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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/bilingual/FS_v.html Sat Sep 10 10:03:58 2022 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,21923 @@ + + <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> + <head> + <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> + <style> + h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} + .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} + div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} + div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} + @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; + orphans: 2; widows: 2; + } + @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} + </style> + </head> + <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.v" class="div2"> + + + <h2 id="FS.v-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[55]-70)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q55">Q. 55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q56">Q. 56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q57">Q. 57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q58">Q. 58. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q59">Q. 59. OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q60">Q. 60. HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q61">Q. 61. OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q62">Q. 62. OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q63">Q. 63. OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q64">Q. 64. OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q65">Q. 65. OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q66">Q. 66. OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q67">Q. 67. OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q68">Q. 68. OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q69">Q. 69. OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q70">Q. 70. OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q71">Q. 71. EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q72">Q. 72. OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q73">Q. 73. OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q74">Q. 74. OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q75">Q. 75. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q76">Q. 76. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q77">Q. 77. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q78">Q. 78. OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q79">Q. 79. OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q80">Q. 80. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q81">Q. 81. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q82">Q. 82. OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q83">Q. 83. OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q84">Q. 84. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q85">Q. 85. OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q86">Q. 86. OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q87">Q. 87. OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q88">Q. 88. OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q89">Q. 89. OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> + <div id="FS_Q55" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q55-p0.1">Q. 55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q55-p2"> We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A3" id="FS_Q55-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters + connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. + Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division + of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q55-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q55-p4"><a href="#FS_Q55_A1"> (1) Whether human virtue is a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p5"><a href="#FS_Q55_A2"> (2) Whether it is an operative habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p6"><a href="#FS_Q55_A3"> (3) Whether it is a good habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p7"><a href="#FS_Q55_A4"> (4) Of the definition of virtue.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 pr."><a name="35787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35787] +Iª-IIae q. 55 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +habitibus in speciali. Et quia habitus, ut dictum est, +distinguuntur per bonum et malum, primo dicendum est de habitibus +bonis, qui sunt virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, scilicet dona, +beatitudines et fructus; secundo, de habitibus malis, scilicet de +vitiis et peccatis. Circa virtutes autem quinque consideranda sunt, +primo, de essentia virtutis; secundo, de subiecto eius; tertio, de +divisione virtutum; quarto, de causa virtutis; quinto, de quibusdam +proprietatibus virtutis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum virtus humana sit habitus. Secundo, utrum sit habitus +operativus. Tertio, utrum sit habitus bonus. Quarto, de definitione +virtutis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q55_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A1-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 1. Whether human virtue is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit + of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore + virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35788] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sit habitus. Virtus +enim est <i>ultimum potentiae</i>, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed +ultimum uniuscuiusque reducitur ad genus illud cuius est ultimum, +sicut punctum ad genus lineae. Ergo virtus reducitur ad genus +potentiae, et non ad genus habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." + But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35789] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in II de libero Arbit., quod <i>virtus est bonus +usus liberi arbitrii</i>. Sed usus liberi arbitrii est actus. Ergo +virtus non est habitus, sed actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But + we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35790] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +habitibus non meremur, sed actibus, alioquin homo mereretur +continue, etiam dormiendo. Sed virtutibus meremur. Ergo virtutes +non sunt habitus, sed actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering + which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, + denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="35791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35791] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod <i>virtus est +ordo amoris</i>. Et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod +<i>ordinatio quae virtus vocatur, est fruendis frui, et utendis +uti</i>. Ordo autem, seu ordinatio, nominat vel actum, vel +relationem. Ergo virtus non est habitus, sed actus vel relatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither + therefore are human virtues habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="35792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35792] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut inveniuntur virtutes humanae, ita et virtutes naturales. Sed +virtutes naturales non sunt habitus, sed potentiae quaedam. Ergo +etiam neque virtutes humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35793] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in libro Praedicament., scientiam et virtutem +ponit esse habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But + the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act. + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A1-p9"> Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And + therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not + determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of + habits, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q55_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a> ). Therefore human virtues + are habits. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 co."><a name="35794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35794] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem. +Uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad +suum finem. Finis autem potentiae actus est. Unde potentia dicitur +esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum. Sunt autem +quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos +actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi +potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes. Potentiae +autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae +ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem +ad actus per habitus, sicut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo virtutes +humanae habitus sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: + for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which + we believe. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest + point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a + man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the original signification + of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, + and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35795] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, +scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur +quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque +autem ipse habitus quo creditur. Unde quando dicitur quod virtus +est ultimum potentiae, sumitur virtus pro obiecto virtutis. Id enim +in quod ultimo potentia potest, est id ad quod dicitur virtus rei, +sicut si aliquis potest ferre centum libras et non plus, virtus +eius consideratur secundum centum libras, non autem secundum +sexaginta. Obiectio autem procedebat ac si essentialiter virtus +esset ultimum potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which + virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35796] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii dicitur esse virtus, +secundum eandem rationem, quia scilicet est id ad quod ordinatur +virtus sicut ad proprium actum. Nihil est enim aliud actus virtutis +quam bonus usus liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus + we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run + by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35797] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquo dicimur mereri dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut +ipso merito, eo modo quo dicimur currere cursu, et hoc modo meremur +actibus. Alio modo dicimur mereri aliquo sicut principio merendi, +sicut dicimur currere potentia motiva, et sic dicimur mereri +virtutibus et habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love + is set in order by virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="35798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35798] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod virtus dicitur ordo vel ordinatio amoris, sicut id ad +quod est virtus, per virtutem enim ordinatur amor in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we + have said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="35799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35799] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod potentiae naturales sunt de se determinatae ad unum, +non autem potentiae rationales. Et ideo non est simile, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A2-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 2. Whether human virtue is an operative habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health + and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither + is virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35800] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis humanae +quod sit habitus operativus. Dicit enim Tullius, in IV de Tuscul. +quaest., quod sicut est sanitas et pulchritudo corporis, ita est +virtus animae. Sed sanitas et pulchritudo non sunt habitus +operativi. Ergo neque etiam virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from + the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some + definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue + is referred not only to act, but also to being. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35801] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in rebus naturalibus invenitur virtus non solum ad agere, sed etiam +ad esse, ut patet per philosophum, in I de caelo, quod quaedam +habent virtutem ut sint semper, quaedam vero non ad hoc quod sint +semper, sed aliquo tempore determinato. Sed sicut se habet virtus +naturalis in rebus naturalibus, ita se habet virtus humana in +rationalibus. Ergo etiam virtus humana non solum est ad agere, sed +etiam ad esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." + Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3" target="asv">Eccl. 3</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6" target="asv">6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Eccl.14" target="asv">14</a>) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference + to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, + therefore, an operative habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35802] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., quod virtus est dispositio +perfecti ad optimum. Optimum autem ad quod hominem oportet disponi +per virtutem, est ipse Deus, ut probat Augustinus in libro II de +moribus Eccles.; ad quem disponitur anima per assimilationem ad +ipsum. Ergo videtur quod virtus dicatur qualitas quaedam animae in +ordine ad Deum, tanquam assimilativa ad ipsum, non autem in ordine +ad operationem. Non igitur est habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35803] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus +uniuscuiusque rei est quae opus eius bonum reddit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above + <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q55_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the + second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these + is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is + potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything + acts in so far as it is in act. + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A2-p7"> Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common + with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces + which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are + speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human + virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative + habit. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 co."><a name="35804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35804] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat quandam +perfectionem potentiae, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum duplex sit +potentia, scilicet potentia ad esse et potentia ad agere, utriusque +potentiae perfectio virtus vocatur. Sed potentia ad esse se tenet +ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad +agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod +unumquodque agit inquantum est actu. In constitutione autem +hominis, corpus se habet sicut materia, anima vero sicut forma. Et +quantum quidem ad corpus, homo communicat cum aliis animalibus; et +similiter quantum ad vires quae sunt animae et corpori communes; +solae autem illae vires quae sunt propriae animae, scilicet +rationales, sunt hominis tantum. Et ideo virtus humana, de qua +loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id +quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem +ad esse, sed magis ad agere. Et ideo de ratione virtutis humanae +est quod sit habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue + is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding + disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so + far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, + and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, + which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35805] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, +unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit +principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante +praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit +autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam +dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae +animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra. +Et ideo virtus, inquantum est conveniens dispositio animae, +assimilatur sanitati et pulchritudini, quae sunt debitae +dispositiones corporis. Sed per hoc non excluditur quin virtus +etiam sit operationis principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which + are proper to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35806] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed +solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria +hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have + said above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q55_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in + an operation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35807] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio +hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra +dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo +conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione +consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A3-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 3. Whether human virtue is a good habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. + But there is a virtue even of sin; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.56" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:56</a>: "The virtue [Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35808] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis quod sit +habitus bonus. Peccatum enim in malo semper sumitur. Sed etiam +peccati est aliqua virtus; secundum illud I ad Cor. XV, <i>virtus +peccati lex</i>. Ergo virtus non semper est habitus bonus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5" target="asv">Is. 5</a>: "Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue also is referred to good and + evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35809] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus potentiae respondet. Sed potentia non solum se habet ad +bonum, sed etiam ad malum; secundum illud Isaiae V, <i>vae, qui +potentes estis ad bibendum vinum, et viri fortes ad miscendam +ebrietatem</i>. Ergo etiam virtus se habet et ad bonum et ad +malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "Virtue [Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only + to good, but also to evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35810] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum apostolum, II ad Cor. XII, virtus in infirmitate +perficitur. Sed infirmitas est quoddam malum. Ergo virtus non solum +se habet ad bonum, sed etiam ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says + (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35811] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., <i>nemo +autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam</i>. Et +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus est quae bonum +facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above + <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q55_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now + the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every + evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue + which is an operative habit, is a + good habit, productive of good works. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 co."><a name="35812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35812] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus importat perfectionem +potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in +quod res potest, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Ultimum autem in quod +unaquaeque potentia potest, oportet quod sit bonum, nam omne malum +defectum quendam importat; unde Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. +Nom., quod omne malum est infirmum. Et propter hoc oportet quod +virtus cuiuslibet rei dicatur in ordine ad bonum. Unde virtus +humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni +operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or + robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is + applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through + the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35813] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sicut perfectum, ita et bonum dicitur +metaphorice in malis, dicitur enim et perfectus fur sive latro, et +bonus fur sive latro; ut patet per philosophum, in V Metaphys. +Secundum hoc ergo, etiam virtus metaphorice in malis dicitur. Et +sic virtus peccati dicitur lex, inquantum scilicet per legem +occasionaliter est peccatum augmentatum, et quasi ad maximum suum +posse pervenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together + with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in + direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible + with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35814] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum ebrietatis et nimiae potationis, consistit in +defectu ordinis rationis. Contingit autem, cum defectu rationis, +esse aliquam potentiam inferiorem perfectam ad id quod est sui +generis, etiam cum repugnantia vel cum defectu rationis. Perfectio +autem talis potentiae, cum sit cum defectu rationis, non posset +dici virtus humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of + the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in + infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35815] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tanto ratio perfectior esse ostenditur, quanto +infirmitates corporis et inferiorum partium magis potest vincere +seu tolerare. Et ideo virtus humana, quae rationi attribuitur, in +infirmitate perfici dicitur, non quidem rationis, sed in +infirmitate corporis et inferiorum partium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A4-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 4. Whether virtue is suitably defined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, + by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, + since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is + therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35816] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio virtutis +quae solet assignari, scilicet, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, +qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine +nobis operatur. Virtus enim est bonitas hominis, ipsa enim est quae +bonum facit habentem. Sed bonitas non videtur esse bona, sicut nec +albedo est alba. Igitur inconvenienter dicitur quod virtus est bona +qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than + quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference + of quality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35817] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nulla differentia est communior suo genere, cum sit generis +divisiva. Sed bonum est communius quam qualitas, convertitur enim +cum ente. Ergo bonum non debet poni in definitione virtutis, ut +differentia qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the + field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35818] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., <i>ubi primo occurrit +aliquid quod non sit nobis pecoribusque commune, illud ad mentem +pertinet</i>. Sed quaedam virtutes sunt etiam irrationabilium +partium; ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Non ergo omnis virtus +est bona qualitas mentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. + It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live + righteously." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35819] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +rectitudo videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, unde idem dicuntur recti, +et iusti. Sed iustitia est species virtutis. Inconvenienter ergo +ponitur rectum in definitione virtutis, cum dicitur, qua recte +vivitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, + that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of + virtue." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="35820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35820] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque superbit de aliquo, male utitur eo. Sed multi superbiunt +de virtute, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, <i>quod superbia +etiam bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant</i>. Falsum est ergo +quod nemo virtute male utatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.11" target="asv"> Jn. 15:11</a>: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.11" target="asv">Ap. 11</a>]: "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say that "God works + virtue in us, without us." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="35821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35821] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +homo per virtutem iustificatur. Sed Augustinus dicit, super illud +Ioan., <i>maiora horum faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non +iustificabit te sine te</i>. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod +virtutem Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, + 19. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35822] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio +colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is + gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, + as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the + genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for + "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus. + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p10"> Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" + it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, + and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here + we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is + mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind." + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p11"> The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always + referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred + both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of + virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live + righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, + "of which no one makes bad use." + </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p12"> Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words + "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, + whether acquired or infused. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 co."><a name="35823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35823] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem +virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex +omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes +causas virtutis. Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et +cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum +dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, +differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si +loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum. Virtus +autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed +habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. +Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in +praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur +virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in +communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur +quod est bona qualitas mentis. Finis autem virtutis, cum sit +habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum +operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; +aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum, sicut opinio +se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se +habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper +se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem +discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad +malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur. Causa autem efficiens +virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod +dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem +particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus +virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently + as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and + that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness + and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with + the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, + not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct + goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something + is good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35824] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde +unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per +consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente. Unde +dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est +ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate. Non autem hoc habet +locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim +omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. +Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non +subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia +eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua +alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. +Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends + further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of + the soul is to be in accord with reason." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35825] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est +bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam +qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in +IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>quod bonum animae est secundum rationem +esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). + And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35826] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, +nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo +ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the + proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q58_A8" id="FS_Q55_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[58], A[8]</a>). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated + above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35827] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod iustitiae est propria rectitudo quae constituitur +circa res exteriores quae in usum hominis veniunt, quae sunt +propria materia iustitiae, ut infra patebit. Sed rectitudo quae +importat ordinem ad finem debitum et ad legem divinam, quae est +regula voluntatis humanae, ut supra dictum est, communis est omni +virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or + by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="35828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35828] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod virtute potest aliquis male uti tanquam obiecto, puta +cum male sentit de virtute, cum odit eam, vel superbit de ea, non +autem tanquam principio usus, ita scilicet quod malus sit actus +virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the + words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without + action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="35829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35829] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis +agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est +intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. +Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis +agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q56" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q56-p0.1">Q. 56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q56-p2"> We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q56-p3"><a href="#FS_Q56_A1"> (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p4"><a href="#FS_Q56_A2"> (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p5"><a href="#FS_Q56_A3"> (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p6"><a href="#FS_Q56_A4"> (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p7"><a href="#FS_Q56_A5"> (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p8"><a href="#FS_Q56_A6"> (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 pr."><a name="35830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35830] +Iª-IIae q. 56 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto virtutis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum virtus +sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Secundo, utrum una virtus +possit esse in pluribus potentiis. Tertio, utrum intellectus possit +esse subiectum virtutis. Quarto, utrum irascibilis et +concupiscibilis. Quinto, utrum vires apprehensivae sensitivae. +Sexto, utrum voluntas.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q56_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A1-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 1. Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue + is that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue + is not a power, but in the essence of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35831] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non sit in potentia animae +sicut in subiecto. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II de Lib. Arbit., +quod virtus est qua recte vivitur. Vivere autem non est per +potentiam animae, sed per eius essentiam. Ergo virtus non est in +potentia animae, sed in eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." + But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong + to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35832] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>virtus est quae bonum facit +habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>. Sed sicut opus +constituitur per potentiam, ita habens virtutem constituitur per +essentiam animae. Ergo virtus non magis pertinet ad potentiam +animae, quam ad eius essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35833] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +potentia est in secunda specie qualitatis. Virtus autem est quaedam +qualitas, ut supra dictum est. Qualitatis autem non est qualitas. +Ergo virtus non est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a + power of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35834] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed ultimum +est in eo cuius est ultimum. Ergo virtus est in potentia +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of + virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue + is an operative habit, as we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is + best: for + the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's + power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 co."><a name="35835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35835] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtutem pertinere ad potentiam animae, ex tribus +potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem, ex ipsa ratione virtutis, +quae importat perfectionem potentiae, perfectio autem est in eo +cuius est perfectio. Secundo, ex hoc quod est habitus operativus, +ut supra dictum est, omnis autem operatio est ab anima per aliquam +potentiam. Tertio, ex hoc quod disponit ad optimum, optimum autem +est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per +operationem a potentia egredientem. Unde virtus humana est in +potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs + to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for + the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous + actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35836] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod vivere dupliciter sumitur. Quandoque enim +dicitur vivere ipsum esse viventis, et sic pertinet ad essentiam +animae, quae est viventi essendi principium. Alio modo vivere +dicitur operatio viventis, et sic virtute recte vivitur, inquantum +per eam aliquis recte operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, + this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35837] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum vel est finis, vel in ordine ad finem dicitur. +Et ideo, cum bonum operantis consistat in operatione, hoc etiam +ipsum quod virtus facit operantem bonum, refertur ad operationem, +et per consequens ad potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident + inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the + subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35838] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod unum accidens dicitur esse in alio sicut in subiecto, +non quia accidens per seipsum possit sustentare aliud accidens, sed +quia unum accidens inhaeret substantiae mediante alio accidente, ut +color corpori mediante superficie; unde superficies dicitur esse +subiectum coloris. Et eo modo potentia animae dicitur esse +subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A2-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 2. Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various + way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive + power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35839] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod una virtus possit esse in duabus +potentiis. Habitus enim cognoscuntur per actus. Sed unus actus +progreditur diversimode a diversis potentiis, sicut ambulatio +procedit a ratione ut a dirigente, a voluntate sicut a movente, et +a potentia motiva sicut ab exequente. Ergo etiam unus habitus +virtutis potest esse in pluribus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to + work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several + powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35840] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem tria requiruntur, +scilicet scire, velle et immobiliter operari. Sed scire pertinet ad +intellectum, velle ad voluntatem. Ergo virtus potest esse in +pluribus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in + the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35841] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia est in ratione, cum sit recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur +in VI Ethic. Est etiam in voluntate, quia non potest esse cum +voluntate perversa, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo una virtus +potest esse in duabus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot + be in several powers of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35842] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +virtus est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Sed idem accidens +non potest esse in pluribus subiectis. Ergo una virtus non potest +esse in pluribus potentiis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way + it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, + while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is + diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or + more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in + one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved + by another, and one power receives from another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 co."><a name="35843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35843] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid esse in duobus, contingit dupliciter. Uno +modo, sic quod ex aequo sit in utroque. Et sic impossibile est unam +virtutem esse in duabus potentiis, quia diversitas potentiarum +attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas +autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas +potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur. Alio +modo potest esse aliquid in duobus vel pluribus, non ex aequo, sed +ordine quodam. Et sic una virtus pertinere potest ad plures +potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad +alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis; secundum +quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia +accipit ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various + degrees. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35844] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem +ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas +rationes, et diverso ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue + is essentially in the appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35845] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum +virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter +in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further + on + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q56_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[57], A[4]). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35846] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto, +sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium, ut infra +dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A3-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 3. Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is + love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35847] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit subiectum +virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod +omnis virtus est amor. Subiectum autem amoris non est intellectus, +sed solum vis appetitiva. Ergo nulla virtus est in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q56_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, + but the appetitive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35848] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut ex supradictis patet. Bonum autem +non est obiectum intellectus, sed appetitivae virtutis. Ergo +subiectum virtutis non est intellectus, sed appetitiva virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects + the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his + art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35849] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem</i>, ut +philosophus dicit. Sed habitus perficiens intellectum non facit +bonum habentem, non enim propter scientiam vel artem dicitur homo +bonus. Ergo intellectus non est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given, + of virtue ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35850] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod mens maxime dicitur intellectus. Subiectum autem virtutis +est mens; ut patet ex definitione virtutis supra inducta. Ergo +intellectus est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q56_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by + the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. + But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: + and the case is the same + with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: + for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p7"> And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of + what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, + because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes + its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they + make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: + because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. + For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian + or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are + called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2). + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p8"> Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical + intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that + science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue + simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, + that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1]; + Q[17], AA[1],5; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q82_A4" id="FS_Q56_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do + well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved + by the will. + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p9"> Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, + because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of + virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect + is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" + [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right + reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason + of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just + as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore + as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to + the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 co."><a name="35851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35851] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus est habitus quo quis +bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum +actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini +facultas ad bonum actum, sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo +facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo +semper recte loquatur, potest enim grammaticus barbarizare aut +soloecismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et +artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem +agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur, sicut +iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta +operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur. Et quia bonum, sicut +et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in +potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu; ideo ab huiusmodi +habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus, +puta quia est iustus vel temperatus; et eadem ratio est de +similibus. Et quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus +eius bonum reddit, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, +quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum +habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, +quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec +simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter +aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur +bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber. +Et propter hoc, plerumque scientia et ars contra virtutem +dividitur, quandoque autem virtutes dicuntur, ut patet in VI Ethic. +Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest +esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus +speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem, sic enim +philosophus, in VI Ethic., scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et +etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes. Subiectum vero +habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi +voluntas; vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota a voluntate. +Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias quae +aliqualiter sunt rationales, ad suos actus, ut supra habitum est, +et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet +bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus quae facit bene agere in actu, non +solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate; vel in +aliqua potentia secundum quod est a voluntate mota. Contingit autem +intellectum a voluntate moveri, sicut et alias potentias, +considerat enim aliquis aliquid actu, eo quod vult. Et ideo +intellectus, secundum quod habet ordinem ad voluntatem, potest esse +subiectum virtutis simpliciter dictae. Et hoc modo intellectus +speculativus, vel ratio, est subiectum fidei, movetur enim +intellectus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei, ex imperio +voluntatis; nullus enim credit nisi volens. Intellectus vero +practicus est subiectum prudentiae. Cum enim prudentia sit recta +ratio agibilium, requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat +ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines; ad quos +bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia +speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis. Et ideo sicut +subiectum scientiae, quae est ratio recta speculabilium, est +intellectus speculativus in ordine ad intellectum agentem; ita +subiectum prudentiae est intellectus practicus in ordine ad +voluntatem rectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it + depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above + (Q[25], AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4]; + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q56_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[20], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35852] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini intelligendum est de virtute +simpliciter dicta non quod omnis talis virtus sit simpliciter amor; +sed quia dependet aliqualiter ab amore, inquantum dependet a +voluntate, cuius prima affectio est amor, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act + of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative + or practical, is a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35853] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum uniuscuiusque est finis eius, et ideo, cum +verum sit finis intellectus, cognoscere verum est bonus actus +intellectus. Unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum +cognoscendum, vel in speculativis vel in practicis, dicitur +virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers virtue simply so called. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35854] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtute simpliciter dicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A4-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 4. Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to + us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. + It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive + appetite, as we have said in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q56_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35855] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non +possint esse subiectum virtutis. Huiusmodi enim vires sunt communes +nobis et brutis. Sed nunc loquimur de virtute secundum quod est +propria homini, sic enim dicitur virtus humana. Non igitur humanae +virtutis potest esse subiectum irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae +sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's + body: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35856] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +appetitus sensitivus est vis utens organo corporali. Sed bonum +virtutis non potest esse in corpore hominis, dicit enim apostolus, +Rom. VII, <i>scio quod non habitat in carne mea bonum</i>. Ergo +appetitus sensitivus non potest esse subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body + is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my + coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me." But just as + the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the + irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which + we live rightly," as we have said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35857] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus probat, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod virtus non est +in corpore, sed in anima, eo quod per animam corpus regitur, unde +quod aliquis corpore bene utatur, totum refertur ad animam; +<i>sicut si mihi auriga obtemperans, equos quibus praeest, recte +regit, hoc totum mihi debetur</i>. Sed sicut anima regit corpus, +ita etiam ratio regit appetitum sensitivum. Ergo totum rationali +parti debetur, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis recte regantur. +Sed virtus est qua recte vivitur, ut supra dictum est. Virtus +igitur non est in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed solum in parte +rationali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible + powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A2" id="FS_Q56_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[2]</a>). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35858] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +principalis actus virtutis moralis est electio, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Sed electio non est actus irascibilis et concupiscibilis, +sed rationis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus moralis non est in +irascibili et concupiscibili, sed in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, + 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35859] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod fortitudo ponitur esse in irascibili, temperantia autem in +concupiscibili. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>hae +virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of + the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered + as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or + concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in + the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A4-p8"> For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from + one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for + instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. + Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved + by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible + and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity + with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but + a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 co."><a name="35860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35860] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari +possunt. Uno modo secundum se, inquantum sunt partes appetitus +sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competit eis quod sint subiectum +virtutis. Alio modo possunt considerari inquantum participant +rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire. Et sic +irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis +humanae, sic enim est principium humani actus, inquantum participat +rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes. Quod +enim in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes, patet. +Actus enim qui progreditur ab una potentia secundum quod est ab +alia mota, non potest esse perfectus, nisi utraque potentia sit +bene disposita ad actum, sicut actus artificis non potest esse +congruus, nisi et artifex sit bene dispositus ad agendum, et etiam +ipsum instrumentum. In his igitur circa quae operatur irascibilis +et concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a ratione motae, necesse est +ut aliquis habitus perficiens ad bene agendum sit non solum in +ratione, sed etiam in irascibili et concupiscibili. Et quia bona +dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum +conformitatem ad potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in +irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quaedam +habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and + dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. + And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35861] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se +consideratae, prout sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, communes sunt +nobis et brutis. Sed secundum quod sunt rationales per +participationem, ut obedientes rationi, sic sunt propriae hominis. +Et hoc modo possunt esse subiectum virtutis humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being + moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, + have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, + the good of reason is begotten in them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35862] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut caro hominis ex se quidem non habet bonum +virtutis, fit tamen instrumentum virtuosi actus, inquantum, movente +ratione, membra nostra exhibemus ad serviendum iustitiae, ita etiam +irascibilis et concupiscibilis ex se quidem non habent bonum +virtutis sed magis infectionem fomitis; inquantum vero conformantur +rationi, sic in eis adgeneratur bonum virtutis moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body + obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: + whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave: + wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this + reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; + on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher + says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which + free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in + the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35863] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod alia ratione regitur corpus ab anima, et irascibilis +et concupiscibilis a ratione. Corpus enim ad nutum obedit animae +absque contradictione, in his in quibus natum est ab anima moveri, +unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus +despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum. Et ideo totus +motus corporis refertur ad animam. Et propter hoc in corpore non +est virtus, sed solum in anima. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis +non ad nutum obediunt rationi, sed habent proprios motus suos, +quibus interdum rationi repugnant, unde in eodem libro philosophus +dicit quod ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem principatu +politico, quo scilicet reguntur liberi, qui habent in aliquibus +propriam voluntatem. Et propter hoc etiam oportet in irascibili et +concupiscibili esse aliquas virtutes, quibus bene disponantur ad +actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential + choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible + powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. + And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are + in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35864] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod in electione duo sunt, scilicet intentio finis, quae +pertinet ad virtutem moralem; et praeacceptio eius quod est ad +finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Quod +autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones animae, hoc +contingit ex bona dispositione irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Et +ideo virtutes morales circa passiones, sunt in irascibili et +concupiscibili, sed prudentia est in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A5-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 5. Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite + can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: + for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q56_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35865] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis +interius, possit esse aliqua virtus. Appetitus enim sensitivus +potest esse subiectum virtutis, inquantum obedit rationi. Sed vires +sensitivae apprehensivae interius, rationi obediunt, ad imperium +enim rationis operatur et imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa. +Ergo in his viribus potest esse virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so + also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in + the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35866] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas, in suo actu potest +impediri, vel etiam adiuvari, per appetitum sensitivum; ita etiam +intellectus vel ratio potest impediri, vel etiam iuvari, per vires +praedictas. Sicut ergo in viribus sensitivis appetitivis potest +esse virtus, ita etiam in apprehensivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the + power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35867] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia est quaedam virtus, cuius partem ponit Tullius memoriam, +in sua rhetorica. Ergo etiam in vi memorativa potest esse aliqua +virtus. Et eadem ratione, in aliis interioribus apprehensivis +viribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual + virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive + powers of apprehension. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35868] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod omnes virtutes vel sunt intellectuales, vel morales, ut +dicitur in II Ethic. Morales autem virtutes omnes sunt in parte +appetitiva, intellectuales autem in intellectu vel ratione, sicut +patet in VI Ethic. Nulla ergo virtus est in viribus sensitivis +apprehensivis interius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the + Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second + nature." Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says + of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, + in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so + called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A4" id="FS_Q56_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>, ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 co."><a name="35869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35869] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis interius, +ponuntur aliqui habitus. Quod patet ex hoc praecipue quod +philosophus dicit, in libro de memoria, <i>quod in memorando unum +post aliud, operatur consuetudo, quae est quasi quaedam natura</i>, +nihil autem est aliud habitus consuetudinalis quam habitudo +acquisita per consuetudinem, quae est in modum naturae. Unde de +virtute dicit Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod est <i>habitus in +modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. In homine tamen id quod ex +consuetudine acquiritur in memoria, et in aliis viribus sensitivis +apprehensivis, non est habitus per se; sed aliquid annexum +habitibus intellectivae partis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p7"> Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never + happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the + knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective + knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these + are rather in the intellect or reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed tamen si +qui sunt habitus in talibus viribus, virtutes dici non possunt. +Virtus enim est habitus perfectus, quo non contingit nisi bonum +operari, unde oportet quod virtus sit in illa potentia quae est +consummativa boni operis. Cognitio autem veri non consummatur in +viribus sensitivis apprehensivis; sed huiusmodi vires sunt quasi +praeparatoriae ad cognitionem intellectivam. Et ideo in huiusmodi +viribus non sunt virtutes, quibus cognoscitur verum; sed magis in +intellectu vel ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the + act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject + of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason + that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight + (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive + virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35870] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus se habet ad voluntatem, +quae est appetitus rationis, sicut motus ab eo. Et ideo opus +appetitivae virtutis consummatur in appetitu sensitivo. Et propter +hoc, appetitus sensitivus est subiectum virtutis. Virtutes autem +sensitivae apprehensivae magis se habent ut moventes respectu +intellectus, eo quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam, +sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo opus +cognitionis in intellectu terminatur. Et propter hoc, virtutes +cognoscitivae sunt in ipso intellectu vel ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p9"> And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35871] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of + the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35872] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod memoria non ponitur pars prudentiae, sicut species +est pars generis, quasi ipsa memoria sit quaedam virtus per se, sed +quia unum eorum quae requiruntur ad prudentiam, est bonitas +memoriae; ut sic quodammodo se habeat per modum partis +integralis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A6-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 6. Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power + by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the + Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is + ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his + Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35873] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non sit subiectum alicuius +virtutis. Ad id enim quod convenit potentiae ex ipsa ratione +potentiae, non requiritur aliquis habitus. Sed de ipsa ratione +voluntatis, cum sit in ratione, secundum philosophum in III de +anima, est quod tendat in id quod est bonum secundum rationem, ad +quod ordinatur omnis virtus, quia unumquodque naturaliter appetit +proprium bonum, <i>virtus enim est habitus per modum naturae, +consentaneus rationi</i>, ut Tullius dicit in sua rhetorica. Ergo +voluntas non est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the + intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which + are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35874] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis virtus aut est intellectualis, aut moralis, ut dicitur in I +et II Ethic. Sed virtus intellectualis est, sicut in subiecto, in +intellectu et ratione, non autem in voluntate, virtus autem moralis +est, sicut in subiecto, in irascibili et concupiscibili, quae sunt +rationales per participationem. Ergo nulla virtus est in voluntate +sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect + of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there + will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore + the will cannot be the subject of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35875] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes actus humani, ad quos virtutes ordinantur, sunt voluntarii. +Si igitur respectu aliquorum humanorum actuum sit aliqua virtus in +voluntate, pari ratione respectu omnium actuum humanorum erit +virtus in voluntate. Aut ergo in nulla alia potentia erit aliqua +virtus, aut ad eundem actum ordinabuntur duae virtutes, quod +videtur inconveniens. Voluntas ergo non potest esse subiectum +virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. + Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35876] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod maior perfectio requiritur in movente quam in moto. Sed +voluntas movet irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Multo ergo magis +debet esse virtus in voluntate, quam in irascibili et +concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which + habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose. + </p><p id="FS_Q56_A6-p7"> Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q56_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue + perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, + such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as + regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as + those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 co."><a name="35877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35877] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi +indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem +habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio +potentiae. Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine +ad obiectum. Unde cum, sicut dictum est, obiectum voluntati sit +bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum, quantum ad hoc non indiget +voluntas virtute perficiente. Sed si quod bonum immineat homini +volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis; sive quantum ad totam +speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites +humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi; +ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae +ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum, sunt in +voluntate sicut in subiecto; ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which + are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A6" id="FS_Q56_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35878] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa habet locum de virtute quae ordinat +ad bonum proprium ipsius volentis, sicut temperantia et fortitudo, +quae sunt circa passiones humanas et alia huiusmodi, ut ex dictis +patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. + in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the + will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q56_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35879] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est +irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed omnino, idest universaliter, +appetitivum, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sub appetitivo autem +comprehenditur voluntas. Et ideo, si qua virtus est in voluntate, +erit moralis, nisi sit theologica, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases + there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need + exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35880] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quaedam virtutes ordinantur ad bonum passionis +moderatae, quod est proprium huius vel illius hominis, et in +talibus non est necessarium quod sit aliqua virtus in voluntate, +cum ad hoc sufficiat natura potentiae, ut dictum est. Sed hoc solum +necessarium est in illis virtutibus quae ordinantur ad aliquod +bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q57" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q57-p0.1">Q. 57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q57-p2"> We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological + virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q57-p3"><a href="#FS_Q57_A1"> (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p4"><a href="#FS_Q57_A2"> (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p5"><a href="#FS_Q57_A3"> (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p6"><a href="#FS_Q57_A4"> (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p7"><a href="#FS_Q57_A5"> (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p8"><a href="#FS_Q57_A6"> (6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 pr."><a name="35881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35881] +Iª-IIae q. 57 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione virtutum. Et primo, quantum ad virtutes +intellectuales; secundo, quantum ad morales; tertio, quantum ad +theologicas. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum habitus +intellectuales speculativi sint virtutes. Secundo, utrum sint tres, +scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Tertio, utrum habitus +intellectualis qui est ars, sit virtus. Quarto, utrum prudentia sit +virtus distincta ab arte. Quinto, utrum prudentia sit virtus +necessaria homini. Sexto, utrum eubulia, synesis et gnome sint +virtutes adiunctae prudentiae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q57_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A1-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 1. Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have + said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q57_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore + the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35882] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus intellectuales speculativi non +sint virtutes. Virtus enim est habitus operativus, ut supra dictum +est. Sed habitus speculativi non sunt operativi, distinguitur enim +speculativum a practico, idest operativo. Ergo habitus +intellectuales speculativi non sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. + i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather + things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35883] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus est eorum per quae fit homo felix sive beatus, eo quod +felicitas est virtutis praemium, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed habitus +intellectuales non considerant actus humanos, aut alia bona humana, +per quae homo beatitudinem adipiscitur, sed magis res naturales et +divinas. Ergo huiusmodi habitus virtutes dici non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, + as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35884] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia est habitus speculativus. Sed scientia et virtus +distinguuntur sicut diversa genera non subalternatim posita; ut +patet per philosophum, in IV Topic. Ergo habitus speculativi non +sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. + vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise + than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35885] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +soli habitus speculativi considerant necessaria quae impossibile +est aliter se habere. Sed philosophus ponit, in VI Ethic., quasdam +virtutes intellectuales in parte animae quae considerat necessaria +quae non possunt aliter se habere. Ergo habitus intellectuales +speculativi sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a habit, as we have already observed ( + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, + it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), belongs to those habits alone which affect the + appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective + uses. + </p><p id="FS_Q57_A1-p7"> Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only + the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration + of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they + conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does + not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has + scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue + which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there + can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the + "contemplative life has greater merit than the active life." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 co."><a name="35886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35886] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum omnis virtus dicatur in ordine ad bonum, sicut +supra dictum est, duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus, +ut supra dictum est, uno modo, quia facit facultatem bene operandi; +alio modo, quia cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum. Et hoc, +sicut supra dictum est, pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui +respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est +quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus. Cum igitur habitus +intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec +aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam; possunt +quidem dici virtutes inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae +operationis, quae est consideratio veri (hoc enim est bonum opus +intellectus), non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi +facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis +habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum, +sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam, sed +quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo +virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit +etiam bene uti huiusmodi speculativis habitibus. Et secundum hoc +etiam, in actibus horum habituum potest esse meritum, si ex +caritate fiant, sicut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod +<i>contemplativa est maioris meriti quam activa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative + faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior + act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35887] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod duplex est opus, scilicet exterius, et interius. +Practicum ergo, vel operativum, quod dividitur contra speculativum, +sumitur ab opere exteriori, ad quod non habet ordinem habitus +speculativus. Sed tamen habet ordinem ad interius opus intellectus, +quod est speculari verum. Et secundum hoc est habitus +operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues + are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient + cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to + be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those + things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because + they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A7" id="FS_Q57_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35888] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus est aliquorum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut +obiectorum. Et sic huiusmodi virtutes speculativae non sunt eorum +per quae homo fit beatus; nisi forte secundum quod ly per dicit +causam efficientem vel obiectum completae beatitudinis, quod est +Deus, quod est summum speculabile. Alio modo dicitur virtus esse +aliquorum sicut actuum. Et hoc modo virtutes intellectuales sunt +eorum per quae homo fit beatus. Tum quia actus harum virtutum +possunt esse meritorii, sicut dictum est. Tum etiam quia sunt +quaedam inchoatio perfectae beatitudinis, quae in contemplatione +veri consistit, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35889] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia dividitur contra virtutem secundo modo +dictam, quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A2-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 2. Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. + Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science + among the intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35890] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur tres +virtutes intellectuales speculativae, scilicet sapientia, scientia +et intellectus. Species enim non debet condividi generi. Sed +sapientia est quaedam scientia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo +sapientia non debet condividi scientiae, in numero virtutum +intellectualium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of + these objects, as we have already explained ( + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q57_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now + the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of + principles + should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35891] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in distinctione potentiarum, habituum et actuum, quae attenditur +secundum obiecta, attenditur principaliter distinctio quae est +secundum rationem formalem obiectorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Non +ergo diversi habitus debent distingui secundum materiale obiectum; +sed secundum rationem formalem illius obiecti. Sed principium +demonstrationis est ratio sciendi conclusiones. Non ergo +intellectus principiorum debet poni habitus alius, aut alia virtus, +a scientia conclusionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason + employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, + which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35892] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus intellectualis dicitur quae est in ipso rationali per +essentiam. Sed ratio, etiam speculativa, sicut ratiocinatur +syllogizando demonstrative; ita etiam ratiocinatur syllogizando +dialectice. Ergo sicut scientia, quae causatur ex syllogismo +demonstrativo, ponitur virtus intellectualis speculativa; ita etiam +et opinio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35893] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, VI Ethic., ponit has solum tres virtutes +intellectuales speculativas, scilicet sapientiam, scientiam et +intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated + <a href="#FS_Q57_A1" id="FS_Q57_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: + for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as known through another. + What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects + the intellect for the consideration + of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles. + </p><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p7"> On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the + reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; + secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint, + are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with + respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which + considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, + because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which + is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the + different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 co."><a name="35894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35894] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, virtus intellectualis +speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad +considerandum verum, hoc enim est bonum opus eius. Verum autem est +dupliciter considerabile, uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo, +sicut per aliud notum. Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut +principium; et percipitur statim ab intellectu. Et ideo habitus +perficiens intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem, vocatur +intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum. Verum autem quod est per +aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu, sed per +inquisitionem rationis, et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem +potest esse dupliciter, uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere; +alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae. +<i>Et quia ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et +magis nota secundum naturam</i>, ut dicitur in I Physic.; ideo id +quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod +est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa +huiusmodi est sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas, ut +dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de +omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest +nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. Ad id vero quod est ultimum +in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perficit intellectum +scientia. Et ideo secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi +habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions + from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, + not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35895] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet +id quod est commune omnibus scientiis, ut scilicet ex principiis +conclusiones demonstret. Sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra +alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat; et non +solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima +principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam +scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or + power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, + and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, + the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the + conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can + be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the + conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding. + </p><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p10"> Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, + but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for + instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that + science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as + obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions + of science, and of the principles on which they are based. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35896] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad +potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae +penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale, sicut ad eandem +potentiam visivam pertinet videre colorem, et lumen, quod est ratio +videndi colorem et simul cum ipso videtur. Principia vero +demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod +considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum +conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. +Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, +quae considerat etiam conclusiones, sed considerare principia +secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum. Unde, si quis recte +consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab +invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, +quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est +perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc +enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. +Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub +se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus +scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, + and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never + tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they + are not intellectual + virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35897] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus virtutis determinate +se habet ad bonum, nullo autem modo ad malum. Bonum autem +intellectus est verum, malum autem eius est falsum. Unde soli illi +habitus virtutes intellectuales dicuntur, quibus semper dicitur +verum, et nunquam falsum. Opinio vero et suspicio possunt esse veri +et falsi. Et ideo non sunt intellectuales virtutes, ut dicitur in +VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A3-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 3. Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad + use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore + art is not a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35898] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ars non sit virtus intellectualis. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod virtute +nullus male utitur. Sed arte aliquis male utitur, potest enim +aliquis artifex, secundum scientiam artis suae, male operari. Ergo +ars non est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore + art is not a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35899] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutis non est virtus. Artis autem est aliqua virtus, ut dicitur +in VI Ethic. Ergo ars non est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are + speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35900] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +artes liberales sunt excellentiores quam artes mechanicae. Sed +sicut artes mechanicae sunt practicae, ita artes liberales sunt +speculativae. Ergo si ars esset virtus intellectualis, deberet +virtutibus speculativis annumerari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, + which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35901] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit artem esse virtutem; nec +tamen connumerat eam virtutibus speculativis, quarum subiectum +ponit scientificam partem animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not + on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as + such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly + speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative + habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human + appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his + appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we + have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither + art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects + the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 co."><a name="35902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35902] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum +faciendorum. Quorum tamen bonum non consistit in eo quod appetitus +humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus quod fit, +in se bonum est. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, inquantum +artifex est, qua voluntate opus faciat; sed quale sit opus quod +facit. Sic igitur ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et +tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad +ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam +considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad +illas. Dummodo enim verum geometra demonstret, non refert qualiter +se habeat secundum appetitivam partem, utrum sit laetus vel iratus, +sicut nec in artifice refert, ut dictum est. Et ideo eo modo ars +habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi, inquantum +scilicet nec ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus +quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum; +sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the + art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. + Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this + reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect + virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although + there cannot be a good use without the art. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35903] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis habens artem operatur malum +artificium, hoc non est opus artis, immo est contra artem, sicut +etiam cum aliquis sciens verum mentitur, hoc quod dicit non est +secundum scientiam, sed contra scientiam. Unde sicut scientia se +habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars, et secundum hoc +dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, +quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud +requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for + this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires + a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35904] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, +requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem; +ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus, scilicet moralis, +inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur. +Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit +voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or + the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by + a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained + to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the + body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences + which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, + does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35905] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum +cuiusdam operis, puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae +aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi +opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam +similitudinem artes, sed liberales; ad differentiam illarum artium +quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo +serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo +secundum animam est liber. Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum +huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non +autem artes. Nec oportet, si liberales artes sunt nobiliores, quod +magis eis conveniat ratio artis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A4-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 4. Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity + of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore + prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35906] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit alia virtus ab arte. +Ars enim est ratio recta aliquorum operum. Sed diversa genera +operum non faciunt ut aliquid amittat rationem artis, sunt enim +diversae artes circa opera valde diversa. Cum igitur etiam +prudentia sit quaedam ratio recta operum, videtur quod etiam ipsa +debeat dici ars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters + that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, + should prudence be called an art. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35907] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus speculativi, +utrumque enim eorum est circa contingens aliter se habere, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed quidam habitus speculativi dicuntur artes. +Ergo multo magis prudentia debet dici ars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, + as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct + from art. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35908] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed +etiam in quibusdam artibus consiliari contingit, ut dicitur in III +Ethic., sicut in arte militari, et gubernativa, et medicinali. Ergo +prudentia ab arte non distinguitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35909] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus distinguit prudentiam ab arte, in VI +Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above + <a href="#FS_Q57_A1" id="FS_Q57_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[56], A[3]) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits + are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the + mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas + prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the + rectitude thereof. + </p><p id="FS_Q57_A4-p7"> The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason + of things to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing + into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to + see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions, + consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things + with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which + reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the + habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, + 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with + regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, + which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good + of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more + praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence + to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is + evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 co."><a name="35910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35910] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ubi invenitur diversa ratio virtutis, ibi oportet +virtutes distingui. Dictum est autem supra quod aliquis habitus +habet rationem virtutis ex hoc solum quod facit facultatem boni +operis, aliquis autem ex hoc quod facit non solum facultatem boni +operis, sed etiam usum. Ars autem facit solum facultatem boni +operis, quia non respicit appetitum. Prudentia autem non solum +facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum, respicit enim +appetitum, tanquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus. Cuius +differentiae ratio est, quia ars est recta ratio factibilium; +prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium. Differt autem facere et +agere quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., factio est actus transiens +in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare, et huiusmodi; +agere autem est actus permanens in ipso agente, sicut videre, +velle, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur hoc modo se habet prudentia ad +huiusmodi actus humanos, qui sunt usus potentiarum et habituum, +sicut se habet ars ad exteriores factiones, quia utraque est +perfecta ratio respectu illorum ad quae comparatur. Perfectio autem +et rectitudo rationis in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex +quibus ratio syllogizat, sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab +intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In +humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in +speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae +est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus +circa fines, quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad +prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus +rectus. Bonum autem artificialium non est bonum appetitus humani, +sed bonum ipsorum operum artificialium, et ideo ars non +praesupponit appetitum rectum. Et inde est quod magis laudatur +artifex qui volens peccat, quam qui peccat nolens; magis autem +contra prudentiam est quod aliquis peccet volens, quam nolens, quia +rectitudo voluntatis est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de +ratione artis. Sic igitur patet quod prudentia est virtus distincta +ab arte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But + prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35911] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra +hominem, et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia +est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum, unde diversificatur ratio +virtutis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are + both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, + then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35912] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus +speculativi, quantum ad subiectum et materiam, utrumque enim est in +opinativa parte animae, et circa contingens aliter se habere. Sed +ars magis convenit cum habitibus speculativis in ratione virtutis, +quam cum prudentia, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there + is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in + matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply + prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35913] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent +ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in +artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines +proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene +consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes +duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter, sed illi +solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam +vitam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A5-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 5. Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which + it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence + is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save + in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence + necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become + virtuous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35914] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit virtus necessaria ad +bene vivendum. Sicut enim se habet ars ad factibilia, quorum est +ratio recta; ita se habet prudentia ad agibilia, secundum quae vita +hominis consideratur, est enim eorum recta ratio prudentia, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed ars non est necessaria in rebus +factibilibus nisi ad hoc quod fiant, non autem postquam sunt +factae. Ergo nec prudentia est necessaria homini ad bene vivendum, +postquam est virtuosus, sed forte solum quantum ad hoc quod +virtuosus fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, + but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough + that he follow the counsels of prudent men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35915] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia est per quam recte consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. +Sed homo potest ex bono consilio agere non solum proprio, sed etiam +alieno. Ergo non est necessarium ad bene vivendum quod ipse homo +habeat prudentiam; sed sufficit quod prudentum consilia +sequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem + to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions + are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence + should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35916] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus intellectualis est secundum quam contingit semper dicere +verum, et nunquam falsum. Sed hoc non videtur contingere secundum +prudentiam, non enim est humanum quod in consiliando de agendis +nunquam erretur; cum humana agibilia sint contingentia aliter se +habere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, <i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et +incertae providentiae nostrae</i>. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non +debeat poni intellectualis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have + nothing more profitable in life." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35917] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Sap. VIII, connumeratur aliis virtutibus necessariis ad +vitam humanam, cum dicitur de divina sapientia, <i>sobrietatem et +prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est +in vita hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, + it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from + impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, + the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably + directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the + end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because + counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue + is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this + virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 co."><a name="35918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35918] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod prudentia est virtus maxime necessaria ad vitam +humanam. Bene enim vivere consistit in bene operari. Ad hoc autem +quod aliquis bene operetur, non solum requiritur quid faciat, sed +etiam quomodo faciat; ut scilicet secundum electionem rectam +operetur, non solum ex impetu aut passione. Cum autem electio sit +eorum quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo electionis duo requirit, +scilicet debitum finem; et id quod convenienter ordinatur ad +debitum finem. Ad debitum autem finem homo convenienter disponitur +per virtutem quae perficit partem animae appetitivam, cuius +obiectum est bonum et finis. Ad id autem quod convenienter in finem +debitum ordinatur, oportet quod homo directe disponatur per habitum +rationis, quia consiliari et eligere, quae sunt eorum quae sunt ad +finem, sunt actus rationis. Et ideo necesse est in ratione esse +aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficiatur ratio ad hoc +quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec +virtus est prudentia. Unde prudentia est virtus necessaria ad bene +vivendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things + to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing + made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the + good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its + perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q57_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it + be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were + proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the + craftsman + needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence + is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35919] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod bonum artis consideratur non in ipso artifice, +sed magis in ipso artificiato, cum ars sit ratio recta factibilium, +factio enim, in exteriorem materiam transiens, non est perfectio +facientis, sed facti, sicut motus est actus mobilis; ars autem +circa factibilia est. Sed prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso +agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere, est enim prudentia recta +ratio agibilium, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad artem non requiritur +quod artifex bene operetur, sed quod bonum opus faciat. +Requireretur autem magis quod ipsum artificiatum bene operaretur, +sicut quod cultellus bene incideret, vel serra bene secaret; si +proprie horum esset agere, et non magis agi, quia non habent +dominium sui actus. Et ideo ars non est necessaria ad bene vivendum +ipsi artificis; sed solum ad faciendum artificiatum bonum, et ad +conservandum ipsum. Prudentia autem est necessaria homini ad bene +vivendum, non solum ad hoc quod fiat bonus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as + regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; + and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35920] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam +rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius; nondum est omnino +perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et +quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen +simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of + the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly + in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent + things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary + things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity + has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected + by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters + that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and + prudence, as regards things to be done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35921] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur quam +verum intellectus speculativi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Nam verum +intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad +rem. Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter conformari rebus +in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis; ideo nullus habitus +speculativus contingentium est intellectualis virtus, sed solum est +circa necessaria. Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per +conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in +necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed +solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint +agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola +contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia +quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A6-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 6. Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? [*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}" + is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. + vi, 9). Therefore "{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35922] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter adiungantur prudentiae +eubulia, synesis et gnome. Eubulia enim est habitus quo bene +consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed bene consiliari pertinet +ad prudentiam, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo eubulia non est +virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed magis est ipsa prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is + judgment. Now "{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore "{synesis}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather + is a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35923] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad superiorem pertinet de inferioribus iudicare. Illa ergo virtus +videtur suprema, cuius est actus iudicium. Sed synesis est bene +iudicativa. Ergo synesis non est virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed +magis ipsa est principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. + But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there + is no need, besides "{synesis}" of the virtue of "{gnome}." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35924] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa +sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum. Sed circa omnia consiliabilia +ponitur una virtus, scilicet eubulia. Ergo ad bene iudicandum de +agendis, non oportet ponere, praeter synesim, aliam virtutem, +scilicet gnomen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of + the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," + and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="35925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35925] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +Tullius ponit, in sua rhetorica, tres alias partes prudentiae, +scilicet memoriam praeteritorum, intelligentiam praesentium, et +providentiam futurorum. Macrobius etiam ponit, super somnium +Scipionis, quasdam alias partes prudentiae, scilicet cautionem, +docilitatem, et alia huiusmodi. Non videntur igitur solae huiusmodi +virtutes prudentiae adiungi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35926] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas philosophi, in VI Ethic., qui has tres virtutes +ponit prudentiae adiunctas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now + there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the + third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel + is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far + as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that + in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue + which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. + "{eustochia}," which perfects counsel; and "{synesis}" and "{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, + and of + whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 co."><a name="35927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35927] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in omnibus potentiis ordinatis illa est principalior, +quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana +tres actus rationis inveniuntur, quorum primus est consiliari, +secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere. Primi autem duo +respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et +iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus +proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus, non +enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. +Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, +principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur. Et ideo +virtuti quae est bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentiae, tanquam +principaliori, adiunguntur tanquam secundariae, eubulia, quae est +bene consiliativa, et synesis et gnome, quae sunt partes +iudicativae; de quarum distinctione dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it + perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35928] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa, non quasi bene +consiliari sit immediate actus eius, sed quia hunc actum perficit +mediante virtute sibi subiecta, quae est eubulia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's + judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded + aright in the point of what has to be done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35929] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iudicium in agendis ad aliquid ulterius ordinatur, +contingit enim aliquem bene iudicare de aliquo agendo, et tamen non +recte exequi. Sed ultimum complementum est, quando ratio iam bene +praecipit de agendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: + because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence + only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is + based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative + matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce + judgment, differ according to their different objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ in respect of the different rules + on which judgment is based: for "{synesis}" judges of actions according to the common law; while "{gnome}" bases its judgment + on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on ( + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q51_A4" id="FS_Q57_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[51], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35930] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia +eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia, quia his +habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et +ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem +virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus +principiis, sed in propriis. Unde et in speculativis una est +dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus, scientiae autem demonstrativae, +quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis. Distinguuntur +autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur, +nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; +gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus +deficit lex communis; sicut plenius infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but + are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective + parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, + potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as + secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="35931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35931] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia et providentia, similiter +etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes +diversae a prudentia, sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam sicut +partes integrales, inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem +prudentiae. Sunt etiam et quaedam partes subiectivae, seu species +prudentiae, sicut oeconomica, regnativa, et huiusmodi. Sed +praedicta tria sunt quasi partes potentiales prudentiae, quia +ordinantur sicut secundarium ad principale. Et de his infra +dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q58" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q58-p0.1">Q. 58. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q58-p2"> We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their + distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues + and the others. + </p><p id="FS_Q58-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q58-p4"><a href="#FS_Q58_A1"> (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p5"><a href="#FS_Q58_A2"> (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p6"><a href="#FS_Q58_A3"> (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p7"><a href="#FS_Q58_A4"> (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p8"><a href="#FS_Q58_A5"> (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 pr."><a name="35932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35932] +Iª-IIae q. 58 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus moralibus. Et primo, de distinctione earum a virtutibus +intellectualibus; secundo, de distinctione earum ab invicem, +secundum propriam materiam; tertio, de distinctione principalium, +vel cardinalium, ab aliis. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum omnis virtus sit virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum virtus +moralis distinguatur ab intellectuali. Tertio, utrum sufficienter +dividatur virtus per intellectualem et moralem. Quarto, utrum +moralis virtus possit esse sine intellectuali. Quinto, utrum e +converso, intellectualis virtus possit esse sine morali.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q58_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A1-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 1. Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now, + we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35933] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus sit moralis. Virtus enim +moralis dicitur a more, idest consuetudine. Sed omnium virtutum +actus consuescere possumus. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue + is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following + the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on ( + <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[64], AA[1]</a>,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35934] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est habitus +electivus in medietate rationis consistens</i>. Sed omnis virtus +videtur esse habitus electivus, quia actus cuiuslibet virtutis +possumus ex electione facere. Omnis etiam virtus aliqualiter in +medio rationis consistit, ut infra patebit. Ergo omnis virtus est +moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since + every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees + with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35935] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod <i>virtus est habitus in +modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. Sed cum omnis virtus +humana ordinetur ad bonum hominis, oportet quod sit consentanea +rationi, cum bonum hominis sit secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius +dicit. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that + he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q58_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[2]</a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35936] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., <i>dicentes de moribus, +non dicimus quoniam sapiens vel intelligens; sed quoniam mitis vel +sobrius</i>. Sic igitur sapientia et intellectus non sunt morales. +Quae tamen sunt virtutes, sicut supra dictum est. Non ergo omnis +virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q58_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able + to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.1" target="asv">Acts 15:1</a>): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural + inclination to do some particular action, in which + sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.1.2" target="asv">2 Macc. 1:2</a>) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": + and the word is used in the same sense in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.7" target="asv">Ps. 67:7</a>, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one + word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes + with a long, and sometimes a short "e". + </p><p id="FS_Q58_A1-p7"> Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. + And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination + similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose + function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], + A[1] + </a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 co."><a name="35937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35937] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit +mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus. Mos autem +duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut +dicitur Act. XV, <i>nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non +poteritis salvi fieri</i>. Quandoque vero significat inclinationem +quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde +etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II +Machab. XI, quod <i>leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt +eos</i>. Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, <i>qui +habitare facit unius moris in domo</i>. Et hae quidem duae +significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad +vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos +morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per +eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et +scribitur per epsilon. Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, +secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel +quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris +propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam +consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem +similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum +proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes +potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo non omnis +virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi +appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35938] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de more, secundum quod +significat consuetudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part + of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects + the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter + of choice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35939] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod omnis actus virtutis potest ex electione agi, sed +electionem rectam agit sola virtus quae est in appetitiva parte +animae, dictum est enim supra quod eligere est actus appetitivae +partis. Unde habitus electivus, qui scilicet est electionis +principium, est solum ille qui perficit vim appetitivam, quamvis +etiam aliorum habituum actus sub electione cadere possint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the + appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which + are in the appetitive faculty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35940] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod natura est principium motus, sicut dicitur in II +Physic. Movere autem ad agendum proprium est appetitivae partis. Et +ideo assimilari naturae in consentiendo rationi, est proprium +virtutum quae sunt in vi appetitiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A2-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 2. Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue + is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35941] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis ab intellectuali non +distinguatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Civ. Dei, quod +<i>virtus est ars recte vivendi</i>. Sed ars est virtus +intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis ab intellectuali non +differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding + those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his + duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35942] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +plerique in definitione virtutum moralium ponunt scientiam, sicut +quidam definiunt quod perseverantia est scientia vel habitus eorum +quibus est immanendum vel non immanendum; et sanctitas est scientia +faciens fideles et servantes quae ad Deum iusta. Scientia autem est +virtus intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis non debet distingui ab +intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the + intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35943] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quod <i>virtus est recta et +perfecta ratio</i>. Sed hoc pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut +patet in VI Ethic. ergo virtus moralis non est distincta ab +intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the + definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed + by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual + virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from + intellectual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="35944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35944] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil distinguitur ab eo quod in eius definitione ponitur. Sed +virtus intellectualis ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, +dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est +habitus electivus existens in medietate determinata ratione, prout +sapiens determinabit</i>. Huiusmodi autem recta ratio determinans +medium virtutis moralis, pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo virtus moralis non distinguitur ab +intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35945] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in I Ethic., <i>determinatur virtus secundum +differentiam hanc, dicimus enim harum has quidem intellectuales, +has vero morales</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason + somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of + the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. + Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. + as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate + to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since + virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that + there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of + prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; + and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 co."><a name="35946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35946] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est, +et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur, +quodammodo rationi obediunt; diversimode tamen. Nam quaedam rationi +obediunt omnino ad nutum, absque omni contradictione, sicut +corporis membra, si fuerint in sua natura consistentia; statim enim +ad imperium rationis, manus aut pes movetur ad opus. Unde +philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico +principatu, idest sicut dominus servum, qui ius contradicendi non +habet. Posuerunt igitur quidam quod omnia principia activa quae +sunt in homine, hoc modo se habent ad rationem. Quod quidem si +verum esset, sufficeret quod ratio esset perfecta, ad bene agendum. +Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum, +sequeretur quod in sola ratione esset, et sic nulla virtus esset +nisi intellectualis. Et haec fuit opinio Socratis, qui dixit omnes +virtutes esse prudentias, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ponebat quod +homo, scientia in eo existente, peccare non poterat; sed quicumque +peccabat, peccabat propter ignorantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8"> Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain + power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic + power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a> (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so + far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And + in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not + sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc autem procedit ex +suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino +ad nutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione, unde philosophus dicit, in +I Polit., quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo +scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui habent ius in aliquo +contradicendi. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Psalm., quod +<i>interdum praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus +affectus</i>, intantum quod quandoque passionibus vel habitibus +appetitivae partis hoc agitur, ut usus rationis in particulari +impediatur. Et secundum hoc, aliqualiter verum est quod Socrates +dixit, quod scientia praesente, non peccatur, si tamen hoc +extendatur usque ad usum rationis in particulari eligibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p9"> Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of + intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs + from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human + acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in + conformity with reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic +igitur ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio +sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam +quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis +moralis. Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus +moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali. Unde sicut appetitus est +principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter +rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, +inquantum rationi conformatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right + reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue + is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as + they are directed by prudence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35947] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus communiter accipit artem, pro +qualibet recta ratione. Et sic sub arte includitur etiam prudentia, +quae ita est recta ratio agibilium, sicut ars est recta ratio +factibilium. Et secundum hoc, quod dicit quod virtus est ars recte +vivendi, essentialiter convenit prudentiae, participative autem +aliis virtutibus, prout secundum prudentiam diriguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we + have said about art (ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35948] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod tales definitiones, a quibuscumque inveniantur datae, +processerunt ex opinione Socratica, et sunt exponendae eo modo quo +de arte praedictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same applies to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35949] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, + but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction + of prudence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="35950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35950] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod recta ratio, quae est secundum prudentiam, ponitur in +definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae eius, sed +sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, +inquantum prudentia dirigit omnes virtutes morales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A3-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 3. Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between + moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by + all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A1" id="FS_Q58_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[1]</a>). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there + were no mean between them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35951] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sufficienter +dividatur per virtutem moralem et intellectualem. Prudentia enim +videtur esse aliquid medium inter virtutem moralem et +intellectualem, connumeratur enim virtutibus intellectualibus in VI +Ethic.; et etiam ab omnibus communiter connumeratur inter quatuor +virtutes cardinales, quae sunt morales, ut infra patebit. Non ergo +sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectualem et moralem, sicut +per immediata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral + virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue + is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35952] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +continentia et perseverantia, et etiam patientia, non computantur +inter virtutes intellectuales. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, +quia non tenent medium in passionibus, sed abundant in eis +passiones. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per +intellectuales et morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. + science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q58_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[57], AA[2]</a> ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. + Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35953] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +fides, spes et caritas quaedam virtutes sunt. Non tamen sunt +virtutes intellectuales, hae enim solum sunt quinque, scilicet +scientia, sapientia, intellectus, prudentia et ars, ut dictum est. +Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non sunt circa passiones, +circa quas maxime est moralis virtus. Ergo virtus non sufficienter +dividitur per intellectuales et morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35954] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>duplicem esse +virtutem, hanc quidem intellectualem, illam autem moralem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human + actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De + Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if + it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it + will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that + every human virtue is either intellectual or moral. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 co."><a name="35955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35955] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem +ad bene operandum. Principium autem humanorum actuum in homine non +est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus, +haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima. +Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius +istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus +speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus +intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit +virtus moralis. Unde relinquitur quod omnis virtus humana vel est +intellectualis vel moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with + the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q58_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[4]</a>). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35956] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est +intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum +virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra +dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound + in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making + it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the + passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since + intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the + end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this + is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless + each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing + an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, + which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action + will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting + from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the + Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35957] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod continentia et perseverantia non sunt perfectiones +appetitivae virtutis sensitivae. Quod ex hoc patet, quod in +continente et perseverante superabundant inordinatae passiones, +quod non esset, si appetitus sensitivus esset perfectus aliquo +habitu conformante ipsum rationi. Est autem continentia, seu +perseverantia, perfectio rationalis partis, quae se tenet contra +passiones ne deducatur. Deficit tamen a ratione virtutis, quia +virtus intellectiva quae facit rationem se bene habere circa +moralia, praesupponit appetitum rectum finis, ut recte se habeat +circa principia, idest fines, ex quibus ratiocinatur; quod +continenti et perseveranti deest. Neque etiam potest esse perfecta +operatio quae a duabus potentiis procedit, nisi utraque potentia +perficiatur per debitum habitum, sicut non sequitur perfecta actio +alicuius agentis per instrumentum, si instrumentum non sit bene +dispositum, quantumcumque principale agens sit perfectum. Unde si +appetitus sensitivus, quem movet rationalis pars, non sit +perfectus; quantumcumque rationalis pars sit perfecta, actio +consequens non erit perfecta. Unde nec principium actionis erit +virtus. Et propter hoc, continentia a delectationibus, et +perseverantia a tristitiis, non sunt virtutes, sed aliquid minus +virtute, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35958] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod fides, spes et caritas sunt supra virtutes humanas, +sunt enim virtutes hominis prout est factus particeps divinae +gratiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A4-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 4. Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is + "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves + it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of + knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining + him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35959] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse sine +intellectuali. <i>Virtus enim moralis</i>, ut dicit Tullius, <i>est +habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. Sed natura etsi +consentiat alicui superiori rationi moventi, non tamen oportet quod +illa ratio naturae coniungatur in eodem, sicut patet in rebus +naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Ergo potest esse in homine +virtus moralis in modum naturae, inclinans ad consentiendum +rationi, quamvis illius hominis ratio non sit perfecta per virtutem +intellectualem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous + and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35960] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per virtutem intellectualem homo consequitur rationis usum +perfectum. Sed quandoque contingit quod aliqui in quibus non multum +viget usus rationis, sunt virtuosi et Deo accepti. Ergo videtur +quod virtus moralis possit esse sine virtute intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural + inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35961] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus moralis facit inclinationem ad bene operandum. Sed quidam +habent naturalem inclinationem ad bene operandum, etiam absque +rationis iudicio. Ergo virtutes morales possunt esse sine +intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues." + But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A5" id="FS_Q58_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[5]</a>). