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there | |
| 6688 is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from | |
| 6689 a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they | |
| 6690 are on the part of the senses. | |
| 6691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="31908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31908] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6692 dicendum quod amor, concupiscentia, et huiusmodi, dupliciter | |
| 6693 accipiuntur. Quandoque quidem secundum quod sunt quaedam passiones, | |
| 6694 cum quadam scilicet concitatione animi provenientes. Et sic | |
| 6695 communiter accipiuntur, et hoc modo sunt solum in appetitu | |
| 6696 sensitivo. Alio modo significant simplicem affectum, absque | |
| 6697 passione vel animi concitatione. Et sic sunt actus voluntatis. Et | |
| 6698 hoc etiam modo attribuuntur Angelis et Deo. Sed prout sic | |
| 6699 accipiuntur, non pertinent ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam | |
| 6700 tantum potentiam, quae dicitur voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p8"> | |
| 6701 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising, that is, | |
| 6702 with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive | |
| 6703 appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of | |
| 6704 the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are | |
| 6705 attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, | |
| 6706 which is called the will. | |
| 6707 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="31909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31909] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6708 dicendum quod ipsa voluntas potest dici irascibilis, prout vult | |
| 6709 impugnare malum, non ex impetu passionis, sed ex iudicio rationis. | |
| 6710 Et eodem modo potest dici concupiscibilis, propter desiderium boni. | |
| 6711 Et sic in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt caritas et spes; idest | |
| 6712 in voluntate secundum quod habet ordinem ad huiusmodi actus. Sic | |
| 6713 etiam potest intelligi quod dicitur in libro de spiritu et anima, | |
| 6714 quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt animae antequam uniatur | |
| 6715 corpori (ut tamen intelligatur ordo naturae, et non temporis), | |
| 6716 licet non sit necessarium verbis illius libri fidem adhibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q82_A5-p9"> | |
| 6717 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but | |
| 6718 from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. | |
| 6719 And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this | |
| 6720 way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the | |
| 6721 irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, | |
| 6722 and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection | |
| 6723 is clear. | |
| 6724 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 82 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="31910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31910] Iª q. 82 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio | |
| 6725 ad tertium.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 6726 <div id="FP_Q83" class="div3"> | |
| 6727 <h3 id="FP_Q83-p0.1">Q. 83. OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 6728 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 6729 <p id="FP_Q83-p2"> We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q83-p3"><a href="#FP_Q83_A1"> (1) Whether man has free-will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p4"><a href="#FP_Q83_A2"> (2) What is free-will---a power, an act, or a habit?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p5"><a href="#FP_Q83_A3"> (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?</a></p><p id="FP_Q83-p6"><a href="#FP_Q83_A4"> (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?</a></p> | |
| 6730 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 pr."><a name="31911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31911] | |
| 6731 Iª q. 83 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de libero arbitrio. | |
| 6732 Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo sit liberi | |
| 6733 arbitrii. Secundo, quid sit liberum arbitrium, utrum sit potentia, | |
| 6734 vel actus, vel habitus. Tertio si est potentia, utrum sit | |
| 6735 appetitiva, vel cognitiva. Quarto, si est appetitiva, utrum sit | |
| 6736 eadem potentia cum voluntate, vel alia.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 6737 <div id="FP_Q83_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A1-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 1. Whether man has free-will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p2"> | |
| 6738 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for | |
| 6739 it is written ( | |
| 6740 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will. | |
| 6741 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31912] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 6742 proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit liberi arbitrii. Quicumque | |
| 6743 enim est liberi arbitrii, facit quod vult. Sed homo non facit quod | |
| 6744 vult, dicitur enim Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; | |
| 6745 sed quod odi malum, illud facio</i>. Ergo homo non est liberi | |
| 6746 arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p3"> | |
| 6747 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: | |
| 6748 for it is written ( | |
| 6749 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv">Rom. 9:16</a>): "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will. | |
| 6750 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31913] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6751 quicumque est liberi arbitrii, eius est velle et non velle, operari | |
| 6752 et non operari. Sed hoc non est hominis, dicitur enim ad Rom. IX, | |
| 6753 non est volentis, scilicet velle, neque currentis, scilicet | |
| 6754 currere. Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4"> | |
| 6755 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is | |
| 6756 not free. But God moves the will, for it is written ( | |
| 6757 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv">Prov. 21:1</a>): "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it" and ( | |
| 6758 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will. | |
| 6759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31914] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, | |
| 6760 liberum est quod sui causa est</i>, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Quod | |
| 6761 ergo movetur ab alio, non est liberum. Sed Deus movet voluntatem, | |
| 6762 dicitur enim Prov. XXI, <i>cor regis in manu Dei, et quocumque | |
| 6763 voluerit vertet illud</i>; et Philipp. II, <i>Deus est qui operatur | |
| 6764 in nobis velle et perficere</i>. Ergo homo non est liberi | |
| 6765 arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p5"> | |
| 6766 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written | |
| 6767 ( | |
| 6768 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.23" target="asv">Jer. 10:23</a>): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk." Therefore man has not free-will. | |
| 6769 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="31915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31915] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6770 quicumque est liberi arbitrii, est dominus suorum actuum. Sed homo | |
| 6771 non est dominus suorum actuum, quia, ut dicitur Ierem. X, <i>non | |
| 6772 est in homine via eius, nec viri est ut dirigat gressus suos</i>. | |
| 6773 Ergo homo non est liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p6"> | |
| 6774 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in | |
| 6775 our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some | |
| 6776 particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing. | |
| 6777 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="31916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31916] Iª q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6778 philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., <i>qualis unusquisque est, talis | |
| 6779 finis videtur ei</i>. Sed non est in potestate nostra aliquales | |
| 6780 esse, sed hoc nobis est a natura. Ergo naturale est nobis quod | |
| 6781 aliquem finem sequamur. Non ergo ex libero arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p7"> | |
| 6782 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 6783 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss adds: "That is of his free-will." | |
| 6784 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31917] Iª q. 83 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6785 quod dicitur Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et | |
| 6786 reliquit eum in manu consilii sui</i>. Glossa, idest in libertate | |
| 6787 arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p8"> | |
| 6788 <b>I answer that,</b> Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In | |
| 6789 order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like | |
| 6790 manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, | |
| 6791 seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, | |
| 6792 because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. | |
| 6793 But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because | |
| 6794 this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the | |
| 6795 reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in | |
| 6796 contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular | |
| 6797 operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate | |
| 6798 to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will. | |
| 6799 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 co."><a name="31918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31918] Iª q. 83 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6800 quod homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, | |
| 6801 exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia et poenae. Ad | |
| 6802 cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod quaedam agunt absque | |
| 6803 iudicio, sicut lapis movetur deorsum; et similiter omnia cognitione | |
| 6804 carentia. Quaedam autem agunt iudicio, sed non libero; sicut | |
| 6805 animalia bruta. Iudicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, | |
| 6806 naturali iudicio, et non libero, quia non ex collatione, sed ex | |
| 6807 naturali instinctu hoc iudicat. Et simile est de quolibet iudicio | |
| 6808 brutorum animalium. Sed homo agit iudicio, quia per vim | |
| 6809 cognoscitivam iudicat aliquid esse fugiendum vel prosequendum. Sed | |
| 6810 quia iudicium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari | |
| 6811 operabili, sed ex collatione quadam rationis; ideo agit libero | |
| 6812 iudicio, potens in diversa ferri. Ratio enim circa contingentia | |
| 6813 habet viam ad opposita; ut patet in dialecticis syllogismis, et | |
| 6814 rhetoricis persuasionibus. Particularia autem operabilia sunt | |
| 6815 quaedam contingentia, et ideo circa ea iudicium rationis ad diversa | |
| 6816 se habet, et non est determinatum ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est | |
| 6817 quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p9"> | |
| 6818 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( | |
| 6819 <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. | |
| 6820 This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes---namely, "not to desire against reason," as Augustine says. | |
| 6821 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31919] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6822 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, appetitus sensitivus, etsi | |
| 6823 obediat rationi, tamen potest in aliquo repugnare, concupiscendo | |
| 6824 contra illud quod ratio dictat. Hoc ergo est bonum quod homo non | |
| 6825 facit cum vult, scilicet non concupiscere contra rationem, ut | |
| 6826 Glossa Augustini ibidem dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p10"> | |
| 6827 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because | |
| 6828 the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God. | |
| 6829 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31920] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6830 dicendum quod verbum illud apostoli non sic est intelligendum quasi | |
| 6831 homo non velit et non currat libero arbitrio, sed quia liberum | |
| 6832 arbitrium ad hoc non est sufficiens, nisi moveatur et iuvetur a | |
| 6833 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p11"> | |
| 6834 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity | |
| 6835 belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need | |
| 6836 it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving | |
| 6837 natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving | |
| 6838 voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; | |
| 6839 for He operates in each thing according to its own nature. | |
| 6840 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31921] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6841 dicendum quod liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per | |
| 6842 liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de | |
| 6843 necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum | |
| 6844 est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur | |
| 6845 quod sit prima causa eius. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et | |
| 6846 naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis, | |
| 6847 movendo eas, non aufert quin actus earum sint naturales; ita | |
| 6848 movendo causas voluntarias, non aufert quin actiones earum sint | |
| 6849 voluntariae, sed potius hoc in eis facit, operatur enim in | |
| 6850 unoquoque secundum eius proprietatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A1-p12"> | |
| 6851 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The | |
| 6852 choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God. | |
| 6853 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="31922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31922] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 6854 dicendum quod dicitur non esse in homine via eius, quantum ad | |
| 6855 executiones electionum, in quibus homo impediri potest, velit | |
| 6856 nolit. Electiones autem ipsae sunt in nobis, supposito tamen divino | |
| 6857 auxilio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q83_A1-p13"> | |
| 6858 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in | |
| 6859 the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual | |
| 6860 part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject | |
| 6861 to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above ( | |
| 6862 <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q83_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[82], AA[1]</a>,2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such | |
| 6863 a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual | |
| 6864 part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does | |
| 6865 his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject | |
| 6866 something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said ( | |
| 6867 <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q83_A1-p13.2" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will. | |
| 6868 </p><p id="FP_Q83_A1-p14"> The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. | |
| 6869 And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is | |
| 6870 in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there | |
| 6871 is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will. | |
| 6872 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="31923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31923] Iª q. 83 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 6873 dicendum quod qualitas hominis est duplex, una naturalis, et alia | |
| 6874 superveniens. Naturalis autem qualitas accipi potest vel circa | |
| 6875 partem intellectivam; vel circa corpus et virtutes corpori annexas. | |
| 6876 Ex eo igitur quod homo est aliqualis qualitate naturali quae | |
| 6877 attenditur secundum intellectivam partem, naturaliter homo appetit | |
| 6878 ultimum finem, scilicet beatitudinem. Qui quidem appetitus | |
| 6879 naturalis est, et non subiacet libero arbitrio, ut ex supradictis | |
| 6880 patet. Ex parte vero corporis et virtutum corpori annexarum, potest | |
| 6881 esse homo aliqualis naturali qualitate, secundum quod est talis | |
| 6882 complexionis, vel talis dispositionis, ex quacumque impressione | |
| 6883 corporearum causarum, quae non possunt in intellectivam partem | |
| 6884 imprimere, eo quod non est alicuius corporis actus. Sic igitur | |
| 6885 qualis unusquisque est secundum corpoream qualitatem, talis finis | |
| 6886 videtur ei, quia ex huiusmodi dispositione homo inclinatur ad | |
| 6887 eligendum aliquid vel repudiandum. Sed istae inclinationes | |
| 6888 subiacent iudicio rationis, cui obedit inferior appetitus, ut | |
| 6889 dictum est. Unde per hoc libertati arbitrii non praeiudicatur. | |
| 6890 Qualitates autem supervenientes sunt sicut habitus et passiones, | |
| 6891 secundum quae aliquis magis inclinatur in unum quam in alterum. | |
| 6892 Tamen istae etiam inclinationes subiacent iudicio rationis. Et | |
| 6893 huiusmodi etiam qualitates ei subiacent, inquantum in nobis est | |
| 6894 tales qualitates acquirere, vel causaliter vel dispositive, vel a | |
| 6895 nobis excludere. Et sic nihil est quod libertati arbitrii | |
| 6896 repugnet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A2-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 2. Whether free-will is a power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p2"> | |
| 6897 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, | |
| 6898 not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power. | |
| 6899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31924] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 6900 proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia. | |
| 6901 Arbitrium enim liberum nihil est aliud quam liberum iudicium. | |
| 6902 Iudicium autem non nominat potentiam, sed actum. Ergo liberum | |
| 6903 arbitrium non est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p3"> | |
| 6904 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which | |
| 6905 is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the | |
| 6906 soul's habit of disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power. | |
| 6907 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31925] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6908 liberum arbitrium dicitur esse facultas voluntatis et rationis. | |
| 6909 Facultas autem nominat facilitatem potestatis, quae quidem est per | |
| 6910 habitum. Ergo liberum arbitrium est habitus. Bernardus etiam dicit | |
| 6911 quod liberum arbitrium est habitus animae liber sui. Non ergo est | |
| 6912 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p4"> | |
| 6913 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, | |
| 6914 by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is not a power. | |
| 6915 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31926] Iª q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulla | |
| 6916 potentia naturalis tollitur per peccatum. Sed liberum arbitrium | |
| 6917 tollitur per peccatum, Augustinus enim dicit quod <i>homo male | |
| 6918 utens libero arbitrio, et se perdit et ipsum</i>. Ergo liberum | |
| 6919 arbitrium non est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p5"> | |
| 6920 <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it | |
| 6921 chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power. | |
| 6922 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31927] Iª q. 83 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6923 quod nihil est subiectum habitus, ut videtur, nisi potentia. Sed | |
| 6924 liberum arbitrium est subiectum gratiae; qua sibi assistente, bonum | |
| 6925 eligit. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q83_A2-p6"> | |
| 6926 <b>I answer that,</b> Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium---i.e. free judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of | |
| 6927 speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of | |
| 6928 an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore | |
| 6929 free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a | |
| 6930 habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must | |
| 6931 be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those | |
| 6932 things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits---for instance, | |
| 6933 to assent to first principles: while those things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we | |
| 6934 have said of the desire of happiness ( | |
| 6935 <a href="#FP_Q82_A1" id="FP_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[82], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural | |
| 6936 habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit. | |
| 6937 </p><p id="FP_Q83_A2-p7"> Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to | |
| 6938 actions and passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance | |
| 6939 ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary | |
| 6940 ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will | |
| 6941 to be a habit. Therefore it is a power. | |
| 6942 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 co."><a name="31928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31928] Iª q. 83 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6943 quod, quamvis liberum arbitrium nominet quendam actum secundum | |
| 6944 propriam significationem vocabuli; secundum tamen communem usum | |
| 6945 loquendi, liberum arbitrium dicimus id quod est huius actus | |
| 6946 principium, scilicet quo homo libere iudicat. Principium autem | |
| 6947 actus in nobis est et potentia et habitus, dicimur enim aliquid | |
| 6948 cognoscere et per scientiam, et per intellectivam potentiam. | |
| 6949 Oportet ergo quod liberum arbitrium vel sit potentia, vel sit | |
| 6950 habitus, vel sit potentia cum aliquo habitu. Quod autem non sit | |
| 6951 habitus, neque potentia cum habitu, manifeste apparet ex duobus. | |
| 6952 Primo quidem, quia si est habitus, oportet quod sit habitus | |
| 6953 naturalis, hoc enim est naturale homini, quod sit liberi arbitrii. | |
| 6954 Nullus autem habitus naturalis adest nobis ad ea quae subsunt | |
| 6955 libero arbitrio, quia ad ea respectu quorum habemus habitus | |
| 6956 naturales, naturaliter inclinamur, sicut ad assentiendum primis | |
| 6957 principiis; ea autem ad quae naturaliter inclinamur, non subsunt | |
| 6958 libero arbitrio, sicut dictum est de appetitu beatitudinis. Unde | |
| 6959 contra propriam rationem liberi arbitrii est, quod sit habitus | |
| 6960 naturalis. Contra naturalitatem autem eius est, quod sit habitus | |
| 6961 non naturalis. Et sic relinquitur quod nullo modo sit habitus. | |
| 6962 Secundo hoc apparet, quia habitus dicuntur secundum quos <i>nos | |
| 6963 habemus ad passiones vel ad actus bene vel male</i>, ut dicitur in | |
| 6964 II Ethic., nam per temperantiam bene nos habemus ad | |
| 6965 concupiscentias, per intemperantiam autem male; per scientiam etiam | |
| 6966 bene nos habemus ad actum intellectus, dum verum cognoscimus per | |
| 6967 habitum autem contrarium male. Liberum autem arbitrium | |
| 6968 indifferenter se habet ad bene eligendum vel male. Unde impossibile | |
| 6969 est quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus. Relinquitur ergo quod sit | |
| 6970 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p8"> | |
| 6971 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power | |
| 6972 which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man. | |
| 6973 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31929] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6974 dicendum quod consuetum est potentiam significari nomine actus. Et | |
| 6975 sic per hunc actum qui est liberum iudicium, nominatur potentia | |
| 6976 quae est huius actus principium. Alioquin, si liberum arbitrium | |
| 6977 nominaret actum, non semper maneret in homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p9"> | |
| 6978 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. | |
| 6979 But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of | |
| 6980 relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the | |
| 6981 action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill. | |
| 6982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31930] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6983 dicendum quod facultas nominat quandoque potestatem expeditam ad | |
| 6984 operandum. Et sic facultas ponitur in definitione liberi arbitrii. | |
| 6985 Bernardus autem accipit habitum non secundum quod dividitur contra | |
| 6986 potentiam, sed secundum quod significat habitudinem quandam, qua | |
| 6987 aliquo modo se aliquis habet ad actum. Quod quidem est tam per | |
| 6988 potentiam quam per habitum, nam per potentiam homo se habet ut | |
| 6989 potens operari, per habitum autem ut aptus ad operandum bene vel | |
| 6990 male.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A2-p10"> | |
| 6991 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as | |
| 6992 regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this | |
| 6993 work (FS, Q[85], seqq.; | |
| 6994 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109" id="FP_Q83_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[109])</a>. | |
| 6995 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31931] Iª q. 83 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6996 dicendum quod homo peccando liberum arbitrium dicitur perdidisse, | |
| 6997 non quantum ad libertatem naturalem, quae est a coactione; sed | |
| 6998 quantum ad libertatem quae est a culpa et a miseria. De qua infra | |
| 6999 in tractatu moralium dicetur, in secunda parte huius operis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A3-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 3. Whether free-will is an appetitive power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p2"> | |
| 7000 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that | |
| 7001 "free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive | |
| 7002 power. | |
| 7003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31932] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 7004 proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium non sit potentia | |
| 7005 appetitiva, sed cognitiva. Dicit enim Damascenus quod <i>cum | |
| 7006 rationali confestim comitatur liberum arbitrium</i>. Sed ratio est | |
| 7007 potentia cognitiva. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia | |
| 7008 cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p3"> | |
| 7009 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore | |
| 7010 free-will is a cognitive power. | |
| 7011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31933] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7012 liberum arbitrium dicitur quasi liberum iudicium. Sed iudicare est | |
| 7013 actus cognitivae virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est cognitiva | |
| 7014 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p4"> | |
| 7015 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a | |
| 7016 certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. | |
| 7017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31934] Iª q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad | |
| 7018 liberum arbitrium praecipue pertinet electio. Sed electio videtur | |
| 7019 ad cognitionem pertinere, quia electio importat quandam | |
| 7020 comparationem unius ad alterum, quod est proprium cognitivae | |
| 7021 virtutis. Ergo liberum arbitrium est potentia cognitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p5"> | |
| 7022 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act of | |
| 7023 the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive | |
| 7024 power. | |
| 7025 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31935] Iª q. 83 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7026 quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>electio est | |
| 7027 desiderium eorum quae sunt in nobis</i>. Sed desiderium est actus | |
| 7028 appetitivae virtutis. Ergo et electio. Liberum autem arbitrium est | |
| 7029 secundum quod eligimus. Ergo liberum arbitrium est virtus | |
| 7030 appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p6"> | |
| 7031 <b>I answer that,</b> The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; | |
| 7032 and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things | |
| 7033 concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the | |
| 7034 cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred | |
| 7035 to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. | |
| 7036 Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive | |
| 7037 power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines | |
| 7038 to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of | |
| 7039 this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which | |
| 7040 is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act | |
| 7041 of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power. | |
| 7042 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 co."><a name="31936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31936] Iª q. 83 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7043 quod proprium liberi arbitrii est electio, ex hoc enim liberi | |
| 7044 arbitrii esse dicimur, quod possumus unum recipere, alio recusato, | |
| 7045 quod est eligere. Et ideo naturam liberi arbitrii ex electione | |
| 7046 considerare oportet. Ad electionem autem concurrit aliquid ex parte | |
| 7047 cognitivae virtutis, et aliquid ex parte appetitivae, ex parte | |
| 7048 quidem cognitivae, requiritur consilium, per quod diiudicatur quid | |
| 7049 sit alteri praeferendum; ex parte autem appetitivae, requiritur | |
| 7050 quod appetendo acceptetur id quod per consilium diiudicatur. Et | |
| 7051 ideo Aristoteles in VI Ethic. sub dubio derelinquit utrum | |
| 7052 principalius pertineat electio ad vim appetitivam, vel ad vim | |
| 7053 cognitivam, dicit enim quod electio vel est intellectus | |
| 7054 appetitivus, vel appetitus intellectivus. Sed in III Ethic. in hoc | |
| 7055 magis declinat quod sit appetitus intellectivus, nominans | |
| 7056 electionem desiderium consiliabile. Et huius ratio est, quia | |
| 7057 proprium obiectum electionis est illud quod est ad finem, hoc | |
| 7058 autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni quod dicitur utile, | |
| 7059 unde cum bonum, inquantum huiusmodi, sit obiectum appetitus, | |
| 7060 sequitur quod electio sit principaliter actus appetitivae virtutis. | |
| 7061 Et sic liberum arbitrium est appetitiva potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p7"> | |
| 7062 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies | |
| 7063 the rational power. | |
| 7064 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31937] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7065 dicendum quod potentiae appetitivae concomitantur apprehensivas. Et | |
| 7066 secundum hoc dicit Damascenus quod <i>cum rationali confestim | |
| 7067 comitatur liberum arbitrium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p8"> | |
| 7068 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, | |
| 7069 by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, | |
| 7070 we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. | |
| 7071 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31938] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7072 dicendum quod iudicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio | |
| 7073 consilii. Determinatur autem consilium, primo quidem per sententiam | |
| 7074 rationis, et secundo per acceptationem appetitus, unde philosophus | |
| 7075 dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>ex consiliari iudicantes desideramus | |
| 7076 secundum consilium</i>. Et hoc modo ipsa electio dicitur quoddam | |
| 7077 iudicium, a quo nominatur liberum arbitrium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A3-p9"> | |
| 7078 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the | |
| 7079 appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some | |
| 7080 likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another. | |
| 7081 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31939] Iª q. 83 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7082 dicendum quod ista collatio quae importatur in nomine electionis, | |
| 7083 pertinet ad consilium praecedens, quod est rationis. Appetitus | |
| 7084 enim, quamvis non sit collativus, tamen inquantum a vi cognitiva | |
| 7085 conferente movetur, habet quandam collationis similitudinem, dum | |
| 7086 unum alteri praeoptat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q83_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q83_A4-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 4. Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p2"> | |
| 7087 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} | |
| 7088 is one thing and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while {boulesis} seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, | |
| 7089 according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will | |
| 7090 is a distinct power from the will. | |
| 7091 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31940] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 7092 proceditur. Videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a | |
| 7093 voluntate. Dicit enim Damascenus, in libro II, quod aliud est | |
| 7094 thelesis, aliud vero bulesis, thelesis autem est voluntas; bulesis | |
| 7095 autem videtur arbitrium liberum, quia bulesis, secundum ipsum, est | |
| 7096 voluntas quae est circa aliquid quasi unius per comparationem ad | |
| 7097 alterum. Ergo videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a | |
| 7098 voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p3"> | |
| 7099 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, | |
| 7100 because "the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will | |
| 7101 is a distinct power from the will. | |
| 7102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31941] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7103 potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed electio, quae est actus | |
| 7104 liberi arbitrii, est aliud a voluntate, ut dicitur in III Ethic., | |
| 7105 <i>quia voluntas est de fine, electio autem de iis quae sunt ad | |
| 7106 finem</i>. Ergo liberum arbitrium est alia potentia a | |
| 7107 voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p4"> | |
| 7108 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers---the active and the passive. Therefore, | |
| 7109 also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only | |
| 7110 be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. | |
| 7111 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31942] Iª q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7112 voluntas est appetitus intellectivus. Sed ex parte intellectus sunt | |
| 7113 duae potentiae, scilicet agens et possibilis. Ergo etiam ex parte | |
| 7114 appetitus intellectivi debet esse alia potentia praeter voluntatem. | |
| 7115 Et haec non videtur esse nisi liberum arbitrium. Ergo liberum | |
| 7116 arbitrium est alia potentia praeter voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p5"> | |
| 7117 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will. | |
| 7118 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31943] Iª q. 83 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7119 quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod liberum arbitrium nihil | |
| 7120 aliud est quam voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6"> | |
| 7121 <b>I answer that,</b> The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above ( | |
| 7122 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q64_A2" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[64], A[2]</a>). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite | |
| 7123 we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their | |
| 7124 respective objects and acts. For the act of "understanding" implies the simple | |
| 7125 acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. | |
| 7126 But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we | |
| 7127 reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies | |
| 7128 the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to | |
| 7129 "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means | |
| 7130 to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the | |
| 7131 principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore | |
| 7132 it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has | |
| 7133 been shown above ( | |
| 7134 <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q83_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[8]</a>) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and | |
| 7135 to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the | |
| 7136 free-will are not two powers, but one. | |
| 7137 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 co."><a name="31944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31944] Iª q. 83 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7138 quod potentias appetitivas oportet esse proportionatas potentiis | |
| 7139 apprehensivis, ut supra dictum est. Sicut autem ex parte | |
| 7140 apprehensionis intellectivae se habent intellectus et ratio, ita ex | |
| 7141 parte appetitus intellectivi se habent voluntas et liberum | |
| 7142 arbitrium, quod nihil aliud est quam vis electiva. Et hoc patet ex | |
| 7143 habitudine obiectorum et actuum. Nam intelligere importat simplicem | |
| 7144 acceptionem alicuius rei, unde intelligi dicuntur proprie | |
| 7145 principia, quae sine collatione per seipsa cognoscuntur. | |
| 7146 Ratiocinari autem proprie est devenire ex uno in cognitionem | |
| 7147 alterius, unde proprie de conclusionibus ratiocinamur, quae ex | |
| 7148 principiis innotescunt. Similiter ex parte appetitus, velle | |
| 7149 importat simplicem appetitum alicuius rei, unde voluntas dicitur | |
| 7150 esse de fine, qui propter se appetitur. Eligere autem est appetere | |
| 7151 aliquid propter alterum consequendum, unde proprie est eorum quae | |
| 7152 sunt ad finem. Sicut autem se habet in cognitivis principium ad | |
| 7153 conclusionem, cui propter principia assentimus; ita in appetitivis | |
| 7154 se habet finis ad ea quae sunt ad finem, quae propter finem | |
| 7155 appetuntur. Unde manifestum est quod sicut se habet intellectus ad | |
| 7156 rationem, ita se habet voluntas ad vim electivam, idest ad liberum | |
| 7157 arbitrium. Ostensum est autem supra quod eiusdem potentiae est | |
| 7158 intelligere et ratiocinari, sicut eiusdem virtutis est quiescere et | |
| 7159 moveri. Unde etiam eiusdem potentiae est velle et eligere. Et | |
| 7160 propter hoc voluntas et liberum arbitrium non sunt duae potentiae, | |
| 7161 sed una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p7"> | |
| 7162 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> {Boulesis} is distinct from {thelesis} on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts. | |
| 7163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31945] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7164 dicendum quod bulesis distinguitur a thelesi, non propter | |
| 7165 diversitatem potentiarum, sed propter differentiam actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p8"> | |
| 7166 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Choice and will---that is, the act of willing ---are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand | |
| 7167 and to reason, as we have said. | |
| 7168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31946] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7169 dicendum quod electio et voluntas, idest ipsum velle, sunt diversi | |
| 7170 actus, sed tamen pertinent ad unam potentiam, sicut etiam | |
| 7171 intelligere et ratiocinari, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q83_A4-p9"> | |
| 7172 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active | |
| 7173 and a passive will. | |
| 7174 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 83 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31947] Iª q. 83 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7175 dicendum quod intellectus comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens. Et | |
| 7176 ideo non oportet in voluntate distinguere agens et possibile.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 7177 <div id="FP_Q84" class="div3"> | |
| 7178 <h3 id="FP_Q84-p0.1">Q. 84. HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 7179 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 7180 <p id="FP_Q84-p2"> We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers | |
| 7181 of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of | |
| 7182 the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this | |
| 7183 work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat | |
| 7184 now. | |
| 7185 </p><p id="FP_Q84-p3"> In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when | |
| 7186 united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom. | |
| 7187 </p><p id="FP_Q84-p4"> The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands | |
| 7188 itself and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it. | |
| 7189 </p><p id="FP_Q84-p5"> In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul | |
| 7190 know them? (2) How and in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them? | |
| 7191 </p><p id="FP_Q84-p6"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q84-p7"><a href="#FP_Q84_A1"> (1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p8"><a href="#FP_Q84_A2"> (2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p9"><a href="#FP_Q84_A3"> (3) If through some species, whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p10"><a href="#FP_Q84_A4"> (4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p11"><a href="#FP_Q84_A5"> (5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p12"><a href="#FP_Q84_A6"> (6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?</a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p13"><a href="#FP_Q84_A7"> (7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the | |
| 7192 phantasms? | |
| 7193 </a></p><p id="FP_Q84-p14"><a href="#FP_Q84_A8"> (8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?</a></p> | |
| 7194 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 pr."><a name="31948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31948] | |
| 7195 Iª q. 84 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de | |
| 7196 actibus animae, quantum ad potentias intellectivas et appetitivas, | |
| 7197 aliae enim animae potentiae non pertinent directe ad | |
| 7198 considerationem theologi. Actus autem appetitivae partis ad | |
| 7199 considerationem moralis scientiae pertinent, et ideo in secunda | |
| 7200 parte huius operis de eis tractabitur, in qua considerandum erit de | |
| 7201 morali materia. Nunc autem de actibus intellectivae partis agetur. | |
| 7202 In consideratione vero actuum, hoc modo procedemus, primo namque | |
| 7203 considerandum est quomodo intelligit anima corpori coniuncta; | |
| 7204 secundo, quomodo intelligit a corpore separata. Prima autem | |
| 7205 consideratio erit tripartita, primo namque considerabitur quomodo | |
| 7206 anima intelligit corporalia, quae sunt infra ipsam; secundo, | |
| 7207 quomodo intelligit seipsam, et ea quae in ipsa sunt; tertio, | |
| 7208 quomodo intelligit substantias immateriales, quae sunt supra ipsam. | |
| 7209 Circa cognitionem vero corporalium, tria consideranda occurrunt, | |
| 7210 primo quidem per quid ea cognoscit; secundo, quomodo et quo ordine; | |
| 7211 tertio, quid in eis cognoscit. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, | |
| 7212 utrum anima cognoscat corpora per intellectum. Secundo, utrum | |
| 7213 intelligat ea per essentiam suam, vel per aliquas species. Tertio, | |
| 7214 si per aliquas species, utrum species omnium intelligibilium sint | |
| 7215 ei naturaliter innatae. Quarto, utrum effluant in ipsam ab | |
| 7216 aliquibus formis immaterialibus separatis. Quinto, utrum anima | |
| 7217 nostra omnia quae intelligit, videat in rationibus aeternis. Sexto, | |
| 7218 utrum cognitionem intelligibilem acquirat a sensu. Septimo, utrum | |
| 7219 intellectus possit actu intelligere per species intelligibiles quas | |
| 7220 penes se habet, non convertendo se ad phantasmata. Octavo, utrum | |
| 7221 iudicium intellectus impediatur per impedimentum sensitivarum | |
| 7222 virtutum.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 7223 <div id="FP_Q84_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A1-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 1. Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p2"> | |
| 7224 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies | |
| 7225 cannot be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses." He says also | |
| 7226 (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. But such are not | |
| 7227 bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. | |
| 7228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="31949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31949] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 7229 proceditur. Videtur quod anima non cognoscat corpora per | |
| 7230 intellectum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II Soliloq. quod <i>corpora | |
| 7231 intellectu comprehendi non possunt; nec aliquod corporeum nisi | |
| 7232 sensibus videri potest</i>. Dicit etiam, XII super Gen. ad Litt., | |
| 7233 quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt per essentiam suam in | |
| 7234 anima. Huiusmodi autem non sunt corpora. Ergo anima per intellectum | |
| 7235 corpora cognoscere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p3"> | |
| 7236 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the | |
| 7237 senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, | |
| 7238 which are sensible. | |
| 7239 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="31950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31950] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 7240 se habet sensus ad intelligibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad | |
| 7241 sensibilia. Sed anima per sensum nullo modo potest cognoscere | |
| 7242 spiritualia, quae sunt intelligibilia. Ergo nullo modo per | |
| 7243 intellectum potest cognoscere corpora, quae sunt sensibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p4"> | |
| 7244 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. | |
| 7245 Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. | |
| 7246 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="31951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31951] Iª q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7247 intellectus est necessariorum et semper eodem modo se habentium. | |
| 7248 Sed corpora omnia sunt mobilia, et non eodem modo se habentia. | |
| 7249 Anima ergo per intellectum corpora cognoscere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p5"> | |
| 7250 <b>On the contrary,</b> Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; | |
| 7251 and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies. | |
| 7252 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 s. c."><a name="31952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31952] Iª q. 84 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7253 quod scientia est in intellectu. Si ergo intellectus non cognoscit | |
| 7254 corpora, sequitur quod nulla scientia sit de corporibus. Et sic | |
| 7255 peribit scientia naturalis, quae est de corpore mobili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p6"> | |
| 7256 <b>I answer that,</b> It should be said in order to elucidate this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things, | |
| 7257 thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them | |
| 7258 to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For | |
| 7259 what is in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, | |
| 7260 for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that "it is not possible | |
| 7261 twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent," as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5). | |
| 7262 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p7"> After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, | |
| 7263 besides these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings he called | |
| 7264 "species" or "ideas," by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man, | |
| 7265 or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of | |
| 7266 the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so that according to | |
| 7267 this the soul does not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof. | |
| 7268 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p8"> Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because, since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge | |
| 7269 of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration | |
| 7270 through moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are | |
| 7271 to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they | |
| 7272 differ from them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason | |
| 7273 claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things. | |
| 7274 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p9"> Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind | |
| 7275 of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the | |
| 7276 thing known. Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, | |
| 7277 immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding | |
| 7278 has a universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode | |
| 7279 of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under | |
| 7280 the same conditions of immateriality and immobility. | |
| 7281 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A1-p10"> But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible | |
| 7282 than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find | |
| 7283 whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the | |
| 7284 thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without | |
| 7285 receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives | |
| 7286 under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver | |
| 7287 according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a | |
| 7288 knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary. | |
| 7289 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 co."><a name="31953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31953] Iª q. 84 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum, | |
| 7290 ad evidentiam huius quaestionis, quod primi philosophi qui de | |
| 7291 naturis rerum inquisiverunt, putaverunt nihil esse in mundo praeter | |
| 7292 corpus. Et quia videbant omnia corpora mobilia esse, et putabant ea | |
| 7293 in continuo fluxu esse, aestimaverunt quod nulla certitudo de rerum | |
| 7294 veritate haberi posset a nobis. Quod enim est in continuo fluxu, | |
| 7295 per certitudinem apprehendi non potest, quia prius labitur quam | |
| 7296 mente diiudicetur, sicut Heraclitus dixit quod <i>non est possibile | |
| 7297 aquam fluvii currentis bis tangere</i>, ut recitat philosophus in | |
| 7298 IV Metaphys. His autem superveniens Plato, ut posset salvare certam | |
| 7299 cognitionem veritatis a nobis per intellectum haberi, posuit | |
| 7300 praeter ista corporalia aliud genus entium a materia et motu | |
| 7301 separatum, quod nominabat species sive ideas, per quarum | |
| 7302 participationem unumquodque istorum singularium et sensibilium | |
| 7303 dicitur vel homo vel equus vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sic ergo dicebat | |
| 7304 scientias et definitiones et quidquid ad actum intellectus | |
| 7305 pertinet, non referri ad ista corpora sensibilia, sed ad illa | |
| 7306 immaterialia et separata; ut sic anima non intelligat ista | |
| 7307 corporalia, sed intelligat horum corporalium species separatas. Sed | |
| 7308 hoc dupliciter apparet falsum. Primo quidem quia, cum illae species | |
| 7309 sint immateriales et immobiles, excluderetur a scientiis cognitio | |
| 7310 motus et materiae (quod est proprium scientiae naturalis) et | |
| 7311 demonstratio per causas moventes et materiales. Secundo autem, quia | |
| 7312 derisibile videtur ut, dum rerum quae nobis manifestae sunt | |
| 7313 notitiam quaerimus, alia entia in medium afferamus, quae non | |
| 7314 possunt esse earum substantiae, cum ab eis differant secundum esse, | |
| 7315 et sic, illis substantiis separatis cognitis, non propter hoc de | |
| 7316 istis sensibilibus iudicare possemus. Videtur autem in hoc Plato | |
| 7317 deviasse a veritate, quia, cum aestimaret omnem cognitionem per | |
| 7318 modum alicuius similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex | |
| 7319 necessitate sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in cognito. | |
| 7320 Consideravit autem quod forma rei intellectae est in intellectu | |
| 7321 universaliter et immaterialiter et immobiliter, quod ex ipsa | |
| 7322 operatione intellectus apparet, qui intelligit universaliter et per | |
| 7323 modum necessitatis cuiusdam; modus enim actionis est secundum modum | |
| 7324 formae agentis. Et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas | |
| 7325 hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter et | |
| 7326 immobiliter. Hoc autem necessarium non est. Quia etiam in ipsis | |
| 7327 sensibilibus videmus quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium | |
| 7328 quam in altero, puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio | |
| 7329 remissior, et in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine | |
| 7330 dulcedine. Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est | |
| 7331 in re quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit | |
| 7332 formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro. Et | |
| 7333 similiter intellectus species, corporum, quae sunt materiales et | |
| 7334 mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum | |
| 7335 suum, nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. | |
| 7336 Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora | |
| 7337 cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p11"> | |
| 7338 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. | |
| 7339 For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; | |
| 7340 but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence. | |
| 7341 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="31954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31954] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7342 dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quantum ad ea | |
| 7343 quibus intellectus cognoscit, non autem quantum ad ea quae | |
| 7344 cognoscit. Cognoscit enim corpora intelligendo, sed non per | |
| 7345 corpora, neque per similitudines materiales et corporeas; sed per | |
| 7346 species immateriales et intelligibiles, quae per sui essentiam in | |
| 7347 anima esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p12"> | |
| 7348 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows | |
| 7349 only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity | |
| 7350 is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power; whereas the higher power operates | |
| 7351 in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power. | |
| 7352 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="31955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31955] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7353 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXII de Civit. Dei, non est | |
| 7354 dicendum quod, sicut sensus cognoscit sola corporalia, ita | |
| 7355 intellectus cognoscit sola spiritualia, quia sequeretur quod Deus | |
| 7356 et Angeli corporalia non cognoscerent. Huius autem diversitatis | |
| 7357 ratio est, quia inferior virtus non se extendit ad ea quae sunt | |
| 7358 superioris virtutis; sed virtus superior ea quae sunt inferioris | |
| 7359 virtutis, excellentiori modo operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A1-p13"> | |
| 7360 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when | |
| 7361 there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves | |
| 7362 immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he | |
| 7363 remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an | |
| 7364 immovable science of movable things. | |
| 7365 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="31956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31956] Iª q. 84 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7366 dicendum quod omnis motus supponit aliquid immobile, cum enim | |
| 7367 transmutatio fit secundum qualitatem, remanet substantia immobilis; | |
| 7368 et cum transmutatur forma substantialis, remanet materia immobilis. | |
| 7369 Rerum etiam mutabilium sunt immobiles habitudines, sicut Socrates | |
| 7370 etsi non semper sedeat, tamen immobiliter est verum quod, | |
| 7371 quandocumque sedet, in uno loco manet. Et propter hoc nihil | |
| 7372 prohibet de rebus mobilibus immobilem scientiam habere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A2-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 2. Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p2"> | |
| 7373 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the | |
| 7374 soul "collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it | |
| 7375 gives them something of its own substance." But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies. Therefore the soul knows | |
| 7376 bodies through its essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, and from which it | |
| 7377 forms them. | |
| 7378 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="31957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31957] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 7379 proceditur. Videtur quod anima per essentiam suam corporalia | |
| 7380 intelligat. Dicit enim Augustinus, X de Trin., quod <i>anima | |
| 7381 imagines corporum convolvit et rapit factas in semetipsa de | |
| 7382 semetipsa, dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae</i>. Sed | |
| 7383 per similitudines corporum corpora intelligit. Ergo per essentiam | |
| 7384 suam, quam dat formandis talibus similitudinibus, et de qua eas | |
| 7385 format, cognoscit corporalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p3"> | |
| 7386 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that "the soul, after a fashion, is everything." Since, therefore, like is | |
| 7387 known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself. | |
| 7388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="31958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31958] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7389 philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>anima quodammodo est | |
| 7390 omnia</i>. Cum ergo simile simili cognoscatur, videtur quod anima | |
| 7391 per seipsam corporalia cognoscat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p4"> | |
| 7392 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in | |
| 7393 themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul | |
| 7394 than in themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence. | |
| 7395 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="31959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31959] Iª q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 7396 est superior corporalibus creaturis. Inferiora autem sunt in | |
| 7397 superioribus eminentiori modo quam in seipsis, ut Dionysius dicit. | |
| 7398 Ergo omnes creaturae corporeae nobiliori modo existunt in ipsa | |
| 7399 substantia animae quam in seipsis. Per suam ergo substantiam potest | |
| 7400 creaturas corporeas cognoscere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p5"> | |
| 7401 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses." But the | |
| 7402 soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself. | |
| 7403 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 s. c."><a name="31960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31960] Iª q. 84 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7404 quod Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., quod <i>mens corporearum rerum | |
| 7405 notitias per sensus corporis colligit</i>. Ipsa autem anima non est | |
| 7406 cognoscibilis per corporis sensus. Non ergo cognoscit corporea per | |
| 7407 suam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p6"> | |
| 7408 <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that "like | |
| 7409 is known by like." But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. | |
| 7410 The Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial | |
| 7411 nature, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist | |
| 7412 immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that things | |
| 7413 known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of | |
| 7414 all things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And because the nature of a result is determined by | |
| 7415 its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of | |
| 7416 all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence | |
| 7417 of our four material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. Consequently, since | |
| 7418 they held that things exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material, thus failing | |
| 7419 to discern intellect from sense. | |
| 7420 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p7"> But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not | |
| 7421 exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act, | |
| 7422 as is shown Metaph. ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known except through its act. It is therefore insufficient | |
| 7423 to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we | |
| 7424 further admit in the soul natures and forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like; thus does | |
| 7425 Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i, 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially | |
| 7426 in the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; | |
| 7427 why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have | |
| 7428 knowledge of fire. | |
| 7429 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p8"> We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. | |
| 7430 The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are | |
| 7431 external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is | |
| 7432 in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no | |
| 7433 power of knowledge whatever---such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing | |
| 7434 receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species | |
| 7435 not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which | |
| 7436 receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, | |
| 7437 sight has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have remarked above ( | |
| 7438 <a href="#FP_Q78_A3" id="FP_Q84_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[3]</a>): while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial. | |
| 7439 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A2-p9"> It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence | |
| 7440 must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it | |
| 7441 may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His | |
| 7442 Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, | |
| 7443 therefore, understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so. | |
| 7444 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 co."><a name="31961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31961] Iª q. 84 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7445 quod antiqui philosophi posuerunt quod anima per suam essentiam | |
| 7446 cognoscit corpora. Hoc enim animis omnium communiter inditum fuit, | |
| 7447 quod simile simili cognoscitur. Existimabant autem quod forma | |
| 7448 cogniti sit in cognoscente eo modo quo est in re cognita. E | |
| 7449 contrario tamen Platonici posuerunt. Plato enim, quia perspexit | |
| 7450 intellectualem animam immaterialem esse et immaterialiter | |
| 7451 cognoscere, posuit formas rerum cognitarum immaterialiter | |
| 7452 subsistere. Priores vero naturales, quia considerabant res cognitas | |
| 7453 esse corporeas et materiales, posuerunt oportere res cognitas etiam | |
| 7454 in anima cognoscente materialiter esse. Et ideo, ut animae | |
| 7455 attribuerent omnium cognitionem, posuerunt eam habere naturam | |
| 7456 communem cum omnibus. Et quia natura principiatorum ex principiis | |
| 7457 constituitur, attribuerunt animae naturam principii, ita quod qui | |
| 7458 dixit principium omnium esse ignem, posuit animam esse de natura | |
| 7459 ignis; et similiter de aere et aqua. Empedocles autem, qui posuit | |
| 7460 quatuor elementa materialia et duo moventia, ex his etiam dixit | |
| 7461 animam esse constitutam. Et ita, cum res materialiter in anima | |
| 7462 ponerent, posuerunt omnem cognitionem animae materialem esse, non | |
| 7463 discernentes inter intellectum et sensum. Sed haec opinio | |
| 7464 improbatur. Primo quidem, quia in materiali principio, de quo | |
| 7465 loquebantur, non existunt principiata nisi in potentia. Non autem | |
| 7466 cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod est in potentia, sed solum | |
| 7467 secundum quod est actu, ut patet in IX Metaphys., unde nec ipsa | |
| 7468 potentia cognoscitur nisi per actum. Sic igitur non sufficeret | |
| 7469 attribuere animae principiorum naturam ad hoc quod omnia | |
| 7470 cognosceret, nisi inessent ei naturae et formae singulorum | |
| 7471 effectuum, puta ossis et carnis et aliorum huiusmodi; ut | |
| 7472 Aristoteles contra Empedoclem argumentatur in I de anima. Secundo | |
| 7473 quia, si oporteret rem cognitam materialiter in cognoscente | |
| 7474 existere, nulla ratio esset quare res quae materialiter extra | |
| 7475 animam subsistunt, cognitione carerent, puta, si anima igne | |
| 7476 cognoscit ignem, et ignis etiam qui est extra animam, ignem | |
| 7477 cognosceret. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet materialia cognita in | |
| 7478 cognoscente existere non materialiter, sed magis immaterialiter. Et | |
| 7479 huius ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt | |
| 7480 extra cognoscentem, cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt. | |
| 7481 Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid unum. Unde | |
| 7482 manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad | |
| 7483 rationem materialitatis. Et ideo quae non recipiunt formas nisi | |
| 7484 materialiter, nullo modo sunt cognoscitiva, sicut plantae; ut | |
| 7485 dicitur in II libro de anima. Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius | |
| 7486 habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectius cognoscit. Unde et | |
| 7487 intellectus, qui abstrahit speciem non solum a materia, sed etiam a | |
| 7488 materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit | |
| 7489 quam sensus, qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, | |
| 7490 sed cum materialibus conditionibus. Et inter ipsos sensus, visus | |
| 7491 est magis cognoscitivus, quia est minus materialis, ut supra dictum | |
| 7492 est. Et inter ipsos intellectus, tanto quilibet est perfectior, | |
| 7493 quanto immaterialior. Ex his ergo patet quod, si aliquis | |
| 7494 intellectus est qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet | |
| 7495 quod essentia eius habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut antiqui | |
| 7496 posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex principiis omnium | |
| 7497 materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc autem est proprium Dei, ut | |
| 7498 sua essentia sit immaterialiter comprehensiva omnium, prout | |
| 7499 effectus virtute praeexistunt in causa. Solus igitur Deus per | |
| 7500 essentiam suam omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque | |
| 7501 etiam Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p10"> | |
| 7502 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the formation | |
| 7503 of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this | |
| 7504 way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image; | |
| 7505 but just as we say that a body is made into something colored because of its | |
| 7506 being informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul "keeps something"---namely, | |
| 7507 not informed with such image---"which is able freely to judge of the species of these images": and that this is the "mind" | |
| 7508 or "intellect." And he says that the part which is informed with these images---namely, the imagination---is "common to us | |
| 7509 and beasts." | |
| 7510 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="31962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31962] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7511 dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de visione imaginaria, quae | |
| 7512 fit per imagines corporum. Quibus imaginibus formandis dat anima | |
| 7513 aliquid suae substantiae, sicut subiectum datur ut informetur per | |
| 7514 aliquam formam. Et sic de seipsa facit huiusmodi imagines, non quod | |
| 7515 anima vel aliquid animae convertatur, ut sit haec vel illa imago; | |
| 7516 sed sicut dicitur de corpore fieri aliquid coloratum, prout | |
| 7517 informatur colore. Et hic sensus apparet ex his quae sequuntur. | |
| 7518 Dicit enim quod servat aliquid, scilicet non formatum tali imagine, | |
| 7519 quod libere de specie talium imaginum iudicet, et hoc dicit esse | |
| 7520 mentem vel intellectum. Partem autem quae informatur huiusmodi | |
| 7521 imaginibus scilicet imaginativam, dicit esse communem nobis et | |
| 7522 bestiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p11"> | |
| 7523 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the | |
| 7524 soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all---through the senses, to all things sensible---through | |
| 7525 the intellect, to all things intelligible. | |
| 7526 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="31963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31963] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7527 dicendum quod Aristoteles non posuit animam esse actu compositam ex | |
| 7528 omnibus, sicut antiqui naturales; sed dixit quodammodo animam esse | |
| 7529 omnia, inquantum est in potentia ad omnia; per sensum quidem ad | |
| 7530 sensibilia, per intellectum vero ad intelligibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A2-p12"> | |
| 7531 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every creature has a finite and determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain | |
| 7532 likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness | |
| 7533 thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence | |
| 7534 is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being | |
| 7535 the universal principle of all. | |
| 7536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="31964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31964] Iª q. 84 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7537 dicendum quod quaelibet creatura habet esse finitum et | |
| 7538 determinatum. Unde essentia superioris creaturae, etsi habeat | |
| 7539 quandam similitudinem inferioris creaturae prout communicant in | |
| 7540 aliquo genere, non tamen complete habet similitudinem illius, quia | |
| 7541 determinatur ad aliquam speciem, praeter quam est species | |
| 7542 inferioris creaturae. Sed essentia Dei est perfecta similitudo | |
| 7543 omnium quantum ad omnia quae in rebus inveniuntur, sicut universale | |
| 7544 principium omnium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A3-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 3. Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p2"> | |
| 7545 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul understands all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension | |
| 7546 (xxix in Ev.), that "man has understanding in common with the angels." But angels understand all things through innate species: | |
| 7547 wherefore in the book De Causis it is said that "every intelligence is full of forms." Therefore the soul also has innate | |
| 7548 species of things, by means of which it understands corporeal things. | |
| 7549 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="31965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31965] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 7550 proceditur. Videtur quod anima intelligat omnia per species sibi | |
| 7551 naturaliter inditas. Dicit enim Gregorius, in homilia ascensionis | |
| 7552 quod <i>homo habet commune cum Angelis intelligere</i>. Sed Angeli | |
| 7553 intelligunt omnia per formas naturaliter inditas, unde in libro de | |
| 7554 causis dicitur quod <i>omnis intelligentia est plena formis</i>. | |
| 7555 Ergo et anima habet species rerum naturaliter inditas, quibus | |
| 7556 corporalia intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p3"> | |
| 7557 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under | |
| 7558 the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. | |
| 7559 And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species. | |
| 7560 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="31966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31966] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 7561 intellectiva est nobilior quam materia prima corporalis. Sed | |
| 7562 materia prima est creata a Deo sub formis ad quas est in potentia. | |
| 7563 Ergo multo magis anima intellectiva est creata a Deo sub speciebus | |
| 7564 intelligibilibus. Et sic anima intelligit corporalia per species | |
| 7565 sibi naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p4"> | |
| 7566 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge, | |
| 7567 answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, | |
| 7568 concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; which would | |
| 7569 not be the case unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal | |
| 7570 things through innate species. | |
| 7571 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="31967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31967] Iª q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7572 nullus potest verum respondere nisi de eo quod scit. Sed aliquis | |
| 7573 etiam idiota, non habens scientiam acquisitam, respondet verum de | |
| 7574 singulis, si tamen ordinate interrogetur, ut narratur in Menone | |
| 7575 Platonis de quodam. Ergo antequam aliquis acquirat scientiam, habet | |
| 7576 rerum cognitionem. Quod non esset nisi anima haberet species | |
| 7577 naturaliter inditas. Intelligit igitur anima res corporeas per | |
| 7578 species naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p5"> | |
| 7579 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written." | |
| 7580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 s. c."><a name="31968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31968] Iª q. 84 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7581 quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, de intellectu loquens, | |
| 7582 quod est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A3-p6"> | |
| 7583 <b>I answer that,</b> Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is | |
| 7584 to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs | |
| 7585 be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes | |
| 7586 is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from | |
| 7587 such potentiality to act---through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation---by instruction | |
| 7588 or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images | |
| 7589 which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De | |
| 7590 Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality | |
| 7591 to | |
| 7592 all such species. | |
| 7593 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A3-p7"> But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, | |
| 7594 as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man's intellect is filled | |
| 7595 with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But | |
| 7596 this seems to be unreasonable. First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems | |
| 7597 impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for | |
| 7598 no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And especially | |
| 7599 unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established | |
| 7600 above ( | |
| 7601 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q84_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76] , A[1]</a>): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered | |
| 7602 by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense | |
| 7603 be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind | |
| 7604 can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things. We must | |
| 7605 therefore conclude that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species. | |
| 7606 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 co."><a name="31969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31969] Iª q. 84 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7607 quod, cum forma sit principium actionis, oportet ut eo modo se | |
| 7608 habeat aliquid ad formam quae est actionis principium, quo se habet | |
| 7609 ad actionem illam, sicut si moveri sursum est ex levitate, oportet | |
| 7610 quod in potentia tantum sursum fertur, esse leve solum in potentia, | |
| 7611 quod autem actu sursum fertur, esse leve in actu. Videmus autem | |
| 7612 quod homo est quandoque cognoscens in potentia tantum, tam secundum | |
| 7613 sensum quam secundum intellectum. Et de tali potentia in actum | |
| 7614 reducitur, ut sentiat quidem, per actiones sensibilium in sensum; | |
| 7615 ut intelligat autem, per disciplinam aut inventionem. Unde oportet | |
| 7616 dicere quod anima cognoscitiva sit in potentia tam ad similitudines | |
| 7617 quae sunt principia sentiendi, quam ad similitudines quae sunt | |
| 7618 principia intelligendi. Et propter hoc Aristoteles posuit quod | |
| 7619 intellectus, quo anima intelligit, non habet aliquas species | |
| 7620 naturaliter inditas, sed est in principio in potentia ad huiusmodi | |
| 7621 species omnes. Sed quia id quod habet actu formam, interdum non | |
| 7622 potest agere secundum formam propter aliquod impedimentum, sicut | |
| 7623 leve si impediatur sursum ferri; propter hoc Plato posuit quod | |
| 7624 intellectus hominis naturaliter est plenus omnibus speciebus | |
| 7625 intelligibilibus, sed per unionem corporis impeditur ne possit in | |
| 7626 actum exire. Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum. Primo quidem | |
| 7627 quia, si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse | |
| 7628 possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, | |
| 7629 quod nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere, nullus enim homo | |
| 7630 obliviscitur ea quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum | |
| 7631 sit maius sua parte, et alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur | |
| 7632 inconveniens, si ponatur esse animae naturale corpori uniri, ut | |
| 7633 supra habitum est, inconveniens enim est quod naturalis operatio | |
| 7634 alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi secundum | |
| 7635 naturam. Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex | |
| 7636 hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum, quae | |
| 7637 apprehenduntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus natus nullam | |
| 7638 potest habere notitiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si animae | |
| 7639 essent naturaliter inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes. Et ideo | |
| 7640 dicendum est quod anima non cognoscit corporalia per species | |
| 7641 naturaliter inditas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p8"> | |
| 7642 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades | |
| 7643 of bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection | |
| 7644 as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms | |
| 7645 which it has not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by | |
| 7646 its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above ( | |
| 7647 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A2" id="FP_Q84_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[2]</a>). In the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the | |
| 7648 human intellect is in potentiality to such species. | |
| 7649 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="31970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31970] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7650 dicendum quod homo quidem convenit cum Angelis in intelligendo, | |
| 7651 deficit tamen ab eminentia intellectus eorum, sicut et corpora | |
| 7652 inferiora, quae tantum existunt secundum Gregorium, deficiunt ab | |
| 7653 existentia superiorum corporum. Nam materia inferiorum corporum non | |
| 7654 est completa totaliter per formam, sed est in potentia ad formas | |
| 7655 quas non habet, materia autem caelestium corporum est totaliter | |
| 7656 completa per formam, ita quod non est in potentia ad aliam formam, | |
| 7657 ut supra habitum est. Et similiter intellectus Angeli est perfectus | |
| 7658 per species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam, intellectus autem | |
| 7659 humanus est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p9"> | |
| 7660 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Primary matter has substantial being through its form, consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would | |
| 7661 not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does | |
| 7662 not receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no comparison. | |
| 7663 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="31971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31971] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7664 dicendum quod materia prima habet esse substantiale per formam, et | |
| 7665 ideo oportuit quod crearetur sub aliqua forma, alioquin non esset | |
| 7666 in actu. Sub una tamen forma existens, est in potentia ad alias. | |
| 7667 Intellectus autem non habet esse substantiale per speciem | |
| 7668 intelligibilem; et ideo non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A3-p10"> | |
| 7669 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now | |
| 7670 by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, | |
| 7671 this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether | |
| 7672 the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by | |
| 7673 asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded. | |
| 7674 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="31972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31972] Iª q. 84 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7675 dicendum quod ordinata interrogatio procedit ex principiis | |
| 7676 communibus per se notis, ad propria. Per talem autem processum | |
| 7677 scientia causatur in anima addiscentis. Unde cum verum respondet de | |
| 7678 his de quibus secundo interrogatur, hoc non est quia prius ea | |
| 7679 noverit; sed quia tunc ea de novo addiscit. Nihil enim refert utrum | |
| 7680 ille qui docet, proponendo vel interrogando procedat de principiis | |
| 7681 communibus ad conclusiones, utrobique enim animus audientis | |
| 7682 certificatur de posterioribus per priora.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A4-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 4. Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p2"> | |
| 7683 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation | |
| 7684 is caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the | |
| 7685 intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect | |
| 7686 in act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence | |
| 7687 is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually | |
| 7688 understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused | |
| 7689 by some separate forms. | |
| 7690 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="31973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31973] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 7691 proceditur. Videtur quod species intelligibiles effluant in animam | |
| 7692 ab aliquibus formis separatis. Omne enim quod per participationem | |
| 7693 est tale, causatur ab eo quod est per essentiam tale; sicut quod | |
| 7694 est ignitum reducitur sicut in causam in ignem. Sed anima | |
| 7695 intellectiva, secundum quod est actu intelligens, participat ipsa | |
| 7696 intelligibilia, intellectus enim in actu, quodammodo est | |
| 7697 intellectum in actu. Ergo ea quae secundum se et per essentiam suam | |
| 7698 sunt intellecta in actu, sunt causae animae intellectivae quod actu | |
| 7699 intelligat. Intellecta autem in actu per essentiam suam, sunt | |
| 7700 formae sine materia existentes. Species igitur intelligibiles | |
| 7701 quibus anima intelligit, causantur a formis aliquibus | |
| 7702 separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p3"> | |
| 7703 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the | |
| 7704 senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible | |
| 7705 species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But | |
| 7706 these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible | |
| 7707 forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances. | |
| 7708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="31974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31974] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7709 intelligibilia se habent ad intellectum, sicut sensibilia ad | |
| 7710 sensum. Sed sensibilia quae sunt in actu extra animam, sunt causae | |
| 7711 specierum sensibilium quae sunt in sensu, quibus sentimus. Ergo | |
| 7712 species intelligibiles quibus intellectus noster intelligit, | |
| 7713 causantur ab aliquibus actu intelligibilibus extra animam | |
| 7714 existentibus. Huiusmodi autem non sunt nisi formae a materia | |
| 7715 separatae. Formae igitur intelligibiles intellectus nostri effluunt | |
| 7716 ab aliquibus substantiis separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p4"> | |
| 7717 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in potentiality, | |
| 7718 afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate | |
| 7719 intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, are caused by some separate substances. | |
| 7720 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="31975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31975] Iª q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 7721 quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum per id quod est actu. Si | |
| 7722 ergo intellectus noster, prius in potentia existens, postmodum actu | |
| 7723 intelligat, oportet quod hoc causetur ab aliquo intellectu qui | |
| 7724 semper est in actu. Hic autem est intellectus separatus. Ergo ab | |
| 7725 aliquibus substantiis separatis causantur species intelligibiles | |
| 7726 quibus actu intelligimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p5"> | |
| 7727 <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the | |
| 7728 fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense. | |
| 7729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 s. c."><a name="31976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31976] Iª q. 84 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7730 quia secundum hoc sensibus non indigeremus ad intelligendum. Quod | |
| 7731 patet esse falsum ex hoc praecipue quod qui caret uno sensu, nullo | |
| 7732 modo potest habere scientiam de sensibilibus illius sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p6"> | |
| 7733 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And | |
| 7734 this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said | |
| 7735 <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q84_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called | |
| 7736 "per se" man, and the form or idea of a horse which is called "per se" horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms | |
| 7737 are | |
| 7738 participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter | |
| 7739 to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individuating | |
| 7740 stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea | |
| 7741 takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held | |
| 7742 that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that | |
| 7743 the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said | |
| 7744 above | |
| 7745 <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q84_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas. | |
| 7746 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p7"> But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves | |
| 7747 in many ways (Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible | |
| 7748 things, instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first | |
| 7749 of which, said he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which | |
| 7750 he called the "active intelligence," from which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible | |
| 7751 species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are | |
| 7752 derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the "active | |
| 7753 intelligence." They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our | |
| 7754 intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive | |
| 7755 them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas | |
| 7756 remain immovably in the soul. | |
| 7757 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p8"> But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said that | |
| 7758 the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, nor is the | |
| 7759 mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul, | |
| 7760 for the latter's proper operation which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the | |
| 7761 body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of | |
| 7762 only certain separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand: | |
| 7763 wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body. | |
| 7764 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p9"> But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the | |
| 7765 consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles: even this seems | |
| 7766 an insufficient explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is overcome by | |
| 7767 sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body: and thus the | |
| 7768 senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters | |
| 7769 through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought. | |
| 7770 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A4-p10"> And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the | |
| 7771 "active intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural | |
| 7772 for the soul to understand through species derived from the "active intelligence," it follows that at times the soul of an | |
| 7773 individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its | |
| 7774 very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding | |
| 7775 sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore | |
| 7776 conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms. | |
| 7777 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 co."><a name="31977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31977] Iª q. 84 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7778 quod quidam posuerunt species intelligibiles nostri intellectus | |
| 7779 procedere ab aliquibus formis vel substantiis separatis. Et hoc | |
| 7780 dupliciter. Plato enim, sicut dictum est, posuit formas rerum | |
| 7781 sensibilium per se sine materia subsistentes; sicut formam hominis, | |
| 7782 quam nominabat per se hominem, et formam vel ideam equi, quam | |
| 7783 nominabat per se equum, et sic de aliis. Has ergo formas separatas | |
| 7784 ponebat participari et ab anima nostra, et a materia corporali; ab | |
| 7785 anima quidem nostra ad cognoscendum, a materia vero corporali ad | |
| 7786 essendum; ut sicut materia corporalis per hoc quod participat ideam | |
| 7787 lapidis, fit hic lapis, ita intellectus noster per hoc quod | |
| 7788 participat ideam lapidis, fit intelligens lapidem. Participatio | |
| 7789 autem ideae fit per aliquam similitudinem ipsius ideae in | |
| 7790 participante ipsam, per modum quo exemplar participatur ab | |
| 7791 exemplato. Sicut igitur ponebat formas sensibiles quae sunt in | |
| 7792 materia corporali, effluere ab ideis sicut quasdam earum | |
| 7793 similitudines; ita ponebat species intelligibiles nostri | |
| 7794 intellectus esse similitudines quasdam idearum ab eis effluentes. | |
| 7795 Et propter hoc, ut supra dictum est, scientias et definitiones ad | |
| 7796 ideas referebat. Sed quia contra rationem rerum sensibilium est | |
| 7797 quod earum formae subsistant absque materiis, ut Aristoteles | |
| 7798 multipliciter probat; ideo Avicenna, hac positione remota, posuit | |
| 7799 omnium rerum sensibilium intelligibiles species, non quidem per se | |
| 7800 subsistere absque materia, sed praeexistere immaterialiter in | |
| 7801 intellectibus separatis; a quorum primo derivantur huiusmodi | |
| 7802 species in sequentem, et sic de aliis usque ad ultimum intellectum | |
| 7803 separatum, quem nominat intellectum agentem; a quo, ut ipse dicit, | |
| 7804 effluunt species intelligibiles in animas nostras, et formae | |
| 7805 sensibiles in materiam corporalem. Et sic in hoc Avicenna cum | |
| 7806 Platone concordat, quod species intelligibiles nostri intellectus | |
| 7807 effluunt a quibusdam formis separatis, quas tamen Plato dicit per | |
| 7808 se subsistere, Avicenna vero ponit eas in intelligentia agente. | |
| 7809 Differunt etiam quantum ad hoc, quod Avicenna ponit species | |
| 7810 intelligibiles non remanere in intellectu nostro postquam desinit | |
| 7811 actu intelligere; sed indiget ut iterato se convertat ad | |
| 7812 recipiendum de novo. Unde non ponit scientiam animae naturaliter | |
| 7813 inditam, sicut Plato, qui ponit participationes idearum immobiliter | |
| 7814 in anima permanere. Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio | |
| 7815 assignari non posset quare anima nostra corpori uniretur. Non enim | |
| 7816 potest dici quod anima intellectiva corpori uniatur propter corpus, | |
| 7817 quia nec forma est propter materiam, nec motor propter mobile, sed | |
| 7818 potius e converso. Maxime autem videtur corpus esse necessarium | |
| 7819 animae intellectivae ad eius propriam operationem, quae est | |
| 7820 intelligere, quia secundum esse suum a corpore non dependet. Si | |
| 7821 autem anima species intelligibiles secundum suam naturam apta nata | |
| 7822 esset recipere per influentiam aliquorum separatorum principiorum | |
| 7823 tantum, et non acciperet eas ex sensibus, non indigeret corpore ad | |
| 7824 intelligendum, unde frustra corpori uniretur. Si autem dicatur quod | |
| 7825 indiget anima nostra sensibus ad intelligendum, quibus quodammodo | |
| 7826 excitetur ad consideranda ea quorum species intelligibiles a | |
| 7827 principiis separatis recipit; hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia | |
| 7828 huiusmodi excitatio non videtur necessaria animae nisi inquantum | |
| 7829 est consopita, secundum Platonicos, quodammodo et obliviosa propter | |
| 7830 unionem ad corpus, et sic sensus non proficerent animae | |
| 7831 intellectivae nisi ad tollendum impedimentum quod animae provenit | |
| 7832 ex corporis unione. Remanet igitur quaerendum quae sit causa | |
| 7833 unionis animae ad corpus. Si autem dicatur, secundum Avicennam, | |
| 7834 quod sensus sunt animae necessarii, quia per eos excitatur ut | |
| 7835 convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem, a qua recipit species; hoc | |
| 7836 quidem non sufficit. Quia si in natura animae est ut intelligat per | |
| 7837 species ab intelligentia agente effluxas, sequeretur quod quandoque | |
| 7838 anima possit se convertere ad intelligentiam agentem ex | |
| 7839 inclinatione suae naturae, vel etiam excitata per alium sensum, ut | |
| 7840 convertat se ad intelligentiam agentem ad recipiendum species | |
| 7841 sensibilium quorum sensum aliquis non habet. Et sic caecus natus | |
| 7842 posset habere scientiam de coloribus, quod est manifeste falsum. | |
| 7843 Unde dicendum est quod species intelligibiles quibus anima nostra | |
| 7844 intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p11"> | |
| 7845 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle | |
| 7846 which is by its essence intelligible---namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and | |
| 7847 material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). | |
| 7848 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="31978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31978] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7849 dicendum quod species intelligibiles quas participat noster | |
| 7850 intellectus, reducuntur sicut in primam causam in aliquod | |
| 7851 principium per suam essentiam intelligibile, scilicet in Deum. Sed | |
| 7852 ab illo principio procedunt mediantibus formis rerum sensibilium et | |
| 7853 materialium, a quibus scientiam colligimus, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p12"> | |
| 7854 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible. | |
| 7855 Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect. | |
| 7856 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="31979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31979] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7857 dicendum quod res materiales, secundum esse quod habent extra | |
| 7858 animam, possunt esse sensibiles actu; non autem actu | |
| 7859 intelligibiles. Unde non est simile de sensu et intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A4-p13"> | |
| 7860 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is | |
| 7861 a power of the soul, as we have said ( | |
| 7862 <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q84_A4-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause. | |
| 7863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="31980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31980] Iª q. 84 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7864 dicendum quod intellectus noster possibilis reducitur de potentia | |
| 7865 ad actum per aliquod ens actu, idest per intellectum agentem, qui | |
| 7866 est virtus quaedam animae nostrae, ut dictum est, non autem per | |
| 7867 aliquem intellectum separatum, sicut per causam proximam; sed forte | |
| 7868 sicut per causam remotam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A6-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 6. Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p2"> | |
| 7869 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we | |
| 7870 cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever | |
| 7871 the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be perceived." Secondly, because, | |
| 7872 "whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to | |
| 7873 the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible | |
| 7874 object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit." And | |
| 7875 so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. | |
| 7876 Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses. | |
| 7877 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="31987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31987] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 7878 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectiva cognitio non accipiatur a | |
| 7879 rebus sensibilibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium | |
| 7880 quaest., quod <i>non est expectanda sinceritas veritatis a corporis | |
| 7881 sensibus</i>. Et hoc probat dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod | |
| 7882 <i>omne quod corporeus sensus attingit, sine ulla intermissione | |
| 7883 temporis commutatur, quod autem non manet, percipi non potest</i>. | |
| 7884 Alio modo, per hoc quod <i>omnia quae per corpus sentimus, etiam | |
| 7885 cum non adsunt sensibus, imagines tamen eorum patimur, ut in somno | |
| 7886 vel furore; non autem sensibus discernere valemus utrum ipsa | |
| 7887 sensibilia, vel imagines eorum falsas sentiamus. Nihil autem | |
| 7888 percipi potest quod a falso non discernitur</i>. Et sic concludit | |
| 7889 quod non est expectanda veritas a sensibus. Sed cognitio | |
| 7890 intellectualis est apprehensiva veritatis. Non ergo cognitio | |
| 7891 intellectualis est expectanda a sensibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p3"> | |
| 7892 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): "We must not thing that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as | |
| 7893 though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's action; for that which acts is in every way more | |