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35962] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXII Moral., quod <i>ceterae virtutes, +nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam +possunt</i>. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non possunt esse sine +intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding + and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now + in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done + by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with + reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot + do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as + stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A5" id="FS_Q58_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[57], AA[5]</a>,6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. + For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident + principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far + as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, + which is the right reason about things to be done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 co."><a name="35963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35963] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam +intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et +arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia. Sine +prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis +virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad +hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur. Primo, ut sit +debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim +appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis +debitus. Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et +hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, +iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad +virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est. Unde virtus moralis +sine prudentia esse non potest. Et per consequens nec sine +intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter +nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Unde sicut recta +ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter +cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum; ita etiam +prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity + require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires + that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35964] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod inclinatio naturae in rebus carentibus ratione, +est absque electione, et ideo talis inclinatio non requirit ex +necessitate rationem. Sed inclinatio virtutis moralis est cum +electione, et ideo ad suam perfectionem indiget quod sit ratio +perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things + which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, + through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.16" target="asv"> Mat. 10:16</a>: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35965] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in virtuoso non oportet quod vigeat usus rationis +quantum ad omnia, sed solum quantum ad ea quae sunt agenda secundum +virtutem. Et sic usus rationis viget in omnibus virtuosis. Unde +etiam qui videntur simplices, eo quod carent mundana astutia, +possunt esse prudentes; secundum illud Matth. X, <i>estote +prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger + this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice + of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, + and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be + not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which + is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with + right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35966] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam +inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim +inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior, +nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae +conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, +tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit. Et ideo, +etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat; non +tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id +quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed +etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in +VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A5-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 5. Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on + the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which + is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be + without it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35967] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus intellectualis possit esse sine +virtute morali. Perfectio enim prioris non dependet a perfectione +posterioris. Sed ratio est prior appetitu sensitivo, et movens +ipsum. Ergo virtus intellectualis quae est perfectio rationis, non +dependet a virtute morali, quae est perfectio appetitivae partis. +Potest ergo esse sine ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper + matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, + it seems most akin to the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35968] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +moralia sunt materia prudentiae, sicut factibilia sunt materia +artis. Sed ars potest esse sine propria materia, sicut faber sine +ferro. Ergo et prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, +quae tamen inter omnes intellectuales virtutes, maxime moralibus +coniuncta videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having + the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35969] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +prudentia est virtus bene consiliativa, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed +multi bene consiliantur, quibus tamen virtutes morales desunt. Ergo +prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. + Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35970] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +velle malum facere opponitur directe virtuti morali; non autem +opponitur alicui quod sine virtute morali esse potest. Opponitur +autem prudentiae quod volens peccet, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non +ergo prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the + right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions + are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, + it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of + action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; + or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For + it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a + particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire + seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding + or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be + rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, + whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the + virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently + the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 co."><a name="35971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35971] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali +esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. +Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium; non +autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt +actiones. Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio +procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non +solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis +particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo +recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem +homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam +scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum +circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi +universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, +corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem, sicut +concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum +quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et +ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia +universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; +ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia +agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos +habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte +iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, virtuosus enim +recte iudicat de fine virtutis, <i>quia qualis unusquisque est, +talis finis videtur ei</i>, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad +rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo +habeat virtutem moralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing + about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles + is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35972] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, +praecedit appetitum finis, sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem +ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad +prudentiam. Sicut etiam in speculativis, intellectus principiorum +est principium rationis syllogizantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, + when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. + Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35973] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod principia artificialium non diiudicantur a nobis bene +vel male secundum dispositionem appetitus nostri, sicut fines, qui +sunt moralium principia, sed solum per considerationem rationis. Et +ideo ars non requirit virtutem perficientem appetitum, sicut +requirit prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment + of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35974] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia non solum est bene consiliativa, sed etiam +bene iudicativa et bene praeceptiva. Quod esse non potest, nisi +removeatur impedimentum passionum corrumpentium iudicium et +praeceptum prudentiae; et hoc per virtutem moralem.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q59" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q59-p0.1">Q. 59. OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q59-p2"> We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, + differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different + kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q59-p3"><a href="#FS_Q59_A1"> (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p4"><a href="#FS_Q59_A2"> (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p5"><a href="#FS_Q59_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p6"><a href="#FS_Q59_A4"> (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p7"><a href="#FS_Q59_A5"> (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 pr."><a name="35975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35975] +Iª-IIae q. 59 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione moralium virtutum ad invicem. Et quia virtutes morales +quae sunt circa passiones, distinguuntur secundum diversitatem +passionum, oportet primo considerare comparationem virtutis ad +passionem; secundo, distinctionem moralium virtutum secundum +passiones. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum virtus +moralis sit passio. Secundo, utrum virtus moralis possit esse cum +passione. Tertio, utrum possit esse cum tristitia. Quarto, utrum +omnis virtus moralis sit circa passionem. Quinto, utrum aliqua +virtus moralis possit esse sine passione.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q59_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A1-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 1. Whether moral virtue is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is + a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35976] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis sit passio. Medium enim +est eiusdem generis cum extremis. Sed virtus moralis est medium +inter passiones. Ergo virtus moralis est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, + such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35977] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus et vitium, cum sint contraria, sunt in eodem genere. Sed +quaedam passiones vitia esse dicuntur, ut invidia et ira. Ergo +etiam quaedam passiones sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A8" id="FS_Q59_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore + a passion may be a moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35978] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +misericordia quaedam passio est, est enim tristitia de alienis +malis, ut supra dictum est. <i>Hanc autem Cicero, locutor egregius, +non dubitavit appellare virtutem</i>; ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de +Civ. Dei. Ergo passio potest esse virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35979] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in II Ethic., quod <i>passiones neque virtutes +sunt neque malitiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive + appetite, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. + Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: + wherefore the passions, + considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now + nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement + of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity + with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, + inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit + of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 co."><a name="35980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35980] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis non potest esse passio. Et hoc patet +triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia passio est motus quidam +appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non +est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus +quidam existens. Secundo quia passiones ex seipsis non habent +rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum +rationem, unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad +bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non +convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad +bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est. Tertio quia, dato quod aliqua +passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum +aliquem modum; tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, +principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius +conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e +converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, +secundum quod a ratione movetur. Unde in definitione virtutis +moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., <i>quod est habitus electivus in +medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens +determinabit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes + the mean between passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35981] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus, secundum suam essentiam, non est medium +inter passiones, sed secundum suum effectum, quia scilicet inter +passiones medium constituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean + sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act + of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35982] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si vitium dicatur habitus secundum quem quis male +operatur, manifestum est quod nulla passio est vitium. Si vero +dicatur vitium peccatum, quod est actus vitiosus, sic nihil +prohibet passionem esse vitium, et e contrario concurrere ad actum +virtutis; secundum quod passio vel contrariatur rationi, vel +sequitur actum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz. + "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders + pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35983] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod misericordia dicitur esse virtus, idest virtutis +actus, secundum quod <i>motus ille animi rationi servit, quando +scilicet ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive +cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur poenitenti</i>, ut +Augustinus dicit ibidem. Si tamen misericordia dicatur aliquis +habitus quo homo perficitur ad rationabiliter miserendum, nihil +prohibet misericordiam sic dictam esse virtutem. Et eadem est ratio +de similibus passionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A2-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 2. Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who + is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. + Therefore all moral virtues are without passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35984] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis cum passione esse non +possit. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Topic., quod <i>mitis est qui +non patitur, patiens autem qui patitur et non deducitur</i>. Et +eadem ratio est de omnibus virtutibus moralibus. Ergo omnis virtus +moralis est sine passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue + is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as + he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35985] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus est quaedam recta habitudo animae, sicut sanitas corporis, +ut dicitur in VII Physic., unde virtus quaedam sanitas animae esse +videtur, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tuscul. quaest. Passiones autem +animae dicuntur morbi quidam animae, ut in eodem libro Tullius +dicit. Sanitas autem non compatitur secum morbum. Ergo neque virtus +compatitur animae passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: + for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that + "when they," i.e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth." Therefore passion is incompatible + with moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35986] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus moralis requirit perfectum usum rationis etiam in +particularibus. Sed hoc impeditur per passiones, dicit enim +philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectationes corrumpunt +existimationem prudentiae</i>; et Sallustius dicit, in Catilinario, +quod non facile verum perspicit animus, ubi illa officiunt, +scilicet animi passiones. Virtus ergo moralis non potest esse cum +passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but + if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral + virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35987] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>si perversa est +voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus</i>, scilicet passionum, si +autem recta est, <i>non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles +erunt</i>. Sed nullum laudabile excluditur per virtutem moralem. +Virtus ergo moralis non excludit passiones, sed potest esse cum +ipsis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the + soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p7"> This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, + through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided + into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of + the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the + soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, + as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose + deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus + Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions + of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, + so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason + without his approving of such things or consenting thereto." + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p8"> Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them + deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can + be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe + virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should + be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and + time." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 co."><a name="35988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35988] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et +Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim +posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive +virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, +ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones +simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae. Haec +autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat +secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici +non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, +et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et +concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones +animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint +motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt +passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur +voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc +quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi +repugnantes. Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in +virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in +virtuoso potest accidere, <i>eo quod animi visa quae appellant +phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant +animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut +sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel +tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus +rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque +consentiunt</i>; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio +dictum. Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, +non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis +consentiatur; ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur +quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, +secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in +II Ethic., quod <i>non bene quidam determinant virtutes +impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter +dicunt</i>, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus +quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, + but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the + Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, + that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of + inordinate passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35989] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus exemplum illud inducit, sicut et +multa alia in libris logicalibus, non secundum opinionem propriam, +sed secundum opinionem aliorum. Haec autem fuit opinio Stoicorum, +quod virtutes essent sine passionibus animae. Quam opinionem +philosophus excludit in II Ethic., dicens virtutes non esse +impassibilitates. Potest tamen dici quod, cum dicitur quod mitis +non patitur, intelligendum est secundum passionem inordinatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's + command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35990] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa, et omnes similes quas Tullius ad hoc +inducit in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., procedit de passionibus +secundum quod significant inordinatas affectiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and + the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution + of reason's command. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35991] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo +praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium +rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad +exequendum imperium rationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A3-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 3. Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv"> Wis. 8:7</a>: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom + "hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35992] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus cum tristitia esse non possit. +Virtutes enim sunt sapientiae effectus, secundum illud Sap. VIII, +sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, scilicet divina sapientia, +prudentiam et virtutem. Sed sapientiae convictus non habet +amaritudinem, ut postea subditur. Ergo nec virtutes cum tristitia +esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is + incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35993] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia est impedimentum operationis; ut patet per philosophum, +in VII et X Ethic. Sed impedimentum bonae operationis repugnat +virtuti. Ergo tristitia repugnat virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, + which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35994] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +tristitia est quaedam animi aegritudo; ut Tullius eam vocat, in III +de Tuscul. quaest. Sed aegritudo animae contrariatur virtuti, quae +est bona animae habitudo. Ergo tristitia contrariatur virtuti, nec +potest simul esse cum ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.38" target="asv">Mat. 26:38</a>): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35995] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Christus fuit perfectus virtute. Sed in eo fuit tristitia, +dicit enim, ut habetur Matth. XXVI, <i>tristis est anima mea usque +ad mortem</i>. Ergo tristitia potest esse cum virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e. + "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; + instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for + two reasons. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p7"> First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they + thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot + be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve + the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently + the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous + man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in + a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily + sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when + moderated by reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p8"> Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even + as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire + to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a + present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is + unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected + by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according + as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad + 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher + says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the + sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p9"> Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices + in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 co."><a name="35996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35996] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>Stoici +voluerunt, pro tribus perturbationibus, in animo sapientis esse +tres eupathias, idest tres bonas passiones, pro cupiditate scilicet +voluntatem; pro laetitia, gaudium; pro metu, cautionem</i>. Pro +tristitia vero, negaverunt posse aliquid esse in animo sapientis, +duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia tristitia est de malo quod iam +accidit. Nullum autem malum aestimant posse accidere sapienti, +crediderunt enim quod, sicut solum hominis bonum est virtus, bona +autem corporalia nulla bona hominis sunt; ita solum inhonestum est +hominis malum, quod in virtuoso esse non potest. Sed hoc +irrationabiliter dicitur. Cum enim homo sit ex anima et corpore +compositus, id quod confert ad vitam corporis conservandam, aliquod +bonum hominis est, non tamen maximum, quia eo potest homo male uti. +Unde et malum huic bono contrarium in sapiente esse potest, et +tristitiam moderatam inducere. Praeterea, etsi virtuosus sine gravi +peccato esse possit, nullus tamen invenitur qui absque levibus +peccatis vitam ducat, secundum illud I Ioan. I, <i>si dixerimus +quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus</i>. Tertio, quia +virtuosus, etsi peccatum non habeat, forte quandoque habuit. Et de +hoc laudabiliter dolet; secundum illud II ad Cor. VII, <i>quae +secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem +operatur</i>. Quarto, quia potest etiam dolere laudabiliter de +peccato alterius. Unde eo modo quo virtus moralis compatitur alias +passiones ratione moderatas, compatitur etiam tristitiam. Secundo, +movebantur ex hoc, quod tristitia est de praesenti malo, timor +autem de malo futuro, sicut delectatio de bono praesenti, +desiderium vero de bono futuro. Potest autem hoc ad virtutem +pertinere, quod aliquis bono habito fruatur, vel non habitum habere +desideret, vel quod etiam malum futurum caveat. Sed quod malo +praesenti animus hominis substernatur, quod fit per tristitiam, +omnino videtur contrarium rationi, unde cum virtute esse non +potest. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Est enim aliquod malum +quod potest esse virtuoso praesens, ut dictum est. Quod quidem +malum ratio detestatur. Unde appetitus sensitivus in hoc sequitur +detestationem rationis, quod de huiusmodi malo tristatur, moderate +tamen, secundum rationis iudicium. Hoc autem pertinet ad virtutem, +ut appetitus sensitivus rationi conformetur, ut dictum est. Unde ad +virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, +sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic. Et hoc etiam utile est +ad fugiendum mala. Sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius +quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur. Sic +igitur dicendum est quod tristitia de his quae conveniunt virtuti, +non potest simul esse cum virtute, quia virtus in propriis +delectatur. Sed de his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, +virtus moderate tristatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. + Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35997] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate habetur quod de sapientia +sapiens non tristetur. Tristatur tamen de his quae sunt impeditiva +sapientiae. Et ideo in beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum +sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35998] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed +adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the + present state of life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35999] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia +autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum +statum praesentis vitae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A4-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 4. Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue + is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.3" shape="rect"> Q[35], AA[1]</a>, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36000] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus moralis sit circa +passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod <i>circa +voluptates et tristitias est moralis virtus</i>. Sed delectatio et +tristitia sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus +moralis est circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. + i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36001] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +rationale per participationem est subiectum moralium virtutum, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Sed huiusmodi pars animae est in qua sunt +passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est circa +passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some + are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about + the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36002] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in omni virtute morali est invenire aliquam passionem. Aut ergo +omnes sunt circa passiones, aut nulla. Sed aliquae sunt circa +passiones, ut fortitudo et temperantia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. +Ergo omnes virtutes morales sunt circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36003] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod iustitia, quae est virtus moralis, non est circa +passiones, ut dicitur in V Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by + reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject + to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations + of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a + passion, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 co."><a name="36004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36004] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae +ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est autem rationis bonum id quod +est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum. Unde circa omne id +quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse +virtutem moralem. Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus +sensitivi; sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, +qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones; sed +quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting + from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, + after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure + or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as + about something that results from virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36005] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes +et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa +aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur +in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario. Unde philosophus post +praemissa verba subdit quod, <i>si virtutes sunt circa actus et +passiones; omni autem passioni et omni actui sequitur delectatio et +tristitia; propter hoc virtus erit circa delectationes et +tristitias</i>, scilicet sicut circa aliquid consequens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where + there are no passions, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36006] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus +sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum; sed etiam voluntas, in qua +non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36007] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in quibusdam virtutibus sunt passiones sicut propria +materia, in quibusdam autem non. Unde non est eadem ratio de +omnibus, ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A5-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 5. Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the + passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36008] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse absque +passione. Quanto enim virtus moralis est perfectior, tanto magis +superat passiones. Ergo in suo perfectissimo esse, est omnino +absque passionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the + passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) they are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36009] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +tunc unumquodque est perfectum, quando est remotum a suo contrario, +et ab his quae ad contrarium inclinant. Sed passiones inclinant ad +peccatum, quod virtuti contrariatur, unde Rom. VII, nominantur +passiones peccatorum. Ergo perfecta virtus est omnino absque +passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does + all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36010] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum virtutem Deo conformamur; ut patet per Augustinum, in +libro de moribus Eccles. Sed Deus omnia operatur sine passione. +Ergo virtus perfectissima est absque omni passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot + be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36011] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione, ut +dicitur in I Ethic. Sed gaudium est passio. Ergo iustitia non +potest esse sine passione. Et multo minus aliae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue + is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, + which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise + it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: + whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make + them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to + their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements. + </p><p id="FS_Q59_A5-p7"> Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue + is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act + of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of + justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the + higher, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A7" id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[7]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q24_A3" id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[24], A[3]</a>). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 co."><a name="36012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36012] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut +Stoici posuerunt; sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine +passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus +sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa +passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non +possunt. Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus +moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad +virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis +actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios +actus agendo. Unde sicut virtus membra corporis ordinat ad actus +exteriores debitos, ita appetitum sensitivum ad motus proprios +ordinatos. Virtutes vero morales quae non sunt circa passiones, sed +circa operationes, possunt esse sine passionibus (et huiusmodi +virtus est iustitia), quia per eas applicatur voluntas ad proprium +actum, qui non est passio. Sed tamen ad actum iustitiae sequitur +gaudium, ad minus in voluntate, quod non est passio. Et si hoc +gaudium multiplicetur per iustitiae perfectionem, fiet gaudii +redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum; secundum quod vires +inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et sic +per redundantiam huiusmodi, quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto +magis passionem causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36013] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus passiones inordinatas superat, moderatas +autem producit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36014] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non +autem si sunt moderatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as + there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: + whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36015] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem +suae naturae. In Deo autem et Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, +sicut est in homine. Et ideo bona operatio Dei et Angeli est omnino +sine passione, sicut et sine corpore, bona autem operatio hominis +est cum passione, sicut et cum corporis ministerio.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q60" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q60-p0.1">Q. 60. HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q60-p2"> We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q60-p3"><a href="#FS_Q60_A1"> (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p4"><a href="#FS_Q60_A2"> (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p5"><a href="#FS_Q60_A3"> (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p6"><a href="#FS_Q60_A4"> (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p7"><a href="#FS_Q60_A5"> (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 pr."><a name="36016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36016] +Iª-IIae q. 60 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione virtutum moralium ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +quinque. Primo, utrum sit tantum una virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum +distinguantur virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, ab his +quae sunt circa passiones. Tertio, utrum circa operationes sit una +tantum moralis virtus. Quarto, utrum circa diversas passiones sint +diversae morales virtutes. Quinto, utrum virtutes morales +distinguantur secundum diversa obiecta passionum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q60_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A1-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 1. Whether there is only one moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which + is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral + virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one + moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36017] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus. Sicut +enim in actibus moralibus directio pertinet ad rationem, quae est +subiectum intellectualium virtutum; ita inclinatio pertinet ad vim +appetitivam, quae est subiectum moralium virtutum. Sed una est +intellectualis virtus dirigens in omnibus moralibus actibus, +scilicet prudentia. Ergo etiam una tantum est moralis virtus +inclinans in omnibus moralibus actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now + the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, + seemingly, there is but one moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36018] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus non distinguuntur secundum materialia obiecta, sed secundum +formales rationes obiectorum. Formalis autem ratio boni ad quod +ordinatur virtus moralis, est unum, scilicet modus rationis. Ergo +videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q60_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite + in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36019] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +moralia recipiunt speciem a fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed finis +omnium virtutum moralium communis est unus, scilicet felicitas; +proprii autem et propinqui sunt infiniti. Non sunt autem infinitae +virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive + part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[80], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36020] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod unus habitus non potest esse in diversis potentiis, ut +supra dictum est. Sed subiectum virtutum moralium est pars +appetitiva animae, quae per diversas potentias distinguitur, ut in +primo dictum est. Ergo non potest esse una tantum virtus +moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A1" id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], AA[1]</a>,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences + of their objects, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the + agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold + relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that + form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive + a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, + the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with + non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are + not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, + we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various + adaptability of matter. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is + commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, + not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong + to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of + various species and are not one only. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 co."><a name="36021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36021] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt +habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt +secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. +Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, +attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente. Est +autem considerandum quod materia patientis se habet ad agens +dupliciter. Quandoque enim recipit formam agentis secundum eandem +rationem, prout est in agente, sicut est in omnibus agentibus +univocis. Et sic necesse est quod, si agens est unum specie, quod +materia recipiat formam unius speciei, sicut ab igne non generatur +univoce nisi aliquid existens in specie ignis. Aliquando vero +materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eandem rationem, +prout est in agente, sicut patet in generantibus non univocis, ut +animal generatur a sole. Et tunc formae receptae in materia ab +eodem agente, non sunt unius speciei sed diversificantur secundum +diversam proportionem materiae ad recipiendum influxum agentis, +sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per +putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum secundum diversam +proportionem materiae. Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio +est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut +imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis +quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per +participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Unde appetibilia secundum +motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum +quod diversimode se habent ad rationem. Et ita sequitur quod +virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una +tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind + of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of + the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing + power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36022] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem +ratio veri in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. +Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia. +Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est +diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem +dirigentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the + various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36023] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud formale est unum genere, propter unitatem +agentis. Sed diversificatur specie, propter diversas habitudines +recipientium, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be + infinite in number, are not infinite in species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36024] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a +finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen +infiniti sunt specie.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A2-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 2. Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. + For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of + pleasure or sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about + operations, since it is an operative habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36025] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur ab +invicem per hoc quod quaedam sunt circa operationes, quaedam circa +passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod virtus +moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias optimorum operativa. +Sed voluptates et tristitiae sunt passiones quaedam, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo eadem virtus quae est circa passiones, est etiam +circa operationes, utpote operativa existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a + consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36026] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones sunt principia exteriorum operationum. Si ergo aliquae +virtutes rectificant passiones, oportet quod etiam per consequens +rectificent operationes. Eaedem ergo virtutes morales sunt circa +passiones et operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite + are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36027] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad omnem operationem exteriorem movetur appetitus sensitivus bene +vel male. Sed motus appetitus sensitivi sunt passiones. Ergo eaedem +virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, sunt circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. + ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36028] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; +temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa +passiones quasdam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has + some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q59_A4" id="FS_Q60_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>, ad 1). + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p7"> Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those + moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that + good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected + towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In + operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, + and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its + parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only + on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected + to + them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the + passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p8"> It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some + inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: + while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, + one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the + immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 co."><a name="36029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36029] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod operatio et passio dupliciter potest comparari ad +virtutem. Uno modo, sicut effectus. Et hoc modo, omnis moralis +virtus habet aliquas operationes bonas, quarum est productiva; et +delectationem aliquam vel tristitiam, quae sunt passiones, ut supra +dictum est. Alio modo potest comparari operatio ad virtutem +moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet +alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa +passiones. Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam +operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo +afficiatur ad eas, inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum +accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in +talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum +secundum seipsas, sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi +operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad +alterum. Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa +operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero +operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum +commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et +malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa +huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint +principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae +passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis +huiusmodi. Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad +alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi +passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris +operationis, est corruptio iustitiae, inquantum autem corrumpitur +commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius +virtutis. Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa +percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia, in immoderantia vero +irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other + two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, + in others, about passions, for the reason given above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36030] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam prima ratio procedit de operatione, +secundum quod est effectus virtutis. Aliae vero duae rationes +procedunt ex hoc, quod ad idem concurrunt operatio et passio. Sed +in quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in +quibusdam circa passionem, ratione praedicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A3-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 3. Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems + to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36031] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum virtus moralis circa +operationes. Rectitudo enim omnium operationum exteriorum videtur +ad iustitiam pertinere. Sed iustitia est una virtus. Ergo una sola +virtus est circa operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the + other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says + (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue + which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does + not cause a diversity of moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36032] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +operationes maxime differentes esse videntur quae ordinantur ad +bonum unius, et quae ordinantur ad bonum multitudinis. Sed ista +diversitas non diversificat virtutes morales, dicit enim +philosophus, in V Ethic., quod iustitia legalis, quae ordinat actus +hominum ad commune bonum, non est aliud a virtute quae ordinat +actus hominis ad unum tantum, nisi secundum rationem. Ergo +diversitas operationum non causat diversitatem virtutum +moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity + of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, + and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36033] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si sunt diversae virtutes morales circa diversas operationes, +oporteret quod secundum diversitatem operationum, esset diversitas +virtutum moralium. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, nam ad iustitiam +pertinet in diversis generibus commutationum rectitudinem statuere, +et etiam in distributionibus, ut patet in V Ethic. Non ergo +diversae virtutes sunt diversarum operationum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36034] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod religio est alia virtus a pietate, quarum tamen utraque +est circa operationes quasdam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something + due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, + the order of reason is established, as we have stated + <a href="#FS_Q60_A2" id="FS_Q60_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from + which + becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice + that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. + But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, + in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a + contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: + e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude," + whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 co."><a name="36035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36035] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, +conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae, quae attenditur +secundum debitum ad alterum, distinguuntur autem secundum diversas +speciales rationes. Cuius ratio est quia in operationibus +exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non +secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam +convenientiam rei in seipsa; secundum quam convenientiam accipitur +ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae, ad iustitiam +enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes huiusmodi +virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem +iustitiae. Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter +enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et +aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto. Et +secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes, +puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam +redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam +redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But + the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36036] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod iustitia proprie dicta est una specialis virtus, +quae attendit perfectam rationem debiti, quod secundum +aequivalentiam potest restitui. Dicitur tamen et ampliato nomine +iustitia, secundum quamcumque debiti redditionem. Et sic non est +una specialis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: + wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs + man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act + of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the + common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue + does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active + of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36037] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod iustitia quae intendit bonum commune, est alia virtus +a iustitia quae ordinatur ad bonum privatum alicuius, unde et ius +commune distinguitur a iure privato; et Tullius ponit unam +specialem virtutem, pietatem, quae ordinat ad bonum patriae. Sed +iustitia ordinans hominem ad bonum commune, est generalis per +imperium, quia omnes actus virtutum ordinat ad finem suum, scilicet +ad bonum commune. Virtus autem secundum quod a tali iustitia +imperatur, etiam iustitiae nomen accipit. Et sic virtus a iustitia +legali non differt nisi ratione, sicut sola ratione differt virtus +operans secundum seipsam, et virtus operans ad imperium +alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue + of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative + justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ( + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q61_A1" id="FS_Q60_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[61], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36038] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in omnibus operationibus ad iustitiam specialem +pertinentibus, est eadem ratio debiti. Et ideo est eadem virtus +iustitiae, praecipue quantum ad commutationes. Forte enim +distributiva est alterius speciei a commutativa, sed de hoc infra +quaeretur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A4-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 4. Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things + that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one + source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2,4; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is but one moral + virtue about all the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36039] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa diversas passiones non sint +diversae virtutes morales. Eorum enim quae conveniunt in principio +et fine, unus est habitus, sicut patet maxime in scientiis. Sed +omnium passionum unum est principium, scilicet amor; et omnes ad +eundem finem terminantur, scilicet ad delectationem vel tristitiam; +ut supra habitum est. Ergo circa omnes passiones est una tantum +moralis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues + as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, + about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about + different passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36040] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si circa diversas passiones essent diversae virtutes morales, +sequeretur quod tot essent virtutes morales quot passiones. Sed hoc +patet esse falsum, quia circa oppositas passiones est una et eadem +virtus moralis, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias, +temperantia circa delectationes et tristitias. Non ergo oportet +quod circa diversas passiones sint diversae virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q60_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about + different passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36041] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +amor, concupiscentia et delectatio sunt passiones specie +differentes, ut supra habitum est. Sed circa omnes has est una +virtus, scilicet temperantia. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt +diversae circa diversas passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36042] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod fortitudo est circa timores et audacias; temperantia circa +concupiscentias; mansuetudo circa iras; ut dicitur in III et IV +Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power + as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q60_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[1]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A4-p7"> On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, + because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About + such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists + in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural + order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions + contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that + which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral + virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the + attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; + and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the + other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are + about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary + which + has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible + passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 co."><a name="36043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36043] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una +sola virtus moralis, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas +potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae +ad concupiscibilem, ut supra dictum est. Nec tamen oportet quod +omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales +diversificandas. Primo quidem, quia quaedam passiones sunt quae +sibi opponuntur secundum contrarietatem, sicut gaudium et +tristitia, timor et audacia, et alia huiusmodi. Et circa huiusmodi +passiones sic oppositas, oportet esse unam et eandem virtutem. Cum +enim virtus moralis in quadam medietate consistat, medium in +contrariis passionibus secundum eandem rationem instituitur, sicut +et in naturalibus idem est medium inter contraria, ut inter album +et nigrum. Secundo, quia diversae passiones inveniuntur secundum +eundem modum rationi repugnantes, puta secundum impulsum ad id quod +est contra rationem; vel secundum retractionem ab eo quod est +secundum rationem. Et ideo diversae passiones concupiscibilis non +pertinent ad diversas virtutes morales, quia earum motus secundum +quendam ordinem se invicem consequuntur, utpote ad idem ordinati, +scilicet ad consequendum bonum, vel ad fugiendum malum; sicut ex +amore procedit concupiscentia, et ex concupiscentia pervenitur ad +delectationem. Et eadem ratio est de oppositis, quia ex odio +sequitur fuga vel abominatio, quae perducit ad tristitiam. Sed +passiones irascibilis non sunt unius ordinis, sed ad diversa +ordinantur, nam audacia et timor ordinantur ad aliquod magnum +periculum; spes et desperatio ad aliquod bonum arduum; ira autem ad +superandum aliquod contrarium quod nocumentum intulit. Et ideo +circa has passiones diversae virtutes ordinantur, utpote +temperantia circa passiones concupiscibilis; fortitudo circa +timores et audacias; magnanimitas circa spem et desperationem; +mansuetudo circa iras.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice + for the unity of moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36044] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones conveniunt in uno principio et +fine communi, non autem in uno proprio principio seu fine. Unde hoc +non sufficit ad unitatem virtutis moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in + the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, + like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36045] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut in naturalibus idem est principium quo +receditur ab uno principio, et acceditur ad aliud; et in +rationalibus est eadem ratio contrariorum, ita etiam virtus +moralis, quae in modum naturae rationi consentit, est eadem +contrariarum passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36046] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae tres passiones ad idem obiectum ordinantur +secundum quendam ordinem, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad eandem virtutem +moralem pertinent.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A5-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 5. Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects + of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according + to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue + of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ + according to the objects of those passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36047] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur +secundum obiecta passionum. Sicut enim sunt obiecta passionum, ita +sunt obiecta operationum. Sed virtutes morales quae sunt circa +operationes, non distinguuntur secundum obiecta operationum, ad +eandem enim virtutem iustitiae pertinet emere vel vendere domum, et +equum. Ergo etiam nec virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones, +diversificantur per obiecta passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate + habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral + virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36048] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones sunt quidam actus vel motus appetitus sensitivi. Sed +maior diversitas requiritur ad diversitatem habituum, quam ad +diversitatem actuum. Diversa igitur obiecta quae non diversificant +speciem passionis, non diversificabunt speciem virtutis moralis. +Ita scilicet quod de omnibus delectabilibus erit una virtus +moralis, et similiter est de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less + pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful + objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36049] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed diversa delectabilia +non differunt nisi secundum magis et minus. Ergo omnia delectabilia +pertinent ad unam speciem virtutis. Et eadem ratione, omnia +terribilia, et similiter de aliis. Non ergo virtus moralis +distinguitur secundum obiecta passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: + thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore + there should be different virtues about fears of evils. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36050] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut virtus est operativa boni, ita est impeditiva mali. Sed circa +concupiscentias bonorum sunt diversae virtutes, sicut temperantia +circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, et eutrapelia circa +delectationes ludi. Ergo etiam circa timores malorum debent esse +diversae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36051] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod castitas est circa delectabilia venereorum; abstinentia +vero est circa delectabilia ciborum; et eutrapelia circa +delectabilia ludorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. + Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their + relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, + cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, + they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. + Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, + as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q60_A4" id="FS_Q60_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several + virtues are directed about one + passion, e.g. pleasure. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p8"> And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q60_A4" id="FS_Q60_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues---for + instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover + since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to + outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, + and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently + is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, + may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed + to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference, + being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p9"> Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep + of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it + will belong to the virtue of "temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not + present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is + about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3). + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p10"> On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money + and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension + of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or + as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, + however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far + as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, + as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as + being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence" [*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken + absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}], i.e. "love of honor": while if we + consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" + seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible. + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p11"> As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object + of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious + matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, + and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards + another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs + to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one + man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, + 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than + play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. + iv, 8). + </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p12"> It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, + liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which + differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there + will be eleven in all. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 co."><a name="36052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36052] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio +autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod +virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones +autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum. Obiecta igitur passionum, +secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, +causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur +ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum. Non est autem idem +motus rationis, et appetitus sensitivi. Unde nihil prohibet aliquam +differentiam obiectorum causare diversitatem passionum, quae non +causat diversitatem virtutum, sicut quando una virtus est circa +multas passiones, ut dictum est, et aliquam etiam differentiam +obiectorum causare diversitatem virtutum, quae non causat +diversitatem passionum, cum circa unam passionem, puta +delectationem, diversae virtutes ordinentur. Et quia diversae +passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes, semper pertinent ad +diversas virtutes, ut dictum est; ideo diversitas obiectorum quae +respicit diversitatem potentiarum, semper diversificat species +virtutum; puta quod aliquid sit bonum absolute, et aliquid bonum +cum aliqua arduitate. Et quia ordine quodam ratio inferiores +hominis partes regit, et etiam se ad exteriora extendit; ideo etiam +secundum quod unum obiectum passionis apprehenditur sensu vel +imaginatione, aut etiam ratione; et secundum etiam quod pertinet ad +animam, corpus, vel exteriores res; diversam habitudinem habet ad +rationem; et per consequens natum est diversificare virtutes. Bonum +igitur hominis, quod est obiectum amoris, concupiscentiae et +delectationis, potest accipi vel ad sensum corporis pertinens; vel +ad interiorem animae apprehensionem. Et hoc, sive ordinetur ad +bonum hominis in seipso, vel quantum ad corpus vel quantum ad +animam; sive ordinetur ad bonum hominis in ordine ad alios. Et +omnis talis diversitas, propter diversum ordinem ad rationem, +diversificat virtutem. Sic igitur si consideretur aliquod bonum, si +quidem sit per sensum tactus apprehensum, et ad consistentiam +humanae vitae pertinens in individuo vel in specie, sicut sunt +delectabilia ciborum et venereorum; erit pertinens ad virtutem +temperantiae. Delectationes autem aliorum sensuum, cum non sint +vehementes, non praestant aliquam difficultatem rationi, et ideo +circa eas non ponitur aliqua virtus, quae est circa difficile, +sicut et ars, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Bonum autem non sensu, sed +interiori virtute apprehensum, ad ipsum hominem pertinens secundum +seipsum, est sicut pecunia et honor; quorum pecunia ordinabilis est +de se ad bonum corporis; honor autem consistit in apprehensione +animae. Et haec quidem bona considerari possunt vel absolute, +secundum quod pertinent ad concupiscibilem; vel cum arduitate +quadam, secundum quod pertinent ad irascibilem. Quae quidem +distinctio non habet locum in bonis quae delectant tactum, quia +huiusmodi sunt quaedam infima, et competunt homini secundum quod +convenit cum brutis. Circa bonum igitur pecuniae absolute sumptum, +secundum quod est obiectum concupiscentiae vel delectationis aut +amoris, est liberalitas. Circa bonum autem huiusmodi cum arduitate +sumptum, secundum quod est obiectum spei, est magnificentia. Circa +bonum vero quod est honor, si quidem sit absolute sumptum, secundum +quod est obiectum amoris, sic est quaedam virtus quae vocatur +philotimia, idest amor honoris. Si vero cum arduitate consideretur, +secundum quod est obiectum spei, sic est magnanimitas. Unde +liberalitas et philotimia videntur esse in concupiscibili, +magnificentia vero et magnanimitas in irascibili. Bonum vero +hominis in ordine ad alium, non videtur arduitatem habere, sed +accipitur ut absolute sumptum, prout est obiectum passionum +concupiscibilis. Quod quidem bonum potest esse alicui delectabile +secundum quod praebet se alteri vel in his quae serio fiunt, idest +in actionibus per rationem ordinatis ad debitum finem; vel in his +quae fiunt ludo, idest in actionibus ordinatis ad delectationem +tantum, quae non eodem modo se habent ad rationem sicut prima. In +seriis autem se exhibet aliquis alteri dupliciter. Uno modo, ut +delectabilem decentibus verbis et factis, et hoc pertinet ad +quandam virtutem quam Aristoteles nominat amicitiam; et potest dici +affabilitas. Alio modo praebet se aliquis alteri ut manifestum, per +dicta et facta, et hoc pertinet ad aliam virtutem, quam nominat +veritatem. Manifestatio enim propinquius accedit ad rationem quam +delectatio; et seria quam iocosa. Unde et circa delectationes +ludorum est alia virtus, quam philosophus eutrapeliam nominat. Sic +igitur patet quod, secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes +morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia, +liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, +amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas +materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa +obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes, +erunt omnes undecim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific + passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36053] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum +speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia +obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non +repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36054] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod alia ratione diversificantur passiones, et alia +virtutes, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36055] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod magis et minus non diversificant speciem, nisi +propter diversam habitudinem ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. + Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, + seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of + anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the + other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. + Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36056] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod bonum fortius est ad movendum quam malum quia malum +non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Unde malum non facit difficultatem rationi quae requirat +virtutem, nisi sit excellens, quod videtur esse unum in uno genere +passionis. Unde circa iras non ponitur nisi una virtus, scilicet +mansuetudo, et similiter circa audacias una sola, scilicet +fortitudo. Sed bonum ingerit difficultatem, quae requirit virtutem, +etiam si non sit excellens in genere talis passionis. Et ideo circa +concupiscentias ponuntur diversae virtutes morales, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q61" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q61-p0.1">Q. 61. OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q61-p2"> We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q61-p3"><a href="#FS_Q61_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p4"><a href="#FS_Q61_A2"> (2) Of their number;</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p5"><a href="#FS_Q61_A3"> (3) Which are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p6"><a href="#FS_Q61_A4"> (4) Whether they differ from one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p7"><a href="#FS_Q61_A5"> (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 pr."><a name="36057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36057] +Iª-IIae q. 61 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus cardinalibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum virtutes morales debeant dici cardinales, vel principales. +Secundo, de numero earum. Tertio, quae sint. Quarto, utrum +differant ab invicem. Quinto, utrum dividantur convenienter in +virtutes politicas, et purgatorias, et purgati animi, et +exemplares.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q61_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A1-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division + are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite + members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36058] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non debeant dici +cardinales, seu principales. Quae enim ex opposito dividuntur, sunt +simul natura, ut dicitur in praedicamentis, et sic unum non est +altero principalius. Sed omnes virtutes ex opposito dividunt genus +virtutis. Ergo nullae earum debent dici principales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues + are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36059] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +finis principalior est his quae sunt ad finem. Sed virtutes +theologicae sunt circa finem, virtutes autem morales circa ea quae +sunt ad finem. Ergo virtutes morales non debent dici principales, +seu cardinales; sed magis theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual + virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[58] , A[3]</a>). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36060] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +principalius est quod est per essentiam, quam quod est per +participationem. Sed virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationale +per essentiam, virtutes autem morales ad rationale per +participationem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non +sunt principales, sed magis virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral + virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36061] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, <i>beati +pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet +temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem</i>. Hae autem +sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only + confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one + that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not + require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be + done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude + of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, + for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[57], A[4]</a>). Consequently, + those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 co."><a name="36062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36062] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum simpliciter de virtute loquimur, intelligimur +loqui de virtute humana. Virtus autem humana, ut supra dictum est, +secundum perfectam rationem virtutis dicitur, quae requirit +rectitudinem appetitus, huiusmodi enim virtus non solum facit +facultatem bene agendi, sed ipsum etiam usum boni operis causat. +Sed secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis dicitur virtus quae non +requirit rectitudinem appetitus, quia solum facit facultatem bene +agendi, non autem causat boni operis usum. Constat autem quod +perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae +continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales. Huiusmodi +autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola +prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut +ex supradictis patet, unde convenienter inter virtutes morales +ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; + although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of + other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to + another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of + the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division + of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36063] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quando genus univocum dividitur in suas +species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum +rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei, una species sit +principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed +quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus +secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse +principalius altero, etiam secundum communem rationem; sicut +substantia principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est +divisio virtutum in diversa genera virtutum, eo quod bonum rationis +non secundum eundem ordinem invenitur in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues are above man, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36064] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sunt supra hominem, ut supra +dictum est. Unde non proprie dicuntur virtutes humanae, sed +superhumanae, vel divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they + do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36065] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum, quod aliae virtutes intellectuales a prudentia, etsi sint +principaliores quam morales quantum ad subiectum; non tamen sunt +principaliores quantum ad rationem virtutis, quae respicit bonum, +quod est obiectum appetitus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A2-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 2. Whether there are four cardinal virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, + as is clear from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q61_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36066] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quatuor virtutes cardinales. +Prudentia enim est directiva aliarum virtutum moralium, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed id quod est directivum aliorum, principalius +est. Ergo prudentia sola est virtus principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, + and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36067] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes principales sunt aliquo modo morales. Sed ad operationes +morales ordinamur per rationem practicam, et appetitum rectum, ut +dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo solae duae virtutes cardinales sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not + to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36068] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter alias etiam virtutes una est principalior altera. Sed ad hoc +quod virtus dicatur principalis, non requiritur quod sit +principalis respectu omnium, sed respectu quarundam. Ergo videtur +quod sint multo plures principales virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36069] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., <i>in quatuor virtutibus +tota boni operis structura consurgit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and + either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p7"> For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two + ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according + as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and + then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their + thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions + need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. + through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and + to this end there is "Fortitude." + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p8"> In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue + we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational + by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and + the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 co."><a name="36070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36070] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum +principia formalia aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo +inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes. Principium enim formale +virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis bonum. Quod quidem +dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod in ipsa +consideratione rationis consistit. Et sic erit una virtus +principalis, quae dicitur prudentia. Alio modo, secundum quod circa +aliquid ponitur rationis ordo. Et hoc vel circa operationes, et sic +est iustitia, vel circa passiones, et sic necesse est esse duas +virtutes. Ordinem enim rationis necesse est ponere circa passiones, +considerata repugnantia ipsarum ad rationem. Quae quidem potest +esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod passio impellit ad aliquid +contrarium rationi, et sic necesse est quod passio reprimatur, et +ab hoc denominatur temperantia. Alio modo, secundum quod passio +retrahit ab eo quod ratio dictat, sicut timor periculorum vel +laborum, et sic necesse est quod homo firmetur in eo quod est +rationis, ne recedat; et ab hoc denominatur fortitudo. Similiter +secundum subiecta, idem numerus invenitur. Quadruplex enim +invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet +rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per +participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae +est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum +temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum +fortitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36071] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus. +Sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36072] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod rationale per participationem dividitur in tria, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as + to the formal principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36073] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnes aliae virtutes, quarum una est principalior +alia, reducuntur ad praedictas quatuor, et quantum ad subiectum, et +quantum ad rationes formales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A3-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 3. Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal + in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more + than any be called a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36074] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliae virtutes debeant dici magis +principales quam istae. Id enim quod est maximum in unoquoque +genere, videtur esse principalius. Sed magnanimitas operatur magnum +in omnibus virtutibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas +maxime debet dici principalis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for + Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against + the wind." Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36075] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud per quod aliae virtutes firmantur, videtur esse maxime +principalis virtus. Sed humilitas est huiusmodi, dicit enim +Gregorius quod <i>qui ceteras virtutes sine humilitate congregat, +quasi paleas in ventum portat</i>. Ergo humilitas videtur esse +maxime principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> James 1:4</a>: "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36076] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud videtur esse principale, quod est perfectissimum. Sed hoc +pertinet ad patientiam; secundum illud Iacobi I, <i>patientia opus +perfectum habet</i>. Ergo patientia debet poni principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36077] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias +reducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q61_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. + These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found + chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined + by reason and put into our operations as + something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of + equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the + pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found + chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p7"> Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In + this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, + any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of + right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called + temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy + doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under + them. Wherefore all the objections fail. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p8"> Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective + matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the + other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue + which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the + pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 co."><a name="36078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36078] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, huiusmodi quatuor virtutes +cardinales accipiuntur secundum quatuor formales rationes virtutis +de qua loquimur. Quae quidem in aliquibus actibus vel passionibus +principaliter inveniuntur. Sicut bonum consistens in consideratione +rationis, principaliter invenitur in ipso rationis imperio; non +autem in consilio, neque in iudicio, ut supra dictum est. Similiter +autem bonum rationis prout ponitur in operationibus secundum +rationem recti et debiti, principaliter invenitur in +commutationibus vel distributionibus quae sunt ad alterum cum +aequalitate. Bonum autem refraenandi passiones principaliter +invenitur in passionibus quas maxime difficile est reprimere, +scilicet in delectationibus tactus. Bonum autem firmitatis ad +standum in bono rationis contra impetum passionum, praecipue +invenitur in periculis mortis, contra quae difficillimum est stare. +Sic igitur praedictas quatuor virtutes dupliciter considerare +possumus. Uno modo, secundum communes rationes formales. Et +secundum hoc, dicuntur principales, quasi generales ad omnes +virtutes, utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in +consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis virtus +quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur +iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, +dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi +contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo. Et sic multi +loquuntur de istis virtutibus, tam sacri doctores quam etiam +philosophi. Et sic aliae virtutes sub ipsis continentur unde +cessant omnes obiectiones. Alio vero modo possunt accipi, secundum +quod istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in +unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias +divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter +principalitatem materiae, puta quod prudentia dicatur quae +praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter +aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum +tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> Thus again do the objections fail: + because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as + stated above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36079] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et sic etiam +cessant obiectiones, quia aliae virtutes possunt habere aliquas +alias principalitates, sed istae dicuntur principales ratione +materiae, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A4-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 4. Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): + "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; + no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance." + But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the + different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36080] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod quatuor praedictae virtutes non sint +diversae virtutes, et ab invicem distinctae. Dicit enim Gregorius, +in XXII Moral., <i>prudentia vera non est, quae iusta, temperans et +fortis non est; nec perfecta temperantia, quae fortis, iusta et +prudens non est; nec fortitudo integra, quae prudens, temperans et +iusta non est; nec vera iustitia, quae prudens, fortis et temperans +non est</i>. Hoc autem non contingeret, si praedictae quatuor +virtutes essent ab invicem distinctae, diversae enim species +eiusdem generis non denominant se invicem. Ergo praedictae virtutes +non sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance + is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, + and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the + manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that + these virtues are not distinct from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36081] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum quae ab invicem sunt distincta, quod est unius, non +attribuitur alteri. Sed illud quod est temperantiae, attribuitur +fortitudini, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I libro de Offic., <i>iure ea +fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, nullis +illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur</i>. De temperantia etiam +dicit quod modum vel ordinem servat <i>omnium quae vel agenda vel +dicenda arbitramur</i>. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi virtutes non +sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should + have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and + act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things + to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his + passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, + implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs + to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from + one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36082] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem haec requiruntur, +<i>primum quidem, si sciens; deinde, si eligens, et eligens propter +hoc; tertium autem, si firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur</i>. +Sed horum primum videtur ad prudentiam pertinere, quae est recta +ratio agibilium; secundum, scilicet eligere, ad temperantiam, ut +aliquis non ex passione, sed ex electione agat, passionibus +refraenatis; tertium, ut aliquis propter debitum finem operetur, +rectitudinem quandam continet, quae videtur ad iustitiam pertinere +aliud, scilicet firmitas et immobilitas, pertinet ad fortitudinem. +Ergo quaelibet harum virtutum est generalis ad omnes virtutes. Ergo +non distinguuntur ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he + applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36083] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod +<i>quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario +affectu</i>, et subiungit de praedictis quatuor virtutibus. +Praedictae ergo quatuor virtutes sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q61_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions + of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in + any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; + temperance, a disposition of the mind, + moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is + strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. + To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous + habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a + certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as + it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. + Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and + does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, + which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially + to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions + or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these + would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and + moral virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A4-p7"> Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each + of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q61_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 co."><a name="36084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36084] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praedictae quatuor virtutes +dupliciter a diversis accipiuntur. Quidam enim accipiunt eas, prout +significant quasdam generales conditiones humani animi, quae +inveniuntur in omnibus virtutibus, ita scilicet quod prudentia +nihil sit aliud quam quaedam rectitudo discretionis in quibuscumque +actibus vel materiis; iustitia vero sit quaedam rectitudo animi, +per quam homo operatur quod debet in quacumque materia; temperantia +vero sit quaedam dispositio animi quae modum quibuscumque +passionibus vel operationibus imponit, ne ultra debitum efferantur; +fortitudo vero sit quaedam dispositio animae per quam firmetur in +eo quod est secundum rationem, contra quoscumque impetus passionum +vel operationum labores. Haec autem quatuor sic distincta, non +important diversitatem habituum virtuosorum quantum ad iustitiam, +temperantiam et fortitudinem. Cuilibet enim virtuti morali, ex hoc +quod est habitus, convenit quaedam firmitas, ut a contrario non +moveatur, quod dictum est ad fortitudinem pertinere. Ex hoc vero +quod est virtus, habet quod ordinetur ad bonum, in quo importatur +ratio recti vel debiti, quod dicebatur ad iustitiam pertinere. In +hoc vero quod est virtus moralis rationem participans, habet quod +modum rationis in omnibus servet, et ultra se non extendat, quod +dicebatur pertinere ad temperantiam. Solum autem hoc quod est +discretionem habere, quod attribuebatur prudentiae, videtur +distingui ab aliis tribus, inquantum hoc est ipsius rationis per +essentiam; alia vero tria important quandam participationem +rationis, per modum applicationis cuiusdam ad passiones vel +operationes. Sic igitur, secundum praedicta, prudentia quidem esset +virtus distincta ab aliis tribus, sed aliae tres non essent +virtutes distinctae ab invicem; manifestum est enim quod una et +eadem virtus et est habitus, et est virtus, et est moralis. Alii +vero, et melius, accipiunt has quatuor virtutes secundum quod +determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad +unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis +conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est. Et +secundum hoc, manifestum est quod praedictae virtutes sunt diversi +habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify + one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed + by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what + is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures + of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his + daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. + Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose + mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to + remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be + unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered + by toil." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36085] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur de praedictis quatuor +virtutibus secundum primam acceptionem. Vel potest dici quod istae +quatuor virtutes denominantur ab invicem per redundantiam quandam. +Id enim quod est prudentiae, redundat in alias virtutes, inquantum +a prudentia diriguntur. Unaquaeque vero aliarum redundat in alias +ea ratione, quod qui potest quod est difficilius, potest et id quod +minus est difficile. Unde qui potest refraenare concupiscentias +delectabilium secundum tactum, ne modum excedant, quod est +difficillimum; ex hoc ipso redditur habilior ut refraenet audaciam +in periculis mortis, ne ultra modum procedat, quod est longe +facilius; et secundum hoc, fortitudo dicitur temperata. Temperantia +etiam dicitur fortis, ex redundantia fortitudinis in temperantiam, +inquantum scilicet ille qui per fortitudinem habet animum firmum +contra pericula mortis, quod est difficillimum, est habilior ut +retineat animi firmitatem contra impetus delectationum; quia, ut +dicit Tullius in I de Offic., <i>non est consentaneum ut qui metu +non frangitur, cupiditate frangatur; nec qui invictum se a labore +praestiterit, vinci a voluptate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps + the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions + of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36086] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad secundum. Sic enim temperantia in omnibus +modum servat, et fortitudo contra illecebras voluptatum animum +servat inflexum, vel inquantum istae virtutes denominant quasdam +generales conditiones virtutum; vel per redundantiam +praedictam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, + be appropriated to them, in the way above stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36087] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae quatuor generales virtutum conditiones quas +ponit philosophus, non sunt propriae praedictis virtutibus. Sed +possunt eis appropriari, secundum modum iam dictum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A5-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 5. Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, + and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." + Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." + Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36088] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter huiusmodi quatuor +virtutes dividantur in virtutes exemplares, purgati animi, +purgatorias, et politicas. Ut enim Macrobius dicit, in I super +somnium Scipionis, <i>virtutes exemplares sunt quae in ipsa divina +mente consistunt</i>. Sed philosophus, in X Ethic., dicit quod +<i>ridiculum est Deo iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et +prudentiam attribuere</i>. Ergo virtutes huiusmodi non possunt esse +exemplares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in + a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows + nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q59_A5" id="FS_Q61_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[5]</a>) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as + "perfect" virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36089] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes purgati animi dicuntur quae sunt absque passionibus, dicit +enim ibidem Macrobius quod <i>temperantiae purgati animi est +terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; +fortitudinis autem passiones ignorare, non vincere</i>. Dictum est +autem supra quod huiusmodi virtutes sine passionibus esse non +possunt. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes purgati animi esse non +possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human + affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): + "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. + power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36090] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes purgatorias dicit esse eorum <i>qui quadam humanorum fuga +solis se inserunt divinis</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse vitiosum, dicit +enim Tullius, in I de Offic., <i>quod qui despicere se dicunt ea +quae plerique mirantur imperia et magistratus, his non modo non +laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto</i>. Ergo non sunt aliquae +virtutes purgatoriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good + of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the + Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36091] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes politicas esse dicit <i>quibus boni viri reipublicae +consulunt, urbesque tuentur</i>. Sed ad bonum commune sola iustitia +legalis ordinatur; ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo aliae +virtutes non debent dici politicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four + kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes + purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues + of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. + Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not + shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of + the truth, lives for the common weal."] + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36092] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Macrobius ibidem dicit, <i>Plotinus, inter philosophiae +professores cum Platone princeps, quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum +genera virtutum. Ex his primae politicae vocantur; secundae, +purgatoriae; tertiae autem, iam purgati animi; quartae, +exemplares</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something + is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just + as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus + we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called + prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to + reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus + states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1). + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p8"> Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in + him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves + himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now. + </p><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p9"> But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in + Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these + virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are + virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. + Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts + of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul + from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted + consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine + similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows + no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by + an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of + perfection. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 co."><a name="36093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36093] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., +<i>oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit +virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene +vivimus</i>. Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo +praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic +igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, +et sic dicuntur virtutes exemplares. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina +mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae +intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc +quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est +eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae +in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit. Et quia homo secundum suam +naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine +existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, +prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus +humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus +locuti sumus. Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se +trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et +hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est +illud Matth. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis +perfectus est</i>, necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter +politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt +virtutes divinae. Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum +diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt +virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et +hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia +omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae +cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, +inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis +autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et +accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad +huius propositi viam. Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium +divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. +Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia +terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia +cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. +Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac +vita perfectissimorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying + and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36094] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus secundum +quod sunt circa res humanas, puta iustitia circa emptiones et +venditiones, fortitudo circa timores, temperantia circa +concupiscentias. Sic enim ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those + who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the + social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, + "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while + it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said + that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36095] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet +virtutes hominum in hoc mundo conversantium. Sed virtutes eorum qui +plenam beatitudinem assequuntur, sunt absque passionibus. Unde +Plotinus dicit quod passiones politicae virtutes molliunt, idest ad +medium reducunt; secundae, scilicet purgatoriae, auferunt; tertiae, +quae sunt purgati animi, obliviscuntur; in quartis, scilicet +exemplaribus, nefas est nominari. Quamvis dici possit quod loquitur +hic de passionibus secundum quod significant aliquos inordinatos +motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: + "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; + as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when + such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with + what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. + If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid + on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36096] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, +vitiosum est, alias est virtuosum. Unde parum supra Tullius +praemittit, <i>his forsitan concedendum est rempublicam non +capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae se dederunt; et his +qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua graviori causa +impediti, a republica recesserunt; cum eius administrandae +potestatem aliis laudemque concederent</i>. Quod consonat ei quod +Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>otium sanctum quaerit caritas +veritatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam +sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum +est veritati, si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter +caritatis necessitatem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service + of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as + we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards + the household, or even towards one individual. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36097] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sola iustitia legalis directe respicit bonum commune, +sed per imperium omnes alias virtutes ad bonum commune trahit, ut +in V Ethic. dicit philosophus. Est enim considerandum quod ad +politicas virtutes, secundum quod hic dicuntur, pertinet non solum +bene operari ad commune, sed etiam bene operari ad partes communis, +scilicet ad domum, vel aliquam singularem personam.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q62" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q62-p0.1">Q. 62. OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q62-p2"> We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q62-p3"><a href="#FS_Q62_A1"> (1) Whether there are any theological virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p4"><a href="#FS_Q62_A2"> (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p5"><a href="#FS_Q62_A3"> (3) How many, and which are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p6"><a href="#FS_Q62_A4"> (4) Of their order.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 pr."><a name="36098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36098] +Iª-IIae q. 62 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +virtutibus theologicis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Secundo, utrum virtutes +theologicae distinguantur ab intellectualibus et moralibus. Tertio, +quot, et quae sint. Quarto, de ordine earum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q62_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A1-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 1. Whether there are any theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition + of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which + is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36099] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. +Ut enim dicitur in VII Physic., <i>virtus est dispositio perfecti +ad optimum, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum +naturam</i>. Sed id quod est divinum, est supra naturam hominis. +Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A5" id="FS_Q62_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[5]</a>), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36100] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quasi virtutes divinae. Sed virtutes +divinae sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quae quidem non sunt in +nobis, sed in Deo. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes +hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of + all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore + there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36101] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quibus ordinamur in Deum, qui est +primum principium et ultimus finis rerum. Sed homo ex ipsa natura +rationis et voluntatis, habet ordinem ad primum principium et +ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum +theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and + charity: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.2.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 2:8, </a> seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and + charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36102] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de actibus +fidei, spei et caritatis dantur praecepta in lege divina, dicitur +enim Eccli. II, qui timetis Deum, credite illi; item, sperate in +illum; item, diligite illum. Ergo fides, spes et caritas sunt +virtutes in Deum ordinantes. Sunt ergo theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A7" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[7]</a>). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The + other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a + kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the + Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him + to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man + to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed + to his + connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called + "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they + are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained + in Holy Writ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 co."><a name="36103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36103] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in +beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex +hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem +proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire +potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam +hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire +potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod +dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae +naturae. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae +excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene +agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum +hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur +homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad +beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia +ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. +Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia +habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; +tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina +revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass + the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, + man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of + the Nature of which he is made a partaker. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36104] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei +dupliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter, et sic huiusmodi virtutes +theologicae excedunt hominis naturam. Alio modo, participative, +sicut lignum ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo +fit homo particeps divinae naturae, ut dictum est. Et sic istae +virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, + and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36105] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod istae virtutes non dicuntur divinae, sicut quibus +Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a Deo, +et in ordine ad Deum. Unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to + nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object + of supernatural happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36106] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout +est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem +naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis +supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non +ordinantur sufficienter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A2-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 2. Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological + virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now + the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, + are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and + intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36107] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes theologicae non distinguantur +a moralibus et intellectualibus. Virtutes enim theologicae, si sunt +in anima humana, oportet quod perficiant ipsam vel secundum partem +intellectivam vel secundum partem appetitivam. Sed virtutes quae +perficiunt partem intellectivam, dicuntur intellectuales, virtutes +autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam, sunt morales. Ergo +virtutes theologicae non distinguuntur a virtutibus moralibus et +intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which + directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological + virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36108] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae dicuntur quae ordinant nos ad Deum. Sed inter +intellectuales virtutes est aliqua quae ordinat nos ad Deum, +scilicet sapientia, quae est de divinis, utpote causam altissimam +considerans. Ergo virtutes theologicae ab intellectualibus +virtutibus non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, + which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36109] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., manifestat in quatuor +virtutibus cardinalibus quod sunt ordo amoris. Sed amor est +caritas, quae ponitur virtus theologica. Ergo virtutes morales non +distinguuntur a theologicis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are + above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q62_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>). Therefore they are distinct from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36110] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +id quod est supra naturam hominis, distinguitur ab eo quod est +secundum naturam hominis. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt super +naturam hominis, cui secundum naturam conveniunt virtutes +intellectuales et morales, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo +distinguuntur ab invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q62_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object + of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other + hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological + virtues are specifically + distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 co."><a name="36111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36111] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur +secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum. Obiectum autem +theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, +prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum +intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione +comprehendi potest. Unde virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur +a moralibus et intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological + virtues, supernaturally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36112] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt +intellectum et appetitum hominis secundum proportionem naturae +humanae, sed theologicae supernaturaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they + are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they + surpass human reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36113] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sapientia quae a philosopho ponitur intellectualis +virtus, considerat divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione +humana. Sed theologica virtus est circa ea secundum quod rationem +humanam excedunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, + this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly + so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; + and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; + Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other + virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q[65], + AA[2],5; + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q23_A7" id="FS_Q62_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[23], A[7]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36114] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est +caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest +intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis. Si +de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo +amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur +ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est +amor, ut supra dictum est. Si autem intelligatur de amore +caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus +essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes +aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A3-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 3. Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological + virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among + the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore + there should be but one theological virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36115] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur tres virtutes +theologicae, fides, spes et caritas. Virtutes enim theologicae se +habent in ordine ad beatitudinem divinam, sicut inclinatio naturae +ad finem connaturalem. Sed inter virtutes ordinatas ad finem +connaturalem, ponitur una sola virtus naturalis, scilicet +intellectus principiorum. Ergo debet poni una sola virtus +theologica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among + the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned + among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned + as theological virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36116] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +theologicae virtutes sunt perfectiores virtutibus intellectualibus +et moralibus. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes fides non ponitur, +sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit cognitio imperfecta. +Similiter etiam inter virtutes morales non ponitur spes, sed est +aliquid minus virtute, cum sit passio. Ergo multo minus debent poni +virtutes theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective + part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, + the other, the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36117] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae ordinant animam hominis ad Deum. Sed ad Deum +non potest anima hominis ordinari nisi per intellectivam partem, in +qua est intellectus et voluntas. Ergo non debent esse nisi duae +virtutes theologicae, una quae perficiat intellectum, alia quae +perficiat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36118] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas, tria haec</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q62_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q62_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed + to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so + far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are + reason's starting-point, both in + speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined + by reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q62_A3-p7"> But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for + them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural + to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which + are + held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to + this end, both as to that end as something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby + the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and + tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 co."><a name="36119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36119] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes theologicae hoc +modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per +naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem. +Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. Primo quidem, secundum rationem +vel intellectum, inquantum continet prima principia universalia +cognita nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit +ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis. Secundo, per rectitudinem +voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis. Sed haec duo +deficiunt ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis; secundum illud I +ad Cor. II, <i>oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor +hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se</i>. +Unde oportuit quod quantum ad utrumque, aliquid homini +supernaturaliter adderetur, ad ordinandum ipsum in finem +supernaturalem. Et primo quidem, quantum ad intellectum, adduntur +homini quaedam principia supernaturalia, quae divino lumine +capiuntur, et haec sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides. Secundo +vero, voluntas ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum +intentionis, in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile +consequi, quod pertinet ad spem, et quantum ad unionem quandam +spiritualem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem, quod +fit per caritatem. Appetitus enim uniuscuiusque rei naturaliter +movetur et tendit in finem sibi connaturalem, et iste motus +provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition + to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention + of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, + for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there + was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36120] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, +per quas intelligat, et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis +habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa natura +voluntatis sufficit ad naturalem ordinem in finem, sive quantum ad +intentionem finis, sive quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum. Sed in +ordine ad ea quae supra naturam sunt, ad nihil horum sufficit +natura potentiae. Et ideo oportet fieri superadditionem habitus +supernaturalis quantum ad utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith + and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which + are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:25</a>: "The weakness of God is stronger than men." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36121] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fides et spes imperfectionem quandam important, quia +fides est de his quae non videntur, et spes de his quae non +habentur. Unde habere fidem et spem de his quae subduntur humanae +potestati, deficit a ratione virtutis. Sed habere fidem et spem de +his quae sunt supra facultatem naturae humanae, excedit omnem +virtutem homini proportionatam; secundum illud I ad Cor. I, <i>quod +infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must + needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36122] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ad appetitum duo pertinent, scilicet motus in finem; +et conformatio ad finem per amorem. Et sic oportet quod in appetitu +humano duae virtutes theologicae ponantur, scilicet spes et +caritas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A4-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 4. Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes + that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36123] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit hic ordo theologicarum +virtutum, quod fides sit prior spe, et spes prior caritate. Radix +enim est prior eo quod est ex radice. Sed caritas est radix omnium +virtutum; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et +fundati</i>. Ergo caritas est prior aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and + loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36124] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., <i>non potest aliquis +diligere quod esse non crediderit. Porro si credit et diligit, bene +agendo efficit ut etiam speret</i>. Ergo videtur quod fides +praecedat caritatem, et caritas spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it + is a passion, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q62_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36125] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +amor est principium omnis affectionis, ut supra dictum est. Sed +spes nominat quandam affectionem; est enim quaedam passio, ut supra +dictum est. Ergo caritas, quae est amor, est prior spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle enumerates them thus ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36126] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est ordo quo apostolus ista enumerat, dicens, <i>nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q62_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes + form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: + because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, + unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith + that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. + In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able + to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason + that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards + their respective acts. + </p><p id="FS_Q62_A4-p7"> But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and + receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch + as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q23_A8" id="FS_Q62_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[23], A[8]</a>). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 co."><a name="36127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36127] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est ordo, scilicet generationis, et +perfectionis. Ordine quidem generationis, quo materia est prior +forma, et imperfectum perfecto, in uno et eodem; fides praecedit +spem, et spes caritatem, secundum actus (nam habitus simul +infunduntur). Non enim potest in aliquid motus appetitivus tendere +vel sperando vel amando, nisi quod est apprehensum sensu aut +intellectu. Per fidem autem apprehendit intellectus ea quae sperat +et amat. Unde oportet quod, ordine generationis, fides praecedat +spem et caritatem. Similiter autem ex hoc homo aliquid amat, quod +apprehendit illud ut bonum suum. Per hoc autem quod homo ab aliquo +sperat se bonum consequi posse, reputat ipsum in quo spem habet, +quoddam bonum suum. Unde ex hoc ipso quod homo sperat de aliquo, +procedit ad amandum ipsum. Et sic, ordine generationis, secundum +actus, spes praecedit caritatem. Ordine vero perfectionis, caritas +praecedit fidem et spem, eo quod tam fides quam spes per caritatem +formatur, et perfectionem virtutis acquirit. Sic enim caritas est +mater omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum +forma, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36128] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs + to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not + already possessed, but which he hopes to possess. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36129] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de spe qua quis sperat ex meritis +iam habitis se ad beatitudinem perventurum, quod est spei formatae, +quae sequitur caritatem. Potest autem aliquis sperare antequam +habeat caritatem, non ex meritis quae iam habet, sed quae sperat se +habiturum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q62_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[7]</a>), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard + to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person + from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards + hope is increased by love. + Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact + that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36130] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, +spes respicit duo. Unum quidem sicut principale obiectum, scilicet +bonum quod speratur. Et respectu huius, semper amor praecedit spem, +nunquam enim speratur aliquod bonum nisi desideratum et amatum. +Respicit etiam spes illum a quo se sperat posse consequi bonum. Et +respectu huius, primo quidem spes praecedit amorem; quamvis postea +ex ipso amore spes augeatur. Per hoc enim quod aliquis reputat per +aliquem se posse consequi aliquod bonum, incipit amare ipsum, et ex +hoc ipso quod ipsum amat, postea fortius de eo sperat.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q63" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q63-p0.1">Q. 63. OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q63-p2"> We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q63-p3"><a href="#FS_Q63_A1"> (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p4"><a href="#FS_Q63_A2"> (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p5"><a href="#FS_Q63_A3"> (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p6"><a href="#FS_Q63_A4"> (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 pr."><a name="36131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36131] +Iª-IIae q. 63 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum virtus sit +in nobis a natura. Secundo, utrum aliqua virtus causetur in nobis +ex assuetudine operum. Tertio, utrum aliquae virtutes morales sint +in nobis per infusionem. Quarto, utrum virtus quam acquirimus ex +assuetudine operum, sit eiusdem speciei cum virtute infusa.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q63_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A1-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 1. Whether virtue is in us by nature? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and + are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if + it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.23" target="asv"> Mat. 4:23, </a> "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36132] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus sit in nobis a natura. Dicit +enim Damascenus, in III libro, <i>naturales sunt virtutes, et +aequaliter insunt omnibus</i>. Et Antonius dicit, in sermone ad +monachos, <i>si naturam voluntas mutaverit, perversitas est; +conditio servetur, et virtus est</i>. Et Matth. IV, super illud, +<i>circuibat Iesus</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>docet naturales +iustitias, scilicet castitatem, iustitiam, humilitatem, quas +naturaliter habet homo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q63_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in + man by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36133] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum virtutis est secundum rationem esse, ut ex dictis patet. Sed +id quod est secundum rationem, est homini naturale, cum ratio sit +hominis natura. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.18" target="asv">Job 31:18</a>): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36134] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud dicitur esse nobis naturale, quod nobis a nativitate inest. +Sed virtutes quibusdam a nativitate insunt, dicitur enim Iob XXXI, +<i>ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est +mecum</i>. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, + as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36135] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +id quod inest homini a natura, est omnibus hominibus commune, et +non tollitur per peccatum, quia etiam in Daemonibus bona naturalia +manent, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed virtus non +inest omnibus hominibus; et abiicitur per peccatum. Ergo non inest +homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, + who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q45_A8" id="FS_Q63_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[45], A[8]</a>; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated + from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they + pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p7"> In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences + would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed + down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of + the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active + intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted + to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p8"> To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is + according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species + from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his + body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific + nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of + his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be + referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p9"> In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's + reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the + nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance + with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in + the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain + parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, + and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural + aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral + virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while + the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the + various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p10"> It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to + perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 co."><a name="36136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36136] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa formas corporales, aliqui dixerunt quod sunt +totaliter ab intrinseco, sicut ponentes latitationem formarum. +Aliqui vero, quod totaliter sint ab extrinseco, sicut ponentes +formas corporales esse ab aliqua causa separata. Aliqui vero, quod +partim sint ab intrinseco, inquantum scilicet praeexistunt in +materia in potentia; et partim ab extrinseco, inquantum scilicet +reducuntur ad actum per agens. Ita etiam circa scientias et +virtutes, aliqui quidem posuerunt eas totaliter esse ab intrinseco, +ita scilicet quod omnes virtutes et scientiae naturaliter +praeexistunt in anima; sed per disciplinam et exercitium +impedimenta scientiae et virtutis tolluntur, quae adveniunt animae +ex corporis gravitate; sicut cum ferrum clarificatur per +limationem. Et haec fuit opinio Platonicorum. Alii vero dixerunt +quod sunt totaliter ab extrinseco, idest ex influentia +intelligentiae agentis, ut ponit Avicenna. Alii vero dixerunt quod +secundum aptitudinem scientiae et virtutes sunt in nobis a natura, +non autem secundum perfectionem, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. +Et hoc verius est. Ad cuius manifestationem, oportet considerare +quod aliquid dicitur alicui homini naturale dupliciter, uno modo, +ex natura speciei; alio modo, ex natura individui. Et quia +unumquodque habet speciem secundum suam formam, individuatur vero +secundum materiam; forma vero hominis est anima rationalis, materia +vero corpus, id quod convenit homini secundum animam rationalem, +est ei naturale secundum rationem speciei; id vero quod est ei +naturale secundum determinatam corporis complexionem, est ei +naturale secundum naturam individui. Quod enim est naturale homini +ex parte corporis secundum speciem, quodammodo refertur ad animam, +inquantum scilicet tale corpus est tali animae proportionatum. +Utroque autem modo virtus est homini naturalis secundum quandam +inchoationem. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, inquantum in ratione +homini insunt naturaliter quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam +scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia +intellectualium virtutum et moralium; et inquantum in voluntate +inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni quod est secundum rationem. +Secundum vero naturam individui, inquantum ex corporis dispositione +aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel peius ad quasdam virtutes, +prout scilicet vires quaedam sensitivae actus sunt quarundam +partium corporis, ex quarum dispositione adiuvantur vel impediuntur +huiusmodi vires in suis actibus, et per consequens vires +rationales, quibus huiusmodi sensitivae vires deserviunt. Et +secundum hoc, unus homo habet naturalem aptitudinem ad scientiam, +alius ad fortitudinem, alius ad temperantiam. Et his modis tam +virtutes intellectuales quam morales, secundum quandam aptitudinis +inchoationem, sunt in nobis a natura. Non autem consummatio earum. +Quia natura determinatur ad unum, consummatio autem huiusmodi +virtutum non est secundum unum modum actionis, sed diversimode, +secundum diversas materias in quibus virtutes operantur, et +secundum diversas circumstantias. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes in +nobis sunt a natura secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, non autem +secundum perfectionem, praeter virtutes theologicas, quae sunt +totaliter ab extrinseco.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by + nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition + which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36137] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam primae duae rationes procedunt +secundum quod seminalia virtutum insunt nobis a natura, inquantum +rationales sumus. Tertia vero ratio procedit secundum quod ex +naturali dispositione corporis, quam habet ex nativitate, unus +habet aptitudinem ad miserendum, alius ad temperate vivendum, alius +ad aliam virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A2-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 2. Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi + cvi.] commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign + Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired + by means of works, but is + caused in us by God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36138] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes in nobis causari non possint +ex assuetudine operum. Quia super illud Rom. XIV, <i>omne quod non +est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, dicit Glossa Augustini, <i>omnis +infidelium vita peccatum est; et nihil est bonum sine summo bono. +Ubi deest cognitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in optimis +moribus</i>. Sed fides non potest acquiri ex operibus, sed causatur +in nobis a Deo; secundum illud Ephes. II, <i>gratia estis salvati +per fidem</i>. Ergo nulla virtus potest in nobis acquiri ex +assuetudine operum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.21" target="asv"> Wis. 8:21</a>: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us + by habituation, but only by the gift of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36139] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum, cum contrarietur virtuti, non compatitur secum virtutem. +Sed homo non potest vitare peccatum nisi per gratiam Dei; secundum +illud Sap. VIII, <i>didici quod non possum esse aliter continens, +nisi Deus det</i>. Ergo nec virtutes aliquae possunt in nobis +causari ex assuetudine operum; sed solum dono Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. + Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36140] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +actus qui sunt in virtutem, deficiunt a perfectione virtutis. Sed +effectus non potest esse perfectior causa. Ergo virtus non potest +causari ex actibus praecedentibus virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, + therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36141] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum est +virtuosius quam malum. Sed ex malis actibus causantur habitus +vitiorum. Ergo multo magis ex bonis actibus possunt causari habitus +virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We have spoken above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[51], AA[2]</a>,3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation + to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as + Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight, and + measure," as expressed in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv"> Wis. 11:21, </a> man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever + is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 co."><a name="36142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36142] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de generatione habituum ex actibus, supra in generali +dictum est. Nunc autem specialiter quantum ad virtutem, +considerandum est quod sicut supra dictum est, virtus hominis +perficit ipsum ad bonum. Cum autem ratio boni consistat in modo, +specie et ordine, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni; sive +in numero, pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap. XI, oportet quod +bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulam consideretur. Quae quidem +est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana, et lex +divina. Et quia lex divina est superior regula, ideo ad plura se +extendit, ita quod quidquid regulatur ratione humana, regulatur +etiam lege divina, sed non convertitur. Virtus igitur hominis +ordinata ad bonum quod modificatur secundum regulam rationis +humanae, potest ex actibus humanis causari, inquantum huiusmodi +actus procedunt a ratione, sub cuius potestate et regula tale bonum +consistit. Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum secundum quod +modificatur per legem divinam, et non per rationem humanam, non +potest causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio, sed +causatur solum in nobis per operationem divinam. Et ideo, huiusmodi +virtutem definiens, Augustinus posuit in definitione virtutis, quam +Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7"> It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by + human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other + hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, + the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in + giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works in us without us" (Super + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36143] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et de +huiusmodi etiam virtutibus prima ratio procedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual + sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as + stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary + to a habit. Wherefore, though + man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, + whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain + mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, + which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later ( + <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q109_A4" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[109], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36144] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus divinitus infusa, maxime si in sua perfectione +consideretur, non compatitur secum aliquod peccatum mortale. Sed +virtus humanitus acquisita potest secum compati aliquem actum +peccati, etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae +voluntati subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per unum actum +peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis acquisitae; habitui enim non +contrariatur directe actus, sed habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia +homo non possit peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet +mortaliter; non tamen impeditur quin possit habitum virtutis +acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et +praecipue ab his quae sunt valde rationi contraria. Sunt etiam +quaedam peccata mortalia quae homo sine gratia nullo modo potest +vitare, quae scilicet directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis, +quae ex dono gratiae sunt in nobis. Hoc tamen infra manifestius +fiet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q63_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent + than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science + of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results + through the appetite partaking + of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, + can cause acquired human virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36145] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, virtutum acquisitarum praeexistunt +in nobis quaedam semina sive principia, secundum naturam. Quae +quidem principia sunt nobiliora virtutibus eorum virtute +acquisitis, sicut intellectus principiorum speculabilium est +nobilior scientia conclusionum; et naturalis rectitudo rationis est +nobilior rectificatione appetitus quae fit per participationem +rationis, quae quidem rectificatio pertinet ad virtutem moralem. +Sic igitur actus humani, inquantum procedunt ex altioribus +principiis, possunt causare virtutes acquisitas humanas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A3-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 3. Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, + save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), + "it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our + acts, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q63_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is not reasonable that + they should be caused in us by infusion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36146] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter virtutes theologicas, non sint +aliae virtutes nobis infusae a Deo. Ea enim quae possunt fieri a +causis secundis, non fiunt immediate a Deo, nisi forte aliquando +miraculose, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, lex divinitatis est ultima +per media adducere. Sed virtutes intellectuales et morales possunt +in nobis causari per nostros actus, ut dictum est. Non ergo +convenienter causantur in nobis per infusionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to + direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36147] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in operibus Dei multo minus est aliquid superfluum quam in operibus +naturae. Sed ad ordinandum nos in bonum supernaturale, sufficiunt +virtutes theologicae. Ergo non sunt aliae virtutes supernaturales, +quas oporteat in nobis causari a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our + souls, according to a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1" target="asv">Heb. 1</a> [*Cf. Jerome on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.15" target="asv"> Gal. 1: 15,16</a>]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36148] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +natura non facit per duo, quod potest facere per unum, et multo +minus Deus. Sed Deus inseruit animae nostrae semina virtutum, ut +dicit Glossa Heb. I. Ergo non oportet quod alias virtutes in nobis +per infusionem causet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36149] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, <i>sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, +prudentiam et virtutem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired + by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated + <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q63_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to + a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive from God other + habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the + moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 co."><a name="36150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36150] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis +proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam +morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex +quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus, ut +supra dictum est. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur +nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem +supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod his etiam +virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus +divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes +theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad +principia naturalia virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological + virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36151] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliquae quidem virtutes morales et +intellectuales possunt causari in nobis ex nostris actibus, tamen +illae non sunt proportionatae virtutibus theologicis. Et ideo +oportet alias, eis proportionatas, immediate a Deo causari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But + the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36152] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sufficienter nos ordinant in +finem supernaturalem, secundum quandam inchoationem, quantum +scilicet ad ipsum Deum immediate. Sed oportet quod per alias +virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen +ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in + addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36153] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum, +non se extendit ultra proportionem naturae. Et ideo in ordine ad +finem supernaturalem, indiget homo perfici per alia principia +superaddita.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A4-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 4. Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, + according to what has been said + <a href="#FS_Q63_A3" id="FS_Q63_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but + by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36154] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes infusae non sint alterius +speciei a virtutibus acquisitis. Virtus enim acquisita et virtus +infusa, secundum praedicta, non videntur differre nisi secundum +ordinem ad ultimum finem. Sed habitus et actus humani non recipiunt +speciem ab ultimo fine, sed a proximo. Non ergo virtutes morales +vel intellectuales infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires + of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36155] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus per actus cognoscuntur. Sed idem est actus temperantiae +infusae, et acquisitae, scilicet moderari concupiscentias tactus. +Ergo non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a + creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the + man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to + the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36156] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus acquisita et infusa differunt secundum illud quod est +immediate a Deo factum, et a creatura. Sed idem est specie homo +quem Deus formavit, et quem generat natura; et oculus quem caeco +nato dedit, et quem virtus formativa causat. Ergo videtur quod est +eadem specie virtus acquisita, et infusa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition + of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q63_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36157] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quaelibet differentia in definitione posita, mutata diversificat +speciem. Sed in definitione virtutis infusae ponitur, quam Deus in +nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus +acquisita, cui hoc non convenit, non est eiusdem speciei cum +infusa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q63_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q56_A2" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[56], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as + in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence + of touch. The + formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something + on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according + to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, + in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, + nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into + subjection" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.27" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:27</a>), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; + and the same applies to the other virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q63_A4-p7"> The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a + horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are + directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are + well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men + behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.19" target="asv">Eph. 2:19</a>), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 co."><a name="36158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36158] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo, +sicut praedictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes +obiectorum. Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum +consideratum in materia propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est +bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti +formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his +concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte +concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem quod alterius rationis est +modus qui imponitur in huiusmodi concupiscentiis secundum regulam +rationis humanae, et secundum regulam divinam. Puta in sumptione +ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini +corporis, nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem regulam legis +divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, et in +servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum +huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita +differunt specie, et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus. Alio modo +habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur, non +enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas +naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit philosophus, in III +Polit., quod diversae sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se +habent ad diversas politias. Et per hunc etiam modum differunt +specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in +ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae +virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad +res humanas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, + as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36159] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt +secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem; sed etiam secundum ordinem ad +propria obiecta, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore + their respective acts are not identical. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36160] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod alia ratione modificat concupiscentias delectabilium +tactus temperantia acquisita, et temperantia infusa, ut dictum est. +Unde non habent eundem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it + was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired + by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36161] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod oculum caeci nati Deus fecit ad eundem actum ad quem +formantur alii oculi secundum naturam, et ideo fuit eiusdem +speciei. Et eadem ratio esset, si Deus vellet miraculose causare in +homine virtutes quales acquiruntur ex actibus. Sed ita non est in +proposito, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q64" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q64-p0.1">Q. 64. OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q64-p2"> We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality + of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q64-p3"><a href="#FS_Q64_A1"> (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p4"><a href="#FS_Q64_A2"> (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p5"><a href="#FS_Q64_A3"> (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p6"><a href="#FS_Q64_A4"> (4) Whether the theological virtues do?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 pr."><a name="36162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36162] +Iª-IIae q. 64 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +proprietatibus virtutum. Et primo quidem, de medio virtutum; +secundo, de connexione virtutum; tertio, de aequalitate earum; +quarto, de ipsarum duratione. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum virtutes morales sint in medio. Secundo, utrum medium +virtutis moralis sit medium rei, vel rationis. Tertio, utrum +intellectuales virtutes consistant in medio. Quarto, utrum virtutes +theologicae.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q64_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A1-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 1. Whether moral virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. + Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore + moral virtue does not observe the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36163] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis non consistat in medio. +Ultimum enim repugnat rationi medii. Sed de ratione virtutis est +ultimum, dicitur enim in I de caelo, quod virtus est ultimum +potentiae. Ergo virtus moralis non consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, + and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36164] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod est maximum, non est medium. Sed quaedam virtutes +morales tendunt in aliquod maximum, sicut magnanimitas est circa +maximos honores, et magnificentia circa maximos sumptus, ut dicitur +in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis virtus moralis est in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the + contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; + thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give + all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is + not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36165] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si de ratione virtutis moralis sit in medio esse, oportet quod +virtus moralis non perficiatur, sed magis corrumpatur, per hoc quod +tendit ad extremum. Sed quaedam virtutes morales perficiuntur per +hoc quod tendunt ad extremum, sicut virginitas, quae abstinet ab +omni delectabili venereo, et sic tenet extremum, et est +perfectissima castitas. Et dare omnia pauperibus est perfectissima +misericordia vel liberalitas. Ergo videtur quod non sit de ratione +virtutis moralis esse in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36166] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis +est habitus electivus in medietate existens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already explained ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q64_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive + part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible + objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the + good things made by art is + that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. + Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things + ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it + is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral + virtue observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 co."><a name="36167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36167] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtus de sui ratione +ordinat hominem ad bonum. Moralis autem virtus proprie est +perfectiva appetitivae partis animae circa aliquam determinatam +materiam. Mensura autem et regula appetitivi motus circa +appetibilia, est ipsa ratio. Bonum autem cuiuslibet mensurati et +regulati consistit in hoc quod conformetur suae regulae, sicut +bonum in artificiatis est ut consequantur regulam artis. Malum +autem per consequens in huiusmodi est per hoc quod aliquid +discordat a sua regula vel mensura. Quod quidem contingit vel per +hoc quod superexcedit mensuram, vel per hoc quod deficit ab ea, +sicut manifeste apparet in omnibus regulatis et mensuratis. Et ideo +patet quod bonum virtutis moralis consistit in adaequatione ad +mensuram rationis. Manifestum est autem quod inter excessum et +defectum medium est aequalitas sive conformitas. Unde manifeste +apparet quod virtus moralis in medio consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore + we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, + viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral + virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes + the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a + mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best' + and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36168] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtus moralis bonitatem habet ex regula +rationis, pro materia autem habet passiones vel operationes. Si +ergo comparetur virtus moralis ad rationem, sic, secundum id quod +rationis est, habet rationem extremi unius, quod est conformitas, +excessus vero et defectus habet rationem alterius extremi, quod est +difformitas. Si vero consideretur virtus moralis secundum suam +materiam, sic habet rationem medii, inquantum passionem reducit ad +regulam rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus +secundum substantiam medietas est, inquantum regula virtutis +ponitur circa propriam materiam, secundum optimum autem et bene, +est extremitas, scilicet secundum conformitatem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being + extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through + being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity + of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and + a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since + these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and + for an "end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or "where" it is not + right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when" one + aught. + This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, + but the mean in the right mode of his action." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36169] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod medium et extrema considerantur in actionibus et +passionibus secundum diversas circumstantias, unde nihil prohibet +in aliqua virtute esse extremum secundum unam circumstantiam, quod +tamen est medium secundum alias circumstantias, per conformitatem +ad rationem. Et sic est in magnificentia et magnanimitate. Nam si +consideretur quantitas absoluta eius in quod tendit magnificus et +magnanimus, dicetur extremum et maximum, sed si consideretur hoc +ipsum per comparationem ad alias circumstantias, sic habet rationem +medii; quia in hoc tendunt huiusmodi virtutes secundum regulam +rationis, idest ubi oportet, et quando oportet, et propter quod +oportet. Excessus autem, si in hoc maximum tendatur quando non +oportet, vel ubi non oportet, vel propter quod non oportet; +defectus autem est, si non tendatur in hoc maximum ubi oportet, et +quando oportet. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., +quod <i>magnanimus est quidem magnitudine extremus; eo autem quod +ut oportet, medius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty + from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But + if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if + it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a + vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36170] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod eadem ratio est de virginitate et paupertate, quae +est de magnanimitate. Abstinet enim virginitas ab omnibus venereis, +et paupertas ab omnibus divitiis, propter quod oportet, et secundum +quod oportet; idest secundum mandatum Dei, et propter vitam +aeternam. Si autem hoc fiat secundum quod non oportet, idest +secundum aliquam superstitionem illicitam, vel etiam propter inanem +gloriam; erit superfluum. Si autem non fiat quando oportet, vel +secundum quod oportet, est vitium per defectum, ut patet in +transgredientibus votum virginitatis vel paupertatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A2-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 2. Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists + in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral + virtue is a real mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36171] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod medium virtutis moralis non sit medium +rationis, sed medium rei. Bonum enim virtutis moralis consistit in +hoc quod est in medio. Bonum autem, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys., est +in rebus ipsis. Ergo medium virtutis moralis est medium rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather + a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36172] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio est vis apprehensiva. Sed virtus moralis non consistit in +medio apprehensionum; sed magis in medio operationum et passionum. +Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis, sed medium +rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean + of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36173] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +medium quod accipitur secundum proportionem arithmeticam vel +geometricam, est medium rei. Sed tale est medium iustitiae, ut +dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium +rationis, sed rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36174] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis in +medio consistit quoad nos, determinata ratione</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as + though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, + but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be + considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every + mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated + <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q64_A2-p7"> But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real + mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in + relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, + which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q60_A2" id="FS_Q64_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[2]</a>): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his + due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established + in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established + in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the + passions. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 co."><a name="36175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36175] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod medium rationis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno +modo, secundum quod medium in ipso actu rationis existit, quasi +ipse actus rationis ad medium reducatur. Et sic, quia virtus +moralis non perficit actum rationis, sed actum virtutis +appetitivae; medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis. Alio +modo potest dici medium rationis id quod a ratione ponitur in +aliqua materia. Et sic omne medium virtutis moralis est medium +rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, virtus moralis dicitur consistere +in medio, per conformitatem ad rationem rectam. Sed quandoque +contingit quod medium rationis est etiam medium rei, et tunc +oportet quod virtutis moralis medium sit medium rei; sicut est in +iustitia. Quandoque autem medium rationis non est medium rei, sed +accipitur per comparationem ad nos, et sic est medium in omnibus +aliis virtutibus moralibus. Cuius ratio est quia iustitia est circa +operationes, quae consistunt in rebus exterioribus, in quibus +rectum institui debet simpliciter et secundum se, ut supra dictum +est, et ideo medium rationis in iustitia est idem cum medio rei, +inquantum scilicet iustitia dat unicuique quod debet, et non plus +nec minus. Aliae vero virtutes morales consistunt circa passiones +interiores, in quibus non potest rectum constitui eodem modo, +propter hoc quod homines diversimode se habent ad passiones, et +ideo oportet quod rectitudo rationis in passionibus instituatur per +respectum ad nos, qui afficimur secundum passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very + act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36176] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam, primae duae rationes procedunt de +medio rationis quod scilicet invenitur in ipso actu rationis. +Tertia vero ratio procedit de medio iustitiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A3-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 3. Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming + to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore + the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36177] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non consistant +in medio. Virtutes enim morales consistunt in medio, inquantum +conformantur regulae rationis. Sed virtutes intellectuales sunt in +ipsa ratione; et sic non videntur habere superiorem regulam. Ergo +virtutes intellectuales non consistunt in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue observes + the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, + this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36178] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +medium virtutis moralis determinatur a virtute intellectuali, +dicitur enim in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus consistit in medietate +determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit</i>. Si igitur +virtus intellectualis iterum consistat in medio, oportet quod +determinetur sibi medium per aliquam aliam virtutem. Et sic +procedetur in infinitum in virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there + seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition + to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual + virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36179] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +medium proprie est inter contraria; ut patet per philosophum, in X +Metaphys. Sed in intellectu non videtur esse aliqua contrarietas, +cum etiam ipsa contraria, secundum quod sunt in intellectu, non +sint contraria, sed simul intelligantur, ut album et nigrum, sanum +et aegrum. Ergo in intellectualibus virtutibus non est medium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes + the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36180] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ars est virtus intellectualis, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.; et +tamen artis est aliquod medium, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo etiam +virtus intellectualis consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may + happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an + intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual + virtue is + the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, + it is the true in conformity with a right appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p7"> Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure + of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing + is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with + things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are + not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something + were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas + in reality it is. + </p><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p8"> The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; + so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we + consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason + is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as + ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 co."><a name="36181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36181] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod bonum alicuius rei consistit in medio, secundum quod +conformatur regulae vel mensurae quam contingit transcendere et ab +ea deficere, sicut dictum est. Virtus autem intellectualis +ordinatur ad bonum, sicut et moralis, ut supra dictum est. Unde +secundum quod bonum virtutis intellectualis se habet ad mensuram, +sic se habet ad rationem medii. Bonum autem virtutis intellectualis +est verum, speculativae quidem virtutis, verum absolute, ut in VI +Ethic. dicitur; practicae autem virtutis, verum secundum +conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Verum autem intellectus nostri +absolute consideratum, est sicut mensuratum a re, res enim est +mensura intellectus nostri, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.; ex eo enim +quod res est vel non est, veritas est in opinione et in oratione. +Sic igitur bonum virtutis intellectualis speculativae consistit in +quodam medio, per conformitatem ad ipsam rem, secundum quod dicit +esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; in quo ratio veri +consistit. Excessus autem est secundum affirmationem falsam, per +quam dicitur esse quod non est, defectus autem accipitur secundum +negationem falsam, per quam dicitur non esse quod est. Verum autem +virtutis intellectualis practicae, comparatum quidem ad rem, habet +rationem mensurati. Et sic eodem modo accipitur medium per +conformitatem ad rem, in virtutibus intellectualibus practicis, +sicut in speculativis. Sed respectu appetitus, habet rationem +regulae et mensurae. Unde idem medium, quod est virtutis moralis, +etiam est ipsius prudentiae, scilicet rectitudo rationis, sed +prudentiae quidem est istud medium ut regulantis et mensurantis; +virtutis autem moralis, ut mensuratae et regulatae. Similiter +excessus et defectus accipitur diversimode utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36182] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod etiam virtus intellectualis habet suam mensuram, +ut dictum est, et per conformitatem ad ipsam, accipitur in ipsa +medium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another + kind of virtue, but things themselves. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36183] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non est necesse in infinitum procedere in virtutibus, +quia mensura et regula intellectualis virtutis non est aliquod +aliud genus virtutis, sed ipsa res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other: + nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end + of Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, + so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we + have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something + positive in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary + to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36184] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ipsae res contrariae non habent contrarietatem in +anima, quia unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et tamen in +intellectu est contrarietas affirmationis et negationis, quae sunt +contraria, ut dicitur in fine peri hermeneias. Quamvis enim esse et +non esse non sint contraria, sed contradictorie opposita, si +considerentur ipsa significata prout sunt in rebus, quia alterum +est ens, et alterum est pure non ens, tamen si referantur ad actum +animae, utrumque ponit aliquid. Unde esse et non esse sunt +contradictoria, sed opinio qua opinamur quod bonum est bonum, est +contraria opinioni qua opinamur quod bonum non est bonum. Et inter +huiusmodi contraria medium est virtus intellectualis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A4-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 4. Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. + Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36185] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus theologica consistat in medio. +Bonum enim aliarum virtutum consistit in medio. Sed virtus +theologica excedit in bonitate alias virtutes. Ergo virtus +theologica multo magis est in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists + in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q64_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36186] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +medium virtutis accipitur, moralis quidem secundum quod appetitus +regulatur per rationem; intellectualis vero secundum quod +intellectus noster mensuratur a re. Sed virtus theologica et +perficit intellectum, et appetitum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam +virtus theologica consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course + between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, + we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the + heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue + observes the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36187] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +spes quae est virtus theologica, medium est inter desperationem et +praesumptionem. Similiter etiam fides incedit media inter +contrarias haereses, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, +quod enim confitemur in Christo unam personam et duas naturas, +medium est inter haeresim Nestorii, qui dicit duas personas et duas +naturas; et haeresim Eutychis, qui dicit unam personam et unam +naturam. Ergo virtus theologica consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess + against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.33" target="asv">Ecclus. 43:33</a>): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not observe + the mean. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36188] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +in omnibus in quibus consistit virtus in medio, contingit peccare +per excessum, sicut et per defectum. Sed circa Deum, qui est +obiectum virtutis theologicae, non contingit peccare per excessum, +dicitur enim Eccli. XLIII, <i>benedicentes Deum, exaltate illum +quantum potestis, maior enim est omni laude</i>. Ergo virtus +theologica non consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that + rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure + and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to + His goodness; hope, according to the + immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as + much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in + such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit. + </p><p id="FS_Q64_A4-p7"> The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as + much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. + Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 co."><a name="36189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36189] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, medium virtutis accipitur per +conformitatem ad suam regulam vel mensuram, secundum quod contingit +ipsam transcendere vel ab ea deficere. Virtutis autem theologicae +duplex potest accipi mensura. Una quidem secundum ipsam rationem +virtutis. Et sic mensura et regula virtutis theologicae est ipse +Deus, fides enim nostra regulatur secundum veritatem divinam, +caritas autem secundum bonitatem eius, spes autem secundum +magnitudinem omnipotentiae et pietatis eius. Et ista est mensura +excellens omnem humanam facultatem, unde nunquam potest homo tantum +diligere Deum quantum diligi debet, nec tantum credere aut sperare +in ipsum, quantum debet. Unde multo minus potest ibi esse excessus. +Et sic bonum talis virtutis non consistit in medio, sed tanto est +melius, quanto magis acceditur ad summum. Alia vero regula vel +mensura virtutis theologicae est ex parte nostra, quia etsi non +possumus ferri in Deum quantum debemus, debemus tamen ferri in +ipsum credendo, sperando et amando, secundum mensuram nostrae +conditionis. Unde per accidens potest in virtute theologica +considerari medium et extrema, ex parte nostra.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: + whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36190] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod bonum virtutum intellectualium et moralium +consistit in medio per conformitatem ad regulam vel mensuram quam +transcendere contingit. Quod non est in virtutibus theologicis, per +se loquendo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the + theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36191] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtutes morales et intellectuales perficiunt +intellectum et appetitum nostrum in ordine ad mensuram et regulam +creatam, virtutes autem theologicae in ordine ad mensuram et +regulam increatam. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, + through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which + according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is + infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary + heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion + itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36192] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod spes est media inter praesumptionem et desperationem, +ex parte nostra, inquantum scilicet aliquis praesumere dicitur ex +eo quod sperat a Deo bonum quod excedit suam conditionem; vel non +sperat quod secundum suam conditionem sperare posset. Non autem +potest esse superabundantia spei ex parte Dei, cuius bonitas est +infinita. Similiter etiam fides est media inter contrarias +haereses, non per comparationem ad obiectum, quod est Deus, cui non +potest aliquis nimis credere, sed inquantum ipsa opinio humana est +media inter contrarias opiniones, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q65" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q65-p0.1">Q. 65. OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q65-p2"> We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q65-p3"><a href="#FS_Q65_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p4"><a href="#FS_Q65_A2"> (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p5"><a href="#FS_Q65_A3"> (3) Whether charity can be without them?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p6"><a href="#FS_Q65_A4"> (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p7"><a href="#FS_Q65_A5"> (5) Whether charity can be without them?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 pr."><a name="36193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36193] +Iª-IIae q. 65 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +connexione virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum +virtutes morales sint ad invicem connexae. Secundo, utrum virtutes +morales possint esse sine caritate. Tertio, utrum caritas possit +esse sine eis. Quarto, utrum fides et spes possint esse sine +caritate. Quinto, utrum caritas possit esse sine eis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q65_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A1-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the + exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising + himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36194] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non sint ex +necessitate connexae. Virtutes enim morales quandoque causantur ex +exercitio actuum, ut probatur in II Ethic. Sed homo potest +exercitari in actibus alicuius virtutis sine hoc quod exercitetur +in actibus alterius virtutis. Ergo una virtus moralis potest haberi +sine altera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence + or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other + virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous." + Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36195] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +magnificentia et magnanimitas sunt quaedam virtutes morales. Sed +aliquis potest habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habeat +magnificentiam et magnanimitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in IV +Ethic., quod inops non potest esse magnificus, qui tamen potest +habere quasdam alias virtutes; et quod <i>ille qui parvis est +dignus, et his se dignificat, temperatus est, magnanimus autem non +est</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt connexae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective + part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, + therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36196] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut virtutes morales perficiunt partem appetitivam animae, ita +virtutes intellectuales perficiunt partem intellectivam. Sed +virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae, potest enim aliquis +habere unam scientiam, sine hoc quod habeat aliam. Ergo etiam neque +virtutes morales sunt connexae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But + this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in + relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making + certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about + things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36197] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +si virtutes morales sint connexae, hoc non est nisi quia +connectuntur in prudentia. Sed hoc non sufficit ad connexionem +virtutum moralium. Videtur enim quod aliquis possit esse prudens +circa agibilia quae pertinent ad unam virtutem, sine hoc quod sit +prudens in his quae pertinent ad aliam, sicut etiam aliquis potest +habere artem circa quaedam factibilia, sine hoc quod habeat artem +circa alia. Prudentia autem est recta ratio agibilium. Ergo non est +necessarium virtutes morales esse connexas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20</a>: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De + Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral. + xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. + Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having + one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36198] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, <i>connexae sibi sunt, +concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet, plures habere +videatur</i>. Augustinus etiam dicit, in VI de Trin., quod +<i>virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, nullo modo separantur ab +invicem</i>. Et Gregorius dicit, XXII Moral., quod <i>una virtus +sine aliis aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta</i>. Et Tullius +dicit, in II de Tuscul. quaest., <i>si unam virtutem confessus es +te non habere, nullam necesse est te habiturum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or + fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or + by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament + or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in + doing deeds of chastity. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p8"> But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, + we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding + to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by + saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, + in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength + of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is + the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue, + "if + isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to + speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. + <a href="#FS_Q61_A4" id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[61], A[4]</a>, OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4). + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p9"> Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the + reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q65_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective + habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, + but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands + in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since + prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to + which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the + understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly + that the moral virtues are connected with one another. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 co."><a name="36199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36199] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus moralis potest accipi vel perfecta vel +imperfecta. Imperfecta quidem moralis virtus, ut temperantia vel +fortitudo, nihil aliud est quam aliqua inclinatio in nobis existens +ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum, sive talis inclinatio +sit in nobis a natura, sive ex assuetudine. Et hoc modo accipiendo +virtutes morales, non sunt connexae, videmus enim aliquem ex +naturali complexione, vel ex aliqua consuetudine, esse promptum ad +opera liberalitatis, qui tamen non est promptus ad opera +castitatis. Perfecta autem virtus moralis est habitus inclinans in +bonum opus bene agendum. Et sic accipiendo virtutes morales, +dicendum est eas connexas esse; ut fere ab omnibus ponitur. Cuius +ratio duplex assignatur, secundum quod diversimode aliqui virtutes +cardinales distinguunt. Ut enim dictum est, quidam distinguunt eas +secundum quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, utpote quod +discretio pertineat ad prudentiam, rectitudo ad iustitiam, +moderantia ad temperantiam, firmitas animi ad fortitudinem, in +quacumque materia ista considerentur. Et secundum hoc, manifeste +apparet ratio connexionis, non enim firmitas habet laudem virtutis, +si sit sine moderatione, vel rectitudine, aut discretione; et eadem +ratio est de aliis. Et hanc rationem connexionis assignat +Gregorius, XXII Moral., dicens quod <i>virtutes, si sint +disiunctae, non possunt esse perfectae</i>, secundum rationem +virtutis, <i>quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et +fortis non est</i>; et idem subdit de aliis virtutibus. Et similem +rationem assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin. Alii vero distinguunt +praedictas virtutes secundum materias. Et secundum hoc assignatur +ratio connexionis ab Aristotele, in VI Ethic. Quia sicut supra +dictum est, nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi, eo +quod proprium virtutis moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum +sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem electionem non solum +sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem, quod est directe per habitum +virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae +sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et +iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem. Similiter etiam +prudentia non potest haberi nisi habeantur virtutes morales, cum +prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, quae, sicut ex principiis, +procedit ex finibus agibilium, ad quos aliquis recte se habet per +virtutes morales. Unde sicut scientia speculativa non potest haberi +sine intellectu principiorum, ita nec prudentia sine virtutibus +moralibus. Ex quo manifeste sequitur virtutes morales esse +connexas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be + done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. + And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if + he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to + another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a + certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which + is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, + if prudence be lacking. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p11"> But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; + and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have + the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, + when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because + when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of + money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, + acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having + a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which + is + scarcely lacking is not lacking at all." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36200] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem +secundum communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in +omni vita hominum occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul +exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem +circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquiret habitus omnium +virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando circa unam +materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, +non autem circa concupiscentias; acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad +refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter +defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur. Sicut +etiam naturales inclinationes non habent perfectam rationem +virtutis, si prudentia desit. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt +quae perficiunt hominem secundum aliquem eminentem statum, sicut +magnificentia, et magnanimitas. Et quia exercitium circa materias +harum virtutum non occurrit unicuique communiter, potest aliquis +habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habitus harum virtutum +habeat actu, loquendo de virtutibus acquisitis. Sed tamen, +acquisitis aliis virtutibus, habet istas virtutes in potentia +propinqua. Cum enim aliquis per exercitium adeptus est +liberalitatem circa mediocres donationes et sumptus, si superveniat +ei abundantia pecuniarum, modico exercitio acquiret magnificentiae +habitum, sicut geometer modico studio acquirit scientiam alicuius +conclusionis quam nunquam consideravit. Illud autem habere dicimur, +quod in promptu est ut habeamus; secundum illud philosophi, in II +Physic., <i>quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36201] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various + sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about + passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial + passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure + and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. + Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p14"> Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend + on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal + principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are + the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the + appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q58_A5" id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.2" shape="rect"> Q[58], A[5]</a>, ad 1). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36202] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales sunt circa diversas materias +ad invicem non ordinatas, sicut patet in diversis scientiis et +artibus. Et ideo non invenitur in eis connexio quae invenitur in +virtutibus moralibus existentibus circa passiones et operationes, +quae manifeste habent ordinem ad invicem. Nam omnes passiones, a +quibusdam primis procedentes, scilicet amore et odio, ad quasdam +alias terminantur, scilicet delectationem et tristitiam. Et +similiter omnes operationes quae sunt virtutis moralis materia, +habent ordinem ad invicem, et etiam ad passiones. Et ideo tota +materia moralium virtutum sub una ratione prudentiae cadit. Habent +tamen omnia intelligibilia ordinem ad prima principia. Et secundum +hoc, omnes virtutes intellectuales dependent ab intellectu +principiorum; sicut prudentia a virtutibus moralibus, ut dictum +est. Principia autem universalia, quorum est intellectus +principiorum, non dependent a conclusionibus, de quibus sunt +reliquae intellectuales virtutes; sicut morales dependent a +prudentia, eo quod appetitus movet quodammodo rationem, et ratio +appetitum, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the + principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in + another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong + about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the + science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related + to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things + to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36203] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ea ad quae inclinant virtutes morales, se habent ad +prudentiam sicut principia, non autem factibilia se habent ad artem +sicut principia, sed solum sicut materia. Manifestum est autem +quod, etsi ratio possit esse recta in una parte materiae, et non in +alia; nullo tamen modo potest dici ratio recta, si sit defectus +cuiuscumque principii. Sicut si quis erraret circa hoc principium, +omne totum est maius sua parte, non posset habere scientiam +geometricam, quia oporteret multum recedere a veritate in +sequentibus. Et praeterea, agibilia sunt ordinata ad invicem; non +autem factibilia, ut dictum est. Et ideo defectus prudentiae circa +unam partem agibilium, induceret defectum etiam circa alia +agibilia. Quod in factibilibus non contingit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A2-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 2. Whether moral virtues can be without charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every + virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same + book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36204] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales possint esse sine +caritate. Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, quod +<i>omnis virtus praeter caritatem, potest esse communis bonis et +malis</i>. Sed caritas non potest esse nisi in bonis, ut dicitur +ibidem. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt haberi sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had + otherwise than by infusion, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have + the other virtues without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36205] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes morales possunt acquiri ex actibus humanis, ut dicitur in +II Ethic. Sed caritas non habetur nisi ex infusione; secundum illud +Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum +sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt +haberi sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; + indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and + can be without it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36206] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes morales connectuntur ad invicem, inquantum dependent a +prudentia. Sed caritas non dependet a prudentia; immo prudentiam +excedit, secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>supereminentem scientiae +caritatem Christi</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non connectuntur +caritati, sed sine ea esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.14" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:14</a>): "He that loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is "by them" that + "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36207] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>qui non diligit, manet in +morte</i>. Sed per virtutes perficitur vita spiritualis, ipsae enim +sunt quibus recte vivitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Lib. +Arbit. Ergo non possunt esse sine dilectione caritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce + good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can + be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a + supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot + be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q65_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[58], AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, + because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now + for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed + towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is + the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, + that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be + without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A2-p7"> It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues + simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues + in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, + but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on + the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 co."><a name="36208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36208] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales prout sunt +operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem +naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic +acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis +gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad +ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem +virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a +Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt. +Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse +sine prudentia; prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus +moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad +quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae. Ad rectam autem +rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat +circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios +fines, quod fit per virtutes morales, sicut ratio recta in +speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod +est contradictoria non simul esse vera. Unde manifestum fit quod +nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine caritate; nec aliae virtutes +morales consequenter, quae sine prudentia esse non possunt. Patet +igitur ex dictis quod solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et +simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem +ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt +secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter, ordinant enim +hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem +respectu finis ultimi simpliciter. Unde Rom. XIV super illud, +<i>omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, dicit Glossa +Augustini, <i>ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam +in bonis moribus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor + good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36209] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes ibi accipiuntur secundum imperfectam +rationem virtutis. Alioquin, si virtus moralis secundum perfectam +rationem virtutis accipiatur, bonum facit habentem; et per +consequens in malis esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36210] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtutibus moralibus +acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the + infused moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36211] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi caritas excedat scientiam et prudentiam, tamen +prudentia dependet a caritate, ut dictum est. Et per consequens, +omnes virtutes morales infusae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A3-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 3. Whether charity can be without moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is + superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4, </a> seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36212] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas sine aliis virtutibus +moralibus haberi possit. Ad id enim ad quod sufficit unum, +indebitum est quod plura ordinentur. Sed sola caritas sufficit ad +omnia opera virtutis implenda, ut patet per id quod dicitur I ad +Cor. XIII, <i>caritas patiens est, benigna est,</i> et cetera. Ergo +videtur quod, habita caritate, aliae virtutes superfluerent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for + their own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from + mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, + but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36213] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt +virtutis, et ei secundum se placent, unde et signum habitus est +delectatio quae fit in opere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed multi +habent caritatem, absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen +difficultatem in operibus virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se +placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad caritatem. Ergo +multi habent caritatem, qui non habent alias virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says + (on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.10" target="asv"> Lk. 17:10</a>) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. + Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36214] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +caritas in omnibus sanctis invenitur. Sed quidam sunt sancti qui +tamen aliquibus virtutibus carent, dicit enim Beda quod sancti +magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam de virtutibus +quas habent, glorientur. Ergo non est necessarium quod qui habet +caritatem, omnes virtutes morales habeat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all + the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that + has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi + de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36215] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod per caritatem tota lex impletur, dicitur enim Rom. XIII, +<i>qui diligit proximum, legem implevit</i>. Sed tota lex impleri +non potest nisi per omnes virtutes morales, quia lex praecipit de +omnibus actibus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo qui habet +caritatem, habet omnes virtutes morales. Augustinus etiam dicit, in +quadam epistola, quod caritas includit in se omnes virtutes +cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works + of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain + works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the + actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as + it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the + moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind + of good work. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A3-p7"> It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: + and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 co."><a name="36216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36216] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod cum caritate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes +morales. Cuius ratio est quia Deus non minus perfecte operatur in +operibus gratiae, quam in operibus naturae. Sic autem videmus in +operibus naturae, quod non invenitur principium aliquorum operum in +aliqua re, quin inveniantur in ea quae sunt necessaria ad huiusmodi +opera perficienda, sicut in animalibus inveniuntur organa quibus +perfici possunt opera ad quae peragenda anima habet potestatem. +Manifestum est autem quod caritas, inquantum ordinat hominem ad +finem ultimum, est principium omnium bonorum operum quae in finem +ultimum ordinari possunt. Unde oportet quod cum caritate simul +infundantur omnes virtutes morales, quibus homo perficit singula +genera bonorum operum. Et sic patet quod virtutes morales infusae +non solum habent connexionem propter prudentiam; sed etiam propter +caritatem. Et quod qui amittit caritatem per peccatum mortale, +amittit omnes virtutes morales infusas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower + power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well + disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him + well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is + referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that + are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36217] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ad hoc quod actus inferioris potentiae sit +perfectus, requiritur quod non solum adsit perfectio in superiori +potentia, sed etiam in inferiori, si enim principale agens debito +modo se haberet, non sequeretur actio perfecta, si instrumentum non +esset bene dispositum. Unde oportet ad hoc quod homo bene operetur +in his quae sunt ad finem, quod non solum habeat virtutem qua bene +se habeat circa finem, sed etiam virtutes quibus bene se habeat +circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nam virtus quae est circa finem, se +habet ut principalis et motiva respectu earum quae sunt ad finem. +Et ideo cum caritate necesse est etiam habere alias virtutes +morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently + feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a + habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of + moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary + dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the + repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36218] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis habens habitum, +patitur difficultatem in operando, et per consequens non sentit +delectationem et complacentiam in actu, propter aliquod +impedimentum extrinsecus superveniens, sicut ille qui habet habitum +scientiae, patitur difficultatem in intelligendo, propter +somnolentiam vel aliquam infirmitatem. Et similiter habitus +moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum difficultatem in +operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex +praecedentibus actibus relictas. Quae quidem difficultas non ita +accidit in virtutibus moralibus acquisitis, quia per exercitium +actuum, quo acquiruntur, tolluntur etiam contrariae +dispositiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, + for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36219] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliqui sancti dicuntur aliquas virtutes non habere, +inquantum patiuntur difficultatem in actibus earum, ratione iam +dicta; quamvis habitus omnium virtutum habeant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A4-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 4. Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be + more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore + can faith and hope be without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36220] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides et spes nunquam sint sine +caritate. Cum enim sint virtutes theologicae, digniores esse +videntur virtutibus moralibus, etiam infusis. Sed virtutes morales +infusae non possunt esse sine caritate. Ergo neque fides et +spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection + thereof, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q65_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith cannot be without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36221] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus credit nisi volens, sed caritas est in voluntate ut +Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Sicut perfectio eius, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo fides non potest esse sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this + love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36222] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>spes sine amore esse non +potest</i>. Amor autem est caritas, de hoc enim amore ibi loquitur. +Ergo spes non potest esse sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore + faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36223] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Matth. I, dicitur in Glossa quod <i>fides generat spem, +spes vero caritatem</i>. Sed generans est prius generato, et potest +esse sine eo. Ergo fides potest esse sine spe; et spes sine +caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete + virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing + a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done + is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that + is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does + is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result + of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. + </p><p id="FS_Q65_A4-p7"> Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue + without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own + free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which + perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be + without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act + is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through + merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is + possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues + properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we + should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 co."><a name="36224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36224] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod fides et spes, sicut et virtutes morales, dupliciter +considerari possunt. Uno modo, secundum inchoationem quandam; alio +modo, secundum perfectum esse virtutis. Cum enim virtus ordinetur +ad bonum opus agendum, virtus quidem perfecta dicitur ex hoc quod +potest in opus perfecte bonum, quod quidem est dum non solum bonum +est quod fit, sed etiam bene fit. Alioquin, si bonum sit quod fit, +non autem bene fiat, non erit perfecte bonum, unde nec habitus qui +est talis operis principium, habebit perfecte rationem virtutis. +Sicut si aliquis operetur iusta, bonum quidem facit, sed non erit +opus perfectae virtutis, nisi hoc bene faciat, idest secundum +electionem rectam, quod est per prudentiam, et ideo iustitia sine +prudentia non potest esse virtus perfecta. Sic igitur fides et spes +sine caritate possunt quidem aliqualiter esse, perfectae autem +virtutis rationem sine caritate non habent. Cum enim fidei opus sit +credere Deo; credere autem sit alicui propria voluntate assentire, +si non debito modo velit, non erit fidei opus perfectum. Quod autem +debito modo velit, hoc est per caritatem, quae perficit voluntatem, +omnis enim rectus motus voluntatis ex recto amore procedit, ut +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur fides est quidem +sine caritate, sed non perfecta virtus, sicut temperantia vel +fortitudo sine prudentia. Et similiter dicendum est de spe. Nam +actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo. Qui quidem +actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quae quis habet, quod non +potest esse sine caritate. Si autem hoc expectet ex meritis quae +nondum habet, sed proponit in futurum acquirere, erit actus +imperfectus, et hoc potest esse sine caritate. Et ideo fides et +spes possunt esse sine caritate, sed sine caritate, proprie +loquendo, virtutes non sunt; nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut +non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene, ut +dicitur in II Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves + the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not + depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, + as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36225] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia, +prudentia autem infusa nec rationem prudentiae habere potest absque +caritate, utpote deficiente debita habitudine ad primum principium, +quod est ultimus finis. Fides autem et spes, secundum proprias +rationes, nec a prudentia nec a caritate dependent. Et ideo sine +caritate esse possunt; licet non sint virtutes sine caritate, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36226] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fide quae habet perfectam +rationem virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this + is not without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36227] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de spe, secundum quod aliquis +expectat futuram beatitudinem per merita quae iam habet, quod non +est sine caritate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A5-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 5. Whether charity can be without faith and hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love + God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36228] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas possit esse sine fide et spe. +Caritas enim est amor Dei. Sed Deus potest a nobis amari +naturaliter, etiam non praesupposita fide, vel spe futurae +beatitudinis. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without + faith and hope, and the other virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36229] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in +caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Sed radix aliquando est sine +ramis. Ergo caritas potest esse aliquando sine fide et spe et aliis +virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, + as we shall explain further on ( + <a href="TP_ii.html#TP_Q7_A3" id="FS_Q65_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">TP, Q[7], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36230] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in Christo fuit perfecta caritas. Ipse tamen non habuit fidem et +spem, quia fuit perfectus comprehensor, ut infra dicetur. Ergo +caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.17" target="asv"> Prov. 8:17</a>: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.3" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36231] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, <i>sine fide impossibile est +placere Deo</i>; quod maxime pertinet ad caritatem, ut patet; +secundum illud Proverb. VIII, <i>ego diligentes me diligo</i>. Spes +etiam est quae introducit ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +caritas non potest haberi sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain + mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident + from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:9, </a> where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the + fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun + here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and + hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility + of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as + to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite + impossible without faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 co."><a name="36232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36232] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam +amicitiam quandam ad ipsum; quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam +redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione, ut dicitur in VIII +Ethic. Et quod hoc ad caritatem pertineat, patet per id quod +dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus +in eo</i>. Et I ad Cor. I dicitur, <i>fidelis Deus, per quem vocati +estis in societatem filii eius</i>. Haec autem societas hominis ad +Deum, quae est quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur +quidem hic in praesenti per gratiam, perficietur autem in futuro +per gloriam, quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut +aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel +desperaret se posse habere aliquam societatem vel familiarem +conversationem cum ipso; ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad +Deum, quae est caritas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat +huiusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret +se ad hanc societatem pertinere. Et sic caritas sine fide et spe +nullo modo esse potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object + we are directed by faith and hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36233] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod caritas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor +Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis obiectum, ad quod ordinamur per +fidem et spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are + the precursors of charity, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q65_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>), and so charity is impossible without them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36234] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod caritas est radix fidei et spei, inquantum dat eis +perfectionem virtutis. Sed fides et spes, secundum rationem +propriam, praesupponuntur ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Et sic +caritas sine eis esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest + vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A3" id="FS_Q65_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">, Q[4], A[3]</a>]: so that in Him was perfect charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36235] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Christo defuit fides et spes, propter id quod est +imperfectionis in eis. Sed loco fidei, habuit apertam visionem; et +loco spei, plenam comprehensionem. Et sic fuit perfecta caritas in +eo.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q66" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q66-p0.1">Q. 66. OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q66-p2"> We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q66-p3"><a href="#FS_Q66_A1"> (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p4"><a href="#FS_Q66_A2"> (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p5"><a href="#FS_Q66_A3"> (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p6"><a href="#FS_Q66_A4"> (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p7"><a href="#FS_Q66_A5"> (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p8"><a href="#FS_Q66_A6"> (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 pr."><a name="36236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36236] +Iª-IIae q. 66 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +aequalitate virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum +virtus possit esse maior vel minor. Secundo, utrum omnes virtutes +simul in eodem existentes, sint aequales. Tertio, de comparatione +virtutum moralium ad intellectuales. Quarto, de comparatione +virtutum moralium ad invicem. Quinto, de comparatione virtutum +intellectualium ad invicem. Sexto, de comparatione virtutum +theologicarum ad invicem.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q66_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A1-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 1. Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.16" target="asv">Apoc. 21:16</a>) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues + are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36237] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior vel +minor. Dicitur enim in Apoc. XXI, quod latera civitatis Ierusalem +sunt aequalia. Per haec autem significantur virtutes, ut Glossa +dicit ibidem. Ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. Non ergo potest +esse virtus maior virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in + a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. + Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue + cannot be greater or less than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36238] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omne illud cuius ratio consistit in maximo, non potest esse maius +vel minus. Sed ratio virtutis consistit in maximo, est enim virtus +ultimum potentiae, ut philosophus dicit in I de caelo; et +Augustinus etiam dicit, in II de Lib. Arb., quod <i>virtutes sunt +maxima bona, quibus nullus potest male uti</i>. Ergo videtur quod +virtus non possit esse maior neque minor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God + Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36239] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quantitas effectus pensatur secundum virtutem agentis. Sed virtutes +perfectae, quae sunt virtutes infusae, sunt a Deo, cuius virtus est +uniformis et infinita. Ergo videtur quod virtus non possit esse +maior virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and + increase: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20</a>): "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven": + and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv">Prov. 15:5</a>): "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or + less than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36240] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ubicumque potest esse augmentum et superabundantia, potest esse +inaequalitas. Sed in virtutibus invenitur superabundantia et +augmentum, dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>nisi abundaverit iustitia +vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in +regnum caelorum</i>; et Proverb. XV dicitur, <i>in abundanti +iustitia virtus maxima est</i>. Ergo videtur quod virtus possit +esse maior vel minor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying + to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always + more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from + what has been said ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[61], + A[2] + </a>) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the + other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better + than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining + moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the + concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p7"> The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was + said above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q66_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[1]</a> ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; + secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, + according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a + virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: + for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius + states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature + of virtue consists in a maximum. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p8"> If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different + times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined + by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning + judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of + the giving of Christ," as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.9" target="asv"> Eph. 4:9.</a> And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed + to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were + an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. + Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly + and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 co."><a name="36241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36241] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod cum quaeritur utrum virtus una possit esse maior +alia, dupliciter intelligi potest quaestio. Uno modo, in virtutibus +specie differentibus. Et sic manifestum est quod una virtus est +alia maior. Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu, et in +effectibus, tanto aliquid est potius, quanto est causae +propinquius. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod causa et radix +humani boni est ratio. Et ideo prudentia, quae perficit rationem, +praefertur in bonitate aliis virtutibus moralibus, perficientibus +vim appetitivam inquantum participat rationem. Et in his etiam +tanto est una altera melior, quanto magis ad rationem accedit. Unde +et iustitia, quae est in voluntate, praefertur aliis virtutibus +moralibus, et fortitudo, quae est in irascibili, praefertur +temperantiae, quae est in concupiscibili, quae minus participat +rationem, ut patet in VII Ethic. Alio modo potest intelligi +quaestio in virtute eiusdem speciei. Et sic, secundum ea quae dicta +sunt supra, cum de intensionibus habituum ageretur, virtus potest +dupliciter dici maior et minor, uno modo, secundum seipsam; alio +modo, ex parte participantis subiecti. Si igitur secundum seipsam +consideretur, magnitudo vel parvitas eius attenditur secundum ea ad +quae se extendit. Quicumque autem habet aliquam virtutem, puta +temperantiam, habet ipsam quantum ad omnia ad quae se temperantia +extendit. Quod de scientia et arte non contingit, non enim +quicumque est grammaticus, scit omnia quae ad grammaticam +pertinent. Et secundum hoc bene dixerunt Stoici, ut Simplicius +dicit in commento praedicamentorum, quod virtus non recipit magis +et minus, sicut scientia vel ars; eo quod ratio virtutis consistit +in maximo. Si vero consideretur virtus ex parte subiecti +participantis, sic contingit virtutem esse maiorem vel minorem, +sive secundum diversa tempora, in eodem; sive in diversis +hominibus. Quia ad attingendum medium virtutis, quod est secundum +rationem rectam, unus est melius dispositus quam alius, vel propter +maiorem assuetudinem, vel propter meliorem dispositionem naturae, +vel propter perspicacius iudicium rationis, aut etiam propter maius +gratiae donum, quod unicuique donatur secundum mensuram donationis +Christi, ut dicitur ad Ephes. IV. Et in hoc deficiebant Stoici, +aestimantes nullum esse virtuosum dicendum, nisi qui summe fuerit +dispositus ad virtutem. Non enim exigitur ad rationem virtutis, +quod attingat rectae rationis medium in indivisibili, sicut Stoici +putabant, sed sufficit prope medium esse, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. +Idem etiam indivisibile signum unus propinquius et promptius +attingit quam alius, sicut etiam patet in sagittatoribus +trahentibus ad certum signum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we + shall see further on + <a href="#FS_Q66_A2" id="FS_Q66_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36242] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aequalitas illa non est secundum quantitatem +absolutam, sed est secundum proportionem intelligenda, quia omnes +virtutes proportionaliter crescunt in homine, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained above: + since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36243] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud ultimum quod pertinet ad virtutem, potest +habere rationem magis vel minus boni secundum praedictos modos, cum +non sit ultimum indivisibile, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures + of virtue, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv"> Eph. 4:7</a>: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36244] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non operatur secundum necessitatem naturae, sed +secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, secundum quam diversam mensuram +virtutis hominibus largitur, secundum illud ad Ephes. IV, +<i>unicuique vestrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis +Christi</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A2-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 2. Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:7</a>): "Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that." Now one gift would not be more + proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are + not all equal in one and the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36245] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes virtutes in uno et eodem +sint aequaliter intensae. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, +<i>unusquisque habet proprium donum a Deo, alius quidem sic, alius +autem sic</i>. Non esset autem unum donum magis proprium alicui +quam aliud, si omnes virtutes dono Dei infusas quilibet aequaliter +haberet. Ergo videtur quod non omnes virtutes sint aequales in uno +et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another + in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised + for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4" target="asv">Rom. 4</a>), Moses for his meekness ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Num.7.3" target="asv">Num. 7:3</a>), Job for his patience ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Tob.2.12" target="asv">Tob. 2:12</a>). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: + "There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], + since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36246] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si omnes virtutes essent aeque intensae in uno et eodem, sequeretur +quod quicumque excederet aliquem in una virtute, excederet ipsum in +omnibus aliis virtutibus. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, quia diversi +sancti de diversis virtutibus praecipue laudantur; sicut Abraham de +fide, Moyses de mansuetudine, Iob de patientia. Unde et de quolibet +confessore cantatur in Ecclesia, <i>non est inventus similis illi, +qui conservaret legem excelsi</i>; eo quod quilibet habuit +praerogativam alicuius virtutis. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt +aequales in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows + that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in + one and the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36247] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto habitus est intensior, tanto homo secundum ipsum +delectabilius et promptius operatur. Sed experimento patet quod +unus homo delectabilius et promptius operatur actum unius virtutis +quam actum alterius. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales in uno +et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on. + Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36248] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod <i>quicumque sunt +aequales in fortitudine, aequales sunt in prudentia et +temperantia</i>; et sic de aliis. Hoc autem non esset, nisi omnes +virtutes unius hominis essent aequales. Ergo omnes virtutes unius +hominis sunt aequales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above + <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in + this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, + it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss + in its subject. In this sense all + the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers + are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p7"> Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues + is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these + four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this + way + virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind + of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than + the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, + since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all + in + the same way." + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p8"> The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper + respective matters ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[65] , AA[1]</a>,2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and + not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can + also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the + same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right + reason in each matter of virtue. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p9"> But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier + to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again + by the grace of God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 co."><a name="36249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36249] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quantitas virtutum, sicut ex dictis patet, potest +attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem speciei. Et sic non +est dubium quod una virtus unius hominis sit maior quam alia, sicut +caritas fide et spe. Alio modo potest attendi secundum +participationem subiecti, prout scilicet intenditur vel remittitur +in subiecto. Et secundum hoc, omnes virtutes unius hominis sunt +aequales quadam aequalitate proportionis, inquantum aequaliter +crescunt in homine, sicut digiti manus sunt inaequales secundum +quantitatem, sed sunt aequales secundum proportionem, cum +proportionaliter augeantur. Huiusmodi autem aequalitatis oportet +eodem modo rationem accipere, sicut et connexionis, aequalitas enim +est quaedam connexio virtutum secundum quantitatem. Dictum est +autem supra quod ratio connexionis virtutum dupliciter assignari +potest. Uno modo, secundum intellectum eorum qui intelligunt per +has quatuor virtutes, quatuor conditiones generales virtutum, +quarum una simul invenitur cum aliis in qualibet materia. Et sic +virtus in qualibet materia non potest aequalis dici, nisi habeat +omnes istas conditiones aequales. Et hanc rationem aequalitatis +virtutum assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin., dicens, <i>si dixeris +aequales esse istos fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia; +sequitur quod huius fortitudo minus prudens sit. Ac per hoc, nec +fortitudine aequales sunt, quando est illius fortitudo prudentior. +Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem +consideratione percurras</i>. Alio modo assignata est ratio +connexionis virtutum secundum eos qui intelligunt huiusmodi +virtutes habere materias determinatas. Et secundum hoc, ratio +connexionis virtutum moralium accipitur ex parte prudentiae, et ex +parte caritatis quantum ad virtutes infusas, non autem ex parte +inclinationis, quae est ex parte subiecti, ut supra dictum est. Sic +igitur et ratio aequalitatis virtutum potest accipi ex parte +prudentiae, quantum ad id quod est formale in omnibus virtutibus +moralibus, existente enim ratione aequaliter perfecta in uno et +eodem, oportet quod proportionaliter secundum rationem rectam +medium constituatur in qualibet materia virtutum. Quantum vero ad +id quod est materiale in virtutibus moralibus, scilicet +inclinationem ipsam ad actum virtutis; potest esse unus homo magis +promptus ad actum unius virtutis quam ad actum alterius, vel ex +natura, vel ex consuetudine, vel etiam ex gratiae dono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all + of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of + which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, + or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36250] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli potest intelligi de donis +gratiae gratis datae, quae non sunt communia omnibus, nec omnia +aequalia in uno et eodem. Vel potest dici quod refertur ad mensuram +gratiae gratum facientis; secundum quam unus abundat in omnibus +virtutibus plus quam alius, propter maiorem abundantiam prudentiae, +vel etiam caritatis, in qua connectuntur omnes virtutes +infusae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness + for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36251] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unus sanctus laudatur praecipue de una virtute, et +alius de alia, propter excellentiorem promptitudinem ad actum unius +virtutis, quam ad actum alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36252] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A3-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 3. Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, + is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, + moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36253] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales praeemineant +intellectualibus. Quod enim magis est necessarium, et permanentius, +est melius. Sed virtutes morales sunt permanentiores etiam +disciplinis, quae sunt virtutes intellectuales, et sunt etiam magis +necessariae ad vitam humanam. Ergo sunt praeferendae virtutibus +intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, + and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual + virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36254] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione virtutis est quod bonum faciat habentem. Sed secundum +virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus, non autem secundum virtutes +intellectuales, nisi forte secundum solam prudentiam. Ergo virtus +moralis est melior quam intellectualis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of + the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which + is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36255] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +finis est nobilior his quae sunt ad finem. Sed sicut dicitur in VI +Ethic., <i>virtus moralis facit rectam intentionem finis; prudentia +autem facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem</i>. Ergo +virtus moralis est nobilior prudentia, quae est virtus +intellectualis circa moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially + rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore + intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36256] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +virtus moralis est in rationali per participationem; virtus autem +intellectualis in rationali per essentiam, sicut dicitur in I +Ethic. Sed rationale per essentiam est nobilius quam rationale per +participationem. Ergo virtus intellectualis est nobilior virtute +morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something + from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, + Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes + its species from its object, as explained above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the + object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, + while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, + the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, + which perfect the appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A3-p7"> But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to + move the other powers to act, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q66_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, + it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues + are more excellent + habits, simply speaking. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 co."><a name="36257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36257] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest dici maius vel minus, dupliciter, uno +modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Nihil enim prohibet +aliquid esse melius simpliciter, ut philosophari quam ditari, quod +tamen non est melius secundum quid, idest necessitatem patienti. +Simpliciter autem consideratur unumquodque, quando consideratur +secundum propriam rationem suae speciei. Habet autem virtus speciem +ex obiecto, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, illa +virtus nobilior est quae habet nobilius obiectum. Manifestum est +autem quod obiectum rationis est nobilius quam obiectum appetitus, +ratio enim apprehendit aliquid in universali; sed appetitus tendit +in res, quae habent esse particulare. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, +virtutes intellectuales, quae perficiunt rationem, sunt nobiliores +quam morales, quae perficiunt appetitum. Sed si consideretur virtus +in ordine ad actum, sic virtus moralis, quae perficit appetitum, +cuius est movere alias potentias ad actum, ut supra dictum est, +nobilior est. Et quia virtus dicitur ex eo quod est principium +alicuius actus, cum sit perfectio potentiae, sequitur etiam quod +ratio virtutis magis competat virtutibus moralibus quam virtutibus +intellectualibus, quamvis virtutes intellectuales sint nobiliores +habitus simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the + life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting + than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary + for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. + Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful + thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness + which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A6" id="FS_Q66_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36258] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales sunt magis permanentes quam +intellectuales, propter exercitium earum in his quae pertinent ad +vitam communem. Sed manifestum est quod obiecta disciplinarum, quae +sunt necessaria et semper eodem modo se habentia, sunt +permanentiora quam obiecta virtutum moralium, quae sunt quaedam +particularia agibilia. Quod autem virtutes morales sunt magis +necessariae ad vitam humanam, non ostendit eas esse nobiliores +simpliciter, sed quoad hoc. Quinimmo virtutes intellectuales +speculativae, ex hoc ipso quod non ordinantur ad aliud sicut utile +ordinatur ad finem, sunt digniores. Hoc enim contingit quia +secundum eas quodammodo inchoatur in nobis beatitudo, quae +consistit in cognitione veritatis, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because + the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q66_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36259] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus +simpliciter, et non secundum intellectuales, ea ratione, quia +appetitus movet alias potentias ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. +Unde per hoc etiam non probatur nisi quod virtus moralis sit melior +secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each + moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling + of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36260] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in +eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem. +Est autem finis uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis attingere medium in +propria materia, quod quidem medium determinatur secundum rectam +rationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in II et VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A4-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 4. Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what + is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than + justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36261] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia non sit praecipua inter +virtutes morales. Maius enim est dare alicui de proprio, quam +reddere alicui quod ei debetur. Sed primum pertinet ad +liberalitatem; secundum autem ad iustitiam. Ergo videtur quod +liberalitas sit maior virtus quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> Jam. 1:4, </a> "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36262] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +illud videtur esse maximum in unoquoque, quod est perfectissimum in +ipso. Sed sicut dicitur Iac. I, <i>patientia opus perfectum +habet</i>. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit maior quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. + Therefore it is greater than justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36263] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, magnanimitas operatur magnum, in omnibus +virtutibus</i>, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnificat etiam ipsam +iustitiam. Est igitur maior quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36264] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod <i>iustitia est +praeclarissima virtutum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, + whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q66_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by + considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, + as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order + not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among + the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected + to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is + life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters + of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. + Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue + is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e. + fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, + which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, + viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence + also. + </p><p id="FS_Q66_A4-p7"> A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is + more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far + as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 co."><a name="36265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36265] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtus aliqua secundum suam speciem potest dici maior +vel minor, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem +virtus dicitur maior, secundum quod in ea maius bonum rationis +relucet, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, iustitia inter omnes +virtutes morales praecellit, tanquam propinquior rationi. Quod +patet et ex subiecto, et ex obiecto. Ex subiecto quidem, quia est +in voluntate sicut in subiecto, voluntas autem est appetitus +rationalis, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum autem obiectum sive +materiam, quia est circa operationes, quibus homo ordinatur non +solum in seipso, sed etiam ad alterum. Unde iustitia est +praeclarissima virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Inter alias autem +virtutes morales, quae sunt circa passiones, tanto in unaquaque +magis relucet rationis bonum, quanto circa maiora motus appetitivus +subditur rationi. Maximum autem in his quae ad hominem pertinent, +est vita, a qua omnia alia dependent. Et ideo fortitudo, quae +appetitivum motum subdit rationi in his quae ad mortem et vitam +pertinent, primum locum tenet inter virtutes morales quae sunt +circa passiones, tamen ordinatur infra iustitiam. Unde philosophus +dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod <i>necesse est maximas esse virtutes, +quae sunt aliis honoratissimae, siquidem est virtus potentia +benefactiva. Propter hoc, fortes et iustos maxime honorant, haec +quidem enim in bello, scilicet fortitudo; haec autem, scilicet +iustitia, et in bello et in pace utilis est</i>. Post fortitudinem +autem ordinatur temperantia, quae subiicit rationi appetitum circa +ea quae immediate ordinantur ad vitam, vel in eodem secundum +numerum, vel in eodem secundum speciem, scilicet in cibis et +venereis. Et sic istae tres virtutes, simul cum prudentia, dicuntur +esse principales etiam dignitate. Secundum quid autem dicitur +aliqua virtus esse maior, secundum quod adminiculum vel ornamentum +praebet principali virtuti. Sicut substantia est simpliciter +dignior accidente; aliquod tamen accidens est secundum quid dignius +substantia, inquantum perficit substantiam in aliquo esse +accidentali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his + own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas + justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being + its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and + an addition to justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36266] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus liberalitatis oportet quod fundetur super +actum iustitiae, <i>non enim esset liberalis datio, si non de +proprio daret</i>, ut in II Polit. dicitur. Unde liberalitas sine +iustitia esse non posset, quae secernit suum a non suo. Iustitia +autem potest esse sine liberalitate. Unde iustitia simpliciter est +maior liberalitate, tanquam communior, et fundamentum ipsius, +liberalitas autem est secundum quid maior, cum sit quidam ornatus +iustitiae, et complementum eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also + excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; + but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking + up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues + simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence + whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36267] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in tolerantia +malorum, in quibus non solum excludit iniustam vindictam, quam +etiam excludit iustitia; neque solum odium quod facit caritas; +neque solum iram, quod facit mansuetudo; sed etiam excludit +tristitiam inordinatam, quae est radix omnium praedictorum. Et ideo +in hoc est perfectior et maior, quod in hac materia extirpat +radicem. Non autem est simpliciter perfectior omnibus aliis +virtutibus. Quia fortitudo non solum sustinet molestias absque +perturbatione, quod est patientiae, sed etiam ingerit se eis, cum +opus fuerit. Unde quicumque est fortis, est patiens, sed non +convertitur, est enim patientia quaedam fortitudinis pars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, + so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36268] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod magnanimitas non potest esse nisi aliis virtutibus +praeexistentibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Unde comparatur ad alias +sicut ornatus earum. Et sic secundum quid est maior omnibus aliis, +non tamen simpliciter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A5-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 5. Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one + commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to + prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should + devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that + prudence is greater than wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36269] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sapientia non sit maxima inter +virtutes intellectuales. Imperans enim maius est eo cui imperatur. +Sed prudentia videtur imperare sapientiae, dicitur enim I Ethic., +quod <i>quales disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, et +quales unumquemque addiscere, et usquequo, haec praeordinat</i>, +scilicet politica, quae ad prudentiam pertinet, ut dicitur in VI +Ethic. Cum igitur inter disciplinas etiam sapientia contineatur, +videtur quod prudentia sit maior quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing + to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby + man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence + is a greater virtue than wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36270] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione virtutis est quod ordinet hominem ad felicitatem, est +enim virtus dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII +Physic. Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, per quae homo ad +felicitatem perducitur, sapientia autem non considerat humanos +actus, quibus ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Ergo prudentia est maior +virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, + which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by + Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.26.26" target="asv"> Job 26:26</a>: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than + wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36271] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto cognitio est perfectior, tanto videtur esse maior. Sed +perfectiorem cognitionem habere possumus de rebus humanis, de +quibus est scientia, quam de rebus divinis, de quibus est +sapientia, ut distinguit Augustinus in XII de Trin., quia divina +incomprehensibilia sunt, secundum illud Iob XXXVI, <i>ecce Deus +magnus, vincens scientiam nostram</i>. Ergo scientia est maior +virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable + principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater + virtue than wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36272] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +cognitio principiorum est dignior quam cognitio conclusionum. Sed +sapientia concludit ex principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est +intellectus; sicut et aliae scientiae. Ergo intellectus est maior +virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36273] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod sapientia est sicut +caput inter virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q66_A3" id="FS_Q66_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of + all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the + Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; + hence it is that wisdom exercises + judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 co."><a name="36274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36274] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam +speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Obiectum autem sapientiae +praecellit inter obiecta omnium virtutum intellectualium, +considerat enim causam altissimam, quae Deus est, ut dicitur in +principio Metaphys. Et quia per causam iudicatur de effectu, et per +causam superiorem de causis inferioribus; inde est quod sapientia +habet iudicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus; et +eius est ordinare omnes; et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectu +omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater + virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, + as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man + judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. + 2:15 + </a>). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed + to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; + for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36275] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum prudentia sit circa res humanas, sapientia +vero circa causam altissimam; impossibile est quod prudentia sit +maior virtus quam sapientia, <i>nisi</i>, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., +<i>maximum eorum quae sunt in mundo, esset homo</i>. Unde dicendum +est, sicut in eodem libro dicitur, quod prudentia non imperat ipsi +sapientiae, sed potius e converso, quia <i>spiritualis iudicat +omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur</i>, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Non +enim prudentia habet se intromittere de altissimis, quae considerat +sapientia, sed imperat de his quae ordinantur ad sapientiam, +scilicet quomodo homines debeant ad sapientiam pervenire. Unde in +hoc est prudentia, seu politica, ministra sapientiae, introducit +enim ad eam, praeparans ei viam, sicut ostiarius ad regem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme + Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness + in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, + it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future + happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36276] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prudentia considerat ea quibus pervenitur ad +felicitatem, sed sapientia considerat ipsum obiectum felicitatis, +quod est altissimum intelligibile. Et si quidem esset perfecta +consideratio sapientiae respectu sui obiecti, esset perfecta +felicitas in actu sapientiae. Sed quia actus sapientiae in hac vita +est imperfectus respectu principalis obiecti, quod est Deus; ideo +actus sapientiae est quaedam inchoatio seu participatio futurae +felicitatis. Et sic propinquius se habet ad felicitatem quam +prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher + object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which + possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that + which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the + Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though + it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime + things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, + especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this + little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36277] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de anima, <i>una +notitia praefertur alteri aut ex eo quod est nobiliorum, aut +propter certitudinem</i>. Si igitur subiecta sint aequalia in +bonitate et nobilitate, illa quae est certior, erit maior virtus. +Sed illa quae est minus certa de altioribus et maioribus, +praefertur ei quae est magis certa de inferioribus rebus. Unde +philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod magnum est de rebus +caelestibus aliquid posse cognoscere etiam debili et topica +ratione. Et in I de partibus Animal., dicit quod <i>amabile est +magis parvum aliquid cognoscere de rebus nobilioribus quam multa +cognoscere de rebus ignobilioribus</i>. Sapientia igitur ad quam +pertinet Dei cognitio, homini, maxime in statu huius vitae, non +potest perfecte advenire, ut sit quasi eius possessio; sed hoc +solius Dei est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed tamen illa modica +cognitio quae per sapientiam de Deo haberi potest, omni alii +cognitioni praefertur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is + a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and + non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles + are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper + effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, + not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating + them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36278] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium +dependet ex ratione terminorum, cognito enim quid est totum et quid +pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. +Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis, +et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis +constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam, +quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet +Dei. Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis +indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, +sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando +contra negantes. Unde sequitur quod sapientia sit maior virtus quam +intellectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A6-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 6. Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while + hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral + virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q66_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36279] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit maxima inter virtutes +theologicas. Cum enim fides sit in intellectu, spes autem et +caritas in vi appetitiva, ut supra dictum est; videtur quod fides +comparetur ad spem et caritatem, sicut virtus intellectualis ad +moralem. Sed virtus intellectualis est maior morali, ut ex dictis +patet. Ergo fides est maior spe et caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added + to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward + to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36280] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse maius eo. Sed +spes, ut videtur, se habet ex additione ad caritatem, praesupponit +enim spes amorem, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid.; addit autem +quendam motum protensionis in rem amatam. Ergo spes est maior +caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.3" target="asv"> Mat. 1:3 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36281] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +causa est potior effectu. Sed fides et spes sunt causa caritatis, +dicitur enim Matth. I, in Glossa, quod <i>fides generat spem, et +spes caritatem</i>. Ergo fides et spes sunt maiores caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36282] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>nunc autem manent +fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est +caritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q66_A3" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at + God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater + object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than + the others. Because the others, in their + very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. + But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, + the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 co."><a name="36283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36283] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum +suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Cum autem tres virtutes +theologicae respiciant Deum sicut proprium obiectum, non potest una +earum dici maior altera ex hoc quod sit circa maius obiectum; sed +ex eo quod una se habet propinquius ad obiectum quam alia. Et hoc +modo caritas est maior aliis. Nam aliae important in sui ratione +quandam distantiam ab obiecto, est enim fides de non visis, spes +autem de non habitis. Sed amor caritatis est de eo quod iam +habetur, est enim amatum quodammodo in amante, et etiam amans per +affectum trahitur ad unionem amati; propter quod dicitur I Ioan. +IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because + the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things + beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected + by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being + drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according + to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the + appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, + which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its + object surpasses human knowledge, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36284] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non hoc modo se habent fides et spes ad +caritatem, sicut prudentia ad virtutem moralem. Et hoc propter duo. +Primo quidem, quia virtutes theologicae habent obiectum quod est +supra animam humanam, sed prudentia et virtutes morales sunt circa +ea quae sunt infra hominem. In his autem quae sunt supra hominem, +nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio. Perficitur enim cognitio, +secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente, dilectio vero, secundum +quod diligens trahitur ad rem dilectam. Id autem quod est supra +hominem, nobilius est in seipso quam sit in homine, quia +unumquodque est in altero per modum eius in quo est. E converso +autem est in his quae sunt infra hominem. Secundo, quia prudentia +moderatur motus appetitivos ad morales virtutes pertinentes, sed +fides non moderatur motum appetitivum tendentem in Deum, qui +pertinet ad virtutes theologicas; sed solum ostendit obiectum. +Motus autem appetitivus in obiectum, excedit cognitionem humanam; +secundum illud ad Ephes. III, <i>supereminentem scientiae caritatem +Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires + good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led + by hope, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q66_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36285] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se +sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae, quo quidem amore magis se +amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem +importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe, ut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more + noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in + the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36286] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod causa perficiens est potior effectu, non autem causa +disponens. Sic enim calor ignis esset potior quam anima, ad quam +disponit materiam, quod patet esse falsum. Sic autem fides generat +spem, et spes caritatem, secundum scilicet quod una disponit ad +alteram.