| 7894 excellent than that which it acts on." Whence he concludes that "the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the | |
| 7895 spirit causes it in itself." Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible | |
| 7896 things. | |
| 7897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="31988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31988] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7898 Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>non est putandum | |
| 7899 facere aliquid corpus in spiritum, tanquam spiritus corpori | |
| 7900 facienti materiae vice subdatur, omni enim modo praestantior est | |
| 7901 qui facit, ea re de qua aliquid facit</i>. Unde concludit quod | |
| 7902 <i>imaginem corporis non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in | |
| 7903 seipso facit</i>. Non ergo intellectualis cognitio a sensibilibus | |
| 7904 derivatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p4"> | |
| 7905 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for | |
| 7906 we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible | |
| 7907 things. | |
| 7908 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="31989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31989] Iª q. 84 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7909 effectus non se extendit ultra virtutem suae causae. Sed | |
| 7910 intellectualis cognitio se extendit ultra sensibilia, intelligimus | |
| 7911 enim quaedam quae sensu percipi non possunt. Intellectualis ergo | |
| 7912 cognitio non derivatur a rebus sensibilibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p5"> | |
| 7913 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses. | |
| 7914 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 s. c."><a name="31990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31990] Iª q. 84 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7915 quod philosophus probat, I Metaphys., et in fine Poster., quod | |
| 7916 principium nostrae cognitionis est a sensu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p6"> | |
| 7917 <b>I answer that,</b> On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing from | |
| 7918 the bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle | |
| 7919 says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by a "discharge of images." And the reason for this | |
| 7920 opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish | |
| 7921 between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible, | |
| 7922 they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression | |
| 7923 Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images. | |
| 7924 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p7"> Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making | |
| 7925 use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual | |
| 7926 knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated | |
| 7927 by the intellect, as we have said above ( | |
| 7928 <a href="#FP_Q84_A4" id="FP_Q84_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[4]</a> ,5). Moreover he held that | |
| 7929 sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: | |
| 7930 but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself | |
| 7931 the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that the "body | |
| 7932 feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what | |
| 7933 is | |
| 7934 announced from without." Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor | |
| 7935 sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses | |
| 7936 rouse the intellect to the act of understanding. | |
| 7937 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p8"> Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense | |
| 7938 has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of | |
| 7939 the "composite." And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable | |
| 7940 that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the "composite," | |
| 7941 Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible | |
| 7942 on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every | |
| 7943 operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an | |
| 7944 operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. | |
| 7945 And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does | |
| 7946 not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, | |
| 7947 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere intellectual operation is effected | |
| 7948 in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he | |
| 7949 calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above ( | |
| 7950 <a href="#FP_Q79_A3" id="FP_Q84_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[79], AA[3]</a>,4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction. | |
| 7951 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A6-p9"> According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since | |
| 7952 the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active | |
| 7953 intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather | |
| 7954 that it is in a way the material cause. | |
| 7955 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 co."><a name="31991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31991] Iª q. 84 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7956 quod circa istam quaestionem triplex fuit philosophorum opinio. | |
| 7957 Democritus enim posuit quod <i>nulla est alia causa cuiuslibet | |
| 7958 nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his corporibus quae cogitamus, | |
| 7959 veniunt atque intrant imagines in animas nostras</i>; ut Augustinus | |
| 7960 dicit in epistola sua ad Dioscorum. Et Aristoteles etiam dicit, in | |
| 7961 libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod Democritus posuit cognitionem fieri | |
| 7962 per idola et defluxiones. Et huius positionis ratio fuit, quia tam | |
| 7963 ipse Democritus quam alii antiqui naturales non ponebant | |
| 7964 intellectum differre a sensu, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de | |
| 7965 anima. Et ideo, quia sensus immutatur a sensibili, arbitrabantur | |
| 7966 omnem nostram cognitionem fieri per solam immutationem a | |
| 7967 sensibilibus. Quam quidem immutationem Democritus asserebat fieri | |
| 7968 per imaginum defluxiones. Plato vero e contrario posuit intellectum | |
| 7969 differre a sensu; et intellectum quidem esse virtutem immaterialem | |
| 7970 organo corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum non | |
| 7971 potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio intellectualis non | |
| 7972 fit per immutationem intellectus a sensibilibus, sed per | |
| 7973 participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut dictum | |
| 7974 est. Sensum etiam posuit virtutem quandam per se operantem. Unde | |
| 7975 nec ipse sensus, cum sit quaedam vis spiritualis, immutatur a | |
| 7976 sensibilibus, sed organa sensuum a sensibilibus immutantur, ex qua | |
| 7977 immutatione anima quodammodo excitatur ut in se species sensibilium | |
| 7978 formet. Et hanc opinionem tangere videtur Augustinus, XII super | |
| 7979 Gen. ad Litt., ubi dicit quod <i>corpus non sentit, sed anima per | |
| 7980 corpus, quo velut nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod | |
| 7981 extrinsecus nuntiatur</i>. Sic igitur secundum Platonis opinionem, | |
| 7982 neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam | |
| 7983 sensibilis totaliter a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant | |
| 7984 animam sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant | |
| 7985 animam intellectivam ad intelligendum. Aristoteles autem media via | |
| 7986 processit. Posuit enim cum Platone intellectum differre a sensu. | |
| 7987 Sed sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine | |
| 7988 communicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae | |
| 7989 tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiter posuit de omnibus operationibus | |
| 7990 sensitivae partis. Quia igitur non est inconveniens quod sensibilia | |
| 7991 quae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc | |
| 7992 Aristoteles cum Democrito concordavit, quod operationes sensitivae | |
| 7993 partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum, non per | |
| 7994 modum defluxionis, ut Democritus posuit, sed per quandam | |
| 7995 operationem. Nam et Democritus omnem actionem fieri posuit per | |
| 7996 influxionem atomorum, ut patet in I de Generat. Intellectum vero | |
| 7997 posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione | |
| 7998 corporis. Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem | |
| 7999 incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, | |
| 8000 secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium | |
| 8001 corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est | |
| 8002 honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit. Non tamen ita quod | |
| 8003 intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione | |
| 8004 aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et | |
| 8005 nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra | |
| 8006 diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in | |
| 8007 actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte | |
| 8008 phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia | |
| 8009 phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed | |
| 8010 oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non | |
| 8011 potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa | |
| 8012 intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia | |
| 8013 causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p10"> | |
| 8014 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect | |
| 8015 is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their | |
| 8016 likeness. | |
| 8017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="31992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31992] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8018 dicendum quod per verba illa Augustini datur intelligi quod veritas | |
| 8019 non sit totaliter a sensibus expectanda. Requiritur enim lumen | |
| 8020 intellectus agentis, per quod immutabiliter veritatem in rebus | |
| 8021 mutabilibus cognoscamus, et discernamus ipsas res a similitudinibus | |
| 8022 rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p11"> | |
| 8023 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, | |
| 8024 the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed | |
| 8025 on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect | |
| 8026 must be separate, namely, because "the agent is more noble than the | |
| 8027 patient." And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but | |
| 8028 also an active power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination, is an action | |
| 8029 of the "composite," there is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far | |
| 8030 as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored is compared to the | |
| 8031 pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is through | |
| 8032 the agency of the sensible, since "fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless | |
| 8033 there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, even of things not perceived | |
| 8034 by the senses. And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense. | |
| 8035 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="31993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31993] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8036 dicendum quod Augustinus ibi non loquitur de intellectuali | |
| 8037 cognitione, sed de imaginaria. Et quia, secundum Platonis | |
| 8038 opinionem, vis imaginaria habet operationem quae est animae solius; | |
| 8039 eadem ratione usus est Augustinus ad ostendendum quod corpora non | |
| 8040 imprimunt suas similitudines in vim imaginariam, sed hoc facit ipsa | |
| 8041 anima, qua utitur Aristoteles ad probandum intellectum agentem esse | |
| 8042 aliquid separatum, quia scilicet agens est honorabilius patiente. | |
| 8043 Et procul dubio oportet, secundum hanc positionem, in vi | |
| 8044 imaginativa ponere non solum potentiam passivam, sed etiam activam. | |
| 8045 Sed si ponamus, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, quod actio virtutis | |
| 8046 imaginativae sit coniuncti, nulla sequitur difficultas, quia corpus | |
| 8047 sensibile est nobilius organo animalis, secundum hoc quod | |
| 8048 comparatur ad ipsum ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, sicut | |
| 8049 coloratum in actu ad pupillam, quae colorata est in potentia. | |
| 8050 Posset tamen dici quod, quamvis prima immutatio virtutis | |
| 8051 imaginariae sit per motum sensibilium, quia phantasia est motus | |
| 8052 factus secundum sensum, ut dicitur in libro de anima; tamen est | |
| 8053 quaedam operatio animae in homine quae dividendo et componendo | |
| 8054 format diversas rerum imagines, etiam quae non sunt a sensibus | |
| 8055 acceptae. Et quantum ad hoc possunt accipi verba Augustini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A6-p12"> | |
| 8056 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual | |
| 8057 knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge. | |
| 8058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="31994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31994] Iª q. 84 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8059 dicendum quod sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis | |
| 8060 cognitionis. Et ideo non est mirum si intellectualis cognitio ultra | |
| 8061 sensitivam se extendit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A7-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 7. Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to | |
| 8062 the phantasms? | |
| 8063 </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p2"> | |
| 8064 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without | |
| 8065 turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the | |
| 8066 intellect is in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, | |
| 8067 without turning to the phantasms. | |
| 8068 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="31995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31995] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 8069 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus possit actu intelligere per | |
| 8070 species intelligibiles quas penes se habet, non convertendo se ad | |
| 8071 phantasmata. Intellectus enim fit in actu per speciem | |
| 8072 intelligibilem qua informatur. Sed intellectum esse in actu, est | |
| 8073 ipsum intelligere. Ergo species intelligibiles sufficiunt ad hoc | |
| 8074 quod intellectus actu intelligat, absque hoc quod ad phantasmata se | |
| 8075 convertat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p3"> | |
| 8076 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually | |
| 8077 imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms. | |
| 8078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="31996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31996] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magis | |
| 8079 dependet imaginatio a sensu, quam intellectus ab imaginatione. Sed | |
| 8080 imaginatio potest imaginari actu, absentibus sensibilibus. Ergo | |
| 8081 multo magis intellectus potest intelligere actu, non convertendo se | |
| 8082 ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p4"> | |
| 8083 <b>Objection 3:</b> There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect | |
| 8084 cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. | |
| 8085 Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the angels. | |
| 8086 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="31997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31997] Iª q. 84 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8087 incorporalium non sunt aliqua phantasmata, quia imaginatio tempus | |
| 8088 et continuum non transcendit. Si ergo intellectus noster non posset | |
| 8089 aliquid intelligere in actu nisi converteretur ad phantasmata, | |
| 8090 sequeretur quod non posset intelligere incorporeum aliquid. Quod | |
| 8091 patet esse falsum, intelligimus enim veritatem ipsam, et Deum et | |
| 8092 Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p5"> | |
| 8093 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm." | |
| 8094 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 s. c."><a name="31998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31998] Iª q. 84 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8095 quod philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod <i>nihil sine | |
| 8096 phantasmate intelligit anima</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q84_A7-p6"> | |
| 8097 <b>I answer that,</b> In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand | |
| 8098 anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make | |
| 8099 use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there | |
| 8100 were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now | |
| 8101 sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear | |
| 8102 that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge | |
| 8103 already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination | |
| 8104 is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, | |
| 8105 as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. | |
| 8106 Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to | |
| 8107 serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is | |
| 8108 that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for | |
| 8109 the purpose of understanding. | |
| 8110 </p><p id="FP_Q84_A7-p7"> Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of | |
| 8111 the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas | |
| 8112 the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; | |
| 8113 and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to | |
| 8114 such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature | |
| 8115 of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore | |
| 8116 the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing | |
| 8117 in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the | |
| 8118 intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal | |
| 8119 nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists | |
| 8120 say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn | |
| 8121 to the phantasms whenever it understands. | |
| 8122 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 co."><a name="31999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[31999] Iª q. 84 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8123 quod impossibile est intellectum nostrum, secundum praesentis vitae | |
| 8124 statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, aliquid intelligere in | |
| 8125 actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indiciis | |
| 8126 apparet. Primo quidem quia, cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non | |
| 8127 utens corporali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per | |
| 8128 laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur ad eius | |
| 8129 actum actus alicuius potentiae utentis organo corporali. Utuntur | |
| 8130 autem organo corporali sensus et imaginatio et aliae vires | |
| 8131 pertinentes ad partem sensitivam. Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc | |
| 8132 quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum accipiendo scientiam de | |
| 8133 novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus | |
| 8134 imaginationis et ceterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quod, impedito | |
| 8135 actu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in phreneticis; | |
| 8136 et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtutis, ut in lethargicis; | |
| 8137 impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu etiam ea quorum scientiam | |
| 8138 praeaccepit. Secundo, quia hoc quilibet in seipso experiri potest, | |
| 8139 quod quando aliquis conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua | |
| 8140 phantasmata sibi per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat | |
| 8141 quod intelligere studet. Et inde est etiam quod quando alium | |
| 8142 volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, ex | |
| 8143 quibus sibi phantasmata formare possit ad intelligendum. Huius | |
| 8144 autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur | |
| 8145 cognoscibili. Unde intellectus angelici, qui est totaliter a | |
| 8146 corpore separatus, obiectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis | |
| 8147 a corpore separata; et per huiusmodi intelligibilia materialia | |
| 8148 cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, | |
| 8149 proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali | |
| 8150 existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in | |
| 8151 invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem | |
| 8152 huius naturae est, quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est | |
| 8153 absque materia corporali, sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod | |
| 8154 sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, | |
| 8155 et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis | |
| 8156 rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod | |
| 8157 cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem | |
| 8158 apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad | |
| 8159 hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod | |
| 8160 convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in | |
| 8161 particulari existentem. Si autem proprium obiectum intellectus | |
| 8162 nostri esset forma separata; vel si naturae rerum sensibilium | |
| 8163 subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos; non | |
| 8164 oporteret quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret | |
| 8165 se ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p8"> | |
| 8166 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have | |
| 8167 said above ( | |
| 8168 <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q84_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make | |
| 8169 use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals. | |
| 8170 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32000] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8171 dicendum quod species conservatae in intellectu possibili, in eo | |
| 8172 existunt habitualiter quando actu non intelligit, sicut supra | |
| 8173 dictum est. Unde ad hoc quod intelligamus in actu, non sufficit | |
| 8174 ipsa conservatio specierum; sed oportet quod eis utamur secundum | |
| 8175 quod convenit rebus quarum sunt species, quae sunt naturae in | |
| 8176 particularibus existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p9"> | |
| 8177 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of | |
| 8178 the individual, whereas the intellect does. | |
| 8179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32001] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8180 dicendum quod etiam ipsum phantasma est similitudo rei | |
| 8181 particularis, unde non indiget imaginatio aliqua alia similitudine | |
| 8182 particularis, sicut indiget intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A7-p10"> | |
| 8183 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are | |
| 8184 phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. | |
| 8185 Nom. i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state | |
| 8186 of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, | |
| 8187 therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no | |
| 8188 phantasms of the things themselves. | |
| 8189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32002] Iª q. 84 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8190 dicendum quod incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur | |
| 8191 a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum sunt | |
| 8192 phantasmata. Sicut veritatem intelligimus ex consideratione rei | |
| 8193 circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deum autem, ut Dionysius dicit, | |
| 8194 cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem; alias | |
| 8195 etiam incorporeas substantias, in statu praesentis vitae, | |
| 8196 cognoscere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel aliquam | |
| 8197 comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi aliquid | |
| 8198 intelligimus, necesse habemus converti ad phantasmata corporum, | |
| 8199 licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q84_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q84_A8-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 8. Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p2"> | |
| 8200 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior | |
| 8201 does not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the | |
| 8202 intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. | |
| 8203 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32003] Iª q. 84 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 8204 proceditur. Videtur quod iudicium intellectus non impediatur per | |
| 8205 ligamentum sensus. Superius enim non dependet ab inferiori. Sed | |
| 8206 iudicium intellectus est supra sensum. Ergo iudicium intellectus | |
| 8207 non impeditur per ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p3"> | |
| 8208 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vigil. | |
| 8209 i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through | |
| 8210 suspension of the senses. | |
| 8211 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32004] Iª q. 84 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8212 syllogizare est actus intellectus. In somno autem ligatur sensus, | |
| 8213 ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et Vig.; contingit tamen quandoque | |
| 8214 quod aliquis dormiens syllogizat. Ergo non impeditur iudicium | |
| 8215 intellectus per ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p4"> | |
| 8216 <b>On the contrary,</b> What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, | |
| 8217 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment | |
| 8218 of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses. | |
| 8219 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32005] Iª q. 84 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8220 quod in dormiendo ea quae contra licitos mores contingunt, non | |
| 8221 imputantur ad peccatum; ut Augustinus in XII super Gen. ad Litt. | |
| 8222 dicit. Hoc autem non esset si homo in dormiendo liberum usum | |
| 8223 rationis et intellectus haberet. Ergo impeditur rationis usus per | |
| 8224 ligamentum sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p5"> | |
| 8225 <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above | |
| 8226 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q84_A8-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>, our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything | |
| 8227 cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is the term | |
| 8228 and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is action, so the end | |
| 8229 of natural science is that which | |
| 8230 is perceived principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, | |
| 8231 in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know | |
| 8232 the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives | |
| 8233 with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the | |
| 8234 knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. | |
| 8235 But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it | |
| 8236 is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things | |
| 8237 are known to us. | |
| 8238 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 co."><a name="32006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32006] Iª q. 84 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8239 quod, sicut dictum est, proprium obiectum intellectui nostro | |
| 8240 proportionatum est natura rei sensibilis. Iudicium autem perfectum | |
| 8241 de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent | |
| 8242 cognoscantur, et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et | |
| 8243 finis iudicii. Dicit autem philosophus, in III de caelo, quod | |
| 8244 <i>sicut finis factivae scientiae est opus, ita naturalis scientiae | |
| 8245 finis est quod videtur principaliter secundum sensum</i>, faber | |
| 8246 enim non quaerit cognitionem cultelli nisi propter opus, ut | |
| 8247 operetur hunc particularem cultellum; et similiter naturalis non | |
| 8248 quaerit cognoscere naturam lapidis et equi, nisi ut sciat rationes | |
| 8249 eorum quae videntur secundum sensum. Manifestum est autem quod non | |
| 8250 posset esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus | |
| 8251 ignoraret, et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium | |
| 8252 scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. | |
| 8253 Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a | |
| 8254 nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde | |
| 8255 impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, | |
| 8256 cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p6"> | |
| 8257 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and | |
| 8258 principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance | |
| 8259 to the judgment of the intellect. | |
| 8260 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32007] Iª q. 84 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8261 dicendum quod, quamvis intellectus sit superior sensu, accipit | |
| 8262 tamen aliquo modo a sensu, et eius obiecta prima et principalia in | |
| 8263 sensibilibus fundantur. Et ideo necesse est quod impediatur | |
| 8264 iudicium intellectus ex ligamento sensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q84_A8-p7"> | |
| 8265 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in | |
| 8266 De Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. | |
| 8267 For when the amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; | |
| 8268 thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating and | |
| 8269 drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus | |
| 8270 it happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: | |
| 8271 thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If | |
| 8272 the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; | |
| 8273 so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things, and their | |
| 8274 images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from | |
| 8275 the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination | |
| 8276 are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while | |
| 8277 asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect. | |
| 8278 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 84 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32008] Iª q. 84 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8279 dicendum quod sensus ligatur in dormientibus propter evaporationes | |
| 8280 quasdam et fumositates resolutas, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. et | |
| 8281 Vig. Et ideo secundum dispositionem huiusmodi evaporationum, | |
| 8282 contingit esse ligamentum sensus maius vel minus. Quando enim | |
| 8283 multus fuerit motus vaporum, ligatur non solum sensus, sed etiam | |
| 8284 imaginatio, ita ut nulla appareant phantasmata; sicut praecipue | |
| 8285 accidit cum aliquis incipit dormire post multum cibum et potum. Si | |
| 8286 vero motus vaporum aliquantulum fuerit remissior, apparent | |
| 8287 phantasmata, sed distorta et inordinata; sicut accidit in | |
| 8288 febricitantibus. Si vero adhuc magis motus sedetur, apparent | |
| 8289 phantasmata ordinata; sicut maxime solet contingere in fine | |
| 8290 dormitionis, et in hominibus sobriis et habentibus fortem | |
| 8291 imaginationem. Si autem motus vaporum fuerit modicus, non solum | |
| 8292 imaginatio remanet libera, sed etiam ipse sensus communis ex parte | |
| 8293 solvitur; ita quod homo iudicat interdum in dormiendo ea quae videt | |
| 8294 somnia esse, quasi diiudicans inter res et rerum similitudines. Sed | |
| 8295 tamen ex aliqua parte remanet sensus communis ligatus; et ideo, | |
| 8296 licet aliquas similitudines discernat a rebus, tamen semper in | |
| 8297 aliquibus decipitur. Sic igitur per modum quo sensus solvitur et | |
| 8298 imaginatio in dormiendo, liberatur et iudicium intellectus, non | |
| 8299 tamen ex toto. Unde illi qui dormiendo syllogizant, cum excitantur, | |
| 8300 semper recognoscunt se in aliquo defecisse.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 8301 <div id="FP_Q85" class="div3"> | |
| 8302 <h3 id="FP_Q85-p0.1">Q. 85. OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 8303 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 8304 <p id="FP_Q85-p2"> We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q85-p3"><a href="#FP_Q85_A1"> (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p4"><a href="#FP_Q85_A2"> (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it | |
| 8305 understands? | |
| 8306 </a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p5"><a href="#FP_Q85_A3"> (3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p6"><a href="#FP_Q85_A4"> (4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p7"><a href="#FP_Q85_A5"> (5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p8"><a href="#FP_Q85_A6"> (6) Whether the intellect can err?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p9"><a href="#FP_Q85_A7"> (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q85-p10"><a href="#FP_Q85_A8"> (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</a></p> | |
| 8307 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 pr."><a name="32009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32009] | |
| 8308 Iª q. 85 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de modo et | |
| 8309 ordine intelligendi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum | |
| 8310 intellectus noster intelligat abstrahendo species a phantasmatibus. | |
| 8311 Secundo, utrum species intelligibiles abstractae a phantasmatibus, | |
| 8312 se habeant ad intellectum nostrum ut quod intelligitur, vel sicut | |
| 8313 id quo intelligitur. Tertio, utrum intellectus noster naturaliter | |
| 8314 intelligat prius magis universale. Quarto, utrum intellectus noster | |
| 8315 possit multa simul intelligere. Quinto, utrum intellectus noster | |
| 8316 intelligat componendo et dividendo. Sexto, utrum intellectus possit | |
| 8317 errare. Septimo, utrum unus possit eandem rem melius intelligere | |
| 8318 quam alius. Octavo, utrum intellectus noster per prius cognoscat | |
| 8319 indivisibile quam divisibile.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 8320 <div id="FP_Q85_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A1-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 1. Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p2"> | |
| 8321 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For | |
| 8322 the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not | |
| 8323 exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by | |
| 8324 abstraction of the species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect. | |
| 8325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32010] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 8326 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat res | |
| 8327 corporeas et materiales per abstractionem a phantasmatibus. | |
| 8328 Quicumque enim intellectus intelligit rem aliter quam sit, est | |
| 8329 falsus. Formae autem rerum materialium non sunt abstractae a | |
| 8330 particularibus, quorum similitudines sunt phantasmata. Si ergo | |
| 8331 intelligamus res materiales per abstractionem specierum a | |
| 8332 phantasmatibus, erit falsitas in intellectu nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p3"> | |
| 8333 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood | |
| 8334 apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter | |
| 8335 is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from | |
| 8336 the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the | |
| 8337 phantasm. | |
| 8338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32011] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res | |
| 8339 materiales sunt res naturales, in quarum definitione cadit materia. | |
| 8340 Sed nihil potest intelligi sine eo quod cadit in definitione eius. | |
| 8341 Ergo res materiales non possunt intelligi sine materia. Sed materia | |
| 8342 est individuationis principium. Ergo res materiales non possunt | |
| 8343 intelligi per abstractionem universalis a particulari, quod est | |
| 8344 abstrahere species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p4"> | |
| 8345 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. | |
| 8346 But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither | |
| 8347 does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself | |
| 8348 on the intellect. | |
| 8349 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32012] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 8350 III de anima dicitur quod phantasmata se habent ad animam | |
| 8351 intellectivam sicut colores ad visum. Sed visio non fit per | |
| 8352 abstractionem aliquarum specierum a coloribus, sed per hoc quod | |
| 8353 colores imprimunt in visum. Ergo nec intelligere contingit per hoc | |
| 8354 quod aliquid abstrahatur a phantasmatibus, sed per hoc quod | |
| 8355 phantasmata imprimunt in intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p5"> | |
| 8356 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul---the passive intellect and | |
| 8357 the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, | |
| 8358 but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to | |
| 8359 the phantasm, as light is to color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but | |
| 8360 rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms. | |
| 8361 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32013] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ut | |
| 8362 dicitur in III de anima, in intellectiva anima sunt duo, scilicet | |
| 8363 intellectus possibilis, et agens. Sed abstrahere a phantasmatibus | |
| 8364 species intelligibiles non pertinet ad intellectum possibilem, sed | |
| 8365 recipere species iam abstractas. Sed nec etiam videtur pertinere ad | |
| 8366 intellectum agentem, qui se habet ad phantasmata sicut lumen ad | |
| 8367 colores, quod non abstrahit aliquid a coloribus, sed magis eis | |
| 8368 influit. Ergo nullo modo intelligimus abstrahendo a | |
| 8369 phantasmatibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p6"> | |
| 8370 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not, therefore, | |
| 8371 by abstraction. | |
| 8372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32014] Iª q. 85 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8373 philosophus, in III de anima, dicit quod <i>intellectus intelligit | |
| 8374 species in phantasmatibus</i>. Non ergo eas abstrahendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p7"> | |
| 8375 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter." Therefore | |
| 8376 material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms. | |
| 8377 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32015] Iª q. 85 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8378 quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>sicut res sunt separabiles a | |
| 8379 materia, sic circa intellectum sunt</i>. Ergo oportet quod | |
| 8380 materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur, et a | |
| 8381 similitudinibus materialibus, quae sunt phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p8"> | |
| 8382 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 8383 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. | |
| 8384 For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power | |
| 8385 is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power | |
| 8386 of the sensitive part can only have | |
| 8387 knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor | |
| 8388 in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore | |
| 8389 a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, | |
| 8390 namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; | |
| 8391 yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above ( | |
| 8392 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q85_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this | |
| 8393 individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from | |
| 8394 individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands | |
| 8395 material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of | |
| 8396 immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial. | |
| 8397 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p9"> But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held | |
| 8398 that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating things | |
| 8399 abstract, as stated above ( | |
| 8400 <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q85_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[84] , A[1]</a>). | |
| 8401 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 co."><a name="32016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32016] Iª q. 85 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8402 quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum cognoscibile proportionatur | |
| 8403 virtuti cognoscitivae. Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae | |
| 8404 virtutis. Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi | |
| 8405 corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et ideo obiectum cuiuslibet sensitivae | |
| 8406 potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali existit. Et quia | |
| 8407 huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis | |
| 8408 potentia sensitivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum. | |
| 8409 Quaedam autem virtus cognoscitiva est quae neque est actus organi | |
| 8410 corporalis, neque est aliquo modo corporali materiae coniuncta, | |
| 8411 sicut intellectus angelicus. Et ideo huius virtutis cognoscitivae | |
| 8412 obiectum est forma sine materia subsistens, etsi enim materialia | |
| 8413 cognoscant, non tamen nisi in immaterialibus ea intuentur, scilicet | |
| 8414 vel in seipsis vel in Deo. Intellectus autem humanus medio modo se | |
| 8415 habet, non enim est actus alicuius organi, sed tamen est quaedam | |
| 8416 virtus animae, quae est forma corporis, ut ex supra dictis patet. | |
| 8417 Et ideo proprium eius est cognoscere formam in materia quidem | |
| 8418 corporali individualiter existentem, non tamen prout est in tali | |
| 8419 materia. Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non | |
| 8420 prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia | |
| 8421 individuali, quam repraesentant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est | |
| 8422 dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a | |
| 8423 phantasmatibus; et per materialia sic considerata in immaterialium | |
| 8424 aliqualem cognitionem devenimus, sicut e contra Angeli per | |
| 8425 immaterialia materialia cognoscunt. Plato vero, attendens solum ad | |
| 8426 immaterialitatem intellectus humani, non autem ad hoc quod est | |
| 8427 corpori quodammodo unitus, posuit obiectum intellectus ideas | |
| 8428 separatas; et quod intelligimus, non quidem abstrahendo, sed magis | |
| 8429 abstracta participando, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p10"> | |
| 8430 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does | |
| 8431 not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we | |
| 8432 understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not | |
| 8433 really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply | |
| 8434 falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from | |
| 8435 one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that color | |
| 8436 is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider | |
| 8437 color and its properties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word what we thus | |
| 8438 understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore color | |
| 8439 can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as | |
| 8440 a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion | |
| 8441 of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the | |
| 8442 phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. | |
| 8443 If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word | |
| 8444 "otherwise" refers to the thing understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; | |
| 8445 and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the | |
| 8446 species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one | |
| 8447 who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode | |
| 8448 of a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the | |
| 8449 intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing. | |
| 8450 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32017] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8451 dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum | |
| 8452 compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non | |
| 8453 esse in alio, vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum | |
| 8454 simplicis et absolutae considerationis; sicut cum intelligimus | |
| 8455 unum, nihil considerando de alio. Abstrahere igitur per intellectum | |
| 8456 ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta, secundum primum modum | |
| 8457 abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate. Sed secundo modo abstrahere | |
| 8458 per intellectum quae non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet | |
| 8459 falsitatem; ut in sensibilibus manifeste apparet. Si enim | |
| 8460 intelligamus vel dicamus colorem non inesse corpori colorato, vel | |
| 8461 esse separatum ab eo, erit falsitas in opinione vel in oratione. Si | |
| 8462 vero consideremus colorem et proprietates eius, nihil considerantes | |
| 8463 de pomo colorato; vel quod sic intelligimus, etiam voce exprimamus; | |
| 8464 erit absque falsitate opinionis et orationis. Pomum enim non est de | |
| 8465 ratione coloris; et ideo nihil prohibet colorem intelligi, nihil | |
| 8466 intelligendo de pomo. Similiter dico quod ea quae pertinent ad | |
| 8467 rationem speciei cuiuslibet rei materialis, puta lapidis aut | |
| 8468 hominis aut equi, possunt considerari sine principiis | |
| 8469 individualibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei. Et hoc est | |
| 8470 abstrahere universale a particulari, vel speciem intelligibilem a | |
| 8471 phantasmatibus, considerare scilicet naturam speciei absque | |
| 8472 consideratione individualium principiorum, quae per phantasmata | |
| 8473 repraesentantur. Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus est falsus qui | |
| 8474 intelligit rem aliter quam sit, verum est si ly aliter referatur ad | |
| 8475 rem intellectam. Tunc enim intellectus est falsus, quando | |
| 8476 intelligit rem esse aliter quam sit. Unde falsus esset intellectus, | |
| 8477 si sic abstraheret speciem lapidis a materia, ut intelligeret eam | |
| 8478 non esse in materia, ut Plato posuit. Non est autem verum quod | |
| 8479 proponitur, si ly aliter accipiatur ex parte intelligentis. Est | |
| 8480 enim absque falsitate ut alius sit modus intelligentis in | |
| 8481 intelligendo, quam modus rei in existendo, quia intellectum est in | |
| 8482 intelligente immaterialiter, per modum intellectus; non autem | |
| 8483 materialiter, per modum rei materialis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p11"> | |
| 8484 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that | |
| 8485 were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is | |
| 8486 twofold, common, and "signate" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. | |
| 8487 The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual | |
| 8488 sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from "this flesh and | |
| 8489 these bones," which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be | |
| 8490 considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect form "flesh and bones." | |
| 8491 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A1-p12"> Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also | |
| 8492 from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal | |
| 8493 matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter | |
| 8494 is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible | |
| 8495 qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered | |
| 8496 apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding | |
| 8497 the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they | |
| 8498 can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual | |
| 8499 intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as "being," "unity," "power," | |
| 8500 "act," and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to | |
| 8501 consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to | |
| 8502 be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality. | |
| 8503 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32018] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8504 dicendum quod quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit | |
| 8505 forma solum, et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum | |
| 8506 hoc, in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et | |
| 8507 ideo aliter dicendum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet | |
| 8508 communis, et signata vel individualis, communis quidem, ut caro et | |
| 8509 os; individualis autem, ut hae carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus | |
| 8510 igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili | |
| 8511 individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem | |
| 8512 hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de | |
| 8513 ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII | |
| 8514 Metaphys.; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis | |
| 8515 non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus. Species | |
| 8516 autem mathematicae possunt abstrahi per intellectum a materia | |
| 8517 sensibili non solum individuali, sed etiam communi; non tamen a | |
| 8518 materia intelligibili communi, sed solum individuali. Materia enim | |
| 8519 sensibilis dicitur materia corporalis secundum quod subiacet | |
| 8520 qualitatibus sensibilibus, scilicet calido et frigido, duro et | |
| 8521 molli, et huiusmodi. Materia vero intelligibilis dicitur substantia | |
| 8522 secundum quod subiacet quantitati. Manifestum est autem quod | |
| 8523 quantitas prius inest substantiae quam qualitates sensibiles. Unde | |
| 8524 quantitates, ut numeri et dimensiones et figurae, quae sunt | |
| 8525 terminationes quantitatum, possunt considerari absque qualitatibus | |
| 8526 sensibilibus, quod est eas abstrahi a materia sensibili, non tamen | |
| 8527 possunt considerari sine intellectu substantiae quantitati | |
| 8528 subiectae, quod esset eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili communi. | |
| 8529 Possunt tamen considerari sine hac vel illa substantia; quod est | |
| 8530 eas abstrahi a materia intelligibili individuali. Quaedam vero sunt | |
| 8531 quae possunt abstrahi etiam a materia intelligibili communi, sicut | |
| 8532 ens, unum, potentia et actus, et alia huiusmodi, quae etiam esse | |
| 8533 possunt absque omni materia, ut patet in substantiis | |
| 8534 immaterialibus. Et quia Plato non consideravit quod dictum est de | |
| 8535 duplici modo abstractionis, omnia quae diximus abstrahi per | |
| 8536 intellectum, posuit abstracta esse secundum rem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p13"> | |
| 8537 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can | |
| 8538 impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have | |
| 8539 not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression | |
| 8540 on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which | |
| 8541 by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific | |
| 8542 conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from | |
| 8543 the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as | |
| 8544 a body transferred from one place to another. | |
| 8545 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32019] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8546 dicendum quod colores habent eundem modum existendi prout sunt in | |
| 8547 materia corporali individuali, sicut et potentia visiva, et ideo | |
| 8548 possunt imprimere suam similitudinem in visum. Sed phantasmata, cum | |
| 8549 sint similitudines individuorum, et existant in organis corporeis, | |
| 8550 non habent eundem modum existendi quem habet intellectus humanus, | |
| 8551 ut ex dictis patet; et ideo non possunt sua virtute imprimere in | |
| 8552 intellectum possibilem. Sed virtute intellectus agentis resultat | |
| 8553 quaedam similitudo in intellectu possibili ex conversione | |
| 8554 intellectus agentis supra phantasmata, quae quidem est | |
| 8555 repraesentativa eorum quorum sunt phantasmata, solum quantum ad | |
| 8556 naturam speciei. Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species | |
| 8557 intelligibilis a phantasmatibus, non quod aliqua eadem numero | |
| 8558 forma, quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in | |
| 8559 intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco et | |
| 8560 transfertur ad alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p14"> | |
| 8561 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible | |
| 8562 species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by | |
| 8563 its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the | |
| 8564 abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active | |
| 8565 intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able | |
| 8566 to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs | |
| 8567 the passive intellect. | |
| 8568 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32020] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 8569 dicendum quod phantasmata et illuminantur ab intellectu agente; et | |
| 8570 iterum ab eis, per virtutem intellectus agentis, species | |
| 8571 intelligibiles abstrahuntur. Illuminantur quidem, quia, sicut pars | |
| 8572 sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectivam efficitur virtuosior, | |
| 8573 ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut | |
| 8574 ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur. Abstrahit autem | |
| 8575 intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, | |
| 8576 inquantum per virtutem intellectus agentis accipere possumus in | |
| 8577 nostra consideratione naturas specierum sine individualibus | |
| 8578 conditionibus, secundum quarum similitudines intellectus possibilis | |
| 8579 informatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A1-p15"> | |
| 8580 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things | |
| 8581 in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of | |
| 8582 which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ( | |
| 8583 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A1-p15.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). | |
| 8584 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32021] Iª q. 85 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 8585 dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species | |
| 8586 intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum | |
| 8587 in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus, quia non | |
| 8588 potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi | |
| 8589 convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A2-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 2. Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p2"> | |
| 8590 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. | |
| 8591 For the understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing | |
| 8592 of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this | |
| 8593 species is what is actually understood. | |
| 8594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32022] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 8595 proceditur. Videtur quod species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus | |
| 8596 abstractae, se habeant ad intellectum nostrum sicut id quod | |
| 8597 intelligitur. Intellectum enim in actu est in intelligente, quia | |
| 8598 intellectum in actu est ipse intellectus in actu. Sed nihil de re | |
| 8599 intellecta est in intellectu actu intelligente, nisi species | |
| 8600 intelligibilis abstracta. Ergo huiusmodi species est ipsum | |
| 8601 intellectum in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p3"> | |
| 8602 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the | |
| 8603 soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually | |
| 8604 understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species. | |
| 8605 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32023] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8606 intellectum in actu oportet in aliquo esse, alioquin nihil esset. | |
| 8607 Sed non est in re quae est extra animam, quia, cum res extra animam | |
| 8608 sit materialis, nihil quod est in ea, potest esse intellectum in | |
| 8609 actu. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectum in actu sit in intellectu. | |
| 8610 Et ita nihil est aliud quam species intelligibilis praedicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p4"> | |
| 8611 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words are signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the | |
| 8612 things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul---viz. the intelligible | |
| 8613 species, are what is actually understood. | |
| 8614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32024] Iª q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8615 philosophus dicit, in I Periherm., quod <i>voces sunt notae earum | |
| 8616 quae sunt in anima passionum</i>. Sed voces significant res | |
| 8617 intellectas, id enim voce significamus quod intelligimus. Ergo | |
| 8618 ipsae passiones animae, scilicet species intelligibiles, sunt ea | |
| 8619 quae intelliguntur in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p5"> | |
| 8620 <b>On the contrary,</b> The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what | |
| 8621 is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, | |
| 8622 but that by which the intellect understands. | |
| 8623 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32025] Iª q. 85 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 8624 species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum, sicut species | |
| 8625 sensibilis ad sensum. Sed species sensibilis non est illud quod | |
| 8626 sentitur, sed magis id quo sensus sentit. Ergo species | |
| 8627 intelligibilis non est quod intelligitur actu, sed id quo | |
| 8628 intelligit intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p6"> | |
| 8629 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is | |
| 8630 cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, | |
| 8631 namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. | |
| 8632 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p7"> This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore | |
| 8633 if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned | |
| 8634 with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of | |
| 8635 the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [* | |
| 8636 <a href="#FP_Q84_A1" id="FP_Q85_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[1]</a>]. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" | |
| 8637 [*Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its | |
| 8638 own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. | |
| 8639 Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so | |
| 8640 every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives | |
| 8641 that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be | |
| 8642 equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in | |
| 8643 fact, every sort of apprehension. | |
| 8644 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which | |
| 8645 is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see | |
| 8646 and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions | |
| 8647 proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is | |
| 8648 the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which | |
| 8649 proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness | |
| 8650 of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the | |
| 8651 intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of | |
| 8652 intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; | |
| 8653 but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion | |
| 8654 of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, | |
| 8655 by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, | |
| 8656 according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; | |
| 8657 it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species. | |
| 8658 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 co."><a name="32026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32026] Iª q. 85 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8659 quod quidam posuerunt quod vires cognoscitivae quae sunt in nobis, | |
| 8660 nihil cognoscunt nisi proprias passiones; puta quod sensus non | |
| 8661 sentit nisi passionem sui organi. Et secundum hoc, intellectus | |
| 8662 nihil intelligit nisi suam passionem, idest speciem intelligibilem | |
| 8663 in se receptam. Et secundum hoc, species huiusmodi est ipsum quod | |
| 8664 intelligitur. Sed haec opinio manifeste apparet falsa ex duobus. | |
| 8665 Primo quidem, quia eadem sunt quae intelligimus, et de quibus sunt | |
| 8666 scientiae. Si igitur ea quae intelligimus essent solum species quae | |
| 8667 sunt in anima, sequeretur quod scientiae omnes non essent de rebus | |
| 8668 quae sunt extra animam, sed solum de speciebus intelligibilibus | |
| 8669 quae sunt in anima; sicut secundum Platonicos omnes scientiae sunt | |
| 8670 de ideis, quas ponebant esse intellecta in actu. Secundo, quia | |
| 8671 sequeretur error antiquorum dicentium quod <i>omne quod videtur est | |
| 8672 verum</i>; et sic quod contradictoriae essent simul verae. Si enim | |
| 8673 potentia non cognoscit nisi propriam passionem, de ea solum | |
| 8674 iudicat. Sic autem videtur aliquid, secundum quod potentia | |
| 8675 cognoscitiva afficitur. Semper ergo iudicium potentiae | |
| 8676 cognoscitivae erit de eo quod iudicat, scilicet de propria | |
| 8677 passione, secundum quod est; et ita omne iudicium erit verum. Puta | |
| 8678 si gustus non sentit nisi propriam passionem, cum aliquis habens | |
| 8679 sanum gustum iudicat mel esse dulce, vere iudicabit; et similiter | |
| 8680 si ille qui habet gustum infectum, iudicet mel esse amarum, vere | |
| 8681 iudicabit, uterque enim iudicat secundum quod gustus eius | |
| 8682 afficitur. Et sic sequitur quod omnis opinio aequaliter erit vera, | |
| 8683 et universaliter omnis acceptio. Et ideo dicendum est quod species | |
| 8684 intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit | |
| 8685 intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut | |
| 8686 dicitur IX Metaphys., una quae manet in agente, ut videre et | |
| 8687 intelligere, altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere | |
| 8688 et secare; utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma | |
| 8689 secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est | |
| 8690 similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor calefacientis est similitudo | |
| 8691 calefacti; similiter forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in | |
| 8692 agente, est similitudo obiecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est | |
| 8693 secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est | |
| 8694 species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus | |
| 8695 intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, | |
| 8696 secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et | |
| 8697 speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est | |
| 8698 id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius | |
| 8699 species intelligibilis est similitudo. Et hoc etiam patet ex | |
| 8700 antiquorum opinione, qui ponebant simile simili cognosci. Ponebant | |
| 8701 enim quod anima per terram quae in ipsa erat, cognosceret terram | |
| 8702 quae extra ipsam erat; et sic de aliis. Si ergo accipiamus speciem | |
| 8703 terrae loco terrae, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, qui dicit quod | |
| 8704 <i>lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis</i>; sequetur quod | |
| 8705 anima per species intelligibiles cognoscat res quae sunt extra | |
| 8706 animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p9"> | |
| 8707 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually | |
| 8708 understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness | |
| 8709 of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is | |
| 8710 what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof. | |
| 8711 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32027] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8712 dicendum quod intellectum est in intelligente per suam | |
| 8713 similitudinem. Et per hunc modum dicitur quod intellectum in actu | |
| 8714 est intellectus in actu, inquantum similitudo rei intellectae est | |
| 8715 forma intellectus; sicut similitudo rei sensibilis est forma sensus | |
| 8716 in actu. Unde non sequitur quod species intelligibilis abstracta | |
| 8717 sit id quod actu intelligitur, sed quod sit similitudo eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p10"> | |
| 8718 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In these words "the thing actually understood" there is a double implication---the thing which is understood, and the fact | |
| 8719 that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal" imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction | |
| 8720 or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is | |
| 8721 only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as | |
| 8722 universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple | |
| 8723 apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that | |
| 8724 the color which is seen is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch | |
| 8725 as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in | |
| 8726 this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and | |
| 8727 consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, | |
| 8728 in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality. | |
| 8729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32028] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8730 dicendum quod, cum dicitur intellectum in actu, duo importantur, | |
| 8731 scilicet res quae intelligitur, et hoc quod est ipsum intelligi. Et | |
| 8732 similiter cum dicitur universale abstractum, duo intelliguntur, | |
| 8733 scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa | |
| 8734 igitur natura cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio | |
| 8735 universalitatis, non est nisi in singularibus; sed hoc ipsum quod | |
| 8736 est intelligi vel abstrahi, vel intentio universalitatis, est in | |
| 8737 intellectu. Et hoc possumus videre per simile in sensu. Visus enim | |
| 8738 videt colorem pomi sine eius odore. Si ergo quaeratur ubi sit color | |
| 8739 qui videtur sine odore manifestum est quod color qui videtur, non | |
| 8740 est nisi in pomo; sed quod sit sine odore perceptus, hoc accidit ei | |
| 8741 ex parte visus, inquantum in visu est similitudo coloris et non | |
| 8742 odoris. Similiter humanitas quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc | |
| 8743 vel in illo homine, sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine | |
| 8744 individualibus conditionibus, quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod | |
| 8745 sequitur intentio universalitatis, accidit humanitatis secundum | |
| 8746 quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae | |
| 8747 speciei, et non individualium principiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A2-p11"> | |
| 8748 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes | |
| 8749 place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself | |
| 8750 an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in | |
| 8751 the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the | |
| 8752 intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed | |
| 8753 by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division | |
| 8754 or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for | |
| 8755 itself for the purpose of judging of external things. | |
| 8756 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32029] Iª q. 85 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8757 dicendum quod in parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. Una | |
| 8758 secundum solam immutationem, et sic perficitur operatio sensus per | |
| 8759 hoc quod immutatur a sensibili. Alia operatio est formatio, | |
| 8760 secundum quod vis imaginativa format sibi aliquod idolum rei | |
| 8761 absentis, vel etiam nunquam visae. Et utraque haec operatio | |
| 8762 coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio | |
| 8763 intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie | |
| 8764 intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem | |
| 8765 vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde | |
| 8766 ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio | |
| 8767 significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces | |
| 8768 significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus | |
| 8769 sibi format ad iudicandum de rebus exterioribus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A3-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 3. Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p2"> | |
| 8770 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its | |
| 8771 own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because | |
| 8772 "that is first which does not involve the existence of its correlative" (Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily | |
| 8773 known as regards our intellect. | |
| 8774 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32030] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 8775 proceditur. Videtur quod magis universalia non sint priora in | |
| 8776 nostra cognitione intellectuali. Quia ea quae sunt priora et | |
| 8777 notiora secundum naturam, sunt posteriora et minus nota secundum | |
| 8778 nos. Sed universalia sunt priora secundum naturam, quia prius est a | |
| 8779 quo non convertitur subsistendi consequentia. Ergo universalia sunt | |
| 8780 posteriora in cognitione nostri intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p3"> | |
| 8781 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known | |
| 8782 secondarily by us. | |
| 8783 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32031] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8784 composita sunt priora quoad nos quam simplicia. Sed universalia | |
| 8785 sunt simpliciora. Ergo sunt posterius nota quoad nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p4"> | |
| 8786 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. | |
| 8787 But the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore | |
| 8788 the universals are secondarily known by us. | |
| 8789 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32032] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8790 philosophus dicit, in I Physic. quod definitum prius cadit in | |
| 8791 cognitione nostra quam partes definitionis. Sed universaliora sunt | |
| 8792 partes definitionis minus universalium, sicut animal est pars | |
| 8793 definitionis hominis. Ergo universalia sunt posterius nota quoad | |
| 8794 nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p5"> | |
| 8795 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily | |
| 8796 known by us. | |
| 8797 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32033] Iª q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, per | |
| 8798 effectus devenimus in causas et principia. Sed universalia sunt | |
| 8799 quaedam principia. Ergo universalia sunt posterius nota quoad | |
| 8800 nos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p6"> | |
| 8801 <b>On the contrary,</b> "We must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual" (Phys. i, 1) | |
| 8802 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32034] Iª q. 85 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8803 quod dicitur in I Physic., quod <i>ex universalibus in singularia | |
| 8804 oportet devenire</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p7"> | |
| 8805 <b>I answer that,</b> In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible | |
| 8806 knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, | |
| 8807 it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our | |
| 8808 intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every | |
| 8809 power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality | |
| 8810 and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object | |
| 8811 is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, | |
| 8812 and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and | |
| 8813 hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards | |
| 8814 we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things, | |
| 8815 without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge | |
| 8816 not only of the universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be | |
| 8817 known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know | |
| 8818 the less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal"; whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as | |
| 8819 "rational" or "irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows "animal" before it knows | |
| 8820 man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal. | |
| 8821 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p8"> Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. | |
| 8822 For by sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to place and time; in reference to place, | |
| 8823 when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is | |
| 8824 seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards | |
| 8825 time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore "children at | |
| 8826 first call men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The reason of this is clear: because | |
| 8827 he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows "genus" | |
| 8828 is in a state of potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between | |
| 8829 potentiality and act. | |
| 8830 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p9"> We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the | |
| 8831 universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the | |
| 8832 more common precedes the knowledge of the less common. | |
| 8833 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 co."><a name="32035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32035] Iª q. 85 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8834 quod in cognitione nostri intellectus duo oportet considerare. | |
| 8835 Primo quidem, quod cognitio intellectiva aliquo modo a sensitiva | |
| 8836 primordium sumit. Et quia sensus est singularium, intellectus autem | |
| 8837 universalium; necesse est quod cognitio singularium, quoad nos, | |
| 8838 prior sit quam universalium cognitio. Secundo oportet considerare | |
| 8839 quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit. Omne autem | |
| 8840 quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum | |
| 8841 incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum | |
| 8842 perfectum. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus, est | |
| 8843 scientia completa, per quam distincte et determinate res | |
| 8844 cognoscuntur. Actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per | |
| 8845 quam sciuntur res indistincte sub quadam confusione, quod enim sic | |
| 8846 cognoscitur, secundum quid cognoscitur in actu, et quodammodo in | |
| 8847 potentia. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Physic., quod <i>sunt primo | |
| 8848 nobis manifesta et certa confusa magis; posterius autem cognoscimus | |
| 8849 distinguendo distincte principia et elementa</i>. Manifestum est | |
| 8850 autem quod cognoscere aliquid in quo plura continentur, sine hoc | |
| 8851 quod habeatur propria notitia uniuscuiusque eorum quae continentur | |
| 8852 in illo, est cognoscere aliquid sub confusione quadam. Sic autem | |
| 8853 potest cognosci tam totum universale, in quo partes continentur in | |
| 8854 potentia, quam etiam totum integrale, utrumque enim totum potest | |
| 8855 cognosci in quadam confusione, sine hoc quod partes distincte | |
| 8856 cognoscantur. Cognoscere autem distincte id quod continetur in toto | |
| 8857 universali, est habere cognitionem de re minus communi. Sicut | |
| 8858 cognoscere animal indistincte, est cognoscere animal inquantum est | |
| 8859 animal, cognoscere autem animal distincte, est cognoscere animal | |
| 8860 inquantum est animal rationale vel irrationale, quod est cognoscere | |
| 8861 hominem vel leonem. Prius igitur occurrit intellectui nostro | |
| 8862 cognoscere animal quam cognoscere hominem, et eadem ratio est si | |
| 8863 comparemus quodcumque magis universale ad minus universale. Et quia | |
| 8864 sensus exit de potentia in actum sicut et intellectus, idem etiam | |
| 8865 ordo cognitionis apparet in sensu. Nam prius secundum sensum | |
| 8866 diiudicamus magis commune quam minus commune, et secundum locum et | |
| 8867 secundum tempus. Secundum locum quidem, sicut, cum aliquid videtur | |
| 8868 a remotis, prius deprehenditur esse corpus, quam deprehendatur esse | |
| 8869 animal; et prius deprehenditur esse animal, quam deprehendatur esse | |
| 8870 homo; et prius homo, quam Socrates vel Plato. Secundum tempus | |
| 8871 autem, quia puer a principio prius distinguit hominem a non homine, | |
| 8872 quam distinguat hunc hominem ab alio homine; et ideo <i>pueri a | |
| 8873 principio appellant omnes viros patres, posterius autem determinant | |
| 8874 unumquemque</i>, ut dicitur in I Physic. Et huius ratio manifesta | |
| 8875 est. Quia qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut | |
| 8876 sciat distinctionis principium; sicut qui scit genus, est in | |
| 8877 potentia ut sciat differentiam. Et sic patet quod cognitio | |
| 8878 indistincta media est inter potentiam et actum. Est ergo dicendum | |
| 8879 quod cognitio singularium est prior quoad nos quam cognitio | |
| 8880 universalium, sicut cognitio sensitiva quam cognitio intellectiva. | |
| 8881 Sed tam secundum sensum quam secundum intellectum, cognitio magis | |
| 8882 communis est prior quam cognitio minus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p10"> | |
| 8883 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of | |
| 8884 universality. And since the intention of universality---viz. the relation of one and the same to many---is due to intellectual | |
| 8885 abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal | |
| 8886 animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to Plato, who | |
| 8887 held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according | |
| 8888 to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas. | |
| 8889 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A3-p11"> Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself---for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. | |
| 8890 And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential | |
| 8891 come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and | |
| 8892 animal; for "the animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). | |
| 8893 The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally | |
| 8894 prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man | |
| 8895 comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of | |
| 8896 man. | |
| 8897 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32036] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8898 dicendum quod universale dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, | |
| 8899 secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione | |
| 8900 universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum | |
| 8901 et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione | |
| 8902 intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit | |
| 8903 posterius. Unde in I de anima dicitur quod <i>animal universale aut | |
| 8904 nihil est, aut posterius est</i>. Sed secundum Platonem, qui posuit | |
| 8905 universalia subsistentia, secundum hanc considerationem universale | |
| 8906 esset prius quam particularia, quae secundum eum non sunt nisi per | |
| 8907 participationem universalium subsistentium, quae dicuntur ideae. | |
| 8908 Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam naturam, scilicet | |
| 8909 animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus. Et | |
| 8910 sic dicendum est quod duplex est ordo naturae. Unus secundum viam | |
| 8911 generationis et temporis, secundum quam viam, ea quae sunt | |
| 8912 imperfecta et in potentia, sunt priora. Et hoc modo magis commune | |
| 8913 est prius secundum naturam, quod apparet manifeste in generatione | |
| 8914 hominis et animalis; nam prius generatur animal quam homo, ut | |
| 8915 dicitur in libro de Generat. Animal. Alius est ordo perfectionis, | |
| 8916 sive intentionis naturae; sicut actus simpliciter est prius | |
| 8917 secundum naturam quam potentia, et perfectum prius quam | |
| 8918 imperfectum. Et per hunc modum, minus commune est prius secundum | |
| 8919 naturam quam magis commune, ut homo quam animal, naturae enim | |
| 8920 intentio non sistit in generatione animalis, sed intendit generare | |
| 8921 hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p12"> | |
| 8922 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more common universal may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that | |
| 8923 in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained | |
| 8924 not only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, | |
| 8925 but also more; as "man" contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore | |
| 8926 "animal" in itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man" comes before "animal" considered as part of the same idea. | |
| 8927 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32037] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8928 dicendum quod universale magis commune comparatur ad minus commune | |
| 8929 ut totum et ut pars. Ut totum quidem, secundum quod in magis | |
| 8930 universali non solum continetur in potentia minus universale, sed | |
| 8931 etiam alia; ut sub animali non solum homo, sed etiam equus. Ut pars | |
| 8932 autem, secundum quod minus commune continet in sui ratione non | |
| 8933 solum magis commune, sed etiam alia; ut homo non solum animal, sed | |
| 8934 etiam rationale. Sic igitur animal consideratum in se, prius est in | |
| 8935 nostra cognitione quam homo; sed homo est prius in nostra | |
| 8936 cognitione quam quod animal sit pars rationis eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p13"> | |
| 8937 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known | |
| 8938 before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must | |
| 8939 needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles | |
| 8940 of definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined | |
| 8941 would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know | |
| 8942 how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature. | |
| 8943 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32038] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8944 dicendum quod pars aliqua dupliciter potest cognosci. Uno modo | |
| 8945 absolute, secundum quod in se est, et sic nihil prohibet prius | |
| 8946 cognoscere partes quam totum, ut lapides quam domum. Alio modo, | |
| 8947 secundum quod sunt partes huius totius, et sic necesse est quod | |
| 8948 prius cognoscamus totum quam partes; prius enim cognoscimus domum | |
| 8949 quadam confusa cognitione, quam distinguamus singulas partes eius. | |
| 8950 Sic igitur dicendum est quod definientia, absolute considerata, | |
| 8951 sunt prius nota quam definitum, alioquin non notificaretur | |
| 8952 definitum per ea. Sed secundum quod sunt partes definitionis, sic | |
| 8953 sunt posterius nota, prius enim cognoscimus hominem quadam confusa | |
| 8954 cognitione, quam sciamus distinguere omnia quae sunt de hominis | |
| 8955 ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A3-p14"> | |
| 8956 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far | |
| 8957 as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of | |
| 8958 knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, | |
| 8959 and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according | |
| 8960 to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, | |
| 8961 13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature | |
| 8962 of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from | |
| 8963 the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, | |
| 8964 because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that which | |
| 8965 is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual | |
| 8966 part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because | |
| 8967 the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, | |
| 8968 knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with | |
| 8969 unknown effects, and sometimes conversely. | |
| 8970 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32039] Iª q. 85 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 8971 dicendum quod universale, secundum quod accipitur cum intentione | |
| 8972 universalitatis, est quidem quodammodo principium cognoscendi, | |
| 8973 prout intentio universalitatis consequitur modum intelligendi qui | |
| 8974 est per abstractionem. Non autem est necesse quod omne quod est | |
| 8975 principium cognoscendi, sit principium essendi, ut Plato | |
| 8976 existimavit, cum quandoque cognoscamus causam per effectum, et | |
| 8977 substantiam per accidentia. Unde universale sic acceptum, secundum | |
| 8978 sententiam Aristotelis, non est principium essendi, neque | |
| 8979 substantia, ut patet in VII Metaphys. Si autem consideremus ipsam | |
| 8980 naturam generis et speciei prout est in singularibus, sic | |
| 8981 quodammodo habet rationem principii formalis respectu singularium, | |
| 8982 nam singulare est propter materiam, ratio autem speciei sumitur ex | |
| 8983 forma. Sed natura generis comparatur ad naturam speciei magis per | |
| 8984 modum materialis principii, quia natura generis sumitur ab eo quod | |
| 8985 est materiale in re, ratio vero speciei ab eo quod est formale; | |
| 8986 sicut ratio animalis a sensitivo, ratio vero hominis ab | |
| 8987 intellectivo. Et inde est quod ultima naturae intentio est ad | |
| 8988 speciem, non autem ad individuum, neque ad genus, quia forma est | |
| 8989 finis generationis, materia vero est propter formam. Non autem | |
| 8990 oportet quod cuiuslibet causae vel principii cognitio sit posterior | |
| 8991 quoad nos, cum quandoque cognoscamus per causas sensibiles, | |
| 8992 effectus ignotos; quandoque autem e converso.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A4-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 4. Whether we can understand many things at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p2"> | |
| 8993 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we can understand many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of | |
| 8994 before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the same | |
| 8995 time. | |
| 8996 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32040] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 8997 proceditur. Videtur quod possimus multa simul intelligere. | |
| 8998 Intellectus enim est supra tempus. Sed prius et posterius ad tempus | |
| 8999 pertinent. Ergo intellectus non intelligit diversa secundum prius | |
| 9000 et posterius, sed simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p3"> | |
| 9001 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, | |
| 9002 for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is | |
| 9003 nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many | |
| 9004 things at the same time. | |
| 9005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32041] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil | |
| 9006 prohibet diversas formas non oppositas simul eidem actu inesse, | |
| 9007 sicut odorem et colorem pomo. Sed species intelligibiles non sunt | |
| 9008 oppositae. Ergo nihil prohibet intellectum unum simul fieri in actu | |
| 9009 secundum diversas species intelligibiles et sic potest multa simul | |
| 9010 intelligere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p4"> | |
| 9011 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore | |
| 9012 the intellect understands many things at the same time. | |
| 9013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32042] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9014 intellectus simul intelligit aliquod totum, ut hominem vel domum. | |
| 9015 Sed in quolibet toto continentur multae partes. Ergo intellectus | |
| 9016 simul multa intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p5"> | |
| 9017 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the | |
| 9018 same is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another. | |
| 9019 Therefore it knows many things at the same time. | |
| 9020 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32043] Iª q. 85 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non | |
| 9021 potest cognosci differentia unius ad alterum, nisi simul utrumque | |
| 9022 apprehendatur, ut dicitur in libro de anima, et eadem ratio est de | |
| 9023 quacumque alia comparatione. Sed intellectus noster cognoscit | |
| 9024 differentiam et comparationem unius ad alterum. Ergo cognoscit | |
| 9025 multa simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p6"> | |
| 9026 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that "understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many." | |
| 9027 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32044] Iª q. 85 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9028 quod dicitur in libro Topic., quod <i>intelligere est unum solum, | |
| 9029 scire vero multa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p7"> | |
| 9030 <b>I answer that,</b> The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by "one" but not by "many" intelligible | |
| 9031 species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the | |
| 9032 intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the | |
| 9033 same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things | |
| 9034 the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it | |
| 9035 is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, | |
| 9036 just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes. Now all | |
| 9037 intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things | |
| 9038 which | |
| 9039 the species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected | |
| 9040 at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things. | |
| 9041 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 co."><a name="32045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32045] Iª q. 85 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9042 quod intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum unius, | |
| 9043 non autem multa per modum multorum, dico autem per modum unius vel | |
| 9044 multorum, per unam vel plures species intelligibiles. Nam modus | |
| 9045 cuiusque actionis consequitur formam quae est actionis principium. | |
| 9046 Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, | |
| 9047 simul intelligere potest, et inde est quod Deus omnia simul videt, | |
| 9048 quia omnia videt per unum, quod est essentia sua. Quaecumque vero | |
| 9049 intellectus per diversas species intelligit, non simul intelligit. | |
| 9050 Et huius ratio est, quia impossibile est idem subiectum perfici | |
| 9051 simul pluribus formis unius generis et diversarum specierum, sicut | |
| 9052 impossibile est quod idem corpus secundum idem simul coloretur | |
| 9053 diversis coloribus, vel figuretur diversis figuris. Omnes autem | |
| 9054 species intelligibiles sunt unius generis, quia sunt perfectiones | |
| 9055 unius intellectivae potentiae; licet res quarum sunt species, sint | |
| 9056 diversorum generum. Impossibile est ergo quod idem intellectus | |
| 9057 simul perficiatur diversis speciebus intelligibilibus, ad | |
| 9058 intelligendum diversa in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p8"> | |
| 9059 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible | |
| 9060 species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude | |
| 9061 is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time." | |
| 9062 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32046] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9063 dicendum quod intellectus est supra tempus quod est numerus motus | |
| 9064 corporalium rerum. Sed ipsa pluralitas specierum intelligibilium | |
| 9065 causat vicissitudinem quandam intelligibilium operationum, secundum | |
| 9066 quam una operatio est prior altera. Et hanc vicissitudinem | |
| 9067 Augustinus nominat tempus, cum dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., | |
| 9068 quod <i>Deus movet creaturam spiritualem per tempus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p9"> | |
| 9069 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging | |
| 9070 to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes. | |
| 9071 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32047] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9072 dicendum quod non solum oppositae formae non possunt esse simul in | |
| 9073 eodem subiecto, sed nec quaecumque formae eiusdem generis, licet | |
| 9074 non sint oppositae, sicut patet per exemplum inductum de coloribus | |
| 9075 et figuris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p10"> | |
| 9076 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through | |
| 9077 the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its | |
| 9078 species; and so they are not understood at the same time. | |
| 9079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32048] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9080 dicendum quod partes possunt intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sub | |
| 9081 quadam confusione, prout sunt in toto, et sic cognoscuntur per unam | |
| 9082 formam totius, et sic simul cognoscuntur. Alio modo, cognitione | |
| 9083 distincta, secundum quod quaelibet cognoscitur per suam speciem, et | |
| 9084 sic non simul intelliguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A4-p11"> | |
| 9085 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference | |
| 9086 or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole. | |
| 9087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32049] Iª q. 85 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 9088 dicendum quod quando intellectus intelligit differentiam vel | |
| 9089 comparationem unius ad alterum, cognoscit utrumque differentium vel | |
| 9090 comparatorum sub ratione ipsius comparationis vel differentiae; | |
| 9091 sicut dictum est quod cognoscit partes sub ratione totius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A5-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 5. Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p2"> | |
| 9092 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of | |
| 9093 many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition | |
| 9094 and division. | |
| 9095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32050] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 9096 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster non intelligat | |
| 9097 componendo et dividendo. Compositio enim et divisio non est nisi | |
| 9098 multorum. Sed intellectus non potest simul multa intelligere. Ergo | |
| 9099 non potest intelligere componendo et dividendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p3"> | |
| 9100 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as | |
| 9101 also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division. | |
| 9102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32051] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omni | |
| 9103 compositioni et divisioni adiungitur tempus praesens, praeteritum | |
| 9104 vel futurum. Sed intellectus abstrahit a tempore, sicut etiam ab | |
| 9105 aliis particularibus conditionibus. Ergo intellectus non intelligit | |
| 9106 componendo et dividendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p4"> | |
| 9107 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, | |
| 9108 for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that | |
| 9109 the composition be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division. | |
| 9110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32052] Iª q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9111 intellectus intelligit per assimilationem ad res. Sed compositio et | |
| 9112 divisio nihil est in rebus, nihil enim invenitur in rebus nisi res | |
| 9113 quae significatur per praedicatum et subiectum, quae est una et | |
| 9114 eadem si compositio est vera; homo enim est vere id quod est | |
| 9115 animal. Ergo intellectus non componit et dividit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p5"> | |
| 9116 <b>On the contrary,</b> Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition | |
| 9117 and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division. | |
| 9118 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32053] Iª q. 85 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, voces | |
| 9119 significant conceptiones intellectus, ut dicit philosophus in I | |
| 9120 Periherm. Sed in vocibus est compositio et divisio; ut patet in | |
| 9121 propositionibus affirmativis et negativis. Ergo intellectus | |
| 9122 componit et dividit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A5-p6"> | |
| 9123 <b>I answer that,</b> The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality | |
| 9124 to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: | |
| 9125 so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends | |
| 9126 something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and | |
| 9127 proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily | |
| 9128 compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, | |
| 9129 which is the process of reasoning. | |
| 9130 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A5-p7"> But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. | |
| 9131 Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing | |
| 9132 the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human | |
| 9133 intellect knows by composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect | |
| 9134 know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence. | |
| 9135 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 co."><a name="32054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32054] Iª q. 85 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9136 quod intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et | |
| 9137 dividendo. Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, | |
| 9138 similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non | |
| 9139 statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et | |
| 9140 similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione | |
| 9141 capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de | |
| 9142 ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium | |
| 9143 obiectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et | |
| 9144 accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum | |
| 9145 hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et | |
| 9146 ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est | |
| 9147 ratiocinari. Intellectus autem angelicus et divinus se habet sicut | |
| 9148 res incorruptibiles, quae statim a principio habent suam totam | |
| 9149 perfectionem. Unde intellectus angelicus et divinus statim perfecte | |
| 9150 totam rei cognitionem habet. Unde in cognoscendo quidditatem rei, | |
| 9151 cognoscit de re simul quidquid nos cognoscere possumus componendo | |
| 9152 et dividendo et ratiocinando. Et ideo intellectus humanus cognoscit | |
| 9153 componendo et dividendo, sicut et ratiocinando. Intellectus autem | |
| 9154 divinus et angelicus cognoscunt quidem compositionem et divisionem | |
| 9155 et ratiocinationem, non componendo et dividendo et ratiocinando, | |
| 9156 sed per intellectum simplicis quidditatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p8"> | |
| 9157 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things | |
| 9158 by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things. | |
| 9159 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32055] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9160 dicendum quod compositio et divisio intellectus secundum quandam | |