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q67" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q67-p0.1">Q. 67. OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q67-p2"> We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q67-p3"><a href="#FS_Q67_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p4"><a href="#FS_Q67_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p5"><a href="#FS_Q67_A3"> (3) Whether faith remains?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p6"><a href="#FS_Q67_A4"> (4) Whether hope remains?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p7"><a href="#FS_Q67_A5"> (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p8"><a href="#FS_Q67_A6"> (6) Whether charity remains?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 pr."><a name="36287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36287] +Iª-IIae q. 67 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +duratione virtutum post hanc vitam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. +Primo, utrum virtutes morales maneant post hanc vitam. Secundo, +utrum virtutes intellectuales. Tertio, utrum fides. Quarto, utrum +remaneat spes. Quinto, utrum aliquid fidei maneat, vel spei. Sexto, +utrum maneat caritas.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q67_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A1-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv"> Mat. 22:30.</a> But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods" + (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36288] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non maneant post hanc +vitam. Homines enim in statu futurae gloriae erunt similes Angelis, +ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Sed ridiculum est in Angelis ponere +virtutes morales, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo neque in hominibus, +post hanc vitam, erunt virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says + (Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this + life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36289] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes morales perficiunt hominem in vita activa. Sed vita activa +non manet post hanc vitam, dicit enim Gregorius, in VI Moral., +<i>activae vitae opera cum corpore transeunt</i>. Ergo virtutes +morales non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily + organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36290] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +temperantia et fortitudo, quae sunt virtutes morales, sunt +irrationalium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Sed +irrationales partes animae corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore, eo quod +sunt actus organorum corporalium. Ergo videtur quod virtutes +morales non maneant post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>) that "justice is perpetual and immortal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36291] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Sap. I, quod <i>iustitia perpetua est et +immortalis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is + better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain + in the future life, but after a different manner. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 co."><a name="36292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36292] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., Tullius +posuit post hanc vitam quatuor virtutes cardinales non esse; sed in +alia vita homines esse beatos sola cognitione naturae, in qua nihil +est melius aut amabilius, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem, ea natura +quae creavit omnes naturas. Ipse autem postea determinat huiusmodi +quatuor virtutes in futura vita existere, tamen alio modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p7"> In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. + The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according + to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Ad cuius +evidentiam, sciendum est quod in huiusmodi virtutibus aliquid est +formale; et aliquid quasi materiale. Materiale quidem est in his +virtutibus inclinatio quaedam partis appetitivae ad passiones vel +operationes secundum modum aliquem. Sed quia iste modus +determinatur a ratione, ideo formale in omnibus virtutibus est ipse +ordo rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p8"> Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For + in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers + of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, + they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most + perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved + entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) + that "prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, + without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere + to + Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident + what will be its act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this life subjection to a superior is part + of justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi virtutes +morales in futura vita non manent, quantum ad id quod est materiale +in eis. Non enim habebunt in futura vita locum concupiscentiae et +delectationes ciborum et venereorum; neque etiam timores et +audaciae circa pericula mortis; neque etiam distributiones et +communicationes rerum quae veniunt in usum praesentis vitae. Sed +quantum ad id quod est formale, remanebunt in beatis perfectissimae +post hanc vitam, inquantum ratio uniuscuiusque rectissima erit +circa ea quae ad ipsum pertinent secundum statum illum; et vis +appetitiva omnino movebitur secundum ordinem rationis, in his quae +ad statum illum pertinent. Unde Augustinus ibidem dicit quod +<i>prudentia ibi erit sine ullo periculo erroris; fortitudo, sine +molestia tolerandorum malorum; temperantia, sine repugnatione +libidinum. Ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel +aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo +defectu noxio delectari</i>. De iustitia vero manifestius est quem +actum ibi habebit, scilicet esse subditum Deo, quia etiam in hac +vita ad iustitiam pertinet esse subditum superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards + "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36293] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur ibi de huiusmodi virtutibus +moralibus, quantum ad id quod materiale est in eis, sicut de +iustitia, quantum ad commutationes et depositiones; de fortitudine, +quantum ad terribilia et pericula; de temperantia, quantum ad +concupiscentias pravas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of + the virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36294] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad secundum. Ea enim quae sunt activae vitae, +materialiter se habent ad virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; + the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational + powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, + and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be + perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the + soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A8" id="FS_Q67_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[8]</a>. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain + nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence + of justice it is + specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because + its act will not change, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36295] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod status post hanc vitam est duplex, unus quidem ante +resurrectionem, quando animae erunt a corporibus separatae; alius +autem post resurrectionem, quando animae iterato corporibus suis +unientur. In illo ergo resurrectionis statu, erunt vires +irrationales in organis corporis, sicut et nunc sunt. Unde et +poterit in irascibili esse fortitudo, et in concupiscibili +temperantia, inquantum utraque vis perfecte erit disposita ad +obediendum rationi. Sed in statu ante resurrectionem, partes +irrationales non erunt actu in anima, sed solum radicaliter in +essentia ipsius, ut in primo dictum est. Unde nec huiusmodi +virtutes erunt in actu nisi in radice, scilicet in ratione et +voluntate, in quibus sunt seminalia quaedam harum virtutum, ut +dictum est. Sed iustitia, quae est in voluntate, etiam actu +remanebit. Unde specialiter de ea dictum est quod est perpetua et +immortalis, tum ratione subiecti, quia voluntas incorruptibilis +est; tum etiam propter similitudinem actus, ut prius dictum +est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A2-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 2. Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8,9</a>) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge + of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. + Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36296] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non maneant +post hanc vitam. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, quod +scientia destruetur, et ratio est quia ex parte cognoscimus. Sed +sicut cognitio scientiae est ex parte, idest imperfecta; ita etiam +cognitio aliarum virtutum intellectualium, quandiu haec vita durat. +Ergo omnes virtutes intellectuales post hanc vitam cessabunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is + not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore + science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36297] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod scientia, cum sit +habitus, est qualitas difficile mobilis, non enim de facili +amittitur, nisi ex aliqua forti transmutatione vel aegritudine. Sed +nulla est tanta transmutatio corporis humani sicut per mortem. Ergo +scientia et aliae virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc +vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be + no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); + and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual + virtues do not remain after this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36298] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes intellectuales perficiunt intellectum ad bene operandum +proprium actum. Sed actus intellectus non videtur esse post hanc +vitam, eo quod nihil intelligit anima sine phantasmate, ut dicitur +in III de anima; phantasmata autem post hanc vitam non manent, cum +non sint nisi in organis corporeis. Ergo virtutes intellectuales +non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the + knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv"> Lk. 16:25</a>: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore, + does the knowledge of universal and + necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36299] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod firmior est cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quam +particularium et contingentium. Sed in homine remanet post hanc +vitam cognitio particularium contingentium, puta eorum quae quis +fecit vel passus est; secundum illud Luc. XVI, <i>recordare quia +recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala</i>. Ergo +multo magis remanet cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quae +pertinent ad scientiam et ad alias virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A6" id="FS_Q67_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[6]</a> some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands; + and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts + of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, + according to this opinion, + neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted. + </p><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p7"> But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is + in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually." + It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according + to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima + iii) because it preserves the intelligible species. + </p><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p8"> And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as + stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[85], A[1]</a>, ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material + element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species, + which are in the + "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues. + Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues + + <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 co."><a name="36300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36300] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, quidam posuerunt quod +species intelligibiles non permanent in intellectu possibili nisi +quandiu actu intelligit, nec est aliqua conservatio specierum, +cessante consideratione actuali, nisi in viribus sensitivis, quae +sunt actus corporalium organorum, scilicet in imaginativa et +memorativa. Huiusmodi autem vires corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore. +Et ideo secundum hoc, scientia nullo modo post hanc vitam +remanebit, corpore corrupto; neque aliqua alia intellectualis +virtus. Sed haec opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui in +III de anima dicit quod <i>intellectus possibilis est in actu, cum +fit singula, sicut sciens; cum tamen sit in potentia ad +considerandum in actu</i>. Est etiam contra rationem, quia species +intelligibiles recipiuntur in intellectu possibili immobiliter, +secundum modum recipientis. Unde et intellectus possibilis dicitur +locus specierum, quasi species intelligibiles conservans. Sed +phantasmata, ad quae respiciendo homo intelligit in hac vita, +applicando ad ipsa species intelligibiles, ut in primo dictum est, +corrupto corpore corrumpuntur. Unde quantum ad ipsa phantasmata, +quae sunt quasi materialia in virtutibus intellectualibus, virtutes +intellectuales destruuntur, destructo corpore, sed quantum ad +species intelligibiles, quae sunt in intellectu possibili, virtutes +intellectuales manent. Species autem se habent in virtutibus +intellectualibus sicut formales. Unde intellectuales virtutes +manent post hanc vitam, quantum ad id quod est formale in eis, non +autem quantum ad id quod est materiale, sicut et de moralibus +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; + because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the + phantasms. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36301] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli est intelligendum quantum ad id +quod est materiale in scientia, et quantum ad modum intelligendi, +quia scilicet neque phantasmata remanebunt, destructo corpore; +neque erit usus scientiae per conversionem ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, + which are in the "possible" intellect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36302] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod per aegritudinem corrumpitur habitus scientiae +quantum ad id quod est materiale in eo, scilicet quantum ad +phantasmata, non autem quantum ad species intelligibiles, quae sunt +in intellectu possibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q89_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a> the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet + not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues + <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36303] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima separata post mortem habet alium modum +intelligendi quam per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut in primo +dictum est. Et sic scientia manet, non tamen secundum eundem modum +operandi, sicut et de virtutibus moralibus dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A3-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 3. Whether faith remains after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after + this life, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q67_A2" id="FS_Q67_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore faith remains also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36304] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides maneat post hanc vitam. Nobilior +enim est fides quam scientia. Sed scientia manet post hanc vitam, +ut dictum est. Ergo et fides.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:11</a>): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the + foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other + virtue remains. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36305] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +I ad Cor. III, dicitur, <i>fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere, +praeter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Iesus</i>, idest +fides Christi Iesu. Sed sublato fundamento, non remanet id quod +superaedificatur. Ergo, si fides non remanet post hanc vitam, nulla +alia virtus remaneret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible + with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and "morning" knowledge [*Cf. + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A6" id="FS_Q67_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[6]</a>]; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about + one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with + the knowledge of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36306] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +cognitio fidei et cognitio gloriae differunt secundum perfectum et +imperfectum. Sed cognitio imperfecta potest esse simul cum +cognitione perfecta, sicut in Angelo simul potest esse cognitio +vespertina cum cognitione matutina; et aliquis homo potest simul +habere de eadem conclusione scientiam per syllogismum +demonstrativum, et opinionem per syllogismum dialecticum. Ergo +etiam fides simul esse potest, post hanc vitam, cum cognitione +gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6,7</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight." But those who are in glory + are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36307] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. V, <i>quandiu sumus in +corpore, peregrinamur a domino, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non +per speciem</i>. Sed illi qui sunt in gloria, non peregrinantur a +domino, sed sunt ei praesentes. Ergo fides non manet post hanc +vitam in gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things + are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect + of contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: + wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when + a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, + it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 co."><a name="36308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36308] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod oppositio est per se et propria causa quod unum +excludatur ab alio, inquantum scilicet in omnibus oppositis +includitur oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Invenitur autem +in quibusdam oppositio secundum contrarias formas, sicut in +coloribus album et nigrum. In quibusdam autem, secundum perfectum +et imperfectum, unde in alterationibus magis et minus accipiuntur +ut contraria, ut cum de minus calido fit magis calidum, ut dicitur +in V Physic. Et quia perfectum et imperfectum opponuntur, +impossibile est quod simul, secundum idem, sit perfectio et +imperfectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p7"> Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack + of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, + cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is + changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the + imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even + as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; + and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Est autem considerandum quod imperfectio quidem +quandoque est de ratione rei, et pertinet ad speciem ipsius, sicut +defectus rationis pertinet ad rationem speciei equi vel bovis. Et +quia unum et idem numero manens non potest transferri de una specie +in aliam, inde est quod, tali imperfectione sublata, tollitur +species rei, sicut iam non esset bos vel equus, si esset +rationalis. Quandoque vero imperfectio non pertinet ad rationem +speciei, sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud, sicut alicui +homini quandoque accidit defectus rationis, inquantum impeditur in +eo rationis usus, propter somnum vel ebrietatem vel aliquid +huiusmodi. Patet autem quod, tali imperfectione remota, nihilominus +substantia rei manet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8"> Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith + being defined as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Where is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect knowledge + that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of + faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Manifestum est autem quod imperfectio +cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Ponitur enim in eius definitione, +<i>fides enim est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non +apparentium</i>, ut dicitur ad Heb. XI. Et Augustinus dicit, +<i>quid est fides? Credere quod non vides</i>. Quod autem cognitio +sit sine apparitione vel visione, hoc ad imperfectionem cognitionis +pertinet. Et sic imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Unde +manifestum est quod fides non potest esse perfecta cognitio, eadem +numero manens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p9"> But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect + knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three + ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. + The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the + "morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" knowledge is about things according to the being which + they have in the Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which + being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified + in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the + subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion + that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is + essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding + of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls + short of science in so far as it lacks vision. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sed ulterius considerandum est utrum simul possit +esse cum cognitione perfecta, nihil enim prohibet aliquam +cognitionem imperfectam simul esse aliquando cum cognitione +perfecta. Est igitur considerandum quod cognitio potest esse +imperfecta tripliciter, uno modo, ex parte obiecti cognoscibilis; +alio modo, ex parte medii; tertio modo, ex parte subiecti. Ex parte +quidem obiecti cognoscibilis, differunt secundum perfectum et +imperfectum cognitio matutina et vespertina in Angelis, nam +cognitio matutina est de rebus secundum quod habent esse in verbo; +cognitio autem vespertina est de eis secundum quod habent esse in +propria natura, quod est imperfectum respectu primi esse. Ex parte +vero medii, differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum cognitio +quae est de aliqua conclusione per medium demonstrativum, et per +medium probabile. Ex parte vero subiecti differunt secundum +perfectum et imperfectum opinio, fides et scientia. Nam de ratione +opinionis est quod accipiatur unum cum formidine alterius oppositi, +unde non habet firmam inhaesionem. De ratione vero scientiae est +quod habeat firmam inhaesionem cum visione intellectiva, habet enim +certitudinem procedentem ex intellectu principiorum. Fides autem +medio modo se habet, excedit enim opinionem, in hoc quod habet +firmam inhaesionem; deficit vero a scientia, in hoc quod non habet +visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p10"> Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect + and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect + on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with + one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and + the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, + e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible + with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the + same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium. + Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject. + Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he + believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that + which makes them happy, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q67_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are + incompatible in one and the same subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Manifestum est autem quod perfectum et imperfectum non +possunt simul esse secundum idem, sed ea quae differunt secundum +perfectum et imperfectum, secundum aliquid idem possunt simul esse +in aliquo alio eodem. Sic igitur cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex +parte obiecti, nullo modo possunt esse de eodem obiecto. Possunt +tamen convenire in eodem medio, et in eodem subiecto, nihil enim +prohibet quod unus homo simul et semel per unum et idem medium +habeat cognitionem de duobus, quorum unum est perfectum et aliud +imperfectum, sicut de sanitate et aegritudine, et bono et malo. +Similiter etiam impossibile est quod cognitio perfecta et +imperfecta ex parte medii, conveniant in uno medio. Sed nihil +prohibet quin conveniant in uno obiecto, et in uno subiecto, potest +enim unus homo cognoscere eandem conclusionem per medium probabile, +et demonstrativum. Et est similiter impossibile quod cognitio +perfecta et imperfecta ex parte subiecti, sint simul in eodem +subiecto. Fides autem in sui ratione habet imperfectionem quae est +ex parte subiecti, ut scilicet credens non videat id quod credit, +beatitudo autem de sui ratione habet perfectionem ex parte +subiecti, ut scilicet beatus videat id quo beatificatur, ut supra +dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod impossibile est quod fides +maneat simul cum beatitudine in eodem subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a + more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the + mode of faith is incompatible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36309] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod fides est nobilior quam scientia, ex parte +obiecti, quia eius obiectum est veritas prima. Sed scientia habet +perfectiorem modum cognoscendi, qui non repugnat perfectioni +beatitudinis, scilicet visioni, sicut repugnat ei modus fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will + be perfected also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36310] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fides est fundamentum quantum ad id quod habet de +cognitione. Et ideo quando perficietur cognitio, erit perfectius +fundamentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36311] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A4-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 4. Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent + manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). + Much more then does hope remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36312] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes maneat post mortem in statu +gloriae. Spes enim nobiliori modo perficit appetitum humanum quam +virtutes morales. Sed virtutes morales manent post hanc vitam, ut +patet per Augustinum, in XIV de Trin. Ergo multo magis spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in + the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36313] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +spei opponitur timor. Sed timor manet post hanc vitam, et in beatis +quidem timor filialis, qui manet in saeculum; et in damnatis timor +poenarum. Ergo spes, pari ratione, potest permanere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory + of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the + soul, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that + there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36314] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut spes est futuri boni, ita et desiderium. Sed in beatis est +desiderium futuri boni, et quantum ad gloriam corporis, quam animae +beatorum desiderant, ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt.; +et etiam quantum ad gloriam animae, secundum illud Eccli. XXIV, +<i>qui edunt me, adhuc esurient, et qui bibunt me, adhuc +sitient</i>; et I Petr. I, dicitur, <i>in quem desiderant Angeli +prospicere</i>. Ergo videtur quod possit esse spes post hanc vitam +in beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they + do not hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36315] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, <i>quod videt quis, quid +sperat?</i> Sed beati vident id quod est obiectum spei, scilicet +Deum. Ergo non sperant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that + subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of + that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement + ceases; for a thing does not continue to + become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from + what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. + the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 co."><a name="36316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36316] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, id quod de ratione sui importat +imperfectionem subiecti, non potest simul stare cum subiecto +opposita perfectione perfecto. Sicut patet quod motus in ratione +sui importat imperfectionem subiecti, est enim actus existentis in +potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, unde quando illa potentia reducitur +ad actum, iam cessat motus; non enim adhuc albatur, postquam iam +aliquid factum est album. Spes autem importat motum quendam in id +quod non habetur; ut patet ex his quae supra de passione spei +diximus. Et ideo quando habebitur id quod speratur, scilicet divina +fruitio, iam spes esse non poterit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with + the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not + remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something + which is in our actual possession. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36317] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes est nobilior virtutibus moralibus quantum +ad obiectum, quod est Deus. Sed actus virtutum moralium non +repugnant perfectioni beatitudinis, sicut actus spei; nisi forte +ratione materiae, secundum quam non manent. Non enim virtus moralis +perficit appetitum solum in id quod nondum habetur; sed etiam circa +id quod praesentialiter habetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[19], A[2]</a>). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility + of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the + other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. + Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.33" target="asv"> Prov. 1:33</a>: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated + above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there + can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a + succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory + of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past + nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42], + A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear + in + them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36318] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod timor est duplex, servilis et filialis, ut infra +dicetur. Servilis quidem est timor poenae, qui non poterit esse in +gloria, nulla possibilitate ad poenam remanente. Timor vero +filialis habet duos actus, scilicet revereri Deum, et quantum ad +hunc actum manet; et timere separationem ab ipso, et quantum ad +hunc actum non manet. Separari enim a Deo habet rationem mali, +nullum autem malum ibi timebitur, secundum illud Proverb. I, +<i>abundantia perfruetur, malorum timore sublato</i>. Timor autem +opponitur spei oppositione boni et mali, ut supra dictum est, et +ideo timor qui remanet in gloria, non opponitur spei. In damnatis +autem magis potest esse timor poenae, quam in beatis spes gloriae. +Quia in damnatis erit successio poenarum, et sic remanet ibi ratio +futuri, quod est obiectum timoris, sed gloria sanctorum est absque +successione, secundum quandam aeternitatis participationem, in qua +non est praeteritum et futurum, sed solum praesens. Et tamen nec +etiam in damnatis est proprie timor. Nam sicut supra dictum est, +timor nunquam est sine aliqua spe evasionis, quae omnino in +damnatis non erit. Unde nec timor; nisi communiter loquendo, +secundum quod quaelibet expectatio mali futuri dicitur timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the + reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason + desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, + but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object + is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated + above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q67_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money + is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are + not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to + desire it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36319] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod quantum ad gloriam animae, non potest esse in beatis +desiderium, secundum quod respicit futurum, ratione iam dicta. +Dicitur autem ibi esse esuries et sitis, per remotionem fastidii, +et eadem ratione dicitur esse desiderium in Angelis. Respectu autem +gloriae corporis, in animabus sanctorum potest quidem esse +desiderium, non tamen spes, proprie loquendo, neque secundum quod +spes est virtus theologica, sic enim eius obiectum est Deus, non +autem aliquod bonum creatum; neque secundum quod communiter +sumitur. Quia obiectum spei est arduum, ut supra dictum est, bonum +autem cuius iam inevitabilem causam habemus, non comparatur ad nos +in ratione ardui. Unde non proprie dicitur aliquis qui habet +argentum, sperare se habiturum aliquid quod statim in potestate +eius est ut emat. Et similiter illi qui habent gloriam animae, non +proprie dicuntur sperare gloriam corporis; sed solum +desiderare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A5-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 5. Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there + remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you + remove living, there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: + and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. + Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36320] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid fidei vel spei remaneat in +gloria. Remoto enim eo quod est proprium, remanet id quod est +commune, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, quod, <i>remoto +rationali, remanet vivum; et remoto vivo, remanet ens</i>. Sed in +fide est aliquid quod habet commune cum beatitudine, scilicet ipsa +cognitio, aliquid autem quod est sibi proprium, scilicet aenigma; +est enim fides cognitio aenigmatica. Ergo, remoto aenigmate fidei, +adhuc remanet ipsa cognitio fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv"> Eph. 1:17,18</a>: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light + of glory, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not + extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it + seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36321] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +fides est quoddam spirituale lumen animae, secundum illud Ephes. I, +<i>illuminatos oculos cordis vestri in agnitionem Dei</i>; sed hoc +lumen est imperfectum respectu luminis gloriae, de quo dicitur in +Psalmo XXXV, <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>. Lumen autem +imperfectum remanet, superveniente lumine perfecto, non enim +candela extinguitur, claritate solis superveniente. Ergo videtur +quod ipsum lumen fidei maneat cum lumine gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of + liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. + Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36322] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +substantia habitus non tollitur per hoc quod subtrahitur materia, +potest enim homo habitum liberalitatis retinere, etiam amissa +pecunia; sed actum habere non potest. Obiectum autem fidei est +veritas prima non visa. Ergo, hoc remoto per hoc quod videtur +veritas prima, adhuc potest remanere ipse habitus fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does + not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, it seems that it is withdrawn entirely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36323] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod fides est quidam habitus simplex. Simplex autem vel totum +tollitur, vel totum manet. Cum igitur fides non totaliter maneat, +sed evacuetur, ut dictum est; videtur quod totaliter tollatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains + in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically + but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other + hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to + the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement. + </p><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p7"> But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. + Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you + remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical + color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not + related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference + is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are + not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. + the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the + whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying + both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has + a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same + whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect. + </p><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p8"> It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, + the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute + the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is + therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the + same, but only generically. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 co."><a name="36324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36324] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod spes totaliter tollitur, fides +autem partim tollitur, scilicet quantum ad aenigma, et partim +manet, scilicet quantum ad substantiam cognitionis. Quod quidem si +sic intelligatur quod maneat non idem numero, sed idem genere, +verissime dictum est, fides enim cum visione patriae convenit in +genere, quod est cognitio. Spes autem non convenit cum beatitudine +in genere, comparatur enim spes ad beatitudinis fruitionem, sicut +motus ad quietem in termino. Si autem intelligatur quod eadem +numero cognitio quae est fidei, maneat in patria; hoc est omnino +impossibile. Non enim, remota differentia alicuius speciei, remanet +substantia generis eadem numero, sicut, remota differentia +constitutiva albedinis, non remanet eadem substantia coloris +numero, ut sic idem numero color sit quandoque albedo, quandoque +vero nigredo. Non enim comparatur genus ad differentiam sicut +materia ad formam, ut remaneat substantia generis eadem numero, +differentia remota; sicut remanet eadem numero substantia materiae, +remota forma. Genus enim et differentia non sunt partes speciei, +alioquin non praedicarentur de specie. Sed sicut species significat +totum, idest compositum ex materia et forma in rebus materialibus, +ita differentia significat totum, et similiter genus, sed genus +denominat totum ab eo quod est sicut materia; differentia vero ab +eo quod est sicut forma; species vero ab utroque. Sicut in homine +sensitiva natura materialiter se habet ad intellectivam, animal +autem dicitur quod habet naturam sensitivam; rationale quod habet +intellectivam; homo vero quod habet utrumque. Et sic idem totum +significatur per haec tria, sed non ab eodem. Unde patet quod, cum +differentia non sit nisi designativa generis, remota differentia, +non potest substantia generis eadem remanere, non enim remanet +eadem animalitas, si sit alia anima constituens animal. Unde non +potest esse quod eadem numero cognitio, quae prius fuit +aenigmatica, postea fiat visio aperta. Et sic patet quod nihil idem +numero vel specie quod est in fide, remanet in patria; sed solum +idem genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36325] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, remoto rationali, non remanet vivum idem +numero, sed idem genere, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: + whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently + they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36326] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod imperfectio luminis candelae non opponitur +perfectioni solaris luminis, quia non respiciunt idem subiectum. +Sed imperfectio fidei et perfectio gloriae opponuntur ad invicem, +et respiciunt idem subiectum. Unde non possunt esse simul, sicut +nec claritas aeris cum obscuritate eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit + of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, + but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36327] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui amittit pecuniam, non amittit possibilitatem +habendi pecuniam, et ideo convenienter remanet habitus +liberalitatis. Sed in statu gloriae non solum actu tollitur +obiectum fidei, quod est non visum; sed etiam secundum +possibilitatem, propter beatitudinis stabilitatem. Et ideo frustra +talis habitus remaneret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A6-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 6. Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10, </a> "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the + charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36328] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non maneat post hanc vitam in +gloria. Quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, <i>cum venerit quod +perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est</i>, idest quod est +imperfectum. Sed caritas viae est imperfecta. Ergo evacuabitur, +adveniente perfectione gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore + the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same + in both cases. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36329] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +habitus et actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum +amoris est bonum apprehensum. Cum ergo alia sit apprehensio +praesentis vitae, et alia apprehensio futurae vitae; videtur quod +non maneat eadem caritas utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the + wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the + charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36330] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum quae sunt unius rationis, imperfectum potest venire ad +aequalitatem perfectionis, per continuum augmentum. Sed caritas +viae nunquam potest pervenire ad aequalitatem caritatis patriae, +quantumcumque augeatur. Ergo videtur quod caritas viae non remaneat +in patria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>): "Charity never falleth away." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36331] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>caritas nunquam +excidit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing + passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, + the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either + seen or not seen. Therefore charity is + not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 co."><a name="36332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36332] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando imperfectio alicuius +rei non est de ratione speciei ipsius, nihil prohibet idem numero +quod prius fuit imperfectum, postea perfectum esse, sicut homo per +augmentum perficitur, et albedo per intensionem. Caritas autem est +amor; de cuius ratione non est aliqua imperfectio, potest enim esse +et habiti et non habiti, et visi et non visi. Unde caritas non +evacuatur per gloriae perfectionem, sed eadem numero manet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although + that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, + charity itself is not done away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36333] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod imperfectio caritatis per accidens se habet ad +ipsam, quia non est de ratione amoris imperfectio. Remoto autem eo +quod est per accidens, nihilominus remanet substantia rei. Unde, +evacuata imperfectione caritatis, non evacuatur ipsa caritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity + of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36334] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod caritas non habet pro obiecto ipsam cognitionem, sic +enim non esset eadem in via et in patria. Sed habet pro obiecto +ipsam rem cognitam, quae est eadem, scilicet ipsum Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part + of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly + we love Him. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36335] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod caritas viae per augmentum non potest pervenire ad +aequalitatem caritatis patriae, propter differentiam quae est ex +parte causae, visio enim est quaedam causa amoris, ut dicitur in IX +Ethic. Deus autem quanto perfectius cognoscitur, tanto perfectius +amatur.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q68" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q68-p0.1">Q. 68. OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q68-p2"> We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q68-p3"><a href="#FS_Q68_A1"> (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p4"><a href="#FS_Q68_A2"> (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p5"><a href="#FS_Q68_A3"> (3) Whether the Gifts are habits?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p6"><a href="#FS_Q68_A4"> (4) Which, and how many are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p7"><a href="#FS_Q68_A5"> (5) Whether the Gifts are connected?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p8"><a href="#FS_Q68_A6"> (6) Whether they remain in heaven?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p9"><a href="#FS_Q68_A7"> (7) Of their comparison with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p10"><a href="#FS_Q68_A8"> (8) Of their comparison with the virtues.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 pr."><a name="36336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36336] +Iª-IIae q. 68 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +donis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum dona differant a +virtutibus. Secundo, de necessitate donorum. Tertio, utrum dona +sint habitus. Quarto, quae, et quot sint. Quinto, utrum dona sint +connexa. Sexto, utrum maneant in patria. Septimo, de comparatione +eorum ad invicem. Octavo, de comparatione eorum ad virtutes.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q68_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A1-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 1. Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.2" target="asv"> Job 1:2, </a> "There were born to him seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly + thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of + the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36337] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non distinguantur a virtutibus. +Dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., exponens illud Iob, <i>nati sunt +ei septem filii, septem nobis nascuntur filii, cum per conceptionem +bonae cogitationis, sancti spiritus septem in nobis virtutes +oriuntur</i>. Et inducit illud quod habetur Isaiae XI, requiescet +super eum spiritus intellectus etc., ubi enumerantur septem +spiritus sancti dona. Ergo septem dona spiritus sancti sunt +virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.45" target="asv"> Mat. 12:45, </a> "Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed + to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly + so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36338] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Quaestionib. Evang., exponens illud +quod habetur Matth. XII, <i>tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios +spiritus etc., septem vitia sunt contraria septem virtutibus +spiritus sancti</i>, idest septem donis. Sunt autem septem vitia +contraria virtutibus communiter dictis. Ergo dona non distinguuntur +a virtutibus communiter dictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; + for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [*Cf. + <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q68_A1-p4.1" shape="rect"> Q[55], A[4]</a>]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to + the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one + another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36339] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quorum est definitio eadem, ipsa quoque sunt eadem. Sed definitio +virtutis convenit donis, unumquodque enim donum est bona qualitas +mentis qua recte vivitur, et cetera. Similiter definitio doni +convenit virtutibus infusis, est enim donum datio irreddibilis, +secundum philosophum. Ergo virtutes et dona non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q68_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[2]</a>), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, + and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36340] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +plura eorum quae enumerantur inter dona, sunt virtutes. Nam sicut +supra dictum est, sapientia et intellectus et scientia sunt +virtutes intellectuales; consilium autem ad prudentiam pertinet; +pietas autem species est iustitiae; fortitudo autem quaedam virtus +est moralis. Ergo videtur quod virtutes non distinguantur a +donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three + theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same + seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36341] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, I Moral., distinguit septem dona, quae dicit +significari per septem filios Iob, a tribus virtutibus theologicis, +quas dicit significari per tres filias Iob. Et in II Moral., +distinguit eadem septem dona a quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, +quae dicit significari per quatuor angulos domus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between + them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers + to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect + another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q63_A3" id="FS_Q68_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[63], + A[3] + </a>) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently + some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them + to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, + for instance, that are not reckoned virtues. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p8"> Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned + a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the + gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding + and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the + free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed + only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections. + If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p9"> Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with + prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His + sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation. + But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the + sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard + to charity, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.7" target="asv">Cant 8:7</a>): "Many waters cannot quench charity." + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p10"> Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3, </a> said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly + with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear + to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly + in humility and meekness, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv"> Mat. 11:29</a>: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.15.12" target="asv"> Jn. 15:12</a>: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p11"> Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses + itself, for we find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are clearly given + to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now + inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within + him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A4" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[4]</a>,6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8). + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p12"> Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists + in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect + must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect + disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues + perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently + man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only + because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.50.5" target="asv"> Is. 50:5</a>: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the + Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there + is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a + principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher + than acts of virtue. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 co."><a name="36342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36342] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de dono et virtute secundum nominis +rationem, sic nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem. Nam ratio +virtutis sumitur secundum quod perficit hominem ad bene agendum, ut +supra dictum est, ratio autem doni sumitur secundum comparationem +ad causam a qua est. Nihil autem prohibet illud quod est ab alio ut +donum, esse perfectivum alicuius ad bene operandum, praesertim cum +supra dixerimus quod virtutes quaedam nobis sunt infusae a Deo. +Unde secundum hoc, donum a virtute distingui non potest. Et ideo +quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a virtutibus distinguenda. +Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, ut scilicet rationem +assignent quare quaedam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et +quare aliqua computantur inter dona, quae non computantur inter +virtutes, ut patet de timore. Unde alii dixerunt dona a virtutibus +esse distinguenda; sed non assignaverunt convenientem distinctionis +causam, quae scilicet ita communis esset virtutibus, quod nullo +modo donis, aut e converso. Considerantes enim aliqui quod, inter +septem dona, quatuor pertinent ad rationem, scilicet sapientia +scientia, intellectus et consilium; et tria ad vim appetitivam, +scilicet fortitudo, pietas et timor; posuerunt quod dona +perficiebant liberum arbitrium secundum quod est facultas rationis, +virtutes vero secundum quod est facultas voluntatis, quia +invenerunt duas solas virtutes in ratione vel intellectu, scilicet +fidem et prudentiam, alias vero in vi appetitiva vel affectiva. +Oporteret autem, si haec distinctio esset conveniens, quod omnes +virtutes essent in vi appetitiva, et omnia dona in ratione. Quidam +vero, considerantes quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod +<i>donum spiritus sancti, quod in mente sibi subiecta format +temperantiam, prudentiam, iustitiam et fortitudinem; eandem mentem +munit contra singula tentamenta per septem dona</i>, dixerunt quod +virtutes ordinantur ad bene operandum, dona vero ad resistendum +tentationibus. Sed nec ista distinctio sufficit. Quia etiam +virtutes tentationibus resistunt, inducentibus ad peccata, quae +contrariantur virtutibus, unumquodque enim resistit naturaliter suo +contrario. Quod praecipue patet de caritate, de qua dicitur Cantic. +VIII, <i>aquae multae non potuerunt extinguere caritatem</i>. Alii +vero, considerantes quod ista dona traduntur in Scriptura secundum +quod fuerunt in Christo, ut patet Isaiae XI; dixerunt quod virtutes +ordinantur simpliciter ad bene operandum; sed dona ordinantur ad +hoc ut per ea conformemur Christo, praecipue quantum ad ea quae +passus est, quia in passione eius praecipue huiusmodi dona +resplenduerunt. Sed hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens. Quia +ipse dominus praecipue nos inducit ad sui conformitatem secundum +humilitatem et mansuetudinem, Matth. XI, <i>discite a me, quia +mitis sum et humilis corde</i>; et secundum caritatem, ut Ioan. XV, +<i>diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos</i>. Et hae etiam virtutes +praecipue in passione Christi refulserunt. Et ideo ad distinguendum +dona a virtutibus, debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae, in qua +nobis traduntur non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine +spirituum, sic enim dicitur Isaiae XI, <i>requiescet super eum +spiritus sapientiae et intellectus,</i> et cetera. Ex quibus verbis +manifeste datur intelligi quod ista septem enumerantur ibi, +secundum quod sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. Inspiratio +autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori. Est enim +considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens, unum +quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est +Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam philosophus hoc dicit, in cap. +de bona fortuna. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur, +necesse est proportionatum esse motori, et haec est perfectio +mobilis inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod +bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto +necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur, +sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum, +ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam capiat a docente. Manifestum est +autem quod virtutes humanae perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo +natus est moveri per rationem in his quae interius vel exterius +agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones, secundum +quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istae +perfectiones vocantur dona, non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed +quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab +inspiratione divina, sicut dicitur Isaiae l, <i>dominus aperuit +mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico, retrorsum non abii</i>. Et +philosophus etiam dicit, in cap. de bona fortuna, quod his qui +moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit consiliari secundum +rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum, quia +moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est quod +quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam +sint actus virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above + the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike + kai theia}]," in respect of which some men are called "divine." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36343] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi dona nominantur quandoque virtutes, +secundum communem rationem virtutis. Habent tamen aliquid +supereminens rationi communi virtutis, inquantum sunt quaedam +divinae virtutes, perficientes hominem inquantum est a Deo motus. +Unde et philosophus, in VII Ethic., supra virtutem communem ponit +quandam virtutem heroicam vel divinam, secundum quam dicuntur +aliqui divini viri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed + to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, + whose light flows from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36344] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod vitia, inquantum sunt contra bonum rationis, +contrariantur virtutibus, inquantum autem sunt contra divinum +instinctum, contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo et +rationi, cuius lumen a Deo derivatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished + from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured + by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation + to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the + promptings of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36345] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod definitio illa datur de virtute secundum communem +modum virtutis. Unde si volumus definitionem restringere ad +virtutes prout distinguuntur a donis, dicemus quod hoc quod +dicitur, qua recte vivitur, intelligendum est de rectitudine vitae +quae accipitur secundum regulam rationis. Similiter autem donum, +prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a +Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet facit hominem bene +sequentem suos instinctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according + as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36346] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod sapientia dicitur intellectualis virtus, secundum +quod procedit ex iudicio rationis, dicitur autem donum, secundum +quod operatur ex instinctu divino. Et similiter dicendum est de +aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A2-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 2. Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing + the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing + the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the + gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36347] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint necessaria homini ad +salutem. Dona enim ordinantur ad quandam perfectionem ultra +communem perfectionem virtutis. Non autem est homini necessarium ad +salutem ut huiusmodi perfectionem consequatur, quae est ultra +communem statum virtutis, quia huiusmodi perfectio non cadit sub +praecepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini +ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now + man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. + Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36348] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad salutem hominis sufficit quod homo se bene habeat et circa +divina et circa humana. Sed per virtutes theologicas homo se habet +bene circa divina; per virtutes autem morales, circa humana. Ergo +dona non sunt homini necessaria ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel + against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against + pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary + to man for salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36349] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod <i>spiritus sanctus dat +sapientiam contra stultitiam, intellectum contra hebetudinem, +consilium contra praecipitationem, fortitudinem contra timorem, +scientiam contra ignorantiam, pietatem contra duritiam, timorem +contra superbiam</i>. Sed sufficiens remedium potest adhiberi ad +omnia ista tollenda per virtutes. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria +homini ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since + of wisdom it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:28</a>): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary + for salvation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36350] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +inter dona summum videtur esse sapientia, infimum autem timor. +Utrumque autem horum necessarium est ad salutem, quia de sapientia +dicitur, Sap. VII, <i>neminem diligit Deus nisi eum qui cum +sapientia inhabitat</i>; et de timore dicitur, Eccli. I, <i>qui +sine timore est, non poterit iustificari</i>. Ergo etiam alia dona +media sunt necessaria ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those + matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is, + in consequence, need for a gift. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p7"> Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; + secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q68_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[1]</a>). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner + than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter + imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue + perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every + nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, + unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has + the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can + work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions + from him. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p8"> Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment + of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be + out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, + had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason + moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does + not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.17" target="asv">17</a>: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.142.10" target="asv"> Ps. 142:10</a>: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that + land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it + is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 co."><a name="36351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36351] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam hominis +perfectiones, quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur +instinctum divinum. Unde in his in quibus non sufficit instinctus +rationis, sed est necessarius spiritus sancti instinctus, per +consequens est necessarium donum. Ratio autem hominis est perfecta +dupliciter a Deo, primo quidem, naturali perfectione, scilicet +secundum lumen naturale rationis; alio modo, quadam supernaturali +perfectione, per virtutes theologicas, ut dictum est supra. Et +quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit maior quam prima, tamen prima +perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda, nam prima habetur +ab homine quasi plena possessio, secunda autem habetur quasi +imperfecta; imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum. +Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque quod perfecte habet naturam +vel formam aliquam aut virtutem, potest per se secundum illam +operari, non tamen exclusa operatione Dei, qui in omni natura et +voluntate interius operatur. Sed id quod imperfecte habet naturam +aliquam vel formam aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab +altero moveatur. Sicut sol, quia est perfecte lucidus, per seipsum +potest illuminare, luna autem, in qua est imperfecte natura lucis, +non illuminat nisi illuminata. Medicus etiam, qui perfecte novit +artem medicinae, potest per se operari, sed discipulus eius, qui +nondum est plene instructus, non potest per se operari, nisi ab eo +instruatur. Sic igitur quantum ad ea quae subsunt humanae rationi, +in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini; homo potest +operari, per iudicium rationis. Si tamen etiam in hoc homo +adiuvetur a Deo per specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis +bonitatis, unde secundum philosophos, non quicumque habebat +virtutes morales acquisitas, habebat virtutes heroicas vel divinas. +Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet +secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per virtutes +theologicas; non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit +instinctus et motio spiritus sancti; secundum illud Rom. VIII, +<i>qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt; et si filii, et +haeredes</i>, et in Psalmo CXLII, dicitur, <i>spiritus tuus bonus +deducet me in terram rectam</i>; quia scilicet in haereditatem +illius terrae beatorum nullus potest pervenire, nisi moveatur et +deducatur a spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum, +necessarium est homini habere donum spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), + but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36352] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dona excedunt communem perfectionem virtutum, +non quantum ad genus operum, eo modo quo consilia excedunt +praecepta, sed quantum ad modum operandi, secundum quod movetur +homo ab altiori principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need + of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36353] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita +perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin semper indigeat +moveri quodam superiori instinctu spiritus sancti, ratione iam +dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does + not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in + the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, + ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the + gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36354] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod rationi humanae non sunt omnia cognita, neque omnia +possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta perfectione naturali, sive +accipiatur ut perfecta theologicis virtutibus. Unde non potest +quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus +ibi fit mentio. Sed Deus cuius scientiae et potestati omnia +subsunt, sua motione ab omni stultitia et ignorantia et hebetudine +et duritia et ceteris huiusmodi, nos tutos reddit. Et ideo dona +spiritus sancti, quae faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ipsius, +dicuntur contra huiusmodi defectus dari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A3-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 3. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined + as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts + of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory + comments as + follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator." + Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36355] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non sint habitus. +Habitus enim est qualitas in homine manens, est enim qualitas +difficile mobilis, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed proprium +Christi est quod dona spiritus sancti in eo requiescant; ut dicitur +Isaiae XI. Et Ioan. I, dicitur, <i>super quem videris spiritum +descendentem, et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat</i>, quod +exponens Gregorius, in II Moral., dicit, <i>in cunctis fidelibus +spiritus sanctus venit; sed in solo mediatore semper singulariter +permanet</i>. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected + by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36356] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem secundum quod agitur a +spiritu Dei, sicut dictum est. Sed inquantum homo agitur a spiritu +Dei, se habet quodammodo ut instrumentum respectu eius. Non autem +convenit ut instrumentum perficiatur per habitum, sed principale +agens. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a + habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, + therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36357] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dona spiritus sancti sunt ex inspiratione divina, ita et +donum prophetiae. Sed prophetia non est habitus, non enim semper +spiritus prophetiae adest prophetis, ut Gregorius dicit, in I +homilia Ezechielis. Ergo neque etiam dona spiritus sancti sunt +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts + abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36358] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit discipulis, de spiritu sancto loquens, Ioan. +XIV, <i>apud vos manebit, et in vobis erit</i>. Spiritus autem +sanctus non est in hominibus absque donis eius. Ergo dona eius +manent in hominibus. Ergo non solum sunt actus vel passiones, sed +etiam habitus permanentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from + what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it + partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly + the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as + compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related + to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. + Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 co."><a name="36359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36359] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam perfectiones +hominis, quibus disponitur ad hoc quod homo bene sequatur +instinctum spiritus sancti. Manifestum est autem ex supradictis +quod virtutes morales perficiunt vim appetitivam secundum quod +participat aliqualiter rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri +per imperium rationis. Hoc igitur modo dona spiritus sancti se +habent ad hominem in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum, sicut +virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparatione ad +rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires +appetitivae disponuntur ad prompte obediendum rationi. Unde et dona +spiritus sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad +prompte obediendum spiritui sancto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy + Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A2" id="FS_Q68_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36360] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius ibidem solvit, dicens quod <i>in illis +donis sine quibus ad vitam perveniri non potest, spiritus sanctus +in electis omnibus semper manet, sed in aliis non semper manet</i>. +Septem autem dona sunt necessaria ad salutem, ut dictum est. Unde +quantum ad ea, spiritus sanctus semper manet in sanctis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is + not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has + a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36361] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de instrumento cuius non est +agere, sed solum agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic +agitur a spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi +arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the + comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36362] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prophetia est de donis quae sunt ad manifestationem +spiritus, non autem ad necessitatem salutis. Unde non est +simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A4-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 4. Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding + to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing + is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to + justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of + fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36363] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter septem dona spiritus +sancti enumerentur. In illa enim enumeratione ponuntur quatuor +pertinentia ad virtutes intellectuales, scilicet sapientia, +intellectus, scientia et consilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, +nihil autem ibi ponitur quod pertineat ad artem, quae est quinta +virtus intellectualis. Similiter etiam ponitur aliquid pertinens ad +iustitiam, scilicet pietas, et aliquid pertinens ad fortitudinem, +scilicet donum fortitudinis, nihil autem ponitur ibi pertinens ad +temperantiam. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore + justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36364] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +pietas est pars iustitiae. Sed circa fortitudinem non ponitur +aliqua pars eius, sed ipsa fortitudo. Ergo non debuit poni pietas, +sed ipsa iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is + moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36365] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes theologicae maxime ordinant nos ad Deum. Cum ergo dona +perficiant hominem secundum quod movetur a Deo, videtur quod +debuissent poni aliqua dona pertinentia ad theologicas +virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided + with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36366] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Deus timetur, ita etiam amatur, et in ipsum aliquis sperat, +et de eo delectatur. Amor autem, spes et delectatio sunt passiones +condivisae timori. Ergo, sicut timor ponitur donum, ita et alia +tria debent poni dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, + some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably + enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="36367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36367] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectui adiungitur sapientia quae regit ipsum; fortitudini +autem consilium, pietati vero scientia. Ergo et timori debuit addi +aliquod donum directivum. Inconvenienter ergo septem dona spiritus +sancti enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Holy Writ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36368] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in +contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae, Isaiae XI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues + perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved + by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior + power. Therefore whatever powers in man + can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the + reason and appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A4-p9"> Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery + of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected + by "understanding"; the practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; + the practical reason by "knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to + another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers; + and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.27" target="asv"> Prov. 15:27</a>: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv"> Ps. 118:120</a>: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all + those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and + moral, extend. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 co."><a name="36369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36369] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quidam habitus +perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum +spiritus sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires +appetitivas ad obediendum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae +natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae +natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori +potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse +principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt +dona, scilicet in ratione, et in vi appetitiva. Ratio autem est +speculativa et practica, et in utraque consideratur apprehensio +veritatis, quae pertinet ad inventionem; et iudicium de veritate. +Ad apprehensionem igitur veritatis, perficitur speculativa ratio +per intellectum; practica vero per consilium. Ad recte autem +iudicandum, speculativa quidem per sapientiam, practica vero per +scientiam perficitur. Appetitiva autem virtus, in his quidem quae +sunt ad alterum, perficitur per pietatem. In his autem quae sunt ad +seipsum, perficitur per fortitudinem contra terrorem periculorum, +contra concupiscentiam vero inordinatam delectabilium, per timorem, +secundum illud Proverb. XV, <i>per timorem domini declinat omnis a +malo</i>; et in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>confige timore tuo carnes meas, a +iudiciis enim tuis timui</i>. Et sic patet quod haec dona extendunt +se ad omnia ad quae se extendunt virtutes tam intellectuales quam +morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but + to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made + (Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, + Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He + moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, + to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to + withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36370] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem in his +quae pertinent ad bene vivendum, ad quae non ordinatur ars, sed ad +exteriora factibilia; est enim ars ratio recta non agibilium, sed +factibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Potest tamen dici quod, +quantum ad infusionem donorum, ars pertinet ad spiritum sanctum, +qui est principaliter movens; non autem ad homines, qui sunt +quaedam organa eius dum ab eo moventur. Temperantiae autem +respondet quodammodo donum timoris. Sicut enim ad virtutem +temperantiae pertinet, secundum eius propriam rationem, ut aliquis +recedat a delectationibus pravis propter bonum rationis; ita ad +donum timoris pertinet quod aliquis recedat a delectationibus +pravis propter Dei timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name + of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship + of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for + God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36371] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nomen iustitiae imponitur a rectitudine rationis, et +ideo nomen virtutis est convenientius quam nomen doni. Sed nomen +pietatis importat reverentiam quam habemus ad patrem et ad patriam. +Et quia pater omnium Deus est, etiam cultus Dei pietas nominatur; +ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Et ideo convenienter donum quo +aliquis propter reverentiam Dei bonum operatur ad omnes, pietas +nominatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved + by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is + by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore + all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36372] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod animus hominis non movetur a spiritu sancto, nisi ei +secundum aliquem modum uniatur, sicut instrumentum non movetur ab +artifice nisi per contactum, aut per aliquam aliam unionem. Prima +autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et caritatem. Unde istae +virtutes praesupponuntur ad dona, sicut radices quaedam donorum. +Unde omnia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, sicut quaedam +derivationes praedictarum virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred + to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to + God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does + not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws + us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36373] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod amor et spes et delectatio habent bonum pro obiecto. +Summum autem bonum Deus est, unde nomina harum passionum +transferuntur ad virtutes theologicas, quibus anima coniungitur +Deo. Timoris autem obiectum est malum, quod Deo nullo modo +competit, unde non importat coniunctionem ad Deum, sed magis +recessum ab aliquibus rebus propter reverentiam Dei. Et ideo non +est nomen virtutis theologicae, sed doni, quod eminentius retrahit +a malis quam virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their + directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. + Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="36374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36374] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod per sapientiam dirigitur et hominis intellectus, et +hominis affectus. Et ideo ponuntur duo correspondentia sapientiae +tanquam directivo, ex parte quidem intellectus, donum intellectus; +ex parte autem affectus, donum timoris. Ratio enim timendi Deum +praecipue sumitur ex consideratione excellentiae divinae, quam +considerat sapientia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A5-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 5. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same + Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are + given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36375] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint connexa. Dicit enim +apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, <i>alii datur per spiritum sermo +sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum</i>. Sed +sapientia et scientia inter dona spiritus sancti computantur. Ergo +dona spiritus sancti dantur diversis, et non connectuntur sibi +invicem in eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some + of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected + together in one and the same man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36376] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod <i>scientia non pollent +fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide</i>. Sed fidem +concomitatur aliquod de donis, ad minus donum timoris. Ergo videtur +quod dona non sint ex necessitate connexa in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless + if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude + is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is + very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it + has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that it is possible to + have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36377] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius, in I Moral., dicit quod <i>minor est sapientia, si +intellectu careat; et valde inutilis est intellectus, si ex +sapientia non subsistat. Vile est consilium, cui opus fortitudinis +deest; et valde fortitudo destruitur, nisi per consilium fulciatur. +Nulla est scientia, si utilitatem pietatis non habet; et valde +inutilis est pietas, si scientiae discretione caret. Timor quoque +ipse, si non has virtutes habuerit, ad nullum opus bonae actionis +surgit</i>. Ex quibus videtur quod unum donum possit sine alio +haberi. Non ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, + that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore + the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36378] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ibidem Gregorius praemittit, dicens, <i>illud in hoc +filiorum convivio perscrutandum videtur, quod semetipsos invicem +pascunt</i>. Per filios autem Iob, de quibus loquitur, designantur +dona spiritus sancti. Ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa, per +hoc quod se invicem reficiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers + of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is + poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, + just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: + so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 co."><a name="36379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36379] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas de facili ex praemissis +potest haberi. Dictum est enim supra quod sicut vires appetitivae +disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione ad regimen +rationis, ita omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in +comparatione ad spiritum sanctum moventem. Spiritus autem sanctus +habitat in nobis per caritatem, secundum illud Rom. V, <i>caritas +Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus +est nobis</i>, sicut et ratio nostra perficitur per prudentiam. +Unde sicut virtutes morales connectuntur sibi invicem in prudentia, +ita dona spiritus sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate, ita +scilicet quod qui caritatem habet, omnia dona spiritus sancti +habet; quorum nullum sine caritate haberi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge + of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense + that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and + the "word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the + Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the + promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in + all who are possessed of charity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36380] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sapientia et scientia uno modo possunt +considerari secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae, prout scilicet +aliquis abundat intantum in cognitione rerum divinarum et +humanarum, ut possit et fideles instruere et adversarios confutare. +Et sic loquitur ibi apostolus de sapientia et scientia, unde +signanter fit mentio de sermone sapientiae et scientiae. Alio modo +possunt accipi prout sunt dona spiritus sancti. Et sic sapientia et +scientia nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam perfectiones humanae mentis, +secundum quas disponitur ad sequendum instinctus spiritus sancti in +cognitione divinorum vel humanorum. Et sic patet quod huiusmodi +dona sunt in omnibus habentibus caritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring + to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it + is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; + and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it + against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36381] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de scientia exponens +praedictam auctoritatem apostoli, unde loquitur de scientia +praedicto modo accepta, secundum quod est gratia gratis data. Quod +patet ex hoc quod subdit, <i>aliud enim est scire tantummodo quid +homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quae non +nisi aeterna est; aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis +opituletur, et contra impios defendatur; quam proprio appellare +vocabulo scientiam videtur apostolus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by + another, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q68_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without + the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend + its support to + another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without + wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36382] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut uno modo connexio virtutum cardinalium +probatur per hoc quod una earum perficitur quodammodo per aliam, ut +supra dictum est; ita Gregorius eodem modo vult probare connexionem +donorum, per hoc quod unum sine alio non potest esse perfectum. +Unde praemittit dicens, <i>valde singula quaelibet destituitur, si +non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur</i>. Non ergo datur +intelligi quod unum donum possit esse sine alio, sed quod +intellectus, si esset sine sapientia, non esset donum; sicut +temperantia, si esset sine iustitia, non esset virtus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A6-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 6. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of + His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.9" target="asv"> Is. 11:9</a>: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in + heaven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36383] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non maneant in +patria. Dicit enim Gregorius, in II Moral., quod <i>spiritus +sanctus contra singula tentamenta septem donis erudit mentem</i>. +Sed in patria non erunt aliqua tentamenta; secundum illud Isaiae +XI, <i>non nocebunt et non occident in universo monte sancto +meo</i>. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non erunt in patria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory + says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly + . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of + which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36384] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +dona spiritus sancti sunt habitus quidam, ut supra dictum est. +Frustra autem essent habitus, ubi actus esse non possunt. Actus +autem quorundam donorum in patria esse non possunt, dicit enim +Gregorius, in I Moral., quod <i>intellectus facit audita penetrare, +et consilium prohibet esse praecipitem, et fortitudo facit non +metuere adversa, et pietas replet cordis viscera operibus +misericordiae</i>; haec autem non competunt statui patriae. Ergo +huiusmodi dona non erunt in statu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, + e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of + the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36385] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +donorum quaedam perficiunt hominem in vita contemplativa, ut +sapientia et intellectus; quaedam in vita activa, ut pietas et +fortitudo. Sed activa vita cum hac vita terminatur; ut Gregorius +dicit, in VI Moral. Ergo in statu gloriae non erunt omnia dona +spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly + river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more + abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36386] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>civitas +Dei illa, Ierusalem caelestis, non meatu alicuius fluvii terrestris +abluitur; sed ex vitae fonte procedens spiritus sanctus, cuius nos +brevi satiamur haustu, in illis caelestibus spiritibus redundantius +videtur affluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens +meatu</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may + be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human + mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may + be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation + about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not + remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues ( + <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[67], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 co."><a name="36387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36387] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de donis dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno modo, quantum +ad essentiam donorum, et sic perfectissime erunt in patria, sicut +patet per auctoritatem Ambrosii inductam. Cuius ratio est quia dona +spiritus sancti perficiunt mentem humanam ad sequendam motionem +spiritus sancti, quod praecipue erit in patria, quando Deus erit +omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, et quando homo erit +totaliter subditus Deo. Alio modo possunt considerari quantum ad +materiam circa quam operantur, et sic in praesenti habent +operationem circa aliquam materiam circa quam non habebunt +operationem in statu gloriae. Et secundum hoc, non manebunt in +patria, sicut supra de virtutibus cardinalibus dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they + afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected + in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36388] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur ibi de donis secundum quod +competunt statui praesenti, sic enim donis protegimur contra +tentamenta malorum. Sed in statu gloriae, cessantibus malis, per +dona spiritus sancti perficiemur in bono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in + the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, + hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and + enlightening its darkness," of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach + no more every man . . . his brother" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3,4</a>); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is necessary + in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude + he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands + of confidence," which remains also in the + future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers + to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, + which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words + taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost + heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say + that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens + it with the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to + the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36389] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Gregorius quasi in singulis donis ponit aliquid quod +transit cum statu praesenti, et aliquid quod permanet etiam in +futuro. Dicit enim quod sapientia mentem de aeternorum spe et +certitudine reficit, quorum duorum spes transit, sed certitudo +remanet. Et de intellectu dicit quod in eo quod audita penetrat, +reficiendo cor, tenebras eius illustrat, quorum auditus transit, +quia non docebit vir fratrem suum, ut dicitur Ierem. XXXI; sed +illustratio mentis manebit. De consilio autem dicit quod prohibet +esse praecipitem, quod est necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod +ratione animum replet, quod est necessarium etiam in futuro. De +fortitudine vero dicit quod adversa non metuit, quod est +necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod confidentiae cibos +apponit, quod permanet etiam in futuro. De scientia vero unum +tantum ponit, scilicet quod ignorantiae ieiunium superat, quod +pertinet ad statum praesentem. Sed quod addit, in ventre mentis, +potest figuraliter intelligi repletio cognitionis, quae pertinet +etiam ad statum futurum. De pietate vero dicit quod cordis viscera +misericordiae operibus replet. Quod quidem secundum verba, pertinet +tantum ad statum praesentem. Sed ipse intimus affectus proximorum, +per viscera designatus, pertinet etiam ad futurum statum; in quo +pietas non exhibebit misericordiae opera, sed congratulationis +affectum. De timore vero dicit quod premit mentem, ne de +praesentibus superbiat, quod pertinet ad statum praesentem; et quod +de futuris cibo spei confortat, quod etiam pertinet ad statum +praesentem, quantum ad spem; sed potest etiam ad statum futurum +pertinere, quantum ad confortationem de rebus hic speratis, et ibi +obtentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; + but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of + heavenly bliss. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36390] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de donis quantum ad materiam. +Opera enim activae vitae non erunt materia donorum, sed omnia +habebunt actus suos circa ea quae pertinent ad vitam +contemplativam, quae est vita beata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A7-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 7. Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, + that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is + written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malachi 1:6</a>): "If . . . I be a master, where is My + fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36391] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod dignitas donorum non attenditur +secundum enumerationem qua enumerantur Isaiae XI. Illud enim +videtur esse potissimum in donis, quod maxime Deus ab homine +requirit. Sed maxime requirit Deus ab homine timorem, dicitur enim +Deut. X, <i>et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, +nisi ut timeas dominum Deum tuum?</i> Et Malach. I, dicitur, <i>si +ego dominus, ubi timor meus?</i> Ergo videtur quod timor, qui +enumeratur ultimo, non sit infimum donorum, sed maximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore + piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36392] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +pietas videtur esse quoddam bonum universale, dicit enim apostolus, +I ad Tim. IV, quod <i>pietas ad omnia utilis est</i>. Sed bonum +universale praefertur particularibus bonis. Ergo pietas, quae +penultimo enumeratur, videtur esse potissimum donorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. + Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36393] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +scientia perficit iudicium hominis; consilium autem ad +inquisitionem pertinet. Sed iudicium praeeminet inquisitioni. Ergo +scientia est potius donum quam consilium, cum tamen post +enumeretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power + than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. + Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="36394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36394] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +fortitudo pertinet ad vim appetitivam; scientia autem ad rationem. +Sed ratio est eminentior quam vis appetitiva. Ergo et scientia est +eminentius donum quam fortitudo, quae tamen primo enumeratur. Non +ergo dignitas donorum attenditur secundum ordinem enumerationis +eorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias + speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.3" target="asv"> Mat. 5:3</a>]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, + with the lower gifts." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36395] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +<i>videtur mihi septiformis operatio spiritus sancti, de qua Isaias +loquitur, his gradibus sententiisque congruere</i> (de quibus fit +mentio Matth. V); sed interest ordinis. Nam ibi (scilicet in Isaia) +<i>enumeratio ab excellentioribus coepit, hic vero, ab +inferioribus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding + from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts + simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for + all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q68_A4" id="FS_Q68_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative + are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before + understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, + understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and + fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude + temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel + are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of + the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference + to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and + piety, it is considered with regard to their matter. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 co."><a name="36396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36396] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod dignitas donorum dupliciter potest attendi, uno modo, +simpliciter, scilicet per comparationem ad proprios actus prout +procedunt a suis principiis; alio modo, secundum quid, scilicet per +comparationem ad materiam. Simpliciter autem loquendo de dignitate +donorum, eadem est ratio comparationis in ipsis et in virtutibus, +quia dona ad omnes actus potentiarum animae perficiunt hominem, ad +quos perficiunt virtutes, ut supra dictum est. Unde sicut virtutes +intellectuales praeferuntur virtutibus moralibus; et in ipsis +virtutibus intellectualibus contemplativae praeferuntur activis, ut +sapientia intellectui, et scientia prudentiae et arti; ita tamen +quod sapientia praefertur intellectui, et intellectus scientiae, +sicut prudentia et synesis eubuliae, ita etiam in donis sapientia +et intellectus, scientia et consilium, praeferuntur pietati et +fortitudini et timori; in quibus etiam pietas praefertur +fortitudini, et fortitudo timori, sicut iustitia fortitudini, et +fortitudo temperantiae. Sed quantum ad materiam, fortitudo et +consilium praeferuntur scientiae et pietati, quia scilicet +fortitudo et consilium in arduis locum habent; pietas autem, et +etiam scientia, in communibus. Sic igitur donorum dignitas ordini +enumerationis respondet, partim quidem simpliciter, secundum quod +sapientia et intellectus omnibus praeferuntur, partim autem +secundum ordinem materiae, secundum quod consilium et fortitudo +praeferuntur scientiae et pietati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the + Lord is the beginning of wisdom" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.10" target="asv">Ps. 110:10</a>; + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.16" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:16</a>), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on + account of fear ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.16" target="asv">Prov. 16:16</a>), before doing good works, and which result from the other + gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36397] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod timor maxime requiritur quasi primordium quoddam +perfectionis donorum, quia initium sapientiae timor domini, non +propter hoc quod sit ceteris dignius. Prius enim est, secundum +ordinem generationis, ut aliquis recedat a malo, quod fit per +timorem, ut dicitur Proverb. XVI; quam quod operetur bonum, quod +fit per alia dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which + he had said it "is profitable to little." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36398] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod pietas non comparatur in verbis apostoli, omnibus +donis Dei, sed soli corporali exercitationi, de qua praemittit quod +ad modicum utilis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: + for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36399] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod scientia etsi praeferatur consilio ratione iudicii, +tamen consilium praefertur ratione materiae, nam consilium non +habet locum nisi in arduis, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; sed iudicium +scientiae in omnibus locum habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation + to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. + But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge + united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of + difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason + of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="36400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36400] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod dona directiva, quae pertinent ad rationem, donis +exequentibus digniora sunt, si considerentur per comparationem ad +actus prout egrediuntur a potentiis, ratio enim appetitivae +praeeminet, ut regulans regulato. Sed ratione materiae, adiungitur +consilium fortitudini, sicut directivum exequenti, et similiter +scientia pietati, quia scilicet consilium et fortitudo in arduis +locum habent, scientia autem et pietas etiam in communibus. Et ideo +consilium simul cum fortitudine, ratione materiae, numeratur ante +scientiam et pietatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A8-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 8. Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of + charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from + the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing." + But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy + Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36401] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes sint praeferendae donis. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in XV de Trin., de caritate loquens, +<i>nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. Solum est quod dividit +inter filios regni aeterni, et filios perditionis aeternae, dantur +et alia per spiritum sanctum munera, sed sine caritate nihil +prosunt</i>. Sed caritas est virtus. Ergo virtus est potior donis +spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; + for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, + fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly + to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against + fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues + are more excellent than the gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36402] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt priora naturaliter, videntur esse potiora. Sed +virtutes sunt priores donis spiritus sancti, dicit enim Gregorius, +in II Moral., quod <i>donum spiritus sancti in subiecta mente ante +alia iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam format, et +sic eandem mentem septem mox virtutibus</i> (idest donis) +<i>temperat, ut contra stultitiam, sapientiam; contra hebetudinem, +intellectum; contra praecipitationem, consilium; contra timorem, +fortitudinem; contra ignorantiam, scientiam; contra duritiam, +pietatem; contra superbiam, det timorem</i>. Ergo virtutes sunt +potiores donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make + evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; + or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; + that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while + it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and + lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than + the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36403] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutibus nullus male uti potest, ut Augustinus dicit. Donis autem +potest aliquis male uti, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod +<i>hostiam nostrae precis immolamus ne sapientia elevet; ne +intellectus, dum subtiliter currit, oberret; ne consilium, dum se +multiplicat, confundat; ne fortitudo, dum fiduciam praebet, +praecipitet; ne scientia, dum novit et non diligit, inflet; ne +pietas, dum se extra rectitudinem inclinat, intorqueat; ne timor, +dum plus iusto trepidat, in desperationis foveam mergat</i>. Ergo +virtutes sunt digniores donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so + that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36404] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dona dantur in adiutorium virtutum contra defectus, ut +patet in auctoritate inducta; et sic videtur quod perficiant quod +virtutes perficere non possunt. Sunt ergo dona potiora +virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[62], A[1]</a>), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues + are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and + the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of + the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion. + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p7"> Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, + in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle + of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so + the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory + says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all + they do be done in faith, hope, and charity." + </p><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p8"> But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. + Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either + the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more + excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect + than the virtues. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 co."><a name="36405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36405] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtutes in tria genera +distinguuntur, sunt enim quaedam virtutes theologicae, quaedam +intellectuales, quaedam morales. Virtutes quidem theologicae sunt +quibus mens humana Deo coniungitur; virtutes autem intellectuales +sunt quibus ratio ipsa perficitur; virtutes autem morales sunt +quibus vires appetitivae perficiuntur ad obediendum rationi. Dona +autem spiritus sancti sunt quibus omnes vires animae disponuntur ad +hoc quod subdantur motioni divinae. Sic ergo eadem videtur esse +comparatio donorum ad virtutes theologicas, per quas homo unitur +spiritui sancto moventi; sicut virtutum moralium ad virtutes +intellectuales, per quas perficitur ratio, quae est virtutum +moralium motiva. Unde sicut virtutes intellectuales praeferuntur +virtutibus moralibus, et regulant eas; ita virtutes theologicae +praeferuntur donis spiritus sancti, et regulant ea. Unde Gregorius +dicit, in I Moral., quod <i>neque ad denarii perfectionem septem +filii</i> (idest septem dona) <i>perveniunt, nisi in fide, spe et +caritate fuerit omne quod agunt</i>. Sed si comparemus dona ad +alias virtutes intellectuales vel morales, dona praeferuntur +virtutibus. Quia dona perficiunt vires animae in comparatione ad +spiritum sanctum moventem, virtutes autem perficiunt vel ipsam +rationem, vel alias vires in ordine ad rationem. Manifestum est +autem quod ad altiorem motorem oportet maiori perfectione mobile +esse dispositum. Unde perfectiora sunt dona virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36406] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod caritas est virtus theologica; de qua concedimus +quod sit potior donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes + love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. + The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: + and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, + through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36407] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid est prius altero dupliciter. Uno modo, ordine +perfectionis et dignitatis, sicut dilectio Dei est prior dilectione +proximi. Et hoc modo dona sunt priora virtutibus intellectualibus +et moralibus, posteriora vero virtutibus theologicis. Alio modo, +ordine generationis seu dispositionis, sicut dilectio proximi +praecedit dilectionem Dei, quantum ad actum. Et sic virtutes +morales et intellectuales praecedunt dona, quia per hoc quod homo +bene se habet circa rationem propriam, disponitur ad hoc quod se +bene habeat in ordine ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth + not perversely" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy + Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36408] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sapientia et intellectus et alia huiusmodi sunt dona +spiritus sancti, secundum quod caritate informantur; quae non agit +perperam, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Et ideo sapientia et +intellectu et aliis huiusmodi nullus male utitur, secundum quod +sunt dona spiritus sancti. Sed ad hoc quod a caritatis perfectione +non recedant, unum ab altero adiuvatur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius +dicere intendit.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q69" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q69-p0.1">Q. 69. OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q69-p2"> We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q69-p3"><a href="#FS_Q69_A1"> (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p4"><a href="#FS_Q69_A2"> (2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p5"><a href="#FS_Q69_A3"> (3) Of the number of the beatitudes;</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p6"><a href="#FS_Q69_A4"> (4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 pr."><a name="36409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36409] +Iª-IIae q. 69 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +beatitudinibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum +beatitudines a donis et virtutibus distinguantur. Secundo, de +praemiis beatitudinum, utrum pertineant ad hanc vitam. Tertio, de +numero beatitudinum. Quarto, de convenientia praemiorum quae eis +attribuuntur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q69_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A1-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 1. Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns + the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Luke 6:20, </a> seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from + the virtues and gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36410] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudines a virtutibus et donis non +distinguantur. Augustinus enim, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, +attribuit beatitudines in Matthaeo enumeratas, donis spiritus +sancti, Ambrosius autem, super Lucam, attribuit beatitudines ibi +enumeratas quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus. Ergo beatitudines non +distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q21_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[21], A[1]</a>). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy + Ghost, as is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.3" shape="rect">Q[68], AA[1]</a>,3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of + the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36411] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +humanae voluntatis non est nisi duplex regula, scilicet ratio, et +lex aeterna, ut supra habitum est. Sed virtutes perficiunt hominem +in ordine ad rationem; dona autem in ordine ad legem aeternam +spiritus sancti, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo non potest esse aliquid +aliud pertinens ad rectitudinem voluntatis humanae, praeter +virtutes et dona. Non ergo beatitudines ab eis distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes + do not differ from the virtues and gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36412] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in enumeratione beatitudinum ponitur mititas, et iustitia, et +misericordia; quae dicuntur esse quaedam virtutes. Ergo +beatitudines non distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. + Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36413] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod quaedam enumerantur inter beatitudines, quae nec sunt +virtutes nec dona; sicut paupertas, et luctus, et pax. Differunt +ergo beatitudines et a virtutibus et a donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[7]</a>; + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[3], A[1]</a>), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore + the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved + towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy + end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is + not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow + him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 co."><a name="36414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36414] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, beatitudo est ultimus finis +humanae vitae. Dicitur autem aliquis iam finem habere, propter spem +finis obtinendi, unde et philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod +<i>pueri dicuntur beati propter spem</i>; et apostolus dicit, Rom. +VIII, <i>spe salvi facti sumus</i>. Spes autem de fine consequendo +insurgit ex hoc quod aliquis convenienter movetur ad finem, et +appropinquat ad ipsum, quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad +finem autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et appropinquat per +operationes virtutum; et praecipue per operationes donorum, si +loquamur de beatitudine aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in +eam inducit spiritus sanctus, ad cuius obedientiam et sequelam per +dona perficimur. Et ideo beatitudines distinguuntur quidem a +virtutibus et donis, non sicut habitus ab eis distincti, sed sicut +actus distinguuntur ab habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more + excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q68_A8" id="FS_Q69_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[68], A[8]</a>). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas + Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more + perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36415] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus et Ambrosius attribuunt beatitudines +donis et virtutibus, sicut actus attribuuntur habitibus. Dona autem +sunt eminentiora virtutibus cardinalibus, ut supra dictum est. Et +ideo Ambrosius, exponens beatitudines turbis propositas, attribuit +eas virtutibus cardinalibus; Augustinus autem, exponens +beatitudines discipulis propositas in monte, tanquam +perfectioribus, attribuit eas donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36416] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod non sunt alii habitus +rectificantes humanam vitam, praeter virtutes et dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might + seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues + perfect him, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q68_A2" id="FS_Q69_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[68], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36417] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod mititas accipitur pro actu mansuetudinis, et +similiter dicendum est de iustitia et de misericordia. Et quamvis +haec videantur esse virtutes, attribuuntur tamen donis, quia etiam +dona perficiunt hominem circa omnia circa quae perficiunt virtutes, +ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A2-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 2. Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because + they hope for a reward, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q69_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36418] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia quae attribuuntur +beatitudinibus, non pertineant ad hanc vitam. Dicuntur enim aliqui +beati propter spem praemiorum, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum spei +beatitudo est futura. Ergo praemia ista pertinent ad vitam +futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.25" target="asv"> Lk. 6:25, </a> where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep." + Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.13" target="asv"> Job 21:13</a>: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes + refer to this life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36419] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Luc. VI, ponuntur quaedam poenae per oppositum ad beatitudines, cum +dicitur, <i>vae vobis qui saturati estis, quia esurietis. Vae vobis +qui ridetis nunc, quia lugebitis et flebitis</i>. Sed istae poenae +non intelliguntur in hac vita, quia frequenter homines in hac vita +non puniuntur, secundum illud Iob XXI, <i>ducunt in bonis dies +suos</i>. Ergo nec praemia beatitudinum pertinent ad hanc +vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv"> Ps. 16:15</a>: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall + see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made + manifest, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall + be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36420] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +regnum caelorum, quod ponitur praemium paupertatis, est beatitudo +caelestis; ut Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei. Plena etiam +saturitas non nisi in futura vita habetur; secundum illud Psalmi +XVI, <i>satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua</i>. Visio etiam Dei, et +manifestatio filiationis divinae, ad vitam futuram pertinent; +secundum illud I Ioan. III, <i>nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum +apparuit quid erimus. Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei +erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est</i>. Ergo praemia illa +pertinent ad vitam futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been + fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised + to us after this life." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36421] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, <i>ista +quidem in hac vita compleri possunt, sicut completa esse in +apostolis credimus. Nam illa omnimoda, et in angelicam formam +mutatio, quae post hanc vitam promittitur, nullis verbis exponi +potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all + these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present + life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p7"> In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by + reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a + kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree + will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to + happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to + refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which + case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and + gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 co."><a name="36422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36422] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa ista praemia expositores sacrae Scripturae +diversimode sunt locuti. Quidam enim omnia ista praemia ad futuram +beatitudinem pertinere dicunt, sicut Ambrosius, super Lucam. +Augustinus vero dicit ea ad praesentem vitam pertinere. +Chrysostomus autem, in suis homiliis, quaedam eorum dicit pertinere +ad futuram vitam, quaedam autem ad praesentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, +considerandum est quod spes futurae beatitudinis potest esse in +nobis propter duo, primo quidem, propter aliquam praeparationem vel +dispositionem ad futuram beatitudinem, quod est per modum meriti; +alio modo, per quandam inchoationem imperfectam futurae +beatitudinis in viris sanctis, etiam in hac vita. Aliter enim +habetur spes fructificationis arboris cum virescit frondibus, et +aliter cum iam primordia fructuum incipiunt apparere. Sic igitur ea +quae in beatitudinibus tanguntur tanquam merita, sunt quaedam +praeparationes vel dispositiones ad beatitudinem, vel perfectam vel +inchoatam. Ea vero quae ponuntur tanquam praemia, possunt esse vel +ipsa beatitudo perfecta, et sic pertinent ad futuram vitam, vel +aliqua inchoatio beatitudinis, sicut est in viris perfectis, et sic +praemia pertinent ad praesentem vitam. Cum enim aliquis incipit +proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod +perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that + end, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.27.7" target="asv"> Ps. 27:7</a>: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36423] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod spes est de futura beatitudine sicut de ultimo +fine, potest etiam esse et de auxilio gratiae, sicut de eo quod +ducit ad finem, secundum illud Psalmi XXVII, <i>in Deo speravit cor +meum, et adiutus sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence + Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." + The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this + way, another that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a + man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes + do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.29" target="asv"> Mat. 19:29, </a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: "Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36424] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod mali, etsi interdum in hac vita temporales poenas non +patiantur, patiuntur tamen spirituales. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I +Confess., <i>iussisti, domine, et sic est, ut poena sibi sit +inordinatus animus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., de +malis, quod <i>contendit ipsorum anima, et hoc quidem huc trahit, +illud autem illuc</i>; et postea concludit, <i>si autem sic miserum +est malum esse, fugiendum est malitiam intense</i>. Et similiter e +converso boni, etsi in hac vita quandoque non habeant corporalia +praemia, nunquam tamen deficiunt a spiritualibus, etiam in hac +vita; secundum illud Matth. XIX, et Marc. X, <i>centuplum +accipietis etiam in hoc saeculo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this + life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote + the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the + well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation + of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is + called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.34" target="asv">Jn. 4:34</a>): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being + cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those + who are the "peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children of God." Nevertheless + these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36425] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia illa praemia perfecte quidem consummabuntur in +vita futura, sed interim etiam in hac vita quodammodo inchoantur. +Nam regnum caelorum, ut Augustinus dicit, potest intelligi +perfectae sapientiae initium, secundum quod incipit in eis spiritus +regnare. Possessio etiam terrae significat affectum bonum animae +requiescentis per desiderium in stabilitate haereditatis perpetuae, +per terram significatae. Consolantur autem in hac vita, spiritum +sanctum, qui Paracletus, idest consolator, dicitur, participando. +Saturantur etiam in hac vita illo cibo de quo dominus dicit, +<i>meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem patris mei</i>. In hac etiam +vita consequuntur homines misericordiam Dei. In hac etiam vita, +purgato oculo per donum intellectus, Deus quodammodo videri potest. +Similiter etiam in hac vita qui motus suos pacificant, ad +similitudinem Dei accedentes, filii Dei nominantur. Tamen haec +perfectius erunt in patria.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A3-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 3. Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above + (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is + assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes + are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36426] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur +beatitudines. Attribuuntur enim beatitudines donis, ut dictum est. +Donorum autem quaedam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam, scilicet +sapientia et intellectus, nulla autem beatitudo ponitur in actu +contemplationis, sed omnes in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam. +Ergo insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge + and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the + beatitudes are insufficiently indicated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36427] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ad vitam activam non solum pertinent dona exequentia; sed etiam +quaedam dona dirigentia, ut scientia et consilium. Nihil autem +ponitur inter beatitudines quod directe ad actum scientiae vel +consilii pertinere videatur. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines +tanguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety + seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes + are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36428] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter dona exequentia in vita activa, timor ponitur ad paupertatem +pertinere; pietas autem videtur pertinere ad beatitudinem +misericordiae. Nihil autem ponitur directe ad fortitudinem +pertinens. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.17" target="asv">Job 5:17</a>): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the + ungodly"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.13" target="asv">Prov. 3:13</a>): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="36429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36429] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +in sacra Scriptura tanguntur multae aliae beatitudines, sicut Iob +V, dicitur, <i>beatus homo qui corripitur a domino</i>; et in +Psalmo I, <i>beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum</i>; et +Proverb. III, <i>beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam</i>. Ergo +insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes + are indicated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1"><a name="36430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36430] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed +contra, videtur quod superflue enumerentur. Sunt enim septem dona +spiritus sancti. Beatitudines autem tanguntur octo.</p><p title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2"><a name="36431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36431] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Luc. VI, ponuntur quatuor tantum beatitudines. Superflue ergo +enumerantur septem, vel octo, in Matthaeo.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Matthew 5</a> are too many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 co."><a name="36432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36432] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod beatitudines istae convenientissime enumerantur. Ad +cuius evidentiam, est considerandum quod triplicem beatitudinem +aliqui posuerunt, quidam enim posuerunt beatitudinem in vita +voluptuosa; quidam in vita activa; quidam vero in vita +contemplativa. Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad +beatitudinem futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic beati. Nam beatitudo +voluptuosa, quia falsa est et rationi contraria, impedimentum est +beatitudinis futurae. Beatitudo vero activae vitae dispositiva est +ad beatitudinem futuram. Beatitudo autem contemplativa, si sit +perfecta, est essentialiter ipsa futura beatitudo, si autem sit +imperfecta, est quaedam inchoatio eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist + in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative + life [*See Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which + we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, + is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative + happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p9"> And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life + of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is + withdrawn---by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them + altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the + contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following + the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn---by + a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, + so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed are + the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation---and + by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice + of sorrow [*Cf. + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A3" id="FS_Q69_A3-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[3]</a>]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn." + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p10"> Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. + To the former we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and + by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry + and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are + they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give + where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and + by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: + hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv">Lk. 14:12,13</a>): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, + nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth + beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful." + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p11"> Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore + they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man + for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and + gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the + passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man + is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17</a>: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Et ideo dominus primo +quidem posuit quasdam beatitudines quasi removentes impedimentum +voluptuosae beatitudinis. Consistit enim voluptuosa vita in duobus. +Primo quidem, in affluentia exteriorum bonorum, sive sint divitiae, +sive sint honores. A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic +ut moderate eis utatur, per donum autem excellentiori modo, ut +scilicet homo totaliter ea contemnat. Unde prima beatitudo ponitur, +beati pauperes spiritu, quod potest referri vel ad contemptum +divitiarum; vel ad contemptum honorum, quod fit per humilitatem. +Secundo vero voluptuosa vita consistit in sequendo proprias +passiones, sive irascibilis sive concupiscibilis. A sequela autem +passionum irascibilis, retrahit virtus ne homo in eis superfluat, +secundum regulam rationis, donum autem excellentiori modo, ut +scilicet homo, secundum voluntatem divinam, totaliter ab eis +tranquillus reddatur. Unde secunda beatitudo ponitur, beati mites. +A sequela vero passionum concupiscibilis, retrahit virtus, moderate +huiusmodi passionibus utendo, donum vero, eas, si necesse fuerit, +totaliter abiiciendo; quinimmo, si necessarium fuerit, voluntarium +luctum assumendo. Unde tertia beatitudo ponitur, beati qui lugent. +Activa vero vita in his consistit praecipue quae proximis +exhibemus, vel sub ratione debiti, vel sub ratione spontanei +beneficii. Et ad primum quidem nos virtus disponit, ut ea quae +debemus proximis, non recusemus exhibere, quod pertinet ad +iustitiam. Donum autem ad hoc ipsum abundantiori quodam affectu nos +inducit, ut scilicet ferventi desiderio opera iustitiae impleamus, +sicut ferventi desiderio esuriens et sitiens cupit cibum vel potum. +Unde quarta beatitudo ponitur, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt +iustitiam. Circa spontanea vero dona nos perficit virtus ut illis +donemus quibus ratio dictat esse donandum, puta amicis aut aliis +nobis coniunctis, quod pertinet ad virtutem liberalitatis. Sed +donum, propter Dei reverentiam, solam necessitatem considerat in +his quibus gratuita beneficia praestat, unde dicitur Luc. XIV, +<i>cum facis prandium aut coenam, noli vocare amicos neque fratres +tuos etc., sed voca pauperes et debiles</i> etc., quod proprie est +misereri. Et ideo quinta beatitudo ponitur, beati misericordes. Ea +vero quae ad contemplativam vitam pertinent, vel sunt ipsa +beatitudo finalis, vel aliqua inchoatio eius, et ideo non ponuntur +in beatitudinibus tanquam merita, sed tanquam praemia. Ponuntur +autem tanquam merita effectus activae vitae, quibus homo disponitur +ad contemplativam vitam. Effectus autem activae vitae, quantum ad +virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in seipso, est munditia +cordis, ut scilicet mens hominis passionibus non inquinetur. Unde +sexta beatitudo ponitur, beati mundo corde. Quantum vero ad +virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in comparatione ad +proximum, effectus activae vitae est pax; secundum illud Isaiae +XXXII, <i>opus iustitiae pax</i>. Et ideo septima beatitudo +ponitur, beati pacifici.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to + the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift + of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36433] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus donorum pertinentium ad vitam activam, +exprimuntur in ipsis meritis, sed actus donorum pertinentium ad +vitam contemplativam, exprimuntur in praemiis, ratione iam dicta. +Videre enim Deum respondet dono intellectus; et conformari Deo +quadam filiatione adoptiva, pertinet ad donum sapientiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even + the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include + the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to + counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the + other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, + and mercy in respect of counsel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36434] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in his quae pertinent ad activam vitam, cognitio non +quaeritur propter seipsam, sed propter operationem, ut etiam +philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Et ideo, quia beatitudo aliquid +ultimum importat, non computantur inter beatitudines actus donorum +dirigentium in vita activa, quos scilicet eliciunt, sicut +consiliari est actus consilii, et iudicare est actus scientiae, sed +magis attribuuntur eis actus operativi in quibus dirigunt, sicut +scientiae lugere, et consilio misereri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first + five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed + among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects + man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.22" target="asv"> + Lk. 6:22 + </a>: "It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions: + poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p15"> Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. + Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, + whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv"> Eccles. 1:18</a>: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive for hungering after the works of + justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv">Dan. 4:24</a>: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities + with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36435] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in attributione beatitudinum ad dona, possunt duo +considerari. Quorum unum est conformitas materiae. Et secundum hoc, +omnes primae quinque beatitudines possunt attribui scientiae et +consilio, tanquam dirigentibus. Sed inter dona exequentia +distribuuntur, ita scilicet quod esuries et sitis iustitiae, et +etiam misericordia, pertineant ad pietatem, quae perficit hominem +in his quae sunt ad alterum; mititas autem ad fortitudinem, dicit +enim Ambrosius, super Lucam, quod <i>fortitudinis est iram vincere, +indignationem cohibere</i>, est enim fortitudo circa passiones +irascibilis; paupertas vero et luctus ad donum timoris, quo homo se +retrahit a cupiditatibus et delectationibus mundi. Alio modo +possumus in his beatitudinibus considerare motiva ipsarum, et sic, +quantum ad aliqua eorum, oportet aliter attribuere. Praecipue enim +ad mansuetudinem movet reverentia ad Deum; quae pertinet ad +pietatem. Ad lugendum autem movet praecipue scientia, per quam homo +cognoscit defectus suos et rerum mundanarum; secundum illud Eccle. +I, <i>qui addit scientiam, addit et dolorem</i>. Ad esuriendum +autem iustitiae opera, praecipue movet animi fortitudo. Ad +miserendum vero praecipue movet consilium Dei; secundum illud Dan. +IV, <i>consilium meum regi placeat, peccata tua eleemosynis redime, +et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum</i>. Et hunc modum +attributionis sequitur Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in +monte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because + they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom + the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked + in the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we + read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies + to all others that can be adduced. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36436] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod necesse est beatitudines omnes quae in sacra +Scriptura ponuntur, ad has reduci vel quantum ad merita, vel +quantum ad praemia, quia necesse est quod omnes pertineant aliquo +modo vel ad vitam activam, vel ad vitam contemplativam. Unde quod +dicitur, beatus vir qui corripitur a domino, pertinet ad +beatitudinem luctus. Quod vero dicitur, beatus vir qui non abiit in +consilio impiorum, pertinet ad munditiam cordis. Quod vero dicitur, +beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam, pertinet ad praemium septimae +beatitudinis. Et idem patet de omnibus aliis quae possunt +induci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is + confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence + the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="36437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36437] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod octava beatitudo est quaedam confirmatio et +manifestatio omnium praecedentium. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis est +confirmatus in paupertate spiritus et mititate et aliis +sequentibus, provenit quod ab his bonis propter nullam +persecutionem recedit. Unde octava beatitudo quodammodo ad septem +praecedentes pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.17" target="asv">Lk. 6:17</a>). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, + temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. + The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The + second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place: + "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside + by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: + "Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20, </a> "poverty corresponds + to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion + gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="36438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36438] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod Lucas narrat sermonem domini factum esse ad turbas. +Unde beatitudines numerantur ab eo secundum capacitatem turbarum, +quae solam voluptuosam et temporalem et terrenam beatitudinem +noverunt. Unde dominus per quatuor beatitudines quatuor excludit +quae ad praedictam beatitudinem pertinere videntur. Quorum primum +est abundantia bonorum exteriorum, quod excludit per hoc quod +dicit, beati pauperes. Secundum est quod sit bene homini quantum ad +corpus, in cibis et potibus et aliis huiusmodi, et hoc excludit per +secundum quod ponit, beati qui esuritis. Tertium est quod sit +homini bene quantum ad cordis iucunditatem, et hoc excludit tertio, +dicens, beati qui nunc fletis. Quartum est exterior hominum favor, +et hoc excludit quarto, dicens, beati eritis cum vos oderint +homines. Et sicut Ambrosius dicit, <i>paupertas pertinet ad +temperantiam, quae illecebrosa non quaerit; esuries ad iustitiam, +quia qui esurit, compatitur, et, compatiendo, largitur; fletus ad +prudentiam, cuius est flere occidua; pati odium hominum, ad +fortitudinem</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A4-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 4. Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal + life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36439] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia beatitudinum inconvenienter +enumerentur. In regno enim caelorum, quod est vita aeterna, bona +omnia continentur. Posito ergo regno caelorum, non oportuit alia +praemia ponere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the + same ground it should have been assigned to all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36440] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +regnum caelorum ponitur pro praemio et in prima beatitudine et in +octava. Ergo, eadem ratione, debuit poni in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas + the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of + heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36441] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in beatitudinibus proceditur ascendendo, sicut Augustinus dicit. In +praemiis autem videtur procedi descendendo, nam possessio terrae +est minus quam regnum caelorum. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi +praemia assignantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36442] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est auctoritas ipsius domini, praemia huiusmodi proponentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness + indicated above + <a href="#FS_Q69_A3" id="FS_Q69_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which + happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal + and perishable things. Wherefore the + rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men + seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom + of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven + to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain + security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby + the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts + and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p7"> Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations + to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns + to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede + from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may + abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, + again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that + they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery. + </p><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p8"> The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence + with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart + are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower + of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, + consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 co."><a name="36443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36443] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod praemia ista convenientissime assignantur, +considerata conditione beatitudinum secundum tres beatitudines +supra assignatas. Tres enim primae beatitudines accipiuntur per +retractionem ab his in quibus voluptuosa beatitudo consistit, quam +homo desiderat quaerens id quod naturaliter desideratur, non ubi +quaerere debet, scilicet in Deo, sed in rebus temporalibus et +caducis. Et ideo praemia trium primarum beatitudinum accipiuntur +secundum ea quae in beatitudine terrena aliqui quaerunt. Quaerunt +enim homines in rebus exterioribus, scilicet divitiis et honoribus, +excellentiam quandam et abundantiam, quorum utrumque importat +regnum caelorum, per quod homo consequitur excellentiam et +abundantiam bonorum in Deo. Et ideo regnum caelorum dominus +pauperibus spiritu repromisit. Quaerunt autem homines feroces et +immites per litigia et bella securitatem sibi acquirere, inimicos +suos destruendo. Unde dominus repromisit mitibus securam et quietam +possessionem terrae viventium, per quam significatur soliditas +aeternorum bonorum. Quaerunt autem homines in concupiscentiis et +delectationibus mundi, habere consolationem contra praesentis vitae +labores. Et ideo dominus consolationem lugentibus repromittit. +Aliae vero duae beatitudines pertinent ad opera activae +beatitudinis, quae sunt opera virtutum ordinantium hominem ad +proximum, a quibus operibus aliqui retrahuntur propter inordinatum +amorem proprii boni. Et ideo dominus attribuit illa praemia his +beatitudinibus, propter quae homines ab eis discedunt. Discedunt +enim aliqui ab operibus iustitiae, non reddentes debitum, sed +potius aliena rapientes ut bonis temporalibus repleantur. Et ideo +dominus esurientibus iustitiam, saturitatem repromisit. Discedunt +etiam aliqui ab operibus misericordiae, ne se immisceant miseriis +alienis. Et ideo dominus misericordibus repromittit misericordiam, +per quam ab omni miseria liberentur. Aliae vero duae ultimae +beatitudines pertinent ad contemplativam felicitatem seu +beatitudinem, et ideo secundum convenientiam dispositionum quae +ponuntur in merito, praemia redduntur. Nam munditia oculi disponit +ad clare videndum, unde mundis corde divina visio repromittitur. +Constituere vero pacem vel in seipso vel inter alios, manifestat +hominem esse Dei imitatorem, qui est Deus unitatis et pacis. Et +ideo pro praemio redditur ei gloria divinae filiationis, quae est +in perfecta coniunctione ad Deum per sapientiam consummatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect + cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion + to the merits to which those rewards are assigned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36444] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, omnia praemia ista +unum sunt in re, scilicet beatitudo aeterna; quam intellectus +humanus non capit. Et ideo oportuit quod per diversa bona nobis +nota, describeretur, observata convenientia ad merita quibus +praemia attribuuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence + it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according + to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but + to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the + glory of the body. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36445] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut octava beatitudo est firmitas quaedam omnium +beatitudinum, ita debentur sibi omnium beatitudinum praemia. Et +ideo redit ad caput, ut intelligantur sibi consequenter omnia +praemia attribui. Vel, secundum Ambrosium, pauperibus spiritu +repromittitur regnum caelorum, quantum ad gloriam animae, sed +passis persecutionem in corpore, quantum ad gloriam corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply + to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in + the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, + it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies + abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And + yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. + Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36446] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam praemia secundum additionem se habent ad +invicem. Nam plus est possidere terram regni caelorum, quam +simpliciter habere, multa enim habemus quae non firmiter et +pacifice possidemus. Plus est etiam consolari in regno, quam habere +et possidere, multa enim cum dolore possidemus. Plus est etiam +saturari quam simpliciter consolari, nam saturitas abundantiam +consolationis importat. Misericordia vero excedit saturitatem, ut +plus scilicet homo accipiat quam meruerit, vel desiderare potuerit. +Adhuc autem maius est Deum videre, sicut maior est qui in curia +regis non solum prandet, sed etiam faciem regis videt. Summam autem +dignitatem in domo regia filius regis habet.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q70" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q70-p0.1">Q. 70. OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q70-p2"> We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q70-p3"><a href="#FS_Q70_A1"> (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p4"><a href="#FS_Q70_A2"> (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p5"><a href="#FS_Q70_A3"> (3) Of their number?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p6"><a href="#FS_Q70_A4"> (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 pr."><a name="36447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36447] +Iª-IIae q. 70 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +fructibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum fructus +spiritus sancti sint actus. Secundo, utrum differant a +beatitudinibus. Tertio, de eorum numero. Quarto, de oppositione +eorum ad opera carnis.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q70_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 1. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5" target="asv">Gal. 5</a>) are acts? + </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our + actions bear fruit: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.15" target="asv">Wis. 3:15</a>): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#John.4.36" target="asv">Jn. 4:36</a>): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." + Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36448] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus spiritus sancti quos apostolus +nominat ad Galat. V, non sint actus. Id enim cuius est alius +fructus, non debet dici fructus, sic enim in infinitum iretur. Sed +actuum nostrorum est aliquis fructus, dicitur enim Sap. III, +<i>bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus</i>; et Ioan. IV, <i>qui +metit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat in vitam +aeternam</i>. Ergo ipsi actus nostri non dicuntur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English + 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their + own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36449] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>fruimur cognitis in +quibus voluntas propter ipsa delectata conquiescit</i>. Sed +voluntas nostra non debet conquiescere in actibus nostris propter +se. Ergo actus nostri fructus dici non debent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. + Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q70_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[1]</a>). Therefore the fruits are not actions. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36450] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter fructus spiritus sancti enumerantur ab apostolo aliquae +virtutes scilicet caritas, mansuetudo, fides et castitas. Virtutes +autem non sunt actus, sed habitus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +fructus non sunt actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv">Mat. 12:33</a>): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore + human actions are called fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36451] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XII, <i>ex fructu arbor cognoscitur</i>; +idest, ex operibus suis homo, ut ibi exponitur a sanctis. Ergo ipsi +actus humani dicuntur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the + product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree + that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word + "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that + which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 co."><a name="36452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36452] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod nomen fructus a corporalibus ad spiritualia est +translatum. Dicitur autem in corporalibus fructus, quod ex planta +producitur cum ad perfectionem pervenerit, et quandam in se +suavitatem habet. Qui quidem fructus ad duo comparari potest, +scilicet ad arborem producentem ipsum; et ad hominem qui fructum ex +arbore adipiscitur. Secundum hoc igitur, nomen fructus in rebus +spiritualibus dupliciter accipere possumus, uno modo, ut dicatur +fructus hominis, quasi arboris, id quod ab eo producitur; alio +modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis id quod homo adipiscitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p7"> Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, + and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field + and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Non +autem omne id quod adipiscitur homo, habet rationem fructus, sed id +quod est ultimum, delectationem habens. Habet enim homo et agrum et +arborem, quae fructus non dicuntur; sed solum id quod est ultimum, +quod scilicet ex agro et arbore homo intendit habere. Et secundum +hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo debet frui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8"> If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the + second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue + of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is + the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine + seed, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> +Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine producitur, sic +ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur, operatio enim est actus +secundus operantis, et delectationem habet, si sit conveniens +operanti. Si igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum +facultatem suae rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus rationis. Si +vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem virtutem, quae est virtus +spiritus sancti; sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus spiritus +sancti, quasi cuiusdam divini seminis, dicitur enim I Ioan. III, +<i>omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen +ipsius in eo manet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate + to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as + they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:23</a>): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36453] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum fructus habeat quodammodo rationem ultimi +et finis, nihil prohibet alicuius fructus esse alium fructum, sicut +finis ad finem ordinatur. Opera igitur nostra inquantum sunt +effectus quidam spiritus sancti in nobis operantis, habent rationem +fructus, sed inquantum ordinantur ad finem vitae aeternae, sic +magis habent rationem florum. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXIV, <i>flores +mei fructus honoris et honestatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression + "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except + the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful + by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, + for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, + nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for + His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness + which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they + refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36454] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur voluntas in aliquo propter se delectari, +potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod ly propter +dicit causam finalem, et sic propter se non delectatur aliquis nisi +in ultimo fine. Alio modo, secundum quod designat causam formalem, +et sic propter se aliquis potest delectari in omni eo quod +delectabile est secundum suam formam. Sicut patet quod infirmus +delectatur in sanitate propter se, sicut in fine; in medicina autem +suavi, non sicut in fine, sed sicut in habente saporem +delectabilem; in medicina autem austera, nullo modo propter se, sed +solum propter aliud. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in Deo delectari +debet homo propter se, sicut propter ultimum finem, in actibus +autem virtuosis, non sicut propter finem, sed propter honestatem +quam continent, delectabilem virtuosis. Unde Ambrosius dicit quod +opera virtutum dicuntur fructus, <i>quia suos possessores sancta et +sincera delectatione reficiunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to + believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our + neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36455] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nomina virtutum sumuntur quandoque pro actibus earum, +sicut Augustinus dicit quod <i>fides est credere quod non vides; et +caritas est motus animi ad diligendum Deum et proximum</i>. Et hoc +modo sumuntur nomina virtutum in enumeratione fructuum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A2-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 2. Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits + of the Holy Ghost. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36456] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus a beatitudinibus non +differant. Beatitudines enim attribuuntur donis, ut supra dictum +est. Sed dona perficiunt hominem secundum quod movetur a spiritu +sancto. Ergo beatitudines ipsae sunt fructus spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the + present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with + future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36457] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet fructus vitae aeternae ad beatitudinem futuram, quae +est rei; ita se habent fructus praesentis vitae ad beatitudines +praesentis vitae, quae sunt spei. Sed fructus vitae aeternae est +ipsa beatitudo futura. Ergo fructus vitae praesentis sunt ipsae +beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above + ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>; + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[4], A[1]</a>). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36458] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione fructus est quod sit quiddam ultimum et delectabile. Sed +hoc pertinet ad rationem beatitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +eadem ratio est fructus et beatitudinis. Ergo non debent ab invicem +distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, + as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36459] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quorum species sunt diversae, ipsa quoque sunt diversa. Sed in +diversas partes dividuntur et fructus et beatitudines; ut patet per +numerationem utrorumque. Ergo fructus differunt a +beatitudinibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; + whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not + vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, + and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to + the virtues, as already stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 co."><a name="36460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36460] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod plus requiritur ad rationem beatitudinis, quam ad +rationem fructus. Nam ad rationem fructus sufficit quod sit aliquid +habens rationem ultimi et delectabilis, sed ad rationem +beatitudinis, ulterius requiritur quod sit aliquid perfectum et +excellens. Unde omnes beatitudines possunt dici fructus, sed non +convertitur. Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in quibus +homo delectatur. Sed beatitudines dicuntur solum perfecta opera, +quae etiam, ratione suae perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis +quam virtutibus, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36461] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod beatitudines sint +fructus, non autem quod omnes fructus beatitudines sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand + the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36462] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fructus vitae aeternae est simpliciter ultimus et +perfectus, et ideo in nullo distinguitur a beatitudine futura. +Fructus autem praesentis vitae non sunt simpliciter ultimi et +perfecti, et ideo non omnes fructus sunt beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36463] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquid amplius est de ratione beatitudinis quam de +ratione fructus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A3-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 3. Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv"> Rom. 6:22</a>: "You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36464] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod apostolus inconvenienter enumeret, ad +Galat. V, duodecim fructus. Alibi enim dicit esse tantum unum +fructum praesentis vitae; secundum illud Rom. VI, habetis fructum +vestrum in sanctificatione et Isaiae XXVII dicitur, <i>hic est +omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum</i>. Non ergo ponendi sunt +duodecim fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.23" target="asv">Mat. 13:23</a>) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore + one should not reckon twelve fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36465] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +fructus est qui ex spirituali semine exoritur, ut dictum est. Sed +dominus, Matth. XIII, ponit triplicem terrae bonae fructum ex +spirituali semine provenientem, scilicet centesimum, et +sexagesimum, et trigesimum. Ergo non sunt ponendi duodecim +fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned + by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but + rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36466] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +fructus habet in sui ratione quod sit ultimum et delectabile. Sed +ratio ista non invenitur in omnibus fructibus ab apostolo +enumeratis, patientia enim et longanimitas videntur in rebus +contristantibus esse; fides autem non habet rationem ultimi, sed +magis rationem primi fundamenti. Superflue igitur huiusmodi fructus +enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q70_A2" id="FS_Q70_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the + acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36467] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +videtur quod insufficienter et diminute enumerentur. Dictum est +enim quod omnes beatitudines fructus dici possunt, sed non omnes +hic enumerantur. Nihil etiam hic ponitur ad actum sapientiae +pertinens, et multarum aliarum virtutum. Ergo videtur quod +insufficienter enumerentur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve + fruits of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.2" target="asv">Apoc. 22:2</a>): "On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from + a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy + Ghost proceeds in us: + which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard + to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it. + </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p7"> Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards + evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions + and the root of them all, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a>). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, + as in His own likeness, + since He Himself is love. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love + of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in + God Whom it loves, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection + of joy + is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in + the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one + object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv">Ps. 118:165</a>): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external + things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not + perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be + not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace" + is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being + disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are + delayed; which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3). + </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p8"> Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this + belongs "goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs "benignity," for the benign are those + in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his + suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger. + Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or + deceit. To this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in + God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that + is his, to God. + </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p9"> Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe + the "mode" in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and "chastity": whether these two differ + because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is + subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from + them. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 co."><a name="36468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36468] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod numerus duodecim fructuum ab apostolo enumeratorum, +conveniens est, et possunt significari per duodecim fructus de +quibus dicitur Apoc. ult., <i>ex utraque parte fluminis lignum +vitae, afferens fructus duodecim</i>. Quia vero fructus dicitur +quod ex aliquo principio procedit sicut ex semine vel radice, +attendenda est distinctio horum fructuum secundum diversum +processum spiritus sancti in nobis. Qui quidem processus attenditur +secundum hoc, ut primo mens hominis in seipsa ordinetur; secundo +vero, ordinetur ad ea quae sunt iuxta; tertio vero, ad ea quae sunt +infra. Tunc autem bene mens hominis disponitur in seipsa, quando +mens hominis bene se habet et in bonis et in malis. Prima autem +dispositio mentis humanae ad bonum, est per amorem, qui est prima +affectio et omnium affectionum radix, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo +inter fructus spiritus primo ponitur caritas; in qua specialiter +spiritus sanctus datur, sicut in propria similitudine, cum et ipse +sit amor. Unde dicitur Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in +cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>. Ad +amorem autem caritatis ex necessitate sequitur gaudium. Omnis enim +amans gaudet ex coniunctione amati. Caritas autem semper habet +praesentem Deum, quem amat; secundum illud I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet +in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>. Unde sequela +caritatis est gaudium. Perfectio autem gaudii est pax, quantum ad +duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad quietem ab exterioribus +conturbantibus, non enim potest perfecte gaudere de bono amato, qui +in eius fruitione ab aliis perturbatur; et iterum, qui perfecte cor +habet in uno pacatum, a nullo alio molestari potest, cum alia quasi +nihil reputet; unde dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>pax multa +diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum</i>, quia +scilicet ab exterioribus non perturbantur, quin Deo fruantur. +Secundo, quantum ad sedationem desiderii fluctuantis, non enim +perfecte gaudet de aliquo, cui non sufficit id de quo gaudet. Haec +autem duo importat pax, scilicet ut neque ab exterioribus +perturbemur; et ut desideria nostra conquiescant in uno. Unde post +caritatem et gaudium, tertio ponitur pax. In malis autem bene se +habet mens quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, ut non perturbetur mens +per imminentiam malorum, quod pertinet ad patientiam. Secundo, ut +non perturbetur in dilatione bonorum, quod pertinet ad +longanimitatem, nam carere bono habet rationem mali, ut dicitur in +V Ethic. Ad id autem quod est iuxta hominem, scilicet proximum, +bene disponitur mens hominis, primo quidem, quantum ad voluntatem +bene faciendi. Et ad hoc pertinet bonitas. Secundo, quantum ad +beneficentiae executionem. Et ad hoc pertinet benignitas, dicuntur +enim benigni quos bonus ignis amoris fervere facit ad benefaciendum +proximis. Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod aequanimiter tolerentur mala +ab eis illata. Et ad hoc pertinet mansuetudo, quae cohibet iras. +Quarto, quantum ad hoc quod non solum per iram proximis non +noceamus, sed etiam neque per fraudem vel per dolum. Et ad hoc +pertinet fides, si pro fidelitate sumatur. Sed si sumatur pro fide +qua creditur in Deum, sic per hanc ordinatur homo ad id quod est +supra se, ut scilicet homo intellectum suum Deo subiiciat, et per +consequens omnia quae ipsius sunt. Sed ad id quod infra est, bene +disponitur homo, primo quidem, quantum ad exteriores actiones, per +modestiam, quae in omnibus dictis et factis modum observat. Quantum +ad interiores concupiscentias, per continentiam et castitatem, sive +haec duo distinguantur per hoc, quod castitas refrenat hominem ad +illicitis, continentia vero etiam a licitis; sive per hoc quod +continens patitur concupiscentias sed non deducitur, castus autem +neque patitur neque deducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in + the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36469] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sanctificatio fit per omnes virtutes per quas +etiam peccata tolluntur. Unde fructus ibi singulariter nominatur +propter unitatem generis, quod in multas species dividitur, +secundum quas dicuntur multi fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees + of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; + the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other + ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the + three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to + its beginning, its middle, and its end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36470] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod fructus centesimus, sexagesimus et trigesimus non +diversificantur secundum diversas species virtuosorum actuum, sed +secundum diversos perfectionis gradus etiam unius virtutis. Sicut +continentia coniugalis dicitur significari per fructum trigesimum; +continentia vidualis per sexagesimum; virginalis autem per +centesimum. Et aliis etiam modis sancti distinguunt tres +evangelicos fructus secundum tres gradus virtutis. Et ponuntur tres +gradus, quia cuiuslibet rei perfectio attenditur secundum +principium, medium et finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, + it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith, + which is certainly about the unseen." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36471] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ipsum quod est in tristitiis non perturbari, rationem +delectabilis habet. Et fides etiam si accipiatur prout est +fundamentum, habet quandam rationem ultimi et delectabilis, +secundum quod continet certitudinem, unde Glossa exponit, <i>fides, +idest de invisibilibus certitudo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but + to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been + mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in + so far as all the virtues and + gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing + to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either + enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36472] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super epistolam ad Galat., +<i>apostolus non hoc ita suscepit, ut doceret quod sunt</i> (vel +opera carnis, vel fructus spiritus); sed <i>ut ostenderet in quo +genere illa vitanda, illa vero sectanda sint</i>. Unde potuissent +vel plures, vel etiam pauciores fructus enumerari. Et tamen omnes +donorum et virtutum actus possunt secundum quandam convenientiam ad +haec reduci, secundum quod omnes virtutes et dona necesse est quod +ordinent mentem aliquo praedictorum modorum. Unde et actus +sapientiae, et quorumcumque donorum ordinantium ad bonum, +reducuntur ad caritatem, gaudium et pacem. Ideo tamen potius haec +quam alia enumeravit, quia hic enumerata magis important vel +fruitionem bonorum, vel sedationem malorum; quod videtur ad +rationem fructus pertinere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A4-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 4. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19, </a> seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits + of the Spirit are not contrary to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36473] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus non contrarientur operibus +carnis quae apostolus enumerat. Contraria enim sunt in eodem +genere. Sed opera carnis non dicuntur fructus. Ergo fructus +spiritus eis non contrariantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore + the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36474] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unum uni est contrarium. Sed plura enumerat apostolus opera carnis +quam fructus spiritus. Ergo fructus spiritus et opera carnis non +contrariantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, + and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary + to the works of the flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36475] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +inter fructus spiritus primo ponuntur caritas, gaudium, pax, quibus +non correspondent ea quae primo enumerantur inter opera carnis, +quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia. Ergo fructus +spiritus non contrariantur operibus carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv">Gal. 5:17</a>) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36476] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit ibidem, quod <i>caro concupiscit adversus +spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q70_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits + of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind + to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, + appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and + downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits + of the Spirit. + </p><p id="FS_Q70_A4-p7"> Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And + in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend + to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which + is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein + also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy + of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against + witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils + inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them. + In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 co."><a name="36477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36477] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod opera carnis et fructus spiritus possunt accipi +dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem. Et hoc modo in +communi fructus spiritus sancti contrariantur operibus carnis. +Spiritus enim sanctus movet humanam mentem ad id quod est secundum +rationem, vel potius ad id quod est supra rationem, appetitus autem +carnis, qui est appetitus sensitivus, trahit ad bona sensibilia, +quae sunt infra hominem. Unde sicut motus sursum et motus deorsum +contrariantur in naturalibus, ita in operibus humanis contrariantur +opera carnis fructibus spiritus. Alio modo possunt considerari +secundum proprias rationes singulorum fructuum enumeratorum, et +operum carnis. Et sic non oportet quod singula singulis +contraponantur, quia, sicut dictum est, apostolus non intendit +enumerare omnia opera spiritualia, nec omnia opera carnalia. Sed +tamen, secundum quandam adaptationem, Augustinus, super epistolam +ad Galat., contraponit singulis operibus carnis singulos fructus. +<i>Sicut fornicationi, quae est amor explendae libidinis a legitimo +connubio solutus, opponitur caritas, per quam anima coniungitur Deo +in qua etiam est vera castitas. Immunditiae autem sunt omnes +perturbationes de illa fornicatione conceptae, quibus gaudium +tranquillitatis opponitur. Idolorum autem servitus, propter quam +bellum est gestum adversus Evangelium Dei, opponitur paci. Contra +veneficia autem, et inimicitias et contentiones et aemulationes, +animositates et dissensiones, opponuntur longanimitas, ad +sustinendum mala hominum inter quos vivimus; et ad curandum, +benignitas; et ad ignoscendum, bonitas. Haeresibus autem opponitur +fides, invidiae, mansuetudo; ebrietatibus et comessationibus, +continentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since + works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue + are called fruits, but not so works of vice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36478] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod procedit ab arbore contra naturam +arboris, non dicitur esse fructus eius, sed magis corruptio +quaedam. Et quia virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera +vero vitiorum sunt contra rationem; ideo opera virtutum fructus +dicuntur, non autem opera vitiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices + are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36479] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod <i>bonum contingit uno modo, malum vero +omnifariam</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., unde et +uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur. Et propter hoc, non est mirum +si plura ponuntur opera carnis quam fructus spiritus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36480] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet solutio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q71" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q71-p0.1">Q. 71. EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q71-p2">OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)</p><p id="FS_Q71-p3"> We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered + in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; + (6) the effect of sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q71-p4"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q71-p5"><a href="#FS_Q71_A1"> (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p6"><a href="#FS_Q71_A2"> (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p7"><a href="#FS_Q71_A3"> (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p8"><a href="#FS_Q71_A4"> (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p9"><a href="#FS_Q71_A5"> (5) Whether every sin includes action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p10"><a href="#FS_Q71_A6"> (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal + law." + </a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 pr."><a name="36481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36481] +Iª-IIae q. 71 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de +vitiis et peccatis. Circa quae sex consideranda occurrunt, primo +quidem, de ipsis vitiis et peccatis secundum se; secundo, de +distinctione eorum; tertio, de comparatione eorum ad invicem; +quarto, de subiecto peccati; quinto, de causa eius; sexto, de +effectu ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum vitium +contrarietur virtuti. Secundo, utrum vitium sit contra naturam. +Tertio, quid sit peius, utrum vitium vel actus vitiosus. Quarto, +utrum actus vitiosus possit esse simul cum virtute. Quinto, utrum +in omni peccato sit aliquis actus. Sexto, de definitione peccati +quam Augustinus ponit, XXII contra Faustum, <i>peccatum est dictum +vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam</i>.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q71_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A1-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 1. Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now + sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition + of bodily members or of any things whatever. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36482] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non contrarietur virtuti. Uni +enim unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed virtuti +contrariantur peccatum et malitia. Non ergo contrariatur ei vitium, +quia vitium dicitur etiam si sit indebita dispositio membrorum +corporalium, vel quarumcumque rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice + is not contrary to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36483] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +virtus nominat quandam perfectionem potentiae. Sed vitium nihil +nominat ad potentiam pertinens. Ergo vitium non contrariatur +virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, + is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36484] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod <i>virtus est +quaedam sanitas animae</i>. Sanitati autem opponitur aegritudo vel +morbus, magis quam vitium. Ergo virtuti non contrariatur +vitium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality + which makes its subject good," as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q71_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36485] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod +<i>vitium est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus</i>. Virtus +autem est qualitas quae facit bonum habentem, ut ex supradictis +patet. Ergo vitium contrariatur virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue + we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby + the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that + "virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I + mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: + because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue + is directed is a good act, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q71_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A1-p7"> Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect + of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is + an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary + of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary + is "vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine + says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 co."><a name="36486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36486] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa virtutem duo possumus considerare, scilicet +ipsam essentiam virtutis; et id ad quod est virtus. In essentia +quidem virtutis aliquid considerari potest directe; et aliquid ex +consequenti. Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quandam +alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae, unde +philosophus dicit, in VII Physic. quod <i>virtus est dispositio +perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum +secundum naturam</i>. Ex consequenti autem sequitur quod virtus sit +bonitas quaedam, in hoc enim consistit uniuscuiusque rei bonitas, +quod convenienter se habeat secundum modum suae naturae. Id autem +ad quod virtus ordinatur, est actus bonus, ut ex supradictis patet. +Secundum hoc igitur tria inveniuntur opponi virtuti. Quorum unum +est peccatum, quod opponitur sibi ex parte eius ad quod virtus +ordinatur, nam peccatum proprie nominat actum inordinatum, sicut +actus virtutis est actus ordinatus et debitus. Secundum autem quod +ad rationem virtutis consequitur quod sit bonitas quaedam, +opponitur virtuti malitia. Sed secundum id quod directe est de +ratione virtutis, opponitur virtuti vitium, vitium enim +uniuscuiusque rei esse videtur quod non sit disposita secundum quod +convenit suae naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., +<i>quod perfectioni naturae deesse perspexeris, id voca +vitium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter + is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly + as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36487] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa tria non contrariantur virtuti secundum +idem, sed peccatum quidem contrariatur secundum quod virtus est +operativa boni; malitia autem secundum quod est bonitas quaedam; +vitium autem proprie secundum quod est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason + for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce + a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36488] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtus non solum importat perfectionem potentiae quae +est principium agendi, sed etiam importat debitam dispositionem +eius cuius est virtus, et hoc ideo quia unumquodque operatur +secundum quod actu est. Requiritur ergo quod aliquid sit in se bene +dispositum, quod debet esse boni operativum. Et secundum hoc +virtuti vitium opponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he calls + it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease + is attended with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well compacted together." And although at times there + may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden + complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things + are indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, + he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv"> Mat. 12:33.</a> But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of + the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, + e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue + extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice + is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36489] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., +morbi et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis, in corporibus enim +morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem, puta febrem vel +aliquid huiusmodi; aegrotationem vero, morbum cum imbecillitate; +vitium autem, cum partes corporis inter se dissident. Et quamvis in +corpore quandoque sit morbus sine aegrotatione, puta cum aliquis +est interius male dispositus, non tamen exterius praepeditur a +solitis operationibus; in animo tamen, ut ipse dicit, haec duo non +possunt nisi cogitatione secerni. Necesse est enim quod +quandocumque aliquis interius est male dispositus, habens +inordinatum affectum, quod ex hoc imbecillis reddatur ad debitas +operationes exercendas, quia unaquaeque arbor ex suo fructu +cognoscitur, idest homo ex opere, ut dicitur Matth. XII. <i>Sed +vitium animi</i>, ut Tullius ibidem dicit, <i>est habitus aut +affectio animi in tota vita inconstans, et a seipsa +dissentiens</i>. Quod quidem invenitur etiam absque morbo vel +aegrotatione, ut puta cum aliquis ex infirmitate vel ex passione +peccat. Unde in plus se habet vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus, +sicut etiam virtus in plus se habet quam sanitas, nam sanitas etiam +quaedam virtus ponitur in VII Physic. Et ideo virtuti convenientius +opponitur vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A2-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 2. Whether vice is contrary to nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is + not contrary to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36490] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non sit contra naturam. Vitium +enim contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes non sunt in +nobis a natura, sed causantur in nobis per infusionem aut ab +assuetudine, ut dictum est. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated + to upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36491] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt contra naturam, non possunt assuefieri, sicut lapis +nunquam assuescit ferri sursum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliqui +assuefiunt ad vitia. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice + is found in the greater number of men; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv">Mat. 7:13</a>): "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to + nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36492] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil quod est contra naturam, invenitur in habentibus illam +naturam ut in pluribus. Sed vitia inveniuntur in hominibus ut in +pluribus, quia, sicut dicitur Matth. VII, <i>lata est via quae +ducit ad perditionem, et multi vadunt per eam</i>. Ergo vitium non +est contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). + But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36493] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum comparatur ad vitium sicut actus ad habitum, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed peccatum definitur esse dictum vel factum +vel concupitum contra legem Dei; ut patet per Augustinum, XXII +contra Faustum. Lex autem Dei est supra naturam. Magis ergo +dicendum est quod vitium sit contra legem, quam sit contra +naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36494] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>omne vitium, eo +ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is + that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14). + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A2-p8"> But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man + derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, + contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. + Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states + (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as + much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 co."><a name="36495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36495] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitium virtuti contrariatur. +Virtus autem uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene +disposita secundum convenientiam suae naturae, ut supra dictum est. +Unde oportet quod in qualibet re vitium dicatur ex hoc quod est +disposita contra id quod convenit naturae. Unde et de hoc +unaquaeque res vituperatur, <i>a vitio autem nomen vituperationis +tractum creditur</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb. Sed +considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma +secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie +constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra +ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est +homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam +hominis inquantum est homo. <i>Bonum autem hominis est secundum +rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse</i>, ut +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde virtus humana, quae +hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est +secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi, vitium autem +intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords + with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, + like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that + vice is contrary to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36496] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod virtutes, etsi non causentur a natura secundum +suum esse perfectum, tamen inclinant ad id quod est secundum +naturam, idest secundum ordinem rationis, dicit enim Tullius, in +sua rhetorica, quod <i>virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationi +consentaneus</i>. Et hoc modo virtus dicitur esse secundum naturam, +et per contrarium intelligitur quod vitium sit contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being + from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense + virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36497] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de his quae sunt contra +naturam, secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est +esse a natura, non autem secundum quod esse contra naturam +opponitur ei quod est esse secundum naturam, eo modo quo virtutes +dicuntur esse secundum naturam, inquantum inclinant ad id quod +naturae convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his + senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than + who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence + of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his + sensitive nature against the order of his reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36498] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in homine est duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et +sensitiva. Et quia per operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus +rationis, ideo plures sequuntur inclinationes naturae sensitivae +quam ordinem rationis, plures enim sunt qui assequuntur principium +rei, quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et +peccata in hominibus proveniunt, quod sequuntur inclinationem +naturae sensitivae contra ordinem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared + to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the + order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every + nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the + Divine art whereby it was made." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36499] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod quidquid est contra rationem artificiati, est etiam +contra naturam artis, qua artificiatum producitur. Lex autem +aeterna comparatur ad ordinem rationis humanae sicut ars ad +artificiatum. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod vitium et peccatum sit +contra ordinem rationis humanae, et quod sit contra legem aeternam. +Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., quod <i>a Deo habent +omnes naturae quod naturae sunt, et intantum sunt vitiosae, +inquantum ab eius, qua factae sunt, arte discedunt</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A3-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 3. Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better + it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. + Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36500] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium, idest habitus malus sit peius +quam peccatum, idest actus malus. Sicut enim bonum quod est +diuturnius, est melius; ita malum quod est diuturnius, est peius. +Sed habitus vitiosus est diuturnior quam actus vitiosi, qui statim +transeunt. Ergo habitus vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore + a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36501] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +plura mala sunt magis fugienda quam unum malum. Sed habitus malus +virtualiter est causa multorum malorum actuum. Ergo habitus +vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their + badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36502] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +causa est potior quam effectus. Sed habitus perficit actum tam in +bonitate quam in malitia. Ergo habitus est potior actu et in +bonitate et in malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action + is worse than a vicious habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36503] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +pro actu vitioso aliquis iuste punitur, non autem pro habitu +vitioso, si non procedat ad actum. Ergo actus vitiosus est peior +quam habitus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated + in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do + evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between + power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding + power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that + a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or + bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the + cause of a thing being such, is yet more so." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 co."><a name="36504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36504] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod habitus medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum. +Manifestum est autem quod actus in bono et in malo praeeminet +potentiae, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., melius est enim bene agere +quam posse bene agere; et similiter vituperabilius est male agere +quam posse male agere. Unde etiam sequitur quod habitus in bonitate +et in malitia medium gradum obtineat inter potentiam et actum, ut +scilicet, sicut habitus bonus vel malus praeeminet in bonitate vel +malitia potentiae, ita etiam subdatur actui. Quod etiam ex hoc +apparet, quod habitus non dicitur bonus vel malus nisi ex hoc quod +inclinat ad actum bonum vel malum. Unde propter bonitatem vel +malitiam actus, dicitur habitus bonus vel malus. Et sic potior est +actus in bonitate vel malitia quam habitus, quia propter quod +unumquodque tale, et illud magis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another + simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses + it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses + habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more + lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always + be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but + habit excels in a certain respect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36505] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter altero +potius, quod tamen secundum quid ab eo deficit. Simpliciter enim +potius iudicatur quod praeeminet quantum ad id quod per se +consideratur in utroque, secundum quid autem quod praeeminet +secundum id quod per accidens se habet ad utrumque. Ostensum est +autem ex ipsa ratione actus et habitus, quod actus est potior in +bonitate et malitia quam habitus. Quod autem habitus sit diuturnior +quam actus, accidit ex eo quod utrumque invenitur in tali natura +quae non potest semper agere, et cuius actio est in motu +transeunte. Unde simpliciter actus est potior tam in bonitate quam +in malitia, sed habitus est potior secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes + act simply, both in goodness and in badness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36506] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod habitus non est simpliciter plures actus, sed +secundum quid, idest virtute. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod +habitus sit simpliciter potior in bonitate vel malitia quam +actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider + the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36507] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod habitus est causa actus in genere causae efficientis, +sed actus est causa habitus in genere causae finalis, secundum quam +consideratur ratio boni et mali. Et ideo in bonitate et malitia +actus praeeminet habitui.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A4-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 4. Whether sin is compatible with virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. + Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36508] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus vitiosus, sive peccatum, non +possit simul esse cum virtute. Contraria enim non possunt esse +simul in eodem. Sed peccatum quodammodo contrariatur virtuti, ut +dictum est. Ergo peccatum non potest simul esse cum virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, + therefore, can sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36509] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum est peius quam vitium, idest actus malus quam habitus +malus. Sed vitium non potest simul esse in eodem cum virtute. Ergo +neque peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural + things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in + the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue + in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36510] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut peccatum accidit in rebus voluntariis, ita et in rebus +naturalibus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed nunquam in rebus +naturalibus accidit peccatum nisi per aliquam corruptionem virtutis +naturalis, sicut monstra accidunt corrupto aliquo principio in +semine, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo etiam in rebus voluntariis +non accidit peccatum nisi corrupta aliqua virtute animae. Et sic +peccatum et virtus non possunt esse in eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act + does not cause a virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A3" id="FS_Q71_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[3]</a>): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36511] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod per contraria virtus +generatur et corrumpitur. Sed unus actus virtuosus non causat +virtutem, ut supra habitum est. Ergo neque unus actus peccati +tollit virtutem. Possunt ergo simul in eodem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of + a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore + a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness + with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): + whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. + Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having + a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare + the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by + one + act as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q71_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed + by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; + and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as + virtues." And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain + unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary + to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are + not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A4-p7"> Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin + is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 co."><a name="36512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36512] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum comparatur ad virtutem sicut actus malus ad +habitum bonum. Aliter autem se habet habitus in anima, et forma in +re naturali. Forma enim naturalis ex necessitate producit +operationem sibi convenientem, unde non potest esse simul cum forma +naturali actus formae contrariae; sicut non potest esse cum calore +actus infrigidationis, neque simul cum levitate motus descensionis, +nisi forte ex violentia exterioris moventis. Sed habitus in anima +non ex necessitate producit suam operationem, sed homo utitur eo +cum voluerit. Unde simul habitu in homine existente, potest non uti +habitu, aut agere contrarium actum. Et sic potest habens virtutem +procedere ad actum peccati. Actus autem peccati, si comparetur ad +ipsam virtutem prout est habitus quidam, non potest ipsam +corrumpere, si sit unus tantum, sicut enim non generatur habitus +per unum actum, ita nec per unum actum corrumpitur, ut supra dictum +est. Sed si comparetur actus peccati ad causam virtutum, sic +possibile est quod per unum actum peccati aliquae virtutes +corrumpantur. Quodlibet enim peccatum mortale contrariatur +caritati, quae est radix omnium virtutum infusarum, inquantum sunt +virtutes, et ideo per unum actum peccati mortalis, exclusa +caritate, excluduntur per consequens omnes virtutes infusae, +quantum ad hoc quod sunt virtutes. Et hoc dico propter fidem et +spem, quarum habitus remanent informes post peccatum mortale, et +sic non sunt virtutes. Sed peccatum veniale, quod non contrariatur +caritati nec excludit ipsam, per consequens etiam non excludit +alias virtutes. Virtutes vero acquisitae non tolluntur per unum +actum cuiuscumque peccati. Sic igitur peccatum mortale non potest +simul esse cum virtutibus infusis, potest tamen simul esse cum +virtutibus acquisitis. Peccatum vero veniale potest simul esse et +cum virtutibus infusis, et cum acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but + not with the habit, of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36513] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum non contrariatur virtuti secundum se, +sed secundum suum actum. Et ideo peccatum non potest simul esse cum +actu virtutis, potest tamen simul esse cum habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts + of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36514] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod vitium directe contrariatur virtuti, sicut et +peccatum actui virtuoso. Et ideo vitium excludit virtutem, sicut +peccatum excludit actum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the + other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36515] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes naturales agunt ex necessitate, et ideo, +integra existente virtute, nunquam peccatum potest in actu +inveniri. Sed virtutes animae non producunt actus ex necessitate, +unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A5-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 5. Whether every sin includes an action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. + Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36516] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in quolibet peccato sit aliquis actus. +Sicut enim meritum comparatur ad virtutem, ita peccatum ad vitium +comparatur. Sed meritum non potest esse absque aliquo actu. Ergo +nec peccatum potest esse absque aliquo actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, + unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every + sin implies an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36517] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>omne peccatum adeo +est voluntarium, quod si non sit voluntarium, non est peccatum</i>. +Sed non potest esse aliquid voluntarium nisi per actum voluntatis. +Ergo omne peccatum habet aliquem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who + never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; + and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36518] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccatum esset absque aliquo actu, sequeretur quod ex hoc ipso +quod aliquis cessat ab actu debito, peccaret. Sed continue aliquis +cessat ab actu debito, ille scilicet qui nunquam actum debitum +operatur. Ergo sequeretur quod continue peccaret, quod est falsum. +Non ergo est aliquod peccatum absque actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv">James 4:17</a>): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore + sin can be without act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36519] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iac. IV, <i>scienti bonum facere et non facienti, +peccatum est illi</i>. Sed non facere non importat aliquem actum. +Ergo peccatum potest esse absque actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For + some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not + to go to church," when he is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or + even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a + way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, + to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that + which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin + of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p7"> Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence + of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills "not to go to church": + while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound + to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church. + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p8"> If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission + must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we + turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission + or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone + omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; + and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which + act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and + in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of + itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something + else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills + to play at the time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the + result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to + the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental + (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding + the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission. + </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p9"> Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and + consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential + to other actual sins. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 co."><a name="36520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36520] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quaestio ista principaliter movetur propter peccatum +omissionis, de quo aliqui diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt +quod in omni peccato omissionis est aliquis actus vel interior vel +exterior. Interior quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult non ire ad +Ecclesiam quando ire tenetur. Exterior autem, sicut cum aliquis +illa hora qua ad Ecclesiam ire tenetur, vel etiam ante, occupat se +talibus quibus ab eundo ad Ecclesiam impeditur. Et hoc quodammodo +videtur in primum redire, qui enim vult aliquid cum quo aliud simul +esse non potest, ex consequenti vult illo carere; nisi forte non +perpendat quod per hoc quod vult facere, impeditur ab eo quod +facere tenetur; in quo casu posset per negligentiam culpabilis +iudicari. Alii vero dicunt quod in peccato omissionis non +requiritur aliquis actus, ipsum enim non facere quod quis facere +tenetur, peccatum est. Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid +veritatem habet. Si enim intelligatur in peccato omissionis illud +solum quod per se pertinet ad rationem peccati, sic quandoque +omissionis peccatum est cum actu interiori, ut cum aliquis vult non +ire ad Ecclesiam, quandoque vero absque omni actu vel interiori vel +exteriori, sicut cum aliquis hora qua tenetur ire ad Ecclesiam, +nihil cogitat de eundo vel non eundo ad Ecclesiam. Si vero in +peccato omissionis intelligantur etiam causae vel occasiones +omittendi, sic necesse est in peccato omissionis aliquem actum +esse. Non enim est peccatum omissionis nisi cum aliquis +praetermittit quod potest facere et non facere. Quod autem aliquis +declinet ad non faciendum illud quod potest facere et non facere, +non est nisi ex aliqua causa vel occasione coniuncta vel +praecedente. Et si quidem causa illa non sit in potestate hominis, +omissio non habet rationem peccati, sicut cum aliquis propter +infirmitatem praetermittit ad Ecclesiam ire. Si vero causa vel +occasio omittendi subiaceat voluntati, omissio habet rationem +peccati, et tunc semper oportet quod ista causa, inquantum est +voluntaria, habeat aliquem actum, ad minus interiorem voluntatis. +Qui quidem actus quandoque directe fertur in ipsam omissionem, puta +cum aliquis vult non ire ad Ecclesiam, vitans laborem. Et tunc +talis actus per se pertinet ad omissionem, voluntas enim +cuiuscumque peccati per se pertinet ad peccatum illud, eo quod +voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Quandoque autem actus +voluntatis directe fertur in aliud, per quod homo impeditur ab actu +debito, sive illud in quod fertur voluntas, sit coniunctum +omissioni, puta cum aliquis vult ludere quando ad Ecclesiam debet +ire; sive etiam sit praecedens, puta cum aliquis vult diu vigilare +de sero, ex quo sequitur quod non vadat hora matutinali ad +Ecclesiam. Et tunc actus iste interior vel exterior per accidens se +habet ad omissionem, quia omissio sequitur praeter intentionem; hoc +autem dicimus per accidens esse, quod est praeter intentionem, ut +patet in II Physic. Unde manifestum est quod tunc peccatum +omissionis habet quidem aliquem actum coniunctum vel praecedentem, +qui tamen per accidens se habet ad peccatum omissionis. Iudicium +autem de rebus dandum est secundum illud quod est per se, et non +secundum illud quod est per accidens. Unde verius dici potest quod +aliquod peccatum possit esse absque omni actu. Alioquin etiam ad +essentiam aliorum peccatorum actualium pertinerent actus et +occasiones circumstantes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> More things are required for good than for evil, since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results + from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or + by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there + can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36521] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod plura requiruntur ad bonum quam ad malum, eo +quod <i>bonum contingit ex tota integra causa, malum autem ex +singularibus defectibus</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Et ideo peccatum potest contingere sive aliquis faciat quod +non debet, sive non faciendo quod debet, sed meritum non potest +esse nisi aliquis faciat voluntarie quod debet. Et ideo meritum non +potest esse sine actu, sed peccatum potest esse sine actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which + we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far + as man has it in his power to will, and not to will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36522] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium non solum quia cadit +super ipsum actus voluntatis, sed quia in potestate nostra est ut +fiat vel non fiat, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde etiam ipsum non +velle potest dici voluntarium, inquantum in potestate hominis est +velle et non velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, + a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36523] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum omissionis contrariatur praecepto +affirmativo, quod obligat semper, sed non ad semper. Et ideo solum +pro tempore illo aliquis cessando ab actu peccat, pro quo +praeceptum affirmativum obligat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A6-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 6. Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because + "Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q71_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore this definition does not include every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36524] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiatur peccatum, +cum dicitur, peccatum est <i>dictum vel factum vel concupitum +contra legem aeternam</i>. Dictum enim, vel factum, vel concupitum, +importat aliquem actum. Sed non omne peccatum importat aliquem +actum, ut dictum est. Ergo haec definitio non includit omne +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised + under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary + to the eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36525] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de duabus animabus, <i>peccatum est +voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat</i>. Sed +voluntas sub concupiscentia comprehenditur, secundum quod +concupiscentia largo modo sumitur, pro omni appetitu. Ergo +suffecisset dicere, peccatum est concupitum contra legem aeternam; +nec oportuit addere, dictum vel factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard + to the end as explained above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A2" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.3" shape="rect"> Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to + neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he + says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should + use." Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition + of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36526] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum proprie consistere videtur in aversione a fine, nam bonum +et malum principaliter considerantur secundum finem, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde et Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., per +comparationem ad finem definit peccatum, dicens quod <i>peccare +nihil est aliud quam, neglectis rebus aeternis, temporalia +sectari</i>, et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod +<i>omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis et frui utendis</i>. +Sed in praemissa definitione nulla fit mentio de aversione a debito +fine. Ergo insufficienter definitur peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, + but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="36527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36527] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse prohibitum, quia legi contrariatur. Sed +non omnia peccata sunt mala quia prohibita, sed quaedam sunt +prohibita quia mala. Non ergo in communi definitione peccati debuit +poni quod sit contra legem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that + sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5"><a name="36528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36528] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum significat malum hominis actum, ut ex dictis patet. Sed +malum hominis est contra rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. +de Div. Nom. Ergo potius debuit dici quod peccatum sit contra +rationem, quam quod peccatum sit contra legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36529] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> In +contrarium sufficit auctoritas Augustini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above + (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by + the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its + due measure: and conformity of measure in a + thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: + one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's + reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining + to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; + the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal + law." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 co."><a name="36530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36530] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, peccatum nihil aliud est quam +actus humanus malus. Quod autem aliquis actus sit humanus, habet ex +hoc quod est voluntarius, sicut ex supradictis patet, sive sit +voluntarius quasi a voluntate elicitus, ut ipsum velle et eligere; +sive quasi a voluntate imperatus, ut exteriores actus vel +locutionis vel operationis. Habet autem actus humanus quod sit +malus, ex eo quod caret debita commensuratione. Omnis autem +commensuratio cuiuscumque rei attenditur per comparationem ad +aliquam regulam, a qua si divertat, incommensurata erit. Regula +autem voluntatis humanae est duplex, una propinqua et homogenea, +scilicet ipsa humana ratio; alia vero est prima regula, scilicet +lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei. Et ideo Augustinus in +definitione peccati posuit duo, unum quod pertinet ad substantiam +actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato, cum dixit, +dictum vel factum vel concupitum; aliud autem quod pertinet ad +rationem mali, quod est quasi formale in peccato, cum dixit, contra +legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the + genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is + not said, what is done and what is not done. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36531] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod affirmatio et negatio reducuntur ad idem genus, +sicut in divinis genitum et ingenitum ad relationem, ut Augustinus +dicit, in V de Trin. Et ideo pro eodem est accipiendum dictum et +non dictum, factum et non factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it + is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance + of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external + action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36532] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod prima causa peccati est in voluntate, quae imperat +omnes actus voluntarios, in quibus solum invenitur peccatum, et +ideo Augustinus quandoque per solam voluntatem definit peccatum. +Sed quia etiam ipsi exteriores actus pertinent ad substantiam +peccati, cum sint secundum se mali, ut dictum est, necesse fuit +quod in definitione peccati poneretur etiam aliquid pertinens ad +exteriores actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to + things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end + and all other forms of inordinateness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36533] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod lex aeterna primo et principaliter ordinat hominem ad +finem, consequenter autem facit hominem bene se habere circa ea +quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo in hoc quod dicit contra legem +aeternam, tangit aversionem a fine, et omnes alias +inordinationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. + If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily + in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural + law, precisely because it is inordinate. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="36534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36534] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod non omne peccatum ideo est malum +quia est prohibitum, intelligitur de prohibitione facta per ius +positivum. Si autem referatur ad ius naturale, quod continetur +primo quidem in lege aeterna, secundario vero in naturali +iudicatorio rationis humanae, tunc omne peccatum est malum quia +prohibitum, ex hoc enim ipso quod est inordinatum, iuri naturali +repugnat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. + Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference + to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. + in matters of faith. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 5"><a name="36535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36535] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod a theologis consideratur peccatum praecipue secundum +quod est offensa contra Deum, a philosopho autem morali, secundum +quod contrariatur rationi. Et ideo Augustinus convenientius definit +peccatum ex hoc quod est contra legem aeternam, quam ex hoc quod +est contra rationem, praecipue cum per legem aeternam regulemur in +multis quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut in his quae sunt +fidei.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q72" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q72-p0.1">Q. 72. OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q72-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q72-p3"><a href="#FS_Q72_A1"> (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p4"><a href="#FS_Q72_A2"> (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p5"><a href="#FS_Q72_A3"> (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p6"><a href="#FS_Q72_A4"> (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p7"><a href="#FS_Q72_A5"> (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p8"><a href="#FS_Q72_A6"> (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p9"><a href="#FS_Q72_A7"> (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p10"><a href="#FS_Q72_A8"> (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p11"><a href="#FS_Q72_A9"> (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 pr."><a name="36536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36536] +Iª-IIae q. 72 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +distinctione peccatorum vel vitiorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur +novem. Primo, utrum peccata distinguantur specie secundum obiecta. +Secundo, de distinctione peccatorum spiritualium et carnalium. +Tertio, utrum secundum causas. Quarto, utrum secundum eos in quos +peccatur. Quinto, utrum secundum diversitatem reatus. Sexto, utrum +secundum omissionem et commissionem. Septimo, utrum secundum +diversum processum peccati. Octavo, utrum secundum abundantiam et +defectum. Nono, utrum secundum diversas circumstantias.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q72_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A1-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 1. Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, + chiefly, to their end, as shown above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.3" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36537] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata non differant specie secundum +obiecta. Actus enim humani praecipue dicuntur boni vel mali per +comparationem ad finem, ut supra ostensum est. Cum igitur peccatum +nihil aliud sit quam actus hominis malus, sicut dictum est, videtur +quod secundum fines peccata debeant distingui specie, magis quam +secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil + in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their + objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36538] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +malum, cum sit privatio, distinguitur specie secundum diversas +species oppositorum. Sed peccatum est quoddam malum in genere +humanorum actuum. Ergo peccata magis distinguuntur specie secundum +opposita, quam secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with + diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. + xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36539] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccata specie differrent secundum obiecta, impossibile esset +idem peccatum specie circa diversa obiecta inveniri. Sed +inveniuntur aliqua huiusmodi peccata, nam superbia est et in rebus +spiritualibus et in corporalibus, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro +XXXIV Moral.; avaritia etiam est circa diversa genera rerum. Ergo +peccata non distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various + objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q72_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a> ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36540] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem +Dei. Sed dicta vel facta vel concupita distinguuntur specie +secundum diversa obiecta, quia actus per obiecta distinguuntur, ut +supra dictum est. Ergo etiam peccata secundum obiecta specie +distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from + God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; + while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one + acts intending evil," as Dionysius + declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that + which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the + part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according + to their objects, as was proved above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Therefore it follows that sins are properly + distinguished in species by their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 co."><a name="36541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36541] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem peccati duo +concurrunt, scilicet actus voluntarius; et inordinatio eius, quae +est per recessum a lege Dei. Horum autem duorum unum per se +comparatur ad peccantem, qui intendit talem actum voluntarium +exercere in tali materia, aliud autem, scilicet inordinatio actus, +per accidens se habet ad intentionem peccantis; nullus enim +intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. +Nom. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque, consequitur speciem +secundum illud quod est per se, non autem secundum id quod est per +accidens, quia ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt extra rationem +speciei. Et ideo peccata specie distinguuntur ex parte actuum +voluntariorum, magis quam ex parte inordinationis in peccato +existentis. Actus autem voluntarii distinguuntur specie secundum +obiecta, ut in superioribus ostensum est. Unde sequitur quod +peccata proprie distinguantur specie secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the + will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their + ends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36542] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod finis principaliter habet rationem boni, et ideo +comparatur ad actum voluntatis, qui est primordialis in omni +peccato, sicut obiectum. Unde in idem redit quod peccata differant +secundum obiecta, vel secundum fines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects + of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite + virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q72_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36543] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito +ordine privatus. Et ideo peccata magis distinguuntur specie +secundum obiecta actuum, quam secundum opposita. Quamvis etiam si +distinguantur secundum oppositas virtutes, in idem rediret, +virtutes enim distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut supra +habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which + aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks + abundance of things adapted to human use. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36544] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod nihil prohibet in diversis rebus specie vel genere +differentibus, invenire unam formalem rationem obiecti, a qua +peccatum speciem recipit. Et hoc modo superbia circa diversas res +excellentiam quaerit, avaritia vero abundantiam eorum quae usui +humano accommodantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A2-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 2. Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. + from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore + carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36545] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur peccata +spiritualia a carnalibus. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Galat. V, +<i>manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, +impudicitia, luxuria, idolorum servitus, veneficia,</i> etc., ex +quo videtur quod omnia peccatorum genera sunt opera carnis. Sed +peccata carnalia dicuntur opera carnis. Ergo non sunt distinguenda +peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.13" target="asv"> Rom. 8:13</a>: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." + Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not + be distinguished from spiritual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36546] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque peccat, secundum carnem ambulat, secundum illud Rom. +VIII, <i>si secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini; si autem spiritu +facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis</i>. Sed vivere vel ambulare +secundum carnem, videtur pertinere ad rationem peccati carnalis. +Ergo omnia peccata sunt carnalia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda +peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv"> Eph. 4:23</a>: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed + in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, + as we shall state further on ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[74], A[7]</a>). + Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36547] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +superior pars animae, quae est mens vel ratio, spiritus nominatur, +secundum illud Ephes. IV, <i>renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae</i>, +ubi spiritus pro ratione ponitur, ut ibi Glossa dicit. Sed omne +peccatum quod secundum carnem committitur, a ratione derivatur per +consensum, quia superioris rationis est consentire in actum +peccati, ut infra dicetur. Ergo eadem peccata sunt carnalia et +spiritualia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against + his own body. But, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>), "every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore + fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv">Eph. 5:3</a>) reckons covetousness with the carnal + sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36548] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +si aliqua peccata specialiter sunt carnalia, hoc potissime +intelligendum videtur de illis peccatis quibus aliquis in corpus +suum peccat. Sed sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, <i>omne +peccatum quodcumque fecerit homo, extra corpus est, qui autem +fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat</i>. Ergo sola fornicatio esset +peccatum carnale, cum tamen apostolus, ad Ephes. V, etiam avaritiam +carnalibus peccatis annumeret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36549] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., dicit quod <i>septem capitalium +vitiorum quinque sunt spiritualia, et duo carnalia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has + an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure + is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; + this can also be called spiritual + pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized + in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure. + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal + pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in + sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:1</a>): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 co."><a name="36550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36550] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccata recipiunt speciem ex +obiectis. Omne autem peccatum consistit in appetitu alicuius +commutabilis boni quod inordinate appetitur, et per consequens in +eo iam habito inordinate aliquis delectatur. Ut autem ex +superioribus patet, duplex est delectatio. Una quidem animalis, +quae consummatur in sola apprehensione alicuius rei ad votum +habitae, et haec etiam potest dici delectatio spiritualis, sicut +cum aliquis delectatur in laude humana, vel in aliquo huiusmodi. +Alia vero delectatio est corporalis, sive naturalis, quae in ipso +tactu corporali perficitur, quae potest etiam dici delectatio +carnalis. Sic igitur illa peccata quae perficiuntur in delectatione +spirituali, vocantur peccata spiritualia, illa vero quae +perficiuntur in delectatione carnali, vocantur peccata carnalia; +sicut gula, quae perficitur in delectatione ciborum, et luxuria, +quae perficitur in delectatione venereorum. Unde et apostolus dicit +II ad Cor. VII. <i>Emundemus nos ab omni inquinamento, carnis et +spiritus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; + but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36551] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, illa vitia dicuntur +opera carnis, <i>non quia in voluptate carnis perficiantur, sed +caro sumitur ibi pro homine, qui dum secundum se vivit, secundum +carnem vivere dicitur</i>; ut etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. +Dei. Et huius ratio est ex hoc, quod omnis rationis humanae +defectus ex sensu carnali aliquo modo initium habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36552] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc +etiam patet responsio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are + named, is carnal pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36553] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccatis etiam carnalibus est aliquis actus +spiritualis, scilicet actus rationis, sed finis horum peccatorum, a +quo denominantur, est delectatio carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning + it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It + may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin + alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, + which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, + it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness + is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory + says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36554] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, <i>specialiter in +fornicationis peccato servit anima corpori, intantum ut nihil aliud +in ipso momento cogitare homini liceat</i>. Delectatio autem gulae, +etsi sit carnalis, non ita absorbet rationem. Vel potest dici quod +in hoc peccato etiam quaedam iniuria fit corpori, dum inordinate +maculatur. Et ideo per hoc solum peccatum dicitur specialiter homo +in corpus peccare. Avaritia vero quae in carnalibus peccatis +connumeratur, pro adulterio ponitur, quod est iniusta usurpatio +uxoris alienae. Vel potest dici quod res in qua delectatur avarus, +corporale quoddam est, et quantum ad hoc, connumeratur peccatis +carnalibus. Sed ipsa delectatio non pertinet ad carnem, sed ad +spiritum, et ideo secundum Gregorium, est spirituale peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A3-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 3. Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence + it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore + they differ specifically in reference to their causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36555] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata distinguantur specie secundum +causas. Ab eodem enim habet res speciem, a quo habet esse. Sed +peccata habent esse ex suis causis. Ergo ab eis etiam speciem +sortiuntur. Differunt ergo specie secundum diversitatem +causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like + its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they + differ in reference to their other causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36556] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +inter alias causas minus videtur pertinere ad speciem causa +materialis. Sed obiectum in peccato est sicut causa materialis. Cum +ergo secundum obiecta peccata specie distinguantur, videtur quod +peccata multo magis secundum alias causas distinguantur specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling + us to undue ardor." For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: + 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on + account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, + too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes + of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36557] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit +quod <i>omne peccatum est ex timore male humiliante, vel ex amore +male inflammante</i>. Dicitur etiam I Ioan. II, quod <i>omne quod +est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia +oculorum, aut superbia vitae</i>, dicitur autem aliquid esse in +mundo, propter peccatum, secundum quod mundi nomine amatores mundi +significantur, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Gregorius etiam, +XXXI Moral., distinguit omnia peccata secundum septem vitia +capitalia. Omnes autem huiusmodi divisiones respiciunt causas +peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod peccata differant specie secundum +diversitatem causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>) that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore + sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36558] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc omnia peccata essent unius speciei, cum ex +una causa causentur, dicitur enim Eccli. X, quod <i>initium omnis +peccati est superbia</i>; et I ad Tim. ult., quod <i>radix omnium +malorum est cupiditas</i>. Manifestum est autem esse diversas +species peccatorum. Non ergo peccata distinguuntur specie secundum +diversitates causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the + "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and + form, both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements + and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, + because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts + are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus + heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in + voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or + motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, + or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue + ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only + in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6) that human acts take their species from the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 co."><a name="36559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36559] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum quatuor sint causarum genera, diversimode +diversis attribuuntur. Causa enim formalis et materialis respiciunt +proprie substantiam rei, et ideo substantiae secundum formam et +materiam specie et genere distinguuntur. Agens autem et finis +respiciunt directe motum et operationem, et ideo motus et +operationes secundum huiusmodi causas specie distinguuntur; +diversimode tamen. Nam principia activa naturalia sunt determinata +semper ad eosdem actus, et ideo diversae species in actibus +naturalibus attenduntur non solum secundum obiecta, quae sunt fines +vel termini, sed etiam secundum principia activa; sicut calefacere +et infrigidare distinguuntur specie secundum calidum et frigidum. +Sed principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cuiusmodi sunt actus +peccatorum, non se habent ex necessitate ad unum, et ideo ex uno +principio activo vel motivo possunt diversae species peccatorum +procedere; sicut ex timore male humiliante potest procedere quod +homo furetur, et quod occidat, et quod deserat gregem sibi +commissum; et haec eadem possunt procedere ex amore. Unde +manifestum est quod peccata non differant specie secundum diversas +causas activas vel motivas; sed solum secundum diversitatem causae +finalis. Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis, ostensum est enim +supra quod actus humani habent speciem ex fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, + unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and + consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36560] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cum non +sint determinata ad unum, non sufficiunt ad producendum humanos +actus, nisi determinetur voluntas ad unum per intentionem finis; ut +patet per philosophum, in IX Metaphys. Et ideo a fine perficitur et +esse et species peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of + the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered + as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. + x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has + the character of end. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36561] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiecta, secundum quod comparantur ad actus +exteriores, habent rationem materiae circa quam, sed secundum quod +comparantur ad actum interiorem voluntatis, habent rationem finium; +et ex hoc habent quod dent speciem actui. Quamvis etiam secundum +quod sunt materia circa quam, habeant rationem terminorum; a quibus +motus specificantur, ut dicitur in V Physic. et in X Ethic. Sed +tamen etiam termini motus dant speciem motibus, inquantum habent +rationem finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36562] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illae divisiones peccatorum non dantur ad +distinguendas species peccatorum; sed ad manifestandas diversas +causas eorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A4-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 4. Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that + which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against + God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q66_A6" id="FS_Q72_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[6]</a>). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of + sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36563] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccatum distinguatur +per peccatum quod est in Deum, in proximum, et in seipsum. Illud +enim quod est commune omni peccato, non debet poni quasi pars in +divisione peccati. Sed commune est omni peccato quod sit contra +Deum, ponitur enim in definitione peccati quod sit contra legem +Dei, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo peccatum in Deum debet poni +quasi pars in divisione peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed + to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly + divided into these three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36564] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis divisio debet fieri per opposita. Sed ista tria genera +peccatorum non sunt opposita, quicumque enim peccat in proximum, +peccat etiam in seipsum et in Deum. Non ergo peccatum convenienter +dividitur secundum haec tria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are + not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36565] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt extrinsecus, non conferunt speciem. Sed Deus et +proximus sunt extra nos. Ergo per haec non distinguuntur peccata +secundum speciem. Inconvenienter igitur secundum haec tria peccatum +dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and + against his neighbor." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36566] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus, in libro de summo bono, distinguens peccata, +dicit quod <i>homo dicitur peccare in se, in Deum, et in +proximum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so + far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule + of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold + order would suffice. But since man is + naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed + in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever + things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised + under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he + that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the + first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, + we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation + to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against + himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he + is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, + his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which + the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: + because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from + what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[62], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his + neighbor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 co."><a name="36567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36567] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum est actus +inordinatus. Triplex autem ordo in homine debet esse. Unus quidem +secundum comparationem ad regulam rationis, prout scilicet omnes +actiones et passiones nostrae debent secundum regulam rationis +commensurari. Alius autem ordo est per comparationem ad regulam +divinae legis, per quam homo in omnibus dirigi debet. Et si quidem +homo naturaliter esset animal solitarium, hic duplex ordo +sufficeret, sed quia homo est naturaliter animal politicum et +sociale, ut probatur in I Polit., ideo necesse est quod sit tertius +ordo, quo homo ordinetur ad alios homines, quibus convivere debet. +Horum autem ordinum secundus continet primum, et excedit ipsum. +Quaecumque enim continentur sub ordine rationis, continentur sub +ordine ipsius Dei, sed quaedam continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei, +quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et quae +debentur soli Deo. Unde qui in talibus peccat, dicitur in Deum +peccare, sicut haereticus et sacrilegus et blasphemus. Similiter +etiam secundus ordo includit tertium, et excedit ipsum. Quia in +omnibus in quibus ordinamur ad proximum, oportet nos dirigi +secundum regulam rationis, sed in quibusdam dirigimur secundum +rationem quantum ad nos tantum, non autem quantum ad proximum. Et +quando in his peccatur, dicitur homo peccare in seipsum, sicut +patet de guloso, luxurioso et prodigo. Quando vero peccat homo in +his quibus ad proximum ordinatur, dicitur peccare in proximum, +sicut patet de fure et homicida. Sunt autem diversa quibus homo +ordinatur ad Deum, et ad proximum, et ad seipsum. Unde haec +distinctio peccatorum est secundum obiecta, secundum quae +diversificantur species peccatorum. Unde haec distinctio peccatorum +proprie est secundum diversas peccatorum species. Nam et virtutes, +quibus peccata opponuntur, secundum hanc differentiam specie +distinguuntur, manifestum est enim ex dictis quod virtutibus +theologicis homo ordinatur ad Deum, temperantia vero et fortitudine +ad seipsum, iustitia autem ad proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order + to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36568] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccare in Deum, secundum quod ordo qui est ad +Deum, includit omnem humanum ordinem, commune est omni peccato. Sed +quantum ad id quod ordo Dei excedit alios duos ordines, sic +peccatum in Deum est speciale genus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, + not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers + and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in + respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the + numbers three and four. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36569] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quando aliqua quorum unum includit alterum, ab +invicem distinguuntur, intelligitur fieri distinctio non secundum +illud quod unum continetur in altero, sed secundum illud quod unum +excedit alterum. Sicut patet in divisione numerorum et figurarum, +non enim triangulus dividitur contra quadratum secundum quod +continetur in eo, sed secundum quod exceditur ab eo; et similiter +est de ternario et quaternario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related + to it as to its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36570] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus et proximus, quamvis sint exteriora respectu +ipsius peccantis, non tamen sunt extranea respectu actus peccati; +sed comparantur ad ipsum sicut propria obiecta ipsius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A5-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 5. Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when + sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even + to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal + punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity + of the fault, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are + not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36571] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod divisio peccatorum quae est secundum +reatum, diversificet speciem, puta cum dividitur secundum veniale +et mortale. Ea enim quae in infinitum differunt, non possunt esse +unius speciei, nec etiam unius generis. Sed veniale et mortale +peccatum differunt in infinitum, veniali enim debetur poena +temporalis, mortali poena aeterna; mensura autem poenae respondet +quantitati culpae, secundum illud Deut. XXV, <i>pro mensura delicti +erit et plagarum modus</i>. Ergo veniale et mortale non sunt unius +generis, nedum quod sint unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder + and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial + and mortal sins differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36572] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam peccata sunt mortalia ex genere, sicut homicidium et +adulterium, quaedam vero ex suo genere sunt peccata venialia, sicut +verbum otiosum et risus superfluus. Ergo peccatum veniale et +mortale specie differunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward + is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their + ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36573] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet actus virtuosus ad praemium, ita se habet peccatum +ad poenam. Sed praemium est finis virtuosi actus. Ergo et poena est +finis peccati. Sed peccata distinguuntur specie secundum fines, ut +dictum est. Ergo etiam distinguuntur specie secundum reatum +poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as + the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36574] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ea quae constituunt speciem, sunt priora, sicut differentiae +specificae. Sed poena sequitur culpam, sicut effectus eius. Ergo +peccata non differunt specie secundum reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to + be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is + consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it + may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific + diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man. + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p7"> We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of + punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and + what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the + intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it + is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to + the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific + diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it. + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p8"> Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes + the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying + the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame + may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, + on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now + the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable + principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away + from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without + turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction + of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of + the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible + to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the + truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider + the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas + when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle + of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to + deserve to be punished eternally. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 co."><a name="36575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36575] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod eorum quae specie differunt, duplex differentia +invenitur. Una quidem quae constituit diversitatem specierum, et +talis differentia nunquam invenitur nisi in speciebus diversis; +sicut rationale et irrationale, animatum et inanimatum. Alia autem +differentia est consequens diversitatem speciei, et talis +differentia, etsi in aliquibus consequatur diversitatem speciei, in +aliis tamen potest inveniri in eadem specie; sicut album et nigrum +consequuntur diversitatem speciei corvi et cygni, tamen invenitur +huiusmodi differentia in eadem hominis specie. Dicendum est ergo +quod differentia venialis et mortalis peccati, vel quaecumque alia +differentia sumitur penes reatum, non potest esse differentia +constituens diversitatem speciei. Nunquam enim id quod est per +accidens, constituit speciem. Id autem quod est praeter intentionem +agentis, est per accidens, ut patet in II Physic. Manifestum est +autem quod poena est praeter intentionem peccantis. Unde per +accidens se habet ad peccatum, ex parte ipsius peccantis. Ordinatur +tamen ad peccatum ab exteriori, scilicet ex iustitia iudicantis, +qui secundum diversas conditiones peccatorum diversas poenas +infligit. Unde differentia quae est ex reatu poenae, potest +consequi diversam speciem peccatorum; non autem constituit +diversitatem speciei. Differentia autem peccati venialis et +mortalis consequitur diversitatem inordinationis, quae complet +rationem peccati. Duplex enim est inordinatio, una per +subtractionem principii ordinis; alia qua, salvato principio +ordinis, fit inordinatio circa ea quae sunt post principium. Sicut +in corpore animalis quandoque quidem inordinatio complexionis +procedit usque ad destructionem principii vitalis, et haec est +mors, quandoque vero, salvo principio vitae, fit inordinatio +quaedam in humoribus, et tunc est aegritudo. Principium autem +totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus, qui ita se habet in +operativis, sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis, ut +dicitur in VII Ethic. Unde quando anima deordinatur per peccatum +usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unimur per +caritatem, tunc est peccatum mortale, quando vero fit deordinatio +citra aversionem a Deo, tunc est peccatum veniale. Sicut enim in +corporalibus deordinatio mortis, quae est per remotionem principii +vitae, est irreparabilis secundum naturam; inordinatio autem +aegritudinis reparari potest, propter id quod salvatur principium +vitae; similiter est in his quae pertinent ad animam. Nam in +speculativis qui errat circa principia, impersuasibilis est, qui +autem errat salvatis principiis, per ipsa principia revocari +potest. Et similiter in operativis qui peccando avertitur ab ultimo +fine, quantum est ex natura peccati, habet lapsum irreparabilem, et +ideo dicitur peccare mortaliter, aeternaliter puniendus. Qui vero +peccat citra aversionem a Deo, ex ipsa ratione peccati +reparabiliter deordinatur, quia salvatur principium, et ideo +dicitur peccare venialiter, quia scilicet non ita peccat ut +mereatur interminabilem poenam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz. + the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, + in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may + even be a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36576] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in +infinitum ex parte aversionis, non autem ex parte conversionis, per +quam respicit obiectum, unde peccatum speciem habet. Unde nihil +prohibet in eadem specie inveniri aliquod peccatum mortale et +veniale, sicut primus motus in genere adulterii est peccatum +veniale; et verbum otiosum, quod plerumque est veniale, potest +etiam esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that + this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may + be found even in things of the same species, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36577] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hoc quod invenitur aliquod peccatum mortale ex +genere, et aliquod peccatum veniale ex genere, sequitur quod talis +differentia consequatur diversitatem peccatorum secundum speciem, +non autem quod causet eam. Talis autem differentia potest inveniri +etiam in his quae sunt eiusdem speciei, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on + the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36578] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod praemium est de intentione merentis vel virtuose +agentis, sed poena non est de intentione peccantis, sed magis est +contra voluntatem ipsius. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A6-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 6. Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.1" target="asv">Eph. 2:1</a>), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,' + by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here + denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of + commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36579] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum commissionis et omissionis +specie differant. Delictum enim contra peccatum dividitur, Ephes. +II, ubi dicitur, <i>cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis +vestris</i>. Et exponit ibi Glossa, <i>delictis, idest dimittendo +quae iubentur; et peccatis, scilicet agendo prohibita</i>, ex quo +patet quod per delictum intelligitur peccatum omissionis, per +peccatum, peccatum commissionis. Differunt igitur specie, cum ex +opposito dividantur, tanquam diversae species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been + said ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q72_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, + against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36580] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccato per se convenit quod sit contra legem Dei, ponitur enim in +eius definitione, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed in lege Dei alia +sunt praecepta affirmativa, contra quae est peccatum omissionis; et +alia praecepta negativa, contra quae est peccatum commissionis. +Ergo peccatum omissionis et peccatum commissionis differunt +specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, + since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. + iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36581] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omissio et commissio differunt sicut affirmatio et negatio. Sed +affirmatio et negatio non possunt esse unius speciei, quia negatio +non habet speciem; non entis enim non sunt neque species neque +differentiae, ut philosophus dicit. Ergo omissio et commissio non +possunt esse unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which + is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and + commission do not differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36582] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +in eadem specie peccati invenitur omissio et commissio, avarus enim +et aliena rapit, quod est peccatum commissionis; et sua non dat +quibus dare debet, quod est peccatum omissionis. Ergo omissio et +commissio non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed + in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which + is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which + are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed + to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves + differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission + and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. + But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because + they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, + and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the + prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, + is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not + give forth cold. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 co."><a name="36583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36583] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in peccatis invenitur duplex differentia, una +materialis, et alia formalis. Materialis quidem attenditur secundum +naturalem speciem actuum peccati, formalis autem secundum ordinem +ad unum finem proprium, quod est obiectum proprium. Unde +inveniuntur aliqui actus materialiter specie differentes, qui tamen +formaliter sunt in eadem specie peccati, quia ad idem ordinantur, +sicut ad eandem speciem homicidii pertinet iugulatio, lapidatio et +perforatio, quamvis actus sint specie differentes secundum speciem +naturae. Sic ergo si loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et +commissionis materialiter, differunt specie, large tamen loquendo +de specie, secundum quod negatio vel privatio speciem habere +potest. Si autem loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et +commissionis formaliter, sic non differunt specie, quia ad idem +ordinantur, et ex eodem motivo procedunt. Avarus enim ad +congregandum pecuniam et rapit, et non dat ea quae dare debet; et +similiter gulosus ad satisfaciendum gulae, et superflua comedit, et +ieiunia debita praetermittit; et idem est videre in ceteris. Semper +enim in rebus negatio fundatur super aliqua affirmatione, quae est +quodammodo causa eius, unde etiam in rebus naturalibus eiusdem +rationis est quod ignis calefaciat, et quod non infrigidet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to + material species, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36584] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod illa divisio quae est per commissionem et +omissionem, non est secundum diversas species formales, sed +materiales tantum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, + first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are + induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but + to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed + to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is + a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically + according to the various precepts of the Law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36585] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod necesse fuit in lege Dei proponi diversa praecepta +affirmativa et negativa, ut gradatim homines introducerentur ad +virtutem, prius quidem abstinendo a malo, ad quod inducimur per +praecepta negativa; et postmodum faciendo bonum, ad quod inducimur +per praecepta affirmativa. Et sic praecepta affirmativa et negativa +non pertinent ad diversas virtutes, sed ad diversos gradus +virtutis. Et per consequens non oportet quod contrarientur diversis +peccatis secundum speciem. Peccatum etiam non habet speciem ex +parte aversionis, quia secundum hoc est negatio vel privatio, sed +ex parte conversionis, secundum quod est actus quidam. Unde +secundum diversa praecepta legis non diversificantur peccata +secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, + negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36586] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de materiali diversitate +speciei. Sciendum est tamen quod negatio, etsi proprie non sit in +specie, constituitur tamen in specie per reductionem ad aliquam +affirmationem quam sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A7-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 7. Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes + three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second + stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to + the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to + reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36587] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur peccatum in +peccatum cordis, oris, et operis. Augustinus enim, in XII de Trin., +ponit tres gradus peccati, quorum primus est, cum carnalis sensus +illecebram quandam ingerit, quod est peccatum cogitationis, +secundus gradus est, quando sola cogitationis delectatione aliquis +contentus est; tertius gradus est, quando faciendum decernitur per +consensum. Sed tria haec pertinent ad peccatum cordis. Ergo +inconvenienter peccatum cordis ponitur quasi unum genus +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, + "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume + on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and + two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36588] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius, in IV Moral., ponit quatuor gradus peccati, quorum +primus est culpa latens in corde; secundus, cum exterius +publicatur; tertius est, cum consuetudine roboratur; quartus est, +cum usque ad praesumptionem divinae misericordiae, vel ad +desperationem, homo procedit. Ubi non distinguitur peccatum operis +a peccato oris; et adduntur duo alii peccatorum gradus. Ergo +inconveniens fuit prima divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. + Therefore they should not be condivided with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36589] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +non potest esse peccatum in ore vel in opere, nisi fiat prius in +corde. Ergo ista peccata specie non differunt. Non ergo debent +contra se invicem dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36590] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Hieronymus dicit, super Ezech., <i>tria sunt generalia +delicta quibus humanum subiacet genus, aut enim cogitatione, aut +sermone, aut opere peccamus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: + secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is + the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, + as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the + generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various + complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first + beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as + man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the + deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three + belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, + is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the + same applies to lust and to any other sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 co."