| 9161 differentiam vel comparationem fit. Unde sic intellectus cognoscit | |
| 9162 multa componendo et dividendo, sicut cognoscendo differentiam vel | |
| 9163 comparationem rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9"> | |
| 9164 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as | |
| 9165 we have said | |
| 9166 <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> | |
| 9167 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A5-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time. | |
| 9168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32056] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9169 dicendum quod intellectus et abstrahit a phantasmatibus; et tamen | |
| 9170 non intelligit actu nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut supra | |
| 9171 dictum est. Et ex ea parte qua se ad phantasmata convertit, | |
| 9172 compositioni et divisioni intellectus adiungitur tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A5-p10"> | |
| 9173 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode | |
| 9174 of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but | |
| 9175 it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity | |
| 9176 of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the | |
| 9177 imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form with matter; | |
| 9178 and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus | |
| 9179 is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular | |
| 9180 from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that | |
| 9181 composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white." Nevertheless composition | |
| 9182 of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the | |
| 9183 intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" | |
| 9184 and "whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white," means that "the man is something having | |
| 9185 whiteness": and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition | |
| 9186 of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; | |
| 9187 man, that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter; and according to this | |
| 9188 kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another. | |
| 9189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32057] Iª q. 85 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9190 dicendum quod similitudo rei recipitur in intellectu secundum modum | |
| 9191 intellectus, et non secundum modum rei. Unde compositioni et | |
| 9192 divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei; tamen | |
| 9193 non eodem modo se habet in re, sicut in intellectu. Intellectus | |
| 9194 enim humani proprium obiectum est quidditas rei materialis, quae | |
| 9195 sub sensu et imaginatione cadit. Invenitur autem duplex compositio | |
| 9196 in re materiali. Prima quidem, formae ad materiam, et huic | |
| 9197 respondet compositio intellectus qua totum universale de sua parte | |
| 9198 praedicatur; nam genus sumitur a materia communi, differentia vero | |
| 9199 completiva speciei a forma, particulare vero a materia individuali. | |
| 9200 Secunda vero compositio est accidentis ad subiectum, et huic reali | |
| 9201 compositioni respondet compositio intellectus secundum quam | |
| 9202 praedicatur accidens de subiecto, ut cum dicitur, homo est albus. | |
| 9203 Tamen differt compositio intellectus a compositione rei, nam ea | |
| 9204 quae componuntur in re, sunt diversa; compositio autem intellectus | |
| 9205 est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur. Non enim intellectus | |
| 9206 sic componit, ut dicat quod homo est albedo; sed dicit quod homo | |
| 9207 est albus, idest habens albedinem, idem autem est subiecto quod est | |
| 9208 homo, et quod est habens albedinem. Et simile est de compositione | |
| 9209 formae et materiae, nam animal significat id quod habet naturam | |
| 9210 sensitivam, rationale vero quod habet naturam intellectivam, homo | |
| 9211 vero quod habet utrumque, Socrates vero quod habet omnia haec cum | |
| 9212 materia individuali; et secundum hanc identitatis rationem, | |
| 9213 intellectus noster unum componit alteri praedicando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q85_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q85_A8-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 8. Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p2"> | |
| 9214 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1) | |
| 9215 that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements | |
| 9216 are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible. | |
| 9217 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32074] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 9218 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster per prius cognoscat | |
| 9219 indivisibile quam divisibile. Dicit enim philosophus, in I Physic., | |
| 9220 quod <i>intelligimus et scimus ex principiorum et elementorum | |
| 9221 cognitione</i>. Sed indivisibilia sunt principia et elementa | |
| 9222 divisibilium. Ergo per prius sunt nobis nota indivisibilia quam | |
| 9223 divisibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p3"> | |
| 9224 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more | |
| 9225 known," as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the | |
| 9226 definition of a line; for as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points"; also unity | |
| 9227 comes into the definition of number, for "number is multitude measured by one," as is said | |
| 9228 Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. | |
| 9229 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32075] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 9230 quod ponitur in definitione alicuius, per prius cognoscitur a | |
| 9231 nobis, quia definitio est ex prioribus et notioribus, ut dicitur in | |
| 9232 VI Topic. Sed indivisibile ponitur in definitione divisibilis, | |
| 9233 sicut <i>linea enim</i>, ut Euclides dicit, <i>est longitudo sine | |
| 9234 latitudine, cuius extremitates sunt duo puncta</i>. Et unitas | |
| 9235 ponitur in definitione numeri, quia numerus est multitudo mensurata | |
| 9236 per unum, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Ergo intellectus noster per | |
| 9237 prius intelligit indivisibile quam divisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p4"> | |
| 9238 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the intellect | |
| 9239 is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible. | |
| 9240 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32076] Iª q. 85 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9241 simile simili cognoscitur. Sed indivisibile est magis simile | |
| 9242 intellectui quam divisibile, quia intellectus est simplex, ut | |
| 9243 dicitur in III de anima. Ergo intellectus noster prius cognoscit | |
| 9244 indivisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p5"> | |
| 9245 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible is expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily. Therefore | |
| 9246 likewise is the indivisible. | |
| 9247 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32077] Iª q. 85 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9248 quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>indivisibile monstratur sicut | |
| 9249 privatio</i>. Sed privatio per posterius cognoscitur. Ergo et | |
| 9250 indivisibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q85_A8-p6"> | |
| 9251 <b>I answer that,</b> The object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, | |
| 9252 as above stated ( | |
| 9253 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q85_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship | |
| 9254 to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said | |
| 9255 De Anima iii, 6. First, the | |
| 9256 continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to | |
| 9257 us before its division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have | |
| 9258 said above | |
| 9259 <a href="#FP_Q85_A3" id="FP_Q85_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, | |
| 9260 the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as we have | |
| 9261 said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason | |
| 9262 of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The | |
| 9263 third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually | |
| 9264 or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined | |
| 9265 by | |
| 9266 way of privation "as that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated | |
| 9267 in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the | |
| 9268 quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect. | |
| 9269 </p><p id="FP_Q85_A8-p7"> But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it | |
| 9270 would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated | |
| 9271 by things. | |
| 9272 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 co."><a name="32078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32078] Iª q. 85 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9273 quod obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est | |
| 9274 quidditas rei materialis, quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit, ut ex | |
| 9275 praemissis patet. Et quia id quod est primo et per se cognitum a | |
| 9276 virtute cognoscitiva, est proprium eius obiectum, considerari | |
| 9277 potest quo ordine indivisibile intelligatur a nobis, ex eius | |
| 9278 habitudine ad huiusmodi quidditatem. Dicitur autem indivisibile | |
| 9279 tripliciter, ut dicitur in III de anima. Uno modo, sicut continuum | |
| 9280 est indivisibile, quia est indivisum in actu, licet sit divisibile | |
| 9281 in potentia. Et huiusmodi indivisibile prius est intellectum a | |
| 9282 nobis quam eius divisio, quae est in partes, quia cognitio confusa | |
| 9283 est prior quam distincta, ut dictum est. Alio modo dicitur | |
| 9284 indivisibile secundum speciem, sicut ratio hominis est quoddam | |
| 9285 indivisibile. Et hoc etiam modo indivisibile est prius intellectum | |
| 9286 quam divisio eius in partes rationis, ut supra dictum est, et | |
| 9287 iterum prius quam intellectus componat et dividat, affirmando vel | |
| 9288 negando. Et huius ratio est, quia huiusmodi duplex indivisibile | |
| 9289 intellectus secundum se intelligit, sicut proprium obiectum. Tertio | |
| 9290 modo dicitur indivisibile quod est omnino indivisibile, ut punctus | |
| 9291 et unitas, quae nec actu nec potentia dividuntur. Et huiusmodi | |
| 9292 indivisibile per posterius cognoscitur, per privationem | |
| 9293 divisibilis. Unde punctum privative definitur, punctum est cuius | |
| 9294 pars non est, et similiter ratio unius est quod sit indivisibile, | |
| 9295 ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Et huius ratio est, quia tale | |
| 9296 indivisibile habet quandam oppositionem ad rem corporalem, cuius | |
| 9297 quidditatem primo et per se intellectus accipit. Si autem | |
| 9298 intellectus noster intelligeret per participationem indivisibilium | |
| 9299 separatorum, ut Platonici posuerunt, sequeretur quod indivisibile | |
| 9300 huiusmodi esset primo intellectum, quia secundum Platonicos, priora | |
| 9301 prius participantur a rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p8"> | |
| 9302 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects | |
| 9303 we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always | |
| 9304 depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider | |
| 9305 that we know, when we can resolve principles into their causes." | |
| 9306 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32079] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9307 dicendum quod in accipiendo scientiam, non semper principia et | |
| 9308 elementa sunt priora, quia quandoque ex effectibus sensibilibus | |
| 9309 devenimus in cognitionem principiorum et causarum intelligibilium. | |
| 9310 Sed in complemento scientiae, semper scientia effectuum dependet ex | |
| 9311 cognitione principiorum et elementorum, quia, ut ibidem dicit | |
| 9312 philosophus, <i>tunc opinamur nos scire, cum principiata possumus | |
| 9313 in causas resolvere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p9"> | |
| 9314 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point is not included in the definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and | |
| 9315 in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions | |
| 9316 a point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore | |
| 9317 it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in | |
| 9318 the definition of the divisible, but rather conversely. | |
| 9319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32080] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9320 dicendum quod punctum non ponitur in definitione lineae communiter | |
| 9321 sumptae, manifestum est enim quod in linea infinita, et etiam in | |
| 9322 circulari, non est punctum nisi in potentia. Sed Euclides definit | |
| 9323 lineam finitam rectam, et ideo posuit punctum in definitione | |
| 9324 lineae, sicut terminum in definitione terminati. Unitas vero est | |
| 9325 mensura numeri, et ideo ponitur in definitione numeri mensurati. | |
| 9326 Non autem ponitur in definitione divisibilis, sed magis e | |
| 9327 converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q85_A8-p10"> | |
| 9328 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not | |
| 9329 on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise | |
| 9330 sight would perceive hearing rather than color. | |
| 9331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 85 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32081] Iª q. 85 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9332 dicendum quod similitudo per quam intelligimus, est species cogniti | |
| 9333 in cognoscente. Et ideo non secundum similitudinem naturae ad | |
| 9334 potentiam cognoscitivam est aliquid prius cognitum, sed per | |
| 9335 convenientiam ad obiectum, alioquin magis visus cognosceret auditum | |
| 9336 quam colorem.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 9337 <div id="FP_Q86" class="div3"> | |
| 9338 <h3 id="FP_Q86-p0.1">Q. 86. WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 9339 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 9340 <p id="FP_Q86-p2"> We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q86-p3"><a href="#FP_Q86_A1"> (1) Whether it knows singulars?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p4"><a href="#FP_Q86_A2"> (2) Whether it knows the infinite?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p5"><a href="#FP_Q86_A3"> (3) Whether it knows contingent things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q86-p6"><a href="#FP_Q86_A4"> (4) Whether it knows future things?</a></p> | |
| 9341 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 pr."><a name="32082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32082] | |
| 9342 Iª q. 86 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quid | |
| 9343 intellectus noster in rebus materialibus cognoscat. Et circa hoc | |
| 9344 quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cognoscat singularia. Secundo, | |
| 9345 utrum cognoscat infinita. Tertio, utrum cognoscat contingentia. | |
| 9346 Quarto, utrum cognoscat futura.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 9347 <div id="FP_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether our intellect can know the infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2"> | |
| 9348 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, | |
| 9349 as we have said above ( | |
| 9350 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[1]</a>). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things. | |
| 9351 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32093] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 9352 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster possit cognoscere | |
| 9353 infinita. Deus enim excedit omnia infinita. Sed intellectus noster | |
| 9354 potest cognoscere Deum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis | |
| 9355 potest cognoscere omnia alia infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p3"> | |
| 9356 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and "species." But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as | |
| 9357 in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. | |
| 9358 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32094] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9359 intellectus noster natus est cognoscere genera et species. Sed | |
| 9360 quorundam generum sunt infinitae species, sicut numeri, | |
| 9361 proportionis et figurae. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere | |
| 9362 infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p4"> | |
| 9363 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies | |
| 9364 being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually | |
| 9365 known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things. | |
| 9366 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32095] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 9367 unum corpus non impediret aliud ab existendo in uno et eodem loco, | |
| 9368 nihil prohiberet infinita corpora in uno loco esse. Sed una species | |
| 9369 intelligibilis non prohibet aliam ab existendo simul in eodem | |
| 9370 intellectu, contingit enim multa scire in habitu. Ergo nihil | |
| 9371 prohibet intellectum nostrum infinitorum scientiam habere in | |
| 9372 habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p5"> | |
| 9373 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said ( | |
| 9374 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect | |
| 9375 can know the infinite. | |
| 9376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32096] Iª q. 86 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9377 intellectus, cum non sit virtus materiae corporalis, ut supra | |
| 9378 dictum est, videtur esse potentia infinita. Sed virtus infinita | |
| 9379 potest super infinita. Ergo intellectus noster potest cognoscere | |
| 9380 infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p6"> | |
| 9381 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered as such, is unknown." | |
| 9382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32097] Iª q. 86 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9383 quod dicitur in I Physic., quod <i>infinitum, inquantum est | |
| 9384 infinitum, est ignotum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p7"> | |
| 9385 <b>I answer that,</b> Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, | |
| 9386 which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, | |
| 9387 in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its | |
| 9388 considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect | |
| 9389 understand so many things, that it cannot understand more. | |
| 9390 </p><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p8"> On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect | |
| 9391 cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one | |
| 9392 species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive | |
| 9393 consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the infinite | |
| 9394 is that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be | |
| 9395 known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible. | |
| 9396 </p><p id="FP_Q86_A2-p9"> For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge results from actual | |
| 9397 consideration: since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for | |
| 9398 us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, | |
| 9399 counting them according to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually | |
| 9400 nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained above. | |
| 9401 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 co."><a name="32098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32098] Iª q. 86 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9402 quod, cum potentia proportionetur suo obiecto, oportet hoc modo se | |
| 9403 habere intellectum ad infinitum, sicut se habet eius obiectum, quod | |
| 9404 est quidditas rei materialis. In rebus autem materialibus non | |
| 9405 invenitur infinitum in actu, sed solum in potentia, secundum quod | |
| 9406 unum succedit alteri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Et ideo in | |
| 9407 intellectu nostro invenitur infinitum in potentia, in accipiendo | |
| 9408 scilicet unum post aliud, quia nunquam intellectus noster tot | |
| 9409 intelligit, quin possit plura intelligere. Actu autem vel habitu | |
| 9410 non potest cognoscere infinita intellectus noster. Actu quidem non, | |
| 9411 quia intellectus noster non potest simul actu cognoscere nisi quod | |
| 9412 per unam speciem cognoscit. Infinitum autem non habet unam speciem, | |
| 9413 alioquin haberet rationem totius et perfecti. Et ideo non potest | |
| 9414 intelligi nisi accipiendo partem post partem, ut ex eius | |
| 9415 definitione patet in III Physic., <i>est enim infinitum cuius | |
| 9416 quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid extra accipere</i>, et | |
| 9417 sic infinitum cognosci non posset actu, nisi omnes partes eius | |
| 9418 numerarentur, quod est impossibile. Et eadem ratione non possumus | |
| 9419 intelligere infinita in habitu. In nobis enim habitualis cognitio | |
| 9420 causatur ex actuali consideratione, intelligendo enim efficimur | |
| 9421 scientes, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Unde non possemus habere habitum | |
| 9422 infinitorum secundum distinctam cognitionem, nisi consideravissemus | |
| 9423 omnia infinita, numerando ea secundum cognitionis successionem, | |
| 9424 quod est impossibile. Et ita nec actu nec habitu intellectus noster | |
| 9425 potest cognoscere infinita, sed in potentia tantum, ut dictum | |
| 9426 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p10"> | |
| 9427 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( | |
| 9428 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q86_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the term 'infinite' is applied | |
| 9429 to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, | |
| 9430 it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is | |
| 9431 unknown to us by reason | |
| 9432 of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot | |
| 9433 know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed | |
| 9434 by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him. | |
| 9435 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32099] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9436 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus dicitur infinitus sicut | |
| 9437 forma quae non est terminata per aliquam materiam, in rebus autem | |
| 9438 materialibus aliquid dicitur infinitum per privationem formalis | |
| 9439 terminationis. Et quia forma secundum se nota est, materia autem | |
| 9440 sine forma ignota, inde est quod infinitum materiale est secundum | |
| 9441 se ignotum. Infinitum autem formale, quod est Deus, est secundum se | |
| 9442 notum, ignotum autem quoad nos, propter defectum intellectus | |
| 9443 nostri, qui secundum statum praesentis vitae habet naturalem | |
| 9444 aptitudinem ad materialia cognoscenda. Et ideo in praesenti Deum | |
| 9445 cognoscere non possumus nisi per materiales effectus. In futuro | |
| 9446 autem tolletur defectus intellectus nostri per gloriam, et tunc | |
| 9447 ipsum Deum in sua essentia videre poterimus, tamen absque | |
| 9448 comprehensione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p11"> | |
| 9449 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species | |
| 9450 of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles; and this | |
| 9451 is to know them potentially and confusedly. | |
| 9452 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32100] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9453 dicendum quod intellectus noster natus est cognoscere species per | |
| 9454 abstractionem a phantasmatibus. Et ideo illas species numerorum et | |
| 9455 figurarum quas quis non est imaginatus, non potest cognoscere nec | |
| 9456 actu nec habitu, nisi forte in genere et in principiis | |
| 9457 universalibus; quod est cognoscere in potentia et confuse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p12"> | |
| 9458 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order | |
| 9459 for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species | |
| 9460 enter into our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time: and therefore there | |
| 9461 must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect. | |
| 9462 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32101] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9463 dicendum quod, si duo corpora essent in uno loco, vel plura, non | |
| 9464 oporteret quod successive subintrarent locum, ut sic per ipsam | |
| 9465 subintrationis successionem numerarentur locata. Sed species | |
| 9466 intelligibiles ingrediuntur intellectum nostrum successive, quia | |
| 9467 non multa simul actu intelliguntur. Et ideo oportet numeratas, et | |
| 9468 non infinitas species esse in intellectu nostro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A2-p13"> | |
| 9469 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not | |
| 9470 terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which | |
| 9471 consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infinite number of individuals. | |
| 9472 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32102] Iª q. 86 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 9473 dicendum quod sicut intellectus noster est infinitus virtute, ita | |
| 9474 infinitum cognoscit. Est enim virtus eius infinita, secundum quod | |
| 9475 non terminatur per materiam corporalem. Et est cognoscitivus | |
| 9476 universalis, quod est abstractum a materia individuali, et per | |
| 9477 consequens non finitur ad aliquod individuum, sed, quantum est de | |
| 9478 se, ad infinita individua se extendit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q86_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A3-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 3. Whether our intellect can know contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p2"> | |
| 9479 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects | |
| 9480 of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things. | |
| 9481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32103] Iª q. 86 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 9482 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit cognoscitivus | |
| 9483 contingentium. Quia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., intellectus et | |
| 9484 sapientia et scientia non sunt contingentium, sed | |
| 9485 necessariorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p3"> | |
| 9486 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts | |
| 9487 from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime | |
| 9488 not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect. | |
| 9489 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32104] Iª q. 86 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 9490 dicitur in IV Physic., <i>ea quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non | |
| 9491 sunt, tempore mensurantur</i>. Intellectus autem a tempore | |
| 9492 abstrahit, sicut et ab aliis conditionibus materiae. Cum igitur | |
| 9493 proprium contingentium sit quandoque esse et quandoque non esse, | |
| 9494 videtur quod contingentia non cognoscantur ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p4"> | |
| 9495 <b>On the contrary,</b> All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of | |
| 9496 which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated | |
| 9497 and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things. | |
| 9498 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32105] Iª q. 86 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnis | |
| 9499 scientia est in intellectu. Sed quaedam scientiae sunt de | |
| 9500 contingentibus; sicut scientiae morales, quae sunt de actibus | |
| 9501 humanis subiectis libero arbitrio; et etiam scientiae naturales, | |
| 9502 quantum ad partem quae tractat de generabilibus et corruptibilibus. | |
| 9503 Ergo intellectus est cognoscitivus contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5"> | |
| 9504 <b>I answer that,</b> Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since | |
| 9505 every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation | |
| 9506 of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, | |
| 9507 for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; | |
| 9508 whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is | |
| 9509 the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover | |
| 9510 it was laid down above | |
| 9511 <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is the singular, which | |
| 9512 in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have | |
| 9513 said above | |
| 9514 <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal | |
| 9515 and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science | |
| 9516 in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some | |
| 9517 sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things. | |
| 9518 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 co."><a name="32106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32106] Iª q. 86 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9519 quod contingentia dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, | |
| 9520 secundum quod contingentia sunt. Alio modo, secundum quod in eis | |
| 9521 aliquid necessitatis invenitur, nihil enim est adeo contingens, | |
| 9522 quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. Sicut hoc ipsum quod est | |
| 9523 Socratem currere, in se quidem contingens est; sed habitudo cursus | |
| 9524 ad motum est necessaria, necessarium enim est Socratem moveri, si | |
| 9525 currit. Est autem unumquodque contingens ex parte materiae, quia | |
| 9526 contingens est quod potest esse et non esse; potentia autem | |
| 9527 pertinet ad materiam. Necessitas autem consequitur rationem formae, | |
| 9528 quia ea quae consequuntur ad formam, ex necessitate insunt. Materia | |
| 9529 autem est individuationis principium, ratio autem universalis | |
| 9530 accipitur secundum abstractionem formae a materia particulari. | |
| 9531 Dictum autem est supra quod per se et directe intellectus est | |
| 9532 universalium; sensus autem singularium, quorum etiam indirecte | |
| 9533 quodammodo est intellectus, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur | |
| 9534 contingentia, prout sunt contingentia, cognoscuntur directe quidem | |
| 9535 sensu, indirecte autem ab intellectu, rationes autem universales et | |
| 9536 necessariae contingentium cognoscuntur per intellectum. Unde si | |
| 9537 attendantur rationes universales scibilium, omnes scientiae sunt de | |
| 9538 necessariis. Si autem attendantur ipsae res, sic quaedam scientia | |
| 9539 est de necessariis, quaedam vero de contingentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A3-p6"> From which the replies to the objections are clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="32107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32107] Iª q. 86 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 9540 patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q86_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q86_A4-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 4. Whether our intellect can know the future?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p2"> | |
| 9541 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from | |
| 9542 the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future. | |
| 9543 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32108] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 9544 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat futura. | |
| 9545 Intellectus enim noster cognoscit per species intelligibiles, quae | |
| 9546 abstrahunt ab hic et nunc, et ita se habent indifferenter ad omne | |
| 9547 tempus. Sed potest cognoscere praesentia. Ergo potest cognoscere | |
| 9548 futura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p3"> | |
| 9549 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect | |
| 9550 is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future. | |
| 9551 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32109] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, homo | |
| 9552 quando alienatur a sensibus, aliqua futura cognoscere potest; ut | |
| 9553 patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Sed quando alienatur a | |
| 9554 sensibus, magis viget intellectu. Ergo intellectus, quantum est de | |
| 9555 se, est cognoscitivus futurorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p4"> | |
| 9556 <b>Objection 3:</b> The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by | |
| 9557 their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future. | |
| 9558 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32110] Iª q. 86 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9559 cognitio intellectiva hominis efficacior est quam cognitio | |
| 9560 quaecumque brutorum animalium. Sed quaedam animalia sunt quae | |
| 9561 cognoscunt quaedam futura; sicut corniculae frequenter crocitantes | |
| 9562 significant pluviam mox futuram. Ergo multo magis intellectus | |
| 9563 humanus potest futura cognoscere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p5"> | |
| 9564 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 9565 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q86_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.8.6" target="asv">Eccles. 8:6,7</a>), "There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger." | |
| 9566 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32111] Iª q. 86 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9567 quod dicitur Eccle. VIII, <i>multa hominis afflictio, qui ignorat | |
| 9568 praeterita, et futura nullo potest scire nuntio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p6"> | |
| 9569 <b>I answer that,</b> We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above | |
| 9570 <a href="#FP_Q86_A3" id="FP_Q86_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by | |
| 9571 reflection only, as stated above | |
| 9572 <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q86_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the | |
| 9573 objects of science. | |
| 9574 </p><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p7"> Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: | |
| 9575 either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which | |
| 9576 in the course of events is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said | |
| 9577 above when treating of God's knowledge ( | |
| 9578 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A13" id="FP_Q86_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[13]</a>). But forasmuch as it exists | |
| 9579 in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with | |
| 9580 its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. | |
| 9581 If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more | |
| 9582 or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect. | |
| 9583 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 co."><a name="32112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32112] Iª q. 86 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9584 quod de cognitione futurorum eodem modo distinguendum est, sicut de | |
| 9585 cognitione contingentium. Nam ipsa futura ut sub tempore cadunt, | |
| 9586 sunt singularia, quae intellectus humanus non cognoscit nisi per | |
| 9587 reflexionem, ut supra dictum est. Rationes autem futurorum possunt | |
| 9588 esse universales, et intellectu perceptibiles, et de eis etiam | |
| 9589 possunt esse scientiae. Ut tamen communiter de cognitione futurorum | |
| 9590 loquamur, sciendum est quod futura dupliciter cognosci possunt, uno | |
| 9591 modo, in seipsis; alio modo, in suis causis. In seipsis quidem | |
| 9592 futura cognosci non possunt nisi a Deo; cui etiam sunt praesentia | |
| 9593 dum in cursu rerum sunt futura, inquantum eius aeternus intuitus | |
| 9594 simul fertur supra totum temporis cursum, ut supra dictum est cum | |
| 9595 de Dei scientia ageretur. Sed prout sunt in suis causis, cognosci | |
| 9596 possunt etiam a nobis. Et si quidem in suis causis sint ut ex | |
| 9597 quibus ex necessitate proveniant, cognoscuntur per certitudinem | |
| 9598 scientiae; sicut astrologus praecognoscit eclipsim futuram. Si | |
| 9599 autem sic sint in suis causis ut ab eis proveniant ut in pluribus, | |
| 9600 sic cognosci possunt per quandam coniecturam vel magis vel minus | |
| 9601 certam, secundum quod causae sunt vel magis vel minus inclinatae ad | |
| 9602 effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p8"> | |
| 9603 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, | |
| 9604 according to the order of the effects to the cause. | |
| 9605 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32113] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9606 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de cognitione quae fit per | |
| 9607 rationes universales causarum, ex quibus futura cognosci possunt | |
| 9608 secundum modum ordinis effectus ad causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p9"> | |
| 9609 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii. 13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very | |
| 9610 nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares | |
| 9611 in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by | |
| 9612 participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul | |
| 9613 by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and | |
| 9614 hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future. | |
| 9615 </p><p id="FP_Q86_A4-p10"> But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it | |
| 9616 is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the future by the impression | |
| 9617 of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through | |
| 9618 the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the | |
| 9619 influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above ( | |
| 9620 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q57_A3" id="FP_Q86_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[3]</a>). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, | |
| 9621 as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may also come from superior corporeal | |
| 9622 causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence | |
| 9623 of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to | |
| 9624 be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such | |
| 9625 events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as | |
| 9626 stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii.], "impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, | |
| 9627 when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, | |
| 9628 and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen." | |
| 9629 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32114] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9630 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII Confess., anima habet | |
| 9631 quandam vim sortis, ut ex sui natura possit futura cognoscere, et | |
| 9632 ideo quando retrahitur a corporeis sensibus, et quodammodo | |
| 9633 revertitur ad seipsam, fit particeps notitiae futurorum. Et haec | |
| 9634 quidem opinio rationabilis esset, si poneremus quod anima acciperet | |
| 9635 cognitionem rerum secundum participationem idearum, sicut Platonici | |
| 9636 posuerunt, quia sic anima ex sui natura cognosceret universales | |
| 9637 causas omnium effectuum, sed impeditur per corpus; unde quando a | |
| 9638 corporis sensibus abstrahitur, futura cognoscit. Sed quia iste | |
| 9639 modus cognoscendi non est connaturalis intellectui nostro, sed | |
| 9640 magis ut cognitionem a sensibus accipiat; ideo non est secundum | |
| 9641 naturam animae quod futura cognoscat cum a sensibus alienatur; sed | |
| 9642 magis per impressionem aliquarum causarum superiorum spiritualium | |
| 9643 et corporalium. Spiritualium quidem, sicut cum virtute divina | |
| 9644 ministerio Angelorum intellectus humanus illuminatur, et | |
| 9645 phantasmata ordinantur ad futura aliqua cognoscenda; vel etiam cum | |
| 9646 per operationem Daemonum fit aliqua commotio in phantasia ad | |
| 9647 praesignandum aliqua futura quae Daemones cognoscunt, ut supra | |
| 9648 dictum est. Huiusmodi autem impressiones spiritualium causarum | |
| 9649 magis nata est anima humana suscipere cum a sensibus alienatur, | |
| 9650 quia per hoc propinquior fit substantiis spiritualibus, et magis | |
| 9651 libera ab exterioribus inquietudinibus. Contingit autem et hoc per | |
| 9652 impressionem superiorum causarum corporalium. Manifestum est enim | |
| 9653 quod corpora superiora imprimunt in corpora inferiora. Unde cum | |
| 9654 vires sensitivae sint actus corporalium organorum, consequens est | |
| 9655 quod ex impressione caelestium corporum immutetur quodammodo | |
| 9656 phantasia. Unde cum caelestia corpora sint causa multorum | |
| 9657 futurorum, fiunt in imaginatione aliqua signa quorundam futurorum. | |
| 9658 Haec autem signa magis percipiuntur in nocte et a dormientibus, | |
| 9659 quam de die et a vigilantibus, quia, ut dicitur in libro de Somn. | |
| 9660 et Vigil., <i>quae deferuntur de die, dissolvuntur magis; plus est | |
| 9661 enim sine turbatione aer noctis, eo quod silentiores sunt noctes. | |
| 9662 Et in corpore faciunt sensum propter somnum, quia parvi motus | |
| 9663 interiores magis sentiuntur a dormientibus quam a vigilantibus. Hi | |
| 9664 vero motus faciunt phantasmata, ex quibus praevidentur | |
| 9665 futura</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q86_A4-p11"> | |
| 9666 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination | |
| 9667 follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain | |
| 9668 and the like, may be known rather from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), | |
| 9669 that "some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is | |
| 9670 not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to | |
| 9671 bear on it." | |
| 9672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 86 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32115] Iª q. 86 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9673 dicendum quod animalia bruta non habent aliquid supra phantasiam | |
| 9674 quod ordinet phantasmata, sicut habent homines rationem; et ideo | |
| 9675 phantasia brutorum animalium totaliter sequitur impressionem | |
| 9676 caelestem. Et ideo ex motibus huiusmodi animalium magis possunt | |
| 9677 cognosci quaedam futura, ut pluvia et huiusmodi, quam ex motibus | |
| 9678 hominum, qui moventur per consilium rationis. Unde philosophus | |
| 9679 dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod <i>quidam imprudentissimi | |
| 9680 sunt maxime praevidentes, nam intelligentia horum non est curis | |
| 9681 affecta, sed tanquam deserta et vacua ab omnibus, et mota secundum | |
| 9682 movens ducitur</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 9683 <div id="FP_Q87" class="div3"> | |
| 9684 <h3 id="FP_Q87-p0.1">Q. 87. HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 9685 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 9686 <p id="FP_Q87-p2"> We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points | |
| 9687 of inquiry: | |
| 9688 </p><p id="FP_Q87-p3"><a href="#FP_Q87_A1"> (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p4"><a href="#FP_Q87_A2"> (2) Whether it knows its own habits?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p5"><a href="#FP_Q87_A3"> (3) How does the intellect know its own act?</a></p><p id="FP_Q87-p6"><a href="#FP_Q87_A4"> (4) How does it know the act of the will?</a></p> | |
| 9689 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 pr."><a name="32116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32116] | |
| 9690 Iª q. 87 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima | |
| 9691 intellectiva cognoscat seipsam, et ea quae in se sunt. Et circa hoc | |
| 9692 quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cognoscat seipsam per suam | |
| 9693 essentiam. Secundo, quomodo cognoscat habitus in se existentes. | |
| 9694 Tertio, quomodo intellectus cognoscat proprium actum. Quarto, | |
| 9695 quomodo cognoscat actum voluntatis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 9696 <div id="FP_Q87_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A1-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 1. Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p2"> | |
| 9697 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the | |
| 9698 mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal." | |
| 9699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32117] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 9700 proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva seipsam cognoscat per | |
| 9701 suam essentiam. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Trin., quod <i>mens | |
| 9702 seipsam novit per seipsam, quoniam est incorporea</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p3"> | |
| 9703 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its | |
| 9704 own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul. | |
| 9705 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32118] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9706 Angelus et anima humana conveniunt in genere intellectualis | |
| 9707 substantiae. Sed Angelus intelligit seipsum per essentiam suam. | |
| 9708 Ergo et anima humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p4"> | |
| 9709 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human | |
| 9710 mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above ( | |
| 9711 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q87_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself | |
| 9712 by its own essence. | |
| 9713 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32119] Iª q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, in | |
| 9714 his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod | |
| 9715 intelligitur</i>, ut dicitur III de anima. Sed mens humana est sine | |
| 9716 materia, non enim est actus corporis alicuius, ut supra dictum est. | |
| 9717 Ergo in mente humana est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur. | |
| 9718 Ergo intelligit se per essentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p5"> | |
| 9719 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But | |
| 9720 it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its | |
| 9721 own essence. | |
| 9722 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32120] Iª q. 87 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9723 quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>intellectus intelligit | |
| 9724 seipsum sicut et alia</i>. Sed alia non intelligit per essentias | |
| 9725 eorum, sed per eorum similitudines. Ergo neque se intelligit per | |
| 9726 essentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q87_A1-p6"> | |
| 9727 <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a | |
| 9728 thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible | |
| 9729 things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, | |
| 9730 so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it | |
| 9731 does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances | |
| 9732 are intelligible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence. | |
| 9733 </p><p id="FP_Q87_A1-p7"> Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence | |
| 9734 God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible | |
| 9735 things as "act," but not as a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed | |
| 9736 by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot | |
| 9737 understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human | |
| 9738 intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards | |
| 9739 sensible beings; and hence it is called "possible" [*Possibilis---elsewhere in this translation rendered "passive"---Ed.]. | |
| 9740 Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but | |
| 9741 not to be | |
| 9742 understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings existed above | |
| 9743 the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that | |
| 9744 the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual | |
| 9745 by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But | |
| 9746 as | |
| 9747 in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above ( | |
| 9748 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light | |
| 9749 of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates | |
| 9750 the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This | |
| 9751 happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul | |
| 9752 because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind | |
| 9753 from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know | |
| 9754 the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains | |
| 9755 the types of all things as above stated ( | |
| 9756 <a href="#FP_Q84_A5" id="FP_Q87_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[5]</a>). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, | |
| 9757 not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is, however, a difference between | |
| 9758 these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind | |
| 9759 itself being the principle of action whereby it | |
| 9760 perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the | |
| 9761 mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant | |
| 9762 of the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let | |
| 9763 the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"---i.e. to know how it differs | |
| 9764 from other things; which is to know its essence and nature. | |
| 9765 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 co."><a name="32121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32121] Iª q. 87 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9766 quod unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non | |
| 9767 secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., sic enim | |
| 9768 aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub cognitione cadit, prout actu | |
| 9769 est. Et hoc quidem manifeste apparet in rebus sensibilibus, non | |
| 9770 enim visus percipit coloratum in potentia, sed solum coloratum in | |
| 9771 actu. Et similiter intellectus manifestum est quod, inquantum est | |
| 9772 cognoscitivus rerum materialium, non cognoscit nisi quod est actu, | |
| 9773 et inde est quod non cognoscit materiam primam nisi secundum | |
| 9774 proportionem ad formam, ut dicitur in I Physic. Unde et in | |
| 9775 substantiis immaterialibus, secundum quod unaquaeque earum se habet | |
| 9776 ad hoc quod sit in actu per essentiam suam, ita se habet ad hoc | |
| 9777 quod sit per suam essentiam intelligibilis. Essentia igitur Dei, | |
| 9778 quae est actus purus et perfectus, est simpliciter et perfecte | |
| 9779 secundum seipsam intelligibilis. Unde Deus per suam essentiam non | |
| 9780 solum seipsum, sed etiam omnia intelligit. Angeli autem essentia | |
| 9781 est quidem in genere intelligibilium ut actus, non tamen ut actus | |
| 9782 purus neque completus. Unde eius intelligere non completur per | |
| 9783 essentiam suam, etsi enim per essentiam suam se intelligat Angelus, | |
| 9784 tamen non omnia potest per essentiam suam cognoscere, sed cognoscit | |
| 9785 alia a se per eorum similitudines. Intellectus autem humanus se | |
| 9786 habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, | |
| 9787 sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium, unde | |
| 9788 possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus, se | |
| 9789 habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde ex seipso habet virtutem ut | |
| 9790 intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit | |
| 9791 actu. Sic enim etiam Platonici posuerunt ordinem entium | |
| 9792 intelligibilium supra ordinem intellectuum, quia intellectus non | |
| 9793 intelligit nisi per participationem intelligibilis; participans | |
| 9794 autem est infra participatum, secundum eos. Si igitur intellectus | |
| 9795 humanus fieret actu per participationem formarum intelligibilium | |
| 9796 separatarum, ut Platonici posuerunt per huiusmodi participationem | |
| 9797 rerum incorporearum intellectus humanus seipsum intelligeret. Sed | |
| 9798 quia connaturale est intellectui nostro, secundum statum praesentis | |
| 9799 vitae, quod ad materialia et sensibilia respiciat, sicut supra | |
| 9800 dictum est; consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus | |
| 9801 noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus | |
| 9802 abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis, quod est actus ipsorum | |
| 9803 intelligibilium, et eis mediantibus intellectus possibilis. Non | |
| 9804 ergo per essentiam suam, sed per actum suum se cognoscit | |
| 9805 intellectus noster. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, | |
| 9806 particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere | |
| 9807 animam intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio | |
| 9808 modo, in universali, secundum quod naturam humanae mentis ex actu | |
| 9809 intellectus consideramus. Sed verum est quod iudicium et efficacia | |
| 9810 huius cognitionis per quam naturam animae cognoscimus, competit | |
| 9811 nobis secundum derivationem luminis intellectus nostri a veritate | |
| 9812 divina, in qua rationes omnium rerum continentur, sicut supra | |
| 9813 dictum est. Unde et Augustinus dicit, in IX de Trin., <i>intuemur | |
| 9814 inviolabilem veritatem, ex qua perfecte, quantum possumus, | |
| 9815 definimus non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens, sed qualis | |
| 9816 esse sempiternis rationibus debeat</i>. Est autem differentia inter | |
| 9817 has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam, | |
| 9818 sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus ex quo | |
| 9819 mens percipit seipsam. Et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam | |
| 9820 praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam, non | |
| 9821 sufficit eius praesentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis | |
| 9822 inquisitio. Unde et multi naturam animae ignorant, et multi etiam | |
| 9823 circa naturam animae erraverunt. Propter quod Augustinus dicit, X | |
| 9824 de Trin., de tali inquisitione mentis, <i>non velut absentem se | |
| 9825 quaerat mens cernere; sed praesentem quaerat discernere</i>, idest | |
| 9826 cognoscere differentiam suam ab aliis rebus, quod est cognoscere | |
| 9827 quidditatem et naturam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p8"> | |
| 9828 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own | |
| 9829 act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident | |
| 9830 in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or | |
| 9831 because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, | |
| 9832 whereas substance is visible by its accident. | |
| 9833 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32122] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9834 dicendum quod mens seipsam per seipsam novit, quia tandem in sui | |
| 9835 ipsius cognitionem pervenit, licet per suum actum, ipsa enim est | |
| 9836 quae cognoscitur, quia ipsa seipsam amat, ut ibidem subditur. | |
| 9837 Potest enim aliquid dici per se notum dupliciter, vel quia per | |
| 9838 nihil aliud in eius notitiam devenitur, sicut dicuntur prima | |
| 9839 principia per se nota; vel quia non sunt cognoscibilia per | |
| 9840 accidens, sicut color est per se visibilis, substantia autem per | |
| 9841 accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p9"> | |
| 9842 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. | |
| 9843 Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality | |
| 9844 to intelligible things---as is the passive intellect---or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms---as | |
| 9845 is the active intellect. | |
| 9846 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32123] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9847 dicendum quod essentia Angeli est sicut actus in genere | |
| 9848 intelligibilium, et ideo se habet et ut intellectus, et ut | |
| 9849 intellectum. Unde Angelus suam essentiam per seipsum apprehendit. | |
| 9850 Non autem intellectus humanus, qui vel est omnino in potentia | |
| 9851 respectu intelligibilium, sicut intellectus possibilis; vel est | |
| 9852 actus intelligibilium quae abstrahuntur a phantasmatibus, sicut | |
| 9853 intellectus agens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A1-p10"> | |
| 9854 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, | |
| 9855 by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood | |
| 9856 in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, | |
| 9857 which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself | |
| 9858 understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter the intellect and what is understood | |
| 9859 are the same," is equal to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the | |
| 9860 same." For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of | |
| 9861 some things are immaterial---as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas | |
| 9862 there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator | |
| 9863 says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in | |
| 9864 their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2). | |
| 9865 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32124] Iª q. 87 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9866 dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi universaliter verum est in | |
| 9867 omni intellectu. Sicut enim sensus in actu est sensibile, propter | |
| 9868 similitudinem sensibilis, quae est forma sensus in actu; ita | |
| 9869 intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu, propter similitudinem | |
| 9870 rei intellectae, quae est forma intellectus in actu. Et ideo | |
| 9871 intellectus humanus, qui fit in actu per speciem rei intellectae, | |
| 9872 per eandem speciem intelligitur, sicut per formam suam. Idem autem | |
| 9873 est dicere quod in his <i>quae sunt sine materia, idem est | |
| 9874 intellectus et quod intelligitur</i>, ac si diceretur quod in his | |
| 9875 quae sunt intellecta in actu, idem est intellectus et quod | |
| 9876 intelligitur, per hoc enim aliquid est intellectum in actu, quod | |
| 9877 est sine materia. Sed in hoc est differentia, quia quorundam | |
| 9878 essentiae sunt sine materia, sicut substantiae separatae quas | |
| 9879 Angelos dicimus, quarum unaquaeque et est intellecta et est | |
| 9880 intelligens, sed quaedam res sunt quarum essentiae non sunt sine | |
| 9881 materia, sed solum similitudines ab eis abstractae. Unde et | |
| 9882 Commentator dicit, in III de anima, quod propositio inducta non | |
| 9883 habet veritatem nisi in substantiis separatis, verificatur enim | |
| 9884 quodammodo in eis quod non verificatur in aliis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A2-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 2. Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p2"> | |
| 9885 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith | |
| 9886 is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but | |
| 9887 we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence"; and the same principle applies to the other | |
| 9888 habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by | |
| 9889 themselves. | |
| 9890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32125] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 9891 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster cognoscat habitus | |
| 9892 animae per essentiam eorum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XIII de Trin., | |
| 9893 <i>non sic videtur fides in corde in quo est, sicut anima alterius | |
| 9894 hominis ex motibus corporis videtur; sed eam tenet certissima | |
| 9895 scientia, clamatque conscientia</i>. Et eadem ratio est de aliis | |
| 9896 habitibus animae. Ergo habitus animae non cognoscuntur per actus, | |
| 9897 sed per seipsos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p3"> | |
| 9898 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to | |
| 9899 be known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the | |
| 9900 soul are known by their essence. | |
| 9901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32126] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, res | |
| 9902 materiales, quae sunt extra animam, cognoscuntur per hoc quod | |
| 9903 similitudines earum sunt praesentialiter in anima; et ideo dicuntur | |
| 9904 per suas similitudines cognosci. Sed habitus animae praesentialiter | |
| 9905 per suam essentiam sunt in anima. Ergo per suam essentiam | |
| 9906 cognoscuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p4"> | |
| 9907 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things | |
| 9908 to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves. | |
| 9909 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32127] Iª q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, | |
| 9910 propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis</i>. Sed res aliae | |
| 9911 cognoscuntur ab anima propter habitus et species intelligibiles. | |
| 9912 Ergo ista magis per seipsa ab anima cognoscuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p5"> | |
| 9913 <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior | |
| 9914 to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts. | |
| 9915 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32128] Iª q. 87 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 9916 habitus sunt principia actuum, sicut et potentiae. Sed sicut | |
| 9917 dicitur II de anima, <i>priores potentiis, secundum rationem, actus | |
| 9918 et operationes sunt</i>. Ergo eadem ratione sunt priores habitibus. | |
| 9919 Et ita habitus per actus cognoscuntur, sicut et potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6"> | |
| 9920 <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said | |
| 9921 <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being | |
| 9922 of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he | |
| 9923 can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit | |
| 9924 by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence | |
| 9925 causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained | |
| 9926 above of the mind | |
| 9927 <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. | |
| 9928 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 co."><a name="32129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32129] Iª q. 87 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9929 quod habitus quodammodo est medium inter potentiam puram et purum | |
| 9930 actum. Iam autem dictum est quod nihil cognoscitur nisi secundum | |
| 9931 quod est actu. Sic ergo inquantum habitus deficit ab actu perfecto, | |
| 9932 deficit ab hoc, ut non sit per seipsum cognoscibilis, sed necesse | |
| 9933 est quod per actum suum cognoscatur, sive dum aliquis percipit se | |
| 9934 habere habitum, per hoc quod percipit se producere actum proprium | |
| 9935 habitus; sive dum aliquis inquirit naturam et rationem habitus, ex | |
| 9936 consideratione actus. Et prima quidem cognitio habitus fit per | |
| 9937 ipsam praesentiam habitus, quia ex hoc ipso quod est praesens, | |
| 9938 actum causat, in quo statim percipitur. Secunda autem cognitio | |
| 9939 habitus fit per studiosam inquisitionem, sicut supra dictum est de | |
| 9940 mente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p7"> | |
| 9941 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior | |
| 9942 act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. | |
| 9943 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32130] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9944 dicendum quod, etsi fides non cognoscatur per exteriores corporis | |
| 9945 motus, percipitur tamen etiam ab eo in quo est, per interiorem | |
| 9946 actum cordis. Nullus enim fidem se habere scit, nisi per hoc quod | |
| 9947 se credere percipit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p8"> | |
| 9948 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the | |
| 9949 nature of a material thing as stated above ( | |
| 9950 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), but as that by which it understands. | |
| 9951 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32131] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9952 dicendum quod habitus sunt praesentes in intellectu nostro, non | |
| 9953 sicut obiecta intellectus (quia obiectum intellectus nostri, | |
| 9954 secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natura rei materialis, ut | |
| 9955 supra dictum est); sed sunt praesentes in intellectu ut quibus | |
| 9956 intellectus intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A2-p9"> | |
| 9957 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same order, | |
| 9958 for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore | |
| 9959 life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health | |
| 9960 is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than | |
| 9961 health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of | |
| 9962 two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, | |
| 9963 is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects | |
| 9964 of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a | |
| 9965 disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove. | |
| 9966 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32132] Iª q. 87 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9967 dicendum quod, cum dicitur, <i>propter quod unumquodque, illud | |
| 9968 magis</i>, veritatem habet, si intelligatur in his quae sunt unius | |
| 9969 ordinis, puta in uno genere causae, puta si dicatur quod sanitas | |
| 9970 est propter vitam, sequitur quod vita sit magis desiderabilis. Si | |
| 9971 autem accipiantur ea quae sunt diversorum ordinum, non habet | |
| 9972 veritatem, ut si dicatur quod sanitas est propter medicinam, non | |
| 9973 ideo sequitur quod medicina sit magis desiderabilis, quia sanitas | |
| 9974 est in ordine finium, medicina autem in ordine causarum | |
| 9975 efficientium. Sic igitur si accipiamus duo, quorum utrumque sit per | |
| 9976 se in ordine obiectorum cognitionis; illud propter quod aliud | |
| 9977 cognoscitur, erit magis notum, sicut principia conclusionibus. Sed | |
| 9978 habitus non est de ordine obiectorum, inquantum est habitus; nec | |
| 9979 propter habitum aliqua cognoscuntur sicut propter obiectum | |
| 9980 cognitum, sed sicut propter dispositionem vel formam qua cognoscens | |
| 9981 cognoscit, et ideo ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A3-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 3. Whether our intellect knows its own act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p2"> | |
| 9982 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the | |
| 9983 act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act. | |
| 9984 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32133] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 9985 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non cognoscat proprium actum. | |
| 9986 Illud enim proprie cognoscitur, quod est obiectum cognoscitivae | |
| 9987 virtutis. Sed actus differt ab obiecto. Ergo intellectus non | |
| 9988 cognoscit suum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p3"> | |
| 9989 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and | |
| 9990 again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible. | |
| 9991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32134] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9992 quidquid cognoscitur, aliquo actu cognoscitur. Si igitur | |
| 9993 intellectus cognoscit actum suum, aliquo actu cognoscit illum; et | |
| 9994 iterum illum actum alio actu. Erit ergo procedere in infinitum, | |
| 9995 quod videtur impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p4"> | |
| 9996 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own | |
| 9997 act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its | |
| 9998 own act. | |
| 9999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32135] Iª q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 10000 se habet sensus ad actum suum, ita et intellectus. Sed sensus | |
| 10001 proprius non sentit actum suum, sed hoc pertinet ad sensum | |
| 10002 communem, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Ergo neque intellectus | |
| 10003 intelligit actum suum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p5"> | |
| 10004 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I understand." | |
| 10005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32136] Iª q. 87 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10006 quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>intelligo me | |
| 10007 intelligere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6"> | |
| 10008 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 10009 <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: | |
| 10010 for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the | |
| 10011 perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. | |
| 10012 Therefore the first thing understood | |
| 10013 of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an | |
| 10014 intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, | |
| 10015 and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there | |
| 10016 is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above ( | |
| 10017 <a href="#FP_Q79_A1" id="FP_Q87_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], | |
| 10018 A[1] | |
| 10019 </a>), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between | |
| 10020 the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by | |
| 10021 one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same | |
| 10022 act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which | |
| 10023 neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object | |
| 10024 is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, | |
| 10025 and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is | |
| 10026 known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known | |
| 10027 before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4). | |
| 10028 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 co."><a name="32137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32137] Iª q. 87 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10029 quod, sicut iam dictum est, unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod | |
| 10030 est actu. Ultima autem perfectio intellectus est eius operatio, non | |
| 10031 enim est sicut actio tendens in alterum, quae sit perfectio | |
| 10032 operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut | |
| 10033 perfectio et actus eius, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Hoc igitur est | |
| 10034 primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum eius | |
| 10035 intelligere. Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se | |
| 10036 habent. Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est | |
| 10037 ipsum suum intelligere. Et sic in Deo idem est quod intelligat se | |
| 10038 intelligere et quod intelligat suam essentiam, quia sua essentia | |
| 10039 est suum intelligere. Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet | |
| 10040 angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere, sicut supra dictum est, | |
| 10041 sed tamen primum obiectum sui intelligere est eius essentia. Unde | |
| 10042 etsi aliud sit in Angelo, secundum rationem, quod intelligat se | |
| 10043 intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam, tamen simul et uno | |
| 10044 actu utrumque intelligit, quia hoc quod est intelligere suam | |
| 10045 essentiam, est propria perfectio suae essentiae; simul autem et uno | |
| 10046 actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Est autem alius | |
| 10047 intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec | |
| 10048 sui intelligere est obiectum primum ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid | |
| 10049 extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo | |
| 10050 cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est huiusmodi obiectum; et | |
| 10051 secundario cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur obiectum; et per | |
| 10052 actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cuius est perfectio ipsum | |
| 10053 intelligere. Et ideo philosophus dicit quod obiecta | |
| 10054 praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p7"> | |
| 10055 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding | |
| 10056 is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, | |
| 10057 in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as considered in material things, as | |
| 10058 we have said above ( | |
| 10059 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), from which it acquires | |
| 10060 knowledge of all other things. | |
| 10061 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32138] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10062 dicendum quod obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, scilicet | |
| 10063 ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. | |
| 10064 Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere. Sed non primo, quia | |
| 10065 nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, | |
| 10066 est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus | |
| 10067 materialibus, ut dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium | |
| 10068 aliorum devenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p8"> | |
| 10069 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature | |
| 10070 of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood | |
| 10071 by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it | |
| 10072 understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being | |
| 10073 thus potentially infinite, as explained above ( | |
| 10074 <a href="#FP_Q86_A2" id="FP_Q87_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[2]</a>). | |
| 10075 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32139] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10076 dicendum quod ipsum intelligere humanum non est actus et perfectio | |
| 10077 naturae intellectae materialis, ut sic possit uno actu intelligi | |
| 10078 natura rei materialis et ipsum intelligere, sicut uno actu | |
| 10079 intelligitur res cum sua perfectione. Unde alius est actus quo | |
| 10080 intellectus intelligit lapidem, et alius est actus quo intelligit | |
| 10081 se intelligere lapidem, et sic inde. Nec est inconveniens in | |
| 10082 intellectu esse infinitum in potentia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A3-p9"> | |
| 10083 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, | |
| 10084 however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the | |
| 10085 common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; | |
| 10086 and so there is no comparison. | |
| 10087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32140] Iª q. 87 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10088 dicendum quod sensus proprius sentit secundum immutationem | |
| 10089 materialis organi a sensibili exteriori. Non est autem possibile | |
| 10090 quod aliquid materiale immutet seipsum; sed unum immutatur ab alio. | |
| 10091 Et ideo actus sensus proprii percipitur per sensum communem. Sed | |
| 10092 intellectus non intelligit per materialem immutationem organi, et | |
| 10093 ideo non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q87_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q87_A4-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 4. Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p2"> | |
| 10094 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it | |
| 10095 be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect | |
| 10096 are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect. | |
| 10097 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32141] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 10098 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non intelligat actum | |
| 10099 voluntatis. Nihil enim cognoscitur ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquo | |
| 10100 modo praesens in intellectu. Sed actus voluntatis non est praesens | |
| 10101 in intellectu, cum sint diversae potentiae. Ergo actus voluntatis | |
| 10102 non cognoscitur ab intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p3"> | |
| 10103 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore | |
| 10104 the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known | |
| 10105 by the intellect. | |
| 10106 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32142] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actus | |
| 10107 habet speciem ab obiecto. Sed obiectum voluntatis differt ab | |
| 10108 obiecto intellectus. Ergo et actus voluntatis speciem habet | |
| 10109 diversam ab obiecto intellectus. Non ergo cognoscitur ab | |
| 10110 intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p4"> | |
| 10111 <b>Objection 3:</b> Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor | |
| 10112 by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions | |
| 10113 of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect | |
| 10114 to known such affections of the soul as the acts of the will. | |
| 10115 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32143] Iª q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10116 Augustinus, in libro X Confess., attribuit affectionibus animae | |
| 10117 quod cognoscuntur neque per imagines, sicut corpora; <i>neque per | |
| 10118 praesentiam, sicut artes, sed per quasdam notiones</i>. Non videtur | |
| 10119 autem quod possint esse aliae notiones rerum in anima nisi vel | |
| 10120 essentiae rerum cognitarum, vel earum similitudines. Ergo | |
| 10121 impossibile videtur quod intellectus cognoscat affectiones animae, | |
| 10122 quae sunt actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p5"> | |
| 10123 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I will." | |
| 10124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32144] Iª q. 87 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10125 quod Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., <i>intelligo me velle</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p6"> | |
| 10126 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( | |
| 10127 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q59_A1" id="FP_Q87_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[1]</a>), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an | |
| 10128 inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; | |
| 10129 and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is | |
| 10130 in the sensible thing sensibly; and | |
| 10131 likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its | |
| 10132 principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)---that "the will is in the reason." | |
| 10133 Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood | |
| 10134 by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and | |
| 10135 consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power. | |
| 10136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 co."><a name="32145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32145] Iª q. 87 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10137 quod, sicut supra dictum est, actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam | |
| 10138 inclinatio quaedam consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus | |
| 10139 naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem. Inclinatio | |
| 10140 autem cuiuslibet rei est in ipsa re per modum eius. Unde inclinatio | |
| 10141 naturalis est naturaliter in re naturali; et inclinatio quae est | |
| 10142 appetitus sensibilis, est sensibiliter in sentiente; et similiter | |
| 10143 inclinatio intelligibilis, quae est actus voluntatis, est | |
| 10144 intelligibiliter in intelligente, sicut in principio et in proprio | |
| 10145 subiecto. Unde et philosophus hoc modo loquendi utitur in III de | |
| 10146 anima, quod voluntas in ratione est. Quod autem intelligibiliter | |
| 10147 est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur. | |
| 10148 Unde actus voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et inquantum | |
| 10149 aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis cognoscit naturam | |
| 10150 huius actus, et per consequens naturam eius principii, quod est | |
| 10151 habitus vel potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p7"> | |
| 10152 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for | |
| 10153 then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and | |
| 10154 since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the | |
| 10155 intellect. | |
| 10156 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32146] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10157 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si voluntas et intellectus, | |
| 10158 sicut sunt diversae potentiae, ita etiam subiecto differrent, sic | |
| 10159 enim quod est in voluntate, esset absens ab intellectu. Nunc autem, | |
| 10160 cum utrumque radicetur in una substantia animae, et unum sit | |
| 10161 quodammodo principium alterius, consequens est ut quod est in | |
| 10162 voluntate, sit etiam quodammodo in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8"> | |
| 10163 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained | |
| 10164 in the other, as we have said above ( | |
| 10165 <a href="#FP_Q82_A4" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>, ad 1; | |
| 10166 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q16_A4" id="FP_Q87_A4-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[16], A[4]</a>, ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those | |
| 10167 of the intellect can fall under the will. | |
| 10168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32147] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10169 dicendum quod bonum et verum, quae sunt obiecta voluntatis et | |
| 10170 intellectus, differunt quidem ratione, verumtamen unum eorum | |
| 10171 continetur sub alio, ut supra dictum est, nam verum est quoddam | |
| 10172 bonum, et bonum est quoddam verum. Et ideo quae sunt voluntatis | |
| 10173 cadunt sub intellectu; et quae sunt intellectus possunt cadere sub | |
| 10174 voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q87_A4-p9"> | |
| 10175 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, | |
| 10176 as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine | |
| 10177 says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions. | |
| 10178 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 87 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32148] Iª q. 87 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10179 dicendum quod affectus animae non sunt in intellectu neque per | |
| 10180 similitudinem tantum, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam ut in | |
| 10181 subiecto, sicut artes; sed sicut principiatum in principio, in quo | |
| 10182 habetur notio principiati. Et ideo Augustinus dicit affectus animae | |
| 10183 esse in memoria per quasdam notiones.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 10184 <div id="FP_Q88" class="div3"> | |
| 10185 <h3 id="FP_Q88-p0.1">Q. 88. HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 10186 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 10187 <p id="FP_Q88-p2"> We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are | |
| 10188 three points of inquiry: | |
| 10189 </p><p id="FP_Q88-p3"><a href="#FP_Q88_A1"> (1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?</a></p><p id="FP_Q88-p4"><a href="#FP_Q88_A2"> (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q88-p5"><a href="#FP_Q88_A3"> (3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?</a></p> | |
| 10190 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 pr."><a name="32149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32149] | |
| 10191 Iª q. 88 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo anima | |
| 10192 humana cognoscat ea quae supra se sunt, scilicet immateriales | |
| 10193 substantias. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum anima | |
| 10194 humana, secundum statum praesentis vitae, possit intelligere | |
| 10195 substantias immateriales quas Angelos dicimus, per seipsas. | |
| 10196 Secundo, utrum possit ad earum notitiam pervenire per cognitionem | |
| 10197 rerum materialium. Tertio, utrum Deus sit id quod primo a nobis | |
| 10198 cognoscitur.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 10199 <div id="FP_Q88_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A1-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 1. Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p2"> | |
| 10200 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine | |
| 10201 (De Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so | |
| 10202 it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things." But these are the immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind | |
| 10203 understands immaterial substances. | |
| 10204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32150] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 10205 proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana, secundum statum vitae | |
| 10206 praesentis, possit intelligere substantias immateriales per | |
| 10207 seipsas. Dicit enim Augustinus, in IX de Trin., <i>mens ipsa, sicut | |
| 10208 corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic | |
| 10209 incorporearum rerum per semetipsam</i>. Huiusmodi autem sunt | |
| 10210 substantiae immateriales. Ergo mens substantias immateriales | |
| 10211 intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p3"> | |
| 10212 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature | |
| 10213 is immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above ( | |
| 10214 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q88_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able to understand immaterial things. | |
| 10215 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32151] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10216 simile simili cognoscitur. Sed magis assimilatur mens humana rebus | |
| 10217 immaterialibus quam materialibus, cum ipsa mens sit immaterialis, | |
| 10218 ut ex supradictis patet. Cum ergo mens nostra intelligat res | |
| 10219 materiales, multo magis intelligit res immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p4"> | |
| 10220 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted | |
| 10221 by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De | |
| 10222 Anima iii, 4. Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. | |
| 10223 As material things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them | |
| 10224 actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves | |
| 10225 whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material things. | |
| 10226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32152] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 10227 ea quae sunt secundum se maxime sensibilia, non maxime sentiantur a | |
| 10228 nobis, provenit ex hoc quod excellentiae sensibilium corrumpunt | |
| 10229 sensum. Sed excellentiae intelligibilium non corrumpunt | |
| 10230 intellectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo ea quae sunt secundum | |
| 10231 se maxime intelligibilia, sunt etiam maxime intelligibilia nobis. | |
| 10232 Sed cum res materiales non sint intelligibiles nisi quia facimus | |
| 10233 eas intelligibiles actu, abstrahendo a materia; manifestum est quod | |
| 10234 magis sint secundum se intelligibiles substantiae quae secundum | |
| 10235 suam naturam sunt immateriales. Ergo multo magis intelliguntur a | |
| 10236 nobis quam res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p5"> | |
| 10237 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature would be frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract | |
| 10238 substances, "because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be understood at all." But in nature | |
| 10239 nothing is idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us. | |
| 10240 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32153] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10241 Commentator dicit, in II Metaphys., quod si substantiae abstractae | |
| 10242 non possent intelligi a nobis, <i>tunc natura otiose egisset, quia | |
| 10243 fecit illud quod est naturaliter in se intellectum, non intellectum | |
| 10244 ab aliquo</i>. Sed nihil est otiosum sive frustra in natura. Ergo | |
| 10245 substantiae immateriales possunt intelligi a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p6"> | |
| 10246 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether | |
| 10247 superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances, | |
| 10248 even the superior and immaterial. | |
| 10249 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32154] Iª q. 88 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 10250 se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita se habet intellectus ad | |
| 10251 intelligibilia. Sed visus noster potest videre omnia corpora, sive | |
| 10252 sint superiora et incorruptibilia, sive sint inferiora et | |
| 10253 corruptibilia. Ergo intellectus noster potest intelligere omnes | |
| 10254 substantias intelligibiles, et superiores et immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7"> | |
| 10255 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 10256 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.16" target="asv">Wis. 9:16</a>): "The things that are in heaven, who shall search out?" But these substances are said to be in heaven, according to | |
| 10257 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv"> Mat. 18:10, </a> "Their angels in heaven," etc. Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation. | |
| 10258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32155] Iª q. 88 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10259 quod dicitur Sap. IX, <i>quae in caelis sunt, quis | |
| 10260 investigabit?</i> In caelis autem dicuntur huiusmodi substantiae | |
| 10261 esse; secundum illud Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in caelis</i> et | |
| 10262 cetera. Ergo non possunt substantiae immateriales per | |
| 10263 investigationem humanam cognosci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p8"> | |
| 10264 <b>I answer that,</b> In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of | |
| 10265 all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called "Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, | |
| 10266 and thus first and "per se" understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy | |
| 10267 and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more | |
| 10268 clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things. | |
| 10269 </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p9"> But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship | |
| 10270 to the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above | |
| 10271 ( | |
| 10272 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q88_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and "per | |
| 10273 se" be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience | |
| 10274 proves us to have. | |
| 10275 </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p10"> Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge | |
| 10276 of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which he calls the "active intellect," and which, | |
| 10277 being a separate substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is perfectly united to us | |
| 10278 so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate | |
| 10279 substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can understand material things. | |
| 10280 Now he said that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of both the active intellect | |
| 10281 and intelligible objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that the active | |
| 10282 intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to | |
| 10283 matter. For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as | |
| 10284 cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active | |
| 10285 intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now | |
| 10286 a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible | |
| 10287 synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and | |
| 10288 the active intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the nearer do we come to the | |
| 10289 point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the intelligible | |
| 10290 objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and | |
| 10291 immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter | |
| 10292 whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active | |
| 10293 intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand separate | |
| 10294 substances (because according to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by means of the active | |
| 10295 intellect. | |
| 10296 </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p11"> This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we could not | |
| 10297 formally understand by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form and act, since | |
| 10298 every agent acts according to its actuality, as was said of the passive intellect ( | |
| 10299 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q70_A1" id="FP_Q88_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[70], A[1]</a>). Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a | |
| 10300 separate substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated in things understood; | |
| 10301 and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; just | |
| 10302 as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its | |
| 10303 light only is united to us, that we may see the colors. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above | |
| 10304 explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard | |
| 10305 to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects together do not | |
| 10306 equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand | |
| 10307 all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the active intellect | |
| 10308 to be | |
| 10309 so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances. | |
| 10310 </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p12"> Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things: | |
| 10311 and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that | |
| 10312 happiness is a "kind of common good, communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is unreasonable that only the few | |
| 10313 of any species attain to the end of the species. | |
| 10314 </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p13"> Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and | |
| 10315 after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge | |
| 10316 of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he had named as the | |
| 10317 chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge | |
| 10318 of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united to the active intellect as some imagined. | |
| 10319 </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p14"> Sixthly, as was shown above ( | |
| 10320 <a href="#FP_Q79_A4" id="FP_Q88_A1-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>), the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects | |
| 10321 to which the passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is "all | |
| 10322 things potentially," and the active intellect is "all things in act." Therefore both intellects, according to the present | |
| 10323 state of life, extend to material things only, | |
| 10324 which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present | |
| 10325 state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect. | |
| 10326 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 co."><a name="32156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32156] Iª q. 88 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10327 quod secundum opinionem Platonis, substantiae immateriales non | |
| 10328 solum a nobis intelliguntur, sed etiam sunt prima a nobis | |
| 10329 intellecta. Posuit enim Plato formas immateriales subsistentes, | |
| 10330 quas ideas vocabat, esse propria obiecta nostri intellectus, et ita | |
| 10331 primo et per se intelliguntur a nobis. Applicatur tamen animae | |
| 10332 cognitio rebus materialibus, secundum quod intellectui permiscetur | |
| 10333 phantasia et sensus. Unde quanto magis intellectus fuerit | |
| 10334 depuratus, tanto magis percipit immaterialium intelligibilem | |
| 10335 veritatem. Sed secundum Aristotelis sententiam, quam magis | |
| 10336 experimur, intellectus noster, secundum statum praesentis vitae, | |
| 10337 naturalem respectum habet ad naturas rerum materialium; unde nihil | |
| 10338 intelligit nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut ex dictis patet. | |
| 10339 Et sic manifestum est quod substantias immateriales, quae sub sensu | |
| 10340 et imaginatione non cadunt, primo et per se, secundum modum | |
| 10341 cognitionis nobis expertum, intelligere non possumus. Sed tamen | |
| 10342 Averroes, in Comment. tertii de anima, ponit quod in fine in hac | |
| 10343 vita homo pervenire potest ad hoc quod intelligat substantias | |
| 10344 separatas, per continuationem vel unionem cuiusdam substantiae | |
| 10345 separatae nobis, quam vocat intellectum agentem, qui quidem, cum | |
| 10346 sit substantia separata, naturaliter substantias separatas | |
| 10347 intelligit. Unde cum fuerit nobis perfecte unitus, sic ut per eum | |
| 10348 perfecte intelligere possimus, intelligemus et nos substantias | |
| 10349 separatas; sicut nunc per intellectum possibilem nobis unitum | |
| 10350 intelligimus res materiales. Ponit autem intellectum agentem sic | |
| 10351 nobis uniri. Cum enim nos intelligamus per intellectum agentem et | |
| 10352 per intelligibilia speculata, ut patet cum conclusiones | |
| 10353 intelligimus per principia intellecta; necesse est quod intellectus | |
| 10354 agens comparetur ad intellecta speculata vel sicut agens principale | |
| 10355 ad instrumenta, vel sicut forma ad materiam. His enim duobus modis | |
| 10356 attribuitur actio aliqua duobus principiis, principali quidem | |
| 10357 agenti et instrumento, sicut sectio artifici et serrae; formae | |
| 10358 autem et subiecto, sicut calefactio calori et igni. Sed utroque | |
| 10359 modo intellectus agens comparabitur ad intelligibilia speculata | |
| 10360 sicut perfectio ad perfectibile, et actus ad potentiam. Simul autem | |
| 10361 recipitur in aliquo perfectum et perfectio; sicut visibile in actu | |
| 10362 et lumen in pupilla. Simul igitur in intellectu possibili | |
| 10363 recipiuntur intellecta speculata et intellectus agens. Et quanto | |
| 10364 plura intellecta speculata recipimus, tanto magis appropinquamus ad | |
| 10365 hoc quod intellectus agens perfecte uniatur nobis. Ita quod cum | |
| 10366 omnia intellecta speculata cognoverimus, intellectus agens perfecte | |
| 10367 unietur nobis; et poterimus per eum omnia cognoscere materialia et | |
| 10368 immaterialia. Et in hoc ponit ultimam hominis felicitatem. Nec | |
| 10369 refert, quantum ad propositum pertinet, utrum in illo statu | |
| 10370 felicitatis intellectus possibilis intelligat substantias separatas | |
| 10371 per intellectum agentem, ut ipse sentit, vel, ut ipse imponit | |
| 10372 Alexandro, intellectus possibilis nunquam intelligat substantias | |
| 10373 separatas (propter hoc quod ponit intellectum possibilem | |
| 10374 corruptibilem), sed homo intelligat substantias separatas per | |
| 10375 intellectum agentem. Sed praedicta stare non possunt. Primo quidem | |
| 10376 quia, si intellectus agens est substantia separata, impossibile est | |
| 10377 quod per ipsam formaliter intelligamus, quia id quo formaliter | |
| 10378 agens agit, est forma et actus agentis; cum omne agens agat | |
| 10379 inquantum est actu. Sicut etiam supra dictum est circa intellectum | |
| 10380 possibilem. Secundo quia, secundum modum praedictum, intellectus | |
| 10381 agens, si est substantia separata, non uniretur nobis secundum suam | |
| 10382 substantiam; sed solum lumen eius, secundum quod participatur in | |
| 10383 intellectis speculatis; et non quantum ad alias actiones | |
| 10384 intellectus agentis, ut possimus per hoc intelligere substantias | |
| 10385 immateriales. Sicut dum videmus colores illuminatos a sole, non | |
| 10386 unitur nobis substantia solis, ut possimus actiones solis agere; | |
| 10387 sed solum nobis unitur lumen solis ad visionem colorum. Tertio, | |
| 10388 quia dato quod secundum modum praedictum uniretur nobis substantia | |
| 10389 intellectus agentis, tamen ipsi non ponunt quod intellectus agens | |
| 10390 totaliter uniatur nobis secundum unum intelligibile vel duo, sed | |
| 10391 secundum omnia intellecta speculata. Sed omnia intellecta speculata | |
| 10392 deficiunt a virtute intellectus agentis, quia multo plus est | |
| 10393 intelligere substantias separatas, quam intelligere omnia | |
| 10394 materialia. Unde manifestum est quod etiam intellectis omnibus | |