><a name="36591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36591] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliqua inveniuntur differre specie dupliciter. Uno +modo, ex eo quod utrumque habet speciem completam, sicut equus et +bos differunt specie. Alio modo, secundum diversos gradus in aliqua +generatione vel motu accipiuntur diversae species, sicut +aedificatio est completa generatio domus, collocatio autem +fundamenti et erectio parietis sunt species incompletae, ut patet +per philosophum, in X Ethic.; et idem etiam potest dici in +generationibus animalium. Sic igitur peccatum dividitur per haec +tria, scilicet peccatum oris, cordis et operis, non sicut per +diversas species completas, nam consummatio peccati est in opere, +unde peccatum operis habet speciem completam. Sed prima inchoatio +eius est quasi fundatio in corde; secundus autem gradus eius est in +ore, secundum quod homo prorumpit facile ad manifestandum conceptum +cordis; tertius autem gradus iam est in consummatione operis. Et +sic haec tria differunt secundum diversos gradus peccati. Patet +tamen quod haec tria pertinent ad unam perfectam peccati speciem, +cum ab eodem motivo procedant, iracundus enim, ex hoc quod appetit +vindictam, primo quidem perturbatur in corde; secundo, in verba +contumeliosa prorumpit; tertio vero, procedit usque ad facta +iniuriosa. Et idem patet in luxuria, et in quolibet alio +peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided + into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36592] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omne peccatum cordis convenit in ratione +occulti, et secundum hoc ponitur unus gradus. Qui tamen per tres +gradus distinguitur, scilicet cogitationis, delectationis et +consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas + Jerome (in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while + in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation + is by way of sequel. + Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation + of a man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36593] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum oris et operis conveniunt in manifestatione, +et propter hoc a Gregorio sub uno computantur. Hieronymus autem +distinguit ea, quia in peccato oris est manifestatio tantum, et +principaliter intenta, in peccato vero operis est principaliter +expletio interioris conceptus cordis, sed manifestatio est ex +consequenti. Consuetudo vero et desperatio sunt gradus consequentes +post speciem perfectam peccati, sicut adolescentia et iuventus post +perfectam hominis generationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each + is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, + but only when there is a break in the movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36594] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum cordis et oris non distinguuntur a peccato +operis, quando simul cum eo coniunguntur, sed prout quodlibet horum +per se invenitur. Sicut etiam pars motus non distinguitur a toto +motu, quando motus est continuus, sed solum quando motus sistit in +medio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A8-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 8. Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect + of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species + of sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36595] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod superabundantia et defectus non +diversificent species peccatorum. Superabundantia enim et defectus +differunt secundum magis et minus. Sed magis et minus non +diversificant speciem. Ergo superabundantia et defectus non +diversificant speciem peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative + matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more + or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude + of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36596] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut peccatum in agibilibus est ex hoc quod receditur a +rectitudine rationis, ita falsitas in speculativis est ex hoc quod +receditur a veritate rei. Sed non diversificatur species falsitatis +ex hoc quod aliquis dicit plus vel minus esse quam sit in re. Ergo +etiam non diversificatur species peccati ex hoc quod recedit a +rectitudine rationis in plus vel in minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency + are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, + by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36597] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, ex duabus speciebus non constituitur una species</i>, +ut Porphyrius dicit. Sed superabundantia et defectus uniuntur in +uno peccato, sunt enim simul quidam illiberales et prodigi, quorum +duorum illiberalitas est peccatum secundum defectum, prodigalitas +autem secundum superabundantiam. Ergo superabundantia et defectus +non diversificant speciem peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices + that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they + differ specifically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36598] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +contraria differunt secundum speciem, nam contrarietas est +differentia secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed vitia +quae differunt secundum superabundantiam et defectum, sunt +contraria, sicut illiberalitas prodigalitati. Ergo differunt +secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order + of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, + as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently + wherever we find a + different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive + for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary + to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of + insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 co."><a name="36599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36599] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum in peccato sint duo, scilicet ipse actus, et +inordinatio eius, prout receditur ab ordine rationis et legis +divinae; species peccati attenditur non ex parte inordinationis, +quae est praeter intentionem peccantis, ut supra dictum est; sed +magis ex parte ipsius actus, secundum quod terminatur ad obiectum, +in quod fertur intentio peccantis. Et ideo ubicumque occurrit +diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est +diversa species peccati. Manifestum est autem quod non est idem +motivum ad peccandum in peccatis quae sunt secundum +superabundantiam, et in peccatis quae sunt secundum defectum; +quinimmo sunt contraria motiva; sicut motivum in peccato +intemperantiae est amor delectationum corporalium, motivum autem in +peccato insensibilitatis est odium earum. Unde huiusmodi peccata +non solum differunt specie, sed etiam sunt sibi invicem +contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in + so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says + (Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, + were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short + thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36600] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod magis et minus, etsi non sint causa diversitatis +speciei, consequuntur tamen quandoque species differentes, prout +proveniunt ex diversis formis, sicut si dicatur quod ignis est +levior aere. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod qui +posuerunt non esse diversas species amicitiarum propter hoc quod +dicuntur secundum magis et minus, non sufficienti crediderunt +signo. Et hoc modo superexcedere rationem, vel deficere ab ea, +pertinet ad diversa peccata secundum speciem, inquantum +consequuntur diversa motiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through + departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, + wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside + the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to + tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds + in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his + debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36601] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod intentio peccantis non est ut recedat a ratione, et +ideo non efficitur eiusdem rationis peccatum superabundantiae et +defectus propter recessum ab eadem rationis rectitudine. Sed +quandoque ille qui dicit falsum, intendit veritatem occultare, unde +quantum ad hoc, non refert utrum dicat vel plus vel minus. Si tamen +recedere a veritate sit praeter intentionem, tunc manifestum est +quod ex diversis causis aliquis movetur ad dicendum plus vel minus, +et secundum hoc diversa est ratio falsitatis. Sicut patet de +iactatore, qui superexcedit dicendo falsum, quaerens gloriam; et de +deceptore, qui diminuit, evadens debiti solutionem. Unde et quaedam +falsae opiniones sunt sibi invicem contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q119_A1" id="FS_Q72_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[119], A[1]</a>, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36602] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod prodigus et illiberalis potest esse aliquis secundum +diversa, ut scilicet sit aliquis illiberalis in accipiendo quae non +debet, et prodigus in dando quae non debet. Nihil autem prohibet +contraria inesse eidem secundum diversa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A9-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 9. Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil + results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption + of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36603] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitia et peccata diversificentur +specie secundum diversas circumstantias. Quia, ut dicit Dionysius, +IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>malum contingit ex singularibus +defectibus</i>. Singulares autem defectus sunt corruptiones +singularum circumstantiarum. Ergo ex singulis circumstantiis +corruptis singulae species peccatorum consequuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q72_A9-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36604] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccata sunt quidam actus humani. Sed actus humani interdum +accipiunt speciem a circumstantiis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo +peccata differunt specie secundum quod diversae circumstantiae +corrumpuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse: + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p5"> 'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner + than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according + to the various circumstances. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36605] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +diversae species gulae assignantur secundum particulas quae in hoc +versiculo continentur, <i>praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, +studiose</i>. Haec autem pertinent ad diversas circumstantias, nam +praepropere est antequam oportet, nimis plus quam oportet, et idem +patet in aliis. Ergo species peccati diversificantur secundum +diversas circumstantias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not"; + and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36606] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in III et IV Ethic., quod singula vitia +peccant agendo et plus quam oportet, et quando non oportet, et +similiter secundum omnes alias circumstantias. Non ergo secundum +hoc diversificantur peccatorum species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q72_A8" id="FS_Q72_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the + end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: + thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on + with the circumstances, since he does + this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not + diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species. + </p><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p8"> Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat + hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive + humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due + to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances + entails different species of sins. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 co."><a name="36607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36607] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi occurrit aliud motivum ad +peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species, quia motivum ad peccandum +est finis et obiectum. Contingit autem quandoque quod in +corruptionibus diversarum circumstantiarum est idem motivum, sicut +illiberalis ab eodem movetur quod accipiat quando non oportet, et +ubi non oportet, et plus quam oportet, et similiter de aliis +circumstantiis; hoc enim facit propter inordinatum appetitum +pecuniae congregandae. Et in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum +corruptiones non diversificant species peccatorum, sed pertinent ad +unam et eandem peccati speciem. Quandoque vero contingit quod +corruptiones diversarum circumstantiarum proveniunt a diversis +motivis. Puta quod aliquis praepropere comedat, potest provenire ex +hoc quod homo non potest ferre dilationem cibi, propter facilem +consumptionem humiditatis; quod vero appetat immoderatum cibum, +potest contingere propter virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum +multum cibum; quod autem aliquis appetat cibos deliciosos, +contingit propter appetitum delectationis quae est in cibo. Unde in +talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones inducunt diversas +peccati species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even + as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A9-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, but from turning to the object of the act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36608] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum, inquantum huiusmodi, privatio est, et +ideo diversificatur specie secundum ea quae privantur, sicut et +ceterae privationes. Sed peccatum non sortitur speciem ex parte +privationis vel aversionis, ut supra dictum est; sed ex conversione +ad obiectum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36609] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod circumstantia nunquam transfert actum in aliam +speciem, nisi quando est aliud motivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36610] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in diversis speciebus gulae diversa sunt motiva, +sicut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q73" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q73-p0.1">Q. 73. OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q73-p2"> We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q73-p3"><a href="#FS_Q73_A1"> (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p4"><a href="#FS_Q73_A2"> (2) Whether all are equal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p5"><a href="#FS_Q73_A3"> (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p6"><a href="#FS_Q73_A4"> (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p7"><a href="#FS_Q73_A5"> (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p8"><a href="#FS_Q73_A6"> (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p9"><a href="#FS_Q73_A7"> (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p10"><a href="#FS_Q73_A8"> (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p11"><a href="#FS_Q73_A9"> (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p12"><a href="#FS_Q73_A10"> (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 pr."><a name="36611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36611] +Iª-IIae q. 73 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +comparatione peccatorum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. +Primo, utrum omnia peccata et vitia sint connexa. Secundo, utrum +omnia sint paria. Tertio, utrum gravitas peccatorum attendatur +secundum obiecta. Quarto, utrum secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus +peccata opponuntur. Quinto, utrum peccata carnalia sint graviora +quam spiritualia. Sexto, utrum secundum causas peccatorum +attendatur gravitas peccatorum. Septimo, utrum secundum +circumstantias. Octavo, utrum secundum quantitatem nocumenti. Nono, +utrum secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Decimo, utrum +propter magnitudinem personae peccantis aggravetur peccatum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q73_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A1-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 1. Whether all sins are connected with one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.10" target="asv">James 2:10</a>): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing + all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression + of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of + all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36612] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint connexa. Dicitur +enim Iac. II, <i>quicumque totam legem servaverit, offendat autem +in uno, factus est omnium reus</i>. Sed idem est esse reum omnium +mandatorum legis, quod habere omnia peccata, quia, sicut Ambrosius +dicit, <i>peccatum est transgressio legis divinae, et caelestium +inobedientia mandatorum</i>. Ergo quicumque peccat uno peccato, +subiicitur omnibus peccatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all + sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36613] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quodlibet peccatum excludit virtutem sibi oppositam. Sed qui caret +una virtute, caret omnibus, ut patet ex supradictis. Ergo qui +peccat uno peccato, privatur omnibus virtutibus. Sed qui caret +virtute, habet vitium sibi oppositum. Ergo qui habet unum peccatum, +habet omnia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[65], AA[1]</a>,2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, + is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as + Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected + so that whoever has one, has them all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36614] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +virtutes omnes sunt connexae quae conveniunt in uno principio, ut +supra habitum est. Sed sicut virtutes conveniunt in uno principio, +ita et peccata, quia sicut amor Dei, qui facit civitatem Dei, est +principium et radix omnium virtutum, ita amor sui, qui facit +civitatem Babylonis, est radix omnium peccatorum; ut patet per +Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo etiam omnia vitia et peccata sunt +connexa, ita ut qui unum habet, habeat omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the + same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36615] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quaedam vitia sunt sibi invicem contraria, ut patet per +philosophum, in II Ethic. Sed impossibile est contraria simul +inesse eidem. Ergo impossibile est omnia peccata et vitia esse sibi +invicem connexa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the + sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule + of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together + in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed + to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed + when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one + another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is + evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not + consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the + one for the many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 co."><a name="36616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36616] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliter se habet intentio agentis secundum virtutem ad +sequendum rationem, et aliter intentio peccantis ad divertendum a +ratione. Cuiuslibet enim agentis secundum virtutem intentio est ut +rationis regulam sequatur, et ideo omnium virtutum intentio in idem +tendit. Et propter hoc omnes virtutes habent connexionem ad invicem +in ratione recta agibilium, quae est prudentia, sicut supra dictum +est. Sed intentio peccantis non est ad hoc quod recedat ab eo quod +est secundum rationem, sed potius ut tendat in aliquod bonum +appetibile, a quo speciem sortitur. Huiusmodi autem bona in quae +tendit intentio peccantis a ratione recedens, sunt diversa, nullam +connexionem habentia ad invicem, immo etiam interdum sunt +contraria. Cum igitur vitia et peccata speciem habeant secundum +illud ad quod convertuntur, manifestum est quod, secundum illud +quod perficit speciem peccatorum, nullam connexionem habent peccata +ad invicem. Non enim peccatum committitur in accedendo a +multitudine ad unitatem, sicut accidit in virtutibus quae sunt +connexae, sed potius in recedendo ab unitate ad multitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[72] , A[1]</a>), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now + all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised + in every sin; and in this sense he + says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt + of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36617] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Iacobus loquitur de peccato non ex parte +conversionis, secundum quod peccata distinguuntur, sicut dictum +est, sed loquitur de eis ex parte aversionis, inquantum scilicet +homo peccando recedit a legis mandato. Omnia autem legis mandata +sunt ab uno et eodem, ut ipse ibidem dicit, et ideo idem Deus +contemnitur in omni peccato. Et ex hac parte dicit quod qui +offendit in uno, factus est omnium reus, quia scilicet uno peccato +peccando, incurrit poenae reatum ex hoc quod contemnit Deum, ex +cuius contemptu provenit omnium peccatorum reatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A4" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[4]</a>), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys + infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; + though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction + of which entails + the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue + is possible, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.3" shape="rect"> Q[65], A[1]</a>). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far + as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. + Nevertheless it + does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, + so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed + to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.4" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36618] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non per quemlibet actum +peccati tollitur virtus opposita, nam peccatum veniale virtutem non +tollit; peccatum autem mortale tollit virtutem infusam, inquantum +avertit a Deo; sed unus actus peccati etiam mortalis, non tollit +habitum virtutis acquisitae. Sed si multiplicentur actus intantum +quod generetur contrarius habitus, excluditur habitus virtutis +acquisitae. Qua exclusa, excluditur prudentia, quia cum homo agit +contra quamcumque virtutem, agit contra prudentiam. Sine prudentia +autem nulla virtus moralis esse potest, ut supra habitum est. Et +ideo per consequens excluduntur omnes virtutes morales, quantum ad +perfectum et formale esse virtutis, quod habent secundum quod +participant prudentiam, remanent tamen inclinationes ad actus +virtutum, non habentes rationem virtutis. Sed non sequitur quod +propter hoc homo incurrat omnia vitia vel peccata. Primo quidem, +quia uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur, ita quod virtus potest +privari per unum eorum, etsi alterum non adsit. Secundo, quia +peccatum directe opponitur virtuti quantum ad inclinationem +virtutis ad actum, ut supra dictum est, unde, remanentibus +aliquibus inclinationibus virtuosis, non potest dici quod homo +habeat vitia vel peccata opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which + flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so + far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, + which arise from self-love, are not connected together. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36619] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod amor Dei est congregativus, inquantum affectum +hominis a multis ducit in unum, et ideo virtutes, quae ex amore Dei +causantur, connexionem habent. Sed amor sui disgregat affectum +hominis in diversa, prout scilicet homo se amat appetendo sibi bona +temporalia, quae sunt varia et diversa, et ideo vitia et peccata, +quae causantur ex amore sui, non sunt connexa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A2-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 2. Whether all sins are equal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one + and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36620] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint paria. Hoc enim est +peccare, facere quod non licet. Sed facere quod non licet, uno et +eodem modo in omnibus reprehenditur. Ergo peccare uno et eodem modo +reprehenditur. Non ergo unum peccatum est alio gravius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. + Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one + go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36621] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omne peccatum consistit in hoc quod homo transgreditur regulam +rationis, quae ita se habet ad actus humanos, sicut regula linearis +in corporalibus rebus. Ergo peccare simile est ei quod est lineas +transilire. Sed lineas transilire est aequaliter et uno modo, etiam +si aliquis longius recedat vel propinquius stet, quia privationes +non recipiunt magis et minus. Ergo omnia peccata sunt aequalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are + equal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36622] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccata virtutibus opponuntur. Sed omnes virtutes aequales sunt, ut +Tullius dicit, in paradoxis. Ergo omnia peccata sunt paria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to Pilate ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.11" target="asv">Jn. 19:11</a>): "He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore + one sin is greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36623] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dominus dicit ad Pilatum, Ioan. XIX, <i>qui tradidit me +tibi, maius peccatum habet</i>. Et tamen constat quod Pilatus +aliquod peccatum habuit. Ergo unum peccatum est maius alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from + which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the + pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through + looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from + reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if + we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, + which consists, so to speak, in "being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such + like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead + on + the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, + in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade + shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite + habit; it consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due + commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and + the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary + habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors + or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such + as + not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance + of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it + matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must + say that sins are not all equal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 co."><a name="36624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36624] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod opinio Stoicorum fuit, quam Tullius prosequitur in +paradoxis, quod omnia peccata sunt paria. Et ex hoc etiam derivatus +est quorundam haereticorum error, qui, ponentes omnia peccata esse +paria, dicunt etiam omnes poenas Inferni esse pares. Et quantum ex +verbis Tullii perspici potest, Stoici movebantur ex hoc quod +considerabant peccatum ex parte privationis tantum, prout scilicet +est recessus a ratione, unde simpliciter aestimantes quod nulla +privatio susciperet magis et minus, posuerunt omnia peccata esse +paria. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, inveniet duplex +privationum genus. Est enim quaedam simplex et pura privatio, quae +consistit quasi in corruptum esse, sicut mors est privatio vitae, +et tenebra est privatio luminis. Et tales privationes non recipiunt +magis et minus, quia nihil residuum est de habitu opposito. Unde +non minus est mortuus aliquis primo die mortis, et tertio vel +quarto, quam post annum, quando iam cadaver fuerit resolutum. Et +similiter non est magis tenebrosa domus, si lucerna sit operta +pluribus velaminibus, quam si sit operta uno solo velamine totum +lumen intercludente. Est autem alia privatio non simplex, sed +aliquid retinens de habitu opposito; quae quidem privatio magis +consistit in corrumpi, quam in corruptum esse, sicut aegritudo, +quae privat debitam commensurationem humorum, ita tamen quod +aliquid eius remanet, alioquin non remaneret animal vivum; et +simile est de turpitudine, et aliis huiusmodi. Huiusmodi autem +privationes recipiunt magis et minus ex parte eius quod remanet de +habitu contrario, multum enim refert ad aegritudinem vel +turpitudinem, utrum plus vel minus a debita commensuratione humorum +vel membrorum recedatur. Et similiter dicendum est de vitiis et +peccatis, sic enim in eis privatur debita commensuratio rationis, +ut non totaliter ordo rationis tollatur; alioquin malum, si sit +integrum, destruit seipsum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.; non enim +posset remanere substantia actus, vel affectio agentis, nisi +aliquid remaneret de ordine rationis. Et ideo multum interest ad +gravitatem peccati, utrum plus vel minus recedatur a rectitudine +rationis. Et secundum hoc dicendum est quod non omnia peccata sunt +paria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness + are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36625] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata committere non licet, propter aliquam +deordinationem quam habent. Unde illa quae maiorem deordinationem +continent, sunt magis illicita; et per consequens graviora +peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36626] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato, ac si esset privatio +pura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to + its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q73_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[66], AA[1]</a>,2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices + or sins are not. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36627] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod virtutes sunt aequales proportionaliter in uno et +eodem, tamen una virtus praecedit aliam dignitate secundum suam +speciem; et unus etiam homo est alio virtuosior in eadem specie +virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Et tamen si virtutes essent pares, +non sequeretur vitia esse paria, quia virtutes habent connexionem, +non autem vitia seu peccata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A3-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 3. Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to + its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to + their various objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36628] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatorum gravitas non varietur +secundum obiecta. Gravitas enim peccati pertinet ad modum vel +qualitatem ipsius peccati. Sed obiectum est materia ipsius peccati. +Ergo secundum diversa obiecta, peccatorum gravitas non +variatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to + which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of + sins does not vary according to their various objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36629] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +gravitas peccati est intensio malitiae ipsius. Peccatum autem non +habet rationem malitiae ex parte conversionis ad proprium obiectum, +quod est quoddam bonum appetibile; sed magis ex parte aversionis. +Ergo gravitas peccatorum non variatur secundum diversa obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one + another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference + of objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36630] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccata quae habent diversa obiecta, sunt diversorum generum. Sed +ea quae sunt diversorum generum, non sunt comparabilia, ut probatur +in VII Physic. Ergo unum peccatum non est gravius altero secundum +diversitatem obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[1]</a>). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity + of sins varies according to their objects. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36631] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +peccata recipiunt speciem ex obiectis, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed +aliquorum peccatorum unum est gravius altero secundum suam speciem, +sicut homicidium furto. Ergo gravitas peccatorum differt secundum +obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[5]</a>), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists + in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain + commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder + of which + causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, + which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the + graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason + directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. + Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A3" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things + are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very + substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin + committed directly against God, e.g. + unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it + is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity + which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 co."><a name="36632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36632] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, gravitas peccatorum +differt eo modo quo una aegritudo est alia gravior, sicut enim +bonum sanitatis consistit in quadam commensuratione humorum per +convenientiam ad naturam animalis, ita bonum virtutis consistit in +quadam commensuratione humani actus secundum convenientiam ad +regulam rationis. Manifestum est autem quod tanto est gravior +aegritudo, quanto tollitur debita humorum commensuratio per +commensurationem prioris principii, sicut aegritudo quae provenit +in corpore humano ex corde, quod est principium vitae, vel ex +aliquo quod appropinquat cordi, periculosior est. Unde oportet +etiam quod peccatum sit tanto gravius, quanto deordinatio contingit +circa aliquod principium quod est prius in ordine rationis. Ratio +autem ordinat omnia in agibilibus ex fine. Et ideo quanto peccatum +contingit in actibus humanis ex altiori fine, tanto peccatum est +gravius. Obiecta autem actuum sunt fines eorum, ut ex supradictis +patet. Et ideo secundum diversitatem obiectorum attenditur +diversitas gravitatis in peccatis. Sicut patet quod res exteriores +ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem; homo autem ordinatur ulterius +in Deum sicut in finem. Unde peccatum quod est circa ipsam +substantiam hominis, sicut homicidium est gravius peccato quod est +circa res exteriores, sicut furtum; et adhuc est gravius peccatum +quod immediate contra Deum committitur, sicut infidelitas, +blasphemia et huiusmodi. Et in ordine quorumlibet horum peccatorum +unum peccatum est gravius altero, secundum quod est circa aliquid +principalius vel minus principale. Et quia peccata habent speciem +ex obiectis, differentia gravitatis quae attenditur penes obiecta, +est prima et principalis, quasi consequens speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention + of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A3" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A6" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[72], A[6]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.3" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36633] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur +actus, habet tamen rationem finis, secundum quod intentio agentis +fertur in ipsum, ut supra dictum est. Forma autem actus moralis +dependet ex fine, ut ex superioribus patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which + aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those + things to which man turns. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36634] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex ipsa indebita conversione ad aliquod bonum +commutabile, sequitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, in qua +perficitur ratio mali. Et ideo oportet quod secundum diversitatem +eorum quae pertinent ad conversionem, sequatur diversa gravitas +malitiae in peccatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as + they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36635] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia obiecta humanorum actuum habent ordinem ad +invicem, et ideo omnes actus humani quodammodo conveniunt in uno +genere, secundum quod ordinantur ad ultimum finem. Et ideo nihil +prohibet omnia peccata esse comparabilia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A4-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 4. Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, + so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv"> Prov. 15:5, </a> "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20, </a> seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice + restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36636] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non differat +secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus peccata opponuntur, ut scilicet +maiori virtuti gravius peccatum opponatur. Quia ut dicitur Prov. +XV, <i>in abundanti iustitia virtus maxima est</i>. Sed sicut dicit +dominus, Matth. V, abundans iustitia cohibet iram; quae est minus +peccatum quam homicidium, quod cohibet minor iustitia. Ergo maximae +virtuti opponitur minimum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the + greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what + is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36637] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +in II Ethic. dicitur quod virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ex +quo videtur quod maior virtus sit circa magis difficile. Sed minus +est peccatum si homo deficiat in magis difficili, quam si deficiat +in minus difficili. Ergo maiori virtuti minus peccatum +opponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. + Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36638] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +caritas est maior virtus quam fides et spes, ut dicitur I ad Cor. +XIII. Odium autem, quod opponitur caritati, est minus peccatum quam +infidelitas vel desperatio, quae opponuntur fidei et spei. Ergo +maiori virtuti opponitur minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; + and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36639] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod <i>pessimum optimo +contrarium est</i>. Optimum autem in moralibus est maxima virtus; +pessimum autem, gravissimum peccatum. Ergo maximae virtuti +opponitur gravissimum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object: + because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: + because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both + sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[72], A[1]</a>). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in + the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue + in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not + only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. + And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more + perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the + greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 co."><a name="36640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36640] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod virtuti opponitur aliquod peccatum, uno quidem modo +principaliter et directe, quod scilicet est circa idem obiectum, +nam contraria circa idem sunt. Et hoc modo oportet quod maiori +virtuti opponatur gravius peccatum. Sicut enim ex parte obiecti +attenditur maior gravitas peccati, ita etiam maior dignitas +virtutis, utrumque enim ex obiecto speciem sortitur, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde oportet quod maximae virtuti directe +contrarietur maximum peccatum, quasi maxime ab eo distans in eodem +genere. Alio modo potest considerari oppositio virtutis ad +peccatum, secundum quandam extensionem virtutis cohibentis +peccatum, quanto enim fuerit virtus maior, tanto magis elongat +hominem a peccato sibi contrario, ita quod non solum ipsum +peccatum, sed etiam inducentia ad peccatum cohibet. Et sic +manifestum est quod quanto aliqua virtus fuerit maior, tanto etiam +minora peccata cohibet, sicut etiam sanitas, quanto fuerit maior, +tanto etiam minores distemperantias excludit. Et per hunc modum +maiori virtuti minus peccatum opponitur ex parte effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor + sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36641] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de oppositione quae +attenditur secundum cohibitionem peccati, sic enim abundans +iustitia etiam minora peccata cohibet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. + For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not + being overcome by the difficulty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36642] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod maiori virtuti, quae est circa bonum magis difficile, +contrariatur directe peccatum quod est circa malum magis difficile. +Utrobique enim invenitur quaedam eminentia, ex hoc quod ostenditur +voluntas proclivior in bonum vel in malum, ex hoc quod difficultate +non vincitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred + of God, which is the most grievous of all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36643] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod caritas non est quicumque amor, sed amor Dei. Unde +non opponitur ei quodcumque odium directe, sed odium Dei, quod est +gravissimum peccatorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A5-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 5. Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv">Prov. 6:30</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.32" target="asv">32</a>): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy + his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal + sin. Therefore carnal sins are + of greater guilt than spiritual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36644] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata carnalia non sint minoris +culpae quam peccata spiritualia. Adulterium enim gravius peccatum +est quam furtum, dicitur enim Prov. VI, <i>non grandis est culpae +cum quis furatus fuerit. Qui autem adulter est, propter cordis +inopiam perdet animam suam</i>. Sed furtum pertinet ad avaritiam, +quae est peccatum spirituale; adulterium autem ad luxuriam, quae +est peccatum carnale. Ergo peccata carnalia sunt maioris +culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil + rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it + seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36645] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, super Levit., quod Diabolus maxime gaudet de +peccato luxuriae et idololatriae. Sed de maiori culpa magis gaudet. +Ergo, cum luxuria sit peccatum carnale, videtur quod peccata +carnalia sint maximae culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger + is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more + grievous than spiritual sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36646] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus probat, in VII Ethic., quod <i>incontinens +concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae</i>. Sed ira est +peccatum spirituale, secundum Gregorium, XXXI Moral.; +concupiscentia autem pertinet ad peccata carnalia. Ergo peccatum +carnale est gravius quam peccatum spirituale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36647] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, quod peccata carnalia sunt minoris +culpae, et maioris infamiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt + than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous + than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject: + because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to + turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs + to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason, implies + a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for + this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is + committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, + than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater + guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we + shall state further on + <a href="#FS_Q73_A6" id="FS_Q73_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate + concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 co."><a name="36648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36648] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccata spiritualia sunt maioris culpae quam peccata +carnalia. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi quodlibet peccatum +spirituale sit maioris culpae quolibet peccato carnali, sed quia, +considerata hac sola differentia spiritualitatis et carnalitatis, +graviora sunt quam cetera peccata, ceteris paribus. Cuius ratio +triplex potest assignari. Prima quidem ex parte subiecti. Nam +peccata spiritualia pertinent ad spiritum, cuius est converti ad +Deum et ab eo averti, peccata vero carnalia consummantur in +delectatione carnalis appetitus, ad quem principaliter pertinet ad +bonum corporale converti. Et ideo peccatum carnale, inquantum +huiusmodi, plus habet de conversione, propter quod etiam est +maioris adhaesionis, sed peccatum spirituale habet plus de +aversione, ex qua procedit ratio culpae. Et ideo peccatum +spirituale, inquantum huiusmodi, est maioris culpae. Secunda ratio +potest sumi ex parte eius in quem peccatur. Nam peccatum carnale, +inquantum huiusmodi, est in corpus proprium; quod est minus +diligendum, secundum ordinem caritatis, quam Deus et proximus, in +quos peccatur per peccata spiritualia. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, +inquantum huiusmodi, sunt maioris culpae. Tertia ratio potest sumi +ex parte motivi. Quia quanto est gravius impulsivum ad peccandum, +tanto homo minus peccat, ut infra dicetur. Peccata autem carnalia +habent vehementius impulsivum, idest ipsam concupiscentiam carnis +nobis innatam. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, inquantum huiusmodi, +sunt maioris culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under + the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv"> Eph. 5:5.</a> "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves + his wife more than his chattels. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36649] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod adulterium non solum pertinet ad peccatum +luxuriae, sed etiam pertinet ad peccatum iniustitiae. Et quantum ad +hoc, potest ad avaritiam reduci; ut Glossa dicit, ad Ephes., super +illud, <i>omnis fornicator, aut immundus, aut avarus</i>. Et tunc +gravius est adulterium quam furtum, quanto homini carior est uxor +quam res possessa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty + be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36650] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Diabolus dicitur maxime gaudere de peccato luxuriae, +quia est maximae adhaerentiae, et difficile ab eo homo potest +eripi, insatiabilis est enim delectabilis appetitus ut philosophus +dicit, in III Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, + is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy + of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man + is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, + 17) that they are more shameful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36651] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod philosophus dicit, turpiorem esse incontinentem +concupiscentiae quam incontinentem irae, quia minus participat de +ratione. Et secundum hoc etiam dicit, in III Ethic., quod peccata +intemperantiae sunt maxime exprobrabilia, quia sunt circa illas +delectationes quae sunt communes nobis et brutis, unde quodammodo +per ista peccata homo brutalis redditur. Et inde est quod, sicut +Gregorius dicit, sunt maioris infamiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A6-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 6. Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly + it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; + for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. + Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36652] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non attendatur +secundum causam peccati. Quanto enim peccati causa fuerit maior, +tanto vehementius movet ad peccandum, et ita difficilius potest ei +resisti. Sed peccatum diminuitur ex hoc quod ei difficilius +resistitur, hoc enim pertinet ad infirmitatem peccantis, ut non +facile resistat peccato; peccatum autem quod est ex infirmitate, +levius iudicatur. Non ergo peccatum habet gravitatem ex parte suae +causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv"> Rom. 7:7, </a> "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now + the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished + by the greatness of its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36653] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia est generalis quaedam causa peccati, unde dicit +Glossa, super illud Rom. VII, <i>nam concupiscentiam nesciebam +etc., bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum +prohibet</i>. Sed quanto homo fuerit victus maiori concupiscentia, +tanto est minus peccatum. Gravitas ergo peccati diminuitur ex +magnitudine causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. + Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether + excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased + by the greatness of its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36654] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut rectitudo rationis est causa virtuosi actus, ita defectus +rationis videtur esse causa peccati. Sed defectus rationis, quanto +fuerit maior, tanto est minus peccatum, intantum quod qui carent +usu rationis, omnino excusentur a peccato; et qui ex ignorantia +peccat, levius peccat. Ergo gravitas peccati non augetur ex +magnitudine causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36655] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Ergo, si causa peccati +maior fuerit, peccatum erit gravius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, + and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv"> Mat. 7:18, </a> "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the + greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q73_A6-p7"> The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these + causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such + is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins + more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will + to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with + the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free + movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its + voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 co."><a name="36656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36656] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in genere peccati, sicut et in quolibet alio genere, +potest accipi duplex causa. Una quae est propria et per se causa +peccati, quae est ipsa voluntas peccandi, comparatur enim ad actum +peccati sicut arbor ad fructum, ut dicitur in Glossa, super illud +Matth. VII, <i>non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere</i>. Et +huiusmodi causa quanto fuerit maior, tanto peccatum erit gravius, +quanto enim voluntas fuerit maior ad peccandum, tanto homo gravius +peccat. Aliae vero causae peccati accipiuntur quasi extrinsecae et +remotae, ex quibus scilicet voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum. Et in +his causis est distinguendum. Quaedam enim harum inducunt +voluntatem ad peccandum, secundum ipsam naturam voluntatis, sicut +finis, quod est proprium obiectum voluntatis. Et ex tali causa +augetur peccatum, gravius enim peccat cuius voluntas ex intentione +peioris finis inclinatur ad peccandum. Aliae vero causae sunt quae +inclinant voluntatem ad peccandum, praeter naturam et ordinem +ipsius voluntatis, quae nata est moveri libere ex seipsa secundum +iudicium rationis. Unde causae quae diminuunt iudicium rationis, +sicut ignorantia; vel quae diminuunt liberum motum voluntatis, +sicut infirmitas vel violentia aut metus, aut aliquid huiusmodi, +diminuunt peccatum, sicut et diminuunt voluntarium, intantum quod +si actus sit omnino involuntarius, non habet rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes + the sin, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36657] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de causa movente +extrinseca, quae diminuit voluntarium, cuius quidem causae +augmentum diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is + a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater + concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, + being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous + temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment + of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement + of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36658] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod si sub concupiscentia includatur etiam ipse motus +voluntatis, sic ubi est maior concupiscentia, est maius peccatum. +Si vero concupiscentia dicatur passio quaedam, quae est motus vis +concupiscibilis, sic maior concupiscentia praecedens iudicium +rationis et motum voluntatis, diminuit peccatum, quia qui maiori +concupiscentia stimulatus peccat, cadit ex graviori tentatione; +unde minus ei imputatur. Si vero concupiscentia sic sumpta sequatur +iudicium rationis et motum voluntatis, sic ubi est maior +concupiscentia, est maius peccatum, insurgit enim interdum maior +concupiscentiae motus ex hoc quod voluntas ineffrenate tendit in +suum obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36659] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa quae causat +involuntarium, et haec diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A7-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 7. Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance + does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36660] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non aggravet peccatum. +Peccatum enim habet gravitatem ex sua specie. Circumstantia autem +non dat speciem peccato, cum sit quoddam accidens eius. Ergo +gravitas peccati non consideratur ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, + it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36661] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +aut circumstantia est mala, aut non. Si circumstantia mala est, +ipsa per se causat quandam speciem mali, si vero non sit mala, non +habet unde augeat malum. Ergo circumstantia nullo modo auget +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the + object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36662] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +malitia peccati est ex parte aversionis. Sed circumstantiae +consequuntur peccatum ex parte conversionis. Ergo non augent +malitiam peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven + (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin + more grievous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36663] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod ignorantia circumstantiae diminuit peccatum, qui enim +peccat ex ignorantia circumstantiae, meretur veniam, ut dicitur in +III Ethic. Hoc autem non esset, nisi circumstantia aggravaret +peccatum. Ergo circumstantia peccatum aggravat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that + which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs + from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it + is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in + three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of + a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin + is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is + a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but + only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, + he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason + his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. + iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who + educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin + by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the + sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous; + although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 co."><a name="36664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36664] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque ex eodem natum est augeri, ex quo +causatur; sicut philosophus dicit de habitu virtutis, in II Ethic. +Manifestum est autem quod peccatum causatur ex defectu alicuius +circumstantiae, ex hoc enim receditur ab ordine rationis, quod +aliquis in operando non observat debitas circumstantias. Unde +manifestum est quod peccatum natum est aggravari per +circumstantiam. Sed hoc quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno quidem +modo, inquantum circumstantia transfert in aliud genus peccati. +Sicut peccatum fornicationis consistit in hoc quod homo accedit ad +non suam, si autem addatur haec circumstantia, ut illa ad quam +accedit sit alterius uxor, transfertur iam in aliud genus peccati, +scilicet in iniustitiam, inquantum homo usurpat rem alterius. Et +secundum hoc, adulterium est gravius peccatum quam fornicatio. +Aliquando vero circumstantia non aggravat peccatum quasi trahens in +aliud genus peccati, sed solum quia multiplicat rationem peccati. +Sicut si prodigus det quando non debet, et cui non debet, +multiplicius peccat eodem genere peccati, quam si solum det cui non +debet. Et ex hoc ipso peccatum fit gravius, sicut etiam aegritudo +est gravior quae plures partes corporis inficit. Unde et Tullius +dicit, in paradoxis, quod <i>in patris vita violanda, multa +peccantur, violatur enim is qui procreavit, qui aluit, qui +erudivit, qui in sede ac domo, atque in republica collocavit</i>. +Tertio modo circumstantia aggravat peccatum ex eo quod auget +deformitatem provenientem ex alia circumstantia. Sicut accipere +alienum constituit peccatum furti, si autem addatur haec +circumstantia, ut multum accipiat de alieno, est peccatum gravius; +quamvis accipere multum vel parum, de se non dicat rationem boni +vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q73_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing + is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, + not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36665] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliqua circumstantia dat speciem actui morali, +ut supra habitum est. Et tamen circumstantia quae non dat speciem, +potest aggravare peccatum. Quia sicut bonitas rei non solum +pensatur ex sua specie, sed etiam ex aliquo accidente; ita malitia +actus non solum pensatur ex specie actus, sed etiam ex +circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species; + because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate + a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36666] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod utroque modo circumstantia potest aggravare peccatum. +Si enim sit mala, non tamen propter hoc oportet quod semper +constituat speciem peccati, potest enim addere rationem malitiae in +eadem specie, ut dictum est. Si autem non sit mala, potest +aggravare peccatum in ordine ad malitiam alterius +circumstantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may + turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one + ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside + from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man + ought to be united by right reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36667] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio debet ordinare actum non solum quantum ad +obiectum, sed etiam quantum ad omnes circumstantias. Et ideo +aversio quaedam a regula rationis attenditur secundum corruptionem +cuiuslibet circumstantiae, puta si aliquis operetur quando non +debet, vel ubi non debet. Et huiusmodi aversio sufficit ad rationem +mali. Hanc autem aversionem a regula rationis, sequitur aversio a +Deo, cui debet homo per rectam rationem coniungi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A8-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 8. Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent + to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A5" id="FS_Q73_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[5]</a>). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36668] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccati non augeatur secundum +maius nocumentum. Nocumentum enim est quidam eventus consequens +actum peccati. Sed eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel +malitiam actus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur +propter maius nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.8" target="asv">8</a>: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee." + If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous + than sins against God or oneself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36669] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nocumentum maxime invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, +quia sibi ipsi nemo vult nocere; Deo autem nemo potest nocere, +secundum illud Iob XXXV, <i>si multiplicatae fuerint iniquitates +tuae, quid facies contra illum? Homini, qui similis tibi est, +nocebit impietas tua</i>. Si ergo peccatum aggravaretur propter +maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod peccatum quo quis peccat in +proximum, esset gravius peccato quo quis peccat in Deum vel in +seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; + because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose + the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace + by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its + causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is + evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36670] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +maius nocumentum infertur alicui cum privatur vita gratiae, quam +cum privatur vita naturae, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita +naturae, intantum quod homo debet vitam naturae contemnere ne +amittat vitam gratiae. Sed ille qui inducit aliquam mulierem ad +fornicandum, quantum est de se, privat eam vita gratiae, inducens +eam ad peccatum mortale. Si ergo peccatum esset gravius propter +maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod simplex fornicator gravius +peccaret quam homicida, quod est manifeste falsum. Non ergo +peccatum est gravius propter maius nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes + the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as + it does more harm. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36671] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>quia vitium +naturae adversatur, tantum additur malitiae vitiorum, quantum +integritati naturarum minuitur</i>. Sed diminutio integritatis +naturae est nocumentum. Ergo tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto +maius est nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when + a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates + the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; + for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he + knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case + again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will + being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not + wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin + accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, + a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly + from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly + consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious + fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen + by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly. + </p><p id="FS_Q73_A8-p7"> But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected + with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity + of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly + consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not + make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has + heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but + his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, + who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire + to + sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 co."><a name="36672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36672] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod nocumentum tripliciter se habere potest ad peccatum. +Quandoque enim nocumentum quod provenit ex peccato, est praevisum +et intentum, sicut cum aliquis aliquid operatur animo nocendi +alteri, ut homicida vel fur. Et tunc directe quantitas nocumenti +adauget gravitatem peccati, quia tunc nocumentum est per se +obiectum peccati. Quandoque autem nocumentum est praevisum, sed non +intentum, sicut cum aliquis transiens per agrum ut compendiosius +vadat ad fornicandum, infert nocumentum his quae sunt seminata in +agro, scienter, licet non animo nocendi. Et sic etiam quantitas +nocumenti aggravat peccatum, sed indirecte, inquantum scilicet ex +voluntate multum inclinata ad peccandum, procedit quod aliquis non +praetermittat facere damnum sibi vel alii, quod simpliciter non +vellet. Quandoque autem nocumentum nec est praevisum nec intentum. +Et tunc si per accidens se habeat ad peccatum, non aggravat +peccatum directe, sed propter negligentiam considerandi nocumenta +quae consequi possent, imputantur homini ad poenam mala quae +eveniunt praeter eius intentionem, si dabat operam rei illicitae. +Si vero nocumentum per se sequatur ex actu peccati, licet non sit +intentum nec praevisum, directe peccatum aggravat, quia quaecumque +per se consequuntur ad peccatum, pertinent quodammodo ad ipsam +peccati speciem. Puta si aliquis publice fornicetur, sequitur +scandalum plurimorum, quod quamvis ipse non intendat, nec forte +praevideat, directe per hoc aggravatur peccatum. Aliter tamen +videtur se habere circa nocumentum poenale, quod incurrit ipse qui +peccat. Huiusmodi enim nocumentum, si per accidens se habeat ad +actum peccati, et non sit praevisum nec intentum, non aggravat +peccatum, neque sequitur maiorem gravitatem peccati, sicut si +aliquis currens ad occidendum, impingat et laedat sibi pedem. Si +vero tale nocumentum per se consequatur ad actum peccati, licet +forte nec sit praevisum nec intentum, tunc maius nocumentum non +facit gravius peccatum; sed e converso gravius peccatum inducit +gravius nocumentum. Sicut aliquis infidelis, qui nihil audivit de +poenis Inferni, graviorem poenam in Inferno patietur pro peccato +homicidii quam pro peccato furti, quia enim hoc nec intendit nec +praevidet, non aggravatur ex hoc peccatum (sicut contingit circa +fidelem, qui ex hoc ipso videtur peccare gravius, quod maiores +poenas contemnit ut impleat voluntatem peccati), sed gravitas +huiusmodi nocumenti solum causatur ex gravitate peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have already stated ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A5" id="FS_Q73_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[5]</a>), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the + goodness and malice of an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36673] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut etiam supra dictum est, cum de bonitate +et malitia exteriorum actuum ageretur, eventus sequens, si sit +praevisus et intentus, addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness + which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the + act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such + sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to + be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although + no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, + by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, + as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some + anxiety. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36674] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, quamvis nocumentum aggravet peccatum, non tamen +sequitur quod ex solo nocumento peccatum aggravetur, quinimmo +peccatum per se est gravius propter inordinationem, ut supra dictum +est. Unde et ipsum nocumentum aggravat peccatum, inquantum facit +actum esse magis inordinatum. Unde non sequitur quod, si nocumentum +maxime habeat locum in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, quod +illa peccata sunt gravissima, quia multo maior inordinatio +invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra Deum, et in quibusdam eorum +quae sunt contra seipsum. Et tamen potest dici quod, etsi Deo +nullus possit nocere quantum ad eius substantiam, potest tamen +nocumentum attentare in his quae Dei sunt, sicut extirpando fidem, +violando sacra, quae sunt peccata gravissima. Sibi etiam aliquis +quandoque scienter et volenter infert nocumentum, sicut patet in +his qui se interimunt, licet finaliter hoc referant ad aliquod +bonum apparens, puta ad hoc quod liberentur ab aliqua angustia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; + whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and + sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because + no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36675] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio non sequitur, propter duo. Primo quidem, +quia homicida intendit directe nocumentum proximi, fornicator autem +qui provocat mulierem, non intendit nocumentum, sed delectationem. +Secundo, quia homicida est per se et sufficiens causa corporalis +mortis, spiritualis autem mortis nullus potest esse alteri causa +per se et sufficiens; quia nullus spiritualiter moritur nisi +propria voluntate peccando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A9-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 9. Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this + were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate + a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through + being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against + whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36676] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod propter conditionem personae in quam +peccatur, peccatum non aggravetur. Si enim hoc esset, maxime +aggravaretur ex hoc quod aliquis peccat contra aliquem virum iustum +et sanctum. Sed ex hoc non aggravatur peccatum, minus enim laeditur +ex iniuria illata virtuosus, qui aequanimiter tolerat, quam alii, +qui etiam interius scandalizati laeduntur. Ergo conditio personae +in quam peccatur, non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, + because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many + times." But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to + himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than + another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate + the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36677] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si conditio personae aggravaret peccatum, maxime aggravaretur ex +propinquitate, quia sicut Tullius dicit in paradoxis, <i>in servo +necando semel peccatur, in patris vita violanda multa +peccantur</i>. Sed propinquitas personae in quam peccatur, non +videtur aggravare peccatum, quia unusquisque sibi ipsi maxime est +propinquus; et tamen minus peccat qui aliquod damnum sibi infert, +quam si inferret alteri, puta si occideret equum suum, quam si +occideret equum alterius, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. +Ergo propinquitas personae non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in + like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position + and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a + poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.25" target="asv">Col. 3:25</a>), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does + not aggravate the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36678] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +conditio personae peccantis praecipue aggravat peccatum ratione +dignitatis vel scientiae, secundum illud Sap. VI, <i>potentes +potenter tormenta patientur</i>; et Luc. XII, <i>servus sciens +voluntatem domini, et non faciens, plagis vapulabit multis</i>. +Ergo, pari ratione, ex parte personae in quam peccatur, magis +aggravaret peccatum dignitas aut scientia personae in quam +peccatur. Sed non videtur gravius peccare qui facit iniuriam +personae ditiori vel potentiori, quam alicui pauperi, quia non est +personarum acceptio apud Deum, secundum cuius iudicium gravitas +peccati pensatur. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, non +aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin + committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.6" target="asv"> Micah 7:6</a>: "the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother." Furthermore + sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Job.34.18" target="asv">Job 34:18</a>): "Who saith to the king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore the condition of the person sinned + against aggravates the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36679] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod in sacra Scriptura specialiter vituperatur peccatum quod +contra servos Dei committitur, sicut III Reg. XIX, <i>altaria tua +destruxerunt, et prophetas tuos occiderunt gladio</i>. Vituperatur +etiam specialiter peccatum commissum contra personas propinquas, +secundum illud Mich. VII, <i>filius contumeliam facit patri, filia +consurgit adversus matrem suam</i>. Vituperatur etiam specialiter +peccatum quod committitur contra personas in dignitate constitutas, +ut patet Iob XXXIV, <i>qui dicit regi, apostata; qui vocat duces +impios</i>. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, aggravat +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above + <a href="#FS_Q73_A3" id="FS_Q73_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its + object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever + we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate + to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered + on the part of these three. + </p><p id="FS_Q73_A9-p7"> First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that + an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.2.8" target="asv"> Zech. 2:8</a>: "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed + against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself, + it is evident + that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through + natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, + for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.14.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 14:5</a>: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according + as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin + committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous + than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, + is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 co."><a name="36680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36680] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod persona in quam peccatur, est quodammodo obiectum +peccati. Dictum est autem supra quod prima gravitas peccati +attenditur ex parte obiecti. Ex quo quidem tanto attenditur maior +gravitas in peccato, quanto obiectum eius est principalior finis. +Fines autem principales humanorum actuum sunt Deus, ipse homo, et +proximus, quidquid enim facimus, propter aliquod horum facimus; +quamvis etiam horum trium unum sub altero ordinetur. Potest igitur +ex parte horum trium considerari maior vel minor gravitas in +peccato secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Primo +quidem, ex parte Dei, cui tanto magis aliquis homo coniungitur, +quanto est virtuosior vel Deo sacratior. Et ideo iniuria tali +personae illata, magis redundat in Deum, secundum illud Zach. II, +<i>qui vos tetigerit, tangit pupillam oculi mei</i>. Unde peccatum +fit gravius ex hoc quod peccatur in personam magis Deo coniunctam, +vel ratione virtutis vel ratione officii. Ex parte vero sui ipsius, +manifestum est quod tanto aliquis gravius peccat, quanto in magis +coniunctam personam, seu naturali necessitudine, seu beneficiis, +seu quacumque coniunctione, peccaverit, quia videtur in seipsum +magis peccare, et pro tanto gravius peccat, secundum illud Eccli. +XIV, <i>qui sibi nequam est, cui bonus erit?</i> Ex parte vero +proximi, tanto gravius peccatur, quanto peccatum plures tangit. Et +ideo peccatum quod fit in personam publicam, puta regem vel +principem, qui gerit personam totius multitudinis, est gravius quam +peccatum quod committitur contra unam personam privatam, unde +specialiter dicitur Exod. XXII, <i>principi populi tui non +maledices</i>. Et similiter iniuria quae fit alicui famosae +personae, videtur esse gravior, ex hoc quod in scandalum et in +turbationem plurimorum redundat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that + the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36681] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ille qui infert iniuriam virtuoso, quantum est +in se, turbat eum et interius et exterius. Sed quod iste interius +non turbetur, contingit ex eius bonitate, quae non diminuit +peccatum iniuriantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his + possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things + that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury + on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, + however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect + of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, + or give his approval. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36682] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod nocumentum quod quis sibi ipsi infert in his quae +subsunt dominio propriae voluntatis, sicut in rebus possessis, +habet minus de peccato quam si alteri inferatur, quia propria +voluntate hoc agit. Sed in his quae non subduntur dominio +voluntatis, sicut sunt naturalia et spiritualia bona, est gravius +peccatum nocumentum sibi ipsi inferre, gravius enim peccat qui +occidit seipsum, quam qui occidit alterum. Sed quia res +propinquorum nostrorum non subduntur voluntatis nostrae dominio, +non procedit ratio quantum ad nocumenta rebus illorum illata, quod +circa ea minus peccetur; nisi forte velint, vel ratum habeant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is + done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36683] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si Deus gravius punit +peccantem contra excellentiores personas, hoc enim fit propter hoc +quod hoc redundat in plurium nocumentum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A10-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 10. Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving + to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.13" target="asv"> Ecclus. 25:13</a>: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man + cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.30.18" target="asv">2 Paral. 30: 18,19</a>): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all + them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not + sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="36684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36684] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnitudo personae peccantis non +aggravet peccatum. Homo enim maxime redditur magnus ex hoc quod Deo +adhaeret, secundum illud Eccli. XXV, <i>quam magnus est qui invenit +sapientiam et scientiam. Sed non est super timentem Deum</i>. Sed +quanto aliquis magis Deo adhaeret, tanto minus imputatur ei aliquid +ad peccatum, dicitur enim II Paralip. XXX, <i>dominus bonus +propitiabitur cunctis qui in toto corde requirunt dominum Deum +patrum suorum, et non imputabitur eis quod minus sanctificati +sunt</i>. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur ex magnitudine personae +peccantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by + the excellence of the person sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="36685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36685] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +non est personarum acceptio apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom. II. Ergo non +magis punit pro uno et eodem peccato, unum quam alium. Non ergo +aggravatur ex magnitudine personae peccantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his + goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="36686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36686] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus debet ex bono incommodum reportare. Reportaret autem, si id +quod agit, magis ei imputaretur ad culpam. Ergo propter +magnitudinem personae peccantis non aggravatur peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent + person." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 s. c."><a name="36687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36687] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Isidorus dicit, in II de summo bono, <i>tanto maius +cognoscitur peccatum esse, quanto maior qui peccat habetur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are + less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human + weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins + are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned + for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; + hence Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv">Lk. 12:47</a>) that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly, + on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: + and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a + sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence + of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, + or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; + because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more + scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont + to bear them with more indignation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 co."><a name="36688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36688] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod duplex est peccatum. Quoddam ex subreptione +proveniens, propter infirmitatem humanae naturae. Et tale peccatum +minus imputatur ei qui est maior in virtute, eo quod minus negligit +huiusmodi peccata reprimere, quae tamen omnino subterfugere +infirmitas humana non sinit. Alia vero peccata sunt ex +deliberatione procedentia. Et ista peccata tanto magis alicui +imputantur, quanto maior est. Et hoc potest esse propter quatuor. +Primo quidem, quia facilius possunt resistere peccato maiores, puta +qui excedunt in scientia et virtute. Unde dominus dicit, Luc. XII, +quod <i>servus sciens voluntatem domini sui, et non faciens, plagis +vapulabit multis</i>. Secundo, propter ingratitudinem, quia omne +bonum quo quis magnificatur, est Dei beneficium, cui homo fit +ingratus peccando. Et quantum ad hoc, quaelibet maioritas, etiam in +temporalibus bonis peccatum aggravat, secundum illud Sap. VI, +<i>potentes potenter tormenta patientur</i>. Tertio, propter +specialem repugnantiam actus peccati ad magnitudinem personae, +sicut si princeps iustitiam violet, qui ponitur iustitiae custos; +et si sacerdos fornicetur, qui castitatem vovit. Quarto, propter +exemplum, sive scandalum, quia, ut Gregorius dicit in pastorali, +<i>in exemplum culpa vehementer extenditur, quando pro reverentia +gradus peccator honoratur</i>. Ad plurium etiam notitiam perveniunt +peccata magnorum; et magis homines ea indigne ferunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="36689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36689] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de his quae per +subreptionem infirmitatis humanae negligenter aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their + sin, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="36690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36690] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non accipit personas, si maiores plus punit, +quia ipsorum maioritas facit ad gravitatem peccati, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="36691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36691] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod homo magnus non reportat incommodum ex bono quod +habet, sed ex malo usu illius.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q74" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q74-p0.1">Q. 74. OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q74-p2"> We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q74-p3"><a href="#FS_Q74_A1"> (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p4"><a href="#FS_Q74_A2"> (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p5"><a href="#FS_Q74_A3"> (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p6"><a href="#FS_Q74_A4"> (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p7"><a href="#FS_Q74_A5"> (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p8"><a href="#FS_Q74_A6"> (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p9"><a href="#FS_Q74_A7"> (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p10"><a href="#FS_Q74_A8"> (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p11"><a href="#FS_Q74_A9"> (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p12"><a href="#FS_Q74_A10"> (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 pr."><a name="36692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36692] +Iª-IIae q. 74 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto vitiorum, sive peccatorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. +Primo, utrum voluntas possit esse subiectum peccati. Secundo, utrum +voluntas sola sit peccati subiectum. Tertio, utrum sensualitas +possit esse subiectum peccati. Quarto, utrum possit esse subiectum +peccati mortalis. Quinto, utrum ratio possit esse subiectum +peccati. Sexto, utrum delectatio morosa, vel non morosa, sit in +ratione inferiori sicut in subiecto. Septimo, utrum peccatum +consensus in actum sit in superiori ratione sicut in subiecto. +Octavo, utrum ratio inferior possit esse subiectum peccati +mortalis. Nono, utrum ratio superior possit esse subiectum peccati +venialis. Decimo, utrum in ratione superiori possit esse peccatum +veniale circa proprium obiectum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q74_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A1-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 1. Whether the will is a subject of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will + and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36693] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non possit esse subiectum +peccati. Dicit enim Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod +<i>malum est praeter voluntatem et intentionem</i>. Sed peccatum +habet rationem mali. Ergo peccatum non potest esse in +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does + not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than + in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36694] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +voluntas est boni, vel apparentis boni. Ex hoc autem quod voluntas +vult bonum, non peccat, hoc autem quod vult apparens bonum quod non +est vere bonum, magis pertinere videtur ad defectum virtutis +apprehensivae quam ad defectum voluntatis. Ergo peccatum nullo modo +est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause + do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the + will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36695] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +non potest esse idem subiectum peccati, et causa efficiens, quia +causa efficiens et materialis non incidunt in idem, ut dicitur in +II Physic. Sed voluntas est causa efficiens peccati, prima enim +causa peccandi est voluntas, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de +duabus animabus. Ergo non est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36696] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod <i>voluntas est +qua peccatur, et recte vivitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an act, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject, + the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the + thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the + agent, e.g. "to + desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must + needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated + above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a> ; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the + principle of sins. Therefore it follows that + sin is in the will as its subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 co."><a name="36697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36697] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum quidam actus est, sicut supra dictum est. +Actuum autem quidam transeunt in exteriorem materiam, ut urere et +secare, et huiusmodi actus habent pro materia et subiecto id in +quod transit actio; sicut philosophus dicit, in III Physic., quod +motus est actus mobilis a movente. Quidam vero actus sunt non +transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut +appetere et cognoscere, et tales actus sunt omnes actus morales, +sive sint actus virtutum, sive peccatorum. Unde oportet quod +proprium subiectum actus peccati sit potentia quae est principium +actus. Cum autem proprium sit actuum moralium quod sint voluntarii, +ut supra habitum est; sequitur quod voluntas, quae est principium +actuum voluntariorum, sive bonorum sive malorum, quae sunt peccata, +sit principium peccatorum. Et ideo sequitur quod peccatum sit in +voluntate sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is + an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36698] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod malum dicitur esse praeter voluntatem, quia +voluntas non tendit in ipsum sub ratione mali. Sed quia aliquod +malum est apparens bonum, ideo voluntas aliquando appetit aliquod +malum. Et secundum hoc peccatum est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in + the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in + the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36699] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod si defectus apprehensivae virtutis nullo modo +subiaceret voluntati, non esset peccatum nec in voluntate nec in +apprehensiva virtute, sicut patet in his qui habent ignorantiam +invincibilem. Et ideo relinquitur quod etiam defectus apprehensivae +virtutis subiacens voluntati, deputetur in peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, + but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36700] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit in causis efficientibus quarum +actiones transeunt in materiam exteriorem, et quae non movent se, +sed alia. Cuius contrarium est in voluntate. Unde ratio non +sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A2-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 2. Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except + by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36701] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod sola voluntas sit subiectum peccati. +Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de duabus animabus, quod <i>non +nisi voluntate peccatur</i>. Sed peccatum est sicut in subiecto in +potentia qua peccatur. Ergo sola voluntas est subiectum +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore + the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36702] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum est quoddam malum contra rationem. Sed bonum et malum ad +rationem pertinens, est obiectum solius voluntatis. Ergo sola +voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so + true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers + are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject + of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, + would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36703] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omne peccatum est actus voluntarius, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, in +libro de Lib. Arb., <i>peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non +sit voluntarium, non est peccatum</i>. Sed actus aliarum virium non +sunt voluntarii nisi inquantum illae vires moventur a voluntate. +Hoc autem non sufficit ad hoc quod sint subiectum peccati, quia +secundum hoc etiam membra exteriora, quae moventur a voluntate, +essent subiectum peccati; quod patet esse falsum. Ergo sola +voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are + the subject of virtues, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q56" id="FS_Q74_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[56])</a>. Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36704] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +peccatum virtuti contrariatur. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. Sed +aliae etiam vires animae praeter voluntatem, sunt subiecta +virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non sola voluntas est subiectum +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited + by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of voluntariness. + Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained + from their acts, by the will; and + these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 co."><a name="36705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36705] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, omne quod est principium +voluntarii actus, est subiectum peccati. Actus autem voluntarii +dicuntur non solum illi qui eliciuntur a voluntate, sed etiam illi +qui a voluntate imperantur; ut supra dictum est, cum de voluntario +ageretur. Unde non sola voluntas potest esse subiectum peccati, sed +omnes illae potentiae quae possunt moveri ad suos actus, vel ab eis +reprimi, per voluntatem. Et eaedem etiam potentiae sunt subiecta +habituum moralium bonorum vel malorum, quia eiusdem est actus et +habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36706] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non peccatur nisi voluntate sicut primo movente, +aliis autem potentiis peccatur sicut ab ea motis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by + reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36707] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bonum et malum pertinent ad voluntatem sicut per se +obiecta ipsius, sed aliae potentiae habent aliquod determinatum +bonum et malum, ratione cuius potest in eis esse et virtus et +vitium et peccatum, secundum quod participant voluntate et +ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves + them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason + as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external + members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow + that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36708] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod membra corporis non sunt principia actuum, sed solum +organa, unde et comparantur ad animam moventem sicut servus, qui +agitur et non agit. Potentiae autem appetitivae interiores +comparantur ad rationem quasi liberae, quia agunt quodammodo et +aguntur, ut patet per id quod dicitur I Polit. Et praeterea actus +exteriorum membrorum sunt actiones in exteriorem materiam +transeuntes, sicut patet de percussione in peccato homicidii. Et +propter hoc non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A3-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 3. Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. + Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36709] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate non possit esse +peccatum. Peccatum enim est proprium homini, qui ex suis actibus +laudatur vel vituperatur. Sed sensualitas est communis nobis et +brutis. Ergo in sensualitate non potest esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement + of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; + wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement + of the sensuality is not a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36710] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest</i>; sicut +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb. Sed homo non potest vitare +quin actus sensualitatis sit inordinatus, est enim sensualitas +perpetuae corruptionis, quandiu in hac mortali vita vivimus; unde +et per serpentem significatur, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. +Ergo inordinatio motus sensualitatis non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which + we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, + which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36711] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud quod homo ipse non facit, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed +hoc solum videmur nos ipsi facere, quod cum deliberatione rationis +facimus; ut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Ergo motus +sensualitatis qui est sine deliberatione rationis, non imputatur +homini ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. + iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. + Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36712] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; +sed quod odi malum, illud facio</i>, quod exponit Augustinus de +malo concupiscentiae, quam constat esse motum quendam +sensualitatis. Ergo in sensualitate est aliquod peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A2" id="FS_Q74_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is + evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it + follows that sin can be in the sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 co."><a name="36713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36713] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum potest inveniri in +qualibet potentia cuius actus potest esse voluntarius et +inordinatus, in quo consistit ratio peccati. Manifestum est autem +quod actus sensualitatis potest esse voluntarius, inquantum +sensualitas, idest appetitus sensitivus, nata est a voluntate +moveri. Unde relinquitur quod in sensualitate possit esse +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have + a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as + we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q74_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain + excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary + action, and, consequently, the subject of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36714] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aliquae vires sensitivae partis, etsi sint +communes nobis et brutis, tamen in nobis habent aliquam +excellentiam ex hoc quod rationi iunguntur, sicut nos, prae aliis +animalibus, habemus in parte sensitiva cogitativam et +reminiscentiam, ut in primo dictum est. Et per hunc modum etiam +appetitus sensitivus in nobis prae aliis animalibus habet quandam +excellentiam, scilicet quod natus est obedire rationi. Et quantum +ad hoc, potest esse principium actus voluntarii; et per consequens +subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed + in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" + does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for + instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his + thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements + of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated + movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: + but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36715] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod perpetua corruptio sensualitatis est intelligenda +quantum ad fomitem, qui nunquam totaliter tollitur in hac vita, +transit enim peccatum originale reatu, et remanet actu. Sed talis +corruptio fomitis non impedit quin homo rationabili voluntate +possit reprimere singulos motus inordinatos sensualitatis, si +praesentiat, puta divertendo cogitationem ad alia. Sed dum homo ad +aliud cogitationem divertit, potest etiam circa illud aliquis +inordinatus motus insurgere, sicut cum aliquis transfert +cogitationem suam a delectabilibus carnis, volens concupiscentiae +motus vitare, ad speculationem scientiae, insurgit quandoque +aliquis motus inanis gloriae impraemeditatus. Et ideo non potest +homo vitare omnes huiusmodi motus, propter corruptionem praedictam, +sed hoc solum sufficit ad rationem peccati voluntarii, quod possit +vitare singulos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing + therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but + is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, + which is something imperfect in the genus of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36716] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod homo facit sine deliberatione rationis, +non perfecte ipse facit, quia nihil operatur ibi id quod est +principale in homine. Unde non est perfecte actus humanus. Et per +consequens non potest esse perfecte actus virtutis vel peccati, sed +aliquid imperfectum in genere horum. Unde talis motus sensualitatis +rationem praeveniens, est peccatum veniale, quod est quiddam +imperfectum in genere peccati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A4-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 4. Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to + commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality + can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36717] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate possit esse peccatum +mortale. Actus enim ex obiecto cognoscitur. Sed circa obiecta +sensualitatis contingit peccare mortaliter, sicut circa +delectabilia carnis. Ergo actus sensualitatis potest esse peccatum +mortale. Et ita in sensualitate peccatum mortale invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of + the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about + the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36718] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum mortale contrariatur virtuti. Sed virtus potest esse in +sensualitate, temperantia enim et fortitudo sunt virtutes +irrationabilium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Ergo +in sensualitate potest esse peccatum mortale, cum contraria sint +nata fieri circa idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial + sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be there also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36719] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +veniale peccatum est dispositio ad mortale. Sed dispositio et +habitus sunt in eodem. Cum igitur veniale peccatum sit in +sensualitate, ut dictum est; etiam mortale peccatum esse poterit in +eadem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even + be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement + of the sensuality is not a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36720] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., et habetur in Glossa +Rom. VII, inordinatus concupiscentiae motus (qui est peccatum +sensualitatis) potest etiam esse in his qui sunt in gratia, in +quibus tamen peccatum mortale non invenitur. Ergo inordinatus motus +sensualitatis non est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys + the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q74_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of + the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to + order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 co."><a name="36721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36721] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut inordinatio corrumpens principium vitae +corporalis, causat corporalem mortem; ita etiam inordinatio +corrumpens principium spiritualis vitae, quod est finis ultimus, +causat mortem spiritualem peccati mortalis, ut supra dictum est. +Ordinare autem aliquid in finem non est sensualitatis, sed solum +rationis. Inordinatio autem a fine non est nisi eius cuius est +ordinare in finem. Unde peccatum mortale non potest esse in +sensualitate, sed solum in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being + an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal + sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36722] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod actus sensualitatis potest concurrere ad +peccatum mortale, sed tamen actus peccati mortalis non habet quod +sit peccatum mortale, ex eo quod est sensualitatis; sed ex eo quod +est rationis, cuius est ordinare in finem. Et ideo peccatum mortale +non attribuitur sensualitati, sed rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an + act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: + wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which + perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36723] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam actus virtutis non perficitur per id quod est +sensualitatis tantum, sed magis per id quod est rationis et +voluntatis, cuius est eligere, nam actus virtutis moralis non est +sine electione. Unde semper cum actu virtutis moralis, quae +perficit vim appetitivam, est etiam actus prudentiae, quae perficit +vim rationalem. Et idem est etiam de peccato mortali, sicut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the + same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the + same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, + as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can + arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In + this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36724] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod dispositio tripliciter se habet ad id ad quod +disponit. Quandoque enim est idem et in eodem, sicut scientia +inchoata dicitur esse dispositio ad scientiam perfectam. Quandoque +autem est in eodem, sed non idem, sicut calor est dispositio ad +formam ignis. Quandoque vero nec idem nec in eodem, sicut in his +quae habent ordinem ad invicem ut ex uno perveniatur in aliud, +sicut bonitas imaginationis est dispositio ad scientiam, quae est +in intellectu. Et hoc modo veniale peccatum, quod est in +sensualitate, potest esse dispositio ad peccatum mortale, quod est +in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A5-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 5. Whether sin can be in the reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason + is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot + be in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36725] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse in ratione. +Cuiuslibet enim potentiae peccatum est aliquis defectus ipsius. Sed +defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed magis excusat peccatum, +excusatur enim aliquis a peccato propter ignorantiam. Ergo in +ratione non potest esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36726] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +primum subiectum peccati est voluntas, ut dictum est. Sed ratio +praecedit voluntatem, cum sit directiva ipsius. Ergo peccatum esse +non potest in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not + among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore + no sin is in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36727] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +non potest esse peccatum nisi circa ea quae sunt in nobis. Sed +perfectio et defectus rationis non est eorum quae sunt in nobis, +quidam enim sunt naturaliter ratione deficientes, vel ratione +solertes. Ergo in ratione non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36728] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro XII de Trin., quod peccatum est +in ratione inferiori et in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing + the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the + reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when + it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements + of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 co."><a name="36729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36729] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in actu +ipsius, sicut ex dictis patet. Habet autem ratio duplicem actum, +unum quidem secundum se, in comparatione ad proprium obiectum, quod +est cognoscere aliquod verum; alius autem actus rationis est +inquantum est directiva aliarum virium. Utroque igitur modo +contingit esse peccatum in ratione. Et primo quidem, inquantum +errat in cognitione veri, quod quidem tunc imputatur ei ad +peccatum, quando habet ignorantiam vel errorem circa id quod potest +et debet scire. Secundo, quando inordinatos actus inferiorum virium +vel imperat, vel etiam post deliberationem non coercet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the + case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a + sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about + something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, + and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always + imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36730] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de defectu rationis qui +pertinet ad actum proprium respectu proprii obiecti, et hoc quando +est defectus cognitionis eius quod quis non potest scire. Tunc enim +talis defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed excusat a peccato, +sicut patet in his quae per furiosos committuntur. Si vero sit +defectus rationis circa id quod homo potest et debet scire, non +omnino homo excusatur a peccato, sed ipse defectus imputatur ei ad +peccatum. Defectus autem qui est solum in dirigendo alias vires, +semper imputatur ei ad peccatum, quia huic defectui occurrere +potest per proprium actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason + moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, + voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason + being the + principle of the will's act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36731] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de actibus voluntatis et +rationis ageretur, voluntas quodammodo movet et praecedit rationem, +et ratio quodammodo voluntatem, unde et motus voluntatis dici +potest rationalis, et actus rationis potest dici voluntarius. Et +secundum hoc in ratione invenitur peccatum, vel prout est defectus +eius voluntarius, vel prout actus rationis est principium actus +voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36732] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A6-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 6. Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive + power, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q74_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not + in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36733] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum morosae delectationis non sit +in ratione. Delectatio enim importat motum appetitivae virtutis, ut +supra dictum est. Sed vis appetitiva distinguitur a ratione, quae +est vis apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio morosa non est in +ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. + Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose + delectation is not in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36734] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ex obiectis cognosci potest ad quam potentiam actus pertineat, per +quem potentia ordinatur ad obiectum. Sed quandoque est delectatio +morosa circa bona sensibilia, et non circa bona rationis. Ergo +peccatum delectationis morosae non est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin 'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time + is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36735] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +morosum dicitur aliquid propter diuturnitatem temporis. Sed +diuturnitas temporis non est ratio quod aliquis actus pertineat ad +aliquam potentiam. Ergo delectatio morosa non pertinet ad +rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of + the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes + the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36736] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod <i>consensus +illecebrae si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, sic +habendum existimo velut cibum vetitum mulier sola comederit</i>. +Per mulierem autem intelligitur ratio inferior, sicut ibidem ipse +exponit. Ergo peccatum morosae delectationis est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated + <a href="#FS_Q74_A5" id="FS_Q74_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. + Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails + in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. + Now it fails, in two ways, in directing + internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a + movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, + having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] + upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 co."><a name="36737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36737] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum contingit esse in +ratione quandoque quidem inquantum est directiva humanorum actuum. +Manifestum est autem quod ratio non solum est directiva exteriorum +actuum, sed etiam interiorum passionum. Et ideo quando deficit +ratio in directione interiorum passionum, dicitur esse peccatum in +ratione, sicut etiam quando deficit in directione exteriorum +actuum. Deficit autem in directione passionum interiorum +dupliciter. Uno modo, quando imperat illicitas passiones, sicut +quando homo ex deliberatione provocat sibi motum irae vel +concupiscentiae. Alio modo, quando non reprimit illicitum passionis +motum, sicut cum aliquis, postquam deliberavit quod motus passionis +insurgens est inordinatus, nihilominus circa ipsum immoratur, et +ipsum non expellit. Et secundum hoc dicitur peccatum delectationis +morosae esse in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in + accordance with what has been stated above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36738] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod delectatio quidem est in vi appetitiva sicut in +proximo principio, sed in ratione est sicut in primo motivo, +secundum hoc quod supra dictum est, quod actiones quae non +transeunt in exteriorem materiam, sunt sicut in subiecto in suis +principiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower + powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction + of reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36739] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio actum proprium illicitum habet circa proprium +obiectum, sed directionem habet circa omnia obiecta inferiorum +virium quae per rationem dirigi possunt. Et secundum hoc etiam +delectatio circa sensibilia obiecta pertinet ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, + and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched + the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36740] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod delectatio dicitur morosa non ex mora temporis; sed +ex eo quod ratio deliberans circa eam immoratur, nec tamen eam +repellit, <i>tenens et volvens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt +animum, respui debuerunt</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A7-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 7. Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, + as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q15_A1" id="FS_Q74_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[1]</a>): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36741] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum consensus in actum non sit in +ratione superiori. Consentire enim est actus appetitivae virtutis, +ut supra habitum est. Sed ratio est vis apprehensiva. Ergo peccatum +consensus in actum non est in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, + 7). [*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A2" id="FS_Q74_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[15], AA[2]</a>,[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the + Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal + law, (cf. A[8], + OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think + about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36742] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio superior intendit rationibus aeternis inspiciendis et +consulendis, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Sed quandoque +consentitur in actum non consultis rationibus aeternis, non enim +semper homo cogitat de rebus divinis, quando consentit in aliquem +actum. Ergo peccatum consensus in actum non semper est in ratione +superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures + or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine + states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36743] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut per rationes aeternas potest homo regulare actus exteriores, +ita etiam interiores delectationes, vel alias passiones. Sed +consensus in delectationem absque hoc quod opere statuatur +implendum, est rationis inferioris; ut dicit Augustinus, XII de +Trin. Ergo etiam consensus in actum peccati debet interdum attribui +rationi inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds + to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, + he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher + reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="36744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36744] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut ratio superior excedit inferiorem, ita ratio excedit vim +imaginativam. Sed quandoque procedit homo in actum per +apprehensionem virtutis imaginativae, absque omni deliberatione +rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex impraemeditato movet manum aut +pedem. Ergo etiam quandoque potest ratio inferior consentire in +actum peccati, absque ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, + so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has + offered the forbidden fruit to her husband." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36745] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>si in consensione male +utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur, ita decernitur +quodcumque peccatum, ut, si potestas sit, etiam corpore compleatur, +intelligenda est mulier cibum illicitum viro dedisse</i>, per quem +superior ratio significatur. Ergo ad rationem superiorem pertinet +consentire in actum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers + its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now + we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see + that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by + referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted + to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that + human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; + and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A4" id="FS_Q74_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>). + Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment + is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced + on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, + and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action + belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower + reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever + is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 co."><a name="36746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36746] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod consensus importat iudicium quoddam de eo in quod +consentitur, sicut enim ratio speculativa iudicat et sententiat de +rebus intelligibilibus, ita ratio practica iudicat et sententiat de +agendis. Est autem considerandum quod in omni iudicio ultima +sententia pertinet ad supremum iudicatorium, sicut videmus in +speculativis quod ultima sententia de aliqua propositione datur per +resolutionem ad prima principia. Quandiu enim remanet aliquod +principium altius, adhuc per ipsum potest examinari id de quo +quaeritur, unde adhuc est suspensum iudicium, quasi nondum data +finali sententia. Manifestum est autem quod actus humani regulari +possunt ex regula rationis humanae, quae sumitur ex rebus creatis, +quas naturaliter homo cognoscit; et ulterius ex regula legis +divinae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum regula legis divinae sit +superior, consequens est ut ultima sententia, per quam iudicium +finaliter terminatur, pertineat ad rationem superiorem, quae +intendit rationibus aeternis. Cum autem de pluribus occurrit +iudicandum, finale iudicium est de eo quod ultimo occurrit. In +actibus autem humanis ultimo occurrit ipse actus; praeambulum autem +est delectatio, quae inducit ad actum. Et ideo ad rationem +superiorem proprie pertinet consensus in actum; ad rationem vero +inferiorem, quae habet inferius iudicium, pertinet iudicium +praeambulum, quod est de delectatione. Quamvis etiam et de +delectatione superior ratio iudicare possit, quia quidquid iudicio +subditur inferioris, subditur etiam iudicio superioris, sed non +convertitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, + as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q15_A3" id="FS_Q74_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[3]</a>). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which + the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36747] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis non +absolute, sed consequenter ad actum rationis deliberantis et +iudicantis, ut supra dictum est, in hoc enim terminatur consensus, +quod voluntas tendit in id quod est ratione iudicatum. Unde +consensus potest attribui et voluntati et rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, + whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it + neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, + as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the + commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining + them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36748] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ratio superior non dirigit actus +humanos secundum legem divinam, impediens actum peccati, dicitur +ipsa consentire; sive cogitet de lege aeterna, sive non. Cum enim +cogitat de lege Dei, actu eam contemnit, cum vero non cogitat, eam +negligit per modum omissionis cuiusdam. Unde omnibus modis +consensus in actum peccati procedit ex superiori ratione, quia, ut +Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>non potest peccatum efficaciter +perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio penes quam +summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi, +malae actioni cedat aut serviat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct + or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while + deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent + to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the + eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36749] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio superior, per considerationem legis aeternae, +sicut potest dirigere vel cohibere actum exteriorem, ita etiam +delectationem interiorem. Sed tamen antequam ad iudicium superioris +rationis deveniatur, statim ut sensualitas proponit delectationem, +inferior ratio, per rationes temporales deliberans, quandoque +huiusmodi delectationem acceptat, et tunc consensus in +delectationem pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Si vero etiam +consideratis rationibus aeternis, homo in eodem consensu +perseveret, iam talis consensus ad superiorem rationem +pertinebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher + or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which + the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly + by imputed to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="36750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36750] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod apprehensio virtutis imaginativae est subita et sine +deliberatione, et ideo potest aliquem actum causare antequam +superior vel inferior ratio etiam habeat tempus deliberandi. Sed +iudicium rationis inferioris est cum deliberatione, quae indiget +tempore, in quo etiam ratio superior deliberare potest. Unde si non +cohibeat ab actu peccati per suam deliberationem, ei imputatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A8-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 8. Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which + does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal + sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q74_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36751] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus in delectationem non sit +peccatum mortale. Consentire enim in delectationem pertinet ad +rationem inferiorem, cuius non est intendere rationibus aeternis +vel legi divinae, et per consequens nec ab eis averti. Sed omne +peccatum mortale est per aversionem a lege divina; ut patet per +definitionem Augustini, de peccato mortali datam, quae supra posita +est. Ergo consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being + such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than + his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to + the delectation a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36752] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +consentire in aliquid non est malum nisi quia illud est malum in +quod consentitur. Sed propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, vel +saltem non minus. Non ergo illud in quod consentitur, potest esse +minus malum quam consensus. Sed delectatio sine opere non est +peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum. Ergo nec consensus in +delectationem est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states + (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation + consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward + thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference + of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither + is the consent to the delectation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36753] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +delectationes differunt in bonitate et malitia secundum +differentiam operationum, ut dicit philosophus, in X Ethic. Sed +alia operatio est interior cogitatio, et alia actus exterior, puta +fornicationis. Ergo et delectatio consequens actum interioris +cogitationis, tantum differt a delectatione fornicationis in +bonitate vel malitia, quantum differt cogitatio interior ab actu +exteriori. Et per consequens etiam eodem modo differt consentire in +utrumque. Sed cogitatio interior non est peccatum mortale; nec +etiam consensus in cogitationem. Ergo per consequens nec consensus +in delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found + also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does + not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="36754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36754] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +exterior actus fornicationis vel adulterii non est peccatum mortale +ratione delectationis, quae etiam invenitur in actu matrimoniali; +sed ratione inordinationis ipsius actus. Sed ille qui consentit in +delectationem, non propter hoc consentit in deordinationem actus. +Ergo non videtur mortaliter peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation + resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from + the thought of fornication. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="36755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36755] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum homicidii est gravius quam simplicis fornicationis. Sed +consentire in delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de +homicidio, non est peccatum mortale. Ergo multo minus consentire in +delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de fornicatione, est +peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). + Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. + xii, 12) that "this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon + for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our + trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6"><a name="36756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36756] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, +oratio dominica quotidie dicitur pro remissione venialium, ut +Augustinus dicit. Sed consensum in delectationem Augustinus docet +esse abolendum per orationem dominicam, dicit enim, in XII de +Trin., quod <i>hoc est longe minus peccatum quam si opere statuatur +implendum, et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda +est, pectusque percutiendum, atque dicendum, dimitte nobis debita +nostra</i>. Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum +veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven + those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them." + But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36757] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus post pauca subdit, <i>totus homo damnabitur, +nisi haec quae, sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate +animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse +peccata, per mediatoris gratiam remittantur</i>. Sed nullus +damnatur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo consensus in delectationem +est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q74_A8-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only + a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must + take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation + may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to + the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because + the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action + itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs + to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and + delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. + a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination + of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, + may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the + delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not + in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and + sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute + about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue + of + its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such + a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true. + </p><p id="FS_Q74_A8-p10"> But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this + act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination + of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it + is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. + Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 co."><a name="36758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36758] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui diversimode opinati sunt. Quidam +enim dixerunt quod consensus in delectationem non est peccatum +mortale, sed veniale tantum. Alii vero dixerunt quod est peccatum +mortale, et haec opinio est communior et verisimilior. Est enim +considerandum quod, cum omnis delectatio consequatur aliquam +operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic.; et iterum cum omnis delectatio +habeat aliquod obiectum, delectatio quaelibet potest comparari ad +duo, scilicet ad operationem quam consequitur, et ad obiectum in +quo quis delectatur. Contingit autem quod aliqua operatio sit +obiectum delectationis, sicut et aliqua alia res, quia ipsa +operatio potest accipi ut bonum et finis, in quo quis delectatus +requiescit. Et quandoque quidem ipsamet operatio quam consequitur +delectatio, est obiectum delectationis, inquantum scilicet vis +appetitiva, cuius est delectari, reflectitur in ipsam operationem +sicut in quoddam bonum; puta cum aliquis cogitat, et delectatur de +hoc ipso quod cogitat, inquantum sua cogitatio placet. Quandoque +vero delectatio consequens unam operationem, puta cogitationem +aliquam, habet pro obiecto aliam operationem quasi rem cogitatam, +et tunc talis delectatio procedit ex inclinatione appetitus non +quidem in cogitationem, sed in operationem cogitatam. Sic igitur +aliquis de fornicatione cogitans, de duobus potest delectari, uno +modo, de ipsa cogitatione; alio modo, de fornicatione cogitata. +Delectatio autem de cogitatione ipsa sequitur inclinationem +affectus in cogitationem ipsam. Cogitatio autem ipsa secundum se +non est peccatum mortale, immo quandoque est veniale tantum, puta +cum aliquis inutiliter cogitat; quandoque autem sine peccato +omnino, puta cum aliquis utiliter de ea cogitat, sicut cum vult de +ea praedicare vel disputare. Et ideo per consequens affectio et +delectatio quae sic est de cogitatione fornicationis, non est de +genere peccati mortalis; sed quandoque est peccatum veniale, +quandoque nullum. Unde nec consensus in talem delectationem est +peccatum mortale. Et secundum hoc prima opinio habet veritatem. +Quod autem aliquis cogitans de fornicatione, delectetur de ipso +actu cogitato, hoc contingit ex hoc quod affectio eius inclinata +est in hunc actum. Unde quod aliquis consentiat in talem +delectationem, hoc nihil aliud est quam quod ipse consentiat in hoc +quod affectus suus sit inclinatus in fornicationem, nullus enim +delectatur nisi in eo quod est conforme appetitui eius. Quod autem +aliquis ex deliberatione eligat quod affectus suus conformetur his +quae secundum se sunt peccata mortalia, est peccatum mortale. Unde +talis consensus in delectationem peccati mortalis, est peccatum +mortale; ut secunda opinio ponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q74_A8-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating + according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: + and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even + the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason + fails in directing them according to the eternal types. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36759] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod consensus in delectationem potest esse non solum +rationis inferioris, sed etiam superioris, ut dictum est. Et tamen +ipsa etiam ratio inferior potest averti a rationibus aeternis. Quia +etsi non intendit eis ut secundum eas regulans, quod est proprium +superioris rationis; intendit tamen eis ut secundum eas regulata. +Et hoc modo, ab eis se avertens, potest peccare mortaliter. Nam et +actus inferiorum virium, et etiam exteriorum membrorum, possunt +esse peccata mortalia, secundum quod deficit ordinatio superioris +rationis regulantis eos secundum rationes aeternas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to + take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, + in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the + incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent + has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36760] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod consensus in peccatum quod est veniale ex genere, est +veniale peccatum. Et secundum hoc potest concludi quod consensus in +delectationem quae est de ipsa vana cogitatione fornicationis, est +peccatum veniale. Sed delectatio quae est in ipso actu +fornicationis, de genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod ante +consensum sit veniale peccatum tantum, hoc est per accidens, +scilicet propter imperfectionem actus. Quae quidem imperfectio +tollitur per consensum deliberatum supervenientem. Unde ex hoc +adducitur in suam naturam, ut sit peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36761] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de delectatione quae habet +cogitationem pro obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even + though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, + and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="36762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36762] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod delectatio quae habet actum exteriorem pro obiecto, +non potest esse absque complacentia exterioris actus secundum se; +etiam si non statuatur implendum, propter prohibitionem alicuius +superioris. Unde actus fit inordinatus, et per consequens +delectatio erit inordinata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the + consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="36763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36763] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod etiam consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex +complacentia ipsius actus homicidii cogitati, est peccatum mortale. +Non autem consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex complacentia +cogitationis de homicidio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 6"><a name="36764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36764] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum +dicendum quod oratio dominica non solum contra peccata venialia +dicenda est, sed etiam contra mortalia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A9-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 9. Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a + sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal + law." But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal + sin in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36765] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse +peccatum veniale, secundum quod est directiva inferiorum virium, +idest secundum quod consentit in actum peccati. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in XII de Trin., quod ratio superior inhaeret +rationibus aeternis. Sed peccare mortaliter est per aversionem a +rationibus aeternis. Ergo videtur quod in superiori ratione non +possit esse peccatum nisi mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of + the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36766] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +superior ratio se habet in vita spirituali tanquam principium; +sicut et cor in vita corporali. Sed infirmitates cordis sunt +mortales. Ergo peccata superioris rationis sunt mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial + sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration + of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36767] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum veniale fit mortale, si fiat ex contemptu. Sed hoc non +videtur esse sine contemptu, quod aliquis ex deliberatione peccet +etiam venialiter. Cum ergo consensus rationis superioris semper sit +cum deliberatione legis divinae, videtur quod non possit esse sine +peccato mortali, propter contemptum divinae legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q74_A9-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36768] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +consensus in actum peccati pertinet ad rationem superiorem, ut +supra dictum est. Sed consensus in actum peccati venialis est +peccatum veniale. Ergo in superiori ratione potest esse peccatum +veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason "is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it contemplates + it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the + fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the + inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, + in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act + of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal + law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 co."><a name="36769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36769] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., ratio +superior <i>inhaeret rationibus aeternis conspiciendis aut +consulendis</i>, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod earum +veritatem speculatur; consulendis autem, secundum quod per rationes +aeternas de aliis iudicat et ordinat; ad quod pertinet quod, +deliberando per rationes aeternas, consentit in aliquem actum, vel +dissentit ab eo. Contingit autem quod inordinatio actus in quem +consentit, non contrariatur rationibus aeternis, quia non est cum +aversione a fine ultimo, sicut contrariatur actus peccati mortalis, +sed est praeter eas, sicut actus peccati venialis. Unde quando +ratio superior in actum peccati venialis consentit, non avertitur a +rationibus aeternis. Unde non peccat mortaliter, sed +venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36770] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and + such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or + of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher + reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is + the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36771] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod duplex est infirmitas cordis. Una quae est in ipsa +substantia cordis, et immutat naturalem complexionem ipsius, et +talis infirmitas semper est mortalis. Alia est autem infirmitas +cordis propter aliquam inordinationem vel motus eius, vel alicuius +eorum quae circumstant cor, et talis infirmitas non semper est +mortalis. Et similiter in ratione superiori semper est peccatum +mortale, quando tollitur ipsa ordinatio rationis superioris ad +proprium obiectum, quod est rationes aeternae. Sed quando est +inordinatio circa hoc, non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the + Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36772] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod deliberatus consensus in peccatum non semper pertinet +ad contemptum legis divinae, sed solum quando peccatum legi divinae +contrariatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A10-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 10. Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of + a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher + reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial + sin in the higher reason as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="36773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36773] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse +peccatum veniale secundum seipsam, idest secundum quod inspicit +rationes aeternas. Actus enim potentiae non invenitur esse +deficiens, nisi per hoc quod inordinate se habet circa suum +obiectum. Sed obiectum superioris rationis sunt aeternae rationes, +a quibus deordinari non est sine peccato mortali. Ergo in superiori +ratione non potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate + movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason + as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="36774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36774] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +cum ratio sit vis deliberativa, actus rationis semper est cum +deliberatione. Sed omnis inordinatus motus in his quae Dei sunt, si +sit cum deliberatione, est peccatum mortale. Ergo in ratione +superiori secundum seipsam, nunquam est peccatum veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, + through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; + just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, + it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to + moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement + that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly + false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="36775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36775] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +contingit quandoque quod peccatum ex subreptione est peccatum +veniale, peccatum autem ex deliberatione est peccatum mortale, per +hoc quod ratio deliberans recurrit ad aliquod maius bonum, contra +quod homo agens gravius peccat, sicut cum de actu delectabili +inordinato ratio deliberat quod est contra legem Dei, gravius +peccat consentiendo, quam si solum consideraret quod est contra +virtutem moralem. Sed ratio superior non potest recurrere ad +aliquod altius quam sit suum obiectum. Ergo si motus ex subreptione +non sit peccatum mortale, neque etiam deliberatio superveniens +faciet ipsum esse peccatum mortale, quod patet esse falsum. Non +ergo in ratione superiori secundum seipsam, potest esse peccatum +veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial + sin in the higher reason as such. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 s. c."><a name="36776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36776] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +motus subreptitius infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. Sed pertinet +ad superiorem rationem secundum seipsam. Ergo in ratione superiori +potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q74_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. + For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so + it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself + a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of + the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins. + </p><p id="FS_Q74_A10-p7"> With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple "intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again + consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about + Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, + yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the + law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other + aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when + a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended + it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine + law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, + the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin + mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things + which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 co."><a name="36777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36777] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ratio superior aliter fertur in suum obiectum, atque +aliter in obiecta inferiorum virium quae per ipsam diriguntur. In +obiecta enim inferiorum virium non fertur nisi inquantum de eis +consulit rationes aeternas. Unde non fertur in ea nisi per modum +deliberationis. Deliberatus autem consensus in his quae ex genere +suo sunt mortalia, est mortale peccatum. Et ideo ratio superior +semper mortaliter peccat, si actus inferiorum virium in quos +consentit, sint peccata mortalia. Sed circa proprium obiectum habet +duos actus, scilicet simplicem intuitum; et deliberationem, +secundum quod etiam de proprio obiecto consulit rationes aeternas. +Secundum autem simplicem intuitum, potest aliquem inordinatum motum +habere circa divina, puta cum quis patitur subitum infidelitatis +motum. Et quamvis infidelitas secundum suum genus sit peccatum +mortale, tamen subitus motus infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. +Quia peccatum mortale non est nisi sit contra legem Dei, potest +autem aliquid eorum quae pertinent ad fidem, subito rationi +occurrere sub quadam alia ratione, antequam super hoc consulatur, +vel consuli possit, ratio aeterna, idest lex Dei; puta cum quis +resurrectionem mortuorum subito apprehendit ut impossibilem +secundum naturam, et simul apprehendendo renititur, antequam tempus +habeat deliberandi quod hoc est nobis traditum ut credendum +secundum legem divinam. Si vero post hanc deliberationem motus +infidelitatis maneat, est peccatum mortale. Et ideo circa proprium +obiectum, etsi sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest ratio +superior peccare venialiter in subitis motibus; vel etiam +mortaliter per deliberatum consensum. In his autem quae pertinent +ad inferiores vires, semper peccat mortaliter in his quae sunt +peccata mortalia ex suo genere, non autem in his quae secundum suum +genus sunt venialia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness + of a sudden action, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="36778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36778] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum quod est contra rationes aeternas, etsi +sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest tamen esse peccatum veniale +propter imperfectionem actus subiti, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as + well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: + consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="36779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36779] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in operativis ad rationem, ad quam pertinet +deliberatio, pertinet etiam simplex intuitus eorum ex quibus +deliberatio procedit, sicut etiam in speculativis ad rationem +pertinet et syllogizare, et propositiones formare. Et ideo etiam +ratio potest habere subitum motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence + of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, + which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, + yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that + which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into + the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="36780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36780] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod una et eadem res potest diversas considerationes +habere, quarum una est altera altior, sicut Deum esse potest +considerari vel inquantum est cognoscibile ratione humana, vel +inquantum creditur revelatione divina, quae est consideratio +altior. Et ideo quamvis obiectum rationis superioris sit quiddam +secundum naturam rei altissimum, tamen potest etiam reduci in +quandam altiorem considerationem. Et hac ratione, quod in motu +subito non erat peccatum mortale, per deliberationem reducentem in +altiorem considerationem fit peccatum mortale, sicut supra +expositum est.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q75" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q75-p0.1">Q. 75. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q75-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of + inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q75-p3"><a href="#FS_Q75_A1"> (1) Whether sin has a cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p4"><a href="#FS_Q75_A2"> (2) Whether it has an internal cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p5"><a href="#FS_Q75_A3"> (3) Whether it has an external cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p6"><a href="#FS_Q75_A4"> (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 pr."><a name="36781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36781] +Iª-IIae q. 75 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +causis peccatorum. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum peccatum habeat +causam. Secundo, utrum habeat causam interiorem. Tertio, utrum +habeat causam exteriorem. Quarto, utrum peccatum sit causa +peccati.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q75_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A1-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 1. Whether sin has a cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q75_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36782] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam. Peccatum +enim habet rationem mali, ut dictum est. Sed malum non habet +causam, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum non +habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for + every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36783] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +causa est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud. Sed quod est ex +necessitate, non videtur esse peccatum, eo quod omne peccatum est +voluntarium. Ergo peccatum non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, + for "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt + is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36784] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccatum habet causam, aut habet pro causa bonum, aut malum. Non +autem bonum, quia bonum non facit nisi bonum; <i>non enim potest +arbor bona fructus malos facere</i>, ut dicitur Matth. VII +similiter autem nec malum potest esse causa peccati, quia malum +poenae sequitur ad peccatum; malum autem culpae est idem quod +peccatum. Peccatum igitur non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.6" target="asv">Job 5:6</a>, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the + law of God." Therefore sin has a cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36785] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +omne quod fit, habet causam, quia, ut dicitur Iob V, nihil in terra +sine causa fit. Sed peccatum fit, est enim dictum vel factum vel +concupitum contra legem Dei. Ergo peccatum habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, + so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may + be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, + is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the + removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, + of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of + its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, + since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought + naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought + to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, + which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause + is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and + on + the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. + Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, + causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order + in the act results from the lack of direction in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 co."><a name="36786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36786] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum est quidam actus inordinatus. Ex parte +igitur actus, potest habere per se causam, sicut et quilibet alius +actus. Ex parte autem inordinationis, habet causam eo modo quo +negatio vel privatio potest habere causam. Negationis autem +alicuius potest duplex causa assignari. Primo quidem, defectus +causae, idest ipsius causae negatio, est causa negationis secundum +seipsam, ad remotionem enim causae sequitur remotio effectus; sicut +obscuritatis causa est absentia solis. Alio modo, causa +affirmationis ad quam sequitur negatio, est per accidens causa +negationis consequentis, sicut ignis, causando calorem ex +principali intentione, consequenter causat privationem +frigiditatis. Quorum primum potest sufficere ad simplicem +negationem. Sed cum inordinatio peccati, et quodlibet malum, non +sit simplex negatio, sed privatio eius quod quid natum est et debet +habere; necesse est quod talis inordinatio habeat causam agentem +per accidens, quod enim natum est inesse et debet, nunquam abesset +nisi propter causam aliquam impedientem. Et secundum hoc consuevit +dici quod malum, quod in quadam privatione consistit, habet causam +deficientem, vel agentem per accidens. Omnis autem causa per +accidens reducitur ad causam per se. Cum igitur peccatum ex parte +inordinationis habeat causam agentem per accidens, ex parte autem +actus habeat causam agentem per se; sequitur quod inordinatio +peccati consequatur ex ipsa causa actus. Sic igitur voluntas carens +directione regulae rationis et legis divinae, intendens aliquod +bonum commutabile, causat actum quidem peccati per se, sed +inordinationem actus per accidens et praeter intentionem, provenit +enim defectus ordinis in actu, ex defectu directionis in +voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject + of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36787] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum non solum significat ipsam privationem +boni, quae est inordinatio; sed significat actum sub tali +privatione, quae habet rationem mali. Quod quidem qualiter habeat +causam, dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not + impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, + on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. + vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that + this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36788] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si illa definitio causae universaliter debeat +verificari, oportet ut intelligatur de causa sufficienti et non +impedita. Contingit enim aliquid esse causam sufficientem alterius, +et tamen non ex necessitate sequitur effectus, propter aliquod +impedimentum superveniens, alioquin sequeretur quod omnia ex +necessitate contingerent, ut patet in VI Metaphys. Sic igitur, etsi +peccatum habeat causam, non tamen sequitur quod sit necessaria, +quia effectus potest impediri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact + of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of + guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking + some other good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36789] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, voluntas sine adhibitione regulae +rationis vel legis divinae, est causa peccati. Hoc autem quod est +non adhibere regulam rationis vel legis divinae, secundum se non +habet rationem mali, nec poenae nec culpae, antequam applicetur ad +actum. Unde secundum hoc, peccati primi non est causa aliquod +malum, sed bonum aliquod cum absentia alicuius alterius boni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A2-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 2. Whether sin has an internal cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal + cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36790] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam interiorem. +Id enim quod est interius alicui rei, semper adest ei. Si igitur +peccatum habeat causam interiorem, semper homo peccaret, cum, +posita causa, ponatur effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of + sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36791] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed interiores motus hominis sunt +peccatum. Ergo non sunt causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for + sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, + is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36792] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est intra hominem, aut est naturale, aut voluntarium. Sed +id quod est naturale, non potest esse peccati causa, quia peccatum +est contra naturam, ut dicit Damascenus. Quod autem est +voluntarium, si sit inordinatum, iam est peccatum. Non ergo aliquid +intrinsecum potest esse causa primi peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36793] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, quod voluntas est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q75_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q75_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human + acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of + which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. + For just as it is due to the judgment of + reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the + sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain + further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason + and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q75_A2-p7"> But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, + viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses + and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and + the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the + conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 co."><a name="36794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36794] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, per se causam peccati oportet +accipere ex parte ipsius actus. Actus autem humani potest accipi +causa interior et mediata, et immediata. Immediata quidem causa +humani actus est ratio et voluntas, secundum quam homo est liber +arbitrio. Causa autem remota est apprehensio sensitivae partis, et +etiam appetitus sensitivus, sicut enim ex iudicio rationis voluntas +movetur ad aliquid secundum rationem, ita etiam ex apprehensione +sensus appetitus sensitivus in aliquid inclinatur. Quae quidem +inclinatio interdum trahit voluntatem et rationem, sicut infra +patebit. Sic igitur duplex causa peccati interior potest assignari, +una proxima, ex parte rationis et voluntatis; alia vero remota, ex +parte imaginationis vel appetitus sensitivi. Sed quia supra dictum +est quod causa peccati est aliquod bonum apparens motivum cum +defectu debiti motivi, scilicet regulae rationis vel legis divinae; +ipsum motivum quod est apparens bonum, pertinet ad apprehensionem +sensus et appetitum. Ipsa autem absentia debitae regulae pertinet +ad rationem, quae nata est huiusmodi regulam considerare. Sed ipsa +perfectio voluntarii actus peccati pertinet ad voluntatem, ita quod +ipse voluntatis actus, praemissis suppositis, iam est quoddam +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the + appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made + actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is + because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is + inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore + the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36795] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod id quod est intrinsecum sicut potentia +naturalis, semper inest, id autem quod est intrinsecum sicut actus +interior appetitivae vel apprehensivae virtutis, non semper inest. +Ipsa autem potentia voluntatis est causa peccati in potentia, sed +reducitur in actum per motus praecedentes et sensitivae partis +primo, et rationis consequenter. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid +proponitur ut appetibile secundum sensum et appetitus sensitivus +inclinatur in illud, ratio interdum cessat a consideratione regulae +debitae, et sic voluntas producit actum peccati. Quia igitur motus +praecedentes non semper sunt in actu, neque peccatum semper est in +actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the + will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36796] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non omnes motus interiores sunt de substantia +peccati, quod consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis, sed +quidam praecedunt, et quidam consequuntur ipsum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which + sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being + unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36797] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud quod est causa peccati sicut potentia producens +actum, est naturale. Motus etiam sensitivae partis, ex quo sequitur +peccatum, interdum est naturalis, sicut cum propter appetitum cibi +aliquis peccat. Sed efficitur peccatum innaturale ex hoc ipso quod +deficit regula naturalis, quam homo secundum naturam suam debet +attendere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A3-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 3. Whether sin has an external cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are + within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36798] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam exteriorem. +Peccatum enim est actus voluntarius. Voluntaria autem sunt eorum +quae sunt in nobis; et ita non habent exteriorem causam. Ergo +peccatum non habet exteriorem causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal + cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, + sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36799] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut natura est principium interius, ita etiam voluntas. Sed +peccatum in rebus naturalibus nunquam accidit nisi ex aliqua +interiori causa, ut puta monstruosi partus proveniunt ex +corruptione alicuius principii interioris. Ergo neque in moralibus +potest contingere peccatum nisi ex interiori causa. Non ergo habet +peccatum causam exteriorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements + to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36800] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed quanto plura sunt +et maiora exterius inducentia ad peccandum, tanto minus id quod +quis inordinate agit, ei imputatur ad peccatum. Ergo nihil exterius +est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.21.16" target="asv">Num. 21:16</a>): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the + Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36801] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Num. XXXI, <i>nonne istae sunt quae deceperunt +filios Israel, et praevaricari vos fecerunt in domino super peccato +Phogor?</i> Ergo aliquid exterius potest esse causa faciens +peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the + appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the + will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10], + A[4]), none can move the will inwardly + save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing external + can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, + as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, + nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto + in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external + can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive + cause of sin being accomplished. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 co."><a name="36802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36802] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, causa interior peccati est +et voluntas, ut perficiens actum peccati; et ratio, quantum ad +carentiam debitae regulae; et appetitus sensitivus inclinans. Sic +ergo aliquid extrinsecum tripliciter posset esse causa peccati, vel +quia moveret immediate ipsam voluntatem; vel quia moveret rationem; +vel quia moveret appetitum sensitivum. Voluntatem autem, ut supra +dictum est, interius movere non potest nisi Deus; qui non potest +esse causa peccati, ut infra ostendetur. Unde relinquitur quod +nihil exterius potest esse causa peccati, nisi vel inquantum movet +rationem, sicut homo vel Daemon persuadens peccatum; vel sicut +movens appetitum sensitivum, sicut aliqua sensibilia exteriora +movent appetitum sensitivum. Sed neque persuasio exterior in rebus +agendis ex necessitate movet rationem; neque etiam res exterius +propositae ex necessitate movent appetitum sensitivum, nisi forte +aliquo modo dispositum; et tamen etiam appetitus sensitivus non ex +necessitate movet rationem et voluntatem. Unde aliquid exterius +potest esse aliqua causa movens ad peccandum, non tamen +sufficienter ad peccatum inducens, sed causa sufficienter complens +peccatum est sola voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that + it remains in our power to sin or not to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36803] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod exteriora moventia ad peccandum +non sufficienter et ex necessitate inducunt, sequitur quod remaneat +in nobis peccare et non peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of + sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36804] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod per hoc quod ponitur interior causa peccati, non +excluditur exterior, non enim id quod est exterius est causa +peccati, nisi mediante causa interiori, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful + act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on + the act being voluntary and in our power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36805] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, multiplicatis exterioribus causis inclinantibus ad +peccandum, multiplicantur actus peccati, quia plures ex illis +causis, et pluries, inclinantur ad actus peccati. Sed tamen +minuitur ratio culpae, quae consistit in hoc quod aliquid sit +voluntarium et in nobis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A4-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 4. Whether one sin is a cause of another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with + one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character + of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," + as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have + no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a + formal cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36806] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non sit causa peccati. Sunt +enim quatuor genera causarum, quorum nullum potest ad hoc congruere +quod peccatum sit causa peccati. Finis enim habet rationem boni, +quod non competit peccato, quod de sua ratione est malum. Et eadem +ratione nec peccatum potest esse causa efficiens, quia malum non +est causa agens, sed est infirmum et impotens, ut Dionysius dicit, +IV cap. de Div. Nom. Causa autem materialis et formalis videntur +habere solum locum in naturalibus corporibus quae sunt composita ex +materia et forma. Ergo peccatum non potest habere causam materialem +et formalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially + something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36807] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +agere sibi simile est rei perfectae, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed +peccatum de sui ratione est imperfectum. Ergo peccatum non potest +esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus + we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36808] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si huius peccati sit causa aliud peccatum, eadem ratione et illius +erit causa aliquod aliud peccatum, et sic procedetur in infinitum, +quod est inconveniens. Non ergo peccatum est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36809] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., <i>peccatum quod per +poenitentiam citius non deletur, peccatum est et causa +peccati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the + same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of + the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, + as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, + by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into + another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed + to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after + the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the + matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, + one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty + of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, + as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it follows that one sin is + also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material + while the latter is formal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 co."><a name="36810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36810] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, cum peccatum habeat causam ex parte actus, hoc modo +unum peccatum posset esse causa alterius, sicut unus actus humanus +potest esse causa alterius. Contingit igitur unum peccatum esse +causam alterius secundum quatuor genera causarum. Primo quidem, +secundum modum causae efficientis vel moventis, et per se et per +accidens. Per accidens quidem, sicut removens prohibens dicitur +movens per accidens, cum enim per unum actum peccati homo amittit +gratiam, vel caritatem, vel verecundiam, vel quodcumque aliud +retrahens a peccato, incidit ex hoc in aliud peccatum; et sic +primum peccatum est causa secundi per accidens. Per se autem, sicut +cum ex uno actu peccati homo disponitur ad hoc quod alium actum +consimilem facilius committit, ex actibus enim causantur +dispositiones et habitus inclinantes ad similes actus. Secundum +vero genus causae materialis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, +inquantum praeparat ei materiam, sicut avaritia praeparat materiam +litigio, quod plerumque est de divitiis congregatis. Secundum vero +genus causae finalis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, inquantum +propter finem unius peccati aliquis committit aliud peccatum, sicut +cum aliquis committit simoniam propter finem ambitionis, vel +fornicationem propter furtum. Et quia finis dat formam in +moralibus, ut supra habitum est, ex hoc etiam sequitur quod unum +peccatum sit formalis causa alterius, in actu enim fornicationis +quae propter furtum committitur, est quidem fornicatio sicut +materiale, furtum vero sicut formale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least + apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of + another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one + sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated + above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36811] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum, inquantum est inordinatum, habet +rationem mali, sed inquantum est actus quidam, habet aliquod bonum, +saltem apparens, pro fine. Et ita ex parte actus potest esse causa +et finalis et effectiva alterius peccati, licet non ex parte +inordinationis. Materiam autem habet peccatum non ex qua, sed circa +quam. Formam autem habet ex fine. Et ideo secundum quatuor genera +causarum peccatum potest dici causa peccati, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act + it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36812] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum est imperfectum imperfectione morali ex +parte inordinationis, sed ex parte actus potest habere perfectionem +naturae. Et secundum hoc potest esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is + not caused by another sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36813] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non omnis causa peccati est peccatum. Unde non +oportet quod procedatur in infinitum; sed potest perveniri ad +aliquod primum peccatum, cuius causa non est aliud peccatum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q76" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q76-p0.1">Q. 76. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q76-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) + sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above + <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q76-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of + sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; + thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will. + </p><p id="FS_Q76-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q76-p4"><a href="#FS_Q76_A1"> (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p5"><a href="#FS_Q76_A2"> (2) Whether ignorance is a sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p6"><a href="#FS_Q76_A3"> (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p7"><a href="#FS_Q76_A4"> (4) Whether it diminishes sin?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 pr."><a name="36814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36814] +Iª-IIae q. 76 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +causis peccati in speciali. Et primo, de causis interioribus +peccati; secundo, de exterioribus; tertio, de peccatis quae sunt +causa aliorum peccatorum. Prima autem consideratio, secundum +praemissa, erit tripartita, nam primo, agetur de ignorantia, quae +est causa peccati ex parte rationis; secundo, de infirmitate seu +passione, quae est causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi; +tertio, de malitia, quae est causa peccati ex parte voluntatis. +Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ignorantia sit causa +peccati. Secundo, utrum ignorantia sit peccatum. Tertio, utrum +totaliter a peccato excuset. Quarto, utrum diminuat peccatum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q76_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A1-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 1. Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is + a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36815] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non possit esse causa +peccati. Quia quod non est, nullius est causa. Sed ignorantia est +non ens, cum sit privatio quaedam scientiae. Ergo ignorantia non +est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36816] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +causae peccati sunt accipiendae ex parte conversionis, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed ignorantia videtur respicere aversionem. +Ergo non debet poni causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the + good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36817] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omne peccatum in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Sed +voluntas non fertur nisi in aliquod cognitum, quia bonum +apprehensum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo ignorantia non potest +esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36818] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, quod +quidam per ignorantiam peccant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that + moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that + removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a + sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act + of sin, in so far as it directs human acts. + </p><p id="FS_Q76_A1-p7"> Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: + because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or + of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular + proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of + a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's + father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle + which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not + every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful + act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he + recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with + the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1). + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 co."><a name="36819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36819] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VIII Physic., causa movens +est duplex, una per se, et alia per accidens. Per se quidem, quae +propria virtute movet, sicut generans est causa movens gravia et +levia. Per accidens autem, sicut removens prohibens, vel sicut ipsa +remotio prohibentis. Et hoc modo ignorantia potest esse causa actus +peccati, est enim privatio scientiae perficientis rationem, quae +prohibet actum peccati, inquantum dirigit actus humanos. +Considerandum est autem quod ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est +humanorum actuum directiva, scilicet secundum scientiam +universalem, et particularem. Conferens enim de agendis, utitur +quodam syllogismo, cuius conclusio est iudicium seu electio vel +operatio. Actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Unde conclusio +syllogismi operativi est singularis. Singularis autem propositio +non concluditur ex universali nisi mediante aliqua propositione +singulari, sicut homo prohibetur ab actu parricidii per hoc quod +scit patrem non esse occidendum, et per hoc quod scit hunc esse +patrem. Utriusque ergo ignorantia potest causare parricidii actum, +scilicet et universalis principii, quod est quaedam regula +rationis; et singularis circumstantiae. Unde patet quod non +quaelibet ignorantia peccantis est causa peccati, sed illa tantum +quae tollit scientiam prohibentem actum peccati. Unde si voluntas +alicuius esset sic disposita quod non prohiberetur ab actu +parricidii, etiam si patrem agnosceret; ignorantia patris non est +huic causa peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum. Et ideo +talis non peccat propter ignorantiam, sed peccat ignorans, secundum +philosophum, in III Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36820] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non ens non potest esse alicuius causa per se, +potest tamen esse causa per accidens, sicut remotio +prohibentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect + of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36821] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod sicut scientia quam tollit ignorantia, respicit +peccatum ex parte conversionis; ita etiam ignorantia ex parte +conversionis est causa peccati ut removens prohibens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, + the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing + is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36822] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in illud quod est quantum ad omnia ignotum, non +potest ferri voluntas, sed si aliquid est secundum aliquid notum et +secundum aliquid ignotum, potest voluntas illud velle. Et hoc modo +ignorantia est causa peccati, sicut cum aliquis scit hunc quem +occidit, esse hominem, sed nescit eum esse patrem; vel cum aliquis +scit aliquem actum esse delectabilem, nescit tamen eum esse +peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A2-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 2. Whether ignorance is a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[5]</a>). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36823] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non sit peccatum. Peccatum +enim est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei, ut +supra habitum est. Sed ignorantia non importat aliquem actum, neque +interiorem neque exteriorem. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting + from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36824] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum directius opponitur gratiae quam scientiae. Sed privatio +gratiae non est peccatum, sed magis poena quaedam consequens +peccatum. Ergo ignorantia, quae est privatio scientiae, non est +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, + it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will + not be a sin, but rather a result of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36825] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si ignorantia est peccatum, hoc non est nisi inquantum est +voluntaria. Sed si ignorantia sit peccatum inquantum est +voluntaria, videtur peccatum in ipso actu voluntatis consistere +magis quam in ignorantia. Ergo ignorantia non erit peccatum, sed +magis aliquid consequens ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain + in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore + ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36826] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +omne peccatum per poenitentiam tollitur; nec aliquod peccatum +transiens reatu remanet actu, nisi solum originale. Ignorantia +autem non tollitur per poenitentiam, sed adhuc remanet actu, omni +reatu per poenitentiam remoto. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum, +nisi forte sit originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual + in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance + would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="36827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36827] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +si ipsa ignorantia sit peccatum, quandiu ignorantia remaneret in +homine, tandiu actu peccaret. Sed continue manet ignorantia in +ignorante. Ergo ignorans continue peccaret. Quod patet esse falsum, +quia sic ignorantia esset gravissimum. Non ergo ignorantia est +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36828] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +nihil meretur poenam nisi peccatum. Sed ignorantia meretur poenam, +secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, <i>si quis ignorat, ignorabitur</i>. +Ergo ignorantia est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge + about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). + On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural + aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without + the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles + of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. + Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as + the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects + to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one + is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently + ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, + not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no + invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; + but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 co."><a name="36829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36829] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ignorantia in hoc a nescientia differt, quod +nescientia dicit simplicem scientiae negationem, unde cuicumque +deest aliquarum rerum scientia, potest dici nescire illas; secundum +quem modum Dionysius in Angelis nescientiam ponit, VII cap. Cael. +Hier. Ignorantia vero importat scientiae privationem, dum scilicet +alicui deest scientia eorum quae aptus natus est scire. Horum autem +quaedam aliquis scire tenetur, illa scilicet sine quorum scientia +non potest debitum actum recte exercere. Unde omnes tenentur scire +communiter ea quae sunt fidei, et universalia iuris praecepta, +singuli autem ea quae ad eorum statum vel officium spectant. +Quaedam vero sunt quae etsi aliquis natus est scire, non tamen ea +scire tenetur, sicut theoremata geometriae, et contingentia +particularia, nisi in casu. Manifestum est autem quod quicumque +negligit habere vel facere id quod tenetur habere vel facere, +peccat peccato omissionis. Unde propter negligentiam, ignorantia +eorum quae aliquis scire tenetur, est peccatum. Non autem imputatur +homini ad negligentiam, si nesciat ea quae scire non potest. Unde +horum ignorantia invincibilis dicitur, quia scilicet studio +superari non potest. Et propter hoc talis ignorantia, cum non sit +voluntaria, eo quod non est in potestate nostra eam repellere, non +est peccatum. Ex quo patet quod nulla ignorantia invincibilis est +peccatum, ignorantia autem vincibilis est peccatum, si sit eorum +quae aliquis scire tenetur; non autem si sit eorum quae quis scire +non tenetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q76_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions + have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; + in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the + knowledge which we ought to + have. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36830] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in hoc quod dicitur +dictum vel factum vel concupitum, sunt intelligendae etiam +negationes oppositae, secundum quod omissio habet rationem peccati. +Et ita negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia est peccatum, +continetur sub praedicta definitione peccati, inquantum +praetermittitur aliquid quod debuit dici vel fieri vel concupisci, +ad scientiam debitam acquirendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have + the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by + his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36831] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod privatio gratiae, etsi secundum se non sit peccatum, +tamen ratione negligentiae praeparandi se ad gratiam, potest habere +rationem peccati, sicut et ignorantia. Et tamen quantum ad hoc est +dissimile, quia homo potest aliquam scientiam acquirere per suos +actus, gratia vero non acquiritur ex nostris actibus, sed ex Dei +munere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is + commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as + it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36832] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in peccato transgressionis peccatum non +consistit in solo actu voluntatis, sed etiam in actu volito qui est +imperatus a voluntate; ita in peccato omissionis non solum actus +voluntatis est peccatum, sed etiam ipsa omissio, inquantum est +aliqualiter voluntaria. Et hoc modo ipsa negligentia sciendi, vel +inconsideratio, est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, + nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36833] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod licet, transeunte reatu per poenitentiam, remaneat +ignorantia secundum quod est privatio scientiae; non tamen remanet +negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia peccatum dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is + it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring + the knowledge that he ought to have. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="36834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36834] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut in aliis peccatis omissionis solo illo tempore +homo actu peccat, pro quo praeceptum affirmativum obligat; ita est +etiam de peccato ignorantiae. Non enim continuo ignorans actu +peccat, sed solum quando est tempus acquirendi scientiam quam +habere tenetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A3-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 3. Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. + Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36835] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia, ex toto excuset a peccato. +Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, omne peccatum voluntarium est. Sed +ignorantia causat involuntarium ut supra habitum est. Ergo +ignorantia totaliter excusat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. + Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. + Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36836] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod aliquis facit praeter intentionem, per accidens agit. Sed +intentio non potest esse de eo quod est ignotum. Ergo id quod per +ignorantiam homo agit, per accidens se habet in actibus humanis. +Sed quod est per accidens, non dat speciem. Nihil ergo quod est per +ignorantiam factum, debet iudicari peccatum vel virtuosum in +humanis actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which + perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36837] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +homo est subiectum virtutis et peccati inquantum est particeps +rationis. Sed ignorantia excludit scientiam, per quam ratio +perficitur. Ergo ignorantia totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone + are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether + excuse from sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36838] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>quaedam +per ignorantiam facta, recte improbantur</i>. Sed solum illa recte +improbantur quae sunt peccata. Ergo quaedam per ignorantiam facta, +sunt peccata. Non ergo ignorantia omnino excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q76_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge + were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which + is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of + the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated + in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make + the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or + accompanies the sinful act. + </p><p id="FS_Q76_A3-p7"> On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses + from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. + First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known + to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which + circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge + is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man + (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting + another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and + that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though + this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. + Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, + as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when + a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For + such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able + to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely + involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance + excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 co."><a name="36839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36839] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ignorantia de se habet quod faciat actum quem causat, +involuntarium esse. Iam autem dictum est quod ignorantia dicitur +causare actum quem scientia opposita prohibebat. Et ita talis +actus, si scientia adesset, esset contrarius voluntati, quod +importat nomen involuntarii. Si vero scientia quae per ignorantiam +privatur, non prohiberet actum, propter inclinationem voluntatis in +ipsum; ignorantia huius scientiae non facit hominem involuntarium, +sed non volentem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et talis ignorantia, +quae non est causa actus peccati, ut dictum est, quia non causat +involuntarium, non excusat a peccato. Et eadem ratio est de +quacumque ignorantia non causante, sed consequente vel concomitante +actum peccati. Sed ignorantia quae est causa actus, quia causat +involuntarium, de se habet quod excuset a peccato, eo quod +voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Sed quod aliquando non +totaliter excuset a peccato, potest contingere ex duobus. Uno modo, +ex parte ipsius rei ignoratae. Intantum enim ignorantia excusat a +peccato, inquantum ignoratur aliquid esse peccatum. Potest autem +contingere quod aliquis ignoret quidem aliquam circumstantiam +peccati, quam si sciret, retraheretur a peccando, sive illa +circumstantia faciat ad rationem peccati sive non; et tamen adhuc +remanet in eius scientia aliquid per quod cognoscit illud esse +actum peccati. Puta si aliquis percutiens aliquem, sciat quidem +ipsum esse hominem, quod sufficit ad rationem peccati; non tamen +scit eum esse patrem, quod est circumstantia constituens novam +speciem peccati; vel forte nescit quod ille se defendens +repercutiat eum, quod si sciret, non percuteret, quod non pertinet +ad rationem peccati. Unde licet talis propter ignorantiam peccet, +non tamen totaliter excusatur a peccato, quia adhuc remanet ei +cognitio peccati. Alio modo potest hoc contingere ex parte ipsius +ignorantiae, quia scilicet ipsa ignorantia est voluntaria, vel +directe, sicut cum aliquis studiose vult nescire aliqua, ut +liberius peccet; vel indirecte, sicut cum aliquis propter laborem, +vel propter alias occupationes, negligit addiscere id per quod a +peccato retraheretur. Talis enim negligentia facit ignorantiam +ipsam esse voluntariam et peccatum, dummodo sit eorum quae quis +scire tenetur et potest. Et ideo talis ignorantia non totaliter +excusat a peccato. Si vero sit talis ignorantia quae omnino sit +involuntaria, sive quia est invincibilis, sive quia est eius quod +quis scire non tenetur; talis ignorantia omnino excusat a +peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q76_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36840] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non omnis ignorantia causat involuntarium, sicut +supra dictum est. Unde non omnis ignorantia totaliter excusat a +peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his + sin is not accidental. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36841] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod inquantum remanet in ignorante de voluntario, +intantum remanet de intentione peccati. Et secundum hoc, non erit +per accidens peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen + and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36842] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, si esset talis ignorantia quae totaliter usum +rationis excluderet, omnino a peccato excusaret, sicut patet in +furiosis et amentibus. Non autem semper ignorantia causans peccatum +est talis. Et ideo non semper totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A4-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 4. Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance + is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does + not diminish sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36843] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non diminuat peccatum. +Illud enim quod est commune in omni peccato, non diminuit peccatum. +Sed ignorantia est communis in omni peccato, dicit enim +philosophus, in III Ethic., quod omnis malus est ignorans. Ergo +ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q76_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it does not diminish a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36844] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum additum peccato facit maius peccatum. Sed ipsa ignorantia +est peccatum, ut dictum est. Ergo non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.4" target="asv"> Rom. 2:4, </a> "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not." + Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36845] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +non est eiusdem aggravare et diminuere peccatum. Sed ignorantia +aggravat peccatum, quoniam super illud apostoli, <i>ignoras quoniam +benignitas Dei,</i> etc., dicit Ambrosius, <i>gravissime peccas, si +ignoras</i>. Ergo ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which + removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36846] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +si aliqua ignorantia diminuit peccatum, hoc maxime videtur de illa +quae totaliter tollit usum rationis. Sed huiusmodi ignorantia non +minuit peccatum, sed magis auget, dicit enim philosophus, in III +Ethic., quod <i>ebrius meretur duplices maledictiones</i>. Ergo +ignorantia non minuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36847] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +quidquid est ratio remissionis peccati, alleviat peccatum. Sed +ignorantia est huiusmodi, ut patet I ad Tim. I, <i>misericordiam +consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci</i>. Ergo ignorantia diminuit, +vel alleviat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not + render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether + (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance + which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, + neither diminishes nor increases the sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q76_A4-p8"> Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does + not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, + as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more + voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the + hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being + committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, + the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk + and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not + known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case + there is less contempt, and therefore less sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 co."><a name="36848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36848] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium, intantum +ignorantia potest diminuere peccatum, inquantum diminuit +voluntarium, si autem voluntarium non diminuat, nullo modo diminuet +peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod ignorantia quae totaliter a +peccato excusat, quia totaliter voluntarium tollit, peccatum non +minuit, sed omnino aufert. Ignorantia vero quae non est causa +peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum, nec minuit +peccatum nec auget. Illa igitur sola ignorantia potest peccatum +minuere, quae est causa peccati, et tamen totaliter a peccato non +excusat. Contingit autem quandoque quod talis ignorantia directe et +per se est voluntaria, sicut cum aliquis sua sponte nescit aliquid, +ut liberius peccet. Et talis ignorantia videtur augere voluntarium +et peccatum, ex intensione enim voluntatis ad peccandum provenit +quod aliquis vult subire ignorantiae damnum, propter libertatem +peccandi. Quandoque vero ignorantia quae est causa peccati, non est +directe voluntaria, sed indirecte vel per accidens, puta cum +aliquis non vult laborare in studio, ex quo sequitur eum esse +ignorantem; vel cum aliquis vult bibere vinum immoderate, ex quo +sequitur eum inebriari et discretione carere. Et talis ignorantia +diminuit voluntarium, et per consequens peccatum. Cum enim aliquid +non cognoscitur esse peccatum, non potest dici quod voluntas +directe et per se feratur in peccatum, sed per accidens, unde est +ibi minor contemptus, et per consequens minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from + that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36849] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia secundum quam omnis malus est +ignorans, non est causa peccati; sed aliquid consequens ad causam, +scilicet ad passionem vel habitum inclinantem in peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do + not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same + gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed + by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because + drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36850] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum peccato additum facit plura peccata, non +tamen facit semper maius peccatum, quia forte non coincidunt in +idem peccatum, sed sunt plura. Et potest contingere, si primum +diminuat secundum, quod ambo simul non habeant tantam gravitatem +quantam unum solum haberet. Sicut homicidium gravius peccatum est a +sobrio homine factum, quam si fiat ab ebrio, quamvis haec sint duo +peccata, quia ebrietas plus diminuit de ratione sequentis peccati, +quam sit sua gravitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species + of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they + may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36851] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod verbum Ambrosii potest intelligi de ignorantia +simpliciter affectata. Vel potest intelligi in genere peccati +ingratitudinis, in qua summus gradus est quod homo etiam beneficia +non recognoscat. Vel potest intelligi de ignorantia infidelitatis, +quae fundamentum spiritualis aedificii subvertit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results + from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, + and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words + quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered + drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might + claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36852] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ebrius meretur quidem duplices maledictiones, propter +duo peccata quae committit, scilicet ebrietatem et aliud peccatum +quod ex ebrietate sequitur. Tamen ebrietas, ratione ignorantiae +adiunctae, diminuit sequens peccatum, et forte plus quam sit +gravitas ipsius ebrietatis, ut dictum est. Vel potest dici quod +illud verbum inducitur secundum ordinationem cuiusdam Pittaci +legislatoris, qui statuit <i>ebrios, si percusserint, amplius +puniendos; non ad veniam respiciens, quam ebrii debent magis +habere; sed ad utilitatem, quia plures iniuriantur ebrii quam +sobrii</i>; ut patet per philosophum, in II politicorum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q77" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q77-p0.1">Q. 77. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q77-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be + a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q77-p3"><a href="#FS_Q77_A1"> (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p4"><a href="#FS_Q77_A2"> (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p5"><a href="#FS_Q77_A3"> (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p6"><a href="#FS_Q77_A4"> (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p7"><a href="#FS_Q77_A5"> (5) Of three causes mentioned in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life." + </a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p8"><a href="#FS_Q77_A6"> (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p9"><a href="#FS_Q77_A7"> (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p10"><a href="#FS_Q77_A8"> (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 pr."><a name="36853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36853] +Iª-IIae q. 77 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi, utrum passio animae sit causa +peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum passio +appetitus sensitivi possit movere vel inclinare voluntatem. +Secundo, utrum possit superare rationem contra eius scientiam. +Tertio, utrum peccatum quod ex passione provenit, sit peccatum ex +infirmitate. Quarto, utrum haec passio quae est amor sui, sit causa +omnis peccati. Quinto, de illis tribus causis quae ponuntur I Ioan. +II, <i>concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, et superbia +vitae</i>. Sexto, utrum passio quae est causa peccati, diminuat +ipsum. Septimo, utrum totaliter excuset. Octavo, utrum peccatum +quod ex passione est, possit esse mortale.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q77_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A1-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 1. Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by + its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of + the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive + appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive + appetite does not move the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36854] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur a passione +appetitus sensitivi. Nulla enim potentia passiva movetur nisi a suo +obiecto. Voluntas autem est potentia passiva et activa simul, +inquantum est movens et mota, sicut in III de anima philosophus +dicit universaliter de vi appetitiva. Cum ergo obiectum voluntatis +non sit passio appetitus sensitivi, sed magis bonum rationis; +videtur quod passio appetitus sensitivi non moveat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational + appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. + 57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." + Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36855] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +superior motor non movetur ab inferiori, sicut anima non movetur a +corpore. Sed voluntas, quae est appetitus rationis, comparatur ad +appetitum sensitivum sicut motor superior ad inferiorem, dicit enim +philosophus, in III de anima, quod <i>appetitus rationis movet +appetitum sensitivum, sicut in corporibus caelestibus sphaera movet +sphaeram</i>. Ergo voluntas non potest moveri a passione appetitus +sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does + not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite + is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move + the intellective appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36856] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum immateriale potest moveri ab aliquo materiali. Sed voluntas +est quaedam potentia immaterialis, non enim utitur organo +corporali, cum sit in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. +Appetitus autem sensitivus est vis materialis, utpote fundata in +organo corporali. Ergo passio appetitus sensitivi non potest movere +appetitum intellectivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv">Dan. 13:56</a>): "Lust hath perverted thy heart." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36857] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Dan. XIII, <i>concupiscentia subvertit cor +tuum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. + First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows + of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its + act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the + contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of + the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. + In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, + the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A1-p7"> Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and + apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of + the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination + and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of + the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do + not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason + often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a + natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 co."><a name="36858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36858] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere +aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno +quidem modo, secundum quandam abstractionem. Cum enim omnes +potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est +quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu +remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediatur. Tum quia omnis virtus +ad plura dispersa fit minor, unde e contrario, quando intenditur +circa unum, minus potest ad alia dispergi. Tum quia in operibus +animae requiritur quaedam intentio, quae dum vehementer applicatur +ad unum, non potest alteri vehementer attendere. Et secundum hunc +modum, per quandam distractionem, quando motus appetitus sensitivi +fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod +remittatur, vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitus +rationalis, qui est voluntas. Alio modo, ex parte obiecti +voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim +iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam +apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut +patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus +sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium +aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium +gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, +non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. +Unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem +appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus +est sequi iudicium rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in + the judgment about the object of the will, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36859] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod per passionem appetitus sensitivi fit aliqua +immutatio circa iudicium de obiecto voluntatis, sicut dictum est; +quamvis ipsa passio appetitus sensitivi non sit directe voluntatis +obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36860] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod superius non movetur ab inferiori directe, sed +indirecte quodammodo moveri potest, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36861] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A2-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 2. Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by + the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a + passion, which is weak and soon passes away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36862] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio non possit superari a passione +contra suam scientiam. Fortius enim non vincitur a debiliori. Sed +scientia, propter suam certitudinem, est fortissimum eorum quae in +nobis sunt. Ergo non potest superari a passione, quae est debilis +et cito transiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which + is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, + but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of + the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36863] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +voluntas non est nisi boni vel apparentis boni. Sed cum passio +trahit voluntatem in id quod est vere bonum, non inclinat rationem +contra scientiam. Cum autem trahit eam in id quod est apparens +bonum et non existens, trahit eam in id quod rationi videtur, hoc +autem est in scientia rationis, quod ei videtur. Ergo passio +nunquam inclinat rationem contra suam scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about + a particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, + e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated + in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were + to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36864] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur +quod trahit rationem scientem aliquid in universali, ut contrarium +iudicet in particulari, contra, universalis et particularis +propositio, si opponantur, opponuntur secundum contradictionem, +sicut omnis homo et non omnis homo. Sed duae opiniones quae sunt +contradictoriarum, sunt contrariae, ut dicitur in II peri Herm. Si +igitur aliquis sciens aliquid in universali, iudicaret oppositum in +singulari, sequeretur quod haberet simul contrarias opiniones, quod +est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who + knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear + from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition + to contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of + fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36865] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque scit universale, scit etiam particulare quod novit sub +universali contineri; sicut quicumque scit omnem mulam esse +sterilem, scit hoc animal esse sterile, dummodo sciat quod sit +mula; ut patet per id quod dicitur in I Poster. Sed ille qui scit +aliquid in universali, puta nullam fornicationem esse faciendam, +scit hoc particulare sub universali contineri, puta hunc actum esse +fornicarium. Ergo videtur quod etiam in particulari sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that + man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he + has knowledge, even in particular. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p7"> Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for + it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="36866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36866] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +ea quae sunt in voce, sunt signa intellectus animae, secundum +philosophum. Sed homo in passione existens frequenter confitetur id +quod eligit esse malum etiam in particulari. Ergo etiam in +particulari habet scientiam. Sic igitur videtur quod passiones non +possint trahere rationem contra scientiam universalem, quia non +potest esse quod habeat scientiam universalem, et existimet +oppositum in particulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law + that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, + it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36867] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris +meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege +peccati</i>. Lex autem quae est in membris, est concupiscentia, de +qua supra locutus fuerat. Cum igitur concupiscentia sit passio +quaedam, videtur quod passio trahat rationem etiam contra hoc quod +scit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore + he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, + since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear + good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, + unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p10"> Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, + according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv"> James 4:17</a>: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and + it is necessary, with the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, + viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as + stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, + and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will + not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known + habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general + but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for + a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what + he + knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the + consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually + what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; + and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far + as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained + above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, + by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; + even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, + fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions + are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or + anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 co."><a name="36868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36868] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod opinio Socratis fuit, ut philosophus dicit in VII +Ethic., quod scientia nunquam posset superari a passione. Unde +ponebat omnes virtutes esse scientias, et omnia peccata esse +ignorantias. In quo quidem aliqualiter recte sapiebat. Quia cum +voluntas sit boni vel apparentis boni, nunquam voluntas in malum +moveretur, nisi id quod non est bonum, aliqualiter rationi bonum +appareret, et propter hoc voluntas nunquam in malum tenderet, nisi +cum aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis. Unde dicitur Prov. XIV, +<i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Sed quia experimento patet quod +multi agunt contra ea quorum scientiam habent; et hoc etiam +auctoritate divina confirmatur, secundum illud Luc. XII, <i>servus +qui cognovit voluntatem domini sui et non fecit, plagis vapulabit +multis</i>; et Iac. IV dicitur, scienti bonum facere et non +facienti, peccatum est illi, non simpliciter verum dixit, sed +oportet distinguere, ut philosophus tradit in VII Ethic. Cum enim +ad recte agendum homo dirigatur duplici scientia, scilicet +universali et particulari; utriusque defectus sufficit ad hoc quod +impediatur rectitudo operis et voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. +Contingit igitur quod aliquis habeat scientiam in universali, puta +nullam fornicationem esse faciendam; sed tamen non cognoscat in +particulari hunc actum qui est fornicatio, non esse faciendum. Et +hoc sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas non sequatur universalem +scientiam rationis. Iterum considerandum est quod nihil prohibet +aliquid sciri in habitu, quod tamen actu non consideratur. Potest +igitur contingere quod aliquis etiam rectam scientiam habeat in +singulari, et non solum in universali, sed tamen in actu non +consideret. Et tunc non videtur difficile quod praeter id quod actu +non considerat, homo agat. Quod autem homo non consideret in +particulari id quod habitualiter scit, quandoque quidem contingit +ex solo defectu intentionis, puta cum homo sciens geometriam, non +intendit ad considerandum geometriae conclusiones, quas statim in +promptu habet considerare. Quandoque autem homo non considerat id +quod habet in habitu propter aliquod impedimentum superveniens, +puta propter aliquam occupationem exteriorem, vel propter aliquam +infirmitatem corporalem. Et hoc modo ille qui est in passione +constitutus, non considerat in particulari id quod scit in +universali, inquantum passio impedit talem considerationem. Impedit +autem tripliciter. Primo, per quandam distractionem, sicut supra +expositum est. Secundo, per contrarietatem, quia plerumque passio +inclinat ad contrarium huius quod scientia universalis habet. +Tertio, per quandam immutationem corporalem, ex qua ratio +quodammodo ligatur, ne libere in actum exeat, sicut etiam somnus +vel ebrietas, quadam corporali transmutatione facta, ligant usum +rationis. Et quod hoc contingat in passionibus, patet ex hoc quod +aliquando, cum passiones multum intenduntur, homo amittit totaliter +usum rationis, multi enim propter abundantiam amoris et irae, sunt +in insaniam conversi. Et per hunc modum passio trahit rationem ad +iudicandum in particulari contra scientiam quam habet in +universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, + since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal + knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36869] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod scientia universalis, quae est certissima, non +habet principalitatem in operatione, sed magis scientia +particularis, eo quod operationes sunt circa singularia. Unde non +est mirum si in operabilibus passio agit contra scientiam +universalem, absente consideratione in particulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this + particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36870] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod rationi videatur in particulari +aliquid bonum quod non est bonum, contingit ex aliqua passione. Et +tamen hoc particulare iudicium est contra universalem scientiam +rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at + the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has + true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: + because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36871] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod non posset contingere quod aliquis haberet simul in +actu scientiam aut opinionem veram de universali affirmativo, et +opinionem falsam de particulari negativo, aut e converso. Sed bene +potest contingere quod aliquis habeat veram scientiam habitualiter +de universali affirmativo, et falsam opinionem in actu de +particulari negativo, actus enim directe non contrariatur habitui, +sed actui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to + draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws + his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, + two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. + No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and + hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and + concludes under the second. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36872] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod ille qui habet scientiam in universali, propter +passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad +conclusionem pervenire, sed assumit sub alia universali, quam +suggerit inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde +philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod syllogismus incontinentis +habet quatuor propositiones, duas universales, quarum una est +rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committendam; alia est +passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat +rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima, unde, ea durante, +assumit et concludit sub secunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, + his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do + so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="36873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36873] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod, sicut ebrius quandoque proferre potest verba +significantia profundas sententias, quas tamen mente diiudicare non +potest, ebrietate prohibente; ita in passione existens, etsi ore +proferat hoc non esse faciendum, tamen interius hoc animo sentit +quod sit faciendum, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A3-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 3. Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement + of the sensitive appetite, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should + not be called a sin of weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36874] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non +debeat dici ex infirmitate. Passio enim est quidam vehemens motus +appetitus sensitivi, ut dictum est. Vehementia autem motus magis +attestatur fortitudini quam infirmitati. Ergo peccatum quod est ex +passione, non debet dici ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.77.39" target="asv">Ps. 77:39</a>): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather + than those which are due to a passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36875] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +infirmitas hominis maxime attenditur secundum illud quod est in eo +fragilius. Hoc autem est caro, unde dicitur in Psalmo LXXVII, +<i>recordatus est quia caro sunt</i>. Ergo magis debet dici +peccatum ex infirmitate quod est ex aliquo corporis defectu, quam +quod est ex animae passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, + whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it." + Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36876] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ad ea non videtur homo esse infirmus, quae eius voluntati +subduntur. Sed facere vel non facere ea ad quae passio inclinat, +hominis voluntati subditur, secundum illud Gen. IV, <i>sub te erit +appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius</i>. Ergo peccatum quod +est ex passione, non est ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore + a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36877] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Tullius, in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., passiones animae +aegritudines vocat. Aegritudines autem alio nomine infirmitates +dicuntur. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, debet dici ex +infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way + of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution + of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to + be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when + it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De + Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account + of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order + of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for + the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by + any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due + action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an + epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 co."><a name="36878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36878] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod causa peccati propria est ex parte animae in qua +principaliter est peccatum. Potest autem dici infirmitas in anima +ad similitudinem infirmitatis corporis. Dicitur autem corpus +hominis esse infirmum, quando debilitatur vel impeditur in +executione propriae operationis, propter aliquam inordinationem +partium corporis, ita scilicet quod humores et membra hominis non +subduntur virtuti regitivae et motivae corporis. Unde et membrum +dicitur esse infirmum, quando non potest perficere operationem +membri sani, sicut oculus quando non potest clare videre, ut dicit +philosophus, in X de historiis animalium. Unde et infirmitas animae +dicitur quando impeditur anima in propria operatione, propter +inordinationem partium ipsius. Sicut autem partes corporis dicuntur +esse inordinatae, quando non sequuntur ordinem naturae; ita et +partes animae dicuntur inordinatae, quando non subduntur ordini +rationis, ratio enim est vis regitiva partium animae. Sic ergo +quando extra ordinem rationis vis concupiscibilis aut irascibilis +aliqua passione afficitur, et per hoc impedimentum praestatur modo +praedicto debitae actioni hominis, dicitur peccatum esse ex +infirmitate. Unde et philosophus, in I Ethic., comparat +incontinentem paralytico, cuius partes moventur in contrarium eius +quod ipse disponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger + the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36879] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut quanto fuerit motus fortior in corpore +praeter ordinem naturae, tanto est maior infirmitas; ita quanto +fuerit motus fortior passionis praeter ordinem rationis, tanto est +maior infirmitas animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may + have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul + is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the + passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36880] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, +qui non impeditur per corporis infirmitatem, potest enim qui est +corpore infirmus, promptam habere voluntatem ad aliquid faciendum. +Impeditur autem per passionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum +dicitur peccatum esse ex infirmitate, magis est referendum ad +infirmitatem animae quam ad infirmitatem corporis. Dicitur tamen +etiam ipsa infirmitas animae infirmitas carnis, inquantum ex +conditione carnis passiones animae insurgunt in nobis, eo quod +appetitus sensitivus est virtus utens organo corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our + appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36881] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in potestate quidem voluntatis est assentire vel non +assentire his in quae passio inclinat, et pro tanto dicitur noster +appetitus sub nobis esse. Sed tamen ipse assensus vel dissensus +voluntatis impeditur per passionem, modo praedicto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A4-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 4. Whether self-love is the source of every sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper + cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36882] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sui non sit principium omnis +peccati. Id enim quod est secundum se bonum et debitum, non est +propria causa peccati. Sed amor sui est secundum se bonum et +debitum, unde et praecipitur homini ut diligat proximum sicut +seipsum, Levit. XIX. Ergo amor sui non potest esse propria causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the + law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause + of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.3" shape="rect"> Q[23], A[4]</a>). + Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36883] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>occasione accepta, peccatum per +mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam</i>, ubi Glossa +dicit quod <i>bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, +omne malum prohibet</i>, quod dicitur propter hoc, quia +concupiscentia est causa omnis peccati. Sed concupiscentia est alia +passio ab amore, ut supra habitum est. Ergo amor sui non est causa +omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine in commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing + false humility." Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36884] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit +quod omne peccatum est <i>ex amore male inflammante, vel ex timore +male humiliante</i>. Non ergo solus amor sui est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. + Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36885] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo quandoque peccat propter inordinatum sui amorem, ita +etiam interdum peccat propter inordinatum amorem proximi. Ergo amor +sui non est causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every + sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36886] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>amor sui usque +ad contemptum Dei, facit civitatem Babylonis</i>. Sed per quodlibet +peccatum pertinet homo ad civitatem Babylonis. Ergo amor sui est +causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q77_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect + every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good + inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore + it is evident that inordinate love of + self is the cause of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 co."><a name="36887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36887] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, propria et per se causa +peccati accipienda est ex parte conversionis ad commutabile bonum; +ex qua quidem parte omnis actus peccati procedit ex aliquo +inordinato appetitu alicuius temporalis boni. Quod autem aliquis +appetat inordinate aliquod temporale bonum, procedit ex hoc quod +inordinate amat seipsum, hoc enim est amare aliquem, velle ei +bonum. Unde manifestum est quod inordinatus amor sui est causa +omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, + leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36888] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis, ita +scilicet quod velit sibi bonum quod congruit. Sed amor sui +inordinatus, qui perducit ad contemptum Dei, ponitur esse causa +peccati secundum Augustinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36889] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod concupiscentia, qua aliquis appetit sibi bonum, +reducitur ad amorem sui sicut ad causam, ut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed + to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance + of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But + each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man + either desires good things, or avoids evil things. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36890] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliquis dicitur amare et illud bonum quod optat sibi, +et se, cui bonum optat. Amor igitur secundum quod dicitur eius esse +quod optatur, puta quod aliquis dicitur amare vinum vel pecuniam, +recipit pro causa timorem, qui pertinet ad fugam mali. Omne enim +peccatum provenit vel ex inordinato appetitu alicuius boni, vel ex +inordinata fuga alicuius mali. Sed utrumque horum reducitur ad +amorem sui. Propter hoc enim homo vel appetit bona vel fugit mala, +quia amat seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed + through self-love. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36891] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod amicus est quasi alter ipse. Et ideo quod peccatur +propter amorem amici, videtur propter amorem sui peccari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A5-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 5. Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as + causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. + Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36892] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur causae +peccatorum esse concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, et +superbia vitae. Quia secundum apostolum, I ad Tim. ult., <i>radix +omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>. Sed superbia vitae sub cupiditate +non continetur. Ergo non oportet poni inter causas peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv"> Dan. 13:56</a>: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36893] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia carnis maxime ex visione oculorum excitatur, +secundum illud Dan. XIII, <i>species decepit te</i>. Ergo non debet +dividi concupiscentia oculorum contra concupiscentiam carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q30_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of + the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36894] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia est delectabilis appetitus, ut supra habitum est. +Delectationes autem contingunt non solum secundum visum, sed etiam +secundum alios sensus. Ergo deberet etiam poni concupiscentia +auditus, et aliorum sensuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance + of evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the + causes of sin are insufficiently described. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36895] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut homo inducitur ad peccandum ex inordinata concupiscentia +boni, ita etiam ex inordinata fuga mali, ut dictum est. Sed nihil +hic enumeratur pertinens ad fugam mali. Ergo insufficienter causae +peccatorum tanguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in + the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.19" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:19</a>): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36896] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Ioan. II, <i>omne quod est in mundo, aut est +concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia +vitae</i>. In mundo autem dicitur aliquid esse propter peccatum, +unde et ibidem, dicit quod <i>totus mundus in maligno positus +est</i>. Ergo praedicta tria sunt causae peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A4" id="FS_Q77_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good + for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, + the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as + it is the object of the concupiscible part; + secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]). + Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain + the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards + the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called + "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation + or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar + mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the + eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote + curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly + to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p8"> The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, + as we shall state further on (Q[84], A[2]; + <a href="SS_iii.html#SS_Q162_A1" id="FS_Q77_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[162], A[1]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p9"> It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of + the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided + into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 co."><a name="36897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36897] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, inordinatus amor sui est causa +omnis peccati. In amore autem sui includitur inordinatus appetitus +boni, unusquisque enim appetit bonum ei quem amat. Unde manifestum +est quod inordinatus appetitus boni est causa omnis peccati. Bonum +autem dupliciter est obiectum sensibilis appetitus, in quo sunt +animae passiones, quae sunt causa peccati, uno modo, absolute, +secundum quod est obiectum concupiscibilis; alio modo, sub ratione +ardui, prout est obiectum irascibilis, ut supra dictum est. Est +autem duplex concupiscentia, sicut supra habitum est. Una quidem +naturalis, quae est eorum quibus natura corporis sustentatur; sive +quantum ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus et alia +huiusmodi; sive quantum ad conservationem speciei, sicut in +venereis. Et horum inordinatus appetitus dicitur concupiscentia +carnis. Alia est concupiscentia animalis, eorum scilicet quae per +sensum carnis sustentationem aut delectationem non afferunt, sed +sunt delectabilia secundum apprehensionem imaginationis, aut +alicuius huiusmodi acceptionis, sicut sunt pecunia, ornatus +vestium, et alia huiusmodi. Et haec quidem animalis concupiscentia +vocatur concupiscentia oculorum, sive intelligatur concupiscentia +oculorum, idest ipsius visionis, quae fit per oculos, ut referatur +ad curiositatem, secundum quod Augustinus exponit, X Confess.; sive +referatur ad concupiscentiam rerum quae exterius oculis +proponuntur, ut referatur ad cupiditatem, secundum quod ab aliis +exponitur. Appetitus autem inordinatus boni ardui pertinet ad +superbiam vitae, nam superbia est appetitus inordinatus +excellentiae, ut inferius dicetur. Et sic patet quod ad ista tria +reduci possunt omnes passiones, quae sunt causa peccati. Nam ad duo +prima reducuntur omnes passiones concupiscibilis, ad tertium autem +omnes passiones irascibilis; quod ideo non dividitur in duo, quia +omnes passiones irascibilis conformantur concupiscentiae +animali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How + covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further + on ( + <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q77_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[1]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36898] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod secundum quod cupiditas importat universaliter +appetitum cuiuscumque boni, sic etiam superbia vitae continetur sub +cupiditate. Quomodo autem cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale +vitium, quod avaritia nominatur, sit radix omnium peccatorum, infra +dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for + such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36899] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod concupiscentia oculorum non dicitur hic +concupiscentia omnium rerum quae oculis videri possunt, sed solum +earum in quibus non quaeritur delectatio carnis, quae est secundum +tactum, sed solum delectatio oculi, idest cuiuscumque apprehensivae +virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its + name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. + xxxiii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36900] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod sensus visus est excellentior inter omnes sensus, et +ad plura se extendens, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Et ideo nomen eius +transfertur ad omnes alios sensus, et etiam ad omnes interiores +apprehensiones, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q39_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.2" shape="rect"> Q[39], A[2]</a>); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately + the avoidance of evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36901] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod fuga mali causatur ex appetitu boni, ut supra dictum +est. Et ideo ponuntur solum passiones inclinantes ad bonum, tanquam +causae earum quae faciunt inordinate fugam mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A6-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 6. Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing + causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated + <a href="#FS_Q77_A5" id="FS_Q77_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36902] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non allevietur propter +passionem. Augmentum enim causae auget effectum, si enim calidum +dissolvit, magis calidum magis dissolvit. Sed passio est causa +peccati, ut habitum est. Ergo quanto est intensior passio, tanto +est maius peccatum. Passio igitur non minuit peccatum, sed +auget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases + merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil + passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36903] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut se habet passio bona ad meritum, ita se habet mala passio ad +peccatum. Sed bona passio auget meritum, tanto enim aliquis magis +videtur mereri, quanto ex maiori misericordia pauperi subvenit. +Ergo etiam mala passio magis aggravat peccatum quam alleviat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels + the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36904] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto intensiori voluntate aliquis facit peccatum, tanto gravius +videtur peccare. Sed passio impellens voluntatem, facit eam +vehementius ferri in actum peccati. Ergo passio aggravat +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the + less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36905] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +passio ipsa concupiscentiae vocatur tentatio carnis. Sed quanto +aliquis maiori tentatione prosternitur, tanto minus peccat, ut +patet per Augustinum. Ergo passio diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement + of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, + according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the + higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a + passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p7"> Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so + far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and + therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more + is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its + voluntariness. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p8"> On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, + in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure + or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 co."><a name="36906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36906] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum essentialiter consistit in actu liberi +arbitrii, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Passio autem +est motus appetitus sensitivi. Appetitus autem sensitivus potest se +habere ad liberum arbitrium et antecedenter, et consequenter. +Antecedenter quidem, secundum quod passio appetitus sensitivi +trahit vel inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. +Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint +vehementes, redundant in inferiores, non enim potest voluntas +intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu +sensitivo. Si igitur accipiatur passio secundum quod praecedit +actum peccati, sic necesse est quod diminuat peccatum. Actus enim +intantum est peccatum, inquantum est voluntarium et in nobis +existens. In nobis autem aliquid esse dicitur per rationem et +voluntatem. Unde quanto ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid agunt, non +ex impulsu passionis, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens. +Et secundum hoc passio minuit peccatum, inquantum minuit +voluntarium. Passio autem consequens non diminuit peccatum, sed +magis auget, vel potius est signum magnitudinis eius, inquantum +scilicet demonstrat intensionem voluntatis ad actum peccati. Et sic +verum est quod quanto aliquis maiori libidine vel concupiscentia +peccat, tanto magis peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part + of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his + intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36907] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. +Gravitas autem peccati magis attenditur ex parte aversionis; quae +quidem ex conversione sequitur per accidens, idest praeter +intentionem peccantis. Causae autem per accidens augmentatae non +augmentant effectus, sed solum causae per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, + rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his + action. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36908] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona passio consequens iudicium rationis, augmentat +meritum. Si autem praecedat, ut scilicet homo magis ex passione +quam ex iudicio rationis moveatur ad bene agendum, talis passio +diminuit bonitatem et laudem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, + as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36909] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi motus voluntatis sit intensior ex passione +incitatus, non tamen ita est voluntatis proprius, sicut si sola +ratione moveretur ad peccandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A7-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 7. Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. + But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv"> Gal. 5:17</a>: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore passion excuses from + sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36910] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio totaliter excuset a peccato. +Quidquid enim causat involuntarium, excusat totaliter a peccato. +Sed concupiscentia carnis, quae est quaedam passio, causat +involuntarium, secundum illud Gal. V, <i>caro concupiscit adversus +spiritum, ut non quaecumque vultis, illa faciatis</i>. Ergo passio +totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q77_A2" id="FS_Q77_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion + excuses from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36911] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passio causat ignorantiam quandam in particulari, ut dictum est. +Sed ignorantia particularis totaliter excusat a peccato, sicut +supra habitum est. Ergo passio totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the + case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36912] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +infirmitas animae gravior est quam infirmitas corporis. Sed +infirmitas corporis totaliter excusat a peccato, ut patet in +phreneticis. Ergo multo magis passio, quae est infirmitas +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) speaks of the passions as "passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case + if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36913] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus, Rom. VII, vocat passiones peccatorum, non nisi +quia peccata causant. Quod non esset, si a peccato totaliter +excusarent. Ergo passiones non totaliter a peccato excusant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. + Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; + otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be + voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," + when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in + that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing + is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could + have prevented it, but did not. + </p><p id="FS_Q77_A7-p7"> Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason + altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the + beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. + If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause + fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely + excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason + can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members + are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A9" id="FS_Q77_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[9]</a>): wherefore such a + passion does not excuse from sin altogether. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 co."><a name="36914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36914] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum hoc solum actus aliquis qui de genere suo +est malus, totaliter a peccato excusatur, quod totaliter +involuntarius redditur. Unde si sit talis passio quae totaliter +involuntarium reddat actum sequentem, totaliter a peccato excusat, +alioquin, non totaliter. Circa quod duo consideranda videntur. +Primo quidem, quod aliquid potest esse voluntarium vel secundum se, +sicut quando voluntas directe in ipsum fertur, vel secundum suam +causam, quando voluntas fertur in causam et non in effectum, ut +patet in eo qui voluntarie inebriatur; ex hoc enim quasi +voluntarium ei imputatur quod per ebrietatem committit. Secundo +considerandum est quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium directe, vel +indirecte, directe quidem, id in quod voluntas fertur; indirecte +autem, illud quod voluntas potuit prohibere, sed non prohibet. +Secundum hoc igitur distinguendum est. Quia passio quandoque quidem +est tanta quod totaliter aufert usum rationis, sicut patet in his +qui propter amorem vel iram insaniunt. Et tunc si talis passio a +principio fuit voluntaria, imputatur actus ad peccatum, quia est +voluntarius in sua causa, sicut etiam de ebrietate dictum est. Si +vero causa non fuit voluntaria, sed naturalis, puta cum aliquis ex +aegritudine, vel aliqua huiusmodi causa, incidit in talem passionem +quae totaliter aufert usum rationis; actus omnino redditur +involuntarius, et per consequens totaliter a peccato excusatur. +Quandoque vero passio non est tanta quod totaliter intercipiat usum +rationis. Et tunc ratio potest passionem excludere, divertendo ad +alias cogitationes; vel impedire ne suum consequatur effectum, quia +membra non applicantur operi nisi per consensum rationis, ut supra +dictum est. Unde talis passio non totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement + of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv"> Rom. 7:19</a>: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case + with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on + account of their concupiscence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36915] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur, <i>ut non quaecumque vultis, +illa faciatis</i>, non est referendum ad ea quae fiunt per +exteriorem actum, sed ad interiorem concupiscentiae motum, vellet +enim homo nunquam concupiscere malum. Sicut etiam exponitur id quod +dicitur Rom. VII, quod <i>odi malum, illud facio</i>. Vel potest +referri ad voluntatem praecedentem passionem, ut patet in +continentibus qui contra suum propositum agunt propter suam +concupiscentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after + taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being + applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36916] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ignorantia particularis quae totaliter excusat, est +ignorantia circumstantiae quam quidem quis scire non potest, debita +diligentia adhibita. Sed passio causat ignorantiam iuris in +particulari, dum impedit applicationem communis scientiae ad +particularem actum. Quam quidem passionem ratio repellere potest, +ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, + which is a kind of bodily disease. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36917] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod infirmitas corporis est involuntaria. Esset autem +simile, si esset voluntaria, sicut de ebrietate dictum est, quae +est quaedam corporalis infirmitas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A8-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 8. Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now + sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through + passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36918] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non +possit esse mortale. Veniale enim peccatum dividitur contra +mortale. Sed peccatum quod est ex infirmitate, est veniale, cum +habeat in se causam veniae. Cum igitur peccatum quod est ex +passione, sit ex infirmitate, videtur quod non possit esse +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the + sensuality, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A4" id="FS_Q77_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[4]</a>). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36919] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +causa non est potior effectu. Sed passio non potest esse peccatum +mortale, non enim in sensualitate est peccatum mortale, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, non potest esse +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore + a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36920] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +passio abducit a ratione, ut ex dictis patet. Sed rationis est +converti ad Deum vel averti ab eo, in quo consistit ratio peccati +mortalis. Peccatum ergo quod est ex passione, non potest esse +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) that "the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is + proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36921] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, quod <i>passiones peccatorum +operantur in membris nostris ad fructificandum morti</i>. Hoc autem +est proprium mortalis peccati, quod fructificet morti. Ergo +peccatum quod est ex passione, potest esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q77_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function + it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, + only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone + proceeds from passion to a + sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue + here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it + does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed + through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 co."><a name="36922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36922] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est, consistit in +aversione ab ultimo fine, qui est Deus, quae quidem aversio +pertinet ad rationem deliberantem, cuius etiam est ordinare in +finem. Hoc igitur solo modo potest contingere quod inclinatio +animae in aliquid quod contrariatur ultimo fini, non sit peccatum +mortale quia ratio deliberans non potest occurrere, quod contingit +in subitis motibus. Cum autem ex passione aliquis procedit ad actum +peccati, vel ad consensum deliberatum, hoc non fit subito. Unde +ratio deliberans potest hic occurrere, potest enim excludere, vel +saltem impedire passionem, ut dictum est. Unde si non occurrat, est +peccatum mortale, sicut videmus quod multa homicidia et adulteria +per passionem committuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens + the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus + every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This + is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection + regards the first kind. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36923] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, ex causa, +quia scilicet habet aliquam causam veniae, quae diminuit peccatum, +et sic peccatum ex infirmitate et ignorantia dicitur veniale. Alio +modo, ex eventu, sicut omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit veniale, +idest veniam consecutum. Tertio modo dicitur veniale ex genere, +sicut verbum otiosum. Et hoc solum veniale opponitur mortali, +obiectio autem procedit de primo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows + accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36924] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. Quod +autem sit mortale, est ex parte aversionis, quae per accidens +sequitur ad conversionem, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non +sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, + so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer + either mortal or venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36925] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio non semper in suo actu totaliter a passione +impeditur, unde remanet ei liberum arbitrium, ut possit averti vel +converti ad Deum. Si autem totaliter tolleretur usus rationis, iam +non esset peccatum nec mortale nec veniale.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q78" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q78-p0.1">Q. 78. OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q78-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of + inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q78-p3"><a href="#FS_Q78_A1"> (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p4"><a href="#FS_Q78_A2"> (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p5"><a href="#FS_Q78_A3"> (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p6"><a href="#FS_Q78_A4"> (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 pr."><a name="36926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36926] +Iª-IIae q. 78 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati quae est ex parte voluntatis, quae dicitur malitia. Et +circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis possit ex certa +malitia, seu industria, peccare. Secundo, utrum quicumque peccat ex +habitu, peccet ex certa malitia. Tertio, utrum quicumque peccat ex +certa malitia, peccet ex habitu. Quarto, utrum ille qui peccat ex +certa malitia, gravius peccet quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q78_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A1-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 1. Whether anyone sins through certain malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. + Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36927] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus peccet ex industria, sive ex +certa malitia. Ignorantia enim opponitur industriae, seu certae +malitiae. Sed omnis malus est ignorans, secundum philosophum. Et +Prov. XIV, dicitur, <i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Ergo nullus +peccat ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the + intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act + is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36928] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>nullus intendens ad +malum operatur</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse peccare ex malitia, +intendere malum in peccando, quod enim est praeter intentionem, est +quasi per accidens, et non denominat actum. Ergo nullus ex malitia +peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, + which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36929] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +malitia ipsa peccatum est. Si igitur malitia sit causa peccati, +sequetur quod peccatum sit causa peccati in infinitum, quod est +inconveniens. Nullus igitur ex malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.27" target="asv">Job 34:27</a>): "[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His ways." Now to revolt + from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36930] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, <i>quasi de industria recesserunt a +Deo, et vias eius intelligere noluerunt</i>. Sed recedere a Deo est +peccare. Ergo aliqui peccant ex industria, seu ex certa +malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due + to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. + Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore + even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when + anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, + so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more + the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order + to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life + which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the + order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of + some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; + and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order + to + possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 co."><a name="36931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36931] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod homo, sicut et quaelibet alia res, naturaliter habet +appetitum boni. Unde quod ad malum eius appetitus declinet, +contingit ex aliqua corruptione seu inordinatione in aliquo +principiorum hominis, sic enim in actionibus rerum naturalium +peccatum invenitur. Principia autem humanorum actuum sunt +intellectus et appetitus, tam rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, +quam sensitivus. Peccatum igitur in humanis actibus contingit +quandoque, sicut ex defectu intellectus, puta cum aliquis per +ignorantiam peccat; et ex defectu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum +aliquis ex passione peccat; ita etiam ex defectu voluntatis, qui +est inordinatio ipsius. Est autem voluntas inordinata, quando minus +bonum magis amat. Consequens autem est ut aliquis eligat pati +detrimentum in bono minus amato, ad hoc quod potiatur bono magis +amato, sicut cum homo vult pati abscissionem membri etiam scienter, +ut conservet vitam, quam magis amat. Et per hunc modum, quando +aliqua inordinata voluntas aliquod bonum temporale plus amat, puta +divitias vel voluptatem, quam ordinem rationis vel legis divinae, +vel caritatem Dei, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sequitur quod velit +dispendium pati in aliquo spiritualium bonorum, ut potiatur aliquo +temporali bono. Nihil autem est aliud malum quam privatio alicuius +boni. Et secundum hoc aliquis scienter vult aliquod malum +spirituale, quod est malum simpliciter, per quod bonum spirituale +privatur, ut bono temporali potiatur. Unde dicitur ex certa +malitia, vel ex industria peccare, quasi scienter malum +eligens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance: + sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: + and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular + good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that + a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36932] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia quandoque quidem excludit scientiam +qua aliquis simpliciter scit hoc esse malum quod agitur, et tunc +dicitur ex ignorantia peccare. Quandoque autem excludit scientiam +qua homo scit hoc nunc esse malum, sicut cum ex passione peccatur. +Quandoque autem excludit scientiam qua aliquis scit hoc malum non +sustinendum esse propter consecutionem illius boni, scit tamen +simpliciter hoc esse malum, et sic dicitur ignorare qui ex certa +malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining + another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering + loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before + him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's + anger, to being deprived of the pleasure. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36933] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod malum non potest esse secundum se intentum ab aliquo, +potest tamen esse intentum ad vitandum aliud malum, vel ad +consequendum aliud bonum, ut dictum est. Et in tali casu aliquis +eligeret consequi bonum per se intentum, absque hoc quod pateretur +detrimentum alterius boni. Sicut aliquis lascivus vellet frui +delectatione absque offensa Dei, sed duobus propositis, magis vult +peccando incurrere offensam Dei, quam delectatione privetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. + v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to + sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we + mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so + far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent + fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for + the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we + can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q75_A4" id="FS_Q78_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>, ad 3). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36934] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod malitia ex qua aliquis dicitur peccare, potest +intelligi malitia habitualis, secundum quod habitus malus a +philosopho nominatur malitia, sicut habitus bonus nominatur virtus. +Et secundum hoc aliquis dicitur ex malitia peccare, quia peccat ex +inclinatione habitus. Potest etiam intelligi malitia actualis. Sive +ipsa mali electio malitia nominetur, et sic dicitur aliquis ex +malitia peccare, inquantum ex mali electione peccat. Sive etiam +malitia dicatur aliqua praecedens culpa, ex qua oritur subsequens +culpa, sicut cum aliquis impugnat fraternam gratiam ex invidia. Et +tunc idem non est causa sui ipsius, sed actus interior est causa +actus exterioris. Et unum peccatum est causa alterius, non tamen in +infinitum, quia est devenire ad aliquod primum peccatum, quod non +causatur ex aliquo priori peccato, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain + malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters + an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36935] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis qui peccat ex habitu, peccet +ex certa malitia. Peccatum enim quod est ex certa malitia, videtur +esse gravissimum. Sed quandoque homo aliquod leve peccatum +committit ex habitu, sicut cum dicit verbum otiosum. Non ergo omne +peccatum quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts + which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed + through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36936] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, actus ex habitu procedentes sunt similes actibus ex +quibus habitus generantur</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed actus +praecedentes habitum vitiosum non sunt ex certa malitia. Ergo etiam +peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv"> Prov. 2:14</a>: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what + we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful + after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious + habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36937] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in his quae aliquis ex certa malitia committit, gaudet postquam +commisit, secundum illud Prov. II, <i>qui laetantur cum male +fecerint et exultant in rebus pessimis</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia +unicuique est delectabile cum consequitur id quod intendit, et qui +operatur quod est ei quodammodo connaturale secundum habitum. Sed +illi qui peccant ex habitu, post peccatum commissum dolent, +poenitudine enim replentur pravi, idest habentes habitum vitiosum, +ut dicitur in IX Ethic. Ergo peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt +ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to + which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from + habit is committed through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36938] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +peccatum ex certa malitia dicitur esse quod est ex electione mali. +Sed unicuique est eligibile id ad quod inclinatur per proprium +habitum; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. de habitu virtuoso. Ergo peccatum +quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary + to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something + we use when we will," as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q78_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[1]</a>). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit + does not + corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are + generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through + the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain + malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something + lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the + very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being + that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is + to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 co."