| 10395 materialibus, non sic uniretur intellectus agens nobis, ut possemus | |
| 10396 intelligere per eum substantias separatas. Quarto, quia intelligere | |
| 10397 omnia intellecta materialia vix contingit alicui in hoc mundo; et | |
| 10398 sic nullus, vel pauci ad felicitatem pervenirent. Quod est contra | |
| 10399 philosophum, in I Ethic., qui dicit quod <i>felicitas est quoddam | |
| 10400 bonum commune, quod potest pervenire omnibus non orbatis ad | |
| 10401 virtutem</i>. Est etiam contra rationem quod finem alicuius speciei | |
| 10402 ut in paucioribus consequantur ea quae continentur sub specie. | |
| 10403 Quinto, quia philosophus dicit expresse, in I Ethic., quod | |
| 10404 <i>felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam virtutem</i>. Et | |
| 10405 enumeratis multis virtutibus, in decimo, concludit quod felicitas | |
| 10406 ultima, consistens in cognitione maximorum intelligibilium, est | |
| 10407 secundum virtutem sapientiae, quam posuerat in sexto esse caput | |
| 10408 scientiarum speculativarum. Unde patet quod Aristoteles posuit | |
| 10409 ultimam felicitatem hominis in cognitione substantiarum | |
| 10410 separatarum, qualis potest haberi per scientias speculativas, et | |
| 10411 non per continuationem intellectus agentis a quibusdam confictam. | |
| 10412 Sexto, quia supra ostensum est quod intellectus agens non est | |
| 10413 substantia separata, sed virtus quaedam animae, ad eadem active se | |
| 10414 extendens, ad quae se extendit intellectus possibilis receptive, | |
| 10415 quia, ut dicitur in III de anima, intellectus possibilis est quo | |
| 10416 est omnia fieri, intellectus agens quo est omnia facere. Uterque | |
| 10417 ergo intellectus se extendit, secundum statum praesentis vitae, ad | |
| 10418 materialia sola; quae intellectus agens facit intelligibilia actu, | |
| 10419 et recipiuntur in intellectu possibili. Unde secundum statum | |
| 10420 praesentis vitae, neque per intellectum possibilem, neque per | |
| 10421 intellectum agentem, possumus intelligere substantias immateriales | |
| 10422 secundum seipsas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p15"> | |
| 10423 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This | |
| 10424 is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate | |
| 10425 substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; | |
| 10426 not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them. | |
| 10427 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32157] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10428 dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini haberi potest quod | |
| 10429 illud quod mens nostra de cognitione incorporalium rerum accipere | |
| 10430 potest, per seipsam cognoscere possit. Et hoc adeo verum est, ut | |
| 10431 etiam apud philosophos dicatur quod scientia de anima est | |
| 10432 principium quoddam ad cognoscendum substantias separatas. Per hoc | |
| 10433 enim quod anima nostra cognoscit seipsam, pertingit ad cognitionem | |
| 10434 aliquam habendam de substantiis incorporeis, qualem eam contingit | |
| 10435 habere, non quod simpliciter et perfecte eas cognoscat, cognoscendo | |
| 10436 seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p16"> | |
| 10437 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true ---that the soul | |
| 10438 needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the | |
| 10439 knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of life, is such that it can be informed | |
| 10440 with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things | |
| 10441 rather than immaterial substances. | |
| 10442 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32158] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10443 dicendum quod similitudo naturae non est ratio sufficiens ad | |
| 10444 cognitionem, alioquin oporteret dicere quod Empedocles dixit, quod | |
| 10445 anima esset de natura omnium, ad hoc quod omnia cognosceret. Sed | |
| 10446 requiritur ad cognoscendum, ut sit similitudo rei cognitae in | |
| 10447 cognoscente quasi quaedam forma ipsius. Intellectus autem noster | |
| 10448 possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natus informari | |
| 10449 similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis, et | |
| 10450 ideo cognoscit magis materialia quam substantias immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p17"> | |
| 10451 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, | |
| 10452 and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not | |
| 10453 merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it | |
| 10454 is that immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our present | |
| 10455 state of life, so that it cannot understand them. | |
| 10456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32159] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10457 dicendum quod requiritur aliqua proportio obiecti ad potentiam | |
| 10458 cognoscitivam, ut activi ad passivum, et perfectionis ad | |
| 10459 perfectibile. Unde quod excellentia sensibilia non capiantur a | |
| 10460 sensu, non sola ratio est quia corrumpunt organa sensibilia; sed | |
| 10461 etiam quia sunt improportionata potentiis sensitivis. Et hoc modo | |
| 10462 substantiae immateriales sunt improportionatae intellectui nostro, | |
| 10463 secundum praesentem statum, ut non possint ab eo intelligi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p18"> | |
| 10464 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it | |
| 10465 does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another. | |
| 10466 </p><p id="FP_Q88_A1-p19"> Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails | |
| 10467 to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood | |
| 10468 by us at all. | |
| 10469 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32160] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10470 dicendum quod illa ratio Commentatoris multipliciter deficit. Primo | |
| 10471 quidem, quia non sequitur quod, si substantiae separatae non | |
| 10472 intelliguntur a nobis, non intelligantur ab aliquo intellectu, | |
| 10473 intelliguntur enim a seipsis, et a se invicem. Secundo, quia non | |
| 10474 est finis substantiarum separatarum ut intelligantur a nobis. Illud | |
| 10475 autem otiose et frustra esse dicitur, quod non consequitur finem ad | |
| 10476 quem est. Et sic non sequitur substantias immateriales esse | |
| 10477 frustra, etiam si nullo modo intelligerentur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A1-p20"> | |
| 10478 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do | |
| 10479 not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way. The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which | |
| 10480 is impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial. | |
| 10481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32161] Iª q. 88 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 10482 dicendum quod eodem modo sensus cognoscit et superiora et inferiora | |
| 10483 corpora, scilicet per immutationem organi a sensibili. Non autem | |
| 10484 eodem modo intelliguntur a nobis substantiae materiales, quae | |
| 10485 intelliguntur per modum abstractionis; et substantiae immateriales, | |
| 10486 quae non possunt sic a nobis intelligi, quia non sunt earum aliqua | |
| 10487 phantasmata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q88_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A2-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 2. Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p2"> | |
| 10488 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says | |
| 10489 (Coel. Hier. i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it | |
| 10490 is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature." Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial | |
| 10491 substances. | |
| 10492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32162] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 10493 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus noster per cognitionem rerum | |
| 10494 materialium possit pervenire ad intelligendum substantias | |
| 10495 immateriales. Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>non | |
| 10496 est possibile humanae menti ad immaterialem illam sursum excitari | |
| 10497 caelestium hierarchiarum contemplationem, nisi secundum se | |
| 10498 materiali manuductione utatur</i>. Relinquitur ergo quod per | |
| 10499 materialia manuduci possumus ad intelligendum substantias | |
| 10500 immateriales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p3"> | |
| 10501 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene | |
| 10502 defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial | |
| 10503 substances can be understood by us. | |
| 10504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32163] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10505 scientia est in intellectu. Sed scientiae et definitiones sunt de | |
| 10506 substantiis immaterialibus, definit enim Damascenus Angelum; et de | |
| 10507 Angelis aliqua documenta traduntur tam in theologicis quam in | |
| 10508 philosophicis disciplinis. Ergo substantiae immateriales intelligi | |
| 10509 possunt a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p4"> | |
| 10510 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by | |
| 10511 which it understands material things. Therefore also other material substances can be understood by us, through their material | |
| 10512 effects. | |
| 10513 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32164] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 10514 humana est de genere substantiarum immaterialium. Sed ipsa | |
| 10515 intelligi potest a nobis per actum suum, quo intelligit materialia. | |
| 10516 Ergo et aliae substantiae immateriales intelligi possunt a nobis | |
| 10517 per suos effectus in rebus materialibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p5"> | |
| 10518 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and | |
| 10519 this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things. | |
| 10520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32165] Iª q. 88 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illa | |
| 10521 sola causa per suos effectus comprehendi non potest, quae in | |
| 10522 infinitum distat a suis effectibus. Hoc autem solius Dei est | |
| 10523 proprium. Ergo aliae substantiae immateriales creatae intelligi | |
| 10524 possunt a nobis per res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p6"> | |
| 10525 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things | |
| 10526 through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal." | |
| 10527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32166] Iª q. 88 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10528 quod Dionysius dicit, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>sensibilibus | |
| 10529 intelligibilia, et compositis simplicia, et corporalibus | |
| 10530 incorporalia apprehendi non possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q88_A2-p7"> | |
| 10531 <b>I answer that,</b> Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher named Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught that by | |
| 10532 the understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial | |
| 10533 substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything material | |
| 10534 residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and | |
| 10535 as the process of abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without | |
| 10536 matter; and this would be the understanding of immaterial substance. | |
| 10537 </p><p id="FP_Q88_A2-p8"> Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms and species of these material things; as the Platonists | |
| 10538 supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material things, | |
| 10539 it follows that however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, it could never arrive at | |
| 10540 anything akin to immaterial substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances | |
| 10541 through material substances. | |
| 10542 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 co."><a name="32167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32167] Iª q. 88 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10543 quod, sicut Averroes narrat in III de anima, quidam Avempace | |
| 10544 nomine, posuit quod per intellectum substantiarum materialium | |
| 10545 pervenire possumus, secundum vera philosophiae principia, ad | |
| 10546 intelligendum substantias immateriales. Cum enim intellectus noster | |
| 10547 natus sit abstrahere quidditatem rei materialis a materia, si | |
| 10548 iterum in illa quidditate sit aliquid materiae, poterit iterato | |
| 10549 abstrahere, et cum hoc in infinitum non procedat, tandem pervenire | |
| 10550 poterit ad intelligendum aliquam quidditatem quae sit omnino sine | |
| 10551 materia. Et hoc est intelligere substantiam immaterialem. Quod | |
| 10552 quidem efficaciter diceretur, si substantiae immateriales essent | |
| 10553 formae et species horum materialium, ut Platonici posuerunt. Hoc | |
| 10554 autem non posito, sed supposito quod substantiae immateriales sint | |
| 10555 omnino alterius rationis a quidditatibus materialium rerum; | |
| 10556 quantumcumque intellectus noster abstrahat quidditatem rei | |
| 10557 materialis a materia, nunquam perveniet ad aliquid simile | |
| 10558 substantiae immateriali. Et ideo per substantias materiales non | |
| 10559 possumus perfecte substantias immateriales intelligere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p9"> | |
| 10560 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof; | |
| 10561 for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material | |
| 10562 things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). | |
| 10563 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32168] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10564 dicendum quod ex rebus materialibus ascendere possumus in aliqualem | |
| 10565 cognitionem immaterialium rerum, non tamen in perfectam, quia non | |
| 10566 est sufficiens comparatio rerum materialium ad immateriales, sed | |
| 10567 similitudines si quae a materialibus accipiuntur ad immaterialia | |
| 10568 intelligenda, sunt multum dissimiles, ut Dionysius dicit, II cap. | |
| 10569 Cael. Hier.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p10"> | |
| 10570 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies | |
| 10571 by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us | |
| 10572 in such a way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by | |
| 10573 their relation to material things. | |
| 10574 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32169] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10575 dicendum quod de superioribus rebus in scientiis maxime tractatur | |
| 10576 per viam remotionis, sic enim corpora caelestia notificat | |
| 10577 Aristoteles per negationem proprietatum inferiorum corporum. Unde | |
| 10578 multo magis immateriales substantiae a nobis cognosci non possunt, | |
| 10579 ut earum quidditates apprehendamus, sed de eis nobis in scientiis | |
| 10580 documenta traduntur per viam remotionis et alicuius habitudinis ad | |
| 10581 res materiales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p11"> | |
| 10582 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power | |
| 10583 and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such act, nor through any | |
| 10584 other material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former. | |
| 10585 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32170] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10586 dicendum quod anima humana intelligit seipsam per suum intelligere, | |
| 10587 quod est actus proprius eius, perfecte demonstrans virtutem eius et | |
| 10588 naturam. Sed neque per hoc, neque per alia quae in rebus | |
| 10589 materialibus inveniuntur, perfecte cognosci potest immaterialium | |
| 10590 substantiarum virtus et natura, quia huiusmodi non adaequant earum | |
| 10591 virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A2-p12"> | |
| 10592 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or | |
| 10593 in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, | |
| 10594 as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural | |
| 10595 genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above ( | |
| 10596 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q88_A2-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according | |
| 10597 to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about | |
| 10598 God. | |
| 10599 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32171] Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10600 dicendum quod substantiae immateriales creatae in genere quidem | |
| 10601 naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est | |
| 10602 in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae, conveniunt tamen cum eis | |
| 10603 in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in | |
| 10604 praedicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non sit earum esse. | |
| 10605 Sed Deus non convenit cum rebus materialibus neque secundum genus | |
| 10606 naturale, neque secundum genus logicum, quia Deus nullo modo est in | |
| 10607 genere, ut supra dictum est. Unde per similitudines rerum | |
| 10608 materialium aliquid affirmative potest cognosci de Angelis secundum | |
| 10609 rationem communem, licet non secundum rationem speciei; de Deo | |
| 10610 autem nullo modo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q88_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q88_A3-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 3. Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p2"> | |
| 10611 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is the first object known by the human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by | |
| 10612 which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But | |
| 10613 we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De | |
| 10614 Vera Relig. xxxi; [*Confess. xii, 25]). Therefore God is the first object known to us. | |
| 10615 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32172] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 10616 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit primum quod a mente humana | |
| 10617 cognoscitur. Illud enim in quo omnia alia cognoscuntur, et per quod | |
| 10618 de aliis iudicamus, est primo cognitum a nobis; sicut lux ab oculo, | |
| 10619 et principia prima ab intellectu. Sed omnia in luce primae | |
| 10620 veritatis cognoscimus, et per eam de omnibus iudicamus; ut dicit | |
| 10621 Augustinus in libro de Trin., et in libro de vera Relig. Ergo Deus | |
| 10622 est id quod primo cognoscitur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p3"> | |
| 10623 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light | |
| 10624 which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" ( | |
| 10625 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv">Jn. 1:9</a>). Therefore God is our first and most known object. | |
| 10626 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32173] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10627 propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis. Sed Deus est causa omnis | |
| 10628 nostrae cognitionis, ipse enim est <i>lux vera, quae illuminat | |
| 10629 omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>, ut dicitur Ioan. I. | |
| 10630 Ergo Deus est id quod primo et maxime est cognitum nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p4"> | |
| 10631 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine | |
| 10632 says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind. | |
| 10633 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32174] Iª q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 10634 quod primo cognoscitur in imagine, est exemplar quo imago formatur. | |
| 10635 Sed in mente nostra est Dei imago, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo id | |
| 10636 quod primo cognoscitur in mente nostra est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p5"> | |
| 10637 <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man hath seen God at any time" ( | |
| 10638 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv">Jn. 1:18</a>). | |
| 10639 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32175] Iª q. 88 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10640 quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6"> | |
| 10641 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances | |
| 10642 <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first | |
| 10643 object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle ( | |
| 10644 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the | |
| 10645 things that are made": while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is | |
| 10646 the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages ( | |
| 10647 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>; | |
| 10648 <a href="#FP_Q85_A8" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[85], A[8]</a>; | |
| 10649 <a href="#FP_Q87_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[87], A[2]</a>, ad 2) | |
| 10650 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 co."><a name="32176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32176] Iª q. 88 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10651 quod, cum intellectus humanus, secundum statum praesentis vitae, | |
| 10652 non possit intelligere substantias immateriales creatas, ut dictum | |
| 10653 est; multo minus potest intelligere essentiam substantiae | |
| 10654 increatae. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod Deus non est primum | |
| 10655 quod a nobis cognoscitur; sed magis per creaturas in Dei | |
| 10656 cognitionem pervenimus, secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. I, | |
| 10657 <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, | |
| 10658 conspiciuntur</i>. Primum autem quod intelligitur a nobis secundum | |
| 10659 statum praesentis vitae, est quidditas rei materialis, quae est | |
| 10660 nostri intellectus obiectum, ut multoties supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p7"> | |
| 10661 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural | |
| 10662 or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above ( | |
| 10663 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[2]</a>). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much less can it be said that God is the | |
| 10664 first object known by our intellect. | |
| 10665 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32177] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10666 dicendum quod in luce primae veritatis omnia intelligimus et | |
| 10667 iudicamus, inquantum ipsum lumen intellectus nostri, sive naturale | |
| 10668 sive gratuitum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam impressio veritatis | |
| 10669 primae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum ipsum lumen intellectus | |
| 10670 nostri non se habeat ad intellectum nostrum sicut quod | |
| 10671 intelligitur, sed sicut quo intelligitur; multo minus Deus est id | |
| 10672 quod primo a nostro intellectu intelligitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p8"> | |
| 10673 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so," must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, | |
| 10674 as explained above ( | |
| 10675 <a href="#FP_Q81_A2" id="FP_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>, ad 3). Other things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first | |
| 10676 cause of our faculty of knowledge. | |
| 10677 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32178] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10678 dicendum quod propter quod unumquodque, illud magis, intelligendum | |
| 10679 est in his quae sunt unius ordinis, ut supra dictum est. Propter | |
| 10680 Deum autem alia cognoscuntur, non sicut propter primum cognitum, | |
| 10681 sed sicut propter primam cognoscitivae virtutis causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q88_A3-p9"> | |
| 10682 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know | |
| 10683 God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not prove. | |
| 10684 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 88 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32179] Iª q. 88 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10685 dicendum quod, si in anima nostra esset perfecta imago Dei, sicut | |
| 10686 filius est perfecta imago patris, statim mens nostra intelligeret | |
| 10687 Deum. Est autem imago imperfecta. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 10688 <div id="FP_Q89" class="div3"> | |
| 10689 <h3 id="FP_Q89-p0.1">Q. 89. OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 10690 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 10691 <p id="FP_Q89-p2"> We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q89-p3"><a href="#FP_Q89_A1"> (1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p4"><a href="#FP_Q89_A2"> (2) Whether it understands separate substances?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p5"><a href="#FP_Q89_A3"> (3) Whether it understands all natural things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p6"><a href="#FP_Q89_A4"> (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p7"><a href="#FP_Q89_A5"> (5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p8"><a href="#FP_Q89_A6"> (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p9"><a href="#FP_Q89_A7"> (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q89-p10"><a href="#FP_Q89_A8"> (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?</a></p> | |
| 10692 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 pr."><a name="32180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32180] | |
| 10693 Iª q. 89 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de cognitione | |
| 10694 animae separatae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum anima | |
| 10695 separata a corpore possit intelligere. Secundo, utrum intelligat | |
| 10696 substantias separatas. Tertio, utrum intelligat omnia naturalia. | |
| 10697 Quarto, utrum cognoscat singularia. Quinto, utrum habitus scientiae | |
| 10698 hic acquisitae remaneat in anima separata. Sexto, utrum possit uti | |
| 10699 habitu scientiae hic acquisitae. Septimo, utrum distantia localis | |
| 10700 impediat cognitionem animae separatae. Octavo, utrum animae | |
| 10701 separatae a corporibus cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 10702 <div id="FP_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2"> | |
| 10703 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to | |
| 10704 the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect | |
| 10705 when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above ( | |
| 10706 <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[1]</a>). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the | |
| 10707 body. | |
| 10708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32189] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 10709 proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata non intelligat substantias | |
| 10710 separatas. Perfectior enim est anima corpori coniuncta, quam a | |
| 10711 corpore separata, cum anima sit naturaliter pars humanae naturae; | |
| 10712 quaelibet autem pars perfectior est in suo toto. Sed anima | |
| 10713 coniuncta corpori non intelligit substantias separatas, ut supra | |
| 10714 habitum est. Ergo multo minus cum fuerit a corpore separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p3"> | |
| 10715 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to | |
| 10716 the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an | |
| 10717 angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances. | |
| 10718 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32190] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 10719 quod cognoscitur, vel cognoscitur per sui praesentiam, vel per suam | |
| 10720 speciem. Sed substantiae separatae non possunt cognosci ab anima | |
| 10721 per suam praesentiam, quia nihil illabitur animae nisi solus Deus. | |
| 10722 Neque etiam per aliquas species quas anima ab Angelo abstrahere | |
| 10723 possit, quia Angelus simplicior est quam anima. Ergo nullo modo | |
| 10724 anima separata potest cognoscere substantias separatas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p4"> | |
| 10725 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, | |
| 10726 therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; | |
| 10727 which cannot be reasonably be said. | |
| 10728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32191] Iª q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10729 quidam philosophi posuerunt in cognitione separatarum substantiarum | |
| 10730 consistere ultimam hominis felicitatem. Si ergo anima separata | |
| 10731 potest intelligere substantias separatas, ex sola sua separatione | |
| 10732 consequitur felicitatem. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p5"> | |
| 10733 <b>On the contrary,</b> Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and | |
| 10734 Abraham ( | |
| 10735 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.23" target="asv">Lk. 16:23</a>). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels. | |
| 10736 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32192] Iª q. 89 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10737 quod animae separatae cognoscunt alias animas separatas; sicut | |
| 10738 dives in Inferno positus vidit Lazarum et Abraham, Luc. XVI. Ergo | |
| 10739 vident etiam et Daemones et Angelos animae separatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6"> | |
| 10740 <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"---i.e. by knowing itself | |
| 10741 ( | |
| 10742 <a href="#FP_Q88_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[1]</a>, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. | |
| 10743 Now it was said above | |
| 10744 <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not | |
| 10745 understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands | |
| 10746 itself through its own act, as shown above ( | |
| 10747 <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[87], A[1]</a>). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply | |
| 10748 intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands | |
| 10749 what is above itself and what is below | |
| 10750 itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one | |
| 10751 who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of | |
| 10752 a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart | |
| 10753 from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels | |
| 10754 so | |
| 10755 far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise. | |
| 10756 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 co."><a name="32193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32193] Iª q. 89 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10757 quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in IX de Trin., <i>mens nostra | |
| 10758 cognitionem rerum incorporearum per seipsam accipit</i>, idest | |
| 10759 cognoscendo seipsam, sicut supra dictum est. Per hoc ergo quod | |
| 10760 anima separata cognoscit seipsam, accipere possumus qualiter | |
| 10761 cognoscit alias substantias separatas. Dictum est autem quod | |
| 10762 quandiu anima corpori est unita, intelligit convertendo se ad | |
| 10763 phantasmata. Et ideo nec seipsam potest intelligere nisi inquantum | |
| 10764 fit actu intelligens per speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam, sic | |
| 10765 enim per actum suum intelligit seipsam, ut supra dictum est. Sed | |
| 10766 cum fuerit a corpore separata, intelliget non convertendo se ad | |
| 10767 phantasmata, sed ad ea quae sunt secundum se intelligibilia, unde | |
| 10768 seipsam per seipsam intelliget. Est autem commune omni substantiae | |
| 10769 separatae quod intelligat id quod est supra se, et id quod est | |
| 10770 infra se, per modum suae substantiae, sic enim intelligitur aliquid | |
| 10771 secundum quod est in intelligente; est autem aliquid in altero per | |
| 10772 modum eius in quo est. Modus autem substantiae animae separatae est | |
| 10773 infra modum substantiae angelicae, sed est conformis modo aliarum | |
| 10774 animarum separatarum. Et ideo de aliis animabus separatis perfectam | |
| 10775 cognitionem habet; de Angelis autem imperfectam et deficientem, | |
| 10776 loquendo de cognitione naturali animae separatae. De cognitione | |
| 10777 autem gloriae est alia ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p7"> | |
| 10778 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: | |
| 10779 but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence | |
| 10780 in the present life. | |
| 10781 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32194] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10782 dicendum quod anima separata est quidem imperfectior, si | |
| 10783 consideretur natura qua communicat cum natura corporis, sed tamen | |
| 10784 quodammodo est liberior ad intelligendum, inquantum per gravedinem | |
| 10785 et occupationem corporis a puritate intelligentiae impeditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p8"> | |
| 10786 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge | |
| 10787 of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel. | |
| 10788 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32195] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10789 dicendum quod anima separata intelligit Angelos per similitudines | |
| 10790 divinitus impressas. Quae tamen deficiunt a perfecta | |
| 10791 repraesentatione eorum, propter hoc quod animae natura est inferior | |
| 10792 quam Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A2-p9"> | |
| 10793 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen | |
| 10794 only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness---not final and ultimate | |
| 10795 happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article. | |
| 10796 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32196] Iª q. 89 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10797 dicendum quod in cognitione substantiarum separatarum non | |
| 10798 quarumcumque, consistit ultima hominis felicitas, sed solius Dei, | |
| 10799 qui non potest videri nisi per gratiam. In cognitione vero aliarum | |
| 10800 substantiarum separatarum est magna felicitas, etsi non ultima, si | |
| 10801 tamen perfecte intelligantur. Sed anima separata naturali | |
| 10802 cognitione non perfecte eas intelligit, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A3-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 3. Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p2"> | |
| 10803 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. | |
| 10804 Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things. | |
| 10805 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32197] Iª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 10806 proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata omnia naturalia cognoscat. | |
| 10807 In substantiis enim separatis sunt rationes omnium rerum | |
| 10808 naturalium. Sed animae separatae cognoscunt substantias separatas. | |
| 10809 Ergo cognoscunt omnia naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p3"> | |
| 10810 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But | |
| 10811 the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more | |
| 10812 can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility. | |
| 10813 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32198] Iª q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, qui | |
| 10814 intelligit magis intelligibile, multo magis potest intelligere | |
| 10815 minus intelligibile. Sed anima separata intelligit substantias | |
| 10816 separatas, quae sunt maxima intelligibilium. Ergo multo magis | |
| 10817 potest intelligere omnia naturalia, quae sunt minus | |
| 10818 intelligibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p4"> | |
| 10819 <b>On the contrary,</b> The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn | |
| 10820 many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural | |
| 10821 things. | |
| 10822 </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 1"><a name="32199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32199] Iª q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, in | |
| 10823 Daemonibus magis viget naturalis cognitio quam in anima separata. | |
| 10824 Sed Daemones non omnia naturalia cognoscunt; sed multa addiscunt | |
| 10825 per longi temporis experientiam, ut Isidorus dicit. Ergo neque | |
| 10826 animae separatae omnia naturalia cognoscunt.</p><p title="I q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 2"><a name="32200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32200] Iª q. 89 a. 3 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 10827 anima statim cum est separata, omnia naturalia cognosceret, frustra | |
| 10828 homines studerent ad rerum scientiam capessendam. Hoc autem est | |
| 10829 inconveniens. Non ergo anima separata omnia naturalia | |
| 10830 cognoscit.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p5"> | |
| 10831 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 10832 <a href="#FP_Q89_A1" id="FP_Q89_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, | |
| 10833 as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through | |
| 10834 such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, | |
| 10835 have the same relation | |
| 10836 through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. | |
| 10837 Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures | |
| 10838 of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows | |
| 10839 that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused | |
| 10840 manner. | |
| 10841 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 co."><a name="32201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32201] Iª q. 89 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10842 quod, sicut supra dictum est, anima separata intelligit per species | |
| 10843 quas recipit ex influentia divini luminis, sicut et Angeli, sed | |
| 10844 tamen, quia natura animae est infra naturam Angeli, cui iste modus | |
| 10845 cognoscendi est connaturalis, anima separata per huiusmodi species | |
| 10846 non accipit perfectam rerum cognitionem, sed quasi in communi et | |
| 10847 confusam. Sicut igitur se habent Angeli ad perfectam cognitionem | |
| 10848 rerum naturalium per huiusmodi species, ita animae separatae ad | |
| 10849 imperfectam et confusam. Angeli autem per huiusmodi species | |
| 10850 cognoscunt cognitione perfecta omnia naturalia, quia omnia quae | |
| 10851 Deus fecit in propriis naturis, fecit in intelligentia angelica, ut | |
| 10852 dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad Litt. Unde et animae separatae de | |
| 10853 omnibus naturalibus cognitionem habent, non certam et propriam, sed | |
| 10854 communem et confusam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p6"> | |
| 10855 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above | |
| 10856 ( | |
| 10857 <a href="#FP_Q87_A1" id="FP_Q89_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[87], A[1]</a>). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion. | |
| 10858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32202] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10859 dicendum quod nec ipse Angelus per suam substantiam cognoscit omnia | |
| 10860 naturalia, sed per species quasdam, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo | |
| 10861 non propter hoc sequitur quod anima cognoscat omnia naturalia, quia | |
| 10862 cognoscit quoquo modo substantiam separatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p7"> | |
| 10863 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural | |
| 10864 things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article. | |
| 10865 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32203] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10866 dicendum quod, sicut anima separata non perfecte intelligit | |
| 10867 substantias separatas ita nec omnia naturalia perfecte cognoscit, | |
| 10868 sed sub quadam confusione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p8"> | |
| 10869 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as | |
| 10870 future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural | |
| 10871 things. | |
| 10872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32204] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10873 dicendum quod Isidorus loquitur de cognitione futurorum; quae nec | |
| 10874 Angeli nec Daemones nec animae separatae cognoscunt, nisi vel in | |
| 10875 suis causis, vel per revelationem divinam. Nos autem loquimur de | |
| 10876 cognitione naturalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A3-p9"> | |
| 10877 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow | |
| 10878 that to study in order to learn is useless. | |
| 10879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32205] Iª q. 89 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10880 dicendum quod cognitio quae acquiritur hic per studium, est propria | |
| 10881 et perfecta; illa autem est confusa. Unde non sequitur quod studium | |
| 10882 addiscendi sit frustra.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A4-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 4. Whether the separated soul knows singulars?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2"> | |
| 10883 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the | |
| 10884 separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above ( | |
| 10885 <a href="#FP_Q77_A8" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[8]</a>). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown ( | |
| 10886 <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q89_A4-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars. | |
| 10887 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32206] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 10888 proceditur. Videtur quod anima separata non cognoscat singularia. | |
| 10889 Nulla enim potentia cognoscitiva remanet in anima separata nisi | |
| 10890 intellectus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Sed intellectus non est | |
| 10891 cognoscitivus singularium, ut supra habitum est. Ergo anima | |
| 10892 separata singularia non cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p3"> | |
| 10893 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no | |
| 10894 determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars. | |
| 10895 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32207] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magis | |
| 10896 est determinata cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquid in singulari, quam | |
| 10897 illa qua cognoscitur aliquid in universali. Sed anima separata non | |
| 10898 habet determinatam cognitionem de speciebus rerum naturalium. Multo | |
| 10899 igitur minus cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p4"> | |
| 10900 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know | |
| 10901 all singulars. Therefore it knows none. | |
| 10902 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32208] Iª q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 10903 cognoscit singularia, et non per sensum, pari ratione omnia | |
| 10904 singularia cognosceret. Sed non cognoscit omnia singularia. Ergo | |
| 10905 nulla cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p5"> | |
| 10906 <b>On the contrary,</b> The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren" ( | |
| 10907 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.28" target="asv">Lk. 16:28</a>). | |
| 10908 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32209] Iª q. 89 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10909 quod dives in Inferno positus dixit, habeo quinque fratres, ut | |
| 10910 habetur Luc. XVI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6"> | |
| 10911 <b>I answer that,</b> Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that | |
| 10912 there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be | |
| 10913 directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above ( | |
| 10914 <a href="#FP_Q86_A1" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for | |
| 10915 the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal | |
| 10916 and individual principles ( | |
| 10917 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine | |
| 10918 Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels | |
| 10919 have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas | |
| 10920 separated have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know | |
| 10921 not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these | |
| 10922 species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or | |
| 10923 by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned | |
| 10924 according to the mode of the recipient. | |
| 10925 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 co."><a name="32210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32210] Iª q. 89 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10926 quod animae separatae aliqua singularia cognoscunt, sed non omnia, | |
| 10927 etiam quae sunt praesentia. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est | |
| 10928 quod duplex est modus intelligendi. Unus per abstractionem a | |
| 10929 phantasmatibus, et secundum istum modum singularia per intellectum | |
| 10930 cognosci non possunt directe, sed indirecte, sicut supra dictum | |
| 10931 est. Alius modus intelligendi est per influentiam specierum a Deo, | |
| 10932 et per istum modum intellectus potest singularia cognoscere. Sicut | |
| 10933 enim ipse Deus per suam essentiam, inquantum est causa universalium | |
| 10934 et individualium principiorum, cognoscit omnia et universalia et | |
| 10935 singularia, ut supra dictum est; ita substantiae separatae per | |
| 10936 species, quae sunt quaedam participatae similitudines illius | |
| 10937 divinae essentiae, possunt singularia cognoscere. In hoc tamen est | |
| 10938 differentia inter Angelos et animas separatas, quia Angeli per | |
| 10939 huiusmodi species habent perfectam et propriam cognitionem de | |
| 10940 rebus, animae vero separatae confusam. Unde Angeli, propter | |
| 10941 efficaciam sui intellectus per huiusmodi species non solum naturas | |
| 10942 rerum in speciali cognoscere possunt, sed etiam singularia sub | |
| 10943 speciebus contenta. Animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere | |
| 10944 per huiusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae quodammodo | |
| 10945 determinantur, vel per praecedentem cognitionem, vel per aliquam | |
| 10946 affectionem, vel per naturalem habitudinem, vel per divinam | |
| 10947 ordinationem, quia omne quod recipitur in aliquo, determinatur in | |
| 10948 eo secundum modum recipientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p7"> | |
| 10949 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained | |
| 10950 above. | |
| 10951 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32211] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10952 dicendum quod intellectus per viam abstractionis non est | |
| 10953 cognoscitivus singularium. Sic autem anima separata non intelligit, | |
| 10954 sed sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p8"> | |
| 10955 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate | |
| 10956 relation, as we have said. | |
| 10957 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32212] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10958 dicendum quod ad illarum rerum species vel individua cognitio | |
| 10959 animae separatae determinatur, ad quae anima separata habet aliquam | |
| 10960 determinatam habitudinem, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A4-p9"> | |
| 10961 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore | |
| 10962 there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars. | |
| 10963 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32213] Iª q. 89 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10964 dicendum quod anima separata non se habet aequaliter ad omnia | |
| 10965 singularia, sed ad quaedam habet aliquam habitudinem quam non habet | |
| 10966 ad alia. Et ideo non est aequalis ratio ut omnia singularia | |
| 10967 cognoscat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A5-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 5. Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p2"> | |
| 10968 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for | |
| 10969 the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" ( | |
| 10970 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>). | |
| 10971 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32214] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 10972 proceditur. Videtur quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae non | |
| 10973 remaneat in anima separata. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, | |
| 10974 scientia destruetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p3"> | |
| 10975 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of | |
| 10976 knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel | |
| 10977 some who are better; which seems unreasonable. | |
| 10978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32215] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10979 quidam minus boni in hoc mundo scientia pollent, aliis magis bonis | |
| 10980 carentibus scientia. Si ergo habitus scientiae permaneret etiam | |
| 10981 post mortem in anima, sequeretur quod aliqui minus boni etiam in | |
| 10982 futuro statu essent potiores aliquibus magis bonis. Quod videtur | |
| 10983 inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p4"> | |
| 10984 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here | |
| 10985 acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject | |
| 10986 which cannot be. | |
| 10987 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32216] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10988 animae separatae habebunt scientiam per influentiam divini luminis. | |
| 10989 Si igitur scientia hic acquisita in anima separata remaneat, | |
| 10990 sequetur quod duae erunt formae unius speciei in eodem subiecto. | |
| 10991 Quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p5"> | |
| 10992 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that "a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed | |
| 10993 by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge | |
| 10994 is destroyed by death. | |
| 10995 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32217] Iª q. 89 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10996 philosophus dicit, in libro Praedicament., quod <i>habitus est | |
| 10997 qualitas difficile mobilis; sed ab aegritudine, vel ab aliquo | |
| 10998 huiusmodi, quandoque corrumpitur scientia</i>. Sed nulla est ita | |
| 10999 fortis immutatio in hac vita, sicut immutatio quae est per mortem. | |
| 11000 Ergo videtur quod habitus scientiae per mortem corrumpatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p6"> | |
| 11001 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven." | |
| 11002 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32218] Iª q. 89 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11003 quod Hieronymus dicit, in epistola ad Paulinum, <i>discamus in | |
| 11004 terris, quorum scientia nobis perseveret in caelo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p7"> | |
| 11005 <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, | |
| 11006 cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it | |
| 11007 would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed. | |
| 11008 </p><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p8"> But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), | |
| 11009 the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can | |
| 11010 be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" | |
| 11011 (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the | |
| 11012 mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a | |
| 11013 certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding | |
| 11014 the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides | |
| 11015 chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same | |
| 11016 distinction is to be applied to habit. | |
| 11017 </p><p id="FP_Q89_A5-p9"> Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the | |
| 11018 sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De | |
| 11019 Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by | |
| 11020 cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not | |
| 11021 corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated ( | |
| 11022 <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q89_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary | |
| 11023 to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety may exist in | |
| 11024 the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in | |
| 11025 statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces | |
| 11026 anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge | |
| 11027 is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false | |
| 11028 argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as | |
| 11029 it | |
| 11030 is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul. | |
| 11031 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 co."><a name="32219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32219] Iª q. 89 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11032 quod quidam posuerunt habitum scientiae non esse in ipso | |
| 11033 intellectu, sed in viribus sensitivis, scilicet imaginativa, | |
| 11034 cogitativa et memorativa; et quod species intelligibiles non | |
| 11035 conservantur in intellectu possibili. Et si haec opinio vera esset, | |
| 11036 sequeretur quod, destructo corpore, totaliter habitus scientiae hic | |
| 11037 acquisitae destrueretur. Sed quia scientia est in intellectu, qui | |
| 11038 est locus specierum, ut dicitur in III de anima; oportet quod | |
| 11039 habitus scientiae hic acquisitae partim sit in praedictis viribus | |
| 11040 sensitivis, et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari | |
| 11041 ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiae acquiritur, nam | |
| 11042 <i>habitus sunt similes actibus ex quibus acquiruntur</i>, ut | |
| 11043 dicitur in II Ethic. Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in praesenti | |
| 11044 vita scientia acquiritur, sunt per conversionem intellectus ad | |
| 11045 phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per | |
| 11046 tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas | |
| 11047 quaedam ad considerandum per species susceptas; et in praedictis | |
| 11048 inferioribus viribus acquiritur quaedam habilitas ut facilius per | |
| 11049 conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari. | |
| 11050 Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est | |
| 11051 in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in | |
| 11052 inferioribus viribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu. Quantum | |
| 11053 ergo ad id quod aliquis praesentis scientiae habet in inferioribus | |
| 11054 viribus, non remanebit in anima separata, sed quantum ad id quod | |
| 11055 habet in ipso intellectu, necesse est ut remaneat. Quia, ut dicitur | |
| 11056 in libro de longitudine et brevitate vitae, dupliciter corrumpitur | |
| 11057 aliqua forma, uno modo, per se, quando corrumpitur a suo contrario, | |
| 11058 ut calidum a frigido; alio modo, per accidens, scilicet per | |
| 11059 corruptionem subiecti. Manifestum est autem quod per corruptionem | |
| 11060 subiecti, scientia quae est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non | |
| 11061 potest, cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis, ut supra ostensum est. | |
| 11062 Similiter etiam nec per contrarium corrumpi possunt species | |
| 11063 intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili, quia intentioni | |
| 11064 intelligibili nihil est contrarium; et praecipue quantum ad | |
| 11065 simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est. Sed | |
| 11066 quantum ad operationem qua intellectus componit et dividit, vel | |
| 11067 etiam ratiocinatur, sic invenitur contrarietas in intellectu, | |
| 11068 secundum quod falsum in propositione vel in argumentatione est | |
| 11069 contrarium vero. Et hoc modo interdum scientia corrumpitur per | |
| 11070 contrarium, dum scilicet aliquis per falsam argumentationem | |
| 11071 abducitur a scientia veritatis. Et ideo philosophus, in libro | |
| 11072 praedicto, ponit duos modos quibus scientia per se corrumpitur, | |
| 11073 scilicet oblivionem, ex parte memorativae, et deceptionem, ex parte | |
| 11074 argumentationis falsae. Sed hoc non habet locum in anima separata. | |
| 11075 Unde dicendum est quod habitus scientiae, secundum quod est in | |
| 11076 intellectu manet in anima separata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p10"> | |
| 11077 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion | |
| 11078 quoted, "Now, I know in part." | |
| 11079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32220] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11080 dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de scientia quantum ad | |
| 11081 habitum, sed quantum ad cognitionis actum. Unde ad huius | |
| 11082 probationem inducit, nunc cognosco ex parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p11"> | |
| 11083 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the | |
| 11084 future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed | |
| 11085 by the better man. | |
| 11086 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32221] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11087 dicendum quod, sicut secundum staturam corporis aliquis minus bonus | |
| 11088 erit maior aliquo magis bono; ita nihil prohibet aliquem minus | |
| 11089 bonum habere aliquem scientiae habitum in futuro, quem non habet | |
| 11090 aliquis magis bonus. Sed tamen hoc quasi nullius momenti est in | |
| 11091 comparatione ad alias praerogativas quas meliores habebunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p12"> | |
| 11092 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility. | |
| 11093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32222] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11094 dicendum quod utraque scientia non est unius rationis. Unde nullum | |
| 11095 inconveniens sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A5-p13"> | |
| 11096 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers. | |
| 11097 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32223] Iª q. 89 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 11098 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de corruptione scientiae quantum | |
| 11099 ad id quod habet ex parte sensitivarum virium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A6-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 6. Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p2"> | |
| 11100 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De | |
| 11101 Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known | |
| 11102 is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired. | |
| 11103 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32224] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 11104 proceditur. Videtur quod actus scientiae hic acquisitae non maneat | |
| 11105 in anima separata. Dicit enim philosophus, in I de anima, quod | |
| 11106 corrupto corpore, anima neque reminiscitur neque amat. Sed | |
| 11107 considerare ea quae prius aliquis novit, est reminisci. Ergo anima | |
| 11108 separata non potest habere actum scientiae quam hic acquisivit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p3"> | |
| 11109 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. | |
| 11110 But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above ( | |
| 11111 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q89_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this | |
| 11112 life. | |
| 11113 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32225] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11114 species intelligibiles non erunt potentiores in anima separata quam | |
| 11115 sint in anima corpori unita. Sed per species intelligibiles non | |
| 11116 possumus modo intelligere, nisi convertendo nos super phantasmata, | |
| 11117 sicut supra habitum est. Ergo nec anima separata hoc poterit. Et | |
| 11118 ita nullo modo per species intelligibiles hic acquisitas anima | |
| 11119 separata intelligere poterit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p4"> | |
| 11120 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But | |
| 11121 the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other | |
| 11122 acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce | |
| 11123 any act of knowledge acquired in this life. | |
| 11124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32226] Iª q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11125 philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>habitus similes actus | |
| 11126 reddunt actibus per quos acquiruntur</i>. Sed habitus scientiae hic | |
| 11127 acquiritur per actus intellectus convertentis se supra phantasmata. | |
| 11128 Ergo non potest alios actus reddere. Sed tales actus non competunt | |
| 11129 animae separatae. Ergo anima separata non habebit aliquem actum | |
| 11130 scientiae hic acquisitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p5"> | |
| 11131 <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Dives in hell ( | |
| 11132 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>): "Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime." | |
| 11133 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32227] Iª q. 89 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11134 quod Luc. XVI, dicitur ad divitem in Inferno positum, <i>recordare | |
| 11135 quia recepisti bona in vita tua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p6"> | |
| 11136 <b>I answer that,</b> Action offers two things for our consideration---its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the | |
| 11137 faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered | |
| 11138 from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see | |
| 11139 it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain | |
| 11140 in the separated soul, as stated above | |
| 11141 <a href="#FP_Q89_A5" id="FP_Q89_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible | |
| 11142 species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different | |
| 11143 way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here | |
| 11144 acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a | |
| 11145 different way. | |
| 11146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 co."><a name="32228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32228] Iª q. 89 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11147 quod in actu est duo considerare, scilicet speciem actus, et modum | |
| 11148 ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex obiecto in quod | |
| 11149 actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est | |
| 11150 obiecti similitudo, sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis. | |
| 11151 Sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis quae | |
| 11152 est in oculo, sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva | |
| 11153 oculi. Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in anima separata, | |
| 11154 sicut dictum est; status autem animae separatae non sit idem sicut | |
| 11155 modo est, sequitur quod secundum species intelligibiles hic | |
| 11156 acquisitas, anima separata intelligere possit quae prius | |
| 11157 intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad | |
| 11158 phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae. Et ita | |
| 11159 manet quidem in anima separata actus scientiae hic acquisitae, sed | |
| 11160 non secundum eundem modum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p7"> | |
| 11161 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to | |
| 11162 the intellect, as explained above ( | |
| 11163 <a href="#FP_Q79_A6" id="FP_Q89_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[6]</a>). | |
| 11164 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32229] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11165 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de reminiscentia, secundum quod | |
| 11166 memoria pertinet ad partem sensitivam, non autem secundum quod | |
| 11167 memoria est quodammodo in intellectu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p8"> | |
| 11168 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species. | |
| 11169 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32230] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11170 dicendum quod diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversa | |
| 11171 virtute specierum, sed ex diverso statu animae intelligentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A6-p9"> | |
| 11172 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just | |
| 11173 things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, | |
| 11174 Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34). | |
| 11175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32231] Iª q. 89 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11176 dicendum quod actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes | |
| 11177 actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem | |
| 11178 quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari iusta, sed non iuste, idest | |
| 11179 delectabiliter, causat habitum iustitiae politicae, per quem | |
| 11180 delectabiliter operamur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A7-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 7. Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p2"> | |
| 11181 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that | |
| 11182 "the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here." But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore | |
| 11183 local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul. | |
| 11184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32232] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 11185 proceditur. Videtur quod distantia localis impediat cognitionem | |
| 11186 animae separatae. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de cura pro | |
| 11187 mortuis agenda, quod <i>animae mortuorum ibi sunt, ubi ea quae hic | |
| 11188 fiunt scire non possunt</i>. Sciunt autem ea quae apud eos aguntur. | |
| 11189 Ergo distantia localis impedit cognitionem animae separatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p3"> | |
| 11190 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the demon's rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown | |
| 11191 to us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, | |
| 11192 therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon's. | |
| 11193 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32233] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11194 Augustinus dicit, in libro de divinatione Daemonum, quod | |
| 11195 <i>Daemones, propter celeritatem motus, aliqua nobis ignota | |
| 11196 denuntiant</i>. Sed agilitas motus ad hoc nihil faceret, si | |
| 11197 distantia localis cognitionem Daemonis non impediret. Multo igitur | |
| 11198 magis distantia localis impedit cognitionem animae separatae, quae | |
| 11199 est inferior secundum naturam quam Daemon.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p4"> | |
| 11200 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated | |
| 11201 soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge. | |
| 11202 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32234] Iª q. 89 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 11203 distat aliquis secundum locum, ita secundum tempus sed distantia | |
| 11204 temporis impedit cognitionem animae separatae, non enim cognoscunt | |
| 11205 futura. Ergo videtur quod etiam distantia secundum locum animae | |
| 11206 separatae cognitionem impediat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p5"> | |
| 11207 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 11208 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.23" target="asv">Lk. 16:23</a>), that Dives, "lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local distance does not impede | |
| 11209 knowledge in the separated soul. | |
| 11210 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32235] Iª q. 89 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11211 quod dicitur Luc. XVI, quod <i>dives cum esset in tormentis, | |
| 11212 elevans oculos suos, vidit Abraham a longe</i>. Ergo distantia | |
| 11213 localis non impedit animae separatae cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p6"> | |
| 11214 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be | |
| 11215 that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon | |
| 11216 the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction | |
| 11217 of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which | |
| 11218 do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived | |
| 11219 from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered | |
| 11220 by local distance. | |
| 11221 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 co."><a name="32236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32236] Iª q. 89 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11222 quod quidam posuerunt quod anima separata cognosceret singularia | |
| 11223 abstrahendo a sensibilibus. Quod si esset verum, posset dici quod | |
| 11224 distantia localis impediret animae separatae cognitionem, | |
| 11225 requireretur enim quod vel sensibilia agerent in animam separatam, | |
| 11226 vel anima separata in sensibilia; et quantum ad utrumque, | |
| 11227 requireretur distantia determinata. Sed praedicta positio est | |
| 11228 impossibilis, quia abstractio specierum a sensibilibus fit | |
| 11229 mediantibus sensibus et aliis potentiis sensitivis, quae in anima | |
| 11230 separata actu non manent. Intelligit autem anima separata | |
| 11231 singularia per influxum specierum ex divino lumine, quod quidem | |
| 11232 lumen aequaliter se habet ad propinquum et distans. Unde distantia | |
| 11233 localis nullo modo impedit animae separatae cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p7"> | |
| 11234 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are 'there,' as if impeded by | |
| 11235 local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain | |
| 11236 <a href="#FP_Q89_A8" id="FP_Q89_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. | |
| 11237 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32237] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11238 dicendum quod Augustinus non dicit quod propter hoc quod ibi sunt | |
| 11239 animae mortuorum, ea quae hic sunt videre non possunt, ut localis | |
| 11240 distantia huius ignorantiae causa esse credatur, sed hoc potest | |
| 11241 propter aliquid aliud contingere, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p8"> | |
| 11242 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive | |
| 11243 powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way | |
| 11244 of narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10. | |
| 11245 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32238] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11246 dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum opinionem illam qua | |
| 11247 aliqui posuerunt quod Daemones habent corpora naturaliter sibi | |
| 11248 unita, secundum quam positionem, etiam potentias sensitivas habere | |
| 11249 possunt, ad quarum cognitionem requiritur determinata distantia. Et | |
| 11250 hanc opinionem etiam in eodem libro Augustinus expresse tangit, | |
| 11251 licet eam magis recitando quam asserendo tangere videatur, ut patet | |
| 11252 per ea quae dicit XXI libro de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A7-p9"> | |
| 11253 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as | |
| 11254 a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and | |
| 11255 is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place. | |
| 11256 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32239] Iª q. 89 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11257 dicendum quod futura, quae distant secundum tempus, non sunt entia | |
| 11258 in actu. Unde in seipsis non sunt cognoscibilia, quia sicut deficit | |
| 11259 aliquid ab entitate, ita deficit a cognoscibilitate. Sed ea quae | |
| 11260 sunt distantia secundum locum, sunt entia in actu, et secundum se | |
| 11261 cognoscibilia. Unde non est eadem ratio de distantia locali, et de | |
| 11262 distantia temporis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q89_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q89_A8-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 8. Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p2"> | |
| 11263 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they | |
| 11264 have, according to what Dives said ( | |
| 11265 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.27" target="asv">Lk. 16:27,28</a>), "I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments." Therefore separated | |
| 11266 souls know what passes on earth. | |
| 11267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32240] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 11268 proceditur. Videtur quod animae separatae cognoscant ea quae hic | |
| 11269 aguntur. Nisi enim ea cognoscerent, de eis curam non haberent. Sed | |
| 11270 habent curam de his quae hic aguntur; secundum illud Luc. XVI, | |
| 11271 <i>habeo quinque fratres, ut testificetur illis, ne et ipsi veniant | |
| 11272 in hunc locum tormentorum</i>. Ergo animae separatae cognoscunt ea | |
| 11273 quae hic aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p3"> | |
| 11274 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared | |
| 11275 to Saul ( | |
| 11276 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.28.11" target="asv">1 Kings 28:11</a>). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth. | |
| 11277 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32241] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11278 frequenter mortui vivis apparent, vel dormientibus vel | |
| 11279 vigilantibus, et eos admonent de iis quae hic aguntur; sicut Samuel | |
| 11280 apparuit Sauli, ut habetur I Reg. XXVIII. Sed hoc non esset si ea | |
| 11281 quae hic sunt non cognoscerent. Ergo ea quae hic aguntur | |
| 11282 cognoscunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p4"> | |
| 11283 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it | |
| 11284 must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false | |
| 11285 <a href="#FP_Q89_A7" id="FP_Q89_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. | |
| 11286 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32242] Iª q. 89 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11287 animae separatae cognoscunt ea quae apud eas aguntur. Si ergo quae | |
| 11288 apud nos aguntur non cognoscerent, impediretur earum cognitio per | |
| 11289 localem distantiam. Quod supra negatum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p5"> | |
| 11290 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 11291 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.21" target="asv">Job 14:21</a>): "He will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor." | |
| 11292 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32243] Iª q. 89 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11293 quod dicitur Iob XIV, <i>sive fuerint filii eius nobiles, sive | |
| 11294 ignobiles, non intelliget</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q89_A8-p6"> | |
| 11295 <b>I answer that,</b> By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows | |
| 11296 from what has been laid down | |
| 11297 <a href="#FP_Q89_A4" id="FP_Q89_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous | |
| 11298 knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both | |
| 11299 by Divine order and by their | |
| 11300 mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of | |
| 11301 what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the | |
| 11302 spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct | |
| 11303 in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the souls of | |
| 11304 the | |
| 11305 dead have no concern in the affairs of the living." | |
| 11306 </p><p id="FP_Q89_A8-p7"> Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory | |
| 11307 continues the passage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, | |
| 11308 we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: "The dead, | |
| 11309 even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss quotes on the | |
| 11310 text, "Abraham hath not known us" ( | |
| 11311 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.16" target="asv">Is. 63:16</a>). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; | |
| 11312 and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised | |
| 11313 to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions ( | |
| 11314 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 22:20</a>). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every one take, as he pleases, | |
| 11315 what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed, seems to be | |
| 11316 the more probable one---that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the | |
| 11317 angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are | |
| 11318 most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except | |
| 11319 in | |
| 11320 accordance with Divine justice. | |
| 11321 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 co."><a name="32244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32244] Iª q. 89 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11322 quod, secundum naturalem cognitionem, de qua nunc hic agitur, | |
| 11323 animae mortuorum nesciunt quae hic aguntur. Et huius ratio ex | |
| 11324 dictis accipi potest. Quia anima separata cognoscit singularia per | |
| 11325 hoc quod quodammodo determinata est ad illa, vel per vestigium | |
| 11326 alicuius praecedentis cognitionis seu affectionis, vel per | |
| 11327 ordinationem divinam. Animae autem mortuorum, secundum ordinationem | |
| 11328 divinam, et secundum modum essendi, segregatae sunt a conversatione | |
| 11329 viventium, et coniunctae conversationi spiritualium substantiarum | |
| 11330 quae sunt a corpore separatae. Unde ea quae apud nos aguntur | |
| 11331 ignorant. Et hanc rationem assignat Gregorius in XII Moralium, | |
| 11332 dicens, <i>mortui vita in carne viventium post eos, qualiter | |
| 11333 disponatur, nesciunt, quia vita spiritus longe est a vita carnis; | |
| 11334 et sicut corporea atque incorporea diversa sunt genere, ita sunt | |
| 11335 distincta cognitione</i>. Et hoc etiam Augustinus videtur tangere | |
| 11336 in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, dicens quod <i>animae | |
| 11337 mortuorum rebus viventium non intersunt</i>. Sed quantum ad animas | |
| 11338 beatorum, videtur esse differentia inter Gregorium et Augustinum. | |
| 11339 Nam Gregorius ibidem subdit, <i>quod tamen de animabus sanctis | |
| 11340 sentiendum non est, quia quae intus omnipotentis Dei claritatem | |
| 11341 vident, nullo modo credendum est quod sit foris aliquid quod | |
| 11342 ignorent</i>. Augustinus vero, in libro de cura pro mortuis agenda, | |
| 11343 expresse dicit quod <i>nesciunt mortui, etiam sancti, quid agant | |
| 11344 vivi et eorum filii</i>, ut habetur in Glossa, super illud, | |
| 11345 <i>Abraham nescivit nos</i>, Isaiae LXIII. Quod quidem confirmat | |
| 11346 per hoc quod a matre sua non visitabatur, nec in tristitiis | |
| 11347 consolabatur, sicut quando vivebat; nec est probabile ut sit facta | |
| 11348 vita feliciore crudelior. Et per hoc quod dominus promisit Iosiae | |
| 11349 regi quod prius moreretur ne videret mala quae erant populo | |
| 11350 superventura, ut habetur IV Reg. XXII. Sed Augustinus hoc dubitando | |
| 11351 dicit, unde praemittit, <i>ut volet, accipiat quisque quod | |
| 11352 dicam</i>. Gregorius autem assertive, quod patet per hoc quod | |
| 11353 dicit, <i>nullo modo credendum est</i>. Magis tamen videtur, | |
| 11354 secundum sententiam Gregorii, quod animae sanctorum Deum videntes, | |
| 11355 omnia praesentia quae hic aguntur cognoscant. Sunt enim Angelis | |
| 11356 aequales, de quibus etiam Augustinus asserit quod ea quae apud | |
| 11357 vivos aguntur non ignorant. Sed quia sanctorum animae sunt | |
| 11358 perfectissime iustitiae divinae coniunctae, nec tristantur, nec | |
| 11359 rebus viventium se ingerunt, nisi secundum quod iustitiae divinae | |
| 11360 dispositio exigit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p8"> | |
| 11361 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring | |
| 11362 forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known | |
| 11363 to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by "the revelation of the | |
| 11364 Holy Ghost," as Augustine says in the same book. | |
| 11365 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32245] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11366 dicendum quod animae mortuorum possunt habere curam de rebus | |
| 11367 viventium, etiam si ignorent eorum statum; sicut nos curam habemus | |
| 11368 de mortuis, eis suffragia impendendo, quamvis eorum statum | |
| 11369 ignoremus. Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos | |
| 11370 cognoscere, sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt; vel | |
| 11371 per Angelos seu Daemones; vel etiam spiritu Dei revelante, sicut | |
| 11372 Augustinus in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p9"> | |
| 11373 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls | |
| 11374 of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living---and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur | |
| 11375 through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the | |
| 11376 living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says | |
| 11377 in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to | |
| 11378 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.46.23" target="asv"> Ecclus. 46:23, </a> "he slept, and told the king the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, | |
| 11379 the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture. | |
| 11380 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32246] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11381 dicendum quod hoc quod mortui viventibus apparent qualitercumque, | |
| 11382 vel contingit per specialem Dei dispensationem, ut animae mortuorum | |
| 11383 rebus viventium intersint, et est inter divina miracula | |
| 11384 computandum. Vel huiusmodi apparitiones fiunt per operationes | |
| 11385 Angelorum bonorum vel malorum, etiam ignorantibus mortuis, sicut | |
| 11386 etiam vivi ignorantes aliis viventibus apparent in somnis, ut | |
| 11387 Augustinus dicit in libro praedicto. Unde et de Samuele dici potest | |
| 11388 quod ipse apparuit per revelationem divinam; secundum hoc quod | |
| 11389 dicitur Eccli. XLVI, quod <i>dormivit, et notum fecit regi finem | |
| 11390 vitae suae</i>. Vel illa apparitio fuit procurata per Daemones, si | |
| 11391 tamen Ecclesiastici auctoritas non recipiatur, propter hoc quod | |
| 11392 inter canonicas Scripturas apud Hebraeos non habetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q89_A8-p10"> | |
| 11393 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above. | |
| 11394 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 89 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32247] Iª q. 89 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11395 dicendum quod ignorantia huiusmodi non contingit ex locali | |
| 11396 distantia, sed propter causam praedictam.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 11397 <div id="FP_Q90" class="div3"> | |
| 11398 <h3 id="FP_Q90-p0.1">Q. 90. OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 11399 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 11400 <p id="FP_Q90-p2"> After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: | |
| 11401 (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place | |
| 11402 of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of man's soul; | |
| 11403 (2) the production of man's body; (3) the production of the woman. | |
| 11404 </p><p id="FP_Q90-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q90-p4"><a href="#FP_Q90_A1"> (1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p5"><a href="#FP_Q90_A2"> (2) Whether, if made, it was created?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p6"><a href="#FP_Q90_A3"> (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?</a></p><p id="FP_Q90-p7"><a href="#FP_Q90_A4"> (4) Whether it was made before the body?</a></p> | |
| 11405 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 pr."><a name="32248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32248] | |
| 11406 Iª q. 90 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa considerandum est de | |
| 11407 prima hominis productione. Et circa hoc consideranda sunt quatuor, | |
| 11408 primo considerandum est de productione ipsius hominis; secundo, de | |
| 11409 fine productionis; tertio, de statu et conditione hominis primo | |
| 11410 producti; quarto, de loco eius. Circa productionem autem | |
| 11411 consideranda sunt tria, primo, de productione hominis quantum ad | |
| 11412 animam; secundo, quantum ad corpus viri; tertio, quantum ad | |
| 11413 productionem mulieris. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, | |
| 11414 utrum anima humana sit aliquid factum, vel sit de substantia ipsius | |
| 11415 Dei. Secundo, supposito quod sit facta, utrum sit creata. Tertio, | |
| 11416 utrum sit facta mediantibus Angelis. Quarto, utrum sit facta ante | |
| 11417 corpus.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 11418 <div id="FP_Q90_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A1-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 1. Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p2"> | |
| 11419 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's substance. For it is written ( | |
| 11420 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." | |
| 11421 But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance. | |
| 11422 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32249] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 11423 proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit facta, sed sit de substantia | |
| 11424 Dei. Dicitur enim Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, | |
| 11425 et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, et factus est homo | |
| 11426 in animam viventem</i>. Sed ille qui spirat, aliquid a se emittit. | |
| 11427 Ergo anima qua homo vivit, est aliquid de substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p3"> | |
| 11428 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as above explained ( | |
| 11429 <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q90_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore | |
| 11430 the soul is of God's substance. | |
| 11431 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32250] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 11432 supra habitum est, anima est forma simplex. Sed forma est actus. | |
| 11433 Ergo anima est actus purus, quod est solius Dei. Ergo anima est de | |
| 11434 substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p4"> | |
| 11435 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only | |
| 11436 be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same. | |
| 11437 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32251] Iª q. 90 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11438 quaecumque sunt, et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et | |
| 11439 mens sunt, et nullo modo differunt, quia oporteret quod aliquibus | |
| 11440 differentiis differrent, et sic essent composita. Ergo Deus et mens | |
| 11441 humana idem sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p5"> | |
| 11442 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary | |
| 11443 to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself." | |
| 11444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32252] Iª q. 90 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11445 quod Augustinus, in libro de origine animae, enumerat quaedam quae | |
| 11446 dicit esse multum aperteque perversa, et fidei Catholicae adversa; | |
| 11447 inter quae primum est, quod quidam dixerunt <i>Deum animam non de | |
| 11448 nihilo, sed de seipso fecisse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p6"> | |
| 11449 <b>I answer that,</b> To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said | |
| 11450 ( | |
| 11451 <a href="#FP_Q77_A2" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[77] , A[2]</a>; | |
| 11452 <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>; | |
| 11453 <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[6]</a>), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence ---acquires its knowledge somehow from | |
| 11454 things---and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is | |
| 11455 a pure act---receives nothing from any other---and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved ( | |
| 11456 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[1]</a>,7; | |
| 11457 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). | |
| 11458 </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p7"> This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature | |
| 11459 of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that | |
| 11460 God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same | |
| 11461 nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the | |
| 11462 soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal | |
| 11463 light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body. | |
| 11464 </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p8"> Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, | |
| 11465 but the form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates | |
| 11466 (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]) So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, | |
| 11467 as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees | |
| 11468 of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. | |
| 11469 </p><p id="FP_Q90_A1-p9"> But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ( | |
| 11470 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[3], AA[1]</a>,8; and | |
| 11471 <a href="#FP_Q75_A1" id="FP_Q90_A1-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God. | |
| 11472 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 co."><a name="32253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32253] Iª q. 90 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11473 quod dicere animam esse de substantia Dei, manifestam | |
| 11474 improbabilitatem continet. Ut enim ex dictis patet, anima humana | |
| 11475 est quandoque intelligens in potentia, et scientiam quodammodo a | |
| 11476 rebus acquirit, et habet diversas potentias, quae omnia aliena sunt | |
| 11477 a Dei natura, qui est actus purus, et nihil ab alio accipiens, et | |
| 11478 nullam in se diversitatem habens, ut supra probatum est. Sed hic | |
| 11479 error principium habuisse videtur ex duabus positionibus | |
| 11480 antiquorum. Primi enim qui naturas rerum considerare incoeperunt, | |
| 11481 imaginationem transcendere non valentes, nihil praeter corpora esse | |
| 11482 posuerunt. Et ideo Deum dicebant esse quoddam corpus, quod aliorum | |
| 11483 corporum iudicabant esse principium. Et quia animam ponebant esse | |
| 11484 de natura illius corporis quod dicebant esse principium, ut dicitur | |
| 11485 in I de anima, per consequens sequebatur quod anima esset de natura | |
| 11486 Dei. Iuxta quam positionem etiam Manichaei, Deum esse quandam lucem | |
| 11487 corpoream existimantes, quandam partem illius lucis animam esse | |
| 11488 posuerunt corpori alligatam. Secundo vero processum fuit ad hoc, | |
| 11489 quod aliqui aliquid incorporeum esse apprehenderunt, non tamen a | |
| 11490 corpore separatum, sed corporis formam. Unde et Varro dixit quod | |
| 11491 <i>Deus est anima mundum motu et ratione gubernans</i>; ut | |
| 11492 Augustinus narrat, VII de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur illius totalis | |
| 11493 animae partem aliqui posuerunt animam hominis, sicut homo est pars | |
| 11494 totius mundi; non valentes intellectu pertingere ad distinguendos | |
| 11495 spiritualium substantiarum gradus, nisi secundum distinctiones | |
| 11496 corporum. Haec autem omnia sunt impossibilia, ut supra probatum | |
| 11497 est. Unde manifeste falsum est animam esse de substantia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p10"> | |
| 11498 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the | |
| 11499 same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, | |
| 11500 but an extraneous thing. | |
| 11501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32254] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11502 dicendum quod inspirare non est accipiendum corporaliter, sed idem | |
| 11503 est Deum inspirare, quod spiritum facere. Quamvis et homo | |
| 11504 corporaliter spirans non emittat aliquid de sua substantia, sed de | |
| 11505 natura extranea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p11"> | |
| 11506 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above | |
| 11507 explained ( | |
| 11508 <a href="#FP_Q75_A5" id="FP_Q90_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[5]</a>, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God. | |
| 11509 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32255] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11510 dicendum quod anima, etsi sit forma simplex secundum suam | |
| 11511 essentiam, non tamen est suum esse, sed est ens per | |
| 11512 participationem; ut ex supra dictis patet. Et ideo non est actus | |
| 11513 purus, sicut Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A1-p12"> | |
| 11514 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. | |
| 11515 For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble | |
| 11516 each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple | |
| 11517 things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter | |
| 11518 into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot | |
| 11519 say that these again differ by some further difference. | |
| 11520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32256] Iª q. 90 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11521 dicendum quod differens, proprie acceptum, aliquo differt, unde ibi | |
| 11522 quaeritur differentia, ubi est convenientia. Et propter hoc oportet | |
| 11523 differentia esse composita quodammodo, cum in aliquo differant, et | |
| 11524 in aliquo conveniant. Sed secundum hoc, licet omne differens sit | |
| 11525 diversum, non tamen omne diversum est differens; ut dicitur in X | |
| 11526 Metaphys. Nam simplicia diversa sunt seipsis, non autem differunt | |
| 11527 aliquibus differentiis, ex quibus componantur. Sicut homo et asinus | |
| 11528 differunt rationali et irrationali differentia, de quibus non est | |
| 11529 dicere quod ulterius aliis differentiis differant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A2-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 2. Whether the soul was produced by creation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p2"> | |
| 11530 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from | |
| 11531 matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it | |
| 11532 was not created. | |
| 11533 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32257] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 11534 proceditur. Videtur quod anima non sit producta in esse per | |
| 11535 creationem. Quod enim in se habet aliquid materiale, fit ex | |
| 11536 materia. Sed anima habet in se aliquid materiale, cum non sit actus | |
| 11537 purus. Ergo anima est facta ex materia. Non ergo est creata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p3"> | |
| 11538 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to | |
| 11539 act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. | |
| 11540 Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter. | |
| 11541 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32258] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 11542 actus materiae alicuius videtur educi de potentia materiae, cum | |
| 11543 enim materia sit in potentia ad actum, actus quilibet praeexistit | |
| 11544 in materia in potentia. Sed anima est actus materiae corporalis, ut | |
| 11545 ex eius definitione apparet. Ergo anima educitur de potentia | |
| 11546 materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p4"> | |
| 11547 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come | |
| 11548 into existence by generation; which is not true. | |
| 11549 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32259] Iª q. 90 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 11550 est forma quaedam. Si igitur anima fit per creationem, pari ratione | |
| 11551 omnes aliae formae. Et sic nulla forma exibit in esse per | |
| 11552 generationem. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p5"> | |
| 11553 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 11554 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>): "God created man to His own image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created. | |
| 11555 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32260] Iª q. 90 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11556 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam</i>. | |
| 11557 Est autem homo ad imaginem Dei secundum animam. Ergo anima exivit | |
| 11558 in esse per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p6"> | |
| 11559 <b>I answer that,</b> The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since | |
| 11560 to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly | |
| 11561 exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and | |
| 11562 truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) | |
| 11563 by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence | |
| 11564 it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same | |
| 11565 is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be | |
| 11566 made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a | |
| 11567 subsistent form, as above explained ( | |
| 11568 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q90_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter---whether corporeal, | |
| 11569 which would render it a corporeal being---or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into | |
| 11570 another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation. | |
| 11571 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 co."><a name="32261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32261] Iª q. 90 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11572 quod anima rationalis non potest fieri nisi per creationem, quod | |
| 11573 non est verum de aliis formis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum fieri sit | |
| 11574 via ad esse, hoc modo alicui competit fieri, sicut ei competit | |
| 11575 esse. Illud autem proprie dicitur esse, quod ipsum habet esse, | |
| 11576 quasi in suo esse subsistens, unde solae substantiae proprie et | |
| 11577 vere dicuntur entia. Accidens vero non habet esse, sed eo aliquid | |
| 11578 est, et hac ratione ens dicitur; sicut albedo dicitur ens, quia ea | |
| 11579 aliquid est album. Et propter hoc dicitur in VII Metaphys., quod | |
| 11580 accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens. Et eadem ratio est de | |
| 11581 omnibus aliis formis non subsistentibus. Et ideo nulli formae non | |
| 11582 subsistenti proprie competit fieri, sed dicuntur fieri per hoc quod | |
| 11583 composita subsistentia fiunt. Anima autem rationalis est forma | |
| 11584 subsistens, ut supra habitum est. Unde sibi proprie competit esse | |
| 11585 et fieri. Et quia non potest fieri ex materia praeiacente, neque | |
| 11586 corporali, quia sic esset naturae corporeae; neque spirituali, quia | |
| 11587 sic substantiae spirituales in invicem transmutarentur, necesse est | |
| 11588 dicere quod non fiat nisi per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p7"> | |
| 11589 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated | |
| 11590 existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds | |
| 11591 if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality | |
| 11592 to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; | |
| 11593 otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. | |
| 11594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32262] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11595 dicendum quod in anima est sicut materiale ipsa simplex essentia, | |
| 11596 formale autem in ipsa est esse participatum, quod quidem ex | |
| 11597 necessitate simul est cum essentia animae, quia esse per se | |
| 11598 consequitur ad formam. Et eadem ratio esset, si poneretur composita | |
| 11599 ex quadam materia spirituali, ut quidam dicunt. Quia illa materia | |
| 11600 non est in potentia ad aliam formam, sicut nec materia caelestis | |
| 11601 corporis, alioquin anima esset corruptibilis. Unde nullo modo anima | |
| 11602 potest fieri ex materia praeiacente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p8"> | |
| 11603 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was | |
| 11604 in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and | |
| 11605 exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen ( | |
| 11606 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q90_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. | |
| 11607 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32263] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11608 dicendum quod actum extrahi de potentia materiae, nihil aliud est | |
| 11609 quam aliquid fieri actu, quod prius erat in potentia. Sed quia | |
| 11610 anima rationalis non habet esse suum dependens a materia corporali, | |
| 11611 sed habet esse subsistens, et excedit capacitatem materiae | |
| 11612 corporalis, ut supra dictum est; propterea non educitur de potentia | |
| 11613 materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A2-p9"> | |
| 11614 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms. | |
| 11615 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32264] Iª q. 90 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11616 dicendum quod non est simile de anima rationali, et de aliis | |
| 11617 formis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A3-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 3. Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p2"> | |
| 11618 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual | |
| 11619 things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says | |
| 11620 (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, | |
| 11621 the angels. | |
| 11622 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32265] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 11623 proceditur. Videtur quod anima rationalis non sit producta a Deo | |
| 11624 immediate, sed mediantibus Angelis. Maior enim ordo est in | |
| 11625 spiritualibus quam in corporalibus. Sed corpora inferiora | |
| 11626 producuntur per corpora superiora, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de | |
| 11627 Div. Nom. Ergo et inferiores spiritus, qui sunt animae rationales, | |
| 11628 producuntur per spiritus superiores, qui sunt Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p3"> | |
| 11629 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of | |
| 11630 things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the | |
| 11631 higher," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls | |
| 11632 by angels. | |
| 11633 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32266] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, finis | |
| 11634 rerum respondet principio, Deus enim est principium et finis rerum. | |
| 11635 Ergo et exitus rerum a principio respondet reductioni rerum in | |
| 11636 finem. Sed infima reducuntur per prima, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo et | |
| 11637 infima procedunt in esse per prima, scilicet animae per | |
| 11638 Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p4"> | |
| 11639 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect | |
| 11640 than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something | |
| 11641 specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul. | |
| 11642 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32267] Iª q. 90 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, | |
| 11643 perfectum est quod potest sibi simile facere</i>, ut dicitur in IV | |
| 11644 Meteor. Sed spirituales substantiae sunt multo magis perfectae quam | |
| 11645 corporales. Cum ergo corpora faciant sibi similia secundum speciem, | |
| 11646 multo magis Angeli poterunt facere aliquid infra se secundum | |
| 11647 speciem naturae, scilicet animam rationalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p5"> | |
| 11648 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 11649 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>) that God Himself "breathed into the face of man the breath of life." | |
| 11650 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32268] Iª q. 90 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11651 quod dicitur Gen. II, quod <i>Deus ipse inspiravit in faciem | |
| 11652 hominis spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p6"> | |
| 11653 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against | |
| 11654 faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for | |
| 11655 the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something | |
| 11656 derived from the first cause, as above explained ( | |
| 11657 <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q90_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], | |
| 11658 A[3] | |
| 11659 </a>): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts | |
| 11660 by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change | |
| 11661 in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God. | |
| 11662 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 co."><a name="32269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32269] Iª q. 90 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11663 quod quidam posuerunt quod Angeli, secundum quod operantur in | |
| 11664 virtute Dei, causant animas rationales. Sed hoc est omnino | |
| 11665 impossibile, et a fide alienum. Ostensum est enim quod anima | |
| 11666 rationalis non potest produci nisi per creationem. Solus autem Deus | |
| 11667 potest creare. Quia solius primi agentis est agere, nullo | |
| 11668 praesupposito, cum semper agens secundum praesupponat aliquid a | |
| 11669 primo agente, ut supra habitum est. Quod autem agit aliquid ex | |
| 11670 aliquo praesupposito, agit transmutando. Et ideo nullum aliud agens | |
| 11671 agit nisi transmutando; sed solus Deus agit creando. Et quia anima | |
| 11672 rationalis non potest produci per transmutationem alicuius | |
| 11673 materiae, ideo non potest produci nisi a Deo immediate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A3-p7"> Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and | |
| 11674 that the higher things lead forward the inferior---all these things are effected through a certain transmutation. | |
| 11675 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32270] Iª q. 90 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 11676 solutio ad obiecta. Nam quod corpora causant vel sibi similia vel | |
| 11677 inferiora, et quod superiora reducunt inferiora, totum hoc provenit | |
| 11678 per quandam transmutationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q90_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q90_A4-p0.1">Q. 90. A. 4. Whether the human soul was produced before the body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2"> | |
| 11679 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and | |
| 11680 adornment, as shown above ( | |
| 11681 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A1" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[1]</a>; | |
| 11682 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q70_A1" id="FP_Q90_A4-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[70], A[1]</a>). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of | |
| 11683 man was made before the body. | |
| 11684 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32271] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 11685 proceditur. Videtur quod anima humana fuerit producta ante corpus. | |
| 11686 Opus enim creationis praecessit opus distinctionis et ornatus, ut | |
| 11687 supra habitum est. Sed anima producta est in esse per creationem; | |
| 11688 corpus autem factum est in fine ornatus. Ergo anima hominis | |
| 11689 producta est ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p3"> | |
| 11690 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before | |
| 11691 bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also | |
| 11692 the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. | |
| 11693 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32272] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 11694 rationalis magis convenit cum Angelis quam cum animalibus brutis. | |
| 11695 Sed Angeli creati fuerunt ante corpora, vel statim a principio cum | |
| 11696 corporali materia; corpus autem hominis formatum est sexto die, | |
| 11697 quando et bruta animalia sunt producta. Ergo anima hominis fuit | |
| 11698 creata ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p4"> | |
| 11699 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning | |
| 11700 it was created before the body. | |
| 11701 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32273] Iª q. 90 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, finis | |
| 11702 proportionatur principio. Sed anima in fine remanet post corpus. | |
| 11703 Ergo et in principio fuit creata ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p5"> | |
| 11704 <b>On the contrary,</b> The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was | |
| 11705 produced in the body. | |
| 11706 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32274] Iª q. 90 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11707 quod actus proprius fit in potentia propria. Cum ergo anima sit | |
| 11708 proprius actus corporis, anima producta est in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p6"> | |
| 11709 <b>I answer that,</b> Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the | |
| 11710 same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are | |
| 11711 equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them---namely, the souls of men or of heavenly | |
| 11712 bodies---are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free | |
| 11713 from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken ( | |
| 11714 <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q90_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>); and so we need say nothing about it here. | |
| 11715 </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p7"> Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, | |
| 11716 before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, | |
| 11717 not actually, but only as to some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing | |
| 11718 corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems | |
| 11719 that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and | |
| 11720 that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as | |
| 11721 his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was | |
| 11722 made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that | |
| 11723 the | |
| 11724 soul was already created." | |
| 11725 </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p8"> Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not | |
| 11726 united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally | |
| 11727 a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their | |
| 11728 perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural | |
| 11729 perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. | |
| 11730 </p><p id="FP_Q90_A4-p9"> Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days ( | |
| 11731 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q74_A2" id="FP_Q90_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[2]</a>), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual | |
| 11732 nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both | |
| 11733 the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days. | |
| 11734 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 co."><a name="32275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32275] Iª q. 90 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11735 quod Origenes posuit non solum animam primi hominis, sed animas | |
| 11736 omnium hominum ante corpora simul cum Angelis creatas; propter hoc | |
| 11737 quod credidit omnes spirituales substantias, tam animas quam | |
| 11738 Angelos, aequales esse secundum suae naturae conditionem, sed solum | |
| 11739 merito distare; sic ut quaedam earum corporibus alligarentur, quae | |
| 11740 sunt animae hominum vel caelestium corporum; quaedam vero in sui | |
| 11741 puritate, secundum diversos ordines, remanerent. De qua opinione | |
| 11742 supra iam diximus, et ideo relinquatur ad praesens. Augustinus | |
| 11743 vero, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod anima primi hominis | |
| 11744 ante corpus cum Angelis est creata, propter aliam rationem. Quia | |
| 11745 scilicet ponit quod corpus hominis in illis operibus sex dierum non | |
| 11746 fuit productum in actu, sed solum secundum causales rationes, quod | |
| 11747 non potest de anima dici; quia nec ex aliqua materia corporali aut | |
| 11748 spirituali praeexistente facta fuit, nec ex aliqua virtute creata | |
| 11749 produci potuit. Et ideo videtur quod ipsamet anima in operibus sex | |
| 11750 dierum, in quibus omnia facta fuerunt, simul cum Angelis fuerit | |
| 11751 creata; et quod postmodum propria voluntate inclinata fuit ad | |
| 11752 corpus administrandum. Sed hoc non dicit asserendo, ut eius verba | |
| 11753 demonstrant. Dicit enim, <i>credatur, si nulla Scripturarum | |
| 11754 auctoritas seu veritatis ratio contradicit, hominem ita factum | |
| 11755 sexto die, ut corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis | |
| 11756 mundi, anima vero iam ipsa crearetur</i>. Posset autem hoc utique | |
| 11757 tolerari secundum eos qui ponunt quod anima habet per se speciem et | |
| 11758 naturam completam, et quod non unitur corpori ut forma, sed solum | |
| 11759 ad ipsum administrandum. Si autem anima unitur corpori ut forma, et | |
| 11760 est naturaliter pars humanae naturae, hoc omnino esse non potest. | |
| 11761 Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in perfecto | |
| 11762 statu suae naturae, secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei species | |
| 11763 exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae, non habet | |
| 11764 naturalem perfectionem nisi secundum quod est corpori unita. Unde | |
| 11765 non fuisset conveniens animam sine corpore creari. Sustinendo ergo | |
| 11766 opinionem Augustini de operibus sex dierum, dici poterit quod anima | |
| 11767 humana praecessit in operibus sex dierum secundum quandam | |
| 11768 similitudinem generis, prout convenit cum Angelis in intellectuali | |
| 11769 natura; ipsa vero fuit creata simul cum corpore. Secundum alios | |
| 11770 vero sanctos, tam anima quam corpus primi hominis in operibus sex | |
| 11771 dierum sunt producta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p10"> | |
| 11772 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that | |
| 11773 the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, | |
| 11774 not separately, but in the body. | |
| 11775 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32276] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11776 dicendum quod, si natura animae haberet integram speciem, ita quod | |
| 11777 secundum se crearetur, ratio illa procederet, ut per se in | |
| 11778 principio crearetur. Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non | |
| 11779 fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p11"> | |
| 11780 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still | |
| 11781 more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle. | |
| 11782 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32277] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter est | |
| 11783 dicendum ad secundum. Nam anima si per se speciem haberet, magis | |
| 11784 conveniret cum Angelis. Sed inquantum est forma corporis, pertinet | |
| 11785 ad genus animalium, ut formale principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q90_A4-p12"> | |
| 11786 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul | |
| 11787 was first created. | |
| 11788 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 90 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32278] Iª q. 90 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11789 dicendum quod animam remanere post corpus, accidit per defectum | |
| 11790 corporis, qui est mors. Qui quidem defectus in principio creationis | |
| 11791 animae, esse non debuit.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 11792 <div id="FP_Q91" class="div3"> | |
| 11793 <h3 id="FP_Q91-p0.1">Q. 91. THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 11794 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 11795 <p id="FP_Q91-p2"> We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q91-p3"><a href="#FP_Q91_A1"> (1) The matter from which it was produced;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p4"><a href="#FP_Q91_A2"> (2) The author by whom it was produced;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p5"><a href="#FP_Q91_A3"> (3) The disposition it received in its production;</a></p><p id="FP_Q91-p6"><a href="#FP_Q91_A4"> (4) The mode and order of its production.</a></p> | |
| 11796 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 pr."><a name="32279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32279] | |
| 11797 Iª q. 91 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 11798 productione corporis primi hominis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur | |
| 11799 quatuor. Primo, de materia ex qua productum est. Secundo, de | |
| 11800 auctore a quo productum est. Tertio, de dispositione quae ei per | |
| 11801 productionem est attributa. Quarto, de modo et ordine productionis | |
| 11802 ipsius.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 11803 <div id="FP_Q91_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A1-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 1. Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p2"> | |
| 11804 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to | |
| 11805 make something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off from actual existence than "being | |
| 11806 in potentiality." But since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's | |
| 11807 body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made | |
| 11808 of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing. | |
| 11809 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32280] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 11810 proceditur. Videtur quod corpus primi hominis non sit factum de | |
| 11811 limo terrae. Maioris enim virtutis est facere aliquid ex nihilo, | |
| 11812 quam ex aliquo, quia plus distat ab actu non ens quam ens in | |
| 11813 potentia. Sed cum homo sit dignissima creaturarum inferiorum, | |
| 11814 decuit ut virtus Dei maxime ostenderetur in productione corporis | |
| 11815 eius. Ergo non debuit fieri ex limo terrae, sed ex nihilo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p3"> | |
| 11816 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected | |
| 11817 by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body. | |
| 11818 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32281] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11819 corpora caelestia sunt nobiliora terrenis. Sed corpus humanum habet | |
| 11820 maximam nobilitatem, cum perficiatur a nobilissima forma, quae est | |
| 11821 anima rationalis. Ergo non debuit fieri de corpore terrestri, sed | |
| 11822 magis de corpore caelesti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p4"> | |
| 11823 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is | |
| 11824 most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth. | |
| 11825 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32282] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ignis | |
| 11826 et aer sunt nobiliora corpora quam terra et aqua, quod ex eorum | |
| 11827 subtilitate apparet. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit dignissimum, | |
| 11828 magis debuit fieri ex igne et ex aere quam ex limo terrae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p5"> | |
| 11829 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the | |
| 11830 four elements. | |
| 11831 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32283] Iª q. 91 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11832 corpus humanum est compositum ex quatuor elementis. Non ergo est | |
| 11833 factum ex limo terrae, sed ex omnibus elementis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p6"> | |
| 11834 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 11835 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God made man of the slime of the earth." | |
| 11836 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32284] Iª q. 91 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11837 quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo | |
| 11838 terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p7"> | |
| 11839 <b>I answer that,</b> As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" | |
| 11840 ( | |
| 11841 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united | |
| 11842 in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according | |
| 11843 to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as | |
| 11844 all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection | |
| 11845 is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed | |
| 11846 of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly | |
| 11847 bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, | |
| 11848 yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where | |
| 11849 there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man | |
| 11850 by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have | |
| 11851 the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; | |
| 11852 because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called 'a little world,' because all creatures | |
| 11853 of the world are in a way to be found in him. | |
| 11854 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 co."><a name="32285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32285] Iª q. 91 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11855 quod, cum Deus perfectus sit, operibus suis perfectionem dedit | |
| 11856 secundum eorum modum; secundum illud Deut. XXXII, <i>Dei perfecta | |
| 11857 sunt opera</i>. Ipse autem simpliciter perfectus est, ex hoc quod | |
| 11858 omnia in se praehabet, non per modum compositionis, sed simpliciter | |
| 11859 et unite, ut Dionysius dicit, eo modo quo diversi effectus | |
| 11860 praeexistunt in causa, secundum unam eius essentiam. Ista autem | |
| 11861 perfectio ad Angelos quidem derivatur, secundum quod omnia sunt in | |
| 11862 eorum cognitione quae sunt a Deo in natura producta, per formas | |
| 11863 diversas. Ad hominem vero derivatur inferiori modo huiusmodi | |
| 11864 perfectio. Non enim in sua cognitione naturali habet omnium | |
| 11865 naturalium notitiam; sed est ex rebus omnibus quodammodo | |
| 11866 compositus, dum de genere spiritualium substantiarum habet in se | |
| 11867 animam rationalem, de similitudine vero caelestium corporum habet | |
| 11868 elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis, | |
| 11869 elementa vero secundum substantiam. Ita tamen quod superiora | |
| 11870 elementa praedominantur in eo secundum virtutem, scilicet ignis et | |
| 11871 aer, quia vita praecipue consistit in calido, quod est ignis, et | |
| 11872 humido, quod est aeris. Inferiora vero elementa abundant in eo | |
| 11873 secundum substantiam, aliter enim non posset esse mixtionis | |
| 11874 aequalitas, nisi inferiora elementa, quae sunt minoris virtutis, | |
| 11875 secundum quantitatem in homine abundarent. Et ideo dicitur corpus | |
| 11876 hominis de limo terrae formatum, quia limus dicitur terra aquae | |
| 11877 permixta. Et propter hoc homo dicitur minor mundus, quia omnes | |
| 11878 creaturae mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p8"> | |
| 11879 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting | |
| 11880 that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, | |
| 11881 as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances. | |
| 11882 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32286] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11883 dicendum quod virtus Dei creantis manifestata est in corpore | |
| 11884 hominis, dum eius materia est per creationem producta. Oportuit | |
| 11885 autem ut ex materia quatuor elementorum fieret corpus humanum, ut | |
| 11886 homo haberet convenientiam cum inferioribus corporibus, quasi | |
| 11887 medium quoddam existens inter spirituales et corporales | |
| 11888 substantias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p9"> | |
| 11889 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly | |
| 11890 body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs | |
| 11891 of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters | |
| 11892 materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the | |
| 11893 soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false---that light is a body. Secondly, | |
| 11894 it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, | |
| 11895 since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects | |
| 11896 of its power. | |
| 11897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32287] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11898 dicendum quod, quamvis corpus caeleste sit simpliciter nobilius | |
| 11899 terrestri corpore, tamen quantum ad actus animae rationalis, est | |
| 11900 minus conveniens. Nam anima rationalis accipit notitiam veritatis | |
| 11901 quodammodo per sensus; quorum organa formari non possunt ex corpore | |
| 11902 caelesti, cum sit impassibile. Nec est verum quod quidam dicunt | |
| 11903 aliquid de quinta essentia materialiter ad compositionem humani | |
| 11904 corporis advenire, ponentes animam uniri corpori mediante quadam | |
| 11905 luce. Primo enim, falsum est quod dicunt, lucem esse corpus. | |
| 11906 Secundo vero, impossibile est aliquid de quinta essentia vel a | |
| 11907 corpore caelesti dividi, vel elementis permisceri, propter | |
| 11908 caelestis corporis impassibilitatem. Unde non venit in | |
| 11909 compositionem mixtorum corporum, nisi secundum suae virtutis | |
| 11910 effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p10"> | |
| 11911 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw | |
| 11912 the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for | |
| 11913 the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have | |
| 11914 the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; | |
| 11915 either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such contraries---thus, for instance, the pupil of the | |
| 11916 eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since | |
| 11917 it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense---or so that the organ is a medium | |
| 11918 between two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes. | |
| 11919 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32288] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11920 dicendum quod, si ignis et aer, quae sunt maioris virtutis in | |
| 11921 agendo, etiam secundum quantitatem in compositione humani corporis | |
| 11922 abundarent, omnino ad se traherent alia, et non posset fieri | |
| 11923 aequalitas commixtionis, quae est necessaria in compositione | |
| 11924 hominis ad bonitatem sensus tactus, qui est fundamentum sensuum | |
| 11925 aliorum. Oportet enim organum cuiuslibet sensus non habere in actu | |
| 11926 contraria quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed in potentia tantum. | |
| 11927 Vel ita quod omnino careat toto genere contrariorum, sicut pupilla | |
| 11928 caret colore, ut sit in potentia ad omnes colores, quod in organo | |
| 11929 tactus non erat possibile, cum sit compositum ex elementis, quorum | |
| 11930 qualitates percipit tactus. Vel ita quod organum sit medium inter | |
| 11931 contraria, ut necesse est in tactu accidere, medium enim est | |
| 11932 quodammodo in potentia ad extrema.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A1-p11"> | |
| 11933 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, | |
| 11934 because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention | |
| 11935 is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately | |
| 11936 addressed. | |
| 11937 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32289] Iª q. 91 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 11938 dicendum quod in limo terrae est terra, et aqua conglutinans partes | |
| 11939 terrae. De aliis autem elementis Scriptura mentionem non fecit, tum | |
| 11940 quia minus abundant secundum quantitatem in corpore hominis, ut | |
| 11941 dictum est; tum etiam quia in tota rerum productione, de igne et | |
| 11942 aere, quae sensu non percipiuntur a rudibus mentionem non fecit | |
| 11943 Scriptura, quae rudi populo tradebatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A2-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 2. Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p2"> | |
| 11944 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal | |
| 11945 things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above | |
| 11946 <a href="#FP_Q91_A1" id="FP_Q91_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God. | |
| 11947 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32290] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 11948 proceditur. Videtur quod corpus humanum non sit immediate a Deo | |
| 11949 productum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod corporalia | |
| 11950 disponuntur a Deo per angelicam creaturam. Sed corpus humanum | |
| 11951 formatum fuit ex materia corporali, ut dictum est. Ergo debuit | |
| 11952 produci mediantibus Angelis, et non immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p3"> | |
| 11953 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can | |
| 11954 be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active | |
| 11955 power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate | |
| 11956 regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God. | |
| 11957 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32291] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 11958 fieri potest virtute creata, non est necessarium quod immediate | |
| 11959 producatur a Deo. Sed corpus humanum produci potest per virtutem | |
| 11960 creatam caelestis corporis, nam et quaedam animalia ex | |
| 11961 putrefactione generantur per virtutem activam corporis caelestis; | |
| 11962 et Albumasar dicit quod in locis in quibus nimis abundat calor aut | |
| 11963 frigus, homines non generantur, sed in locis temperatis tantum. | |
| 11964 Ergo non oportuit quod immediate corpus humanum formaretur a | |
| 11965 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p4"> | |
| 11966 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement | |
| 11967 of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems | |
| 11968 that a heavenly body had part in its production. | |
| 11969 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32292] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nihil | |
| 11970 fit ex materia corporali nisi per aliquam materiae transmutationem. | |
| 11971 Sed omnis transmutatio corporalis causatur ex motu caelestis | |
| 11972 corporis, qui est primus motuum. Cum igitur corpus humanum sit | |
| 11973 productum ex materia corporali, videtur quod ad eius formationem | |
| 11974 aliquid operatum fuerit corpus caeleste.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p5"> | |
| 11975 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the | |
| 11976 causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists | |
| 11977 in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was | |
| 11978 produced by some created power, and not immediately by God. | |
| 11979 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32293] Iª q. 91 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11980 Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod homo factus est | |
| 11981 secundum corpus, in operibus sex dierum, secundum causales rationes | |
| 11982 quas Deus inseruit creaturae corporali; postmodum vero fuit | |
| 11983 formatum in actu. Sed quod praeexistit in corporali creatura | |
| 11984 secundum causales rationes, per aliquam virtutem corpoream produci | |
| 11985 potest. Ergo corpus humanum productum est aliqua virtute creata, et | |
| 11986 non immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p6"> | |
| 11987 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 11988 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:1</a>): "God created man out of the earth." | |
| 11989 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32294] Iª q. 91 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11990 quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, <i>Deus de terra creavit hominem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p7"> | |
| 11991 <b>I answer that,</b> The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from | |
| 11992 God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher | |
| 11993 refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as | |
| 11994 we have explained ( | |
| 11995 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A4" id="FP_Q91_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[4]</a>); and because the agent must | |
| 11996 be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, | |
| 11997 and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of | |
| 11998 another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, | |
| 11999 can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of | |
| 12000 any | |
| 12001 preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature | |
| 12002 of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of | |
| 12003 the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God. | |
| 12004 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 co."><a name="32295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32295] Iª q. 91 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12005 quod prima formatio humani corporis non potuit esse per aliquam | |
| 12006 virtutem creatam, sed immediate a Deo. Posuerunt siquidem aliqui | |
| 12007 formas quae sunt in materia corporali, a quibusdam formis | |
| 12008 immaterialibus derivari. Sed hanc opinionem repellit philosophus, | |
| 12009 in VII Metaphys., per hoc quod formis non competit per se fieri, | |
| 12010 sed composito, ut supra expositum est; et quia oportet agens esse | |
| 12011 simile facto non convenit quod forma pura, quae est sine materia, | |
| 12012 producat formam quae est in materia, quae non fit nisi per hoc quod | |
| 12013 compositum fit. Et ideo oportet quod forma quae est in materia, sit | |
| 12014 causa formae quae est in materia, secundum quod compositum a | |
| 12015 composito generatur. Deus autem, quamvis omnino sit immaterialis, | |
| 12016 tamen solus est qui sua virtute materiam producere potest creando. | |
| 12017 Unde ipsius solius est formam producere in materia absque | |
| 12018 adminiculo praecedentis formae materialis. Et propter hoc, Angeli | |
| 12019 non possunt transmutare corpora ad formam aliquam, nisi adhibitis | |
| 12020 seminibus quibusdam, ut Augustinus dicit in III de Trin. Quia | |
| 12021 igitur corpus humanum nunquam formatum fuerat, cuius virtute per | |
| 12022 viam generationis aliud simile in specie formaretur, necesse fuit | |
| 12023 quod primum corpus hominis immediate formaretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p8"> | |
| 12024 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond | |
| 12025 the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body | |
| 12026 of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body | |
| 12027 of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting | |
| 12028 the dust. | |
| 12029 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32296] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12030 dicendum quod, etsi Angeli aliquod ministerium Deo exhibeant in his | |
| 12031 quae circa corpora operatur; aliqua tamen Deus in creatura corporea | |
| 12032 facit, quae nullo modo Angeli facere possunt; sicut quod suscitat | |
| 12033 mortuos, et illuminat caecos. Secundum quam virtutem etiam corpus | |
| 12034 primi hominis de limo terrae formavit. Potuit tamen fieri ut | |
| 12035 aliquod ministerium in formatione corporis primi hominis Angeli | |
| 12036 exhiberent; sicut exhibebunt in ultima resurrectione, pulveres | |
| 12037 colligendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p9"> | |
| 12038 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although | |
| 12039 the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. | |
| 12040 ii, 26), "man and the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production | |
| 12041 of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the | |
| 12042 production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce | |
| 12043 a perfect than an imperfect thing. | |
| 12044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32297] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12045 dicendum quod animalia perfecta, quae generantur ex semine, non | |
| 12046 possunt generari per solam virtutem caelestis corporis, ut Avicenna | |
| 12047 fingit; licet ad eorum generationem naturalem cooperetur virtus | |
| 12048 caelestis corporis, prout philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod | |
| 12049 <i>homo generat hominem ex materia, et sol</i>. Et exinde est quod | |
| 12050 exigitur locus temperatus ad generationem hominum et aliorum | |
| 12051 animalium perfectorum. Sufficit autem virtus caelestium corporum ad | |
| 12052 generandum quaedam animalia imperfectiora ex materia disposita, | |
| 12053 manifestum est enim quod plura requiruntur ad productionem rei | |
| 12054 perfectae, quam ad productionem rei imperfectae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p10"> | |
| 12055 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the | |
| 12056 Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from | |
| 12057 the slime of the earth. | |
| 12058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32298] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12059 dicendum quod motus caeli est causa transmutationum naturalium, non | |
| 12060 tamen transmutationum quae fiunt praeter naturae ordinem, et sola | |
| 12061 virtute divina, sicut quod mortui resuscitantur, quod caeci | |
| 12062 illuminantur. Quibus est simile quod homo ex limo terrae | |
| 12063 formatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A2-p11"> | |
| 12064 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive | |
| 12065 potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can | |
| 12066 produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In | |
| 12067 this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in | |
| 12068 their causal virtues. | |
| 12069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32299] Iª q. 91 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12070 dicendum quod secundum rationes causales in creaturis dicitur | |
| 12071 aliquid praeexistere dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum potentiam | |
| 12072 activam et passivam, ut non solum ex materia praeexistenti fieri | |
| 12073 possit, sed etiam ut aliqua praeexistens creatura hoc facere | |
| 12074 possit. Alio modo, secundum potentiam passivam tantum, ut scilicet | |
| 12075 de materia praeexistenti fieri possit a Deo. Et hoc modo, secundum | |
| 12076 Augustinum, corpus hominis praeextitit in operibus productis | |
| 12077 secundum causales rationes.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A3-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 3. Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p2"> | |
| 12078 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought | |
| 12079 to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses | |
| 12080 and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly | |
| 12081 disposed. | |
| 12082 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32300] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 12083 proceditur. Videtur quod corpus hominis non habuerit convenientem | |
| 12084 dispositionem. Cum enim homo sit nobilissimum animalium, corpus | |
| 12085 hominis debuit esse dispositum optime ad ea quae sunt propria | |
| 12086 animalis, scilicet ad sensum et motum. Sed quaedam animalia | |
| 12087 inveniuntur acutioris sensus quam homo, et velocioris motus; sicut | |
| 12088 canes melius odorant, et aves velocius moventur. Ergo corpus | |
| 12089 hominis non est convenienter dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p3"> | |
| 12090 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided | |
| 12091 with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed. | |
| 12092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32301] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12093 perfectum est cui nihil deest. Sed plura desunt humano corpori quam | |
| 12094 corporibus aliorum animalium, quae habent tegumenta et arma | |
| 12095 naturalia ad sui protectionem, quae homini desunt. Ergo corpus | |
| 12096 humanum est imperfectissime dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p4"> | |
| 12097 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone | |
| 12098 in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature. | |
| 12099 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32302] Iª q. 91 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, homo | |
| 12100 plus distat a plantis quam ab animalibus brutis. Sed plantae habent | |
| 12101 staturam rectam; animalia autem bruta pronam. Ergo homo non debuit | |
| 12102 habere staturam rectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p5"> | |
| 12103 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 12104 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>): "God made man right." | |
| 12105 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32303] Iª q. 91 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12106 quod dicitur Eccle. VII, <i>Deus fecit hominem rectum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p6"> | |
| 12107 <b>I answer that,</b> All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to | |
| 12108 give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this | |
| 12109 entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he | |
| 12110 makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it | |
| 12111 of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. | |
| 12112 Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This | |
| 12113 is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance." | |
| 12114 </p><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p7"> Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, | |
| 12115 and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which | |
| 12116 was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it | |
| 12117 is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in | |
| 12118 the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations. | |
| 12119 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 co."><a name="32304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32304] Iª q. 91 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12120 quod omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina, unde sunt | |
| 12121 quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet autem artifex intendit | |
| 12122 suo operi dispositionem optimam inducere, non simpliciter, sed per | |
| 12123 comparationem ad finem. Et si talis dispositio habet secum | |
| 12124 adiunctum aliquem defectum, artifex non curat. Sicut artifex qui | |
| 12125 facit serram ad secandum, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad | |
| 12126 secandum; nec curat eam facere ex vitro, quae est pulchrior | |
| 12127 materia, quia talis pulchritudo esset impedimentum finis. Sic | |
| 12128 igitur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositionem, non | |
| 12129 quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad proprium finem. Et hoc | |
| 12130 est quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., <i>et quia dignius est | |
| 12131 sic, non tamen simpliciter, sed ad uniuscuiusque substantiam</i>. | |
| 12132 Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et | |
| 12133 operationes ipsius, materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta | |
| 12134 propter actiones agentis. Dico ergo quod Deus instituit corpus | |
| 12135 humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenientiam ad talem | |
| 12136 formam et ad tales operationes. Et si aliquis defectus in | |
| 12137 dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod | |
| 12138 talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae, ad ea quae | |
| 12139 requiruntur in corpore ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et | |
| 12140 ad animae operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8"> | |
| 12141 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for | |
| 12142 this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior | |
| 12143 sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above ( | |
| 12144 <a href="#FP_Q78_A4" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[78], A[4]</a>). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all | |
| 12145 animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom | |
| 12146 of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above ( | |
| 12147 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q91_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man | |
| 12148 for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the | |
| 12149 smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute | |
| 12150 hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. | |
| 12151 The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is | |
| 12152 inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament. | |
| 12153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32305] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12154 dicendum quod tactus, qui est fundamentum aliorum sensuum, est | |
| 12155 perfectior in homine quam in aliquo alio animali, et propter hoc | |
| 12156 oportuit quod homo haberet temperatissimam complexionem inter omnia | |
| 12157 animalia. Praecedit etiam homo omnia alia animalia, quantum ad | |
| 12158 vires sensitivas interiores; sicut ex supra dictis apparet. Ex | |
| 12159 quadam autem necessitate contingit quod, quantum ad aliquos | |
| 12160 exteriores sensus, homo ab aliis animalibus deficiat. Sicut homo, | |
| 12161 inter omnia animalia, habet pessimum olfactum. Necessarium enim | |
| 12162 fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, respectu sui corporis haberet | |
| 12163 maximum cerebrum, tum ut liberius in eo perficerentur operationes | |
| 12164 interiorum virium sensitivarum, quae sunt necessariae ad | |
| 12165 intellectus operationem, ut supra dictum est; tum etiam ut | |
| 12166 frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis, quem necesse est in | |
| 12167 homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit rectae staturae. Magnitudo | |
| 12168 autem cerebri, propter eius humiditatem, est impedimentum olfactus, | |
| 12169 qui requirit siccitatem. Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare | |
| 12170 quaedam animalia sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam | |
| 12171 homo, propter impedimentum horum sensuum quod necesse est consequi | |
| 12172 in homine ex perfecta complexionis aequalitate. Et eadem etiam | |
| 12173 ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quaedam animalia sunt homine | |
| 12174 velociora, cui excellentiae velocitatis repugnat aequalitas humanae | |
| 12175 complexionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A3-p9"> | |
| 12176 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are | |
| 12177 the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness | |
| 12178 of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby | |
| 12179 he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of | |
| 12180 infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ of organs." Moreover this was more | |
| 12181 becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an | |
| 12182 infinite number of instruments. | |
| 12183 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32306] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12184 dicendum quod cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium | |
| 12185 arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo pilorum aut plumarum, quae | |
| 12186 sunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiae terrestris | |
| 12187 elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et teneritudini complexionis | |
| 12188 humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet | |
| 12189 rationem et manus, quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et | |
| 12190 alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis. Unde et manus, in III de | |
| 12191 anima, dicitur organum organorum. Et hoc etiam magis competebat | |
| 12192 rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet | |
| 12193 facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi parandi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p10"> | |
| 12194 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose | |
| 12195 of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, | |
| 12196 whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure | |
| 12197 in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses | |
| 12198 are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking | |
| 12199 food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which | |
| 12200 is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, | |
| 12201 both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts | |
| 12202 of the | |
| 12203 interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other | |
| 12204 parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; | |
| 12205 and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he | |
| 12206 used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding | |
| 12207 mouth, | |
| 12208 with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other | |
| 12209 animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation. | |
| 12210 </p><p id="FP_Q91_A3-p11"> Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the | |
| 12211 superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed | |
| 12212 as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond | |
| 12213 to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle | |
| 12214 disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids | |
| 12215 itself of the surplus. | |
| 12216 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32307] Iª q. 91 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12217 dicendum quod habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter | |
| 12218 quatuor. Primo quidem, quia sensus sunt dati homini non solum ad | |
| 12219 vitae necessaria procuranda, sicut aliis animalibus; sed etiam ad | |
| 12220 cognoscendum. Unde, cum cetera animalia non delectentur in | |
| 12221 sensibilibus nisi per ordinem ad cibos et venerea, solus homo | |
| 12222 delectatur in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et | |
| 12223 ideo, quia sensus praecipue vigent in facie, alia animalia habent | |
| 12224 faciem pronam ad terram, quasi ad cibum quaerendum et providendum | |
| 12225 sibi de victu, homo vero habet faciem erectam, ut per sensus, et | |
| 12226 praecipue per visum, qui est subtilior et plures differentias rerum | |
| 12227 ostendit, libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia cognoscere, et | |
| 12228 caelestia et terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem colligat | |
| 12229 veritatem. Secundo, ut interiores vires liberius suas operationes | |
| 12230 habeant, dum cerebrum, in quo quodammodo perficiuntur, non est | |
| 12231 depressum, sed super omnes partes corporis elevatum. Tertio, quia | |
| 12232 oporteret quod, si homo haberet pronam staturam, uteretur manibus | |
| 12233 loco anteriorum pedum. Et sic utilitas manuum ad diversa opera | |
| 12234 perficienda cessaret. Quarto, quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et | |
| 12235 uteretur manibus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum | |
| 12236 caperet ore. Et ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, | |
| 12237 et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, sicut patet | |
| 12238 in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio omnino impediret | |
| 12239 locutionem, quae est proprium opus rationis. Et tamen homo staturam | |
| 12240 rectam habens, maxime distat a plantis. Nam homo habet superius | |
| 12241 sui, idest caput, versus superius mundi, et inferius sui versus | |
| 12242 inferius mundi, et ideo est optime dispositus secundum | |
| 12243 dispositionem totius. Plantae vero habent superius sui versus | |
| 12244 inferius mundi (nam radices sunt ori proportionales), inferius | |
| 12245 autem sui versus superius mundi. Animalia vero bruta medio modo, | |
| 12246 nam superius animalis est pars qua accipit alimentum, inferius | |
| 12247 autem est pars qua emittit superfluum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q91_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q91_A4-p0.1">Q. 91. A. 4. Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p2"> | |
| 12248 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made | |
| 12249 by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and | |
| 12250 it was made." Therefore the same should have been said of man. | |
| 12251 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32308] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 12252 proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter corporis humani productio | |
| 12253 in Scriptura describatur. Sicut enim corpus humanum est factum a | |
| 12254 Deo, ita et alia opera sex dierum. Sed in aliis operibus dicitur, | |
| 12255 <i>dixit Deus, fiat, et factum est</i>. Ergo similiter dici debuit | |
| 12256 de hominis productione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p3"> | |
| 12257 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above | |
| 12258 <a href="#FP_Q91_A2" id="FP_Q91_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us make man." | |
| 12259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32309] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12260 corpus humanum a Deo immediate est factum, ut supra dictum est. | |
| 12261 Ergo inconvenienter dicitur, faciamus hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p4"> | |
| 12262 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man | |
| 12263 of the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into him the breath of life." | |
| 12264 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32310] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, forma | |
| 12265 humani corporis est ipsa anima, quae est spiraculum vitae. | |
| 12266 Inconvenienter ergo, postquam dixerat, <i>formavit Deus hominem de | |
| 12267 limo terrae</i>, subiunxit, <i>et inspiravit in faciem eius | |
| 12268 spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p5"> | |
| 12269 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly | |
| 12270 said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life." | |
| 12271 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32311] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12272 anima, quae est spiraculum vitae, est in toto corpore, et | |
| 12273 principaliter in corde. Non ergo debuit dicere, quod <i>inspiravit | |
| 12274 in faciem eius spiraculum vitae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p6"> | |
| 12275 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according | |
| 12276 to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: "To His image He made them," he should | |
| 12277 not have added, "male and female He created them." | |
| 12278 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="32312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32312] Iª q. 91 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, sexus | |
| 12279 masculinus et femininus pertinent ad corpus, imago vero Dei ad | |
| 12280 animam. Sed anima, secundum Augustinum, fuit facta ante corpus. | |
| 12281 Inconvenienter ergo cum dixisset, <i>ad imaginem suam fecit | |
| 12282 illum</i>, addidit, <i>masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p7"> | |
| 12283 <b>On the contrary,</b> Is the authority of Scripture. | |
| 12284 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32313] Iª q. 91 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> In contrarium est | |
| 12285 auctoritas Scripturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8"> | |
| 12286 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though | |
| 12287 He did not make other things; since it is written ( | |
| 12288 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.101.26" target="asv">Ps. 101:26</a>), "The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere ( | |
| 12289 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.94.5" target="asv">Ps. 94:5</a>), "His hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture | |
| 12290 uses a special way of | |
| 12291 speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care | |
| 12292 what we have chiefly in mind. | |
| 12293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32314] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12294 ad primum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in VI super Gen. ad Litt., | |
| 12295 non in hoc praeeminet homo aliis rebus, quod Deus ipse fecit | |
| 12296 hominem, quasi alia ipse non fecerit; cum scriptum sit, <i>opera | |
| 12297 manuum tuarum sunt caeli</i>, et alibi, <i>aridam fundaverunt manus | |
| 12298 eius</i>, sed in hoc quod ad imaginem Dei factus est homo. Utitur | |
| 12299 tamen Scriptura in productione hominis speciali modo loquendi, ad | |
| 12300 ostendendum quod alia propter hominem facta sunt. Ea enim quae | |
| 12301 principaliter intendimus, cum maiori deliberatione et studio | |
| 12302 consuevimus facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p9"> | |
| 12303 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. | |
| 12304 But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man. | |
| 12305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32315] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12306 dicendum quod non est intelligendum Deum Angelis dixisse, faciamus | |
| 12307 hominem; ut quidam perverse intellexerunt. Sed hoc dicitur ad | |
| 12308 significandum pluralitatem divinarum personarum, quarum imago | |
| 12309 expressius invenitur in homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q91_A4-p10"> | |
| 12310 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the | |
| 12311 formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the | |
| 12312 body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as | |
| 12313 regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. | |
| 12314 </p><p id="FP_Q91_A4-p11"> To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man," must be understood of the production of the body | |
| 12315 with the soul; and that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of life," should be understood of | |
| 12316 the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" ( | |
| 12317 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22</a>). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we | |
| 12318 read farther on, "And man was made a living soul"; which words the Apostle ( | |
| 12319 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.45" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:45</a>) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the | |
| 12320 words, "He breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form | |
| 12321 of the body. | |
| 12322 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32316] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12323 dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt corpus hominis prius tempore | |
| 12324 formatum, et postmodum Deum formato iam corpori animam infudisse. | |
| 12325 Sed contra rationem perfectionis primae institutionis rerum est, | |
| 12326 quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel animam sine corpore fecerit, | |
| 12327 cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae. Et hoc etiam est magis | |
| 12328 inconveniens de corpore, quod dependet ex anima, et non e converso. | |
| 12329 Et ideo ad hoc excludendum, quidam posuerunt quod, cum dicitur, | |
| 12330 formavit Deus hominem, intelligitur productio corporis simul cum | |
| 12331 anima; quod autem additur, et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum | |
| 12332 vitae, intelligitur de spiritu sancto; sicut et dominus insufflavit | |
| 12333 in apostolos, dicens, accipite spiritum sanctum, Ioan. XX. Sed haec | |
| 12334 expositio, ut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civ. Dei, excluditur per | |
| 12335 verba Scripturae. Nam subditur ad praedicta, <i>et factus est homo | |
| 12336 in animam viventem</i>, quod apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, non ad vitam | |
| 12337 spiritualem, sed ad vitam animalem refert. Per spiraculum ergo | |
| 12338 vitae intelligitur anima, ut sic quod dicitur, <i>inspiravit in | |
| 12339 faciem eius spiraculum vitae</i>, sit quasi expositio eius quod | |
| 12340 praemiserat; nam anima est corporis forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p12"> | |
| 12341 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore | |
| 12342 Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face. | |
| 12343 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32317] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12344 dicendum quod, quia operationes vitae magis manifestantur in facie | |
| 12345 hominis, propter sensus ibi existentes; ideo dicit in faciem | |
| 12346 hominis inspiratum esse spiraculum vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q91_A4-p13"> | |
| 12347 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to | |
| 12348 him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day | |
| 12349 both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the | |
| 12350 sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made. | |
| 12351 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 91 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="32318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32318] Iª q. 91 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 12352 dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, omnia opera sex dierum simul | |
| 12353 sunt facta. Unde animam primi hominis, quam ponit simul factam cum | |
| 12354 Angelis, non ponit factam ante sextum diem; sed in ipso sexto die | |
| 12355 ponit esse factam et animam primi hominis in actu, et corpus eius | |
| 12356 secundum rationes causales. Alii vero doctores ponunt et animam et | |
| 12357 corpus hominis factum sexto die in actu.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 12358 <div id="FP_Q92" class="div3"> | |
| 12359 <h3 id="FP_Q92-p0.1">Q. 92. THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 12360 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 12361 <p id="FP_Q92-p2"> We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q92-p3"><a href="#FP_Q92_A1"> (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p4"><a href="#FP_Q92_A2"> (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p5"><a href="#FP_Q92_A3"> (3) Whether of man's rib?</a></p><p id="FP_Q92-p6"><a href="#FP_Q92_A4"> (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?</a></p> | |
| 12362 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 pr."><a name="32319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32319] | |
| 12363 Iª q. 92 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 12364 productione mulieris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum | |
| 12365 in illa rerum productione debuerit mulier produci. Secundo, utrum | |
| 12366 debuerit fieri de viro. Tertio, utrum de costa viri. Quarto, utrum | |
| 12367 facta fuerit immediate a Deo.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 12368 <div id="FP_Q92_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A1-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 1. Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p2"> | |
| 12369 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. | |
| 12370 ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production | |
| 12371 of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production. | |
| 12372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32320] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 12373 proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit produci in prima rerum | |
| 12374 productione. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., | |
| 12375 quod <i>femina est mas occasionatus</i>. Sed nihil occasionatum et | |
| 12376 deficiens debuit esse in prima rerum institutione. Ergo in illa | |
| 12377 prima rerum institutione mulier producenda non fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p3"> | |
| 12378 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin ( | |
| 12379 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>): "Thou shalt be under the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." But woman | |
| 12380 is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as Augustine | |
| 12381 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first | |
| 12382 production of things before sin. | |
| 12383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32321] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12384 subiectio et minoratio ex peccato est subsecuta, nam, ad mulierem | |
| 12385 dictum est post peccatum, Gen. III, <i>sub viri potestate eris</i>; | |
| 12386 et Gregorius dicit quod, <i>ubi non delinquimus, omnes pares | |
| 12387 sumus</i>. Sed mulier naturaliter est minoris virtutis et | |
| 12388 dignitatis quam vir, semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente, | |
| 12389 ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non debuit mulier | |
| 12390 produci in prima rerum productione ante peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p4"> | |
| 12391 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore | |
| 12392 He should not have made woman. | |
| 12393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32322] Iª q. 92 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12394 occasiones peccatorum sunt amputandae. Sed Deus praescivit quod | |
| 12395 mulier esset futura viro in occasionem peccati. Ergo non debuit | |
| 12396 mulierem producere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p5"> | |
| 12397 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 12398 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv">Gn. 2:18</a>): "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself." | |
| 12399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32323] Iª q. 92 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12400 quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>non est bonum hominem esse solum; faciamus | |
| 12401 ei adiutorium simile sibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p6"> | |
| 12402 <b>I answer that,</b> It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, | |
| 12403 as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. | |
| 12404 This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not | |
| 12405 possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other | |
| 12406 specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not | |
| 12407 from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; | |
| 12408 for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation | |
| 12409 invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and | |
| 12410 the | |
| 12411 passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is | |
| 12412 principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only | |
| 12413 at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always | |
| 12414 united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still | |
| 12415 nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two | |
| 12416 forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. | |
| 12417 Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be two in one flesh" ( | |
| 12418 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>). | |
| 12419 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 co."><a name="32324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32324] Iª q. 92 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12420 quod necessarium fuit feminam fieri, sicut Scriptura dicit, in | |
| 12421 adiutorium viri, non quidem in adiutorium alicuius alterius operis, | |
| 12422 ut quidam dixerunt, cum ad quodlibet aliud opus convenientius | |
| 12423 iuvari possit vir per alium virum quam per mulierem; sed in | |
| 12424 adiutorium generationis. Quod manifestius videri potest, si in | |
| 12425 viventibus modus generationis consideretur. Sunt enim quaedam | |
| 12426 viventia, quae in seipsis non habent virtutem activam generationis, | |
| 12427 sed ab agente alterius speciei generantur; sicut plantae et | |
| 12428 animalia quae generantur sine semine ex materia convenienti per | |
| 12429 virtutem activam caelestium corporum. Quaedam vero habent virtutem | |
| 12430 generationis activam et passivam coniunctam; sicut accidit in | |
| 12431 plantis quae generantur ex semine. Non enim est in plantis aliquod | |
| 12432 nobilius opus vitae quam generatio, unde convenienter omni tempore | |
| 12433 in eis virtuti passivae coniungitur virtus activa generationis. | |
| 12434 Animalibus vero perfectis competit virtus activa generationis | |
| 12435 secundum sexum masculinum, virtus vero passiva secundum sexum | |
| 12436 femininum. Et quia est aliquod opus vitae nobilius in animalibus | |
| 12437 quam generatio, ad quod eorum vita principaliter ordinatur; ideo | |
| 12438 non omni tempore sexus masculinus feminino coniungitur in | |
| 12439 animalibus perfectis, sed solum tempore coitus; ut imaginemur per | |
| 12440 coitum sic fieri unum ex mare et femina, sicut in planta omni | |
| 12441 tempore coniunguntur vis masculina et feminina, etsi in quibusdam | |
| 12442 plus abundet una harum, in quibusdam plus altera. Homo autem adhuc | |
| 12443 ordinatur ad nobilius opus vitae, quod est intelligere. Et ideo | |
| 12444 adhuc in homine debuit esse maiori ratione distinctio utriusque | |
| 12445 virtutis, ut seorsum produceretur femina a mare, et tamen | |
| 12446 carnaliter coniungerentur in unum ad generationis opus. Et ideo | |
| 12447 statim post formationem mulieris, dicitur Gen. II, <i>erunt duo in | |
| 12448 carne una</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p7"> | |
| 12449 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the | |
| 12450 production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force | |
| 12451 or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as | |
| 12452 the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human | |
| 12453 nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. | |
| 12454 Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, | |
| 12455 God formed not only the male but also the female. | |
| 12456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32325] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12457 dicendum quod per respectum ad naturam particularem, femina est | |
| 12458 aliquid deficiens et occasionatum. Quia virtus activa quae est in | |
| 12459 semine maris, intendit producere sibi simile perfectum, secundum | |
| 12460 masculinum sexum, sed quod femina generetur, hoc est propter | |
| 12461 virtutis activae debilitatem, vel propter aliquam materiae | |
| 12462 indispositionem, vel etiam propter aliquam transmutationem ab | |
| 12463 extrinseco, puta a ventis Australibus, qui sunt humidi, ut dicitur | |
| 12464 in libro de Generat. Animal. Sed per comparationem ad naturam | |
| 12465 universalem, femina non est aliquid occasionatum, sed est de | |
| 12466 intentione naturae ad opus generationis ordinata. Intentio autem | |
| 12467 naturae universalis dependet ex Deo, qui est universalis auctor | |
| 12468 naturae. Et ideo instituendo naturam, non solum marem, sed etiam | |
| 12469 feminam produxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p8"> | |
| 12470 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this | |
| 12471 kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior | |
| 12472 makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order | |
| 12473 would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others | |
| 12474 wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of | |
| 12475 reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove ( | |
| 12476 <a href="#FP_Q96_A3" id="FP_Q92_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[96], A[3]</a>). | |
| 12477 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32326] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12478 dicendum quod duplex est subiectio. Una servilis, secundum quam | |
| 12479 praesidens utitur subiecto ad sui ipsius utilitatem et talis | |
| 12480 subiectio introducta est post peccatum. Est autem alia subiectio | |
| 12481 oeconomica vel civilis, secundum quam praesidens utitur subiectis | |
| 12482 ad eorum utilitatem et bonum. Et ista subiectio fuisset etiam ante | |
| 12483 peccatum, defuisset enim bonum ordinis in humana multitudine, si | |
| 12484 quidam per alios sapientiores gubernati non fuissent. Et sic ex | |
| 12485 tali subiectione naturaliter femina subiecta est viro, quia | |
| 12486 naturaliter in homine magis abundat discretio rationis. Nec | |
| 12487 inaequalitas hominum excluditur per innocentiae statum, ut infra | |
| 12488 dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A1-p9"> | |
| 12489 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. | |
| 12490 Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is | |
| 12491 so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end. | |
| 12492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32327] Iª q. 92 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12493 dicendum quod, si omnia ex quibus homo sumpsit occasionem peccandi, | |
| 12494 Deus subtraxisset a mundo, remansisset universum imperfectum. Nec | |
| 12495 debuit bonum commune tolli, ut vitaretur particulare malum, | |
| 12496 praesertim cum Deus sit adeo potens, ut quodlibet malum possit | |
| 12497 ordinare in bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A2-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 2. Whether woman should have been made from man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p2"> | |
| 12498 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals | |
| 12499 the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man. | |
| 12500 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32328] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 12501 proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non debuit fieri ex viro. Sexus | |
| 12502 enim communis est homini et aliis animalibus. Sed in aliis | |
| 12503 animalibus feminae non sunt factae ex maribus. Ergo nec in homine | |
| 12504 fieri debuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p3"> | |
| 12505 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man | |
| 12506 was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man. | |
| 12507 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32329] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eorum | |
| 12508 quae sunt eiusdem speciei, eadem est materia. Sed mas et femina | |
| 12509 sunt eiusdem speciei. Cum igitur vir fuerit factus ex limo terrae, | |
| 12510 ex eodem debuit fieri femina, et non ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p4"> | |
| 12511 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for | |
| 12512 that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written ( | |
| 12513 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.6" target="asv">Lev. 18:6</a>). Therefore woman should not have been made from man. | |
| 12514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32330] Iª q. 92 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12515 mulier facta est in adiutorium viro ad generationem. Sed nimia | |
| 12516 propinquitas reddit personam ad hoc ineptam, unde personae | |
| 12517 propinquae a matrimonio excluduntur, ut patet Levit. XVIII. Ergo | |
| 12518 mulier non debuit fieri ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p5"> | |
| 12519 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 12520 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:5</a>): "He created of him," that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman. | |
| 12521 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32331] Iª q. 92 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12522 quod dicitur Eccli. XVII, creavit ex ipso, scilicet viro, | |
| 12523 adiutorium sibi simile, idest mulierem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6"> | |
| 12524 <b>I answer that,</b> When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from | |
| 12525 the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is | |
| 12526 the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore | |
| 12527 Paul says that "God made the whole human race from one" ( | |
| 12528 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.26" target="asv">Acts | |
| 12529 17:26 | |
| 12530 </a>). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. | |
| 12531 Hence it is written ( | |
| 12532 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.23" target="asv">Gn. 2:23,24</a>): "She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." This was most | |
| 12533 necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other | |
| 12534 animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. | |
| 12535 viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose | |
| 12536 of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it | |
| 12537 was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. | |
| 12538 For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says ( | |
| 12539 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.32" target="asv">Eph. | |
| 12540 5:32 | |
| 12541 </a>): "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church." | |
| 12542 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 co."><a name="32332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32332] Iª q. 92 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12543 quod conveniens fuit mulierem, in prima rerum institutione, ex viro | |
| 12544 formari, magis quam in aliis animalibus. Primo quidem, ut in hoc | |
| 12545 quaedam dignitas primo homini servaretur, ut, secundum Dei | |
| 12546 similitudinem, esset ipse principium totius suae speciei, sicut | |
| 12547 Deus est principium totius universi. Unde et Paulus dicit, Act. | |
| 12548 XVII, quod <i>Deus fecit ex uno omne genus hominum</i>. Secundo, ut | |
| 12549 vir magis diligeret mulierem, et ei inseparabilius inhaereret, dum | |
| 12550 cognosceret eam ex se esse productam. Unde dicitur Gen. II, <i>de | |
| 12551 viro sumpta est, quamobrem relinquet homo patrem et matrem, et | |
| 12552 adhaerebit uxori suae</i>. Et hoc maxime necessarium fuit in specie | |
| 12553 humana, in qua mas et femina commanent per totam vitam, quod non | |
| 12554 contingit in aliis animalibus. Tertio quia, ut philosophus dicit in | |
| 12555 VIII Ethic., mas et femina coniunguntur in hominibus non solum | |
| 12556 propter necessitatem generationis, ut in aliis animalibus; sed | |
| 12557 etiam propter domesticam vitam, in qua sunt alia opera viri et | |
| 12558 feminae, et in qua vir est caput mulieris. Unde convenienter ex | |
| 12559 viro formata est femina, sicut ex suo principio. Quarto est ratio | |
| 12560 sacramentalis; figuratur enim per hoc quod Ecclesia a Christo sumit | |
| 12561 principium. Unde apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, <i>sacramentum hoc | |
| 12562 magnum est, ego autem dico in Christo et in Ecclesia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p7"> Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32333] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 12563 responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p8"> | |
| 12564 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to | |
| 12565 one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate | |
| 12566 species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such | |
| 12567 as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man. | |
| 12568 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32334] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12569 dicendum quod materia est ex qua aliquid fit. Natura autem creata | |
| 12570 habet determinatum principium; et, cum sit determinata ad unum, | |
| 12571 etiam habet determinatum processum, unde ex determinata materia | |
| 12572 producit aliquid in determinata specie. Sed virtus divina, cum sit | |
| 12573 infinita, potest idem secundum speciem ex quacumque materia facere; | |
| 12574 sicut virum ex limo terrae, et mulierem ex viro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A2-p9"> | |
| 12575 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced | |
| 12576 from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this | |
| 12577 argument does not prove. | |
| 12578 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32335] Iª q. 92 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12579 dicendum quod ex naturali generatione contrahitur quaedam | |
| 12580 propinquitas quae matrimonium impedit. Sed mulier non est producta | |
| 12581 a viro per naturalem generationem, sed sola virtute divina, unde | |
| 12582 Eva non dicitur filia Adae. Et propter hoc, ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q92_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q92_A4-p0.1">Q. 92. A. 4. Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p2"> | |
| 12583 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another | |
| 12584 individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately | |
| 12585 by God. | |
| 12586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32344] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 12587 proceditur. Videtur quod mulier non fuerit immediate formata a Deo. | |
| 12588 Nullum enim individuum ex simili secundum speciem productum, fit | |
| 12589 immediate a Deo. Sed mulier facta est de viro, qui est eiusdem | |
| 12590 speciei cum ipsa. Ergo non est facta immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p3"> | |
| 12591 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body | |
| 12592 was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God. | |
| 12593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32345] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12594 Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod corporalia dispensantur a Deo | |
| 12595 per Angelos. Sed corpus mulieris ex materia corporali est formatum. | |
| 12596 Ergo est factum per ministerium Angelorum, et non immediate a | |
| 12597 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p4"> | |
| 12598 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, | |
| 12599 and not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine | |
| 12600 says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God. | |
| 12601 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32346] Iª q. 92 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea | |
| 12602 quae praeextiterunt in creaturis secundum rationes causales, | |
| 12603 producuntur virtute alicuius creaturae, et non immediate a Deo. Sed | |
| 12604 secundum causales rationes corpus mulieris in primis operibus | |
| 12605 productum fuit, ut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo non | |
| 12606 fuit producta mulier immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p5"> | |
| 12607 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from | |
| 12608 the man's rib." | |
| 12609 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32347] Iª q. 92 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12610 quod Augustinus dicit, in eodem libro, <i>formare vel aedificare | |
| 12611 costam ut mulier esset, non potuit nisi Deus, a quo universa natura | |
| 12612 subsistit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p6"> | |
| 12613 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (A[2], ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence | |
| 12614 man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species | |
| 12615 cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary | |
| 12616 course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime | |
| 12617 of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man. | |
| 12618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 co."><a name="32348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32348] Iª q. 92 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12619 quod, sicut supra dictum est, uniuscuiusque speciei generatio | |
| 12620 naturalis est ex determinata materia. Materia autem ex qua | |
| 12621 naturaliter generatur homo, est semen humanum viri vel feminae. | |
| 12622 Unde ex alia quacumque materia individuum humanae speciei generari | |
| 12623 non potest naturaliter. Solus autem Deus, qui est naturae | |
| 12624 institutor, potest praeter naturae ordinem res in esse producere. | |
| 12625 Et ideo solus Deus potuit vel virum de limo terrae, vel mulierem de | |
| 12626 costa viri formare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p7"> | |
| 12627 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species. | |
| 12628 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32349] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12629 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quando individuum generatur ex | |
| 12630 simili secundum speciem, generatione naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p8"> | |
| 12631 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; | |
| 12632 but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body | |
| 12633 of the woman formed by them from the man's rib. | |
| 12634 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32350] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12635 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., an | |
| 12636 ministerium Angeli exhibuerint Deo in formatione mulieris, | |
| 12637 nescimus, certum tamen est quod, sicut corpus viri de limo non fuit | |
| 12638 formatum per Angelos, ita nec corpus mulieris de costa viri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q92_A4-p9"> | |
| 12639 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it | |
| 12640 made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in | |
| 12641 the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active | |
| 12642 potentiality of the Creator. | |
| 12643 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 92 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32351] Iª q. 92 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12644 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit, <i>non habuit | |
| 12645 prima rerum conditio ut femina omnino sic fieret; sed tantum hoc | |
| 12646 habuit, ut sic fieri posset</i>. Et ideo secundum causales rationes | |
| 12647 praeextitit corpus mulieris in primis operibus, non secundum | |
| 12648 potentiam activam, sed secundum potentiam passivam tantum, in | |
| 12649 ordine ad potentiam activam creatoris.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 12650 <div id="FP_Q93" class="div3"> | |
| 12651 <h3 id="FP_Q93-p0.1">Q. 93. THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 12652 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 12653 <p id="FP_Q93-p2"> We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." | |
| 12654 There are under this head nine points of inquiry: | |
| 12655 </p><p id="FP_Q93-p3"><a href="#FP_Q93_A1"> (1) Whether the image of God is in man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p4"><a href="#FP_Q93_A2"> (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p5"><a href="#FP_Q93_A3"> (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p6"><a href="#FP_Q93_A4"> (4) Whether the image of God is in every man?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p7"><a href="#FP_Q93_A5"> (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p8"><a href="#FP_Q93_A6"> (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p9"><a href="#FP_Q93_A7"> (7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and acts?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p10"><a href="#FP_Q93_A8"> (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?</a></p><p id="FP_Q93-p11"><a href="#FP_Q93_A9"> (9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."</a></p> | |
| 12656 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 pr."><a name="32352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32352] | |
| 12657 Iª q. 93 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de fine sive | |
| 12658 termino productionis hominis, prout dicitur factus ad imaginem et | |
| 12659 similitudinem Dei. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem. Primo, utrum in | |
| 12660 homine sit imago Dei. Secundo, utrum imago Dei sit in | |
| 12661 irrationalibus creaturis. Tertio, utrum imago Dei sit magis in | |
| 12662 Angelo quam in homine. Quarto, utrum imago Dei sit in omni homine. | |
| 12663 Quinto, utrum in homine sit imago Dei per comparationem ad | |
| 12664 essentiam, vel ad personas divinas omnes, aut unam earum. Sexto, | |
| 12665 utrum imago Dei inveniatur in homine solum secundum mentem. | |
| 12666 Septimo, utrum imago Dei sit in homine secundum potentias, aut | |
| 12667 secundum habitus, aut actus. Octavo, utrum per comparationem ad | |
| 12668 omnia obiecta. Nono, de differentia imaginis et similitudinis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 12669 <div id="FP_Q93_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A1-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 1. Whether the image of God is in man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p2"> | |
| 12670 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written ( | |
| 12671 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?" | |
| 12672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32353] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 12673 proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine. Dicitur enim | |
| 12674 Isaiae XL, <i>cui similem fecistis Deum; aut quam imaginem ponetis | |
| 12675 ei?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p3"> | |
| 12676 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says ( | |
| 12677 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.15" target="asv">Col. 1:15</a>): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the image of God is not to be found | |
| 12678 in man. | |
| 12679 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32354] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, esse | |
| 12680 Dei imaginem est proprium primogeniti, de quo dicit apostolus, ad | |
| 12681 Colos. I, <i>qui est imago Dei invisibilis, primogenitus omnis | |
| 12682 creaturae</i>. Non ergo in homine invenitur Dei imago.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p4"> | |
| 12683 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.]) that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; | |
| 12684 and he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But there | |
| 12685 is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can | |
| 12686 be no image of God in man. | |
| 12687 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32355] Iª q. 93 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12688 Hilarius dicit, in libro de Synod., quod <i>imago est eius rei ad | |
| 12689 quam imaginatur, species indifferens</i>; et iterum dicit quod | |
| 12690 <i>imago est rei ad rem coaequandam indiscreta et unita | |
| 12691 similitudo</i>. Sed non est species indifferens Dei et hominis; nec | |
| 12692 potest esse aequalitas hominis ad Deum. Ergo in homine non potest | |
| 12693 esse imago Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p5"> | |
| 12694 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 12695 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness." | |
| 12696 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32356] Iª q. 93 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12697 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et | |
| 12698 similitudinem nostram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A1-p6"> | |
| 12699 <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there | |
| 12700 is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to | |
| 12701 likeness---namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation | |
| 12702 of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to | |
| 12703 another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. | |
| 12704 </p><p id="FP_Q93_A1-p7"> But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image | |
| 12705 there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect | |
| 12706 image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that | |
| 12707 in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of | |
| 12708 equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect | |
| 12709 likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition | |
| 12710 "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance. | |
| 12711 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 co."><a name="32357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32357] Iª q. 93 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12712 quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., | |
| 12713 <i>ubi est imago, continuo est et similitudo; sed ubi est | |
| 12714 similitudo, non continuo est imago</i>. Ex quo patet quod | |
| 12715 similitudo est de ratione imaginis, et quod imago aliquid addit | |
| 12716 supra rationem similitudinis, scilicet quod sit ex alio expressum, | |
| 12717 imago enim dicitur ex eo quod agitur ad imitationem alterius. Unde | |
| 12718 ovum, quantumcumque sit alteri ovo simile et aequale, quia tamen | |
| 12719 non est expressum ex illo, non dicitur imago eius. Aequalitas autem | |
| 12720 non est de ratione imaginis, quia, ut Augustinus ibidem dicit, | |
| 12721 <i>ubi est imago, non continuo est aequalitas</i>; ut patet in | |
| 12722 imagine alicuius in speculo relucente. Est tamen de ratione | |
| 12723 perfectae imaginis, nam in perfecta imagine non deest aliquid | |
| 12724 imagini, quod insit illi de quo expressa est. Manifestum est autem | |
| 12725 quod in homine invenitur aliqua Dei similitudo, quae deducitur a | |
| 12726 Deo sicut ab exemplari, non tamen est similitudo secundum | |
| 12727 aequalitatem, quia in infinitum excedit exemplar hoc tale | |
| 12728 exemplatum. Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen | |
| 12729 perfecta, sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat Scriptura, cum dicit | |
| 12730 hominem factum ad imaginem Dei, praepositio enim ad accessum | |
| 12731 quendam significat, qui competit rei distanti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p8"> | |
| 12732 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But God | |
| 12733 made a spiritual image to Himself in man. | |
| 12734 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32358] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12735 dicendum quod propheta loquitur de corporalibus imaginibus ab | |
| 12736 homine fabricatis, et ideo signanter dicit, <i>quam imaginem | |
| 12737 ponetis ei?</i> Sed Deus ipse sibi in homine posuit spiritualem | |
| 12738 imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p9"> | |
| 12739 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is | |
| 12740 said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the | |
| 12741 image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, | |
| 12742 the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, | |
| 12743 who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver | |
| 12744 coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore). | |
| 12745 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32359] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12746 dicendum quod primogenitus omnis creaturae est imago Dei perfecta, | |
| 12747 perfecte implens illud cuius imago est, et ideo dicitur imago, et | |
| 12748 nunquam ad imaginem. Homo vero et propter similitudinem dicitur | |
| 12749 imago; et propter imperfectionem similitudinis, dicitur ad | |
| 12750 imaginem. Et quia similitudo perfecta Dei non potest esse nisi in | |
| 12751 identitate naturae, imago Dei est in filio suo primogenito sicut | |
| 12752 imago regis in filio sibi connaturali; in homine autem sicut in | |
| 12753 aliena natura, sicut imago regis in nummo argenteo; ut patet per | |
| 12754 Augustinum in libro de decem chordis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A1-p10"> | |
| 12755 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not | |
| 12756 only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature | |
| 12757 is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood | |
| 12758 of a perfect image. | |
| 12759 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32360] Iª q. 93 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12760 dicendum quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, eo modo dicitur species | |
| 12761 indifferens, quo una. Unum autem dicitur aliquid non solum numero | |
| 12762 aut specie aut genere, sed etiam secundum analogiam vel | |
| 12763 proportionem quandam, et sic est unitas vel convenientia creaturae | |
| 12764 ad Deum. Quod autem dicit rei ad rem coaequandam, pertinet ad | |
| 12765 rationem perfectae imaginis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A2-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 2. Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p2"> | |
| 12766 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are | |
| 12767 contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore | |
| 12768 the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. | |
| 12769 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32361] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 12770 proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei inveniatur in irrationalibus | |
| 12771 creaturis. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., <i>habent | |
| 12772 causata causarum suarum contingentes imagines</i>. Sed Deus est | |
| 12773 causa non solum rationalium creaturarum, sed etiam irrationalium. | |
| 12774 Ergo imago Dei invenitur in irrationalibus creaturis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p3"> | |
| 12775 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. | |
| 12776 iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God. | |
| 12777 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32362] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12778 quanto est expressior similitudo in aliquo, tanto magis accedit ad | |
| 12779 rationem imaginis. Sed Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod | |
| 12780 radius solaris maxime habet similitudinem divinae bonitatis. Ergo | |
| 12781 est ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p4"> | |
| 12782 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness | |
| 12783 than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called "very good" ( | |
| 12784 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man. | |
| 12785 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32363] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12786 quanto aliquid est magis perfectum in bonitate, tanto magis est Deo | |
| 12787 simile. Sed totum universum est perfectius in bonitate quam homo, | |
| 12788 quia etsi bona sint singula, tamen simul omnia dicuntur valde bona, | |
| 12789 Gen. I. Ergo totum universum est ad imaginem Dei, et non solum | |
| 12790 homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p5"> | |
| 12791 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore | |
| 12792 the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature. | |
| 12793 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32364] Iª q. 93 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12794 Boetius in libro de Consol., dicit de Deo, <i>mundum mente gerens, | |
| 12795 similique in imagine formans</i>. Ergo totus mundus est ad imaginem | |
| 12796 Dei, et non solum rationalis creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p6"> | |
| 12797 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving | |
| 12798 him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made | |
| 12799 to God's image. | |
| 12800 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32365] Iª q. 93 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12801 quod dicit Augustinus, VI super Gen. ad Litt., <i>hoc excellit in | |
| 12802 homine, quia Deus ad imaginem suam hominem fecit, propter hoc quod | |
| 12803 dedit ei mentem intellectualem, qua praestat pecoribus</i>. Ea ergo | |
| 12804 quae non habent intellectum, non sunt ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A2-p7"> | |
| 12805 <b>I answer that,</b> Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only | |
| 12806 generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For | |
| 12807 instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. | |
| 12808 Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that | |
| 12809 thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus | |
| 12810 the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak | |
| 12811 of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species." | |
| 12812 </p><p id="FP_Q93_A2-p8"> Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most | |
| 12813 commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as | |
| 12814 Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." | |
| 12815 It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image. | |
| 12816 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 co."><a name="32366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32366] Iª q. 93 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12817 quod non quaelibet similitudo, etiam si sit expressa ex altero, | |
| 12818 sufficit ad rationem imaginis. Si enim similitudo sit secundum | |
| 12819 genus tantum, vel secundum aliquod accidens commune, non propter | |
| 12820 hoc dicetur aliquid esse ad imaginem alterius, non enim posset dici | |
| 12821 quod vermis qui oritur ex homine, sit imago hominis propter | |
| 12822 similitudinem generis; neque iterum potest dici quod, si aliquid | |
| 12823 fiat album ad similitudinem alterius, quod propter hoc sit ad eius | |
| 12824 imaginem, quia album est accidens commune pluribus speciebus. | |
| 12825 Requiritur autem ad rationem imaginis quod sit similitudo secundum | |
| 12826 speciem, sicut imago regis est in filio suo, vel ad minus secundum | |
| 12827 aliquod accidens proprium speciei, et praecipue secundum figuram, | |
| 12828 sicut hominis imago dicitur esse in cupro. Unde signanter Hilarius | |
| 12829 dicit quod imago est species indifferens. Manifestum est autem quod | |
| 12830 similitudo speciei attenditur secundum ultimam differentiam. | |
| 12831 Assimilantur autem aliqua Deo, primo quidem, et maxime communiter, | |
| 12832 inquantum sunt; secundo vero, inquantum vivunt; tertio vero, | |
| 12833 inquantum sapiunt vel intelligunt. Quae, ut Augustinus dicit in | |
| 12834 libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>ita sunt Deo similitudine | |
| 12835 proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius</i>. Sic ergo patet | |
| 12836 quod solae intellectuales creaturae, proprie loquendo, sunt ad | |
| 12837 imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p9"> | |
| 12838 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so | |
| 12839 far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that | |
| 12840 effects are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely. | |
| 12841 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32367] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12842 dicendum quod omne imperfectum est quaedam participatio perfecti. | |
| 12843 Et ideo etiam ea quae deficiunt a ratione imaginis, inquantum tamen | |
| 12844 aliqualem Dei similitudinem habent, participant aliquid de ratione | |
| 12845 imaginis. Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod causata habent causarum | |
| 12846 contingentes imagines, idest quantum contingit ea habere, et non | |
| 12847 simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p10"> | |
| 12848 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is | |
| 12849 involved in the idea of an image. | |
| 12850 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32368] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12851 dicendum quod Dionysius assimilat radium solarem divinae bonitati | |
| 12852 quantum ad causalitatem; non secundum dignitatem naturae, quae | |
| 12853 requiritur ad rationem imaginis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p11"> | |
| 12854 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively | |
| 12855 and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for | |
| 12856 the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. | |
| 12857 Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we | |
| 12858 do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded. | |
| 12859 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32369] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12860 dicendum quod universum est perfectius in bonitate quam | |
| 12861 intellectualis creatura extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et | |
| 12862 collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis invenitur in | |
| 12863 intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni. Vel dicendum | |
| 12864 quod pars non dividitur contra totum, sed contra aliam partem. Unde | |
| 12865 cum dicitur quod sola natura intellectualis est ad imaginem Dei, | |
| 12866 non excluditur quin universum, secundum aliquam sui partem, sit ad | |
| 12867 imaginem Dei; sed excluduntur aliae partes universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A2-p12"> | |
| 12868 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in | |
| 12869 the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, | |
| 12870 using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are | |
| 12871 like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, | |
| 12872 like to the Supreme Wisdom. | |
| 12873 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32370] Iª q. 93 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12874 dicendum quod imago accipitur a Boetio secundum rationem | |
| 12875 similitudinis qua artificiatum imitatur speciem artis quae est in | |
| 12876 mente artificis, sic autem quaelibet creatura est imago rationis | |
| 12877 exemplaris quam habet in mente divina. Sic autem non loquimur nunc | |
| 12878 de imagine, sed secundum quod attenditur secundum similitudinem in | |
| 12879 natura; prout scilicet primo enti assimilantur omnia, inquantum | |
| 12880 sunt entia; et primae vitae inquantum sunt viventia; et summae | |
| 12881 sapientiae, inquantum sunt intelligentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A3-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 3. Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p2"> | |
| 12882 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii | |
| 12883 (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to | |
| 12884 say that the angels are more than man to the image of God. | |
| 12885 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32371] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 12886 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam | |
| 12887 homo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de imagine, quod Deus nulli | |
| 12888 alii creaturae dedit quod sit ad imaginem suam, nisi homini. Non | |
| 12889 ergo verum est quod Angelus magis dicatur ad imaginem Dei quam | |
| 12890 homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p3"> | |
| 12891 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be | |
| 12892 between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature is called God's image so far as it is akin | |
| 12893 to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. | |
| 12894 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32372] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12895 secundum Augustinum, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>homo ita | |
| 12896 est ad imaginem Dei, ut, nulla interposita creatura, formetur a | |
| 12897 Deo. Et ideo nihil est illi coniunctius</i>. Sed imago Dei dicitur | |
| 12898 aliqua creatura, inquantum Deo coniungitur. Ergo Angelus non est | |
| 12899 magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p4"> | |
| 12900 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does | |
| 12901 not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are | |
| 12902 not more to the image of God than man. | |
| 12903 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32373] Iª q. 93 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12904 creatura dicitur ad imaginem Dei, inquantum est intellectualis | |
| 12905 naturae. Sed intellectualis natura non intenditur nec remittitur, | |
| 12906 non enim est de genere accidentis, cum sit in genere substantiae. | |
| 12907 Ergo Angelus non est magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p5"> | |
| 12908 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is called a "seal of resemblance" [ | |
| 12909 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.12" target="asv">Ezech. 28:12</a>] because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression." | |
| 12910 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32374] Iª q. 93 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12911 quod dicit Gregorius, in quadam homilia, quod <i>Angelus dicitur | |
| 12912 signaculum similitudinis, quia in eo similitudo divinae imaginis | |
| 12913 magis insinuatur expressa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6"> | |
| 12914 <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, | |
| 12915 the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature | |
| 12916 is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said ( | |
| 12917 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>; | |
| 12918 <a href="#FP_Q79_A8" id="FP_Q93_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[8]</a>). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, | |
| 12919 so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; | |
| 12920 and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole | |
| 12921 human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things | |
| 12922 the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the | |
| 12923 Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals | |
| 12924 would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, | |
| 12925 we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man | |
| 12926 is more like to God. | |
| 12927 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 co."><a name="32375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32375] Iª q. 93 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12928 quod de imagine Dei loqui dupliciter possumus. Uno modo, quantum ad | |
| 12929 id in quo primo consideratur ratio imaginis, quod est | |
| 12930 intellectualis natura. Et sic imago Dei est magis in Angelis quam | |
| 12931 sit in hominibus, quia intellectualis natura perfectior est in eis, | |
| 12932 ut ex supra dictis patet. Secundo potest considerari imago Dei in | |
| 12933 homine, quantum ad id in quo secundario consideratur, prout | |
| 12934 scilicet in homine invenitur quaedam Dei imitatio, inquantum | |
| 12935 scilicet homo est de homine, sicut Deus de Deo; et inquantum anima | |
| 12936 hominis est tota in toto corpore eius, et iterum tota in qualibet | |
| 12937 parte ipsius, sicut Deus se habet ad mundum. Et secundum haec et | |
| 12938 similia, magis invenitur Dei imago in homine quam in Angelo. Sed | |
| 12939 quantum ad hoc non attenditur per se ratio divinae imaginis in | |
| 12940 homine, nisi praesupposita prima imitatione, quae est secundum | |
| 12941 intellectualem naturam, alioquin etiam animalia bruta essent ad | |
| 12942 imaginem Dei. Et ideo, cum quantum ad intellectualem naturam | |
| 12943 Angelus sit magis ad imaginem Dei quam homo, simpliciter | |
| 12944 concedendum est Angelum magis esse ad imaginem Dei; hominem autem | |
| 12945 secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p7"> | |
| 12946 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels. | |
| 12947 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32376] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12948 dicendum quod Augustinus excludit a Dei imagine alias inferiores | |
| 12949 creaturas intellectu carentes, non autem Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p8"> | |
| 12950 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; | |
| 12951 so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine | |
| 12952 had said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." | |
| 12953 Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image. | |
| 12954 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32377] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12955 dicendum quod, sicut ignis dicitur esse subtilissimum corporum | |
| 12956 secundum suam speciem, cum tamen unus ignis sit alio subtilior; ita | |
| 12957 dicitur quod nihil est coniunctius Deo quam mens humana, secundum | |
| 12958 genus intellectualis naturae; quia, sicut ipse supra praemiserat, | |
| 12959 <i>quae sapiunt, ita sunt illi similitudine proxima, ut in | |
| 12960 creaturis nihil sit propinquius</i>. Unde per hoc non excluditur | |
| 12961 quin Angelus sit magis ad Dei imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A3-p9"> | |
| 12962 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect | |
| 12963 than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; | |
| 12964 nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree. | |
| 12965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32378] Iª q. 93 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12966 dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod substantia non recipit magis et | |
| 12967 minus, non intelligitur quod una species substantiae non sit | |
| 12968 perfectior quam alia, sed quod unum et idem individuum non | |
| 12969 participet suam speciem quandoque magis, quandoque minus. Nec etiam | |
| 12970 a diversis individuis participatur species substantiae secundum | |
| 12971 magis et minus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A4-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 4. Whether the image of God is found in every man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p2"> | |
| 12972 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman | |
| 12973 is the image [Vulg. glory] of man" ( | |
| 12974 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God. | |
| 12975 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32379] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 12976 proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in quolibet | |
| 12977 homine. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod <i>vir est imago | |
| 12978 Dei, mulier autem est imago viri</i>. Cum ergo mulier sit | |
| 12979 individuum humanae speciei, non cuilibet individuo convenit esse | |
| 12980 imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p3"> | |
| 12981 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( | |
| 12982 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But all men are not predestined. | |
| 12983 Therefore all men have not the conformity of image. | |
| 12984 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32380] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12985 apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, quod <i>illos quos Deus praescivit | |
| 12986 conformes fieri imagini filii sui, hos praedestinavit</i>. Sed non | |
| 12987 omnes homines praedestinati sunt. Ergo non omnes homines habent | |
| 12988 conformitatem imaginis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p4"> | |
| 12989 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained | |
| 12990 <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God. | |
| 12991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32381] Iª q. 93 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12992 similitudo est de ratione imaginis, ut supra dictum est. Sed per | |
| 12993 peccatum fit homo Deo dissimilis. Ergo amittit Dei imaginem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p5"> | |
| 12994 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 12995 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.38.7" target="asv">Ps. 38:7</a>): "Surely man passeth as an image." | |
| 12996 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32382] Iª q. 93 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12997 quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXVIII, <i>veruntamen in imagine pertransit | |
| 12998 homo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p6"> | |
| 12999 <b>I answer that,</b> Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according | |
| 13000 to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, | |
| 13001 that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as | |
| 13002 man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude | |
| 13003 consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows | |
| 13004 and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and | |
| 13005 loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, | |
| 13006 O Lord, is signed upon us" ( | |
| 13007 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of "creation," of | |
| 13008 "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed. | |
| 13009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 co."><a name="32383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32383] Iª q. 93 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13010 quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei esse | |
| 13011 dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod | |
| 13012 intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem | |
| 13013 intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum | |
| 13014 intelligit et amat. Unde imago Dei tripliciter potest considerari | |
| 13015 in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo habet aptitudinem | |
| 13016 naturalem ad intelligendum et amandum Deum, et haec aptitudo | |
| 13017 consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus | |
| 13018 hominibus. Alio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum | |
| 13019 cognoscit et amat, sed tamen imperfecte, et haec est imago per | |
| 13020 conformitatem gratiae. Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu | |
| 13021 cognoscit et amat perfecte, et sic attenditur imago secundum | |
| 13022 similitudinem gloriae. Unde super illud Psalmi IV, <i>signatum est | |
| 13023 super nos lumen vultus tui, domine</i>, Glossa distinguit triplicem | |
| 13024 imaginem, scilicet creationis, recreationis et similitudinis. Prima | |
| 13025 ergo imago invenitur in omnibus hominibus; secunda in iustis | |
| 13026 tantum; tertia vero solum in beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p7"> | |
| 13027 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence | |
| 13028 after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is added, "Male and female He created them" ( | |
| 13029 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>). Moreover it is said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both | |
| 13030 sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of | |
| 13031 God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every | |
| 13032 creature. So when the Apostle had said that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man," he adds his | |
| 13033 reason for saying this: "For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man." | |
| 13034 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32384] Iª q. 93 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13035 dicendum quod tam in viro quam in muliere invenitur Dei imago | |
| 13036 quantum ad id in quo principaliter ratio imaginis consistit, | |
| 13037 scilicet quantum ad intellectualem naturam. Unde Gen. I, cum | |
| 13038 dixisset, <i>ad imaginem Dei creavit illum</i>, scilicet hominem, | |
| 13039 subdidit, <i>masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>, et dixit | |
| 13040 pluraliter eos, ut Augustinus dicit, ne intelligatur in uno | |
| 13041 individuo uterque sexus fuisse coniunctus. Sed quantum ad aliquid | |
| 13042 secundario imago Dei invenitur in viro, secundum quod non invenitur | |
| 13043 in muliere, nam vir est principium mulieris et finis, sicut Deus | |
| 13044 est principium et finis totius creaturae. Unde cum apostolus | |
| 13045 dixisset quod <i>vir imago et gloria est Dei, mulier autem est | |
| 13046 gloria viri</i>; ostendit quare hoc dixerit, subdens, <i>non enim | |
| 13047 vir est ex muliere, sed mulier ex viro; et vir non est creatus | |
| 13048 propter mulierem, sed mulier propter virum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A4-p8"> Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32385] Iª q. 93 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum et | |
| 13049 tertium dicendum quod illae rationes procedunt de imagine quae est | |
| 13050 secundum conformitatem gratiae et gloriae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A5-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 5. Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p2"> | |
| 13051 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De | |
| 13052 Fide ad Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made." And Hilary | |
| 13053 (De Trin. v) says: "Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity." Therefore the image of God in man is | |
| 13054 of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. | |
| 13055 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32386] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 13056 proceditur. Videtur quod in homine non sit imago Dei quantum ad | |
| 13057 Trinitatem divinarum personarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de | |
| 13058 fide ad Petrum, <i>una est sanctae Trinitatis essentialiter | |
| 13059 divinitas, et imago ad quam factus est homo</i>. Et Hilarius, in V | |
| 13060 de Trin., dicit quod <i>homo fit ad communem Trinitatis | |
| 13061 imaginem</i>. Est ergo in homine imago Dei quantum ad essentiam, et | |
| 13062 non quantum ad Trinitatem personarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p3"> | |
| 13063 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De | |
| 13064 Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." | |
| 13065 Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that "man was made to the image of God, it | |
| 13066 means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the | |
| 13067 fulness of goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. | |
| 13068 Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence. | |
| 13069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32387] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 13070 libro de Eccles. Dogmat. dicitur quod imago Dei attenditur in | |
| 13071 homine secundum aeternitatem. Damascenus etiam dicit quod | |
| 13072 <i>hominem esse ad imaginem Dei, significat intellectuale, et | |
| 13073 arbitrio liberum, et per se potestativum</i>. Gregorius etiam | |
| 13074 Nyssenus dicit quod, cum Scriptura dixit hominem factum ad imaginem | |
| 13075 Dei, <i>aequale est ac si diceret humanam naturam omnis boni factam | |
| 13076 esse participem; bonitatis enim plenitudo divinitas est</i>. Haec | |
| 13077 autem omnia non pertinent ad distinctionem personarum, sed magis ad | |
| 13078 essentiae unitatem. Ergo in homine est imago Dei, non secundum | |
| 13079 Trinitatem personarum, sed secundum essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p4"> | |
| 13080 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God | |
| 13081 as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man | |
| 13082 could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above ( | |
| 13083 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q32_A1" id="FP_Q93_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[32], A[1]</a>). | |
| 13084 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32388] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago | |
| 13085 ducit in cognitionem eius cuius est imago. Si igitur in homine est | |
| 13086 imago Dei secundum Trinitatem personarum, cum homo per naturalem | |
| 13087 rationem seipsum cognoscere possit, sequeretur quod per naturalem | |
| 13088 cognitionem posset homo cognoscere Trinitatem divinarum personarum. | |
| 13089 Quod est falsum, ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p5"> | |
| 13090 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. | |
| 13091 vi, 2) that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, | |
| 13092 this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. | |
| 13093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32389] Iª q. 93 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, nomen | |
| 13094 imaginis non cuilibet trium personarum convenit, sed soli filio, | |
| 13095 dicit enim Augustinus, in VI de Trin., quod <i>solus filius est | |
| 13096 imago patris</i>. Si igitur in homine attenderetur Dei imago | |
| 13097 secundum personam, non esset in homine imago totius Trinitatis, sed | |
| 13098 filii tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p6"> | |
| 13099 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made | |
| 13100 to the image of God." | |
| 13101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32390] Iª q. 93 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13102 quod Hilarius, in IV de Trin., per hoc quod homo dicitur ad | |
| 13103 imaginem Dei factus, ostendit pluralitatem divinarum | |
| 13104 personarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p7"> | |
| 13105 <b>I answer that,</b> as we have seen ( | |
| 13106 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q40_A2" id="FP_Q93_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[2]</a>), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin | |
| 13107 is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, | |
| 13108 and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the | |
| 13109 Divine Persons is suitable to the | |
| 13110 Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same | |
| 13111 image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in | |
| 13112 man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God | |
| 13113 Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. | |
| 13114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 co."><a name="32391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32391] Iª q. 93 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13115 quod, sicut supra habitum est, distinctio divinarum personarum non | |
| 13116 est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes | |
| 13117 originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus | |
| 13118 originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae, | |
| 13119 aliter enim producuntur animata, aliter inanimata; aliter animalia, | |
| 13120 atque aliter plantae. Unde manifestum est quod distinctio divinarum | |
| 13121 personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Unde esse ad | |
| 13122 imaginem Dei secundum imitationem divinae naturae, non excludit hoc | |
| 13123 quod est esse ad imaginem Dei secundum repraesentationem trium | |
| 13124 personarum; sed magis unum ad alterum sequitur. Sic igitur dicendum | |
| 13125 est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam, et | |
| 13126 quantum ad Trinitatem personarum, nam et in ipso Deo in tribus | |
| 13127 personis una existit natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p8"> Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32392] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 13128 responsio ad duo prima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p9"> | |
| 13129 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. | |
| 13130 xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: | |
| 13131 "We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity." | |
| 13132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32393] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13133 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si imago Dei esset in homine | |
| 13134 perfecte repraesentans Deum. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in XV de | |
| 13135 Trin., maxima est differentia huius Trinitatis quae est in nobis, | |
| 13136 ad Trinitatem divinam. Et ideo, ut ipse ibidem dicit, <i>Trinitatem | |
| 13137 quae in nobis est, videmus potius quam credimus, Deum vero esse | |
| 13138 Trinitatem, credimus potius quam videmus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A5-p10"> | |
| 13139 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, | |
| 13140 because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness | |
| 13141 to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, | |
| 13142 the Father would not have said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but | |
| 13143 "to Thy image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of God," the sense is not that the Father made man | |
| 13144 to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, | |
| 13145 of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in two ways: first, so that | |
| 13146 this preposition "to" points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way that Our image | |
| 13147 may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made (like) | |
| 13148 to that one." Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is | |
| 13149 put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another. | |
| 13150 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32394] Iª q. 93 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13151 dicendum quod quidam dixerunt in homine esse solum imaginem filii. | |
| 13152 Sed hoc improbat Augustinus, in XII de Trin. Primo quidem, per hoc | |
| 13153 quod, cum secundum aequalitatem essentiae filius sit patri similis, | |
| 13154 necesse est, si homo sit factus ad similitudinem filii, quod sit | |
| 13155 factus ad similitudinem patris. Secundo quia, si homo esset factus | |
| 13156 solum ad imaginem filii, non diceret pater, <i>faciamus hominem ad | |
| 13157 imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>, sed tuam. Cum ergo dicitur, | |
| 13158 ad imaginem Dei fecit illum, non est intelligendum quod pater | |
| 13159 fecerit hominem solum ad imaginem filii, qui est Deus, ut quidam | |
| 13160 exposuerunt, sed intelligendum est quod Deus Trinitas fecit hominem | |
| 13161 ad imaginem suam, idest totius Trinitatis. Cum autem dicitur quod | |
| 13162 Deus fecit hominem ad imaginem suam, dupliciter potest intelligi. | |
| 13163 Uno modo, quod haec praepositio ad designet terminum factionis, ut | |
| 13164 sit sensus, faciamus hominem taliter, ut sit in eo imago. Alio | |
| 13165 modo, haec praepositio ad potest designare causam exemplarem; sicut | |
| 13166 cum dicitur, iste liber est factus ad illum. Et sic imago Dei est | |
| 13167 ipsa essentia divina, quae abusive imago dicitur, secundum quod | |
| 13168 imago ponitur pro exemplari. Vel, secundum quod quidam dicunt, | |
| 13169 divina essentia dicitur imago, quia secundum eam una persona aliam | |
| 13170 imitatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A6-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 6. Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p2"> | |
| 13171 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 13172 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>) that "the man is the image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only | |
| 13173 in his mind. | |
| 13174 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32395] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 13175 proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non sit in homine solum secundum | |
| 13176 mentem. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XI, quod vir est imago Dei. | |
| 13177 Sed vir non est solum mens. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur solum | |
| 13178 secundum mentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p3"> | |
| 13179 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( | |
| 13180 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>): "God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them." But the distinction | |
| 13181 of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind. | |
| 13182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32396] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Gen. | |
| 13183 I, <i>creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam, ad imaginem Dei | |
| 13184 creavit illum, masculum et feminam creavit eos</i>. Sed distinctio | |
| 13185 masculi et feminae est secundum corpus. Ergo etiam secundum corpus | |
| 13186 attenditur Dei imago in homine, et non secundum mentem tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p4"> | |
| 13187 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image | |
| 13188 of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind. | |
| 13189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32397] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago | |
| 13190 praecipue videtur attendi secundum figuram. Sed figura ad corpus | |
| 13191 pertinet. Ergo imago Dei attenditur in homine etiam secundum | |
| 13192 corpus, et non secundum mentem tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p5"> | |
| 13193 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or | |
| 13194 imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity | |
| 13195 by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others. | |
| 13196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="32398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32398] Iª q. 93 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13197 secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., triplex visio | |
| 13198 invenitur in nobis, scilicet corporalis, spiritualis sive | |
| 13199 imaginaria, et intellectualis. Si ergo secundum visionem | |
| 13200 intellectualem, quae ad mentem pertinet, est aliqua Trinitas in | |
| 13201 nobis, secundum quam sumus ad imaginem Dei; pari ratione et in | |
| 13202 aliis visionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6"> | |
| 13203 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 13204 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv">Eph. 4:23,24</a>): "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which | |
| 13205 consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says ( | |
| 13206 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv">Col. 3:10</a>): "Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the image of Him that created him," | |
| 13207 where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man | |
| 13208 is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only. | |
| 13209 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32399] Iª q. 93 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13210 quod apostolus dicit, ad Eph. IV, <i>renovamini spiritu mentis | |
| 13211 vestrae, et induite novum hominem</i>, ex quo datur intelligi quod | |
| 13212 renovatio nostra, quae fit secundum novi hominis indumentum, ad | |
| 13213 mentem pertinet. Sed ad Col. III, dicit, <i>induentes novum | |
| 13214 hominem, qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius | |
| 13215 qui creavit eum</i>, ubi renovationem quae est secundum novi | |
| 13216 hominis indumentum, attribuit imagini Dei. Esse ergo ad imaginem | |
| 13217 Dei pertinet solum ad mentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p7"> | |
| 13218 <b>I answer that,</b> While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" | |
| 13219 as we have explained above ( | |
| 13220 <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational | |
| 13221 creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; | |
| 13222 while in the other parts, | |
| 13223 which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference | |
| 13224 to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in | |
| 13225 which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, | |
| 13226 as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as | |
| 13227 not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so | |
| 13228 also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. | |
| 13229 </p><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p8"> Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness | |
| 13230 of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of | |
| 13231 the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they | |
| 13232 imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained | |
| 13233 <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, | |
| 13234 if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the | |
| 13235 Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen ( | |
| 13236 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q28_A3" id="FP_Q93_A6-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[28], A[3]</a>); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of | |
| 13237 the | |
| 13238 love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, | |
| 13239 however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence | |
| 13240 of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it | |
| 13241 proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house | |
| 13242 points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good | |
| 13243 end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" | |
| 13244 in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace." | |
| 13245 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 co."><a name="32400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32400] Iª q. 93 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13246 quod, cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in | |
| 13247 sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei per modum | |
| 13248 imaginis, ut supra dictum est, in aliis autem creaturis per modum | |
| 13249 vestigii. Id autem in quo creatura rationalis excedit alias | |
| 13250 creaturas, est intellectus sive mens. Unde relinquitur quod nec in | |
| 13251 ipsa rationali creatura invenitur Dei imago, nisi secundum mentem. | |
| 13252 In aliis vero partibus, si quas habet rationalis creatura, | |
| 13253 invenitur similitudo vestigii; sicut et in ceteris rebus quibus | |
| 13254 secundum partes huiusmodi assimilatur. Cuius ratio manifeste | |
| 13255 cognosci potest, si attendatur modus quo repraesentat vestigium, et | |
| 13256 quo repraesentat imago. Imago enim repraesentat secundum | |
| 13257 similitudinem speciei, ut dictum est. Vestigium autem repraesentat | |
| 13258 per modum effectus qui sic repraesentat suam causam, quod tamen ad | |
| 13259 speciei similitudinem non pertingit, impressiones enim quae ex motu | |
| 13260 animalium relinquuntur, dicuntur vestigia; et similiter cinis | |
| 13261 dicitur vestigium ignis; et desolatio terrae, vestigium hostilis | |
| 13262 exercitus. Potest ergo huiusmodi differentia attendi inter | |
| 13263 creaturas rationales et alias creaturas, et quantum ad hoc quod in | |
| 13264 creaturis repraesentatur similitudo divinae naturae, et quantum ad | |
| 13265 hoc quod in eis repraesentatur similitudo Trinitatis increatae. Nam | |
| 13266 quantum ad similitudinem divinae naturae pertinet, creaturae | |
| 13267 rationales videntur quodammodo ad repraesentationem speciei | |
| 13268 pertingere, inquantum imitantur Deum non solum in hoc quod est et | |
| 13269 vivit, sed etiam in hoc quod intelligit, ut supra dictum est. Aliae | |
| 13270 vero creaturae non intelligunt; sed apparet in eis quoddam | |
| 13271 vestigium intellectus producentis, si earum dispositio | |
| 13272 consideretur. Similiter, cum increata Trinitas distinguatur | |
| 13273 secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab utroque, ut | |
| 13274 supra habitum est; in creatura rationali, in qua invenitur | |
| 13275 processio verbi secundum intellectum, et processio amoris secundum | |
| 13276 voluntatem, potest dici imago Trinitatis increatae per quandam | |
| 13277 repraesentationem speciei. In aliis autem creaturis non invenitur | |
| 13278 principium verbi, et verbum, et amor; sed apparet in eis quoddam | |
| 13279 vestigium quod haec inveniantur in causa producente. Nam hoc ipsum | |
| 13280 quod creatura habet substantiam modificatam et finitam, demonstrat | |
| 13281 quod sit a quodam principio; species vero eius demonstrat verbum | |
| 13282 facientis, sicut forma domus demonstrat conceptionem artificis; | |
| 13283 ordo vero demonstrat amorem producentis, quo effectus ordinatur ad | |
| 13284 bonum, sicut usus aedificii demonstrat artificis voluntatem. Sic | |
| 13285 igitur in homine invenitur Dei similitudo per modum imaginis | |
| 13286 secundum mentem; sed secundum alias partes eius, per modum | |
| 13287 vestigii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p9"> | |
| 13288 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; | |
| 13289 as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God | |
| 13290 as existing in every part of man. | |
| 13291 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32401] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13292 dicendum quod homo dicitur imago Dei, non quia ipse essentialiter | |
| 13293 sit imago, sed quia in eo est Dei imago impressa secundum mentem; | |
| 13294 sicut denarius dicitur imago Caesaris, inquantum habet Caesaris | |
| 13295 imaginem. Unde non oportet quod secundum quamlibet partem hominis | |
| 13296 accipiatur Dei imago.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10"> | |
| 13297 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. | |
| 13298 They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the | |
| 13299 woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." | |
| 13300 All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is | |
| 13301 the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the | |
| 13302 image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after | |
| 13303 the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," | |
| 13304 it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that | |
| 13305 the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of sex, but that the | |
| 13306 image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle | |
| 13307 ( | |
| 13308 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv">Col. 3:10</a>), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [*these | |
| 13309 words are in reality from | |
| 13310 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv"> Gal. 3:28</a>] (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew"). | |
| 13311 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32402] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13312 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XII de Trin., quidam imaginem | |
| 13313 Trinitatis in homine posuerunt, non secundum unum individuum, sed | |
| 13314 secundum plura; dicentes quod <i>vir patris personam intimat; filii | |
| 13315 vero personam, quod de viro ita processit ut de illo nasceretur; | |
| 13316 atque ita tertiam personam, velut spiritum sanctum, dicunt esse | |
| 13317 mulierem, quae ita de viro processit ut non ipsa esset filius aut | |
| 13318 filia</i>. Quod prima facie absurdum videtur. Primo quidem, quia | |
| 13319 sequeretur quod spiritus sanctus esset principium filii, sicut | |
| 13320 mulier est principium prolis quae nascitur de viro. Secundo, quia | |
| 13321 unus homo non esset nisi ad imaginem unius personae. Tertio, quia | |
| 13322 secundum hoc Scriptura de imagine Dei in homine mentionem facere | |
| 13323 non debuisset, nisi producta iam prole. Et ideo dicendum est quod | |
| 13324 Scriptura, postquam dixerat, ad imaginem Dei creavit illum, | |
| 13325 addidit, masculum et feminam creavit eos, non ut imago Dei secundum | |
| 13326 distinctiones sexuum attendatur; sed quia imago Dei utrique sexui | |
| 13327 est communis, cum sit secundum mentem, in qua non est distinctio | |
| 13328 sexuum. Unde apostolus, ad Col. III, postquam dixerat, secundum | |
| 13329 imaginem eius qui creavit illum, subdit, ubi non est masculus et | |
| 13330 femina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A6-p11"> | |
| 13331 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial | |
| 13332 animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that | |
| 13333 it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But | |
| 13334 this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; | |
| 13335 but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace. | |
| 13336 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32403] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13337 dicendum quod, quamvis imago Dei in homine non accipiatur secundum | |
| 13338 figuram corpoream, tamen <i>corpus hominis, quia solum inter | |
| 13339 terrenorum animalium corpora non pronum in alvum prostratum est, | |
| 13340 sed tale est ut ad contemplandum caelum sit aptius, magis in hoc ad | |
| 13341 imaginem et similitudinem Dei, quam cetera corpora animalium, | |
| 13342 factum iure videri potest</i>; ut Augustinus dicit in libro | |
| 13343 octoginta trium quaest. Quod tamen non est sic intelligendum, quasi | |
| 13344 in corpore hominis sit imago Dei, sed quia ipsa figura humani | |
| 13345 corporis repraesentat imaginem Dei in anima, per modum | |
| 13346 vestigii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p12"> | |
| 13347 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal | |
| 13348 vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the | |
| 13349 sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest | |
| 13350 on what is seen. | |
| 13351 </p><p id="FP_Q93_A6-p13"> Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused | |
| 13352 by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the | |
| 13353 intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species | |
| 13354 of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not | |
| 13355 extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality | |
| 13356 and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, | |
| 13357 but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only | |
| 13358 which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the | |
| 13359 Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from | |
| 13360 them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not | |
| 13361 thus properly represented. | |
| 13362 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="32404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32404] Iª q. 93 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13363 dicendum quod tam in visione corporali quam in visione imaginaria | |
| 13364 invenitur quaedam Trinitas, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de Trin. | |
| 13365 In visione enim corporali est quidem primo species exterioris | |
| 13366 corporis; secundo vero ipsa visio, quae fit per impressionem | |
| 13367 cuiusdam similitudinis praedictae speciei in visum; tertio est ibi | |
| 13368 intentio voluntatis applicans visum ad videndum, et eum in re visa | |
| 13369 detinens. Similiter etiam in visione imaginaria invenitur primo | |
| 13370 quidem species in memoria reservata; secundo ipsa imaginaria visio, | |
| 13371 quae provenit ex hoc quod acies animae, idest ipsa vis imaginaria, | |
| 13372 informatur secundum praedictam speciem; tertio vero invenitur | |
| 13373 intentio voluntatis coniungens utrumque. Sed utraque Trinitas | |
| 13374 deficit a ratione divinae imaginis. Nam ipsa species exterioris | |
| 13375 corporis est extra naturam animae, species autem quae est in | |
| 13376 memoria, etsi non sit extra animam, est tamen adventitia animae, et | |
| 13377 ita utrobique deficit repraesentatio connaturalitatis et | |
| 13378 coaeternitatis divinarum personarum. Visio vero corporalis non | |
| 13379 procedit tantum a specie exterioris corporis, sed simul cum hoc a | |
| 13380 sensu videntis, et similiter visio imaginaria non solum procedit a | |
| 13381 specie quae in memoria conservatur, sed etiam a virtute | |
| 13382 imaginativa, et ita per hoc non repraesentatur convenienter | |
| 13383 processio filii a solo patre. Intentio vero voluntatis, quae | |
| 13384 coniungit duo praedicta, non ex eis procedit, neque in visione | |
| 13385 corporea neque in spirituali, unde non convenienter repraesentatur | |
| 13386 processio spiritus sancti a patre et filio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A7-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 7. Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p2"> | |
| 13387 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man | |
| 13388 was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist | |
| 13389 does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts. | |
| 13390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32405] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 13391 proceditur. Videtur quod imago Dei non inveniatur in anima secundum | |
| 13392 actus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XI de Civ. Dei, quod homo factus est | |
| 13393 ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod <i>sumus, et nos esse novimus, et id | |
| 13394 esse ac nosse diligimus</i>. Sed esse non significat actum. Ergo | |
| 13395 imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p3"> | |
| 13396 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things---mind, knowledge, and love. But | |
| 13397 mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does | |
| 13398 not extend to the acts of the soul. | |
| 13399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32406] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13400 Augustinus, in IX de Trin., assignat imaginem Dei in anima secundum | |
| 13401 haec tria, quae sunt mens, notitia et amor. Mens autem non | |
| 13402 significat actum; sed magis potentiam, vel etiam essentiam | |
| 13403 intellectivae animae. Ergo imago Dei non attenditur secundum | |
| 13404 actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p4"> | |
| 13405 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But | |
| 13406 these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of | |
| 13407 God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul. | |
| 13408 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32407] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13409 Augustinus, X de Trin., assignat imaginem Trinitatis in anima | |
| 13410 secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem. Sed haec tria sunt | |
| 13411 vires naturales animae, ut Magister dicit, III distinctione I libri | |
| 13412 Sent. Ergo imago attenditur secundum potentias, et non secundum | |
| 13413 actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p5"> | |
| 13414 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God | |
| 13415 does not extend to the acts. | |
| 13416 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="32408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32408] Iª q. 93 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, imago | |
| 13417 Trinitatis semper manet in anima. Sed actus non semper manet. Ergo | |
| 13418 imago Dei non attenditur in anima secundum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p6"> | |
| 13419 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether | |
| 13420 sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be | |
| 13421 referred to actual vision. | |
| 13422 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32409] Iª q. 93 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13423 quod Augustinus, XI de Trin., assignat Trinitatem in inferioribus | |
| 13424 animae partibus secundum actualem visionem sensibilem et | |
| 13425 imaginariam. Ergo et Trinitas quae est in mente, secundum quam homo | |
| 13426 est ad imaginem Dei, debet attendi secundum actualem visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p7"> | |
| 13427 <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained | |
| 13428 <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is | |
| 13429 to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the | |
| 13430 Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, | |
| 13431 and the procession of Love connecting | |
| 13432 Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and | |
| 13433 chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we | |
| 13434 possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are | |
| 13435 the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image | |
| 13436 of | |
| 13437 the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist | |
| 13438 therein. | |
| 13439 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 co."><a name="32410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32410] Iª q. 93 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13440 quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad rationem imaginis pertinet | |
| 13441 aliqualis repraesentatio speciei. Si ergo imago Trinitatis divinae | |
| 13442 debet accipi in anima, oportet quod secundum illud principaliter | |
| 13443 attendatur, quod maxime accedit, prout possibile est, ad | |
| 13444 repraesentandum speciem divinarum personarum. Divinae autem | |
| 13445 personae distinguuntur secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et | |
| 13446 amoris connectentis utrumque. Verbum autem in anima nostra sine | |
| 13447 actuali cogitatione esse non potest, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de | |
| 13448 Trin. Et ideo primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in | |
| 13449 mente secundum actus, prout scilicet ex notitia quam habemus, | |
| 13450 cogitando interius verbum formamus, et ex hoc in amorem | |
| 13451 prorumpimus. Sed quia principia actuum sunt habitus et potentiae; | |
| 13452 unumquodque autem virtualiter est in suo principio, secundario, et | |
| 13453 quasi ex consequenti, imago Trinitatis potest attendi in anima | |
| 13454 secundum potentias, et praecipue secundum habitus, prout in eis | |
| 13455 scilicet actus virtualiter existunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p8"> | |
| 13456 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so | |
| 13457 far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), | |
| 13458 and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love. | |
| 13459 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32411] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13460 dicendum quod esse nostrum ad imaginem Dei pertinet, quod est nobis | |
| 13461 proprium supra alia animalia; quod quidem esse competit nobis | |
| 13462 inquantum mentem habemus. Et ideo eadem est haec Trinitas cum illa | |
| 13463 quam Augustinus ponit in IX de Trin., quae consistit in mente, | |
| 13464 notitia et amore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p9"> | |
| 13465 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in | |
| 13466 a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself---namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches | |
| 13467 itself, as Augustine subsequently proves---De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to | |
| 13468 mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, | |
| 13469 understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to | |
| 13470 these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient. | |
| 13471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32412] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13472 dicendum quod Augustinus hanc Trinitatem primo adinvenit in mente. | |
| 13473 Sed quia mens, etsi se totam quodammodo cognoscat, etiam quodammodo | |
| 13474 se ignorat, prout scilicet est ab aliis distincta; et sic etiam se | |
| 13475 quaerit, ut Augustinus consequenter probat in X de Trin., ideo, | |
| 13476 quasi notitia non totaliter menti coaequetur, accipit in anima tria | |
| 13477 quaedam propria mentis, scilicet memoriam, intelligentiam et | |
| 13478 voluntatem, quae nullus ignorat se habere, et in istis tribus | |
| 13479 potius imaginem Trinitatis assignat, quasi prima assignatio sit | |
| 13480 quodammodo deficiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p10"> | |
| 13481 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually | |
| 13482 consider them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our | |
| 13483 memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. | |
| 13484 <a href="#FP_Q79_A7" id="FP_Q93_A7-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[7]</a>, ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without | |
| 13485 actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), | |
| 13486 this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that | |
| 13487 whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent." | |
| 13488 From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in | |
| 13489 these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul | |
| 13490 in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers | |
| 13491 as stated in the Sentences. | |
| 13492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32413] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13493 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus probat XIV de Trin., intelligere | |
| 13494 dicimur et velle seu amare aliqua, et quando de his cogitamus, et | |
| 13495 quando de his non cogitamus. Sed quando sine cogitatione sunt, ad | |
| 13496 solam memoriam pertinent; quae nihil est aliud, secundum ipsum, | |
| 13497 quam habitualis retentio notitiae et amoris. Sed quia, ut ipse | |
| 13498 dicit, <i>verbum ibi esse sine cogitatione non potest (cogitamus | |
| 13499 enim omne quod dicimus etiam illo interiori verbo quod ad nullius | |
| 13500 gentis pertinet linguam), in tribus potius illis imago ista | |
| 13501 cognoscitur, memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate. Hanc | |
| 13502 autem nunc dico intelligentiam, qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam | |
| 13503 voluntatem sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem | |
| 13504 parentemque coniungit</i>. Ex quo patet quod imaginem divinae | |
| 13505 Trinitatis potius ponit in intelligentia et voluntate actuali, quam | |
| 13506 secundum quod sunt in habituali retentione memoriae, licet etiam | |
| 13507 quantum ad hoc, aliquo modo sit imago Trinitatis in anima, ut | |
| 13508 ibidem dicitur. Et sic patet quod memoria, intelligentia et | |
| 13509 voluntas non sunt tres vires, ut in sententiis dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A7-p11"> | |
| 13510 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever | |
| 13511 understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. | |
| 13512 But he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." | |
| 13513 Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually | |
| 13514 but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. | |
| 13515 But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always | |
| 13516 actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): | |
| 13517 "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand | |
| 13518 and | |
| 13519 consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence." | |
| 13520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="32414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32414] Iª q. 93 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13521 dicendum quod aliquis respondere posset per hoc quod Augustinus | |
| 13522 dicit XIV de Trin., quod <i>mens semper sui meminit, semper se | |
| 13523 intelligit et amat</i>. Quod quidam sic intelligunt, quasi animae | |
| 13524 adsit actualis intelligentia et amor sui ipsius. Sed hunc | |
| 13525 intellectum excludit per hoc quod subdit, quod <i>non semper se | |
| 13526 cogitat discretam ab his quae non sunt quod ipsa</i>. Et sic patet | |
| 13527 quod anima semper intelligit et amat se, non actualiter, sed | |
| 13528 habitualiter. Quamvis etiam dici possit quod, percipiendo actum | |
| 13529 suum, seipsam intelligit quandocumque aliquid intelligit. Sed quia | |
| 13530 non semper est actu intelligens, ut patet in dormiente, ideo | |
| 13531 oportet dicere quod actus, etsi non semper maneant in seipsis, | |
| 13532 manent tamen semper in suis principiis, scilicet potentiis et | |
| 13533 habitibus. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., <i>si secundum hoc | |
| 13534 facta est ad imaginem Dei anima rationalis, quod uti ratione atque | |
| 13535 intellectu ad intelligendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, ab initio | |
| 13536 quo esse coepit, fuit in ea Dei imago</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A8-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 8. Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p2"> | |
| 13537 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the | |
| 13538 image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above | |
| 13539 <a href="#FP_Q93_A7" id="FP_Q93_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>, according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any | |
| 13540 object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object. | |
| 13541 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32415] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 13542 proceditur. Videtur quod imago divinae Trinitatis sit in anima non | |
| 13543 solum per comparationem ad obiectum quod est Deus. Imago enim | |
| 13544 divinae Trinitatis invenitur in anima, sicut dictum est, secundum | |
| 13545 quod verbum in nobis procedit a dicente et amor ab utroque. Sed hoc | |
| 13546 invenitur in nobis secundum quodcumque obiectum. Ergo secundum | |
| 13547 quodcumque obiectum invenitur in mente nostra imago divinae | |
| 13548 Trinitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p3"> | |
| 13549 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without | |
| 13550 separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of | |
| 13551 the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. | |
| 13552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32416] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13553 Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., quod <i>cum quaerimus in anima | |
| 13554 Trinitatem, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem | |
| 13555 in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum</i>. Ergo etiam | |
| 13556 secundum temporalia obiecta invenitur imago Trinitatis in | |
| 13557 anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p4"> | |
| 13558 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason | |
| 13559 of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common | |
| 13560 to all. | |
| 13561 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32417] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 13562 Deum intelligamus et amemus, convenit nobis secundum gratiae donum. | |
| 13563 Si igitur secundum memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem seu | |
| 13564 dilectionem Dei, attendatur imago Trinitatis in anima, non erit | |
| 13565 imago Dei in homine secundum naturam, sed secundum gratiam. Et sic | |
| 13566 non erit omnibus communis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p5"> | |
| 13567 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written | |
| 13568 ( | |
| 13569 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:18</a>): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. | |
| 13570 Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things. | |
| 13571 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="32418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32418] Iª q. 93 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13572 sancti qui sunt in patria, maxime conformantur imagini Dei secundum | |
| 13573 gloriae visionem, unde dicitur, II ad Cor. III, <i>in eandem | |
| 13574 imaginem transformamur, a claritate in claritatem</i>. Sed secundum | |
| 13575 visionem gloriae temporalia cognoscuntur. Ergo etiam per | |
| 13576 comparationem ad temporalia, Dei imago attenditur in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p6"> | |
| 13577 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves | |
| 13578 itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less, | |
| 13579 therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects. | |
| 13580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32419] Iª q. 93 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13581 quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod <i>non propterea est Dei | |
| 13582 imago in mente, quia sui meminit, et intelligit et diligit se, sed | |
| 13583 quia potest etiam meminisse, intelligere et amare Deum, a quo facta | |
| 13584 est</i>. Multo igitur minus secundum alia obiecta attenditur imago | |
| 13585 Dei in mente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7"> | |
| 13586 <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( | |
| 13587 <a href="#FP_Q93_A2" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we | |
| 13588 need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, | |
| 13589 so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated ( | |
| 13590 <a href="#FP_Q93_A6" id="FP_Q93_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">AA[6]</a>,7), are distinguished from each other according to the | |
| 13591 procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by | |
| 13592 the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects | |
| 13593 diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that | |
| 13594 of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to | |
| 13595 the | |
| 13596 verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul | |
| 13597 according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an | |
| 13598 object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected | |
| 13599 in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind remembers | |
| 13600 itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, | |
| 13601 rightly called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby | |
| 13602 it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary). | |
| 13603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 co."><a name="32420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32420] Iª q. 93 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13604 quod, sicut supra dictum est, imago importat similitudinem utcumque | |
| 13605 pertingentem ad speciei repraesentationem. Unde oportet quod imago | |
| 13606 divinae Trinitatis attendatur in anima secundum aliquid quod | |
| 13607 repraesentat divinas personas repraesentatione speciei, sicut est | |
| 13608 possibile creaturae. Distinguuntur autem divinae personae, ut | |
| 13609 dictum est, secundum processionem verbi a dicente, et amoris ab | |
| 13610 utroque. Verbum autem Dei nascitur de Deo secundum notitiam sui | |
| 13611 ipsius, et amor procedit a Deo secundum quod seipsum amat. | |
| 13612 Manifestum est autem quod diversitas obiectorum diversificat | |
| 13613 speciem verbi et amoris, non enim idem est specie in corde hominis | |
| 13614 verbum conceptum de lapide et de equo, nec idem specie amor. | |
| 13615 Attenditur igitur divina imago in homine secundum verbum conceptum | |
| 13616 de Dei notitia, et amorem exinde derivatum. Et sic imago Dei | |
| 13617 attenditur in anima secundum quod fertur, vel nata est ferri in | |
| 13618 Deum. Fertur autem in aliquid mens dupliciter, uno modo, directe et | |
| 13619 immediate; alio modo, indirecte et mediate, sicut cum aliquis, | |
| 13620 videndo imaginem hominis in speculo, dicitur ferri in ipsum | |
| 13621 hominem. Et ideo Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod <i>mens | |
| 13622 meminit sui, intelligit se, et diligit se, hoc si cernimus, | |
| 13623 cernimus Trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei</i>. | |
| 13624 Sed hoc est, non quia fertur mens in seipsam absolute, sed prout | |
| 13625 per hoc ulterius potest ferri in Deum; ut patet per auctoritatem | |
| 13626 supra inductam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p8"> | |
| 13627 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what | |
| 13628 proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God. | |
| 13629 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32421] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13630 dicendum quod ad rationem imaginis, non solum oportet attendere | |
| 13631 quod aliquid procedat ab aliquo; sed etiam quid a quo procedat, | |
| 13632 scilicet quod verbum Dei procedit a notitia de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p9"> | |
| 13633 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation | |
| 13634 of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that | |
| 13635 part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not | |
| 13636 to be seen there," as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of | |
| 13637 temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; | |
| 13638 but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. | |
| 13639 Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will | |
| 13640 no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith. | |
| 13641 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32422] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13642 dicendum quod in tota quidem anima invenitur aliqua Trinitas, non | |
| 13643 quidem ita quod praeter actionem temporalium et contemplationem | |
| 13644 aeternorum, <i>quaeratur aliquod tertium quo Trinitas | |
| 13645 impleatur</i>, prout ibidem subditur. Sed in illa parte rationis | |
| 13646 quae derivatur a parte temporalium, etsi <i>Trinitas inveniri | |
| 13647 possit, non tamen imago Dei potest inveniri</i>, ut postea dicitur, | |
| 13648 quia huiusmodi temporalium notitia adventitia est animae. Et | |
| 13649 habitus etiam ipsi quibus temporalia cognoscuntur, non semper | |
| 13650 adsunt; sed quandoque quidem praesentialiter adsunt, quandoque | |
| 13651 autem secundum memoriam tantum, etiam postquam adesse incipiunt. | |
| 13652 Sicut patet de fide, quae temporaliter nobis advenit in praesenti, | |
| 13653 in statu autem futurae beatitudinis iam non erit fides, sed memoria | |
| 13654 fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10"> | |
| 13655 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as | |
| 13656 seen above ( | |
| 13657 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>; | |
| 13658 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A3" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>; | |
| 13659 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q60_A5" id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.3" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already | |
| 13660 said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be | |
| 13661 so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured | |
| 13662 and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6). | |
| 13663 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32423] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13664 dicendum quod meritoria Dei cognitio et dilectio non est nisi per | |
| 13665 gratiam. Est tamen aliqua Dei cognitio et dilectio naturalis, ut | |
| 13666 supra habitum est. Et hoc etiam ipsum naturale est, quod mens ad | |
| 13667 intelligendum Deum ratione uti potest, secundum quod imaginem Dei | |
| 13668 semper diximus permanere in mente, sive haec imago Dei ita sit | |
| 13669 obsoleta, quasi obumbrata, ut pene nulla sit, ut in his qui non | |
| 13670 habent usum rationis; sive sit obscura atque deformis, ut in | |
| 13671 peccatoribus; sive sit clara et pulchra, ut in iustis, sicut | |
| 13672 Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A8-p11"> | |
| 13673 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the | |
| 13674 image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully | |
| 13675 adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures. | |
| 13676 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="32424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32424] Iª q. 93 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13677 dicendum quod secundum visionem gloriae, temporalia videbuntur in | |
| 13678 ipso Deo; et ideo huiusmodi temporalium visio ad Dei imaginem | |
| 13679 pertinebit. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Trin., quod | |
| 13680 <i>in illa natura cui mens feliciter adhaerebit, immutabile videbit | |
| 13681 omne quod viderit</i>. Nam et in ipso verbo increato sunt rationes | |
| 13682 omnium creaturarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q93_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q93_A9-p0.1">Q. 93. A. 9. Whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p2"> | |
| 13683 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." For "genus" is not properly distinguished from | |
| 13684 "species." Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, | |
| 13685 but not conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness" is not properly to be distinguished from "image." | |
| 13686 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="32425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32425] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 13687 proceditur. Videtur quod similitudo ab imagine non convenienter | |
| 13688 distinguatur. Genus enim non convenienter distinguitur a specie. | |
| 13689 Sed similitudo comparatur ad imaginem, ut genus ad speciem, quia | |
| 13690 <i>ubi est imago, ibi est continuo similitudo, sed non | |
| 13691 convertitur</i>, ut dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo | |
| 13692 inconvenienter similitudo ab imagine distinguitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p3"> | |
| 13693 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation | |
| 13694 of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness | |
| 13695 is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi). | |
| 13696 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="32426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32426] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ratio | |
| 13697 imaginis attenditur non solum secundum repraesentationem divinarum | |
| 13698 personarum, sed etiam secundum repraesentationem divinae essentiae, | |
| 13699 ad quam repraesentationem pertinet immortalitas et indivisibilitas. | |
| 13700 Non ergo convenienter dicitur quod <i>similitudo est in essentia, | |
| 13701 quia est immortalis et indivisibilis; imago autem in aliis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p4"> | |
| 13702 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the image of God in man is threefold---the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained | |
| 13703 <a href="#FP_Q93_A4" id="FP_Q93_A9-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is | |
| 13704 taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness." | |
| 13705 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="32427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32427] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, imago | |
| 13706 Dei in homine est triplex, scilicet naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut | |
| 13707 supra habitum est. Sed innocentia et iustitia ad gratiam pertinent. | |
| 13708 Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod <i>imago accipitur secundum | |
| 13709 memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem; similitudo autem secundum | |
| 13710 innocentiam et iustitiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p5"> | |
| 13711 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. | |
| 13712 Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in | |
| 13713 the love of virtue." | |
| 13714 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 arg. 4"><a name="32428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32428] Iª q. 93 a. 9 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13715 cognitio veritatis ad intelligentiam pertinet, amor autem virtutis | |
| 13716 ad voluntatem, quae sunt duae partes imaginis. Non ergo | |
| 13717 convenienter dicitur quod <i>imago sit in cognitione veritatis, | |
| 13718 similitudo in dilectione virtutis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p6"> | |
| 13719 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and "likeness," | |
| 13720 since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed." | |
| 13721 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 s. c."><a name="32429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32429] Iª q. 93 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13722 quod Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>sunt | |
| 13723 qui non frustra intelligunt duo dicta esse ad imaginem et | |
| 13724 similitudinem; cum, si una res esset, unum nomen sufficere | |
| 13725 potuisset</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p7"> | |
| 13726 <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, | |
| 13727 since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. | |
| 13728 Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying | |
| 13729 some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between | |
| 13730 "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is | |
| 13731 subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, | |
| 13732 likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we | |
| 13733 have said above | |
| 13734 <a href="#FP_Q93_A1" id="FP_Q93_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>: and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it | |
| 13735 signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation | |
| 13736 is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in | |
| 13737 more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the | |
| 13738 image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without | |
| 13739 doubt was made to the image of God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the | |
| 13740 body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of | |
| 13741 God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness | |
| 13742 may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says | |
| 13743 (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness | |
| 13744 implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the | |
| 13745 love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue. | |
| 13746 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 co."><a name="32430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32430] Iª q. 93 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13747 quod similitudo quaedam unitas est, unum enim in qualitate | |
| 13748 similitudinem causat, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Unum autem, cum sit | |
| 13749 de transcendentibus, et commune est omnibus, et ad singula potest | |
| 13750 aptari; sicut et bonum et verum. Unde, sicut bonum alicui rei | |
| 13751 particulari potest comparari ut praeambulum ad ipsam, et ut | |
| 13752 subsequens, prout designat aliquam perfectionem ipsius; ita etiam | |
| 13753 est de comparatione similitudinis ad imaginem. Est enim bonum | |
| 13754 praeambulum ad hominem, secundum quod homo est quoddam particulare | |
| 13755 bonum, et rursus bonum subsequitur ad hominem, inquantum aliquem | |
| 13756 hominem specialiter dicimus esse bonum, propter perfectionem | |
| 13757 virtutis. Et similiter similitudo consideratur ut praeambulum ad | |
| 13758 imaginem, inquantum est communius quam imago, ut supra dictum est, | |
| 13759 consideratur etiam ut subsequens ad imaginem, inquantum significat | |
| 13760 quandam imaginis perfectionem; dicimus enim imaginem alicuius esse | |
| 13761 similem vel non similem ei cuius est imago, inquantum perfecte vel | |
| 13762 imperfecte repraesentat ipsum. Sic ergo similitudo potest ab | |
| 13763 imagine distingui dupliciter. Uno modo, prout est praeambula ad | |
| 13764 ipsam, et in pluribus existens. Et sic similitudo attenditur | |
| 13765 secundum ea quae sunt communiora proprietatibus naturae | |
| 13766 intellectualis, secundum quas proprie attenditur imago. Et secundum | |
| 13767 hoc dicitur in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod spiritus, idest | |
| 13768 mens, ad imaginem Dei, nullo dubitante, factus est, cetera autem | |
| 13769 hominis, scilicet quae pertinent ad inferiores partes animae, vel | |
| 13770 etiam ad ipsum corpus, ad similitudinem facta esse aliqui volunt. | |
| 13771 Secundum hoc etiam in libro de quantitate animae dicitur quod | |
| 13772 similitudo Dei attenditur in anima, inquantum est incorruptibilis, | |
| 13773 nam corruptibile et incorruptibile sunt differentiae entis | |
| 13774 communis. Alio modo potest considerari similitudo, secundum quod | |
| 13775 significat imaginis expressionem et perfectionem. Et secundum hoc | |
| 13776 Damascenus dicit quod <i>id quod est secundum imaginem, | |
| 13777 intellectuale significat, et arbitrio liberum per se potestativum, | |
| 13778 quod autem secundum similitudinem, virtutis, secundum quod homini | |
| 13779 possibile est inesse, similitudinem</i>. Et ad idem refertur quod | |
| 13780 similitudo dicitur ad dilectionem virtutis pertinere, non enim est | |
| 13781 virtus sine dilectione virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p8"> | |
| 13782 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so | |
| 13783 far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea of "image." | |
| 13784 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="32431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32431] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13785 dicendum quod similitudo non distinguitur ab imagine secundum | |
| 13786 communem rationem similitudinis (sic enim includitur in ratione | |
| 13787 ipsius imaginis), sed secundum quod aliqua similitudo deficit a | |
| 13788 ratione imaginis, vel etiam est imaginis perfectiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p9"> | |
| 13789 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual | |
| 13790 nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility. | |
| 13791 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="32432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32432] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13792 dicendum quod essentia animae pertinet ad imaginem, prout | |
| 13793 repraesentat divinam essentiam secundum ea quae sunt propria | |
| 13794 intellectualis naturae, non autem secundum conditiones consequentes | |
| 13795 ens in communi, ut est esse simplicem et indissolubilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p10"> | |
| 13796 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" | |
| 13797 exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness." | |
| 13798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="32433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32433] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13799 dicendum quod etiam virtutes quaedam naturaliter insunt animae, ad | |
| 13800 minus secundum quaedam earum semina, et secundum has posset attendi | |
| 13801 similitudo naturalis. Quamvis non sit inconveniens ut id quod | |
| 13802 secundum assignationem unam dicitur imago, secundum aliam dicatur | |
| 13803 similitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q93_A9-p11"> | |
| 13804 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as | |
| 13805 virtue itself belongs to likeness. | |
| 13806 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 93 a. 9 ad 4"><a name="32434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32434] Iª q. 93 a. 9 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13807 dicendum quod dilectio verbi, quod est amata notitia, pertinet ad | |
| 13808 rationem imaginis, sed dilectio virtutis pertinet ad similitudinem, | |
| 13809 sicut et virtus.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 13810 <div id="FP_Q94" class="div3"> | |
| 13811 <h3 id="FP_Q94-p0.1">Q. 94. OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 13812 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 13813 <p id="FP_Q94-p2"> We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning | |
| 13814 the first there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as | |
| 13815 to his will. | |
| 13816 </p><p id="FP_Q94-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q94-p4"><a href="#FP_Q94_A1"> (1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p5"><a href="#FP_Q94_A2"> (2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p6"><a href="#FP_Q94_A3"> (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q94-p7"><a href="#FP_Q94_A4"> (4) Whether he could err or be deceived?</a></p> | |
| 13817 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 pr."><a name="32435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32435] | |
| 13818 Iª q. 94 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de statu vel | |
| 13819 conditione primi hominis. Et primo, quantum ad animam; secundo, | |
| 13820 quantum ad corpus. Circa primum consideranda sunt duo, primo, de | |
| 13821 conditione hominis quantum ad intellectum; secundo, de conditione | |
| 13822 hominis quantum ad voluntatem. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. | |
| 13823 Primo, utrum primus homo viderit Deum per essentiam. Secundo, utrum | |
| 13824 videre potuerit substantias separatas, idest Angelos. Tertio, utrum | |
| 13825 habuerit omnium scientiam. Quarto, utrum potuerit errare vel | |
| 13826 decipi.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 13827 <div id="FP_Q94_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A1-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 1. Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p2"> | |
| 13828 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. | |
| 13829 But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says | |
| 13830 (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy | |
| 13831 must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the first | |
| 13832 man in paradise saw God through His Essence. | |
| 13833 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32436] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 13834 proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo per essentiam Deum viderit. | |
| 13835 Beatitudo enim hominis in visione divinae essentiae consistit. Sed | |
| 13836 primus homo, in Paradiso conversans, beatam et omnium divitem | |
| 13837 habuit vitam, ut Damascenus dicit in II libro. Et Augustinus dicit, | |
| 13838 in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>si homines habebant affectus suos quales | |
| 13839 nunc habemus, quomodo erant beati in illo inenarrabilis | |
| 13840 beatitudinis loco, idest Paradiso?</i> Ergo primus homo in Paradiso | |
| 13841 vidit Deum per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p3"> | |
| 13842 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that "the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." | |
| 13843 But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence. | |
| 13844 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32437] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13845 Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>primo homini non aberat | |
| 13846 quidquam quod bona voluntas adipisceretur</i>. Sed nihil melius | |
| 13847 bona voluntas adipisci potest quam divinae essentiae visionem. Ergo | |
| 13848 homo per essentiam Deum videbat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p4"> | |
| 13849 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the vision of God is His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence | |
| 13850 "saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma | |
| 13851 implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state | |
| 13852 saw God through His Essence. | |
| 13853 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32438] Iª q. 94 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, visio | |
| 13854 Dei per essentiam est qua videtur Deus sine medio et sine | |
| 13855 aenigmate. Sed homo in statu innocentiae vidit Deum sine medio; ut | |
| 13856 Magister dicit in I distinctione IV libri Sent. Vidit etiam sine | |
| 13857 aenigmate, quia aenigma obscuritatem importat, ut Augustinus dicit, | |
| 13858 XV de Trin.; obscuritas autem introducta est per peccatum. Ergo | |
| 13859 homo in primo statu vidit Deum per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p5"> | |
| 13860 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 13861 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.46" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:46</a>): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. | |
| 13862 Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence. | |
| 13863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32439] Iª q. 94 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13864 quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XV, quod <i>non prius quod | |
| 13865 spirituale est, sed quod animale</i>. Sed maxime spirituale est | |
| 13866 videre Deum per essentiam. Ergo primus homo, in primo statu | |
| 13867 animalis vitae, Deum per essentiam non vidit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A1-p6"> | |
| 13868 <b>I answer that,</b> The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be | |
| 13869 said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam" ( | |
| 13870 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.21" target="asv">Gn. 2:21</a>). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence | |
| 13871 has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, | |
| 13872 since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly | |
| 13873 turn away from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of | |
| 13874 God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence. | |
| 13875 </p><p id="FP_Q94_A1-p7"> Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our | |
| 13876 knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this | |
| 13877 clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His | |
| 13878 creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in | |
| 13879 it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is | |
| 13880 seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. | |
| 13881 But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he | |
| 13882 is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written ( | |
| 13883 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>): "God made man | |
| 13884 right." And man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher | |
| 13885 nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear | |
| 13886 and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a | |
| 13887 natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak to the | |
| 13888 first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him | |
| 13889 the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible | |
| 13890 effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now. | |
| 13891 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 co."><a name="32440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32440] Iª q. 94 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13892 quod primus homo Deum per essentiam non vidit, secundum communem | |
| 13893 statum illius vitae; nisi forte dicatur quod viderit eum in raptu, | |
| 13894 quando Deus immisit soporem in Adam, ut dicitur Gen. II. Et huius | |
| 13895 ratio est quia, cum divina essentia sit ipsa beatitudo, hoc modo se | |
| 13896 habet intellectus videntis divinam essentiam ad Deum, sicut se | |
| 13897 habet quilibet homo ad beatitudinem. Manifestum est autem quod | |
| 13898 nullus homo potest per voluntatem a beatitudine averti, naturaliter | |
| 13899 enim, et ex necessitate, homo vult beatitudinem, et fugit miseriam. | |
| 13900 Unde nullus videns Deum per essentiam, potest voluntate averti a | |
| 13901 Deo, quod est peccare. Et propter hoc, omnes videntes Deum per | |
| 13902 essentiam, sic in amore Dei stabiliuntur, quod in aeternum peccare | |
| 13903 non possunt. Cum ergo Adam peccaverit, manifestum est quod Deum per | |
| 13904 essentiam non videbat. Cognoscebat tamen Deum quadam altiori | |
| 13905 cognitione quam nos cognoscamus, et sic quodammodo eius cognitio | |
| 13906 media erat inter cognitionem praesentis status, et cognitionem | |
| 13907 patriae, qua Deus per essentiam videtur. Ad cuius evidentiam, | |
| 13908 considerandum est quod visio Dei per essentiam dividitur contra | |
| 13909 visionem Dei per creaturam. Quanto autem aliqua creatura est altior | |
| 13910 et Deo similior, tanto per eam Deus clarius videtur, sicut homo | |
| 13911 perfectius videtur per speculum in quo expressius imago eius | |
| 13912 resultat. Et sic patet quod multo eminentius videtur Deus per | |
| 13913 intelligibiles effectus, quam per sensibiles et corporeos. A | |
| 13914 consideratione autem plena et lucida intelligibilium effectuum | |
| 13915 impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahitur a | |
| 13916 sensibilibus, et circa ea occupatur. Sed, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, | |
| 13917 Deus fecit hominem rectum. Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis | |
| 13918 divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderentur, et | |
| 13919 superiora ab inferioribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non | |
| 13920 impediebatur per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplatione | |
| 13921 intelligibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiatione primae veritatis | |
| 13922 percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita. Unde dicit | |
| 13923 Augustinus, in XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>fortassis Deus | |
| 13924 primis hominibus antea loquebatur, sicut cum Angelis loquitur, ipsa | |
| 13925 incommutabili veritate illustrans mentes eorum; etsi non tanta | |
| 13926 participatione divinae essentiae, quantam capiunt Angeli</i>. Sic | |
| 13927 igitur per huiusmodi intelligibiles effectus Dei, Deum clarius | |
| 13928 cognoscebat quam modo cognoscamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p8"> | |
| 13929 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of | |
| 13930 the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. | |
| 13931 xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection. | |
| 13932 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32441] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13933 dicendum quod homo in Paradiso beatus fuit, non illa perfecta | |
| 13934 beatitudine in quam transferendus erat, quae in divinae essentiae | |
| 13935 visione consistit, habebat tamen beatam vitam secundum quendam | |
| 13936 modum, ut Augustinus dicit XI super Gen. ad Litt., inquantum | |
| 13937 habebat integritatem et perfectionem quandam naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p9"> | |
| 13938 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while | |
| 13939 in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward. | |
| 13940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32442] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13941 dicendum quod bona voluntas est ordinata voluntas. Non autem | |
| 13942 fuisset primi hominis ordinata voluntas, si in statu meriti habere | |
| 13943 voluisset quod ei promittebatur pro praemio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A1-p10"> | |
| 13944 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, | |
| 13945 a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge | |
| 13946 of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without | |
| 13947 the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the | |
| 13948 knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, | |
| 13949 especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied | |
| 13950 in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity | |
| 13951 of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take | |
| 13952 obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with | |
| 13953 sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma. | |
| 13954 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32443] Iª q. 94 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13955 dicendum quod duplex est medium. Quoddam, in quo simul videtur quod | |
| 13956 per medium videri dicitur; sicut cum homo videtur per speculum, et | |
| 13957 simul videtur cum ipso speculo. Aliud medium est, per cuius | |
| 13958 notitiam in aliquid ignotum devenimus; sicut est medium | |
| 13959 demonstrationis. Et sine tali medio Deus videbatur, non tamen sine | |
| 13960 primo medio. Non enim oportebat primum hominem pervenire in Dei | |
| 13961 cognitionem per demonstrationem sumptam ab aliquo effectu, sicut | |
| 13962 nobis est necessarium; sed simul in effectibus, praecipue | |
| 13963 intelligibilibus, suo modo Deum cognoscebat. Similiter etiam est | |
| 13964 considerandum quod obscuritas quae importatur in nomine aenigmatis, | |
| 13965 dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo, secundum quod quaelibet | |
| 13966 creatura est quoddam obscurum, si comparetur ad immensitatem | |
| 13967 divinae claritatis, et sic Adam videbat Deum in aenigmate, quia | |
| 13968 videbat Deum per effectum creatum. Alio modo potest accipi | |
| 13969 obscuritas quae consecuta est ex peccato, prout scilicet impeditur | |
| 13970 homo a consideratione intelligibilium per sensibilium occupationem, | |
| 13971 et secundum hoc, non vidit Deum in aenigmate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A3-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 3. Whether the first man knew all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p2"> | |
| 13972 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, | |
| 13973 or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired | |
| 13974 by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural | |
| 13975 species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says | |
| 13976 (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it | |
| 13977 would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves. | |
| 13978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32452] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 13979 proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non habuerit scientiam omnium. | |
| 13980 Aut enim habuit talem scientiam per species acquisitas, aut per | |
| 13981 species connaturales, aut per species infusas. Non autem per | |
| 13982 species acquisitas, huiusmodi enim cognitio ab experientia | |
| 13983 causatur, ut dicitur in I Metaphys.; ipse autem non tunc fuerat | |
| 13984 omnia expertus. Similiter etiam nec per species connaturales, quia | |
| 13985 erat eiusdem naturae nobiscum; anima autem nostra est sicut tabula | |
| 13986 in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Si autem per | |
| 13987 species infusas, ergo scientia eius quam habebat de rebus, non erat | |
| 13988 eiusdem rationis cum scientia nostra, quam a rebus acquirimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p3"> | |
| 13989 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, | |
| 13990 knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam | |
| 13991 know all things when he was first created. | |
| 13992 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32453] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 13993 omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei est idem modus consequendi | |
| 13994 perfectionem. Sed alii homines non statim in sui principio habent | |
| 13995 omnium scientiam, sed eam per temporis successionem acquirunt | |
| 13996 secundum suum modum. Ergo nec Adam, statim formatus, habuit omnium | |
| 13997 scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p4"> | |
| 13998 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the | |
| 13999 soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore | |
| 14000 also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things. | |
| 14001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32454] Iª q. 94 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14002 status praesentis vitae homini conceditur ut in eo proficiat anima | |
| 14003 et quantum ad cognitionem, et quantum ad meritum; propter hoc enim | |
| 14004 anima corpori videtur esse unita. Sed homo in statu illo | |
| 14005 profecisset quantum ad meritum. Ergo etiam profecisset quantum ad | |
| 14006 cognitionem rerum. Non ergo habuit omnium rerum scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p5"> | |
| 14007 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man named the animals ( | |
| 14008 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.20" target="asv">Gn. 2:20</a>). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals' natures; and in like manner he was | |
| 14009 possessed of the knowledge of all other things. | |
| 14010 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32455] Iª q. 94 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14011 quod ipse imposuit nomina animalibus, ut dicitur Gen. II. Nomina | |
| 14012 autem debent naturis rerum congruere. Ergo Adam scivit naturas | |
| 14013 omnium animalium, et pari ratione, habuit omnium aliorum | |
| 14014 scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A3-p6"> | |
| 14015 <b>I answer that,</b> In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality | |
| 14016 is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they | |
| 14017 might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards | |
| 14018 others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but | |
| 14019 also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the | |
| 14020 work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others. | |
| 14021 </p><p id="FP_Q94_A3-p7"> Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to | |
| 14022 have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in | |
| 14023 the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his | |
| 14024 own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things | |
| 14025 surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to | |
| 14026 know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these | |
| 14027 supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known | |
| 14028 by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such | |
| 14029 as | |
| 14030 the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; | |
| 14031 and the like. | |
| 14032 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 co."><a name="32456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32456] Iª q. 94 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14033 quod naturali ordine perfectum praecedit imperfectum, sicut et | |
| 14034 actus potentiam, quia ea quae sunt in potentia, non reducuntur ad | |
| 14035 actum nisi per aliquod ens actu. Et quia res primitus a Deo | |
| 14036 institutae sunt, non solum ut in seipsis essent, sed etiam ut | |
| 14037 essent aliorum principia; ideo productae sunt in statu perfecto, in | |
| 14038 quo possent esse principia aliorum. Homo autem potest esse | |
| 14039 principium alterius non solum per generationem corporalem, sed | |
| 14040 etiam per instructionem et gubernationem. Et ideo, sicut primus | |
| 14041 homo institutus est in statu perfecto quantum ad corpus, ut statim | |
| 14042 posset generare; ita etiam institutus est in statu perfecto quantum | |
| 14043 ad animam, ut statim posset alios instruere et gubernare. Non | |
| 14044 potest autem aliquis instruere, nisi habeat scientiam. Et ideo | |
| 14045 primus homo sic institutus est a Deo, ut haberet omnium scientiam | |
| 14046 in quibus homo natus est instrui. Et haec sunt omnia illa quae | |
| 14047 virtualiter existunt in primis principiis per se notis, quaecumque | |
| 14048 scilicet naturaliter homines cognoscere possunt. Ad gubernationem | |
| 14049 autem vitae propriae et aliorum, non solum requiritur cognitio | |
| 14050 eorum quae naturaliter sciri possunt, sed etiam cognitio eorum quae | |
| 14051 naturalem cognitionem excedunt; eo quod vita hominis ordinatur ad | |
| 14052 quendam finem supernaturalem; sicut nobis, ad gubernationem vitae | |
| 14053 nostrae, necessarium est cognoscere quae fidei sunt. Unde et de his | |
| 14054 supernaturalibus tantam cognitionem primus homo accepit, quanta | |
| 14055 erat necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae secundum statum | |
| 14056 illum. Alia vero, quae nec naturali hominis studio cognosci | |
| 14057 possunt, nec sunt necessaria ad gubernationem vitae humanae, primus | |
| 14058 homo non cognovit; sicut sunt cogitationes hominum, futura | |
| 14059 contingentia, et quaedam singularia, puta quot lapilli iaceant in | |
| 14060 flumine, et alia huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p8"> | |
| 14061 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as | |
| 14062 the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature. | |
| 14063 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32457] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14064 dicendum quod primus homo habuit scientiam omnium per species a Deo | |
| 14065 infusas. Nec tamen scientia illa fuit alterius rationis a scientia | |
| 14066 nostra; sicut nec oculi quos caeco nato Christus dedit, fuerunt | |
| 14067 alterius rationis ab oculis quos natura produxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p9"> | |
| 14068 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To Adam, as being the first man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what | |
| 14069 is above explained. | |
| 14070 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32458] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14071 dicendum quod Adam debebat aliquid habere perfectionis, inquantum | |
| 14072 erat primus homo, quod ceteris hominibus non competit; ut ex dictis | |
| 14073 patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A3-p10"> | |
| 14074 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what | |
| 14075 he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also | |
| 14076 have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. | |
| 14077 Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; | |
| 14078 since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge. | |
| 14079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32459] Iª q. 94 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14080 dicendum quod Adam in scientia naturalium scibilium non profecisset | |
| 14081 quantum ad numerum scitorum, sed quantum ad modum sciendi, quia | |
| 14082 quae sciebat intellectualiter, scivisset postmodum per | |
| 14083 experimentum. Quantum vero ad supernaturalia cognita, profecisset | |
| 14084 etiam quantum ad numerum, per novas revelationes; sicut et Angeli | |
| 14085 proficiunt per novas illuminationes. Nec tamen est simile de | |
| 14086 profectu meriti, et scientiae, quia unus homo non est alteri | |
| 14087 principium merendi, sicut est sciendi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q94_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q94_A4-p0.1">Q. 94. A. 4. Whether man in his first state could be deceived?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p2"> | |
| 14088 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 14089 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14</a>) that "the woman being seduced was in the transgression." | |
| 14090 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32460] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 14091 proceditur. Videtur quod homo in primo statu decipi potuisset. | |
| 14092 Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>mulier seducta in | |
| 14093 praevaricatione fuit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p3"> | |
| 14094 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought | |
| 14095 that he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived. | |
| 14096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32461] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14097 Magister dicit, XXI dist. II Sent., quod <i>ideo mulier non horruit | |
| 14098 serpentem loquentem, quia officium loquendi eum accepisse a Deo | |
| 14099 putavit</i>. Sed hoc falsum erat. Ergo mulier decepta fuit ante | |
| 14100 peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p4"> | |
| 14101 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes | |
| 14102 is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived | |
| 14103 in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now. | |
| 14104 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32462] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14105 naturale est quod quanto aliquid remotius videtur, tanto minus | |
| 14106 videtur. Sed natura oculi non est contracta per peccatum. Ergo hoc | |
| 14107 idem in statu innocentiae contigisset. Fuisset ergo homo deceptus | |
| 14108 circa quantitatem rei visae, sicut et modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p5"> | |
| 14109 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the | |
| 14110 things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he | |
| 14111 would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities. | |
| 14112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="32463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32463] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14113 Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod in somno adhaeret | |
| 14114 anima similitudini tanquam ipsi rei. Sed homo in statu innocentiae | |
| 14115 comedisset, et per consequens dormivisset et somniasset. Ergo | |
| 14116 deceptus fuisset, adhaerendo similitudinibus tanquam rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p6"> | |
| 14117 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above | |
| 14118 | |
| 14119 <a href="#FP_Q94_A3" id="FP_Q94_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived. | |
| 14120 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="32464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32464] Iª q. 94 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14121 primus homo nescivisset cogitationes hominum et futura | |
| 14122 contingentia, ut dictum est. Si igitur aliquis super his sibi | |
| 14123 falsum diceret, deceptus fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p7"> | |
| 14124 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment | |
| 14125 of man condemned." | |
| 14126 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32465] Iª q. 94 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14127 quod Augustinus dicit, <i>approbare vera pro falsis, non est natura | |
| 14128 instituti hominis, sed poena damnati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p8"> | |
| 14129 <b>I answer that,</b> in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, | |
| 14130 as though it were true, but without the assent of belief---or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be | |
| 14131 deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his | |
| 14132 knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide | |
| 14133 sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory | |
| 14134 to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed. | |
| 14135 </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p9"> Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says | |
| 14136 (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist." | |
| 14137 Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, | |
| 14138 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to | |
| 14139 assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the | |
| 14140 first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false | |
| 14141 opinion. | |
| 14142 </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p10"> This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to | |
| 14143 God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded | |
| 14144 ( | |
| 14145 <a href="#FP_Q85_A6" id="FP_Q94_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[6]</a>), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but | |
| 14146 whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as | |
| 14147 the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, | |
| 14148 but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was | |
| 14149 incompatible with deception of the intellect. | |
| 14150 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 co."><a name="32466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32466] Iª q. 94 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14151 quod quidam dixerunt quod in nomine deceptionis duo possunt | |
| 14152 intelligi, scilicet qualiscumque existimatio levis, qua aliquis | |
| 14153 adhaeret falso tanquam vero, sine assensu credulitatis; et iterum | |
| 14154 firma credulitas. Quantum ergo ad ea quorum scientiam Adam habebat, | |
| 14155 neutro istorum modorum homo decipi poterat ante peccatum. Sed | |
| 14156 quantum ad ea quorum scientiam non habebat, decipi poterat, large | |
| 14157 accepta deceptione pro existimatione qualicumque sine assensu | |
| 14158 credulitatis. Quod ideo dicunt, quia existimare falsum in talibus, | |
| 14159 non est noxium homini; et ex quo temere assensus non adhibetur, non | |
| 14160 est culpabile. Sed haec positio non convenit integritati primi | |
| 14161 status, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civit. Dei, <i>in illo | |
| 14162 statu erat devitatio tranquilla peccati, qua manente, nullum malum | |
| 14163 omnino esse poterat</i>. Manifestum est autem quod, sicut verum est | |
| 14164 bonum intellectus, ita falsum est malum eius, ut dicitur in VI | |
| 14165 Ethic. Unde non poterat esse quod, innocentia manente, intellectus | |
| 14166 hominis alicui falso acquiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris | |
| 14167 corporis primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionis alicuius, | |
| 14168 puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat; ita in | |
| 14169 intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, nulla tamen | |
| 14170 poterat ibi esse existimatio falsi. Quod etiam ex ipsa rectitudine | |
| 14171 primi status apparet, secundum quam, quandiu anima maneret Deo | |
| 14172 subdita, tandiu in homine inferiora superioribus subderentur, nec | |
| 14173 superiora per inferiora impedirentur. Manifestum est autem ex | |
| 14174 praemissis quod intellectus circa proprium obiectum semper verus | |
| 14175 est. Unde ex seipso nunquam decipitur, sed omnis deceptio accidit | |
| 14176 in intellectu ex aliquo inferiori, puta phantasia vel aliquo | |
| 14177 huiusmodi. Unde videmus quod, quando naturale iudicatorium non est | |
| 14178 ligatum, non decipimur per huiusmodi apparitiones, sed solum quando | |
| 14179 ligatur, ut patet in dormientibus. Unde manifestum est quod | |
| 14180 rectitudo primi status non compatiebatur aliquam deceptionem circa | |
| 14181 intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p11"> | |
| 14182 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. | |
| 14183 For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already | |
| 14184 acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit." | |
| 14185 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32467] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14186 dicendum quod illa seductio mulieris, etsi praecesserit peccatum | |
| 14187 operis, subsecuta tamen est peccatum internae elationis. Dicit enim | |
| 14188 Augustinus, XI super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>mulier verbis serpentis | |
| 14189 non crederet, nisi iam inesset menti eius amor propriae potestatis, | |
| 14190 et quaedam de se superba praesumptio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p12"> | |
| 14191 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some | |
| 14192 supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point. | |
| 14193 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32468] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14194 dicendum quod mulier putavit serpentem hoc accepisse loquendi | |
| 14195 officium, non per naturam, sed aliqua supernaturali operatione. | |
| 14196 Quamvis non sit necessarium auctoritatem Magistri sententiarum | |
| 14197 sequi in hac parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p13"> | |
| 14198 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would | |
| 14199 not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. | |
| 14200 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32469] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14201 dicendum quod, si aliquid repraesentatum fuisset sensui vel | |
| 14202 phantasiae primi hominis aliter quam sit in rerum natura, non tamen | |
| 14203 deciperetur, quia per rationem veritatem diiudicaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q94_A4-p14"> | |
| 14204 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper | |
| 14205 action. | |
| 14206 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="32470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32470] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 14207 dicendum quod id quod accidit in somno, non imputatur homini, quia | |
| 14208 non habet usum rationis, qui est proprius hominis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p15"> | |
| 14209 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive | |
| 14210 state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been | |
| 14211 to entertain a false opinion. | |
| 14212 </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p16"> It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his | |
| 14213 knowledge did not extend. | |
| 14214 </p><p id="FP_Q94_A4-p17"> If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that | |
| 14215 man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid. | |
| 14216 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 94 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="32471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32471] Iª q. 94 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 14217 dicendum quod alicui dicenti falsum de contingentibus futuris vel | |
| 14218 cogitationibus cordium, homo in statu innocentiae non credidisset | |
| 14219 ita esse, sed credidisset quod hoc esset possibile, et hoc non | |
| 14220 esset existimare falsum. Vel potest dici quod divinitus ei | |
| 14221 subventum fuisset, ne deciperetur in his quorum scientiam non | |
| 14222 habebat. Nec est instantia, quam quidam afferunt, quod in | |
| 14223 tentatione non fuit ei subventum ne deciperetur, licet tunc maxime | |
| 14224 indigeret. Quia iam praecesserat peccatum in animo, et ad divinum | |
| 14225 auxilium recursum non habuit.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 14226 <div id="FP_Q95" class="div3"> | |
| 14227 <h3 id="FP_Q95-p0.1">Q. 95. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 14228 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 14229 <p id="FP_Q95-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace | |
| 14230 and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. | |
| 14231 </p><p id="FP_Q95-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q95-p4"><a href="#FP_Q95_A1"> (1) Whether the first man was created in grace?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p5"><a href="#FP_Q95_A2"> (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p6"><a href="#FP_Q95_A3"> (3) Whether he had all virtues?</a></p><p id="FP_Q95-p7"><a href="#FP_Q95_A4"> (4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?</a></p> | |
| 14232 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 pr."><a name="32472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32472] | |
| 14233 Iª q. 95 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae | |
| 14234 pertinent ad voluntatem primi hominis. Et circa hoc consideranda | |
| 14235 sunt duo, primo quidem, de gratia et iustitia primi hominis; | |
| 14236 secundo, de usu iustitiae quantum ad dominium super alia. Circa | |
| 14237 primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum primus homo creatus fuerit | |
| 14238 in gratia. Secundo, utrum in statu innocentiae habuerit animae | |
| 14239 passiones. Tertio, utrum habuit virtutes omnes. Quarto, utrum opera | |
| 14240 eius fuissent aeque efficacia ad merendum, sicut modo sunt.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 14241 <div id="FP_Q95_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A1-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 1. Whether the first man was created in grace?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p2"> | |
| 14242 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says | |
| 14243 ( | |
| 14244 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.45" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:45</a>): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. | |
| 14245 Therefore Christ alone was made in grace. | |
| 14246 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32473] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 14247 proceditur. Videtur quod primus homo non fuerit creatus in gratia. | |
| 14248 Apostolus enim, I Cor. XV, distinguens Adam a Christo, dicit, | |
| 14249 <i>factus est primus Adam in animam viventem; novissimus autem in | |
| 14250 spiritum vivificantem</i>. Sed vivificatio spiritus est per | |
| 14251 gratiam. Ergo hoc est proprium Christi, quod fuerit factus in | |
| 14252 gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p3"> | |
| 14253 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of | |
| 14254 St. Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam | |
| 14255 was not created in grace. | |
| 14256 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32474] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14257 Augustinus dicit, in libro de quaestionibus veteris et novi | |
| 14258 testamenti, quod <i>Adam non habuit spiritum sanctum</i>. Sed | |
| 14259 quicumque habet gratiam, habet spiritum sanctum. Ergo Adam non fuit | |
| 14260 creatus in gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p4"> | |
| 14261 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what | |
| 14262 they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." God thus first | |
| 14263 created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them. | |
| 14264 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32475] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14265 Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, quod <i>Deus | |
| 14266 sic ordinavit Angelorum et hominum vitam, ut prius in eis | |
| 14267 ostenderet quid posset eorum liberum arbitrium, deinde quid posset | |
| 14268 suae gratiae beneficium, iustitiaeque iudicium</i>. Primo ergo | |
| 14269 condidit hominem et Angelum in sola naturali arbitrii libertate, et | |
| 14270 postmodum eis gratiam contulit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p5"> | |
| 14271 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient | |
| 14272 to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace. | |
| 14273 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32476] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14274 Magister dicit, in XXIV distinctione libri II Sent., quod <i>homini | |
| 14275 in creatione datum est auxilium per quod stare poterat, sed non | |
| 14276 poterat proficere</i>. Quicumque autem habet gratiam, potest | |
| 14277 proficere per meritum. Ergo primus homo non fuit creatus in | |
| 14278 gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p6"> | |
| 14279 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place | |
| 14280 between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his | |
| 14281 creation. | |
| 14282 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32477] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ad | |
| 14283 hoc quod aliquis accipiat gratiam, requiritur consensus ex parte | |
| 14284 recipientis, cum per hoc perficiatur matrimonium quoddam spirituale | |
| 14285 inter Deum et animam. Sed consensus in gratiam esse non potest nisi | |
| 14286 prius existentis. Ergo homo non accepit gratiam in primo instanti | |
| 14287 suae creationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p7"> | |
| 14288 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes | |
| 14289 glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace. | |
| 14290 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="32478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32478] Iª q. 95 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14291 natura plus distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est | |
| 14292 aliud quam gratia consummata. Sed in homine gratia praecessit | |
| 14293 gloriam. Ergo multo magis natura praecessit gratiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p8"> | |
| 14294 <b>On the contrary,</b> Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): | |
| 14295 "God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace. | |
| 14296 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32479] Iª q. 95 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, homo | |
| 14297 et Angelus aequaliter ordinantur ad gratiam. Sed Angelus est | |
| 14298 creatus in gratia, dicit enim Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, quod | |
| 14299 <i>Deus simul erat in eis condens naturam et largiens gratiam</i>. | |
| 14300 Ergo et homo creatus fuit in gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A1-p9"> | |
| 14301 <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities | |
| 14302 of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence. | |
| 14303 </p><p id="FP_Q95_A1-p10"> But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he | |
| 14304 was created in grace, according to | |
| 14305 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:30, </a> "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the | |
| 14306 body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject | |
| 14307 to God, the lower powers remained subject to | |
| 14308 reason, as Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection | |
| 14309 of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; | |
| 14310 since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that | |
| 14311 also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a | |
| 14312 supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence | |
| 14313 Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they | |
| 14314 were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding | |
| 14315 to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may | |
| 14316 gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein. | |
| 14317 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 co."><a name="32480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32480] Iª q. 95 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14318 quod quidam dicunt quod primus homo non fuit quidem creatus in | |
| 14319 gratia, sed tamen postmodum gratia fuit sibi collata antequam | |
| 14320 peccasset, plurimae enim sanctorum auctoritates attestantur hominem | |
| 14321 in statu innocentiae gratiam habuisse. Sed quod etiam fuerit | |
| 14322 conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa | |
| 14323 rectitudo primi status, in qua Deus hominem fecit, secundum illud | |
| 14324 Eccle. VII, <i>Deus fecit hominem rectum</i>. Erat enim haec | |
| 14325 rectitudo secundum hoc, quod ratio subdebatur Deo, rationi vero | |
| 14326 inferiores vires, et animae corpus. Prima autem subiectio erat | |
| 14327 causa et secundae et tertiae, quandiu enim ratio manebat Deo | |
| 14328 subiecta, inferiora ei subdebantur, ut Augustinus dicit. Manifestum | |
| 14329 est autem quod illa subiectio corporis ad animam, et inferiorum | |
| 14330 virium ad rationem, non erat naturalis, alioquin post peccatum | |
| 14331 mansisset, cum etiam in Daemonibus data naturalia post peccatum | |
| 14332 permanserint, ut Dionysius dicit cap. IV de Div. Nom. Unde | |
| 14333 manifestum est quod et illa prima subiectio, qua ratio Deo | |
| 14334 subdebatur, non erat solum secundum naturam, sed secundum | |
| 14335 supernaturale donum gratiae, non enim potest esse quod effectus sit | |
| 14336 potior quam causa. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIII de Civ. Dei, quod | |
| 14337 <i>posteaquam praecepti facta transgressio est, confestim, gratia | |
| 14338 deserente divina, de corporum suorum nuditate confusi sunt, | |
| 14339 senserunt enim motum inobedientis carnis suae, tanquam reciprocam | |
| 14340 poenam inobedientiae suae</i>. Ex quo datur intelligi, si deserente | |
| 14341 gratia soluta est obedientia carnis ad animam, quod per gratiam in | |
| 14342 anima existentem inferiora ei subdebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p11"> | |
| 14343 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual | |
| 14344 life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's | |
| 14345 words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards | |
| 14346 the body. | |
| 14347 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32481] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14348 dicendum quod apostolus illa verba inducit ad ostendendum esse | |
| 14349 corpus spirituale, si est corpus animale, quia vita spiritualis | |
| 14350 corporis incoepit in Christo, qui est primogenitus ex mortuis, | |
| 14351 sicut vita corporis animalis incoepit in Adam. Non ergo ex verbis | |
| 14352 apostoli habetur quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam; | |
| 14353 sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p12"> | |
| 14354 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with | |
| 14355 the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness | |
| 14356 directly after death. | |
| 14357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32482] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14358 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in eodem loco, non negatur | |
| 14359 quin aliquo modo fuerit in Adam spiritus sanctus, sicut et in aliis | |
| 14360 iustis, sed quod non sic fuerit in eo, sicut nunc est in fidelibus, | |
| 14361 qui admittuntur ad perceptionem haereditatis aeternae statim post | |
| 14362 mortem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p13"> | |
| 14363 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed | |
| 14364 grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards | |
| 14365 by being so confirmed. | |
| 14366 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32483] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14367 dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate Augustini non habetur quod | |
| 14368 Angelus vel homo prius fuerit creatus in naturali libertate | |
| 14369 arbitrii, quam habuisset gratiam, sed quod prius ostendit quid in | |
| 14370 eis posset liberum arbitrium ante confirmationem, et quid postmodum | |
| 14371 consecuti sunt per auxilium gratiae confirmantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p14"> | |
| 14372 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state | |
| 14373 of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created | |
| 14374 that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added. | |
| 14375 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32484] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 14376 dicendum quod Magister loquitur secundum opinionem illorum qui | |
| 14377 posuerunt hominem non esse creatum in gratia, sed in naturalibus | |
| 14378 tantum. Vel potest dici quod, etsi homo fuerit creatus in gratia, | |
| 14379 non tamen habuit ex creatione naturae quod posset proficere per | |
| 14380 meritum, sed ex superadditione gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p15"> | |
| 14381 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the | |
| 14382 first moment of his existence. | |
| 14383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32485] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 14384 dicendum quod, cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil | |
| 14385 prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem | |
| 14386 gratiae consensisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A1-p16"> | |
| 14387 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails. | |
| 14388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="32486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32486] Iª q. 95 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 14389 quod gloriam meremur per actum gratiae, non autem gratiam per actum | |
| 14390 naturae. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A2-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 2. Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p2"> | |
| 14391 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" | |
| 14392 ( | |
| 14393 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.7" target="asv">Gal. 5:7</a>). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul. | |
| 14394 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32487] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 14395 proceditur. Videtur quod in primo homine non fuerint animae | |
| 14396 passiones. Secundum enim passiones animae contingit quod caro | |
| 14397 concupiscit adversus spiritum. Sed hoc non erat in statu | |
| 14398 innocentiae. Ergo in statu innocentiae non erant animae | |
| 14399 passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p3"> | |
| 14400 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul. | |
| 14401 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32488] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, anima | |
| 14402 Adae erat nobilior quam corpus. Sed corpus Adae fuit impassibile. | |
| 14403 Ergo nec in anima eius fuerunt passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p4"> | |
| 14404 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore | |
| 14405 the passions were entirely excluded from him. | |
| 14406 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32489] Iª q. 95 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, per | |
| 14407 virtutem moralem comprimuntur animae passiones. Sed in Adam fuit | |
| 14408 virtus moralis perfecta. Ergo totaliter passiones excludebantur ab | |
| 14409 eo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p5"> | |
| 14410 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of | |
| 14411 the soul. | |
| 14412 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32490] Iª q. 95 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14413 quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod erat in eis amor | |
| 14414 imperturbatus in Deum, et quaedam aliae animae passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p6"> | |
| 14415 <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the | |
| 14416 soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive | |
| 14417 state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine | |
| 14418 says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such | |
| 14419 as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning | |
| 14420 concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the | |
| 14421 proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they | |
| 14422 exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times | |
| 14423 our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual | |
| 14424 appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so | |
| 14425 that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. | |
| 14426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 co."><a name="32491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32491] Iª q. 95 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14427 quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensuali, cuius obiectum est | |
| 14428 bonum et malum. Unde omnium passionum animae quaedam ordinantur ad | |
| 14429 bonum, ut amor et gaudium; quaedam ad malum, ut timor et dolor. Et | |
| 14430 quia in primo statu nullum malum aderat nec imminebat; nec aliquod | |
| 14431 bonum aberat, quod cuperet bona voluntas pro tempore illo habendum, | |
| 14432 ut patet per Augustinum XIV de Civ. Dei, omnes illae passiones quae | |
| 14433 respiciunt malum, in Adam non erant ut timor et dolor et huiusmodi; | |
| 14434 similiter nec illae passiones quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et | |
| 14435 nunc habendum, ut cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae | |
| 14436 possunt esse boni praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt | |
| 14437 futuri boni ut suo tempore habendi, ut desiderium et spes non | |
| 14438 affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae. Aliter tamen quam in | |
| 14439 nobis. Nam in nobis appetitus sensualis, in quo sunt passiones, non | |
| 14440 totaliter subest rationi, unde passiones quandoque sunt in nobis | |
| 14441 praevenientes iudicium rationis, et impedientes; quandoque vero ex | |
| 14442 iudicio rationis consequentes, prout sensualis appetitus | |
| 14443 aliqualiter rationi obedit. In statu vero innocentiae inferior | |
| 14444 appetitus erat rationi totaliter subiectus, unde non erant in eo | |
| 14445 passiones animae, nisi ex rationis iudicio consequentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p7"> | |
| 14446 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of | |
| 14447 innocence. | |
| 14448 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32492] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14449 dicendum quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, per hoc quod | |
| 14450 passiones rationi repugnant, quod in statu innocentiae non | |
| 14451 erat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p8"> | |
| 14452 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as | |
| 14453 will be explained later on ( | |
| 14454 <a href="#FP_Q97_A2" id="FP_Q95_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[2]</a>); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason. | |
| 14455 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32493] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14456 dicendum quod corpus humanum in statu innocentiae erat impassibile | |
| 14457 quantum ad passiones quae removent dispositionem naturalem, ut | |
| 14458 infra dicetur. Et similiter anima fuit impassibilis quantum ad | |
| 14459 passiones quae impediunt rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A2-p9"> | |
| 14460 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he | |
| 14461 ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11. | |
| 14462 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32494] Iª q. 95 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14463 dicendum quod perfecta virtus moralis non totaliter tollit | |
| 14464 passiones, sed ordinat eas, <i>temperati enim est concupiscere | |
| 14465 sicut oportet, et quae oportet</i>, ut dicitur in III Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A3-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 3. Whether Adam had all the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p2"> | |
| 14466 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence | |
| 14467 is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the | |
| 14468 passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist. | |
| 14469 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32495] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 14470 proceditur. Videtur quod Adam non habuerit omnes virtutes. Quaedam | |
| 14471 enim virtutes ordinantur ad refraenandam immoderantiam passionum; | |
| 14472 sicut per temperantiam refraenatur immoderata concupiscentia, et | |
| 14473 per fortitudinem immoderatus timor. Sed immoderantia passionum non | |
| 14474 erat in statu innocentiae. Ergo nec dictae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p3"> | |
| 14475 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude | |
| 14476 with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above | |
| 14477 <a href="#FP_Q95_A2" id="FP_Q95_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither did those virtues exist then. | |
| 14478 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32496] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14479 quaedam virtutes sunt circa passiones respicientes malum; ut | |
| 14480 mansuetudo circa iras, et fortitudo circa timores. Sed tales | |
| 14481 passiones non erant in statu innocentiae, ut dictum est. Ergo nec | |
| 14482 huiusmodi virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p4"> | |
| 14483 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state | |
| 14484 of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist. | |
| 14485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32497] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14486 poenitentia est quaedam virtus respiciens peccatum prius commissum. | |
| 14487 Misericordia etiam est quaedam virtus respiciens miseriam. Sed in | |
| 14488 statu innocentiae non erat peccatum nec miseria. Ergo neque | |
| 14489 huiusmodi virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p5"> | |
| 14490 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not | |
| 14491 every virtue. | |
| 14492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32498] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14493 perseverantia est quaedam virtus. Sed hanc Adam non habuit; ut | |
| 14494 sequens peccatum ostendit. Ergo non habuit omnes virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p6"> | |
| 14495 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which | |
| 14496 seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. | |
| 14497 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="32499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32499] Iª q. 95 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, fides | |
| 14498 quaedam virtus est. Sed haec in statu innocentiae non fuit, | |
| 14499 importat enim aenigmaticam cognitionem, quae perfectioni primi | |
| 14500 status repugnare videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p7"> | |
| 14501 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth | |
| 14502 to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness." | |
| 14503 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32500] Iª q. 95 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14504 quod Augustinus dicit, in quadam homilia, <i>princeps vitiorum | |
| 14505 devicit Adam de limo terrae ad imaginem Dei factum, pudicitia | |
| 14506 armatum, temperantia compositum, claritate splendidum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A3-p8"> | |
| 14507 <b>I answer that,</b> in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For | |
| 14508 it was shown above | |
| 14509 <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q95_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the | |
| 14510 virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to | |
| 14511 the dictate of reason, as will be | |
| 14512 explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (FS, | |
| 14513 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q63_A2" id="FP_Q95_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. | |
| 14514 </p><p id="FP_Q95_A3-p9"> It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; | |
| 14515 and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature | |
| 14516 as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection | |
| 14517 of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things | |
| 14518 not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of | |
| 14519 the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the | |
| 14520 primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection | |
| 14521 of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow | |
| 14522 for | |
| 14523 sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible | |
| 14524 with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their | |
| 14525 acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his | |
| 14526 neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards | |
| 14527 what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if | |
| 14528 he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9). | |
| 14529 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 co."><a name="32501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32501] Iª q. 95 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14530 quod homo in statu innocentiae aliqualiter habuit omnes virtutes. | |
| 14531 Et hoc ex dictis potest esse manifestum. Dictum est enim supra quod | |
| 14532 talis erat rectitudo primi status, quod ratio erat Deo subiecta, | |
| 14533 inferiores autem vires rationi. Virtutes autem nihil aliud sunt | |
| 14534 quam perfectiones quaedam, quibus ratio ordinatur in Deum, et | |
| 14535 inferiores vires disponuntur secundum regulam rationis; ut magis | |
| 14536 patebit cum de virtutibus agetur. Unde rectitudo primi status | |
| 14537 exigebat ut homo aliqualiter omnes virtutes haberet. Sed | |
| 14538 considerandum est quod virtutum quaedam sunt, quae de sui ratione | |
| 14539 nullam imperfectionem important, ut caritas et iustitia. Et | |
| 14540 huiusmodi virtutes fuerunt in statu innocentiae simpliciter, et | |
| 14541 quantum ad habitum et quantum ad actum. Quaedam vero sunt, quae de | |
| 14542 sui ratione imperfectionem important, vel ex parte actus vel ex | |
| 14543 parte materiae. Et si huiusmodi imperfectio non repugnat | |
| 14544 perfectioni primi status, nihilominus huiusmodi virtutes poterant | |
| 14545 esse in primo statu; sicut fides, quae est eorum quae non videntur, | |
| 14546 et spes, quae est eorum quae non habentur. Perfectio enim primi | |
| 14547 status non se extendebat ad hoc, ut videret Deum per essentiam, et | |
| 14548 ut haberet eum cum fruitione finalis beatitudinis, unde fides et | |
| 14549 spes esse poterant in primo statu, et quantum ad habitum et quantum | |
| 14550 ad actum. Si vero imperfectio quae est de ratione virtutis | |
| 14551 alicuius, repugnat perfectioni primi status, poterat huiusmodi | |
| 14552 virtus ibi esse secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum, ut patet | |
| 14553 de poenitentia, quae est dolor de peccato commisso, et de | |
| 14554 misericordia, quae est dolor de miseria aliena; perfectioni enim | |
| 14555 primi status repugnat tam dolor, quam culpa et miseria. Unde | |
| 14556 huiusmodi virtutes erant in primo homine secundum habitum, sed non | |
| 14557 secundum actum, erat enim primus homo sic dispositus, ut si | |
| 14558 peccatum praecessisset, doleret; et similiter si miseriam in alio | |
| 14559 videret, eam pro posse repelleret. Sicut philosophus dicit, in IV | |
| 14560 Ethic., quod verecundia, quae est de turpi facto, <i>contingit | |
| 14561 studioso solum sub conditione, est enim sic dispositus, quod | |
| 14562 verecundaretur si turpe aliquid committeret</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p10"> | |
| 14563 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens | |
| 14564 to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se' competent to moderate the passions. | |
| 14565 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32502] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14566 dicendum quod accidit temperantiae et fortitudini quod | |
| 14567 superabundantiam passionum repellat, inquantum invenit passiones | |
| 14568 superabundantes in subiecto. Sed per se convenit huiusmodi | |
| 14569 virtutibus passiones moderari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p11"> | |
| 14570 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in | |
| 14571 the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible | |
| 14572 with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. | |
| 14573 Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive | |
| 14574 state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such | |
| 14575 passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. | |
| 14576 But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates | |
| 14577 not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the | |
| 14578 act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating | |
| 14579 daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear. | |
| 14580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32503] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14581 dicendum quod illae passiones ad malum ordinatae, repugnant | |
| 14582 perfectioni primi status, quae habent respectum ad malum in ipso | |
| 14583 qui afficitur passione, ut timor et dolor. Sed passiones quae | |
| 14584 respiciunt malum in altero, non repugnant perfectioni primi status, | |
| 14585 poterat enim homo in primo statu habere odio malitiam Daemonum, | |
| 14586 sicut et diligere bonitatem Dei. Unde et virtutes quae circa tales | |
| 14587 passiones essent, possent esse in primo statu, et quantum ad | |
| 14588 habitum et quantum ad actum. Quae vero sunt circa passiones | |
| 14589 respicientes malum in eodem subiecto, si circa huiusmodi solas | |
| 14590 passiones sunt, non poterant esse in primo statu secundum actum, | |
| 14591 sed solum secundum habitum; sicut de poenitentia et misericordia | |
| 14592 dictum est. Sed sunt quaedam virtutes quae non sunt circa has | |
| 14593 passiones solum, sed etiam circa alias; sicut temperantia, quae non | |
| 14594 solum est circa tristitias, sed etiam circa delectationes; et | |
| 14595 fortitudo, quae non solum est circa timores, sed etiam circa | |
| 14596 audaciam et spem. Unde poterat esse in primo statu actus | |
| 14597 temperantiae, secundum quod est moderativa delectationum; et | |
| 14598 similiter fortitudo, secundum quod est moderativa audaciae sive | |
| 14599 spei; non autem secundum quod moderantur tristitiam et timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p12"> | |
| 14600 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> appears from what has been said above. | |
| 14601 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32504] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium patet | |
| 14602 solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p13"> | |
| 14603 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice | |
| 14604 of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; | |
| 14605 signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance. | |
| 14606 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32505] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 14607 dicendum quod perseverantia dupliciter sumitur. Uno modo, prout est | |
| 14608 quaedam virtus, et sic significat quendam habitum, quo quis eligit | |
| 14609 perseverare in bono. Et sic Adam perseverantiam habuit. Alio modo, | |
| 14610 prout est circumstantia virtutis, et sic significat continuationem | |
| 14611 quandam virtutis absque interruptione. Et hoc modo Adam | |
| 14612 perseverantiam non habuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A3-p14"> | |
| 14613 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> appears from what has been said above. | |
| 14614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="32506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32506] Iª q. 95 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum patet | |
| 14615 responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q95_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q95_A4-p0.1">Q. 95. A. 4. Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p2"> | |
| 14616 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the | |
| 14617 mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. | |
| 14618 Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. | |
| 14619 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32507] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 14620 proceditur. Videtur quod opera primi hominis fuerint minus | |
| 14621 efficacia ad merendum quam opera nostra. Gratia enim ex Dei | |
| 14622 misericordia datur, quae magis indigentibus subvenit magis. Sed nos | |
| 14623 indigemus magis gratia quam primus homo in statu innocentiae. Ergo | |
| 14624 copiosius infunditur nobis gratia. Quae cum sit radix meriti, opera | |
| 14625 nostra efficaciora ad merendum redduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p3"> | |
| 14626 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written ( | |
| 14627 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:5</a>): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the | |
| 14628 difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. | |
| 14629 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32508] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad | |
| 14630 meritum requiritur pugna quaedam et difficultas. Dicitur enim II ad | |
| 14631 Tim. II, <i>non coronabitur nisi qui legitime certaverit</i>. Et | |
| 14632 philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus est circa difficile | |
| 14633 et bonum</i>. Sed nunc est maior pugna et difficultas. Ergo et | |
| 14634 maior efficacia ad merendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p4"> | |
| 14635 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit | |
| 14636 now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state. | |
| 14637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32509] Iª q. 95 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14638 Magister dicit, XXIV distinctione II libri Sent., quod <i>homo non | |
| 14639 meruisset, tentationi resistendo; nunc autem meretur qui tentationi | |
| 14640 resistit</i>. Ergo efficaciora sunt opera nostra ad merendum quam | |
| 14641 in primo statu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p5"> | |
| 14642 <b>On the contrary,</b> if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning. | |
| 14643 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32510] Iª q. 95 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14644 quia secundum hoc, homo esset melioris conditionis post | |
| 14645 peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q95_A4-p6"> | |
| 14646 <b>I answer that,</b> Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds | |
| 14647 in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions | |
| 14648 proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. | |
| 14649 This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites | |
| 14650 into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate | |
| 14651 degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the | |
| 14652 degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good. | |
| 14653 </p><p id="FP_Q95_A4-p7"> We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we | |
| 14654 consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human | |
| 14655 nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, | |
| 14656 he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for | |
| 14657 merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with | |
| 14658 difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily. | |
| 14659 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 co."><a name="32511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32511] Iª q. 95 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14660 quod quantitas meriti ex duobus potest pensari. Uno modo, ex radice | |
| 14661 caritatis et gratiae. Et talis quantitas meriti respondet praemio | |
| 14662 essentiali, quod consistit in Dei fruitione, qui enim ex maiori | |
| 14663 caritate aliquid facit, perfectius Deo fruetur. Alio modo pensari | |
| 14664 potest quantitas meriti ex quantitate operis. Quae quidem est | |
| 14665 duplex, scilicet absoluta, et proportionalis. Vidua enim quae misit | |
| 14666 duo aera minuta in gazophylacium; minus opus fecit quantitate | |
| 14667 absoluta, quam illi qui magna munera posuerunt, sed quantitate | |
| 14668 proportionali vidua plus fecit, secundum sententiam domini, quia | |
| 14669 magis eius facultatem superabat. Utraque tamen quantitas meriti | |
| 14670 respondet praemio accidentali; quod est gaudium de bono creato. Sic | |
| 14671 igitur dicendum quod efficaciora fuissent hominis opera ad merendum | |
| 14672 in statu innocentiae quam post peccatum, si attendatur quantitas | |
| 14673 meriti ex parte gratiae; quae tunc copiosior fuisset, nullo | |
| 14674 obstaculo in natura humana invento. Similiter etiam, si | |
| 14675 consideretur absoluta quantitas operis, quia, cum homo esset | |
| 14676 maioris virtutis, maiora opera fecisset. Sed si consideretur | |
| 14677 quantitas proportionalis, maior invenitur ratio meriti post | |
| 14678 peccatum, propter hominis imbecillitatem, magis enim excedit parvum | |
| 14679 opus potestatem eius qui cum difficultate operatur illud, quam opus | |
| 14680 magnum potestatem eius qui sine difficultate operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p8"> | |
| 14681 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before | |
| 14682 sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace | |
| 14683 also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness. | |
| 14684 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32512] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14685 dicendum quod homo post peccatum ad plura indiget gratia quam ante | |
| 14686 peccatum, sed non magis. Quia homo, etiam ante peccatum, indigebat | |
| 14687 gratia ad vitam aeternam consequendam, quae est principalis | |
| 14688 necessitas gratiae. Sed homo post peccatum, super hoc, indiget | |
| 14689 gratia etiam ad peccati remissionem, et infirmitatis | |
| 14690 sustentationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p9"> | |
| 14691 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. | |
| 14692 It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is | |
| 14693 caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another | |
| 14694 performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult | |
| 14695 to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. | |
| 14696 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32513] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14697 dicendum quod difficultas et pugna pertinent ad quantitatem meriti, | |
| 14698 secundum quantitatem operis proportionalem, ut dictum est. Et est | |
| 14699 signum promptitudinis voluntatis, quae conatur ad id quod est sibi | |
| 14700 difficile, promptitudo autem voluntatis causatur ex magnitudine | |
| 14701 caritatis. Et tamen potest contingere quod aliquis ita prompta | |
| 14702 voluntate faciat opus aliquod facile, sicut alius difficile, quia | |
| 14703 paratus esset facere etiam quod sibi esset difficile. Difficultas | |
| 14704 tamen actualis, inquantum est poenalis, habet etiam quod sit | |
| 14705 satisfactoria pro peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q95_A4-p10"> | |
| 14706 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did | |
| 14707 not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch | |
| 14708 as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than | |
| 14709 now to resist temptation even without grace. | |
| 14710 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 95 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32514] Iª q. 95 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14711 dicendum quod resistere tentationi primo homini non fuisset | |
| 14712 meritorium, secundum opinionem ponentium quod gratiam non haberet; | |
| 14713 sicut nec modo est meritorium non habenti gratiam. Sed in hoc est | |
| 14714 differentia, quia in primo statu nihil erat interius impellens ad | |
| 14715 malum, sicut modo est, unde magis tunc poterat homo resistere | |
| 14716 tentationi sine gratia, quam modo.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 14717 <div id="FP_Q96" class="div3"> | |
| 14718 <h3 id="FP_Q96-p0.1">Q. 96. OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 14719 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 14720 <p id="FP_Q96-p2"> We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of | |
| 14721 inquiry: | |
| 14722 </p><p id="FP_Q96-p3"><a href="#FP_Q96_A1"> (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p4"><a href="#FP_Q96_A2"> (2) Whether he was master over all creatures?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p5"><a href="#FP_Q96_A3"> (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q96-p6"><a href="#FP_Q96_A4"> (4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?</a></p> | |
| 14723 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 pr."><a name="32515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32515] | |
| 14724 Iª q. 96 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de dominio | |
| 14725 quod competebat homini in statu innocentiae. Et circa hoc | |
| 14726 quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum homo in statu innocentiae | |
| 14727 animalibus dominaretur. Secundo, utrum dominaretur omni creaturae. | |
| 14728 Tertio, utrum in statu innocentiae omnes homines fuissent aequales. | |
| 14729 Quarto, utrum in illo statu homo hominibus dominaretur.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 14730 <div id="FP_Q96_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A1-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 1. Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p2"> | |
| 14731 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, | |
| 14732 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels | |
| 14733 need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no | |
| 14734 mastership of the animals. | |
| 14735 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32516] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 14736 proceditur. Videtur quod Adam in statu innocentiae animalibus non | |
| 14737 dominabatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX super Gen. ad Litt., quod | |
| 14738 ministerio Angelorum animalia sunt adducta ad Adam, ut eis nomina | |
| 14739 imponeret. Non autem fuisset ibi necessarium Angelorum ministerium, | |
| 14740 si homo per seipsum animalibus dominabatur. Non ergo in statu | |
| 14741 innocentiae habuit dominium homo super alia animalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p3"> | |
| 14742 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals | |
| 14743 are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man. | |
| 14744 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32517] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea | |
| 14745 quae ad invicem discordant, non recte sub uno dominio congregantur. | |
| 14746 Sed multa animalia naturaliter ad invicem discordant, sicut ovis et | |
| 14747 lupus. Ergo omnia animalia sub hominis dominio non | |
| 14748 continebantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p4"> | |
| 14749 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St. Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as | |
| 14750 quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on | |
| 14751 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv"> Gn. 1:26</a>]: "God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals | |
| 14752 would become useful to man." Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. | |
| 14753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32518] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14754 Hieronymus dicit quod <i>homini ante peccatum non indigenti, Deus | |
| 14755 animalium dominationem dedit, praesciebat enim hominem adminiculo | |
| 14756 animalium adiuvandum fore post lapsum</i>. Ergo ad minus usus | |
| 14757 dominii super animalia non competebat homini ante peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p5"> | |
| 14758 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man | |
| 14759 had no mastership over the irrational animals. | |
| 14760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32519] Iª q. 96 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14761 proprium domini esse videtur praecipere. Sed praeceptum non recte | |
| 14762 fertur nisi ad habentem rationem. Ergo homo non habebat dominium | |
| 14763 super animalia irrationalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p6"> | |
| 14764 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 14765 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth" [Vulg."and the | |
| 14766 whole earth"]. | |
| 14767 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32520] Iª q. 96 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14768 quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, <i>praesit piscibus maris, et | |
| 14769 volatilibus caeli, et bestiis terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p7"> | |
| 14770 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( | |
| 14771 <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q96_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore | |
| 14772 in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals | |
| 14773 are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the | |
| 14774 generation of things we | |
| 14775 perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect | |
| 14776 form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use | |
| 14777 of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use | |
| 14778 of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. | |
| 14779 Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises | |
| 14780 a natural right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. | |
| 14781 Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, | |
| 14782 this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated | |
| 14783 prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards | |
| 14784 all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection | |
| 14785 of other animals to man is proved to be natural. | |
| 14786 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 co."><a name="32521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32521] Iª q. 96 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14787 quod, sicut supra dictum est, inobedientia ad hominem eorum quae ei | |
| 14788 debent esse subiecta, subsecuta est in poenam eius, eo quod ipse | |
| 14789 fuit inobediens Deo. Et ideo in statu innocentiae, ante | |
| 14790 inobedientiam praedictam, nihil ei repugnabat quod naturaliter | |
| 14791 deberet ei esse subiectum. Omnia autem animalia sunt homini | |
| 14792 naturaliter subiecta. Quod apparet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex ipso | |
| 14793 naturae processu. Sicut enim in generatione rerum intelligitur | |
| 14794 quidam ordo quo proceditur de imperfecto ad perfectum (nam materia | |
| 14795 est propter formam, et forma imperfectior propter perfectiorem), | |
| 14796 ita etiam est in usu rerum naturalium, nam imperfectiora cedunt in | |
| 14797 usum perfectorum; plantae enim utuntur terra ad sui nutrimentum, | |
| 14798 animalia vero plantis, et homines plantis et animalibus. Unde | |
| 14799 naturaliter homo dominatur animalibus. Et propter hoc philosophus | |
| 14800 dicit, in I Politic., quod venatio sylvestrium animalium est iusta | |
| 14801 et naturalis, quia per eam homo vindicat sibi quod est naturaliter | |
| 14802 suum. Secundo apparet hoc ex ordine divinae providentiae, quae | |
| 14803 semper inferiora per superiora gubernat. Unde, cum homo sit supra | |
| 14804 cetera animalia, utpote ad imaginem Dei factus, convenienter eius | |
| 14805 gubernationi alia animalia subduntur. Tertio apparet idem ex | |
| 14806 proprietate hominis, et aliorum animalium. In aliis enim animalibus | |
| 14807 invenitur, secundum aestimationem naturalem, quaedam participatio | |
| 14808 prudentiae ad aliquos particulares actus, in homine autem invenitur | |
| 14809 universalis prudentia, quae est ratio omnium agibilium. Omne autem | |
| 14810 quod est per participationem, subditur ei quod est per essentiam et | |
| 14811 universaliter. Unde patet quod naturalis est subiectio aliorum | |
| 14812 animalium ad hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p8"> | |
| 14813 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally | |
| 14814 higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for | |
| 14815 instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. | |
| 14816 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32522] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14817 dicendum quod in subiectos multa potest facere superior potestas, | |
| 14818 quae non potest facere inferior. Angelus autem est naturaliter | |
| 14819 superior homine. Unde aliquis effectus poterat fieri circa animalia | |
| 14820 virtute angelica, qui non poterat fieri potestate humana; scilicet | |
| 14821 quod statim omnia animalia congregarentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p9"> | |
| 14822 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only | |
| 14823 in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed | |
| 14824 by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion | |
| 14825 and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on | |
| 14826 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.30" target="asv">Gn. 1:30</a>, say that trees and herbs were | |
| 14827 given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. | |
| 14828 They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for | |
| 14829 that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have | |
| 14830 been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained | |
| 14831 falcon. | |
| 14832 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32523] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14833 dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod animalia quae nunc sunt ferocia et | |
| 14834 occidunt alia animalia, in statu illo fuissent mansueta non solum | |
| 14835 circa hominem, sed etiam circa alia animalia. Sed hoc est omnino | |
| 14836 irrationabile. Non enim per peccatum hominis natura animalium est | |
| 14837 mutata, ut quibus nunc naturale est comedere aliorum animalium | |
| 14838 carnes, tunc vixissent de herbis, sicut leones et falcones. Nec | |
| 14839 Glossa Bedae dicit, Gen. I, quod ligna et herbae datae sunt omnibus | |
| 14840 animalibus et avibus in cibum, sed quibusdam. Fuisset ergo | |
| 14841 naturalis discordia inter quaedam animalia. Nec tamen propter hoc | |
| 14842 subtraherentur dominio hominis; sicut nec nunc propter hoc | |
| 14843 subtrahuntur dominio Dei, cuius providentia hoc totum dispensatur. | |
| 14844 Et huius providentiae homo executor fuisset, ut etiam nunc apparet | |
| 14845 in animalibus domesticis, ministrantur enim falconibus domesticis | |
| 14846 per homines gallinae in cibum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p10"> | |
| 14847 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals---neither for clothing, since then they were | |
| 14848 naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence---nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise---nor | |
| 14849 to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge | |
| 14850 of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the | |
| 14851 animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. | |
| 14852 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32524] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14853 dicendum quod homines in statu innocentiae non indigebant | |
| 14854 animalibus ad necessitatem corporalem, neque ad tegumentum, quia | |
| 14855 nudi erant, et non erubescebant, nullo instante inordinatae | |
| 14856 concupiscentiae motu; neque ad cibum, quia lignis Paradisi | |
| 14857 vescebantur; neque ad vehiculum, propter corporis robur. Indigebant | |
| 14858 tamen eis ad experimentalem cognitionem sumendam de naturis eorum. | |
| 14859 Quod significatum est per hoc, quod Deus ad eum animalia adduxit, | |
| 14860 ut eis nomina imponeret, quae eorum naturas designant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A1-p11"> | |
| 14861 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that | |
| 14862 cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the | |
| 14863 present state some domestic animals obey him. | |
| 14864 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32525] Iª q. 96 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 14865 dicendum quod alia animalia habent quandam participationem | |
| 14866 prudentiae et rationis secundum aestimationem naturalem; ex qua | |
| 14867 contingit quod grues sequuntur ducem, et apes obediunt regi. Et sic | |
| 14868 tunc omnia animalia per seipsa homini obedivissent, sicut nunc | |
| 14869 quaedam domestica ei obediunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q96_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A2-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 2. Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p2"> | |
| 14870 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally | |
| 14871 has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy | |
| 14872 angels." Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. | |
| 14873 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32526] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 14874 proceditur. Videtur quod homo non habuisset dominium super omnes | |
| 14875 alias creaturas. Angelus enim naturaliter est maioris potestatis | |
| 14876 quam homo. Sed, sicut dicit Augustinus III de Trin., <i>materia | |
| 14877 corporalis non obedivisset ad nutum etiam sanctis Angelis</i>. Ergo | |
| 14878 multo minus homini in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p3"> | |
| 14879 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not naturally | |
| 14880 obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have | |
| 14881 mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. | |
| 14882 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32527] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 14883 plantis non sunt de viribus animae nisi nutritiva et augmentativa | |
| 14884 et generativa. Hae autem non sunt natae obedire rationi; ut in uno | |
| 14885 et eodem homine apparet. Ergo, cum dominium competat homini | |
| 14886 secundum rationem, videtur quod plantis homo in statu innocentiae | |
| 14887 non dominaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p4"> | |
| 14888 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; | |
| 14889 for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them. | |
| 14890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32528] Iª q. 96 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14891 quicumque dominatur alicui rei, potest illam rem mutare. Sed homo | |
| 14892 non potuisset mutare cursum caelestium corporum, hoc enim solius | |
| 14893 Dei est, ut Dionysius dicit in epistola ad Polycarpum. Ergo non | |
| 14894 dominabatur eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p5"> | |
| 14895 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 14896 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "That he may have dominion over . . . every creature." | |
| 14897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32529] Iª q. 96 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14898 quod dicitur Gen. I, de homine, <i>praesit universae | |
| 14899 creaturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p6"> | |
| 14900 <b>I answer that,</b> Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he | |
| 14901 can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his "reason," which makes him like to the angels'; | |
| 14902 his "sensitive powers," whereby he is like the animals; his "natural forces," which liken him to the plants; and "the body | |
| 14903 itself," wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of | |
| 14904 a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all | |
| 14905 creatures," we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible | |
| 14906 and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man | |
| 14907 had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by | |
| 14908 commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted | |
| 14909 not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. | |
| 14910 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 co."><a name="32530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32530] Iª q. 96 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14911 quod in homine quodammodo sunt omnia, et ideo secundum modum quo | |
| 14912 dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum competit ei | |
| 14913 dominari aliis. Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet | |
| 14914 rationem, secundum quam convenit cum Angelis; vires sensitivas, | |
| 14915 secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales, secundum | |
| 14916 quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit | |
| 14917 cum rebus inanimatis. Ratio autem in homine habet locum dominantis, | |
| 14918 et non subiecti dominio. Unde homo Angelis non dominabatur in primo | |
| 14919 statu, et quod dicitur omni creaturae, intelligitur quae non est ad | |
| 14920 imaginem Dei. Viribus autem sensitivis, sicut irascibili et | |
| 14921 concupiscibili, quae aliqualiter obediunt rationi, dominatur anima | |
| 14922 imperando. Unde et in statu innocentiae animalibus aliis per | |
| 14923 imperium dominabatur. Viribus autem naturalibus, et ipsi corpori, | |
| 14924 homo dominatur non quidem imperando, sed utendo. Et sic etiam homo | |
| 14925 in statu innocentiae dominabatur plantis et rebus inanimatis, non | |
| 14926 per imperium vel immutationem, sed absque impedimento utendo eorum | |
| 14927 auxilio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A2-p7"> The answers to the objections appear from the above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="32531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32531] Iª q. 96 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 14928 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q96_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q96_A3-p0.1">Q. 96. A. 3. Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p2"> | |
| 14929 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no | |
| 14930 sin, there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal. | |
| 14931 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32532] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 14932 proceditur. Videtur quod homines in statu innocentiae omnes | |
| 14933 fuissent aequales. Dicit enim Gregorius quod, <i>ubi non | |
| 14934 delinquimus, omnes pares sumus</i>. Sed in statu innocentiae non | |
| 14935 erat delictum. Ergo omnes erant pares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p3"> | |
| 14936 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to | |
| 14937 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19, </a> "Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there was among men an | |
| 14938 abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence. | |
| 14939 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32533] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14940 similitudo et aequalitas est ratio mutuae dilectionis; secundum | |
| 14941 illud Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile, sic et omnis | |
| 14942 homo proximum sibi</i>. In illo autem statu inter homines abundabat | |
| 14943 dilectio, quae est vinculum pacis. Ergo omnes fuissent pares in | |
| 14944 statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p4"> | |
| 14945 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the | |
| 14946 part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through | |
| 14947 a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive | |
| 14948 state. Therefore, etc. | |
| 14949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32534] Iª q. 96 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14950 cessante causa, cessat effectus. Sed causa inaequalitatis inter | |
| 14951 homines videtur nunc esse, ex parte quidem Dei, quod quosdam pro | |
| 14952 meritis praemiat, quosdam vero punit, ex parte vero naturae, quia | |
| 14953 propter naturae defectum quidam nascuntur debiles et orbati, quidam | |
| 14954 autem fortes et perfecti. Quae in primo statu non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p5"> | |
| 14955 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 14956 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "The things which are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of God"]. But order chiefly consists | |
| 14957 in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place." | |
| 14958 Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. | |
| 14959 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32535] Iª q. 96 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14960 quod dicitur Rom. XIII, <i>quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt</i>. Ordo | |
| 14961 autem maxime videtur in disparitate consistere, dicit enim | |
| 14962 Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>ordo est parium dispariumque rerum | |
| 14963 sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio</i>. Ergo in primo statu, qui | |
| 14964 decentissimus fuisset, disparitas inveniretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p6"> | |
| 14965 <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation | |
| 14966 depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union | |
| 14967 have been sterile. | |
| 14968 </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p7"> Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of | |
| 14969 necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; | |
| 14970 hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. | |
| 14971 </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p8"> There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not | |
| 14972 to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain | |
| 14973 life. | |
| 14974 </p><p id="FP_Q96_A3-p9"> So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body | |
| 14975 than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus | |
| 14976 surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body. | |
| 14977 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 co."><a name="32536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32536] Iª q. 96 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14978 quod necesse est dicere aliquam disparitatem in primo statu fuisse, | |
| 14979 ad minus quantum ad sexum, quia sine diversitate sexus, generatio | |
| 14980 non fuisset. Similiter etiam quantum ad aetatem, sic enim quidam ex | |
| 14981 aliis nascebantur; nec illi qui miscebantur, steriles erant. Sed et | |
| 14982 secundum animam diversitas fuisset, et quantum ad iustitiam et | |
| 14983 quantum ad scientiam. Non enim ex necessitate homo operabatur, sed | |
| 14984 per liberum arbitrium; ex quo homo habet quod possit magis et minus | |
| 14985 animum applicare ad aliquid faciendum vel volendum vel | |
| 14986 cognoscendum. Unde quidam magis profecissent in iustitia et | |
| 14987 scientia quam alii. Ex parte etiam corporis, poterat esse | |
| 14988 disparitas. Non enim erat exemptum corpus humanum totaliter a | |
| 14989 legibus naturae, quin ex exterioribus agentibus aliquod commodum | |
| 14990 aut auxilium reciperet magis et minus, cum etiam et cibis eorum | |
| 14991 vita sustentaretur. Et sic nihil prohibet dicere quin secundum | |
| 14992 diversam dispositionem aeris et diversum situm stellarum, aliqui | |
| 14993 robustiores corpore generarentur quam alii, et maiores et | |
| 14994 pulchriores et melius complexionati. Ita tamen quod in illis qui | |
| 14995 excederentur, nullus esset defectus sive peccatum, sive circa | |
| 14996 animam sive circa corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p10"> | |
| 14997 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some | |
| 14998 are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. | |
| 14999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32537] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15000 dicendum quod Gregorius per verba illa intendit excludere | |
| 15001 disparitatem quae est secundum differentiam iustitiae et peccati; | |
| 15002 ex qua contingit quod aliqui poenaliter sunt sub aliis | |
| 15003 coercendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p11"> | |
| 15004 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between | |
| 15005 equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; | |
| 15006 although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. | |
| 15007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32538] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15008 dicendum quod aequalitas est causa quod dilectio mutua sit | |
| 15009 aequalis. Sed tamen inter inaequales potest esse maior dilectio | |
| 15010 quam inter aequales, licet non aequaliter utrinque respondeat. | |
| 15011 Pater enim plus diligit filium naturaliter, quam frater fratrem; | |
| 15012 licet filius non tantundem diligat patrem, sicut ab eo | |
| 15013 diligitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q96_A3-p12"> | |
| 15014 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He | |
| 15015 would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise | |
| 15016 on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature. | |
| 15017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 96 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32539] Iª q. 96 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15018 dicendum quod causa disparitatis poterat esse et ex parte Dei, non | |
| 15019 quidem ut puniret quosdam et quosdam praemiaret; sed ut quosdam | |
| 15020 plus, quosdam minus sublimaret, ut pulchritudo ordinis magis in | |
| 15021 hominibus reluceret. Et etiam ex parte naturae poterat disparitas | |
| 15022 causari secundum praedictum modum, absque aliquo defectu | |
| 15023 naturae.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 15024 <div id="FP_Q97" class="div3"> | |
| 15025 <h3 id="FP_Q97-p0.1">Q. 97. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 15026 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 15027 <p id="FP_Q97-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; | |
| 15028 secondly, as regards the preservation of the species. | |
| 15029 </p><p id="FP_Q97-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q97-p4"><a href="#FP_Q97_A1"> (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p5"><a href="#FP_Q97_A2"> (2) Whether he was impassible?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p6"><a href="#FP_Q97_A3"> (3) Whether he stood in need of food?</a></p><p id="FP_Q97-p7"><a href="#FP_Q97_A4"> (4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?</a></p> | |
| 15030 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 pr."><a name="32546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32546] | |
| 15031 Iª q. 97 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae | |
| 15032 pertinent ad statum primi hominis secundum corpus. Et primo, | |
| 15033 quantum ad conservationem individui; secundo, quantum ad | |
| 15034 conservationem speciei. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, | |
| 15035 utrum homo in statu innocentiae esset immortalis. Secundo, utrum | |
| 15036 esset impassibilis. Tertio, utrum indigeret cibis. Quarto, utrum | |
| 15037 per lignum vitae immortalitatem consequeretur.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 15038 <div id="FP_Q97_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A1-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p2"> | |
| 15039 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. | |
| 15040 But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal. | |
| 15041 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32547] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 15042 proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non erat | |
| 15043 immortalis. Mortale enim ponitur in definitione hominis. Sed remota | |
| 15044 definitione, aufertur definitum. Ergo si homo erat, non poterat | |
| 15045 esse immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p3"> | |
| 15046 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there | |
| 15047 can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in | |
| 15048 the present state. | |
| 15049 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32548] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15050 corruptibile et incorruptibile genere differunt, ut dicitur in X | |
| 15051 Metaphys. Sed eorum quae differunt genere, non est transmutatio in | |
| 15052 invicem. Si ergo primus homo fuit incorruptibilis, non posset homo | |
| 15053 in statu isto esse corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p4"> | |
| 15054 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, | |
| 15055 for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this | |
| 15056 be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to | |
| 15057 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.10.2" target="asv"> Wis. 10:2</a>: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not | |
| 15058 the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. | |
| 15059 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32549] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 15060 homo in statu innocentiae fuit immortalis, aut hoc habuit per | |
| 15061 naturam, aut per gratiam. Sed non per naturam, quia, cum natura | |
| 15062 eadem maneat secundum speciem, nunc quoque esset immortalis. | |
| 15063 Similiter nec per gratiam, quia primus homo gratiam per | |
| 15064 poenitentiam recuperavit, secundum illud Sap. X, <i>eduxit illum a | |
| 15065 delicto suo</i>; ergo immortalitatem recuperasset; quod patet esse | |
| 15066 falsum. Non ergo homo erat immortalis in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p5"> | |
| 15067 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to | |
| 15068 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv"> Apoc. 21:4</a>: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore | |
| 15069 man was not immortal in the state of innocence. | |
| 15070 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32550] Iª q. 97 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15071 immortalitas promittitur homini in praemium; secundum illud Apoc. | |
| 15072 XXI, <i>mors ultra non erit</i>. Sed homo non fuit conditus in | |
| 15073 statu praemii, sed ut praemium mereretur. Ergo homo in statu | |
| 15074 innocentiae non fuit immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p6"> | |
| 15075 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 15076 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By sin death came into the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin. | |
| 15077 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32551] Iª q. 97 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15078 quod dicitur ad Rom. V, quod <i>per peccatum intravit mors in | |
| 15079 mundum</i>. Ergo ante peccatum homo erat immortalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p7"> | |
| 15080 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter---that is to say, either because it possesses no | |
| 15081 matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. | |
| 15082 Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being | |
| 15083 by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from | |
| 15084 corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul | |
| 15085 of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor | |
| 15086 of incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible | |
| 15087 and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous | |
| 15088 author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might | |
| 15089 achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but | |
| 15090 by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption | |
| 15091 so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the | |
| 15092 capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained ( | |
| 15093 <a href="#FP_Q76_A1" id="FP_Q97_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity | |
| 15094 of corporeal matter. | |
| 15095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 co."><a name="32552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32552] Iª q. 97 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15096 quod aliquid potest dici incorruptibile tripliciter. Uno modo, ex | |
| 15097 parte materiae, eo scilicet quod vel non habet materiam, sicut | |
| 15098 Angelus; vel habet materiam quae non est in potentia nisi ad unam | |
| 15099 formam, sicut corpus caeleste. Et hoc dicitur secundum naturam | |
| 15100 incorruptibile. Alio modo dicitur aliquid incorruptibile ex parte | |
| 15101 formae, quia scilicet rei corruptibili per naturam, inhaeret aliqua | |
| 15102 dispositio per quam totaliter a corruptione prohibetur. Et hoc | |
| 15103 dicitur incorruptibile secundum gloriam, quia, ut dicit Augustinus | |
| 15104 in epistola ad Dioscorum, <i>tam potenti natura Deus fecit animam, | |
| 15105 ut ex eius beatitudine redundet in corpus plenitudo sanitatis</i>, | |
| 15106 idest incorruptionis vigor. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid | |
| 15107 incorruptibile ex parte causae efficientis. Et hoc modo homo in | |
| 15108 statu innocentiae fuisset incorruptibilis et immortalis. Quia, ut | |
| 15109 Augustinus dicit in libro de quaest. Vet. et Nov. Test., <i>Deus | |
| 15110 hominem fecit, qui quandiu non peccaret, immortalitate vigeret, ut | |
| 15111 ipse sibi auctor esset aut ad vitam aut ad mortem</i>. Non enim | |
| 15112 corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immortalitatis vigorem | |
| 15113 in eo existentem; sed inerat animae vis quaedam supernaturaliter | |
| 15114 divinitus data, per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptione | |
| 15115 praeservare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod | |
| 15116 rationabiliter factum est. Quia enim anima rationalis excedit | |
| 15117 proportionem corporalis materiae, ut supra dictum est. Conveniens | |
| 15118 fuit ut in principio ei virtus daretur, per quam corpus conservare | |
| 15119 posset supra naturam corporalis materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p8"> Reply OBJ 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32553] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo et | |
| 15120 secundum dicendum quod rationes illae procedunt de incorruptibili | |
| 15121 et immortali per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p9"> | |
| 15122 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace | |
| 15123 as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect | |
| 15124 of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, | |
| 15125 as we shall explain further on (TP, | |
| 15126 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A4" id="FP_Q97_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[14] , A[4]</a>, ad 1). | |
| 15127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32554] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15128 dicendum quod vis illa praeservandi corpus a corruptione, non erat | |
| 15129 animae humanae naturalis, sed per donum gratiae. Et quamvis gratiam | |
| 15130 recuperaverit ad remissionem culpae et meritum gloriae, non tamen | |
| 15131 ad amissae immortalitatis effectum. Hoc enim reservabatur Christo, | |
| 15132 per quem naturae defectus in melius reparandus erat, ut infra | |
| 15133 dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A1-p10"> | |
| 15134 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence. | |
| 15135 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32555] Iª q. 97 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 15136 dicendum quod differt immortalitas gloriae, quae promittitur in | |
| 15137 praemium, ab immortalitate quae fuit homini collata in statu | |
| 15138 innocentiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q97_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A2-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p2"> | |
| 15139 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of | |
| 15140 innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible. | |
| 15141 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32556] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 15142 proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae fuisset | |
| 15143 passibilis. Sentire enim est pati quoddam. Sed homo in statu | |
| 15144 innocentiae fuisset sensibilis. Ergo fuisset passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p3"> | |
| 15145 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to | |
| 15146 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.21" target="asv"> Gn. 2:21, </a> "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible. | |
| 15147 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32557] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15148 somnus passio quaedam est. Sed homo in statu innocentiae | |
| 15149 dormivisset; secundum illud Gen. II, <i>immisit Deus soporem in | |
| 15150 Adam</i>. Ergo fuisset passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p4"> | |
| 15151 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of | |
| 15152 the cutting out of part of his body. | |
| 15153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32558] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15154 ibidem subditur quod tulit unam de costis eius. Ergo fuisset | |
| 15155 passibilis etiam per abscissionem partis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p5"> | |
| 15156 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had | |
| 15157 come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man | |
| 15158 was passible. | |
| 15159 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32559] Iª q. 97 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15160 corpus hominis molle fuit. Sed molle naturaliter passivum est a | |
| 15161 duro. Ergo si corpori primi hominis obvium fuisset aliquod corpus | |
| 15162 durum, ab eo passum fuisset. Et sic primus homo fuit | |
| 15163 passibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p6"> | |
| 15164 <b>On the contrary,</b> Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive suffering | |
| 15165 wastes the very substance." | |
| 15166 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32560] Iª q. 97 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15167 quia, si fuit passibilis, fuit etiam corruptibilis, quia passio, | |
| 15168 magis facta, abiicit a substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p7"> | |
| 15169 <b>I answer that,</b> "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its | |
| 15170 natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according | |
| 15171 as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind | |
| 15172 of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and | |
| 15173 sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both | |
| 15174 in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could | |
| 15175 curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. | |
| 15176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 co."><a name="32561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32561] Iª q. 97 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15177 quod passio dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, proprie, et sic pati | |
| 15178 dicitur quod a sua naturali dispositione removetur. Passio enim est | |
| 15179 effectus actionis, in rebus autem naturalibus contraria agunt et | |
| 15180 patiuntur ad invicem, quorum unum removet alterum a sua naturali | |
| 15181 dispositione. Alio modo, dicitur passio communiter, secundum | |
| 15182 quamcumque mutationem, etiam si pertineat ad perfectionem naturae; | |
| 15183 sicut intelligere vel sentire dicitur pati quoddam. Hoc igitur | |
| 15184 secundo modo, homo in statu innocentiae passibilis erat, et | |
| 15185 patiebatur, et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Primo autem modo | |
| 15186 dicta passione, erat impassibilis et secundum animam et secundum | |
| 15187 corpus, sicut et immortalis, poterat enim passionem prohibere, | |
| 15188 sicut et mortem, si absque peccato perstitisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p8"> Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, | |
| 15189 but are ordered to his natural welfare. | |
| 15190 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32562] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 15191 responsio ad duo prima. Nam sentire et dormire non removent hominem | |
| 15192 a naturali dispositione, sed ad bonum naturae ordinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p9"> | |
| 15193 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As already explained ( | |
| 15194 <a href="#FP_Q92_A3" id="FP_Q97_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. | |
| 15195 Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib. | |
| 15196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32563] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15197 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, costa illa fuit in Adam, | |
| 15198 inquantum erat principium humani generis; sicut semen est in | |
| 15199 homine, inquantum est principium per generationem. Sicut igitur | |
| 15200 decisio seminis non est cum passione quae removeat hominem a | |
| 15201 naturali dispositione, ita etiam est dicendum de separatione illius | |
| 15202 costae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A2-p10"> | |
| 15203 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his | |
| 15204 reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of | |
| 15205 a harmful nature could come upon him unawares. | |
| 15206 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32564] Iª q. 97 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 15207 dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae poterat | |
| 15208 praeservari ne pateretur laesionem ab aliquo duro, partim quidem | |
| 15209 per propriam rationem, per quam poterat nociva vitare; partim etiam | |
| 15210 per divinam providentiam, quae sic ipsum tuebatur, ut nihil ei | |
| 15211 occurreret ex improviso, a quo laederetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q97_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q97_A3-p0.1">Q. 97. A. 3. Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p2"> | |
| 15212 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has | |
| 15213 lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food. | |
| 15214 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32565] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 15215 proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae non indigebat | |
| 15216 cibis. Cibus enim necessarius est homini ad restaurationem | |
| 15217 deperditi. Sed in corpore Adae, ut videtur, nulla fiebat | |
| 15218 deperditio, quia incorruptibile erat. Ergo non erat ei cibus | |
| 15219 necessarius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p3"> | |
| 15220 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it | |
| 15221 does not appear how food could be needful to him. | |
| 15222 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32566] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cibus | |
| 15223 est necessarius ad nutriendum. Sed nutritio non est sine passione. | |
| 15224 Cum ergo corpus hominis esset impassibile, non erat ei cibus | |
| 15225 necessarius, ut videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p4"> | |
| 15226 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he | |
| 15227 would not have died. Therefore he did not require food. | |
| 15228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32567] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cibus | |
| 15229 dicitur esse nobis necessarius ad vitae conservationem. Sed Adam | |
| 15230 aliter vitam poterat conservare, quia si non peccaret, non | |
| 15231 moreretur. Ergo cibus non erat ei necessarius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p5"> | |
| 15232 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore | |
| 15233 it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state. | |
| 15234 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="32568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32568] Iª q. 97 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ad | |
| 15235 sumptionem cibi sequitur emissio superfluitatum, quae habent | |
| 15236 quandam turpitudinem non convenientem dignitati primi status. Ergo | |
| 15237 videtur quod homo in primo statu cibis non uteretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p6"> | |
| 15238 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 15239 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.16" target="asv">Gn. 2:16</a>): "Of every tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat." | |
| 15240 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32569] Iª q. 97 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15241 quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>de omni ligno quod est in Paradiso, | |
| 15242 comedetis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q97_A3-p7"> | |
| 15243 <b>I answer that,</b> In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life | |
| 15244 needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called | |
| 15245 a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls---that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written | |
| 15246 ( | |
| 15247 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "Man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving | |
| 15248 life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as | |
| 15249 possessing an intellectual immaterial power. | |
| 15250 </p><p id="FP_Q97_A3-p8"> Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body | |
| 15251 was called "animal" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. | |
| 15252 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.44" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:44 </a>seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher | |
| 15253 says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore | |
| 15254 such operations befitted | |
| 15255 man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate | |
| 15256 to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, | |
| 15257 whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in | |
| 15258 the state of innocence. | |
| 15259 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 co."><a name="32570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32570] Iª q. 97 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15260 quod homo in statu innocentiae habuit vitam animalem cibis | |
| 15261 indigentem; post resurrectionem vero habebit vitam spiritualem | |
| 15262 cibis non indigentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod | |
| 15263 anima rationalis et anima est et spiritus. Dicitur autem esse anima | |
| 15264 secundum illud quod est sibi commune et aliis animabus, quod est | |
| 15265 vitam corpori dare, unde dicitur Gen. II, <i>factus est homo in | |
| 15266 animam viventem</i>, idest vitam corpori dantem. Sed spiritus | |
| 15267 dicitur secundum illud quod est proprium sibi et non aliis | |
| 15268 animabus, quod scilicet habeat virtutem intellectivam immaterialem. | |
| 15269 In primo igitur statu anima rationalis communicabat corpori id quod | |
| 15270 competit ei inquantum est anima, et ideo corpus illud dicebatur | |
| 15271 animale, inquantum scilicet habebat vitam ab anima. Primum autem | |
| 15272 principium vitae in istis inferioribus, ut dicitur in libro de | |
| 15273 anima, est anima vegetabilis, cuius opera sunt alimento uti et | |
| 15274 generare et augeri. Et ideo haec opera homini in primo statu | |
| 15275 competebant. In ultimo vero statu post resurrectionem, anima | |
| 15276 communicabit quodammodo corpori ea quae sunt sibi propria inquantum | |
| 15277 est spiritus, immortalitatem quidem, quantum ad omnes; | |
| 15278 impassibilitatem vero et gloriam et virtutem, quantum ad bonos, | |
| 15279 quorum corpora spiritualia dicentur. Unde post resurrectionem | |
| 15280 homines cibis non indigebunt, sed in statu innocentiae eis | |
| 15281 indigebant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p9"> | |
| 15282 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): | |
| 15283 "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." | |
| 15284 For we have explained | |
| 15285 <a href="#FP_Q97_A1" id="FP_Q97_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition | |
| 15286 of the body: so | |
| 15287 that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the | |
| 15288 humor, man was obliged to take food. | |
| 15289 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32571] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15290 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de quaest. Vet. et | |
| 15291 Nov. Test., <i>quomodo immortale corpus habebat, quod cibo | |
| 15292 sustentabatur? Immortale enim non eget esca neque potu</i>. Dictum | |
| 15293 est enim supra quod immortalitas primi status erat secundum vim | |
| 15294 quandam supernaturalem in anima residentem; non autem secundum | |
| 15295 aliquam dispositionem corpori inhaerentem. Unde per actionem | |
| 15296 caloris aliquid de humido illius corporis poterat deperdi; et ne | |
| 15297 totaliter consumeretur, necesse erat per assumptionem cibi homini | |
| 15298 subveniri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p10"> | |
| 15299 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. | |
| 15300 So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion | |
| 15301 conduced to the perfection of the nature. | |
| 15302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32572] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15303 dicendum quod in nutritione est quaedam passio et alteratio, | |
| 15304 scilicet ex parte alimenti, quod convertitur in substantiam eius | |
| 15305 quod alitur. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod corpus hominis | |
| 15306 fuerit passibile, sed quod cibus assumptus erat passibilis. Quamvis | |
| 15307 etiam talis passio esset ad perfectionem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p11"> | |
| 15308 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same | |
| 15309 time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise. | |
| 15310 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32573] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15311 dicendum quod, si homo sibi non subveniret de cibo, peccaret; sicut | |
| 15312 peccavit sumendo vetitum cibum. Simul enim sibi praeceptum fuit ut | |
| 15313 a ligno scientiae boni et mali abstineret, et ut de omni alio ligno | |
| 15314 Paradisi vesceretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q97_A3-p12"> | |
| 15315 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been | |
| 15316 nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. | |
| 15317 Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state. | |
| 15318 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 97 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="32574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32574] Iª q. 97 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 15319 dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod homo in statu innocentiae non | |
| 15320 assumpsisset de cibo nisi quantum fuisset ei necessarium, unde non | |
| 15321 fuisset ibi superfluitatum emissio. Sed hoc irrationabile videtur, | |
| 15322 quod in cibo assumpto non esset aliqua faeculentia, quae non esset | |
| 15323 apta ut converteretur in hominis nutrimentum. Unde oportebat | |
| 15324 superfluitates emitti. Tamen fuisset divinitus provisum ut nulla ex | |
| 15325 hoc indecentia esset.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 15326 <div id="FP_Q98" class="div3"> | |
| 15327 <h3 id="FP_Q98-p0.1">Q. 98. OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 15328 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 15329 <p id="FP_Q98-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the | |
| 15330 offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: | |
| 15331 </p><p id="FP_Q98-p3"><a href="#FP_Q98_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q98-p4"><a href="#FP_Q98_A2"> (2) Whether generation would have been through coition?</a></p> | |
| 15332 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 pr."><a name="32582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32582] | |
| 15333 Iª q. 98 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae | |
| 15334 pertinent ad conservationem speciei. Et primo, de ipsa generatione; | |
| 15335 secundo, de conditione prolis genitae. Circa primum quaeruntur duo. | |
| 15336 Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio. Secundo, utrum | |
| 15337 fuisset generatio per coitum.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 15338 <div id="FP_Q98_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q98_A1-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p2"> | |
| 15339 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, "corruption is | |
| 15340 contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of | |
| 15341 innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation. | |
| 15342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32583] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 15343 proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset | |
| 15344 generatio. Generationi enim corruptio est contraria, ut dicitur in | |
| 15345 V Physic. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. In statu autem | |
| 15346 innocentiae non fuisset corruptio. Ergo neque generatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p3"> | |
| 15347 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore | |
| 15348 there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived | |
| 15349 for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. | |
| 15350 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32584] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15351 generatio ordinatur ad hoc quod conservetur in specie quod secundum | |
| 15352 individuum conservari non potest, unde et in illis individuis quae | |
| 15353 in perpetuum durant, generatio non invenitur. Sed in statu | |
| 15354 innocentiae homo in perpetuum absque morte vixisset. Ergo in statu | |
| 15355 innocentiae generatio, non fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p4"> | |
| 15356 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion | |
| 15357 of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights | |
| 15358 when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, | |
| 15359 as Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the | |
| 15360 state of innocence. | |
| 15361 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32585] Iª q. 98 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, per | |
| 15362 generationem homines multiplicantur. Sed multiplicatis dominis, | |
| 15363 necesse est fieri possessionum divisionem, ad evitandam confusionem | |
| 15364 dominii. Ergo, cum homo sit institutus dominus animalium, facta | |
| 15365 multiplicatione humani generis per generationem, secuta fuisset | |
| 15366 divisio dominii. Quod videtur esse contrarium iuri naturali, | |
| 15367 secundum quod omnia sunt communia, ut Isidorus dicit. Non ergo | |
| 15368 fuisset generatio in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p5"> | |
| 15369 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 15370 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.28" target="asv">Gn. 1:28</a>): "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original | |
| 15371 number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence. | |
| 15372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32586] Iª q. 98 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15373 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>crescite et multiplicamini, et replete | |
| 15374 terram</i>. Huiusmodi autem multiplicatio absque nova generatione | |
| 15375 fieri non potuisset, cum duo tantum fuerint primitus instituti. | |
| 15376 Ergo in primo statu generatio fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p6"> | |
| 15377 <b>I answer that,</b> In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise | |
| 15378 man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, | |
| 15379 by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally | |
| 15380 incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's | |
| 15381 purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of | |
| 15382 nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but | |
| 15383 as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become void. | |
| 15384 </p><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p7"> Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose | |
| 15385 of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible | |
| 15386 substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the | |
| 15387 chief purpose of nature. | |
| 15388 </p><p id="FP_Q98_A1-p8"> Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which | |
| 15389 is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the | |
| 15390 Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, | |
| 15391 He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. | |
| 15392 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 co."><a name="32587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32587] Iª q. 98 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15393 quod in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio ad multiplicationem | |
| 15394 humani generis, alioquin peccatum hominis fuisset valde | |
| 15395 necessarium, ex quo tantum bonum consecutum est. Est ergo | |
| 15396 considerandum quod homo, secundum suam naturam, est constitutus | |
| 15397 quasi medium quoddam inter creaturas corruptibiles et | |
| 15398 incorruptibiles, nam anima eius est naturaliter incorruptibilis, | |
| 15399 corpus vero naturaliter corruptibile. Est autem considerandum quod | |
| 15400 alio modo intentio naturae fertur ad corruptibiles, et | |
| 15401 incorruptibiles creaturas. Id enim per se videtur esse de | |
| 15402 intentione naturae, quod est semper et perpetuum. Quod autem est | |
| 15403 solum secundum aliquod tempus, non videtur esse principaliter de | |
| 15404 intentione naturae, sed quasi ad aliud ordinatum, alioquin, eo | |
| 15405 corrupto, naturae intentio cassaretur. Quia igitur in rebus | |
| 15406 corruptibilibus nihil est perpetuum et semper manens nisi species, | |
| 15407 bonum speciei est de principali intentione naturae, ad cuius | |
| 15408 conservationem naturalis generatio ordinatur. Substantiae vero | |
| 15409 incorruptibiles manent semper non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam | |
| 15410 secundum individua, et ideo etiam ipsa individua sunt de principali | |
| 15411 intentione naturae. Sic igitur homini ex parte corporis, quod | |
| 15412 corruptibile est secundum naturam suam, competit generatio. Ex | |
| 15413 parte vero animae, quae incorruptibilis est, competit ei quod | |
| 15414 multitudo individuorum sit per se intenta a natura, vel potius a | |
| 15415 naturae auctore, qui solus est humanarum animarum creator. Et ideo, | |
| 15416 ad multiplicationem humani generis, generationem in humano genere | |
| 15417 statuit, etiam in statu innocentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p9"> | |
| 15418 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. | |
| 15419 Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. | |
| 15420 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32588] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15421 dicendum quod corpus hominis in statu innocentiae, quantum erat de | |
| 15422 se, corruptibile erat, sed potuit praeservari a corruptione per | |
| 15423 animam. Et ideo non fuit homini subtrahenda generatio, quae debetur | |
| 15424 corruptibilibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p10"> | |
| 15425 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would | |
| 15426 have been required for the multiplication of the individual. | |
| 15427 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32589] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15428 dicendum quod generatio in statu innocentiae, etsi non fuisset | |
| 15429 propter conservationem speciei, fuisset tamen propter | |
| 15430 multiplicationem individuorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A1-p11"> | |
| 15431 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community | |
| 15432 of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will | |
| 15433 of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's | |
| 15434 need, those things of which they were masters---a state of things to be observed | |
| 15435 even now among many good men. | |
| 15436 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32590] Iª q. 98 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15437 dicendum quod in statu isto, multiplicatis dominis, necesse est | |
| 15438 fieri divisionem possessionum, quia communitas possessionis est | |
| 15439 occasio discordiae, ut philosophus dicit in II Politic. Sed in | |
| 15440 statu innocentiae fuissent voluntates hominum sic ordinatae, quod | |
| 15441 absque omni periculo discordiae communiter usi fuissent, secundum | |
| 15442 quod unicuique eorum competeret, rebus quae eorum dominio | |
| 15443 subdebantur, cum hoc etiam modo apud multos bonos viros | |
| 15444 observetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q98_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q98_A2-p0.1">Q. 98. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p2"> | |
| 15445 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide | |
| 15446 Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was "like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, | |
| 15447 when men will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as is written | |
| 15448 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition. | |
| 15449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32591] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 15450 proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio | |
| 15451 per coitum. Quia, ut Damascenus dicit, primus homo erat in Paradiso | |
| 15452 terrestri sicut Angelus quidam. Sed in futuro resurrectionis statu, | |
| 15453 quando erunt homines Angelis similes, neque nubent neque nubentur, | |
| 15454 ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Ergo neque in Paradiso fuisset generatio | |
| 15455 per coitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p3"> | |
| 15456 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed | |
| 15457 before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture ( | |
| 15458 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv">Gn. 4:1</a>). | |
| 15459 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32592] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, primi | |
| 15460 homines in perfecta aetate conditi fuerunt. Si igitur in eis ante | |
| 15461 peccatum generatio fuisset per coitum, fuissent etiam in Paradiso | |
| 15462 carnaliter coniuncti. Quod patet esse falsum, secundum | |
| 15463 Scripturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p4"> | |
| 15464 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight | |
| 15465 which he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared | |
| 15466 to beasts by reason of sin, according to | |
| 15467 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.13" target="asv"> Ps. 48:13</a>: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them." Therefore, | |
| 15468 before sin, there | |
| 15469 would have been no such intercourse of man and woman. | |
| 15470 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32593] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 15471 coniunctione carnali maxime efficitur homo similis bestiis, propter | |
| 15472 vehementiam delectationis, unde etiam continentia laudatur, per | |
| 15473 quam homines ab huiusmodi delectationibus abstinent. Sed bestiis | |
| 15474 homo comparatur propter peccatum, secundum illud Psalmi XLVIII, | |
| 15475 <i>homo cum in honore esset, non intellexit, comparatus est | |
| 15476 iumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis</i>. Ergo ante | |
| 15477 peccatum non fuisset maris et feminae carnalis coniunctio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p5"> | |
| 15478 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. | |
| 15479 Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence. | |
| 15480 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32594] Iª q. 98 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 15481 statu innocentiae nulla fuisset corruptio. Sed per coitum | |
| 15482 corrumpitur integritas virginalis. Ergo coitus in statu innocentiae | |
| 15483 non fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6"> | |
| 15484 <b>On the contrary,</b> God made man and woman before sin ( | |
| 15485 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, | |
| 15486 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">2</a>). But nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which | |
| 15487 the distinction of sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man ( | |
| 15488 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv">Gn. 2:18</a>, | |
| 15489 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.20" target="asv">20</a>). But she is not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in | |
| 15490 anything else. Therefore there would | |
| 15491 have been such generation also in the state of innocence. | |
| 15492 </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 1"><a name="32595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32595] Iª q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15493 quod Deus ante peccatum masculum et feminam fecit, ut dicitur Gen. | |
| 15494 I et II. Nihil autem est frustra in operibus Dei. Ergo etiam si | |
| 15495 homo non peccasset, fuisset coitus, ad quem distinctio sexuum | |
| 15496 ordinatur.</p><p title="I q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 2"><a name="32596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32596] Iª q. 98 a. 2 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Gen. | |
| 15497 II, dicitur mulier esse facta in adiutorium viri. Sed non ad aliud | |
| 15498 nisi ad generationem quae fit per coitum, quia ad quodlibet aliud | |
| 15499 opus, convenientius adiuvari posset vir per virum quam per feminam. | |
| 15500 Ergo etiam in statu innocentiae fuisset generatio per coitum.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q98_A2-p7"> | |
| 15501 <b>I answer that,</b> Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded | |
| 15502 that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. | |
| 15503 Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied | |
| 15504 without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and | |
| 15505 female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this | |
| 15506 is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by | |
| 15507 coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained ( | |
| 15508 <a href="#FP_Q97_A3" id="FP_Q98_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[3]</a>), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot | |
| 15509 allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin. | |
| 15510 </p><p id="FP_Q98_A2-p8"> Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which | |
| 15511 comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. | |
| 15512 Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of | |
| 15513 nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second | |
| 15514 thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, | |
| 15515 when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from | |
| 15516 supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved | |
| 15517 by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body." | |
| 15518 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 co."><a name="32597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32597] Iª q. 98 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15519 quod quidam antiquorum doctorum, considerantes concupiscentiae | |
| 15520 foeditatem quae invenitur in coitu in isto statu, posuerunt quod in | |
| 15521 statu innocentiae non fuisset generatio per coitum. Unde Gregorius | |
| 15522 Nyssenus dicit in libro quem fecit de homine, quod in Paradiso | |
| 15523 aliter fuisset multiplicatum genus humanum, sicut multiplicati sunt | |
| 15524 Angeli, absque concubitu, per operationem divinae virtutis. Et | |
| 15525 dicit quod Deus ante peccatum fecit masculum et feminam, respiciens | |
| 15526 ad modum generationis qui futurus erat post peccatum, cuius Deus | |
| 15527 praescius erat. Sed hoc non dicitur rationabiliter. Ea enim quae | |
| 15528 sunt naturalia homini, neque subtrahuntur neque dantur homini per | |
| 15529 peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod homini, secundum animalem | |
| 15530 vitam, quam etiam ante peccatum habebat, ut supra dictum est, | |
| 15531 naturale est generare per coitum, sicut et ceteris animalibus | |
| 15532 perfectis. Et hoc declarant naturalia membra ad hunc usum deputata. | |
| 15533 Et ideo non est dicendum quod usus horum membrorum naturalium non | |
| 15534 fuisset ante peccatum, sicut et ceterorum membrorum. Sunt igitur in | |
| 15535 coitu duo consideranda, secundum praesentem statum. Unum quod | |
| 15536 naturae est, scilicet coniunctio maris et feminae ad generandum. In | |
| 15537 omni enim generatione requiritur virtus activa et passiva. Unde, | |
| 15538 cum in omnibus in quibus est distinctio sexuum, virtus activa sit | |
| 15539 in mare, virtus vero passiva in femina; naturae ordo exigit ut ad | |
| 15540 generandum conveniant per coitum mas et femina. Aliud autem quod | |
| 15541 considerari potest, est quaedam deformitas immoderatae | |
| 15542 concupiscentiae. Quae in statu innocentiae non fuisset quando | |
| 15543 inferiores vires omnino rationi subdebantur. Unde Augustinus dicit, | |
| 15544 in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>absit ut suspicemur non potuisse prolem seri | |
| 15545 sine libidinis morbo. Sed eo voluntatis nutu moverentur illa membra | |
| 15546 quo cetera, et sine ardore et illecebroso stimulo, cum | |
| 15547 tranquillitate animi et corporis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p9"> | |
| 15548 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the | |
| 15549 resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel. | |
| 15550 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32598] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15551 dicendum quod homo in Paradiso fuisset sicut Angelus per | |
| 15552 spiritualem mentem, cum tamen haberet, vitam animalem quantum ad | |
| 15553 corpus. Sed post resurrectionem erit homo similis Angelo, | |
| 15554 spiritualis effectus et secundum animam et secundum corpus. Unde | |
| 15555 non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p10"> | |
| 15556 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they | |
| 15557 were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command | |
| 15558 relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time. | |
| 15559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32599] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15560 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit IX super Gen. ad Litt., ideo | |
| 15561 primi parentes in Paradiso non coierunt, quia, formata muliere, | |
| 15562 post modicum propter peccatum de Paradiso eiecti sunt, vel quia | |
| 15563 expectabatur divina auctoritas ad determinatum tempus commixtionis, | |
| 15564 a qua acceperunt universale mandatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p11"> | |
| 15565 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. | |
| 15566 In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of | |
| 15567 sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity | |
| 15568 of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of | |
| 15569 concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not | |
| 15570 to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" | |
| 15571 I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the | |
| 15572 glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do | |
| 15573 not | |
| 15574 exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence | |
| 15575 would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it | |
| 15576 removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust. | |
| 15577 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32600] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15578 dicendum quod bestiae carent ratione. Unde secundum hoc homo in | |
| 15579 coitu bestialis efficitur, quod delectationem coitus et fervorem | |
| 15580 concupiscentiae ratione moderari non potest. Sed in statu | |
| 15581 innocentiae nihil huiusmodi fuisset quod ratione non moderaretur, | |
| 15582 non quia esset minor delectatio secundum sensum, ut quidam dicunt | |
| 15583 (fuisset enim tanto maior delectatio sensibilis, quanto esset | |
| 15584 purior natura, et corpus magis sensibile); sed quia vis | |
| 15585 concupiscibilis non ita inordinate se effudisset super huiusmodi | |
| 15586 delectatione, regulata per rationem, ad quam non pertinet ut sit | |
| 15587 minor delectatio in sensu, sed ut vis concupiscibilis non | |
| 15588 immoderate delectationi inhaereat; et dico immoderate, praeter | |
| 15589 mensuram rationis. Sicut sobrius in cibo moderate assumpto non | |
| 15590 minorem habet delectationem quam gulosus; sed minus eius | |
| 15591 concupiscibilis super huiusmodi delectatione requiescit. Et hoc | |
| 15592 sonant verba Augustini, quae a statu innocentiae non excludunt | |
| 15593 magnitudinem delectationis, sed ardorem libidinis et inquietudinem | |
| 15594 animi. Et ideo continentia in statu innocentiae non fuisset | |
| 15595 laudabilis, quae in tempore isto laudatur non propter defectum | |
| 15596 fecunditatis, sed propter remotionem inordinatae libidinis. Tunc | |
| 15597 autem fuisset fecunditas absque libidine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q98_A2-p12"> | |
| 15598 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state "intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; | |
| 15599 this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by | |
| 15600 groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate | |
| 15601 action." | |
| 15602 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 98 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32601] Iª q. 98 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 15603 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>in illo | |
| 15604 statu nulla corruptione integritatis infunderetur gremio maritus | |
| 15605 uxoris. Ita enim potuit utero coniugis, salva integritate feminei | |
| 15606 genitalis, virile semen immitti, sicut nunc potest, eadem | |
| 15607 integritate salva, ex utero virginis fluxus menstrui cruoris | |
| 15608 emitti. Ut enim ad pariendum non doloris gemitus, sed maturitatis | |
| 15609 impulsus feminea viscera relaxaret; sic ad concipiendum non | |
| 15610 libidinis appetitus, sed voluntarius usus naturam utramque | |
| 15611 coniungeret</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 15612 <div id="FP_Q99" class="div3"> | |
| 15613 <h3 id="FP_Q99-p0.1">Q. 99. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 15614 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 15615 <p id="FP_Q99-p2"> We must now consider the condition of the offspring---first, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in | |
| 15616 knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: | |
| 15617 </p><p id="FP_Q99-p3"><a href="#FP_Q99_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?</a></p><p id="FP_Q99-p4"><a href="#FP_Q99_A2"> (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?</a></p> | |
| 15618 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 pr."><a name="32602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32602] | |
| 15619 Iª q. 99 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de conditione | |
| 15620 prolis generandae. Et primo, quantum ad corpus; secundo, quantum ad | |
| 15621 iustitiam; tertio, quantum ad scientiam. Circa primum quaeruntur | |
| 15622 duo. Primo, utrum in statu innocentiae pueri mox geniti habuissent | |
| 15623 perfectam virtutem corpoream. Secundo, utrum omnes fuissent nati in | |
| 15624 sexu masculino.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 15625 <div id="FP_Q99_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q99_A2-p0.1">Q. 99. A. 2. Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p2"> | |
| 15626 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, | |
| 15627 3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing | |
| 15628 would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born. | |
| 15629 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32613] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 15630 proceditur. Videtur quod in primo statu feminae natae non fuissent. | |
| 15631 Dicit enim philosophus, in libro II de Generat. Animal., quod | |
| 15632 femina est mas occasionatus, quasi praeter intentionem naturae | |
| 15633 proveniens. Sed in statu illo nihil evenisset innaturale in hominis | |
| 15634 generatione. Ergo feminae natae non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p3"> | |
| 15635 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire | |
| 15636 cannot burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's | |
| 15637 active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always | |
| 15638 have been born. | |
| 15639 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32614] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 15640 agens generat sibi simile, nisi impediatur vel propter defectum | |
| 15641 virtutis, vel propter indispositionem materiae, sicut parvus ignis | |
| 15642 non potest comburere ligna viridia. In generatione autem vis activa | |
| 15643 est in mare. Cum igitur in statu innocentiae nullus fuisset | |
| 15644 defectus virtutis ex parte maris, nec indispositio materiae ex | |
| 15645 parte feminae, videtur quod semper masculi nati fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p4"> | |
| 15646 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have | |
| 15647 been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in | |
| 15648 the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born. | |
| 15649 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32615] Iª q. 99 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 15650 statu innocentiae generatio ad multiplicationem hominum | |
| 15651 ordinabatur. Sed sufficienter homines multiplicari potuissent per | |
| 15652 primum hominem et per primam feminam, ex quo in perpetuum victuri | |
| 15653 erant. Ergo non fuit necessarium quod in statu innocentiae feminae | |
| 15654 nascerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5"> | |
| 15655 <b>On the contrary,</b> Nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But established | |
| 15656 male and female in human nature, as it is written ( | |
| 15657 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, | |
| 15658 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">2</a>). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born. | |
| 15659 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32616] Iª q. 99 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15660 quod sic natura processisset in generando, sicut eam Deus | |
| 15661 instituit. Sed Deus instituit marem et feminam in natura humana, ut | |
| 15662 dicitur Gen. I et II. Ergo etiam in statu illo fuissent mares et | |
| 15663 feminae generati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p6"> | |
| 15664 <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different | |
| 15665 grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore | |
| 15666 in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten. | |
| 15667 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 co."><a name="32617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32617] Iª q. 99 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15668 quod nihil eorum quae ad complementum humanae naturae pertinent, in | |
| 15669 statu innocentiae defuisset. Sicut autem ad perfectionem universi | |
| 15670 pertinent diversi gradus rerum, ita etiam diversitas sexus est ad | |
| 15671 perfectionem humanae naturae. Et ideo in statu innocentiae uterque | |
| 15672 sexus per generationem productus fuisset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p7"> | |
| 15673 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: | |
| 15674 but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained ( | |
| 15675 <a href="#FP_Q92_A1" id="FP_Q99_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[92], A[1]</a>, ad 2). | |
| 15676 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32618] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15677 dicendum quod femina dicitur mas occasionatus, quia est praeter | |
| 15678 intentionem naturae particularis, non autem praeter intentionem | |
| 15679 naturae universalis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p8"> | |
| 15680 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; | |
| 15681 but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind | |
| 15682 favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of | |
| 15683 the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). | |
| 15684 Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will | |
| 15685 of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified. | |
| 15686 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32619] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15687 dicendum quod generatio feminae non solum contingit ex defectu | |
| 15688 virtutis activae vel indispositione materiae, ut obiectio tangit. | |
| 15689 Sed quandoque quidem ex aliquo accidenti extrinseco; sicut | |
| 15690 philosophus dicit, in libro de animalibus, quod <i>ventus | |
| 15691 Septentrionalis coadiuvat ad generationem masculorum, Australis | |
| 15692 vero ad generationem feminarum</i>. Quandoque etiam ex conceptione | |
| 15693 animae, ad quam de facili immutatur corpus. Et praecipue in statu | |
| 15694 innocentiae hoc esse poterat, quando corpus magis erat animae | |
| 15695 subiectum; ut scilicet secundum voluntatem generantis, | |
| 15696 distingueretur sexus in prole.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q99_A2-p9"> | |
| 15697 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that | |
| 15698 all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in | |
| 15699 equal number. | |
| 15700 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 99 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32620] Iª q. 99 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15701 dicendum quod proles fuisset genita vivens vita animali, ad quam | |
| 15702 sicut pertinet alimento uti, sic etiam generare. Unde conveniebat | |
| 15703 quod omnes generarent, et non solum primi parentes. Ad quod | |
| 15704 consequens videtur quod tot fuissent generatae feminae, quot et | |
| 15705 mares.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 15706 <div id="FP_Q100" class="div3"> | |
| 15707 <h3 id="FP_Q100-p0.1">Q. 100. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 15708 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 15709 <p id="FP_Q100-p2"> We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q100-p3"><a href="#FP_Q100_A1"> (1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?</a></p><p id="FP_Q100-p4"><a href="#FP_Q100_A2"> (2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?</a></p> | |
| 15710 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 pr."><a name="32621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32621] | |
| 15711 Iª q. 100 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 15712 conditione prolis generandae quantum ad iustitiam. Et circa hoc | |
| 15713 quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum homines fuissent nati cum iustitia. | |
| 15714 Secundo, utrum nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 15715 <div id="FP_Q100_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q100_A1-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 1. Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p2"> | |
| 15716 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor | |
| 15717 says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness." | |
| 15718 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32622] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 15719 proceditur. Videtur quod homines non fuissent cum iustitia nati. | |
| 15720 Dicit enim Hugo de sancto Victore quod <i>primus homo ante peccatum | |
| 15721 generaret quidem filios sine peccato, sed non paternae iustitiae | |
| 15722 haeredes</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3"> | |
| 15723 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says ( | |
| 15724 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.16" target="asv">Rom. 5:16</a>, | |
| 15725 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.21" target="asv">21</a>). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children | |
| 15726 would not have been born righteous. | |
| 15727 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32623] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15728 iustitia est per gratiam, ut apostolus dicit ad Rom. V. Sed gratia | |
| 15729 non transfunditur, quia sic esset naturalis; sed a solo Deo | |
| 15730 infunditur. Ergo pueri cum iustitia nati non fuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p4"> | |
| 15731 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness | |
| 15732 have been transmitted from parents, to the children. | |
| 15733 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32624] Iª q. 100 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15734 iustitia in anima est. Sed anima non est ex traduce. Ergo nec | |
| 15735 iustitia traducta fuisset a parentibus in filios.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p5"> | |
| 15736 <b>On the contrary,</b> Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness | |
| 15737 together with the rational soul." | |
| 15738 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32625] Iª q. 100 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15739 quod Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu Virg., <i>quod simul cum | |
| 15740 rationalem haberent animam, iusti essent quos generaret homo, si | |
| 15741 non peccaret</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p6"> | |
| 15742 <b>I answer that,</b> Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, | |
| 15743 must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. | |
| 15744 But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first | |
| 15745 man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as | |
| 15746 caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the | |
| 15747 fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin | |
| 15748 of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have | |
| 15749 been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness. | |
| 15750 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 co."><a name="32626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32626] Iª q. 100 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15751 quod naturaliter homo generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Unde | |
| 15752 quaecumque accidentia consequuntur naturam speciei, in his necesse | |
| 15753 est quod filii parentibus similentur, nisi sit error in operatione | |
| 15754 naturae, qui in statu innocentiae non fuisset. In accidentibus | |
| 15755 autem individualibus non est necesse quod filii parentibus | |
| 15756 similentur. Iustitia autem originalis, in qua primus homo conditus | |
| 15757 fuit, fuit accidens naturae speciei, non quasi ex principiis | |
| 15758 speciei causatum, sed sicut quoddam donum divinitus datum toti | |
| 15759 naturae. Et hoc apparet, quia opposita sunt unius generis, peccatum | |
| 15760 autem originale, quod opponitur illi iustitiae, dicitur esse | |
| 15761 peccatum naturae; unde traducitur a parente in posteros. Et propter | |
| 15762 hoc etiam filii parentibus assimilati fuissent quantum ad | |
| 15763 originalem iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p7"> | |
| 15764 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act | |
| 15765 thereof. | |
| 15766 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32627] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15767 dicendum quod verbum Hugonis est intelligendum non quantum ad | |
| 15768 habitum iustitiae, sed quantum ad executionem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8"> | |
| 15769 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with | |
| 15770 original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when | |
| 15771 he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, | |
| 15772 as above explained ( | |
| 15773 <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>), we must conclude that if | |
| 15774 children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first | |
| 15775 man was created in grace ( | |
| 15776 <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q100_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[95], A[1]</a>). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would | |
| 15777 have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted | |
| 15778 by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human | |
| 15779 body is apt to receive it. | |
| 15780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32628] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15781 dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod pueri non fuissent nati cum | |
| 15782 iustitia gratuita, quae est merendi principium, sed cum iustitia | |
| 15783 originali. Sed cum radix originalis iustitiae, in cuius rectitudine | |
| 15784 factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad | |
| 15785 Deum, quae est per gratiam gratum facientem, ut supra dictum est; | |
| 15786 necesse est dicere quod, si pueri nati fuissent in originali | |
| 15787 iustitia, quod etiam nati fuissent cum gratia; sicut et de primo | |
| 15788 homine supra diximus quod fuit cum gratia conditus. Non tamen | |
| 15789 fuisset propter hoc gratia naturalis, quia non fuisset transfusa | |
| 15790 per virtutem seminis, sed fuisset collata homini statim cum | |
| 15791 habuisset animam rationalem. Sicut etiam statim cum corpus est | |
| 15792 dispositum infunditur a Deo anima rationalis, quae tamen non est ex | |
| 15793 traduce.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A1-p9"> From this the reply to the third objection is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32629] Iª q. 100 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet | |
| 15794 solutio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q100_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q100_A2-p0.1">Q. 100. A. 2. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p2"> | |
| 15795 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. | |
| 15796 iv) on the words of | |
| 15797 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.3.13" target="asv"> Job 3:13</a>: "For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten | |
| 15798 "children of hell"; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer." Therefore | |
| 15799 all would have been born confirmed | |
| 15800 in righteousness. | |
| 15801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32630] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 15802 proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae nati fuissent | |
| 15803 in iustitia confirmati. Dicit enim Gregorius, IV Moralium, super | |
| 15804 illud, <i>somno meo requiescerem etc., si parentem primum nulla | |
| 15805 putredo peccati corrumperet, nequaquam ex se filios Gehennae | |
| 15806 generaret; sed hi qui nunc per redemptorem salvandi sunt, soli ab | |
| 15807 illo electi nascerentur</i>. Ergo nascerentur omnes in iustitia | |
| 15808 confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p3"> | |
| 15809 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would | |
| 15810 have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children | |
| 15811 would have been born confirmed in righteousness. | |
| 15812 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32631] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15813 Anselmus dicit, in libro cur Deus homo, quod <i>si primi parentes | |
| 15814 sic vixissent ut tentati non peccassent, ita confirmarentur cum | |
| 15815 omni propagine sua, ut ultra peccare non possent</i>. Ergo pueri | |
| 15816 nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p4"> | |
| 15817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity | |
| 15818 of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity | |
| 15819 of preserving righteousness. | |
| 15820 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32632] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15821 bonum est potentius quam malum. Sed propter peccatum primi hominis | |
| 15822 consecuta est necessitas peccandi in his qui nascuntur ex eo. Ergo | |
| 15823 si primus homo in iustitia perstitisset, derivaretur ad posteros | |
| 15824 necessitas observandi iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p5"> | |
| 15825 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable | |
| 15826 henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have | |
| 15827 begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness. | |
| 15828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32633] Iª q. 100 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15829 Angelus adhaerens Deo aliis peccantibus, statim est in iustitia | |
| 15830 confirmatus, ut ulterius peccare non posset. Ergo similiter et | |
| 15831 homo, si tentationi restitisset, confirmatus fuisset. Sed qualis | |
| 15832 ipse fuit, tales alios generasset. Ergo et eius filii confirmati in | |
| 15833 iustitia nascerentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p6"> | |
| 15834 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they---that is our first parents---had | |
| 15835 committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would | |
| 15836 have been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might | |
| 15837 have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in | |
| 15838 righteousness. | |
| 15839 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32634] Iª q. 100 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15840 quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>tam felix universa esset | |
| 15841 humana societas si nec illi</i>, scilicet primi parentes, <i>malum | |
| 15842 quod in posteros traiicerent, nec quisquam ex stirpe eorum | |
| 15843 iniquitatem committeret, quae damnationem reciperet</i>. Ex quo | |
| 15844 datur intelligi quod, etiam si primi homines non peccassent, aliqui | |
| 15845 ex eorum stirpe potuissent iniquitatem committere. Non ergo | |
| 15846 nascerentur in iustitia confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p7"> | |
| 15847 <b>I answer that,</b> It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it | |
| 15848 is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the | |
| 15849 parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed | |
| 15850 in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once | |
| 15851 it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing | |
| 15852 is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the | |
| 15853 case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to | |
| 15854 that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would | |
| 15855 have | |
| 15856 ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. | |
| 15857 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 co."><a name="32635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32635] Iª q. 100 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15858 quod non videtur possibile quod pueri in statu innocentiae | |
| 15859 nascerentur in iustitia confirmati. Manifestum est enim quod pueri | |
| 15860 in sua nativitate non habuissent plus perfectionis quam eorum | |
| 15861 parentes in statu generationis. Parentes autem, quandiu | |
| 15862 generassent, non fuissent confirmati in iustitia. Ex hoc enim | |
| 15863 creatura rationalis in iustitia confirmatur, quod efficitur beata | |
| 15864 per apertam Dei visionem, cui viso non potest non inhaerere, cum | |
| 15865 ipse sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, a qua nullus potest averti, cum | |
| 15866 nihil desideretur et ametur nisi sub ratione boni. Et hoc dico | |
| 15867 secundum legem communem, quia ex aliquo privilegio speciali secus | |
| 15868 accidere potest, sicut creditur de virgine matre Dei. Quam cito | |
| 15869 autem Adam ad illam beatitudinem pervenisset quod Deum per | |
| 15870 essentiam videret, efficeretur spiritualis et mente et corpore, et | |
| 15871 animalis vita cessaret, in qua sola generationis usus fuisset. Unde | |
| 15872 manifestum est quod parvuli non nascerentur in iustitia | |
| 15873 confirmati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p8"> | |
| 15874 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin | |
| 15875 which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, | |
| 15876 they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, | |
| 15877 but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin. | |
| 15878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32636] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15879 dicendum quod, si Adam non peccasset, non generaret ex se filios | |
| 15880 Gehennae, ita scilicet quod ab ipso peccatum contraherent, quod est | |
| 15881 causa Gehennae. Possent tamen fieri filii Gehennae per liberum | |
| 15882 arbitrium peccando. Vel, si filii Gehennae non fierent per | |
| 15883 peccatum, hoc non esset propter hoc, quia essent in iustitia | |
| 15884 confirmati; sed propter divinam providentiam, per quam a peccato | |
| 15885 conservarentur immunes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p9"> | |
| 15886 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: | |
| 15887 "It seems that if they had lived, etc." | |
| 15888 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32637] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15889 dicendum quod Anselmus hoc non dicit asserendo, sed opinando. Quod | |
| 15890 patet ex ipso modo loquendi, cum dicit, videtur quod, si vixissent | |
| 15891 et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p10"> | |
| 15892 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. | |
| 15893 For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, | |
| 15894 which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity | |
| 15895 of not sinning, which is only in the blessed. | |
| 15896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32638] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15897 dicendum quod ratio ista non est efficax, quamvis per eam Anselmus | |
| 15898 motus fuisse videatur, ut ex eius verbis apparet. Non enim sic per | |
| 15899 peccatum primi parentis eius posteri necessitatem peccandi | |
| 15900 incurrunt, ut ad iustitiam redire non possint, quod est tantum in | |
| 15901 damnatis. Unde nec ita necessitatem non peccandi transmisisset ad | |
| 15902 posteros, quod omnino peccare non possent, quod est tantum in | |
| 15903 beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q100_A2-p11"> | |
| 15904 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas | |
| 15905 the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels ( | |
| 15906 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q64_A2" id="FP_Q100_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[64], A[2]</a>). | |
| 15907 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 100 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32639] Iª q. 100 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 15908 dicendum quod non est simile de homine et Angelo. Nam homo habet | |
| 15909 liberum arbitrium vertibile et ante electionem et post, non autem | |
| 15910 Angelus, sicut supra dictum est, cum de Angelis ageretur.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 15911 <div id="FP_Q101" class="div3"> | |
| 15912 <h3 id="FP_Q101-p0.1">Q. 101. OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 15913 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 15914 <p id="FP_Q101-p2"> We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q101-p3"><a href="#FP_Q101_A1"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q101-p4"><a href="#FP_Q101_A2"> (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?</a></p> | |
| 15915 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 pr."><a name="32640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32640] | |
| 15916 Iª q. 101 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de | |
| 15917 conditione prolis generandae quantum ad scientiam. Et circa hoc | |
| 15918 quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum pueri nascerentur in scientia | |
| 15919 perfecti. Secundo, utrum statim post nativitatem habuissent | |
| 15920 perfectum usum rationis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 15921 <div id="FP_Q101_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q101_A1-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 1. Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p2"> | |
| 15922 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten | |
| 15923 children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge ( | |
| 15924 <a href="#FP_Q94_A3" id="FP_Q101_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[94], A[3]</a>). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. | |
| 15925 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32641] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 15926 proceditur. Videtur quod in statu innocentiae pueri nati fuissent | |
| 15927 in scientia perfecti. Qualis enim fuit Adam, tales filios | |
| 15928 generasset. Sed Adam fuit in scientia perfectus, ut supra dictum | |
| 15929 est. Ergo filii nascerentur ab eo in scientia perfecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p3"> | |
| 15930 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. FS, | |
| 15931 <a href="#FP_Q85_A3" id="FP_Q101_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[3]</a>). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they | |
| 15932 were born. | |
| 15933 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32642] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15934 ignorantia ex peccato causatur, ut Beda dicit. Sed ignorantia est | |
| 15935 privatio scientiae. Ergo ante peccatum pueri mox nati omnem | |
| 15936 scientiam habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p4"> | |
| 15937 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since | |
| 15938 it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. | |
| 15939 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32643] Iª q. 101 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15940 pueri mox nati iustitiam habuissent. Sed ad iustitiam requiritur | |
| 15941 scientia, quae dirigit in agendis. Ergo etiam scientiam | |
| 15942 habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p5"> | |
| 15943 <b>On the contrary,</b> The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). | |
| 15944 But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children | |
| 15945 would have been without knowledge at birth. | |
| 15946 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32644] Iª q. 101 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15947 quod anima nostra per naturam est sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil | |
| 15948 est scriptum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed eadem animae natura | |
| 15949 est modo, quae tunc fuisset. Ergo animae puerorum in principio | |
| 15950 scientia caruissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6"> | |
| 15951 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( | |
| 15952 <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we | |
| 15953 must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above | |
| 15954 explained ( | |
| 15955 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>; | |
| 15956 <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[6]</a>); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for | |
| 15957 its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive | |
| 15958 powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; | |
| 15959 but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning. | |
| 15960 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 co."><a name="32645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32645] Iª q. 101 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15961 quod, sicut supra dictum est, de his quae sunt supra naturam, soli | |
| 15962 auctoritati creditur, unde ubi auctoritas deficit, sequi debemus | |
| 15963 naturae conditionem. Est autem naturale homini ut scientiam per | |
| 15964 sensus acquirat, sicut supra dictum est, et ideo anima unitur | |
| 15965 corpori, quia indiget eo ad suam propriam operationem; quod non | |
| 15966 esset, si statim a principio scientiam haberet non acquisitam per | |
| 15967 sensitivas virtutes. Et ideo dicendum est quod pueri in statu | |
| 15968 innocentiae non nascerentur perfecti in scientia; sed eam in | |
| 15969 processu temporis absque difficultate acquisivissent, inveniendo | |
| 15970 vel addiscendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p7"> | |
| 15971 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and | |
| 15972 instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents | |
| 15973 which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. | |
| 15974 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32646] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15975 dicendum quod esse perfectum in scientia fuit individuale accidens | |
| 15976 primi parentis, inquantum scilicet ipse instituebatur ut pater et | |
| 15977 instructor totius humani generis. Et ideo quantum ad hoc, non | |
| 15978 generabat filios similes sibi; sed solum quantum ad accidentia | |
| 15979 naturalia vel gratuita totius naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p8"> | |
| 15980 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, | |
| 15981 for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only | |
| 15982 nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). | |
| 15983 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32647] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15984 dicendum quod ignorantia est privatio scientiae quae debet haberi | |
| 15985 pro tempore illo. Quod in pueris mox natis non fuisset, habuissent | |
| 15986 enim scientiam quae eis competebat secundum tempus illud. Unde | |
| 15987 ignorantia in eis non fuisset, sed nescientia respectu aliquorum. | |
| 15988 Quam etiam Dionysius ponit in Angelis sanctis, in VII Cael. | |
| 15989 Hier.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A1-p9"> | |
| 15990 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal | |
| 15991 principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise | |
| 15992 their knowledge of other universal principles. | |
| 15993 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32648] Iª q. 101 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15994 dicendum quod pueri habuissent sufficientem scientiam ad dirigendum | |
| 15995 eos in operibus iustitiae in quibus homines diriguntur per | |
| 15996 universalia principia iuris; quam multo plenius tunc habuissent | |
| 15997 quam nunc naturaliter habemus, et similiter aliorum universalium | |
| 15998 principiorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q101_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q101_A2-p0.1">Q. 101. A. 2. Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p2"> | |
| 15999 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason | |
| 16000 in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it | |
| 16001 is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" ( | |
| 16002 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q101_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv">Wis. 9:15</a>). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at | |
| 16003 birth. | |
| 16004 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32649] Iª q. 101 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 16005 proceditur. Videtur quod pueri in statu innocentiae mox nati | |
| 16006 habuissent perfectum usum rationis. Nunc enim pueri perfectum usum | |
| 16007 rationis non habent propter hoc, quod anima per corpus aggravatur. | |
| 16008 Hoc autem tunc non erat, quia, ut dicitur Sap. IX, <i>corpus quod | |
| 16009 corrumpitur, aggravat animam</i>. Ergo ante peccatum et | |
| 16010 corruptionem a peccato subsecutam, pueri mox nati perfectum usum | |
| 16011 rationis habuissent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p3"> | |
| 16012 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, | |
| 16013 therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. | |
| 16014 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32650] Iª q. 101 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16015 quaedam alia animalia mox nata habent naturalis industriae usum, | |
| 16016 sicut agnus statim fugit lupum. Multo ergo magis homines in statu | |
| 16017 innocentiae mox nati habuissent usum perfectum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p4"> | |
| 16018 <b>On the contrary,</b> In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have | |
| 16019 had the perfect use of reason from the very outset. | |
| 16020 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32651] Iª q. 101 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16021 quod natura procedit ab imperfecto ad perfectum in omnibus | |
| 16022 generatis. Ergo pueri non statim a principio habuissent perfectum | |
| 16023 usum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5"> | |
| 16024 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( | |
| 16025 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired | |
| 16026 and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. | |
| 16027 Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of | |
| 16028 the former is of necessity | |
| 16029 hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account | |
| 16030 of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state | |
| 16031 of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they | |
| 16032 would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above | |
| 16033 regarding the use of their limbs ( | |
| 16034 <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A2-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>). | |
| 16035 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 co."><a name="32652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32652] Iª q. 101 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16036 quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, usus rationis dependet | |
| 16037 quodammodo ex usu virium sensitivarum, unde ligato sensu, et | |
| 16038 impeditis interioribus viribus sensitivis, homo perfectum usum | |
| 16039 rationis non habet, ut patet in dormientibus et phreneticis. Vires | |
| 16040 autem sensitivae sunt virtutes quaedam corporalium organorum, et | |
| 16041 ideo, impeditis earum organis, necesse est quod earum actus | |
| 16042 impediantur, et per consequens rationis usus. In pueris autem est | |
| 16043 impedimentum harum virium, propter nimiam humiditatem cerebri. Et | |
| 16044 ideo in eis non est perfectus usus rationis, sicut nec aliorum | |
| 16045 membrorum. Et ideo pueri in statu innocentiae non habuissent | |
| 16046 perfectum usum rationis, sicut habituri erant in perfecta aetate. | |
| 16047 Habuissent tamen perfectiorem quam nunc, quantum ad ea quae ad eos | |
| 16048 pertinebant quantum ad statum illum; sicut et de usu membrorum | |
| 16049 superius est dictum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p6"> | |
| 16050 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to | |
| 16051 man at all ages. | |
| 16052 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32653] Iª q. 101 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16053 dicendum quod aggravatio additur ex corruptione corporis in hoc, | |
| 16054 quod usus rationis impeditur quantum ad ea etiam quae pertinent ad | |
| 16055 hominem secundum quamcumque aetatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q101_A2-p7"> | |
| 16056 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from | |
| 16057 the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment | |
| 16058 exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above ( | |
| 16059 <a href="#FP_Q99_A1" id="FP_Q101_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[99], A[1]</a>). | |
| 16060 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 101 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32654] Iª q. 101 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16061 dicendum quod etiam alia animalia non habent ita perfectum usum | |
| 16062 industriae naturalis statim a principio, sicut postea. Quod ex hoc | |
| 16063 patet, quod aves docent volare pullos suos, et similia in aliis | |
| 16064 generibus animalium inveniuntur. Et tamen in homine est speciale | |
| 16065 impedimentum propter abundantiam humiditatis cerebri, ut supra | |
| 16066 dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 16067 <div id="FP_Q102" class="div3"> | |
| 16068 <h3 id="FP_Q102-p0.1">Q. 102. OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 16069 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 16070 <p id="FP_Q102-p2"> We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q102-p3"><a href="#FP_Q102_A1"> (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p4"><a href="#FP_Q102_A2"> (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p5"><a href="#FP_Q102_A3"> (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?</a></p><p id="FP_Q102-p6"><a href="#FP_Q102_A4"> (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?</a></p> | |
| 16071 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 pr."><a name="32655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32655] | |
| 16072 Iª q. 102 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de loco | |
| 16073 hominis, qui est Paradisus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, | |
| 16074 utrum Paradisus sit locus corporeus. Secundo, utrum sit conveniens | |
| 16075 locus habitationis humanae. Tertio, ad quid homo in Paradiso | |
| 16076 positus fuit. Quarto, utrum in Paradiso debuit fieri.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 16077 <div id="FP_Q102_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A1-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 1. Whether paradise is a corporeal place?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p2"> | |
| 16078 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on | |
| 16079 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv"> Gn. 2:8</a>] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary | |
| 16080 to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume | |
| 16081 the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. | |
| 16082 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32656] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 16083 proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non sit locus corporeus. Dicit | |
| 16084 enim Beda quod <i>Paradisus pertingit usque ad lunarem | |
| 16085 circulum</i>. Sed nullus locus terrenus talis esse potest, tum quia | |
| 16086 contra naturam terrae esset quod tantum elevaretur; tum etiam quia | |
| 16087 sub globo lunari est regio ignis, qui terram consumeret. Non est | |
| 16088 ergo Paradisus locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p3"> | |
| 16089 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise ( | |
| 16090 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.10" target="asv">Gn. 2:10</a>). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore | |
| 16091 paradise is not a corporeal place. | |
| 16092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32657] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16093 Scriptura commemorat quatuor flumina in Paradiso oriri, ut patet | |
| 16094 Gen. II. Illa autem flumina quae ibi nominantur, alibi habent | |
| 16095 manifestas origines; ut patet etiam per philosophum in libro | |
| 16096 Meteor. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p4"> | |
| 16097 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore | |
| 16098 apparently it is not a corporeal place. | |
| 16099 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32658] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16100 aliqui diligentissime inquisierunt omnia loca terrae habitabilis, | |
| 16101 qui tamen nullam mentionem faciunt de loco Paradisi. Ergo non | |
| 16102 videtur esse locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p5"> | |
| 16103 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written | |
| 16104 of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" ( | |
| 16105 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.18" target="asv">Prov. 3:18</a>). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. | |
| 16106 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32659] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 16107 Paradiso describitur lignum vitae esse. Sed lignum vitae est | |
| 16108 aliquid spirituale, dicitur enim Prov. III, de sapientia, quod est | |
| 16109 lignum vitae his qui apprehendunt eam. Ergo et Paradisus non est | |
| 16110 locus corporeus, sed spiritualis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p6"> | |
| 16111 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for | |
| 16112 corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of | |
| 16113 the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. | |
| 16114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="32660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32660] Iª q. 102 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 16115 Paradisus est locus corporalis, oportet quod et ligna Paradisi sint | |
| 16116 corporalia. Sed hoc non videtur, cum corporalia ligna sint producta | |
| 16117 tertio die; de plantatione autem lignorum Paradisi legitur Gen. II, | |
| 16118 post opera sex dierum. Ergo Paradisus non est locus corporeus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p7"> | |
| 16119 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; | |
| 16120 others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual." | |
| 16121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32661] Iª q. 102 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16122 quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>tres sunt de | |
| 16123 Paradiso generales sententiae, una eorum qui tantummodo | |
| 16124 corporaliter Paradisum intelligi volunt; alia eorum qui | |
| 16125 spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo Paradisum | |
| 16126 accipiunt, quam mihi fateor placere sententiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p8"> | |
| 16127 <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; | |
| 16128 so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about | |
| 16129 paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical | |
| 16130 truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so | |
| 16131 paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting | |
| 16132 that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now | |
| 16133 the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than | |
| 16134 the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east. | |
| 16135 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 co."><a name="32662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32662] Iª q. 102 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16136 quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XIII de Civ. Dei, <i>quae commode dici | |
| 16137 possunt de intelligendo spiritualiter Paradiso, nemine prohibente | |
| 16138 dicantur; dum tamen et illius historiae fidelissima veritas rerum | |
| 16139 gestarum narratione commendata credatur</i>. Ea enim quae de | |
| 16140 Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis historicae | |
| 16141 proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tradit, est pro | |
| 16142 fundamento tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales | |
| 16143 expositiones fabricandae. Est ergo Paradisus, ut Isidorus dicit in | |
| 16144 libro Etymol., <i>locus in orientis partibus constitutus, cuius | |
| 16145 vocabulum a Graeco in Latinum vertitur hortus</i>. Convenienter | |
| 16146 autem in parte Orientali dicitur situs. Quia credendum est quod in | |
| 16147 nobilissimo loco totius terrae sit constitutus. Cum autem oriens | |
| 16148 sit dextera caeli, ut patet per philosophum in II de caelo; dextera | |
| 16149 autem est nobilior quam sinistra; conveniens fuit ut in Orientali | |
| 16150 parte Paradisus terrenus institueretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p9"> | |
| 16151 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to | |
| 16152 the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually | |
| 16153 even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, | |
| 16154 is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly | |
| 16155 bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by | |
| 16156 clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon---that is, to the middle space of the air, | |
| 16157 where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it | |
| 16158 would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, | |
| 16159 as | |
| 16160 is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth. | |
| 16161 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32663] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16162 dicendum quod Bedae verbum non est verum, si secundum sensum | |
| 16163 manifestum intelligatur. Potest tamen exponi quod usque ad locum | |
| 16164 lunaris globi ascendit, non secundum situs eminentiam, sed secundum | |
| 16165 similitudinem, quia est ibi perpetua aeris temperies, ut Isidorus | |
| 16166 dicit, et in hoc assimilatur corporibus caelestibus, quae sunt | |
| 16167 absque contrarietate. Magis tamen fit mentio de lunari globo quam | |
| 16168 de aliis sphaeris, quia lunaris globus est terminus caelestium | |
| 16169 corporum versus nos; et luna etiam est magis terrae affinis inter | |
| 16170 omnia corpora caelestia; unde et quasdam tenebras nebulosas habet, | |
| 16171 quasi accedens ad opacitatem. Quidam autem dicunt quod Paradisus | |
| 16172 pertingebat usque ad lunarem globum, idest usque ad medium aeris | |
| 16173 interstitium, in quo generantur pluviae et venti et huiusmodi, quia | |
| 16174 dominium super huiusmodi evaporationes maxime attribuitur lunae. | |
| 16175 Sed secundum hoc, locus ille non esset conveniens habitationi | |
| 16176 humanae, tum quia ibi est maxima intemperies; tum quia non est | |
| 16177 contemperatus complexioni humanae, sicut aer inferior magis terrae | |
| 16178 vicinus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p10"> | |
| 16179 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose | |
| 16180 sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that | |
| 16181 such is the case with some other streams?" | |
| 16182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32664] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16183 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., | |
| 16184 <i>credendum est, quoniam locus Paradisi a cognitione hominum est | |
| 16185 remotissimus, flumina, quorum fontes noti esse dicuntur, alicubi | |
| 16186 isse sub terras, et post tractus prolixarum regionum, locis aliis | |
| 16187 erupisse. Nam hoc solere nonnullas aquas facere, quis | |
| 16188 ignorat?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p11"> | |
| 16189 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot | |
| 16190 be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. | |
| 16191 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32665] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16192 dicendum quod locus ille seclusus est a nostra habitatione | |
| 16193 aliquibus impedimentis vel montium, vel marium, vel alicuius | |
| 16194 aestuosae regionis, quae pertransiri non potest. Et ideo scriptores | |
| 16195 locorum de hoc loco mentionem non fecerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p12"> | |
| 16196 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated | |
| 16197 ( | |
| 16198 <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[97] , A[4]</a>). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In | |
| 16199 like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after | |
| 16200 eating of it, man was to learn, by | |
| 16201 experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also | |
| 16202 be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. | |
| 16203 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32666] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 16204 dicendum quod lignum vitae est quaedam materialis arbor, sic dicta | |
| 16205 quia eius fructus habebat virtutem conservandi vitam, ut supra | |
| 16206 dictum est. Et tamen aliquid significabat spiritualiter, sicut et | |
| 16207 petra in deserto fuit aliquod materiale, et tamen significavit | |
| 16208 Christum. Similiter etiam lignum scientiae boni et mali materialis | |
| 16209 arbor fuit, sic nominata propter eventum futurum, quia post eius | |
| 16210 esum homo, per experimentum poenae, didicit quid interesset inter | |
| 16211 obedientiae bonum et inobedientiae malum. Et tamen spiritualiter | |
| 16212 potuit significare liberum arbitrium, ut quidam dicunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A1-p13"> | |
| 16213 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their | |
| 16214 seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. | |
| 16215 According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the | |
| 16216 trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the | |
| 16217 work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted | |
| 16218 a paradise of pleasure from the beginning" ( | |
| 16219 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv">Gn. 2:8</a>). | |
| 16220 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="32667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32667] Iª q. 102 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 16221 dicendum quod, secundum Augustinum, tertio die productae sunt | |
| 16222 plantae non in actu, sed secundum quasdam rationes seminales; sed | |
| 16223 post opera sex dierum productae sunt plantae tam Paradisi quam | |
| 16224 aliae in actu. Secundum alios vero sanctos, oportet dicere quod | |
| 16225 omnes plantae productae sunt in actu tertio die, et etiam ligna | |
| 16226 Paradisi, sed quod dicitur de plantatione lignorum Paradisi post | |
| 16227 opera sex dierum, intelligitur per recapitulationem esse dictum. | |
| 16228 Unde littera nostra habet, <i>plantaverat dominus Deus Paradisum | |
| 16229 voluptatis a principio</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A2-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 2. Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p2"> | |
| 16230 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. | |
| 16231 But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed---that is, the empyrean | |
| 16232 heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also. | |
| 16233 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32668] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 16234 proceditur. Videtur quod Paradisus non fuerit locus conveniens | |
| 16235 habitationi humanae. Homo enim et Angelus similiter ad beatitudinem | |
| 16236 ordinantur. Sed Angelus statim a principio factus est habitator | |
| 16237 loci beatorum, scilicet caeli Empyrei. Ergo etiam ibi debuit | |
| 16238 institui habitatio hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p3"> | |
| 16239 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of | |
| 16240 the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the | |
| 16241 desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided | |
| 16242 for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. | |
| 16243 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32669] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 16244 locus aliquis debetur homini, aut debetur ei ratione animae, aut | |
| 16245 ratione corporis. Si ratione animae, debetur ei pro loco caelum, | |
| 16246 qui videtur esse locus naturalis animae, cum omnibus insitus sit | |
| 16247 appetitus caeli. Ratione autem corporis, non debetur ei alius locus | |
| 16248 quam aliis animalibus. Ergo Paradisus nullo modo fuit locus | |
| 16249 conveniens habitationi humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p4"> | |
| 16250 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were | |
| 16251 adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. | |
| 16252 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32670] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16253 frustra est locus in quo nullum locatum continetur. Sed post | |
| 16254 peccatum Paradisus non est locus habitationis humanae. Ergo, si est | |
| 16255 locus habitationi humanae congruus, in vanum videtur a Deo | |
| 16256 institutus fuisse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p5"> | |
| 16257 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not | |
| 16258 of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator---a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year | |
| 16259 the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man. | |
| 16260 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="32671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32671] Iª q. 102 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16261 homini, cum sit temperatae complexionis congruus est locus | |
| 16262 temperatus. Sed locus Paradisi non est locus temperatus, dicitur | |
| 16263 enim esse sub aequinoctiali circulo, qui locus videtur esse | |
| 16264 calidissimus, cum bis in anno sol pertranseat super summitatem | |
| 16265 capitum eorum qui ibi habitant. Ergo Paradisus non est locus | |
| 16266 congruus habitationi humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p6"> | |
| 16267 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image." | |
| 16268 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32672] Iª q. 102 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16269 quod Damascenus dicit de Paradiso, quod <i>est divina regio, et | |
| 16270 digna eius qui secundum imaginem Dei erat, conversatio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7"> | |
| 16271 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( | |
| 16272 <a href="#FP_Q97_A1" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[1]</a>), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul | |
| 16273 there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From | |
| 16274 within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained ( | |
| 16275 <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[97], A[4]</a>), and man was able to | |
| 16276 ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere | |
| 16277 of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions | |
| 16278 were found; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of | |
| 16279 a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise | |
| 16280 was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality. | |
| 16281 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 co."><a name="32673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32673] Iª q. 102 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16282 quod, sicut supra dictum est, homo sic erat incorruptibilis et | |
| 16283 immortalis, non quia corpus eius dispositionem incorruptibilitatis | |
| 16284 haberet, sed quia inerat animae vis quaedam ad praeservandum corpus | |
| 16285 a corruptione. Corrumpi autem potest corpus humanum et ab interiori | |
| 16286 et ab exteriori. Ab interiori quidem corrumpitur per consumptionem | |
| 16287 humidi, et per senectutem, ut supra dictum est, cui corruptioni | |
| 16288 occurrere poterat primus homo per esum ciborum. Inter ea vero quae | |
| 16289 exterius corrumpunt, praecipuum videtur esse distemperatus aer, | |
| 16290 unde huic corruptioni maxime occurritur per temperiem aeris. In | |
| 16291 Paradiso autem utrumque invenitur, quia, ut Damascenus dicit, | |
| 16292 <i>est locus temperato et tenuissimo et purissimo aere | |
| 16293 circumfulgens, plantis semper floridis comatus</i>. Unde manifestum | |
| 16294 est quod Paradisus est locus conveniens habitationi humanae, | |
| 16295 secundum primae immortalitatis statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p8"> | |
| 16296 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, | |
| 16297 it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through | |
| 16298 spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, | |
| 16299 as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the | |
| 16300 state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very | |
| 16301 nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler | |
| 16302 over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed | |
| 16303 from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final | |
| 16304 beatitude. | |
| 16305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32674] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16306 dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est supremum corporalium locorum, et | |
| 16307 est extra omnem mutabilitatem. Et quantum ad primum horum, est | |
| 16308 locus congruus naturae angelicae, quia, sicut Augustinus dicit in | |
| 16309 III de Trin., <i>Deus regit creaturam corporalem per | |
| 16310 spiritualem</i>; unde conveniens est quod spiritualis natura sit | |
| 16311 supra omnem corporalem constituta, sicut ei praesidens. Quantum | |
| 16312 autem ad secundum, convenit statui beatitudinis, qui est firmatus | |
| 16313 in summa stabilitate. Sic igitur locus beatitudinis congruit Angelo | |
| 16314 secundum naturam suam, unde ibi creatus est. Non autem congruit | |
| 16315 homini secundum suam naturam, cum non praesideat toti corporali | |
| 16316 creaturae per modum gubernationis, sed competit ei solum ratione | |
| 16317 beatitudinis. Unde non est positus a principio in caelo Empyreo; | |
| 16318 sed illuc transferendus erat in statu finalis beatitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p9"> | |
| 16319 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular | |
| 16320 place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as | |
| 16321 regards both his body and his soul---that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. | |
| 16322 This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene | |
| 16323 says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were | |
| 16324 brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. | |
| 16325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32675] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16326 dicendum quod ridiculum est dicere quod animae, aut alicui | |
| 16327 spirituali substantiae, sit aliquis locus naturalis, sed per | |
| 16328 congruentiam quandam aliquis specialis locus creaturae incorporali | |
| 16329 attribuitur. Paradisus ergo terrestris erat locus congruens homini | |
| 16330 et quantum ad animam et quantum ad corpus, inquantum scilicet in | |
| 16331 anima erat vis praeservandi corpus humanum a corruptione. Quod non | |
| 16332 competebat aliis animalibus. Et ideo, ut Damascenus dicit, <i>in | |
| 16333 Paradiso nullum irrationalium habitabat</i>, licet ex quadam | |
| 16334 dispensatione animalia fuerint illuc divinitus adducta ad Adam, et | |
| 16335 serpens illuc accesserit per operationem Diaboli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p10"> | |
| 16336 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in | |
| 16337 vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that | |
| 16338 Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. | |
| 16339 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32676] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16340 dicendum quod non propter hoc locus est frustra, quia non est ibi | |
| 16341 hominum habitatio post peccatum, sicut etiam non frustra fuit | |
| 16342 homini attributa immortalitas quaedam, quam conservaturus non erat. | |
| 16343 Per huiusmodi enim ostenditur benignitas Dei ad hominem, et quid | |
| 16344 homo peccando amiserit. Quamvis, ut dicitur, nunc Enoch et Elias in | |
| 16345 illo Paradiso habitent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A2-p11"> | |
| 16346 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account | |
| 16347 of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never | |
| 16348 too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, | |
| 16349 Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable | |
| 16350 on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically | |
| 16351 overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must | |
| 16352 hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. | |
| 16353 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="32677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32677] Iª q. 102 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 16354 dicendum quod illi qui dicunt Paradisum esse sub circulo | |
| 16355 aequinoctiali, opinantur sub circulo illo esse locum | |
| 16356 temperatissimum, propter aequalitatem dierum et noctium omni | |
| 16357 tempore; et quia sol nunquam multum ab eis elongatur, ut sit apud | |
| 16358 eos superabundantia frigoris; nec iterum est apud eos, ut dicunt, | |
| 16359 superabundantia caloris, quia etsi sol pertranseat super eorum | |
| 16360 capita, non tamen diu moratur ibi in hac dispositione. Aristoteles | |
| 16361 tamen, in libro Meteor., expresse dicit quod regio illa est | |
| 16362 inhabitabilis propter aestum. Quod videtur probabilius, quia terrae | |
| 16363 per quas nunquam sol pertransit in directum capitis, sunt | |
| 16364 intemperatae in calore propter solam vicinitatem solis. Quidquid | |
| 16365 autem de hoc sit, credendum est Paradisum in loco temperatissimo | |
| 16366 constitutum esse, vel sub aequinoctiali vel alibi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A3-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 3. Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p2"> | |
| 16367 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin | |
| 16368 would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin ( | |
| 16369 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. 3:17</a>). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. | |
| 16370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32678] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 16371 proceditur. Videtur quod homo non sit positus in Paradiso ut | |
| 16372 operaretur et custodiret illum. Quod enim introductum est in poenam | |
| 16373 peccati, non fuisset in Paradiso in statu innocentiae. Sed | |
| 16374 agricultura introducta est in poenam peccati, ut dicitur Gen. III. | |
| 16375 Ergo homo non fuit positus in Paradiso ut operaretur ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p3"> | |
| 16376 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear | |
| 16377 of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. | |
| 16378 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32679] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16379 custodia non est necessaria, ubi non timetur violentus invasor. Sed | |
| 16380 in Paradiso nullus timebatur violentus invasor. Ergo non erat | |
| 16381 necessarium ut Paradisum custodiret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p4"> | |
| 16382 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, | |
| 16383 and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it. | |
| 16384 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32680] Iª q. 102 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 16385 homo positus est in Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret ipsum, | |
| 16386 videtur sequi quod homo factus sit propter Paradisum, et non e | |
| 16387 converso, quod videtur esse falsum. Ergo homo non est positus in | |
| 16388 Paradiso ut operaretur et custodiret illum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p5"> | |
| 16389 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 16390 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.15" target="asv">Gn. 2: 15</a>): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it." | |
| 16391 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32681] Iª q. 102 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16392 quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>tulit dominus Deus hominem, et posuit | |
| 16393 illum in Paradiso voluptatis, ut operaretur et custodiret | |
| 16394 illum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p6"> | |
| 16395 <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that | |
| 16396 God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man | |
| 16397 at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption | |
| 16398 and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have | |
| 16399 involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of | |
| 16400 nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest | |
| 16401 he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. | |
| 16402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 co."><a name="32682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32682] Iª q. 102 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16403 quod, sicut Augustinus dicit VIII super Gen. ad Litt., verbum istud | |
| 16404 Genesis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo sic, quod Deus posuit | |
| 16405 hominem in Paradiso, ut ipse Deus operaretur et custodiret hominem, | |
| 16406 operaretur, inquam, iustificando ipsum, cuius operatio si ab homine | |
| 16407 cesset, continuo obtenebratur, sicut aer obtenebratur si cesset | |
| 16408 influentia luminis; ut custodiret vero ab omni corruptione et malo. | |
| 16409 Alio modo potest intelligi, ut homo operaretur et custodiret | |
| 16410 Paradisum. Nec tamen illa operatio esset laboriosa, sicut post | |
| 16411 peccatum, sed fuisset iucunda, propter experientiam virtutis | |
| 16412 naturae. Custodia etiam illa non esset contra invasores, sed esset | |
| 16413 ad hoc quod homo sibi Paradisum custodiret, ne ipsum peccando | |
| 16414 amitteret. Et hoc totum in bonum hominis cedebat, et sic Paradisus | |
| 16415 ordinatur ad bonum hominis, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A3-p7"> Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 3 ad arg."><a name="32683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32683] Iª q. 102 a. 3 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 16416 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q102_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q102_A4-p0.1">Q. 102. A. 4. Whether man was created in paradise?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p2"> | |
| 16417 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place---namely, the empyrean heaven. | |
| 16418 But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. | |
| 16419 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32684] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 16420 proceditur. Videtur quod homo factus fuerit in Paradiso. Angelus | |
| 16421 enim in loco suae habitationis creatus fuit, scilicet in caelo | |
| 16422 Empyreo. Sed Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae ante | |
| 16423 peccatum. Ergo videtur quod in Paradiso homo debuit fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p3"> | |
| 16424 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the | |
| 16425 earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created ( | |
| 16426 <a href="#FP_Q97_A4" id="FP_Q102_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[97], A[4]</a>). Therefore he was created in paradise. | |
| 16427 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32685] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, alia | |
| 16428 animalia conservantur in loco suae generationis; sicut pisces in | |
| 16429 aquis, et animalia gressibilia in terra, unde producta sunt. Homo | |
| 16430 autem conservatus fuisset in Paradiso, ut dictum est. Ergo in | |
| 16431 Paradiso fieri debuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p4"> | |
| 16432 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. | |
| 16433 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32686] Iª q. 102 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16434 mulier in Paradiso facta fuit. Sed vir dignior est muliere. Ergo | |
| 16435 multo magis vir debuit fieri in Paradiso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p5"> | |
| 16436 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 16437 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.15" target="asv">Gn. 2:15</a>): "God took man and placed him in paradise." | |
| 16438 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32687] Iª q. 102 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16439 quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>tulit Deus hominem, et posuit eum in | |
| 16440 Paradiso</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p6"> | |
| 16441 <b>I answer that,</b> Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was | |
| 16442 man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human | |
| 16443 nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; | |
| 16444 and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. | |
| 16445 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 co."><a name="32688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32688] Iª q. 102 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16446 quod Paradisus fuit locus congruus habitationi humanae, quantum ad | |
| 16447 incorruptionem primi status. Incorruptio autem illa non erat | |
| 16448 hominis secundum naturam, sed ex supernaturali Dei dono. Ut ergo | |
| 16449 hoc gratiae Dei imputaretur, non humanae naturae, Deus hominem | |
| 16450 extra Paradisum fecit, et postea ipsum in Paradiso posuit, ut | |
| 16451 habitaret ibi toto tempore animalis vitae, postmodum, cum | |
| 16452 spiritualem vitam adeptus esset, transferendus in caelum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p7"> | |
| 16453 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. | |
| 16454 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32689] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16455 dicendum quod caelum Empyreum est locus congruus Angelis etiam | |
| 16456 quantum ad eorum naturam, et ideo ibi sunt creati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p8"> In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32690] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter | |
| 16457 dicendum ad secundum. Loca enim illa congruunt animalibus secundum | |
| 16458 suam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q102_A4-p9"> | |
| 16459 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her | |
| 16460 body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already. | |
| 16461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 102 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32691] Iª q. 102 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16462 dicendum quod mulier facta fuit in Paradiso non propter dignitatem | |
| 16463 suam, sed propter dignitatem principii ex quo corpus eius | |
| 16464 formabatur. Quia similiter et filii in Paradiso fuissent nati, in | |
| 16465 quo parentes iam erant positi.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 16466 | |
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| 16469 </div> | |
| 16470 </body> | |
| 16471 </html> |