><a name="36939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36939] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod non est idem peccare habentem habitum, et peccare ex +habitu. Uti enim habitu non est necessarium, sed subiacet voluntati +habentis, unde et habitus definitur esse quo quis utitur cum +voluerit. Et ideo sicut potest contingere quod aliquis habens +habitum vitiosum, prorumpat in actum virtutis, eo quod ratio non +totaliter corrumpitur per malum habitum, sed aliquid eius integrum +manet, ex quo provenit quod peccator aliqua operatur de genere +bonorum; ita etiam potest contingere quod aliquis habens habitum, +interdum non ex habitu operetur, sed ex passione insurgente, vel +etiam ex ignorantia. Sed quandocumque utitur habitu vitioso, +necesse est quod ex certa malitia peccet. Quia unicuique habenti +habitum, est per se diligibile id quod est ei conveniens secundum +proprium habitum, quia fit ei quodammodo connaturale, secundum quod +consuetudo et habitus vertitur in naturam. Hoc autem quod est +alicui conveniens secundum habitum vitiosum, est id quod excludit +bonum spirituale. Ex quo sequitur quod homo eligat malum +spirituale, ut adipiscatur bonum quod est ei secundum habitum +conveniens. Et hoc est ex certa malitia peccare. Unde manifestum +est quod quicumque peccat ex habitu, peccet ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, + but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36940] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non excludunt bonum spirituale, +quod est gratia Dei vel caritas. Unde non dicuntur mala +simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et propter hoc nec habitus ipsorum +possunt dici simpliciter mali, sed solum secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them + as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36941] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actus qui procedunt ex habitibus, sunt similes +secundum speciem actibus ex quibus habitus generantur, differunt +tamen ab eis sicut perfectum ab imperfecto. Et talis est +differentia peccati quod committitur ex certa malitia, ad peccatum +quod committitur ex aliqua passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able + not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen + that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man + is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on + account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36942] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui peccat ex habitu, semper gaudet de hoc quod +ex habitu operatur, quandiu habitu utitur. Sed quia potest habitu +non uti, sed per rationem, quae non est totaliter corrupta, aliquid +aliud meditari; potest contingere quod, non utens habitu, doleat de +hoc quod per habitum commisit. Plerumque tamen tales poenitent de +peccato, non quia eis peccatum secundum se displiceat; sed propter +aliquod incommodum quod ex peccato incurrunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A3-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 3. Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an + unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through + certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q78_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36943] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod quicumque peccat ex certa malitia, +peccet ex habitu. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod non est +cuiuslibet iniusta facere qualiter iniustus facit, scilicet ex +electione, sed solum habentis habitum. Sed peccare ex certa malitia +est peccare ex electione mali, ut dictum est. Ergo peccare ex certa +malitia non est nisi habentis habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little." + But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain + malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36944] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Origenes dicit, in I peri archon, quod <i>non ad subitum quis +evacuatur aut deficit, sed paulatim per partes defluere necesse +est</i>. Sed maximus defluxus esse videtur ut aliquis ex certa +malitia peccet. Ergo non statim a principio, sed per multam +consuetudinem, ex qua habitus generari potest, aliquis ad hoc +devenit ut ex certa malitia peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But + by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something + supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through + weakness, as stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q78_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore whenever anyone + sins through certain malice, he sins through habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36945] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quandocumque aliquis ex certa malitia peccat, oportet quod ipsa +voluntas de se inclinetur ad malum quod eligit. Sed ex natura +potentiae non inclinatur homo ad malum, sed magis ad bonum. Ergo +oportet, si eligit malum, quod hoc sit ex aliquo supervenienti, +quod est passio vel habitus. Sed quando aliquis peccat ex passione, +non peccat ex certa malitia, sed ex infirmitate, ut dictum est. +Ergo quandocumque aliquis peccat ex certa malitia, oportet quod +peccet ex habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. + But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. + Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36946] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +sicut se habet habitus bonus ad electionem boni, ita habitus malus +ad electionem mali. Sed quandoque aliquis non habens habitum +virtutis, eligit id quod est bonum secundum virtutem. Ergo etiam +quandoque aliquis non habens habitum vitiosum, potest eligere +malum, quod est ex certa malitia peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational + good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, + to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the + reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the + impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain + malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may + happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, + some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will + tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt + disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who + is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, + may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not + through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, + or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 co."><a name="36947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36947] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod voluntas aliter se habet ad bonum, et aliter ad +malum. Ex natura enim suae potentiae inclinatur ad bonum rationis, +sicut ad proprium obiectum, unde et omne peccatum dicitur esse +contra naturam. Quod ergo in aliquod malum voluntas eligendo +inclinetur, oportet quod aliunde contingat. Et quandoque quidem +contingit ex defectu rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex ignorantia +peccat, quandoque autem ex impulsu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum +peccat ex passione. Sed neutrum horum est ex certa malitia peccare; +sed tunc solum ex certa malitia aliquis peccat, quando ipsa +voluntas ex seipsa movetur ad malum. Quod potest contingere +dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, per hoc quod homo habet aliquam +dispositionem corruptam inclinantem ad malum, ita quod secundum +illam dispositionem fit homini quasi conveniens et simile aliquod +malum, et in hoc, ratione convenientiae, tendit voluntas quasi in +bonum, quia unumquodque secundum se tendit in id quod sibi est +conveniens. Talis autem dispositio corrupta vel est aliquis habitus +acquisitus ex consuetudine, quae vertitur in naturam, vel est +aliqua aegritudinalis habitudo ex parte corporis, sicut aliquis +habens quasdam naturales inclinationes ad aliqua peccata, propter +corruptionem naturae in ipso. Alio modo contingit quod voluntas per +se tendit in aliquod malum, per remotionem alicuius prohibentis. +Puta si aliquis prohibeatur peccare non quia peccatum ei secundum +se displiceat, sed propter spem vitae aeternae vel propter timorem +Gehennae; remota spe per desperationem, vel timore per +praesumptionem, sequitur quod ex certa malitia, quasi absque freno, +peccet. Sic igitur patet quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, +semper praesupponit in homine aliquam inordinationem, quae tamen +non semper est habitus. Unde non est necessarium quod quicumque +peccat ex certa malitia, peccet ex habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p7"> It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, + however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins + through habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36948] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod operari qualiter iniustus operatur, non solum +est operari iniusta ex certa malitia, sed etiam delectabiliter, et +sine gravi renisu rationis. Quod non est nisi eius qui habet +habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with + pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36949] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non statim ad hoc aliquis labitur quod ex certa +malitia peccet, sed praesupponitur aliquid, quod tamen non semper +est habitus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something + is not always a habit, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36950] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud propter quod voluntas inclinatur ad malum, non +semper habitus est vel passio, sed quaedam alia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there + is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good + can be perfect without the evil of fault. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36951] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod non est similis ratio de electione boni, et de +electione mali. Quia malum nunquam est sine bono naturae, sed bonum +potest esse sine malo culpae perfecte.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A4-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 4. Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses + from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins + through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the + Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the + end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, + than for one who sins through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36952] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, non +peccet gravius quam ille qui peccat ex passione. Ignorantia enim +excusat peccatum vel in toto vel in parte. Sed maior est ignorantia +in eo qui peccat ex certa malitia, quam in eo qui peccat ex +passione, nam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, patitur ignorantiam +principii, quae est maxima, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.; +habet enim malam existimationem de fine, qui est principium in +operativis. Ergo magis excusatur a peccato qui peccat ex certa +malitia, quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong + into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which + is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36953] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quanto aliquis habet maius impellens ad peccandum, tanto minus +peccat, sicut patet de eo qui maiori impetu passionis deiicitur in +peccatum. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, impellitur ab +habitu, cuius est fortior impulsio quam passionis. Ergo ille qui +peccat ex habitu, minus peccat quam ille qui peccat ex +passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. + Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36954] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccare ex certa malitia est peccare ex electione mali. Sed ille +qui peccat ex passione, etiam eligit malum. Ergo non minus peccat +quam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.26" target="asv"> Job 34:26</a>: "He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment + is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain + malice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36955] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod peccatum quod ex industria committitur, ex hoc ipso +graviorem poenam meretur, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, <i>quasi impios +percussit eos in loco videntium, qui quasi de industria recesserunt +ab eo</i>. Sed poena non augetur nisi propter gravitatem culpae. +Ergo peccatum ex hoc aggravatur, quod est ex industria, seu certa +malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, + as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, + according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of + sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is + committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated + by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is + diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion + which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; + whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in + his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick + man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers + intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is + the + principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, + whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now + the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous + than one committed through passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 co."><a name="36956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36956] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, est gravius +peccato quod est ex passione, triplici ratione. Primo quidem quia, +cum peccatum principaliter in voluntate consistat, quanto motus +peccati est magis proprius voluntati, tanto peccatum est gravius, +ceteris paribus. Cum autem ex certa malitia peccatur, motus peccati +est magis proprius voluntati, quae ex seipsa in malum movetur, quam +quando ex passione peccatur, quasi ex quodam extrinseco impulsu ad +peccandum. Unde peccatum ex hoc ipso quod est ex malitia, +aggravatur, et tanto magis, quanto fuerit vehementior malitia. Ex +eo vero quod est ex passione, diminuitur, et tanto magis, quanto +passio fuerit magis vehemens. Secundo, quia passio quae inclinat +voluntatem ad peccandum, cito transit, et sic homo cito redit ad +bonum propositum, poenitens de peccato. Sed habitus, quo homo ex +malitia peccat, est qualitas permanens, et ideo qui ex malitia +peccat, diuturnius peccat. Unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., +comparat intemperatum, qui peccat ex malitia, infirmo qui continue +laborat; incontinentem autem, qui peccat ex passione, ei qui +laborat interpolate. Tertio, quia ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, +est male dispositus quantum ad ipsum finem, qui est principium in +operabilibus. Et sic eius defectus est periculosior quam eius qui +ex passione peccat, cuius propositum tendit in bonum finem, licet +hoc propositum interrumpatur ad horam propter passionem. Semper +autem defectus principii est pessimus. Unde manifestum est quod +gravius est peccatum quod est ex malitia, quam quod est ex +passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q76_A4" id="FS_Q78_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[4]</a>). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36957] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ignorantia electionis, de qua obiectio procedit, +neque excusat neque diminuit peccatum, ut supra dictum est. Unde +neque maior ignorantia talis facit esse minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined + from within. Hence the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36958] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod impulsio quae est ex passione, est quasi ex exteriori +respectu voluntatis, sed per habitum inclinatur voluntas quasi ab +interiori. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while + choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced + through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through + certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained ( + <a href="#FS_Q78_A2" id="FS_Q78_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin + "through" choosing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36959] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod aliud est peccare eligentem, et aliud peccare ex +electione. Ille enim qui peccat ex passione, peccat quidem eligens, +non tamen ex electione, quia electio non est in eo primum peccati +principium, sed inducitur ex passione ad eligendum id quod extra +passionem existens non eligeret. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa +malitia, secundum se eligit malum, eo modo quo dictum est. Et ideo +electio in ipso est principium peccati; et propter hoc dicitur ex +electione peccare.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q79" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q79-p0.1">Q. 79. OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q79-p2"> We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part + of man. + </p><p id="FS_Q79-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q79-p4"><a href="#FS_Q79_A1"> (1) Whether God is a cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p5"><a href="#FS_Q79_A2"> (2) Whether the act of sin is from God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p6"><a href="#FS_Q79_A3"> (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p7"><a href="#FS_Q79_A4"> (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 pr."><a name="36960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36960] +Iª-IIae q. 79 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +causis exterioribus peccati. Et primo, ex parte Dei; secundo, ex +parte Diaboli; tertio, ex parte hominis. Circa primum quaeruntur +quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit causa peccati. Secundo, utrum actus +peccati sit a Deo. Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa excaecationis et +obdurationis. Quarto, utrum haec ordinentur ad salutem eorum qui +excaecantur vel obdurantur.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q79_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A1-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 1. Whether God is a cause of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.28" target="asv">Rom. 1:28</a>): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss + comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good + or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore + God is to man a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36961] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati. Dicit enim +apostolus, Rom. I, de quibusdam, <i>tradidit eos Deus in reprobum +sensum, ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt</i>. Et Glossa ibidem +dicit quod <i>Deus operatur in cordibus hominum, inclinando +voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum sive in +malum</i>. Sed facere quae non conveniunt, et inclinari secundum +voluntatem ad malum, est peccatum. Ergo Deus hominibus est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.11" target="asv">Wis. 14:11</a>): "The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." But a temptation usually denotes + a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the + <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36962] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Sap. XIV, dicitur, <i>creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt, et in +tentationem animae hominum</i>. Sed tentatio solet dici provocatio +ad peccandum. Cum ergo creaturae non sint factae nisi a Deo, ut in +primo habitum est, videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati provocans +homines ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause + of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36963] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quidquid est causa causae, est causa effectus. Sed Deus est causa +liberi arbitrii, quod est causa peccati. Ergo Deus est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; + since of this evil it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">Is. 45:7</a>) that God creates evil, and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv">Amos 3:6</a>): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's + goodness that He should cause the evil of fault. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36964] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +omne malum opponitur bono. Sed non repugnat divinae bonitati quod +ipse sit causa mali poenae, de isto enim malo dicitur Isaiae XLV, +quod <i>Deus est creans malum</i>; et Amos III, <i>si est malum in +civitate quod Deus non fecerit?</i> Ergo etiam divinae bonitati non +repugnat quod Deus sit causa culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36965] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +Sap. XI, dicitur de Deo, <i>nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti</i>. +Odit autem Deus peccatum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>odio est Deo +impius, et impietas eius</i>. Ergo Deus non est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's + will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.3.18" target="asv">Ezech. 3:18</a>) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the wicked, + 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] . . . I will require his blood at thy + hand." Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the + order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius + states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from + the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin + indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He + to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom + and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is + not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to + steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 co."><a name="36966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36966] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod homo dupliciter est causa peccati vel sui vel +alterius. Uno modo, directe, inclinando scilicet voluntatem suam +vel alterius ad peccandum. Alio modo, indirecte, dum scilicet non +retrahit aliquos a peccato, unde Ezech. III speculatori dicitur, +<i>si non dixeris impio, morte morieris, sanguinem eius de manu tua +requiram</i>. Deus autem non potest esse directe causa peccati vel +sui vel alterius. Quia omne peccatum est per recessum ab ordine qui +est in ipsum sicut in finem. Deus autem omnia inclinat et convertit +in seipsum sicut in ultimum finem, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. de +Div. Nom. Unde impossibile est quod sit sibi vel aliis causa +discedendi ab ordine qui est in ipsum. Unde non potest directe esse +causa peccati. Similiter etiam neque indirecte. Contingit enim quod +Deus aliquibus non praebet auxilium ad vitandum peccata, quod si +praeberet, non peccarent. Sed hoc totum facit secundum ordinem suae +sapientiae et iustitiae, cum ipse sit sapientia et iustitia. Unde +non imputatur ei quod alius peccat, sicut causae peccati, sicut +gubernator non dicitur causa submersionis navis ex hoc quod non +gubernat navem, nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem potens et +debens gubernare. Et sic patet quod Deus nullo modo est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it + follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up + to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose + a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et + Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be + understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated + above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36967] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quantum ad verba apostoli, ex ipso textu patet +solutio. Si enim Deus tradit aliquos in reprobum sensum, iam ergo +reprobum sensum habent ad faciendum ea quae non conveniunt. Dicitur +ergo tradere eos in reprobum sensum, inquantum non prohibet eos +quin suum sensum reprobum sequantur, sicut dicimur exponere illos +quos non tuemur. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, in libro de gratia et +libero arbitrio, unde sumpta est Glossa, quod <i>Deus inclinat +voluntates hominum in bonum et malum</i>; sic intelligendum est +quod in bonum quidem directe inclinat voluntatem, in malum autem +inquantum non prohibet, sicut dictum est. Et tamen hoc etiam +contingit ex merito praecedentis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition + "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem" + admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures + that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, + wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for + a purpose other than that for which they were made. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36968] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, cum dicitur, <i>creaturae Dei factae sunt in odium +et in tentationem animae hominum</i>, haec praepositio in non +ponitur causaliter, sed consecutive, non enim Deus fecit creaturas +ad malum hominum, sed hoc consecutum est propter insipientiam +hominum. Unde subditur, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui +scilicet per suam insipientiam utuntur creaturis ad aliud quam ad +quod factae sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first + cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced + to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though + he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits + against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36969] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod effectus causae mediae procedens ab ea secundum quod +subditur ordini causae primae, reducitur etiam in causam primam. +Sed si procedat a causa media secundum quod exit ordinem causae +primae, non reducitur in causam primam, sicut si minister faciat +aliquid contra mandatum domini, hoc non reducitur in dominum sicut +in causam. Et similiter peccatum quod liberum arbitrium committit +contra praeceptum Dei, non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed + to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison + between fault and punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36970] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod poena opponitur bono eius qui punitur, qui privatur +quocumque bono. Sed culpa opponitur bono ordinis qui est in Deum, +unde directe opponitur bonitati divinae. Et propter hoc non est +similis ratio de culpa et poena.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A2-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 2. Whether the act of sin is from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not + a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36971] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus peccati non sit a Deo. Dicit +enim Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod <i>actus +peccati non est res aliqua</i>. Omne autem quod est a Deo, est res +aliqua. Ergo actus peccati non est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending + evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36972] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +homo non dicitur esse causa peccati nisi quia homo est causa actus +peccati, nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius +dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed Deus non est causa peccati, ut +dictum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause + of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the + cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above + <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36973] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +aliqui actus secundum suam speciem sunt mali et peccata, ut ex +supradictis patet. Sed quidquid est causa alicuius, est causa eius +quod convenit ei secundum suam speciem. Si ergo Deus esset causa +actus peccati, sequeretur quod esset causa peccati. Sed hoc non est +verum, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares + (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36974] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +actus peccati est quidam motus liberi arbitrii. Sed voluntas Dei +est causa omnium motionum, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Ergo +voluntas Dei est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of + its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something + existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the + First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the + cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect + is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this + defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg + as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly + God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 co."><a name="36975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36975] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod actus peccati et est ens, et est actus; et ex utroque +habet quod sit a Deo. Omne enim ens, quocumque modo sit, oportet +quod derivetur a primo ente; ut patet per Dionysium, V cap. de Div. +Nom. Omnis autem actio causatur ab aliquo existente in actu, quia +nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, omne autem ens actu +reducitur in primum actum, scilicet Deum, sicut in causam, qui est +per suam essentiam actus. Unde relinquitur quod Deus sit causa +omnis actionis, inquantum est actio. Sed peccatum nominat ens et +actionem cum quodam defectu. Defectus autem ille est ex causa +creata, scilicet libero arbitrio, inquantum deficit ab ordine primi +agentis, scilicet Dei. Unde defectus iste non reducitur in Deum +sicut in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium, sicut defectus +claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non +autem in virtutem motivam, a qua tamen causatur quidquid est +motionis in claudicatione. Et secundum hoc, Deus est causa actus +peccati, non tamen est causa peccati, quia non est causa huius, +quod actus sit cum defectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the + act of sin is not a thing. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36976] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus nominat ibi rem id quod est res +simpliciter, scilicet substantiam. Sic enim actus peccati non est +res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to + Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the + cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause + of the sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36977] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod in hominem sicut in causam reducitur non solum actus, +sed etiam ipse defectus, quia scilicet non subditur ei cui debet +subdi, licet hoc ipse non intendat principaliter. Et ideo homo est +causa peccati. Sed Deus sic est causa actus, quod nullo modo est +causa defectus concomitantis actum. Et ideo non est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[1]</a>), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some + object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species + of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36978] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, actus et habitus non +recipiunt speciem ex ipsa privatione, in qua consistit ratio mali; +sed ex aliquo obiecto cui coniungitur talis privatio. Et sic ipse +defectus, qui dicitur non esse a Deo, pertinet ad speciem actus +consequenter, et non quasi differentia specifica.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A3-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 3. Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. + 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36979] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa excaecationis et +indurationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium +quaest., quod <i>Deus non est causa eius quod homo sit +deterior</i>. Sed per excaecationem et obdurationem fit homo +deterior. Ergo Deus non est causa excaecationis et +obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened + heart, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 3:27</a>: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36980] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Fulgentius dicit quod <i>Deus non est ultor illius rei cuius est +auctor</i>. Sed Deus est ultor cordis obdurati, secundum illud +Eccli. III, <i>cor durum male habebit in novissimo</i>. Ergo Deus +non est causa obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice + of man, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.21" target="asv"> Wis. 2:21</a>: "For their own malice blinded them," and again, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:4</a>: "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is + not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36981] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +idem effectus non attribuitur causis contrariis. Sed causa +excaecationis dicitur esse malitia hominis, secundum illud Sap. II, +<i>excaecavit enim eos malitia eorum</i>; et etiam Diabolus, +secundum illud II ad Cor. IV, <i>Deus huius saeculi excaecavit +mentes infidelium</i>; quae quidem causae videntur esse contrariae +Deo. Deus ergo non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.10" target="asv">Is. 6:10</a>): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.18" target="asv"> Rom. 9:18</a>: "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36982] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Isaiae VI, <i>excaeca cor populi huius, et aures +eius aggrava</i>. Et Rom. IX dicitur, <i>cuius vult, miseretur; et +quem vult, indurat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and + turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, + just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not + enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as + regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. + </p><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p7"> Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9</a>: "That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is the universal cause + of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works + freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all + bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters + are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in + failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, + God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being + withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this + way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart. + </p><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p8"> These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, + and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, + viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that spiritual "blindness" + corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 co."><a name="36983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36983] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod excaecatio et obduratio duo important. Quorum unum +est motus animi humani inhaerentis malo, et aversi a divino lumine. +Et quantum ad hoc Deus non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis, +sicut non est causa peccati. Aliud autem est subtractio gratiae, ex +qua sequitur quod mens divinitus non illuminetur ad recte videndum, +et cor hominis non emolliatur ad recte vivendum. Et quantum ad hoc +Deus est causa excaecationis et obdurationis. Est autem +considerandum quod Deus est causa universalis illuminationis +animarum, secundum illud Ioan. I, <i>erat lux vera quae illuminat +omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>, sicut sol est +universalis causa illuminationis corporum. Aliter tamen et aliter, +nam sol agit illuminando per necessitatem naturae; Deus autem agit +voluntarie, per ordinem suae sapientiae. Sol autem, licet quantum +est de se omnia corpora illuminet, si quod tamen impedimentum +inveniat in aliquo corpore, relinquit illud tenebrosum, sicut patet +de domo cuius fenestrae sunt clausae. Sed tamen illius +obscurationis nullo modo causa est sol, non enim suo iudicio agit +ut lumen interius non immittat, sed causa eius est solum ille qui +claudit fenestram. Deus autem proprio iudicio lumen gratiae non +immittit illis in quibus obstaculum invenit. Unde causa +subtractionis gratiae est non solum ille qui ponit obstaculum +gratiae, sed etiam Deus, qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit. Et +per hunc modum Deus est causa excaecationis, et aggravationis +aurium, et obdurationis cordis. Quae quidem distinguuntur secundum +effectus gratiae, quae et perficit intellectum dono sapientiae, et +affectum emollit igne caritatis. Et quia ad cognitionem intellectus +maxime deserviunt duo sensus, scilicet visus et auditus, quorum +unus deservit inventioni, scilicet visus, alius disciplinae, +scilicet auditus, ideo quantum ad visum, ponitur excaecatio; +quantum ad auditum, aurium aggravatio; quantum ad affectum, +obduratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they + make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36984] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, cum excaecatio et induratio, ex parte +subtractionis gratiae, sint quaedam poenae, ex hac parte eis homo +non fit deterior, sed deterior factus per culpam, haec incurrit, +sicut et ceteras poenas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36985] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de obduratione secundum quod +est culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is + said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36986] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod malitia est causa excaecationis meritoria, sicut +culpa est causa poenae. Et hoc etiam modo Diabolus excaecare +dicitur, inquantum inducit ad culpam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A4-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 4. Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. + For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could + draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. + Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q79_A3" id="FS_Q79_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36987] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod excaecatio et obduratio semper +ordinentur ad salutem eius qui excaecatur et obduratur. Dicit enim +Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod <i>Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo +modo permitteret fieri aliquod malum, nisi posset ex quolibet malo +elicere bonum</i>. Multo igitur magis ordinat ad bonum illud malum +cuius ipse est causa. Sed excaecationis et obdurationis Deus est +causa, ut dictum est. Ergo haec ordinantur ad salutem eius qui +excaecatur vel induratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>) that "God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the + destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness + to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the + invalid when he prescribes a bitter + medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36988] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Sap. I dicitur quod <i>Deus non delectatur in perditione +impiorum</i>. Videretur autem in eorum perditione delectari, si +eorum excaecationem in bonum eorum non converteret, sicut medicus +videretur delectari in afflictione infirmi, si medicinam amaram, +quam infirmo propinat, ad eius sanitatem non ordinaret. Ergo Deus +excaecationem convertit in bonum excaecatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34</a>). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not + to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, + as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are + blinded. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36989] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> +<i>Praeterea, Deus non est personarum acceptor</i>, ut dicitur Act. +X. Sed quorundam excaecationem ordinat ad eorum salutem, sicut +quorundam Iudaeorum, qui excaecati sunt ut Christo non crederent, +et non credentes occiderent, et postmodum compuncti converterentur, +sicut de quibusdam legitur Act. II; ut patet per Augustinum, in +libro de quaest. Evang. Ergo Deus omnium excaecationem convertit in +eorum salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.8" target="asv"> Rom. 3:8, </a> evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of + their welfare. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36990] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +non sunt facienda mala ut veniant bona, ut dicitur Rom. III. Sed +excaecatio est malum. Ergo Deus non excaecat aliquos propter eorum +bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation---to + another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall + into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). + Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who + are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed + medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are + blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine + says + (De Quaest. Evang. iii). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 co."><a name="36991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36991] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod excaecatio est quoddam praeambulum ad peccatum. +Peccatum autem ad duo ordinatur, ad unum quidem per se, scilicet ad +damnationem; ad aliud autem ex misericordi Dei providentia, +scilicet ad sanationem, inquantum Deus permittit aliquos cadere in +peccatum, ut peccatum suum agnoscentes, humilientur et +convertantur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia. +Unde et excaecatio ex sui natura ordinatur ad damnationem eius qui +excaecatur, propter quod etiam ponitur reprobationis effectus, sed +ex divina misericordia excaecatio ad tempus ordinatur medicinaliter +ad salutem eorum qui excaecantur. Sed haec misericordia non omnibus +impenditur excaecatis, <i>sed praedestinatis solum, quibus omnia +cooperantur in bonum</i>, sicut dicitur Rom. VIII. Unde quantum ad +quosdam, excaecatio ordinatur ad sanationem, quantum autem ad +alios, ad damnationem, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de quaest. +Evang.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the + evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of + the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36992] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnia mala quae Deus facit vel permittit fieri, +ordinantur in aliquod bonum, non tamen semper in bonum eius in quo +est malum, sed quandoque ad bonum alterius, vel etiam totius +universi. Sicut culpam tyrannorum ordinavit in bonum martyrum; et +poenam damnatorum ordinat in gloriam suae iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that + ensues from the loss. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36993] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum quantum ad +ipsam perditionem, sed ratione suae iustitiae, vel propter bonum +quod inde provenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others + is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God + a respecter of persons, as explained in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q23_A5" id="FS_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[23], A[5]</a>, ad 3. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36994] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod hoc quod Deus aliquorum excaecationem ordinat in +eorum salutem, misericordiae est, quod autem excaecatio aliorum +ordinetur ad eorum damnationem, iustitiae est. Quod autem +misericordiam quibusdam impendit et non omnibus, non facit +personarum acceptionem in Deo, sicut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36995] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod mala culpae non sunt facienda ut veniant bona, sed +mala poenae sunt inferenda propter bonum.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q80" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q80-p0.1">Q. 80. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q80-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q80-p3"><a href="#FS_Q80_A1"> (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p4"><a href="#FS_Q80_A2"> (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p5"><a href="#FS_Q80_A3"> (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p6"><a href="#FS_Q80_A4"> (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 pr."><a name="36996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36996] +Iª-IIae q. 80 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte Diaboli. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, +utrum Diabolus sit directe causa peccati. Secundo, utrum Diabolus +inducat ad peccandum interius persuadendo. Tertio, utrum possit +necessitatem peccandi inducere. Quarto, utrum omnia peccata ex +Diaboli suggestione proveniant.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q80_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A1-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 1. Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. + Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.3" target="asv"> Acts 5:3, </a> says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills + men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the + cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36997] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus sit homini directe causa +peccandi. Peccatum enim directe in affectu consistit. Sed +Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod <i>Diabolus suae societati +malignos affectus inspirat</i>. Et Beda, super Act., dicit quod +<i>Diabolus animam in affectum malitiae trahit</i>. Et Isidorus +dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod <i>Diabolus corda hominum +occultis cupiditatibus replet</i>. Ergo Diabolus directe est causa +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." + But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36998] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Hieronymus dicit quod <i>sicut Deus est perfector boni, ita +Diabolus est perfector mali</i>. Sed Deus est directe causa bonorum +nostrorum. Ergo Diabolus est directe causa peccatorum +nostrorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle + of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man + to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly + the cause of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36999] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus probat, in quodam cap. Ethicae Eudemicae, quod oportet +esse quoddam principium extrinsecum humani consilii. Consilium +autem humanum non solum est de bonis, sed etiam de malis. Ergo +sicut Deus movet ad consilium bonum, et per hoc directe est causa +boni; ita Diabolus movet hominem ad consilium malum, et per hoc +sequitur quod Diabolus directe sit causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now + man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's + own will alone. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37000] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus probat, in I et III de Lib. Arb., <i>quod nulla +alia re fit mens hominis serva libidinis, nisi propria +voluntate</i>. Sed homo non fit servus libidinis nisi per peccatum. +Ergo causa peccati non potest esse Diabolus, sed sola propria +voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an + action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action + is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move + the will to act. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p7"> Now the will, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: + secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown + above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[79], A[1]</a>). Therefore it follows that + in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p8"> As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed + to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, + he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will + its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible + things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may + incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three + ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, + as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q80_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[10], AA[1]</a>,2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that + proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, + neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 co."><a name="37001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37001] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum actus quidam est. Unde hoc modo potest esse +aliquid directe causa peccati, per quem modum aliquis directe est +causa alicuius actus. Quod quidem non contingit nisi per hoc quod +proprium principium illius actus movet ad agendum. Proprium autem +principium actus peccati est voluntas, quia omne peccatum est +voluntarium. Unde nihil potest directe esse causa peccati, nisi +quod potest movere voluntatem ad agendum. Voluntas autem, sicut +supra dictum est, a duobus moveri potest, uno modo, ab obiecto, +sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum; alio +modo, ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum. Hoc +autem non est nisi vel ipsa voluntas, vel Deus, ut supra ostensum +est. Deus autem non potest esse causa peccati, ut dictum est. +Relinquitur ergo quod ex hac parte sola voluntas hominis sit +directe causa peccati eius. Ex parte autem obiecti, potest +intelligi quod aliquid moveat voluntatem tripliciter. Uno modo, +ipsum obiectum propositum, sicut dicimus quod cibus excitat +desiderium hominis ad comedendum. Alio modo, ille qui proponit vel +offert huiusmodi obiectum. Tertio modo, ille qui persuadet obiectum +propositum habere rationem boni, quia et hic aliqualiter proponit +proprium obiectum voluntati, quod est rationis bonum verum vel +apparens. Primo igitur modo, res sensibiles exterius apparentes +movent voluntatem hominis ad peccandum, secundo autem et tertio +modo, vel Diabolus, vel etiam homo, potest incitare ad peccandum, +vel offerendo aliquid appetibile sensui, vel persuadendo rationi. +Sed nullo istorum trium modorum potest aliquid esse directa causa +peccati, quia voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ab aliquo obiecto +nisi ab ultimo fine, ut supra dictum est; unde non est sufficiens +causa peccati neque res exterius oblata, neque ille qui eam +proponit, neque ille qui persuadet. Unde sequitur quod Diabolus non +sit causa peccati directe et sufficienter; sed solum per modum +persuadentis, vel proponentis appetibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man + to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37002] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnes illae auctoritates, et si quae similes +inveniantur, sunt referendae ad hoc quod Diabolus suggerendo, vel +aliqua appetibilia proponendo, inducit in affectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause + of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, + whereas the devil cannot move us in this way. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37003] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod similitudo illa est attendenda quantum ad hoc, quod +Diabolus quodammodo est causa peccatorum nostrorum, sicut Deus est +aliquo modo causa bonorum nostrorum. Non tamen attenditur quantum +ad modum causandi, nam Deus causat bona interius movendo +voluntatem, quod Diabolo convenire non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, + is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37004] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus +humani, sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, +hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a Diabolo per modum +persuadentis, vel appetibilia proponentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A2-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 2. Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul + are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal + soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37005] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non possit inducere ad +peccandum interius instigando. Interiores enim motus animae sunt +quaedam opera vitae. Sed nullum opus vitae potest esse nisi a +principio intrinseco; nec etiam opus animae vegetabilis, quod est +infimum inter opera vitae. Ergo Diabolus secundum interiores motus +non potest hominem instigare ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God + alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FS_Q80_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[4]</a>. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived + by the external senses. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37006] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omnes interiores motus, secundum ordinem naturae, a sensibus +exterioribus oriuntur. Sed praeter ordinem naturae aliquid operari +est solius Dei, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo Diabolus non potest in +interioribus motibus hominis aliquid operari, nisi secundum ea quae +exterioribus sensibus apparent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with + either of these, because, as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary + species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, + the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37007] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +interiores actus animae sunt intelligere et imaginari. Sed quantum +ad neutrum horum potest Diabolus aliquid operari. Quia, ut in primo +habitum est, Diabolus non imprimit in intellectum humanum. In +phantasiam etiam videtur quod imprimere non possit, quia formae +imaginatae, tanquam magis spirituales, sunt digniores quam formae +quae sunt in materia sensibili; quas tamen Diabolus imprimere non +potest, ut patet ex his quae in primo habita sunt. Ergo Diabolus +non potest secundum interiores motus inducere hominem ad +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37008] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc nunquam tentaret hominem nisi visibiliter +apparendo. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. + As regards the will, we have already stated + <a href="#FS_Q80_A1" id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the + knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he + darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently + the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can + induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the + sensitive appetite to some passion or other. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p7"> The reason of this is, that as stated in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FS_Q80_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[3]</a>, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all + those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. + Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno + et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. + iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend + with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible + species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were + being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, + whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p8"> In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and + the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive + appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, + before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. + iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing + of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is + held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 co."><a name="37009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37009] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod interior pars animae est intellectiva et sensitiva. +Intellectiva autem continet intellectum et voluntatem. Et de +voluntate quidem iam dictum est quomodo ad eam Diabolus se habet. +Intellectus autem per se quidem movetur ab aliquo illuminante ipsum +ad cognitionem veritatis, quod Diabolus circa hominem non intendit, +sed magis obtenebrare rationem ipsius ad consentiendum peccato. +Quae quidem obtenebratio provenit ex phantasia et appetitu +sensitivo. Unde tota interior operatio Diaboli esse videtur circa +phantasiam et appetitum sensitivum. Quorum utrumque commovendo, +potest inducere ad peccatum, potest enim operari ad hoc quod +imaginationi aliquae formae imaginariae praesententur; potest etiam +facere quod appetitus sensitivus concitetur ad aliquam passionem. +Dictum est enim in primo libro quod natura corporalis spirituali +naturaliter obedit ad motum localem. Unde et Diabolus omnia illa +causare potest quae ex motu locali corporum inferiorum provenire +possunt, nisi virtute divina reprimatur. Quod autem aliquae formae +repraesententur imaginationi, consequitur quandoque ad motum +localem. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de somno et vigilia, quod +<i>cum animal dormierit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium +sensitivum, simul descendunt motus</i>, sive impressiones relictae +ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in sensibilibus speciebus +conservantur, et movent principium apprehensivum, ita quod apparent +ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus +immutaretur. Unde talis motus localis spirituum vel humorum potest +procurari a Daemonibus, sive dormiant sive vigilent homines, et sic +sequitur quod homo aliqua imaginetur. Similiter etiam appetitus +sensitivus concitatur ad aliquas passiones secundum quendam +determinatum motum cordis et spirituum. Unde ad hoc etiam Diabolus +potest cooperari. Et ex hoc quod passiones aliquae concitantur in +appetitu sensitivo, sequitur quod et motum sive intentionem +sensibilem praedicto modo reductam ad principium apprehensivum, +magis homo percipiat, quia, ut philosophus in eodem libro dicit, +<i>amantes modica similitudine in apprehensionem rei amatae +moventur</i>. Contingit etiam ex hoc quod passio est concitata, ut +id quod proponitur imaginationi, iudicetur prosequendum, quia ei +qui a passione detinetur, videtur esse bonum id ad quod per +passionem inclinatur. Et per hunc modum Diabolus interius inducit +ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as + external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37010] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod opera vitae semper etsi sint ab aliquo principio +intrinseco, tamen ad ea potest cooperari aliquod exterius agens, +sicut etiam ad opera animae vegetabilis operatur calor exterior, ut +facilius digeratur cibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according + to local movement, as explained above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37011] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod huiusmodi apparitio formarum imaginabilium non est +omnino praeter ordinem naturae. Nec est per solum imperium, sed per +motum localem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37012] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad tertium, quia formae illae sunt a sensibus acceptae +primordialiter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A3-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 3. Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said + of the devil ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv">Job 41:24</a>) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the + earth. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37013] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus possit necessitatem inferre +ad peccandum. Potestas enim maior potest necessitatem inferre +minori. Sed de Diabolo dicitur Iob XLI, <i>non est potestas super +terram quae ei valeat comparari</i>. Ergo potest homini terreno +necessitatem inferre ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented + to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima + iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q80_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, + to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends + with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37014] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ratio hominis non potest moveri nisi secundum ea quae exterius +sensibus proponuntur et imaginationi repraesentantur, quia omnis +nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu, <i>et non est intelligere sine +phantasmate</i>, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Sed Diabolus potest +movere imaginationem hominis, ut dictum est, et etiam exteriores +sensus, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., +quod <i>serpit hoc malum</i>, scilicet quod est a Diabolo, <i>per +omnes aditus sensuales; dat se figuris, accommodat coloribus, +adhaeret sonis, infundit saporibus</i>. Ergo potest rationem +hominis ex necessitate inclinare ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the + devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above + <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q80_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37015] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum Augustinum, <i>nonnullum peccatum est, cum caro +concupiscit adversus spiritum</i>. Sed concupiscentiam carnis +Diabolus potest causare, sicut et ceteras passiones, eo modo quo +supra dictum est. Ergo ex necessitate potest inducere ad +peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish + thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin + of necessity. + </p><p id="FS_Q80_A3-p6"> Further, it is likewise written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.7" target="asv">Jam. 4:7</a>): "Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly, + if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor + would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37016] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur I Petr. ult., <i>adversarius vester Diabolus +tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret, cui resistite +fortes in fide</i>. Frustra autem talis admonitio daretur, si homo +ei ex necessitate succumberet. Non ergo potest homini necessitatem +inducere ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; + but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves + him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the + sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being + thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, + then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A7" id="FS_Q80_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[7]</a>). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 co."><a name="37017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37017] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod Diabolus propria virtute, nisi refraenetur a Deo, +potest aliquem inducere ex necessitate ad faciendum aliquem actum +qui de suo genere peccatum est, non autem potest inducere +necessitatem peccandi. Quod patet ex hoc quod homo motivo ad +peccandum non resistit nisi per rationem, cuius usum totaliter +impedire potest movendo imaginationem et appetitum sensitivum, +sicut in arreptitiis patet. Sed tunc, ratione sic ligata, quidquid +homo agat, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed si ratio non sit +totaliter ligata, ex ea parte qua est libera, potest resistere +peccato, sicut supra dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod Diabolus +nullo modo potest necessitatem inducere homini ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A6" id="FS_Q80_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[6]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37018] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet potestas maior homine, potest +movere voluntatem hominis, sed solus Deus, ut supra habitum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use + of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37019] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod est apprehensum per sensum vel +imaginationem, non ex necessitate movet voluntatem, si homo habeat +usum rationis. Nec semper huiusmodi apprehensio ligat rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise + of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37020] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum, quando ratio +ei actualiter resistit, non est peccatum, sed materia exercendae +virtutis. Quod autem ratio ei non resistat, non est in potestate +Diaboli. Et ideo non potest inducere necessitatem peccati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A4-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 4. Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd + of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37021] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata hominum sint ex +suggestione Diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., +quod <i>multitudo Daemonum causa est omnium malorum et sibi et +aliis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.34" target="asv"> Jn. 8:34</a>: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is + the slave" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:19</a>). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37022] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque peccat mortaliter, efficitur servus Diaboli; secundum +illud Ioan. VIII, <i>qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Sed ei +aliquis in servitutem addicitur, a quo superatus est</i>, ut +dicitur II Petr. II. Ergo quicumque facit peccatum, superatus est a +Diabolo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, + if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which + is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37023] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Gregorius dicit quod peccatum Diaboli est irreparabile, quia +cecidit nullo suggerente. Si igitur aliqui homines peccarent per +liberum arbitrium, nullo suggerente, eorum peccatum esset +irremediabile, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo omnia peccata humana a +Diabolo suggeruntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement + of the free-will." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37024] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, <i>non +omnes cogitationes nostrae malae a Diabolo excitantur, sed +aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of + whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man + who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though + each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from + the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which + desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 co."><a name="37025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37025] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod occasionaliter quidem et indirecte Diabolus est causa +omnium peccatorum nostrorum, inquantum induxit primum hominem ad +peccandum, ex cuius peccato intantum vitiata est humana natura, ut +omnes simus ad peccandum proclives, sicut diceretur esse causa +combustionis lignorum qui ligna siccaret, ex quo sequeretur quod +facile incenderentur. Directe autem non est causa omnium peccatorum +humanorum, ita quod singula peccata persuadeat. Quod Origenes +probat ex hoc, quia etiam si Diabolus non esset, homines haberent +appetitum cibi et venereorum et similium, qui posset esse +inordinatus nisi ratione ordinaretur, quod subiacet libero +arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37026] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod multitudo Daemonum est causa omnium malorum +nostrorum secundum primam originem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it + is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37027] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non solum fit servus alicuius qui ab eo superatur, +sed etiam qui se ei voluntarie subiicit. Et hoc modo fit servus +Diaboli qui motu proprio peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already + prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37028] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum Diaboli fuit irremediabile, quia nec aliquo +suggerente peccavit, nec habuit aliquam pronitatem ad peccandum ex +praecedenti suggestione causatam. Quod de nullo hominis peccato +dici potest.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q81" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q81-p0.1">Q. 81. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q81-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, + by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original + sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject. + </p><p id="FS_Q81-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q81-p4"><a href="#FS_Q81_A1"> (1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p5"><a href="#FS_Q81_A2"> (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way + of origin? + </a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p6"><a href="#FS_Q81_A3"> (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p7"><a href="#FS_Q81_A4"> (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p8"><a href="#FS_Q81_A5"> (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 pr."><a name="37029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37029] +Iª-IIae q. 81 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati ex parte hominis. Cum autem homo sit causa peccati alteri +homini exterius suggerendo, sicut et Diabolus, habet quendam +specialem modum causandi peccatum in alterum per originem. Unde de +peccato originali dicendum est. Circa quod tria consideranda +occurrunt, primo, de eius traductione; secundo, de eius essentia; +tertio, de eius subiecto. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, +utrum primum peccatum hominis derivetur per originem in posteros. +Secundo, utrum omnia alia peccata primi parentis, vel etiam aliorum +parentum, per originem in posteros deriventur. Tertio, utrum +peccatum originale derivetur ad omnes qui ex Adam per viam seminis +generantur. Quarto, utrum derivaretur ad illos qui miraculose ex +aliqua parte humani corporis formarentur. Quinto, utrum si femina +peccasset, viro non peccante, traduceretur originale peccatum.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q81_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A1-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 1. Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of origin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore + no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37030] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum peccatum primi parentis non +traducatur ad alios per originem. Dicitur enim Ezech. XVIII, +<i>filius non portabit iniquitatem patris</i>. Portaret autem, si +ab eo iniquitatem traheret. Ergo nullus trahit ab aliquo parentum +per originem aliquod peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not + pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, + as was shown in the + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A2" id="FS_Q81_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[118], A[2]</a>. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37031] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +accidens non traducitur per originem, nisi traducto subiecto, eo +quod accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum. Sed anima +rationalis, quae est subiectum culpae, non traducitur per originem, +ut in primo ostensum est. Ergo neque aliqua culpa per originem +traduci potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because + it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37032] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omne illud quod traducitur per originem humanam, causatur ex +semine. Sed semen non potest causare peccatum, eo quod caret +rationali parte animae, quae sola potest esse causa peccati. Ergo +nullum peccatum potest trahi per originem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united + to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can + the semen infect the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37033] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quod est perfectius in natura, virtuosius est ad agendum. Sed caro +perfecta non potest inficere animam sibi unitam, alioquin anima non +posset emundari a culpa originali dum est carni unita. Ergo multo +minus semen potest inficere animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who + are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their + origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="37034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37034] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>propter naturam turpes +nullus increpat, sed eos qui propter desidiam et negligentiam</i>. +Dicuntur autem natura turpes qui habent turpitudinem ex sua +origine. Ergo nihil quod est per originem, est increpabile, neque +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, + since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.24" target="asv">Wis. 2:24</a>): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin + entered into the world. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37035] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit</i>. Quod non potest intelligi per modum +imitationis, propter hoc quod dicitur Sap. II, <i>invidia Diaboli +mors intravit in orbem terrarum</i>. Restat ergo quod per originem +a primo homine peccatum in mundo intravit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, + by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed + from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For + instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono + Persev. xi, xii.] + </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p9"> In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various + writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained + that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. + Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be + transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted + from parent to child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some + seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and + since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is + passed + on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt. + </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p10"> But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from + parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in + the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin + seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the + rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to + be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man + born blind; one rather takes pity on him." + </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p11"> Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch + as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members + of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that + "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so + many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will + of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would + not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging + to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is + voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate + from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first + parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called + "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except + inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin + of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the + "sin of nature," according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.3" target="asv"> Eph. 2:3</a>: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 co."><a name="37036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37036] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam est tenendum quod primum +peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros. Propter +quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad Baptismum, tanquam ab +aliqua infectione culpae abluendi. Contrarium autem est haeresis +Pelagianae, ut patet per Augustinum in plurimis suis libris. Ad +investigandum autem qualiter peccatum primi parentis originaliter +possit transire in posteros, diversi diversis viis processerunt. +Quidam enim, considerantes quod peccati subiectum est anima +rationalis, posuerunt quod cum semine rationalis anima traducatur, +ut sic ex infecta anima animae infectae derivari videantur. Alii +vero, hoc repudiantes tanquam erroneum, conati sunt ostendere +quomodo culpa animae parentis traducitur in prolem, etiam si anima +non traducatur, per hoc quod corporis defectus traducuntur a +parente in prolem, sicut si leprosus generat leprosum, et +podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis, licet +talis corruptio non dicatur lepra vel podagra. Cum autem corpus sit +proportionatum animae, et defectus animae redundent in corpus, et e +converso; simili modo dicunt quod culpabilis defectus animae per +traductionem seminis in prolem derivatur, quamvis semen actualiter +non sit culpae subiectum. Sed omnes huiusmodi viae insufficientes +sunt. Quia dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente transeant +in prolem per originem; et etiam aliqui defectus animae ex +consequenti, propter corporis indispositionem, sicut interdum ex +fatuis fatui generantur, tamen hoc ipsum quod est ex origine +aliquem defectum habere, videtur excludere rationem culpae, de +cuius ratione est quod sit voluntaria. Unde etiam posito quod anima +rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc ipso quod infectio animae prolis +non esset in eius voluntate, amitteret rationem culpae obligantis +ad poenam, quia, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., <i>nullus +improperabit caeco nato, sed magis miserebitur</i>. Et ideo alia +via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex +Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, inquantum conveniunt in +natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus +omnes qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et +tota communitas quasi unus homo. Porphyrius etiam dicit quod +<i>participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo</i>. Sic +igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati, sunt tanquam multa membra +unius corporis. Actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, +non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae, +quae primo movet membra. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non +imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se +ut divisa a corpore, sed imputatur ei inquantum est aliquid hominis +quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur +inordinatio quae est in isto homine, ex Adam generato, non est +voluntaria voluntate ipsius sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet +motione generationis omnes qui ex eius origine derivantur, sicut +voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum. Unde peccatum quod sic +a primo parente in posteros derivatur, dicitur originale, sicut +peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur +actuale. Et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod +committitur, non est peccatum illius membri nisi inquantum illud +membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur peccatum +humanum; ita peccatum originale non est peccatum huius personae, +nisi inquantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente. Unde +et vocatur peccatum naturae; secundum illud Ephes. II, <i>eramus +natura filii irae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share + in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even + as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37037] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod filius dicitur non portare peccatum patris, quia +non punitur pro peccato patris, nisi sit particeps culpae. Et sic +est in proposito, derivatur enim per originem culpa a patre in +filium, sicut et peccatum actuale per imitationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless + the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits + the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated + with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature + from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37038] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, etsi anima non traducatur, quia virtus seminis non +potest causare animam rationalem; movet tamen ad ipsam dispositive. +Unde per virtutem seminis traducitur humana natura a parente in +prolem, et simul cum natura naturae infectio, ex hoc enim fit iste +qui nascitur consors culpae primi parentis, quod naturam ab eo +sortitur per quandam generativam motionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37039] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, etsi culpa non sit actu in semine, est tamen ibi +virtute humana natura, quam concomitatur talis culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the + soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37040] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod semen est principium generationis, quae est proprius +actus naturae, eius propagationi deserviens. Et ideo magis +inficitur anima per semen quam per carnem iam perfectam, quae iam +determinata est ad personam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him + as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on + account of a crime committed by one of his forbears. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="37041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37041] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod illud quod est per originem, non est increpabile, si +consideretur iste qui nascitur secundum se. Sed si consideretur +prout refertur ad aliquod principium, sic potest esse ei +increpabile, sicut aliquis qui nascitur patitur ignominiam generis +ex culpa alicuius progenitorum causatam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A2-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 2. Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. + For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate + parents, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." + Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those + who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37042] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam alia peccata vel ipsius primi +parentis, vel proximorum parentum, traducantur in posteros. Poena +enim nunquam debetur nisi culpae. Sed aliqui puniuntur iudicio +divino pro peccato proximorum parentum; secundum illud Exod. XX, +<i>ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios, in +tertiam et quartam generationem</i>. Iudicio etiam humano, in +crimine laesae maiestatis, filii exheredantur pro peccato parentum. +Ergo etiam culpa proximorum parentum transit ad posteros.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: + thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has + from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37043] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +magis potest transferre in alterum id quod habet aliquis a seipso, +quam id quod habet ex alio, sicut ignis magis potest calefacere +quam aqua calefacta, sed homo transfert in prolem per originem +peccatum quod habet ab Adam. Ergo multo magis peccatum quod ipse +commisit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our + nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it + be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.11" target="asv"> Apoc. 22:11</a>: "He that is filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer + ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37044] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ideo contrahimus a primo parente peccatum originale, quia in eo +fuimus sicut in principio naturae, quam ipse corrupit. Sed +similiter fuimus in proximis parentibus sicut in quibusdam +principiis naturae, quae etsi sit corrupta, potest adhuc magis +corrumpi per peccatum, secundum illud Apoc. ult., <i>qui in +sordibus est, sordescat adhuc</i>. Ergo filii contrahunt peccata +proximorum parentum per originem, sicut et primi parentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much + less therefore are their sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37045] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +bonum est magis diffusivum sui quam malum. Sed merita proximorum +parentum non traducuntur ad posteros. Ergo multo minus peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q81_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully + we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first + parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently + those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and + matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the + knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the + species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son + having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural + disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those + that are purely personal, as stated above. + </p><p id="FS_Q81_A2-p7"> Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong + to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In + this way original justice, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q100_A1" id="FS_Q81_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[100], A[1]</a>, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first + sin. Wherefore as that + original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual + sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that + person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 co."><a name="37046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37046] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod Augustinus hanc quaestionem movet in Enchiridio, et +insolutam relinquit. Sed si quis diligenter attendit, impossibile +est quod aliqua peccata proximorum parentum, vel etiam primi +parentis praeter primum, per originem traducantur. Cuius ratio est +quia homo generat sibi idem in specie, non autem secundum +individuum. Et ideo ea quae directe pertinent ad individuum, sicut +personales actus et quae ad eos pertinent, non traducuntur a +parentibus in filios, non enim grammaticus traducit in filium +scientiam grammaticae, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quae +pertinent ad naturam speciei, traducuntur a parentibus in filios, +nisi sit defectus naturae, sicut oculatus generat oculatum, nisi +natura deficiat. Et si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia +individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad dispositionem +naturae, sicut velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia +huiusmodi, nullo autem modo ea quae sunt pure personalia, ut dictum +est. Sicut autem ad personam pertinet aliquid secundum seipsam, et +aliquid ex dono gratiae; ita etiam ad naturam potest aliquid +pertinere secundum seipsam, scilicet quod causatur ex principiis +eius, et aliquid ex dono gratiae. Et hoc modo iustitia originalis, +sicut in primo dictum est, erat quoddam donum gratiae toti humanae +naturae divinitus collatum in primo parente. Quod quidem primus +homo amisit per primum peccatum. Unde sicut illa originalis +iustitia traducta fuisset in posteros simul cum natura, ita etiam +inordinatio opposita. Sed alia peccata actualia vel primi parentis +vel aliorum, non corrumpunt naturam quantum ad id quod naturae est; +sed solum quantum ad id quod personae est, idest secundum +pronitatem ad actum. Unde alia peccata non traducuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment + on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul + is God's immediate property, as stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.4" target="asv"> Ezech. 18:4.</a> Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as + the + child, as to its body, is part of its father. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37047] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena spirituali, sicut Augustinus dicit in +epistola ad avitum, nunquam puniuntur filii pro parentibus, nisi +communicent in culpa, vel per originem vel per imitationem, quia +omnes animae immediate sunt Dei, ut dicitur Ezech. XVIII. Sed poena +corporali interdum, iudicio divino vel humano, puniuntur filii pro +parentibus, inquantum filius est aliquid patris secundum +corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer + ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37048] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud quod habet aliquis ex se, magis potest +traducere, dummodo sit traducibile. Sed peccata actualia proximorum +parentum non sunt traducibilia, quia sunt pure personalia, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption + pertaining only to the person. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37049] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod primum peccatum corrumpit naturam humanam corruptione +ad naturam pertinente, alia vero peccata corrumpunt eam corruptione +pertinente ad solam personam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A3-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 3. Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment + consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still + living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.14" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:14</a>: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have + slept." Therefore they do not contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37050] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum primi parentis non transeat +per originem in omnes homines. Mors enim est poena consequens +originale peccatum. Sed non omnes qui procedunt seminaliter ex +Adam, morientur, illi enim qui vivi reperientur in adventu domini, +nunquam morientur, ut videtur per quod dicitur I Thessal. IV, +<i>nos qui vivimus, non praeveniemus in adventu domini eos qui +dormierunt</i>. Ergo illi non contrahunt originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he + does not transmit it to his children. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37051] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus dat alteri quod ipse non habet. Sed homo baptizatus non +habet peccatum originale. Ergo non traducit ipsum in prolem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv">Rom. 5:15, </a> seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37052] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +donum Christi est maius quam peccatum Adae, ut apostolus dicit, +Rom. V. Sed donum Christi non transit in omnes homines. Ergo nec +peccatum Adae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37053] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>mors in omnes pertransiit, in +quo omnes peccaverunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract + original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf. Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through + Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his + posterity, just as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved + by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved + by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 co."><a name="37054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37054] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam firmiter est tenendum quod +omnes homines, praeter solum Christum, ex Adam derivati, peccatum +originale ex eo contrahunt, alioquin non omnes indigerent +redemptione quae est per Christum; quod est erroneum. Ratio autem +sumi potest ex hoc quod supra dictum est, quod sic ex peccato primi +parentis traducitur culpa originalis in posteros, sicut a voluntate +animae per motionem membrorum traducitur peccatum actuale ad membra +corporis. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum actuale traduci potest +ad omnia membra quae nata sunt moveri a voluntate. Unde et culpa +originalis traducitur ad omnes illos qui moventur ab Adam motione +generationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, + and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP ( + <a href="XP_iii.html#XP_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q81_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">XP, Q[78], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others + in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the + objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death + will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37055] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod probabilius et communius tenetur quod omnes illi +qui in adventu domini reperientur, morientur, et post modicum +resurgent, ut in tertio plenius dicetur. Si tamen hoc verum sit +quod alii dicunt, quod illi nunquam morientur, sicut Hieronymus +narrat diversorum opiniones in quadam epistola ad Minerium, de +resurrectione carnis; dicendum est ad argumentum, quod illi etsi +non moriantur, est tamen in eis reatus mortis, sed poena aufertur a +Deo, qui etiam peccatorum actualium poenas condonare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless + original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes," which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the + body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized + transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, + but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37056] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale per Baptismum aufertur reatu, +inquantum anima recuperat gratiam quantum ad mentem. Remanet tamen +peccatum originale actu quantum ad fomitem, qui est inordinatio +inferiorum partium animae et ipsius corporis, secundum quod homo +generat, et non secundum mentem. Et ideo baptizati traducunt +peccatum originale, non enim generant inquantum sunt renovati per +Baptismum, sed inquantum retinent adhuc aliquid de vetustate primi +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that + are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but + also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37057] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut peccatum Adae traducitur in omnes qui ab Adam +corporaliter generantur, ita gratia Christi traducitur in omnes qui +ab eo spiritualiter generantur per fidem et Baptismum, et non solum +ad removendam culpam primi parentis, sed etiam ad removendum +peccata actualia, et ad introducendum in gloriam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A4-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 4. Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv"> Gn. 4:1 </a>says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life, + before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, + his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would + contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37058] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si aliquis formaretur ex carne humana +miraculose, contraheret originale peccatum. Dicit enim quaedam +Glossa Gen. IV, quod <i>in lumbis Adae fuit tota posteritas +corrupta, quia non est separata prius in loco vitae, sed postea in +loco exilii</i>. Sed si aliquis homo sic formaretur sicut dictum +est, caro eius separaretur in loco exilii. Ergo contraheret +originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. + Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37059] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale causatur in nobis inquantum anima inficitur ex +carne. Sed caro tota hominis est infecta. Ergo ex quacumque parte +carnis homo formaretur, anima eius inficeretur infectione +originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who + might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37060] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale a primo parente pervenit in omnes, inquantum +omnes in eo peccante fuerunt. Sed illi qui ex carne humana +formarentur, in Adam fuissent. Ergo peccatum originale +contraherent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original + sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37061] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia non fuissent in Adam secundum seminalem rationem; quod +solum causat traductionem peccati originalis, ut Augustinus dicit, +X super Gen. ad Litt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, + even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power + of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation + originally derived from Adam, i.e. who + are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But + if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. + Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by + the man's will, but by some external power. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 co."><a name="37062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37062] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum originale a primo +parente traducitur in posteros, inquantum moventur ab ipso per +generationem, sicut membra moventur ab anima ad peccatum actuale. +Non autem est motio ad generationem nisi per virtutem activam in +generatione. Unde illi soli peccatum originale contrahunt, qui ab +Adam descendunt per virtutem activam in generatione originaliter ab +Adam derivatam, quod est secundum seminalem rationem ab eo +descendere, nam ratio seminalis nihil aliud est quam vis activa in +generatione. Si autem aliquis formaretur virtute divina ex carne +humana, manifestum est quod vis activa non derivaretur ab Adam. +Unde non contraheret peccatum originale, sicut nec actus manus +pertineret ad peccatum humanum, si manus non moveretur a voluntate +hominis, sed ab aliquo extrinseco movente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account + of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37063] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Adam non fuit in loco exilii nisi post peccatum. +Unde non propter locum exilii, sed propter peccatum, traducitur +originalis culpa ad eos ad quos activa eius generatio pervenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37064] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod caro non inficit animam nisi inquantum est principium +activum in generatione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is + St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica + <a href="TP_ii.html#TP_Q31_A6" id="FS_Q81_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">TP, Q[31], A[6]</a>, Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37065] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui formaretur ex carne humana, fuisset in Adam +secundum corpulentam substantiam; sed non secundum seminalem +rationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non contraheret originale +peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A5-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 5. Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract + original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted + original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37066] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si Adam non peccasset, Eva peccante, +filii originale peccatum contraherent. Peccatum enim originale a +parentibus contrahimus, inquantum in eis fuimus, secundum illud +apostoli, Rom. V, <i>in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>. Sed sicut homo +praeexistit in patre suo, ita in matre. Ergo ex peccato matris homo +peccatum originale contraheret, sicut et ex peccato patris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is + "the mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and + liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments + of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would + contract original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37067] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +si Eva peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii passibiles et mortales +nascerentur, mater enim dat materiam in generatione, ut dicit +philosophus, in II de Generat. Animal.; mors autem, et omnis +passibilitas, provenit ex necessitate materiae. Sed passibilitas et +necessitas moriendi sunt poena peccati originalis. Ergo, si Eva +peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii contraherent originale +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born + without original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin + were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve + had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37068] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Damascenus dicit, in libro III, quod spiritus sanctus praevenit in +virginem, de qua Christus erat absque peccato originali nasciturus, +purgans eam. Sed illa purgatio non fuisset necessaria, si infectio +originalis peccati non traheretur ex matre. Ergo infectio +originalis peccati ex matre trahitur. Et sic, Eva peccante, eius +filii peccatum originale contraherent, etiam si Adam non +peccasset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should + have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. + Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37069] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit</i>. Magis autem fuisset dicendum quod per +duos intrasset, cum ambo peccaverint; vel potius per mulierem, quae +primo peccavit; si femina peccatum originale in prolem +transmitteret. Non ergo peccatum originale derivatur in filios a +matre, sed a patre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore + it has been said + <a href="#FS_Q81_A4" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that + in the opinion of philosophers, the active + principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not + from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract + original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 co."><a name="37070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37070] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod huius dubitationis solutio ex praemissis apparet. +Dictum est enim supra quod peccatum originale a primo parente +traducitur inquantum ipse movet ad generationem natorum, unde +dictum est quod, si materialiter tantum aliquis ex carne humana +generaretur, originale peccatum non contraheret. Manifestum est +autem secundum doctrinam philosophorum, quod principium activum in +generatione est a patre, materiam autem mater ministrat. Unde +peccatum originale non contrahitur a matre, sed a patre. Et +secundum hoc, si, Adam non peccante, Eva peccasset, filii originale +peccatum non contraherent. E converso autem esset, si Adam +peccasset, et Eva non peccasset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. + Consequently the comparison fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37071] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod in patre praeexistit filius sicut in principio +activo, sed in matre sicut in principio materiali et passivo. Unde +non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject + to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the + mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q81_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], AA[1]</a>, 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the + original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to + the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing + Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that + the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer + and subject to the necessity of dying. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37072] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod quibusdam videtur quod, Eva peccante, si Adam non +peccasset, filii essent immunes a culpa, paterentur tamen +necessitatem moriendi, et alias passibilitates provenientes ex +necessitate materiae, quam mater ministrat, non sub ratione poenae, +sed sicut quosdam naturales defectus. Sed hoc non videtur +conveniens. Immortalitas enim et impassibilitas primi status non +erat ex conditione materiae, ut in primo dictum est; sed ex +originali iustitiae, per quam corpus subdebatur animae, quandiu +anima esset subiecta Deo. Defectus autem originalis iustitiae est +peccatum originale. Si igitur, Adam non peccante, peccatum +originale non transfunderetur in posteros propter peccatum Evae; +manifestum est quod in filiis non esset defectus originalis +iustitiae. Unde non esset in eis passibilitas vel necessitas +moriendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because + it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy + to receive God unless it be pure, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.92.5" target="asv"> Ps. 92:5</a>: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37073] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa purgatio praeveniens in beata virgine, non +requirebatur ad auferendum transfusionem originalis peccati, sed +quia oportebat ut mater Dei maxima puritate niteret. Non enim est +aliquid digne receptaculum Dei, nisi sit mundum; secundum illud +Psalmi XCII, <i>domum tuam, domine, decet sanctitudo</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q82" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q82-p0.1">Q. 82. OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q82-p2"> We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q82-p3"><a href="#FS_Q82_A1"> (1) Whether original sin is a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p4"><a href="#FS_Q82_A2"> (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p5"><a href="#FS_Q82_A3"> (3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p6"><a href="#FS_Q82_A4"> (4) Whether original sin is equally in all?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 pr."><a name="37074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37074] +Iª-IIae q. 82 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +peccato originali quantum ad suam essentiam. Et circa hoc +quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum originale peccatum sit habitus. +Secundo, utrum sit unum tantum in uno homine. Tertio, utrum sit +concupiscentia. Quarto, utrum sit aequaliter in omnibus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q82_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A1-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 1. Whether original sin is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De + Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin + is not a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37075] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod originale peccatum non sit habitus. +Originale enim peccatum est carentia originalis iustitiae, ut +Anselmus dicit, in libro de concepto virginali, et sic originale +peccatum est quaedam privatio. Sed privatio opponitur habitui. Ergo +originale peccatum non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual + sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original + habit has the nature of a fault. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37076] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actuale peccatum habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale, +inquantum habet plus de ratione voluntarii. Sed habitus actualis +peccati non habet rationem culpae, alioquin sequeretur quod homo +dormiens culpabiliter, peccaret. Ergo nullus habitus originalis +habet rationem culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is + not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37077] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +in malis actus semper praecedit habitum, nullus enim habitus malus +est infusus, sed acquisitus. Sed originale peccatum non praecedit +aliquis actus. Ergo originale peccatum non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little + children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore + original sin is a habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37078] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Baptismo puerorum, quod +secundum peccatum originale parvuli sunt concupiscibiles, etsi non +sint actu concupiscentes. Sed habilitas dicitur secundum aliquem +habitum. Ergo peccatum originale est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[50], A[1]</a>), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. + In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature + is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of + sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction + of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, + by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the + "languor of nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, serm. iii]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 co."><a name="37079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37079] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est habitus. Unus +quidem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum, sicut scientiae et +virtutes habitus dicuntur. Et hoc modo peccatum originale non est +habitus. Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicuius naturae ex +multis compositae, secundum quam bene se habet vel male ad aliquid, +et praecipue cum talis dispositio versa fuerit quasi in naturam, ut +patet de aegritudine et sanitate. Et hoc modo peccatum originale +est habitus. Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex +dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis +iustitiae, sicut etiam aegritudo corporalis est quaedam inordinata +dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur aequalitas in qua +consistit ratio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale languor naturae +dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly + something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original + justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but + a corrupt habit. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37080] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut aegritudo corporalis habet aliquid de +privatione, inquantum tollitur aequalitas sanitatis; et aliquid +habet positive, scilicet ipsos humores inordinate dispositos, ita +etiam peccatum originale habet privationem originalis iustitiae, et +cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae. Unde non est +privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of + nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q82_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and + for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin + cannot. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37081] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actuale peccatum est inordinatio quaedam actus, +originale vero, cum sit peccatum naturae, est quaedam inordinata +dispositio ipsius naturae, quae habet rationem culpae inquantum +derivatur ex primo parente, ut dictum est. Huiusmodi autem +dispositio naturae inordinata habet rationem habitus, sed +inordinata dispositio actus non habet rationem habitus. Et propter +hoc, peccatum originale potest esse habitus, non autem peccatum +actuale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless + a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal + of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements + results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that + original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): + but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37082] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu quo potentia +inclinatur in actum, talis autem habitus non est peccatum +originale. Quamvis etiam ex peccato originali sequatur aliqua +inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte, +scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis iustitiae, +quae prohibebat inordinatos motus, sicut etiam ex aegritudine +corporali indirecte sequitur inclinatio ad motus corporales +inordinatos. Nec debet dici quod peccatum originale sit habitus +infusus; aut acquisitus per actum nisi primi parentis, non autem +huius personae; sed per vitiatam originem innatus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A2-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 2. Whether there are several original sins in one man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.1.7" target="asv">Ps. 1:7</a>): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived + is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37083] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod in uno homine sint multa originalia +peccata. Dicitur enim in Psalmo l, <i>ecce enim in iniquitatibus +conceptus sum, et in peccatis concepit me mater mea</i>. Sed +peccatum in quo homo concipitur, est originale. Ergo plura peccata +originalia sunt in uno homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of + nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original + sin is not one habit; but several. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37084] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unus et idem habitus non inclinat ad contraria, habitus enim +inclinat per modum naturae, quae tendit in unum. Sed peccatum +originale, etiam in uno homine, inclinat ad diversa peccata et +contraria. Ergo peccatum originale non est unus habitus, sed +plures.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, + as shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74" id="FS_Q82_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74])</a>. Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37085] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale inficit omnes animae partes. Sed diversae partes +animae sunt diversa subiecta peccati, ut ex praemissis patet. Cum +igitur unum peccatum non possit esse in diversis subiectis, videtur +quod peccatum originale non sit unum, sed multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular + is that the "sin of the world" is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37086] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit +peccatum mundi</i>. Quod singulariter dicitur, quia peccatum mundi, +quod est peccatum originale, est unum; ut Glossa ibidem +exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original + sin. For it has been stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one + in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken + from the very essence of + original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is + derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. + from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in + number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original + justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can + be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 co."><a name="37087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37087] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in uno homine est unum peccatum originale. Cuius +ratio dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, ex parte causae peccati +originalis. Dictum est enim supra quod solum primum peccatum primi +parentis in posteros traducitur. Unde peccatum originale in uno +homine est unum numero; et in omnibus hominibus est unum +proportione, in respectu scilicet ad primum principium. Alio modo +potest accipi ratio eius ex ipsa essentia originalis peccati. In +omni enim inordinata dispositione unitas speciei consideratur ex +parte causae; unitas autem secundum numerum, ex parte subiecti. +Sicut patet in aegritudine corporali, sunt enim diversae +aegritudines specie quae ex diversis causis procedunt, puta ex +superabundantia calidi vel frigidi, vel ex laesione pulmonis vel +hepatis; una autem aegritudo secundum speciem, in uno homine non +est nisi una numero. Causa autem huius corruptae dispositionis quae +dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio +originalis iustitiae, per quam sublata est subiectio humanae mentis +ad Deum. Et ideo peccatum originale est unum specie. Et in uno +homine non potest esse nisi unum numero, in diversis autem +hominibus est unum specie et proportione, diversum autem +numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of + the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually + pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities + in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so + forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37088] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod pluraliter dicitur in peccatis, secundum illum +morem divinae Scripturae quo frequenter ponitur pluralis numerus +pro singulari, sicut Matth. II, <i>defuncti sunt qui quaerebant +animam pueri</i>. Vel quia in peccato originali virtualiter +praeexistunt omnia peccata actualia, sicut in quodam principio, +unde est multiplex virtute. Vel quia in peccato primi parentis quod +per originem traducitur, fuerunt plures deformitates, scilicet +superbiae, inobedientiae, gulae, et alia huiusmodi. Vel quia multae +partes animae inficiuntur per peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason + why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed + body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, + the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37089] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod unus habitus non potest inclinare per se et directe, +idest per propriam formam, ad contraria. Sed indirecte et per +accidens, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, nihil prohibet, +sicut, soluta harmonia corporis mixti, elementa tendunt in loca +contraria. Et similiter, soluta harmonia originalis iustitiae, +diversae animae potentiae in diversa feruntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice + held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one + man, although the various parts of the body are affected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37090] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum originale inficit diversas partes animae, +secundum quod sunt partes unius totius, sicut et iustitia +originalis continebat omnes animae partes in unum. Et ideo est unum +tantum peccatum originale. Sicut etiam est una febris in uno +homine, quamvis diversae partes corporis graventur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A3-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 3. Whether original sin is concupiscence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide + Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which + is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37091] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit +concupiscentia. Omne enim peccatum est contra naturam, ut dicit +Damascenus, in II libro. Sed concupiscentia est secundum naturam, +est enim proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis, quae est potentia +naturalis. Ergo concupiscentia non est peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37092] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +per peccatum originale sunt in nobis passiones peccatorum; ut patet +per apostolum, Rom. VII. Sed multae aliae sunt passiones praeter +concupiscentiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccatum originale non +magis est concupiscentia quam aliqua alia passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is + the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than + concupiscence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37093] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +per peccatum originale deordinantur omnes animae partes, ut dictum +est. Sed intellectus est suprema inter animae partes; ut patet per +philosophum, in X Ethic. Ergo peccatum originale magis est +ignorantia quam concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37094] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., <i>concupiscentia est +reatus originalis peccati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q82_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered + in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be + considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original + justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function + it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, + all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made + subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material + element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning + inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin + is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 co."><a name="37095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37095] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod unumquodque habet speciem a sua forma. Dictum est +autem supra quod species peccati originalis sumitur ex sua causa. +Unde oportet quod id quod est formale in originali peccato, +accipiatur ex parte causae peccati originalis. Oppositorum autem +oppositae sunt causae. Est igitur attendenda causa originalis +peccati ex causa originalis iustitiae, quae ei opponitur. Tota +autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae ex hoc est, quod voluntas +hominis erat Deo subiecta. Quae quidem subiectio primo et +principaliter erat per voluntatem, cuius est movere omnes alias +partes in finem, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex aversione voluntatis +a Deo, consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae viribus. +Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas +subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali, omnis autem alia +inordinatio virium animae se habet in peccato originali sicut +quiddam materiale. Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae +praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum +commutabile, quae quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici +concupiscentia. Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est +concupiscentia; formaliter vero, defectus originalis iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, + as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, + contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37096] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, quia in homine concupiscibilis naturaliter +regitur ratione, intantum concupiscere est homini naturale, +inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem, concupiscentia autem quae +transcendit limites rationis, est homini contra naturam. Et talis +est concupiscentia originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence + is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, + in a fashion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37097] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis +ad passiones concupiscibilis reducuntur, sicut ad principaliores. +Inter quas concupiscentia vehementius movet, et magis sentitur, ut +supra habitum est. Et ideo concupiscentiae attribuitur, tanquam +principaliori, et in qua quodammodo omnes aliae passiones +includuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found + to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[77], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[80], A[2]</a>). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects + of original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37098] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in bonis intellectus et ratio principalitatem +habent, ita e converso in malis inferior pars animae principalior +invenitur, quae obnubilat et trahit rationem, ut supra dictum est. +Et propter hoc peccatum originale magis dicitur esse concupiscentia +quam ignorantia, licet etiam ignorantia inter defectus materiales +peccati originalis contineatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A4-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 4. Whether original sin is equally in all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above + + <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37099] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit aequaliter +in omnibus. Est enim peccatum originale concupiscentia inordinata, +ut dictum est. Sed non omnes aequaliter sunt proni ad +concupiscendum. Ergo peccatum originale non est aequaliter in +omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. + But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37100] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale est quaedam inordinata dispositio animae, sicut +aegritudo est quaedam inordinata dispositio corporis. Sed aegritudo +recipit magis et minus. Ergo peccatum originale recipit magis et +minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation + may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37101] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nupt. et Concupisc., quod <i>libido +transmittit originale peccatum in prolem</i>. Sed contingit esse +maiorem libidinem unius in actu generationis, quam alterius. Ergo +peccatum originale potest esse maius in uno quam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q82_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37102] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia peccatum originale est peccatum naturae, ut dictum est. +Sed natura aequaliter est in omnibus. Ergo et peccatum +originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation + to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin + has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, + such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q73_A2" id="FS_Q82_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[73], A[2]</a>). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our + corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently + it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 co."><a name="37103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37103] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in originali peccato sunt duo, quorum unum est +defectus originalis iustitiae; aliud autem est relatio huius +defectus ad peccatum primi parentis, a quo per vitiatam originem +deducitur. Quantum autem ad primum, peccatum originale non recipit +magis et minus, quia totum donum originalis iustitiae est sublatum; +privationes autem totaliter aliquid privantes, ut mors et tenebrae, +non recipiunt magis et minus, sicut supra dictum est. Similiter +etiam nec quantum ad secundum, aequaliter enim omnes relationem +habent ad primum principium vitiatae originis, ex quo peccatum +originale recipit rationem culpae; relationes enim non recipiunt +magis et minus. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum originale non +potest esse magis in uno quam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each + power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some + of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently + if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to + original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, + left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37104] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, soluto vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo +quodam ordine omnes vires animae continebantur, unaquaeque vis +animae tendit in suum proprium motum; et tanto vehementius, quanto +fuerit fortior. Contingit autem vires aliquas animae esse fortiores +in uno quam in alio, propter diversas corporis complexiones. Quod +ergo unus homo sit pronior ad concupiscendum quam alter, non est +ratione peccati originalis, cum in omnibus aequaliter solvatur +vinculum originalis iustitiae, et aequaliter in omnibus partes +inferiores animae sibi relinquantur, sed accidit hoc ex diversa +dispositione potentiarum, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused + by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the + cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37105] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod aegritudo corporalis non habet in omnibus aequalem +causam, etiam si sit eiusdem speciei, puta, si sit febris ex +cholera putrefacta, potest esse maior vel minor putrefactio, et +propinquior vel remotior a principio vitae. Sed causa originalis +peccati in omnibus est aequalis. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust + in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive + appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37106] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod libido quae transmittit peccatum originale in prolem, +non est libido actualis, quia dato quod virtute divina concederetur +alicui quod nullam inordinatam libidinem in actu generationis +sentiret, adhuc transmitteret in prolem originale peccatum. Sed +libido illa est intelligenda habitualiter, secundum quod appetitus +sensitivus non continetur sub ratione vinculo originalis iustitiae. +Et talis libido in omnibus est aequalis.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q83" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q83-p0.1">Q. 83. OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q83-p2"> We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q83-p3"><a href="#FS_Q83_A1"> (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p4"><a href="#FS_Q83_A2"> (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p5"><a href="#FS_Q83_A3"> (3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p6"><a href="#FS_Q83_A4"> (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the + sense of touch? + </a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 pr."><a name="37107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37107] +Iª-IIae q. 83 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +subiecto originalis peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. +Primo, utrum subiectum originalis peccati per prius sit caro vel +anima. Secundo, si anima, utrum per essentiam aut per potentias +suas. Tertio, utrum voluntas per prius sit subiectum peccati +originalis quam aliae potentiae. Quarto, utrum aliquae potentiae +animae sint specialiter infectae, scilicet generativa, vis +concupiscibilis et sensus tactus.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q83_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A1-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 1. Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind + arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the + flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37108] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale magis sit in carne +quam in anima. Repugnantia enim carnis ad mentem ex corruptione +originalis peccati procedit. Sed radix huius repugnantiae in carne +consistit, dicit enim apostolus ad Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem +in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Ergo originale +peccatum in carne principaliter consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now + the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather + than in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37109] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +unumquodque potius est in causa quam in effectu, sicut calor magis +est in igne calefaciente quam in aqua calefacta. Sed anima +inficitur infectione originalis peccati per semen carnale. Ergo +peccatum originale magis est in carne quam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our + souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37110] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale ex primo parente contrahimus, prout in eo fuimus +secundum rationem seminalem. Sic autem non fuit ibi anima, sed sola +caro. Ergo originale peccatum non est in anima, sed in carne.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, + it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the + author of the soul's creation and fusion. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37111] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +anima rationalis creata a Deo corpori infunditur. Si igitur anima +per peccatum originale inficeretur, consequens esset quod ex sua +creatione vel infusione inquinaretur. Et sic Deus esset causa +peccati, qui est auctor creationis et infusionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational + soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection + of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is + not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the + flesh. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="37112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37112] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus sapiens liquorem pretiosum vasi infunderet ex quo sciret +ipsum liquorem infici. Sed anima rationalis est pretiosior omni +liquore. Si ergo anima ex corporis unione infici posset infectione +originalis culpae, Deus, qui ipsa sapientia est, nunquam animam +tali corpori infunderet. Infundit autem. Non ergo inquinatur ex +carne. Sic igitur peccatum originale non est in anima, sed in +carne.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of + virtue: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be + the subject of original sin, but only the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37113] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod idem est subiectum virtutis et vitii sive peccati, quod +contrariatur virtuti. Sed caro non potest esse subiectum virtutis, +dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, <i>scio quod non habitat in me, +hoc est in carne mea, bonum</i>. Ergo caro non potest esse +subiectum originalis peccati, sed solum anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. + Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power + of the semen that original sin together with human + nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul. + </p><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p9"> The reason for this is that, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in + the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, + that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that + guilt, either as its + subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues + to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved + by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal + members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt. + </p><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p10"> Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever + accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, + has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the + flesh. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 co."><a name="37114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37114] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid potest esse in aliquo dupliciter, uno modo, +sicut in causa, vel principali vel instrumentali; alio modo, sicut +in subiecto. Peccatum ergo originale omnium hominum fuit quidem in +ipso Adam sicut in prima causa principali; secundum illud apostoli, +Rom. V, <i>in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>. In semine autem corporali +est peccatum originale sicut in causa instrumentali, eo quod per +virtutem activam seminis traducitur peccatum originale in prolem, +simul cum natura humana. Sed sicut in subiecto, peccatum originale +nullo modo potest esse in carne, sed solum in anima. Cuius ratio +est quia, sicut supra dictum est, hoc modo ex voluntate primi +parentis peccatum originale traducitur in posteros per quandam +generativam motionem, sicut a voluntate alicuius hominis derivatur +peccatum actuale ad alias partes eius. In qua quidem derivatione +hoc potest attendi, quod quidquid provenit ex motione voluntatis +peccati ad quamcumque partem hominis quae quocumque modo potest +esse particeps peccati, vel per modum subiecti vel per modum +instrumenti, habet rationem culpae, sicut ex voluntate gulae +provenit concupiscentia cibi ad concupiscibilem, et sumptio cibi ad +manus et os, quae inquantum moventur a voluntate ad peccatum, sunt +instrumenta peccati. Quod vero ulterius derivatur ad vim nutritivam +et ad interiora membra, quae non sunt nata moveri a voluntate, non +habet rationem culpae. Sic igitur, cum anima possit esse subiectum +culpae, caro autem de se non habeat quod sit subiectum culpae; +quidquid provenit de corruptione primi peccati ad animam, habet +rationem culpae; quod autem provenit ad carnem, non habet rationem +culpae, sed poenae. Sic igitur anima est subiectum peccati +originalis, non autem caro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, + who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." + Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37115] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Retract., +apostolus loquitur ibi de homine iam redempto, qui liberatus est a +culpa, sed subiacet poenae, ratione cuius peccatum dicitur habitare +in carne. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod caro sit subiectum culpae, +sed solum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental + cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in + him it had the nature of actual sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37116] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale causatur ex semine sicut ex causa +instrumentali. Non autem oportet quod aliquid sit principalius in +causa instrumentali quam in effectu, sed solum in causa principali. +Et hoc modo peccatum originale potiori modo fuit in Adam, in quo +fuit secundum rationem actualis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but + as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce + the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37117] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod anima huius hominis non fuit secundum seminalem +rationem in Adam peccante sicut in principio effectivo, sed sicut +in principio dispositivo, eo quod semen corporale, quod ex Adam +traducitur, sua virtute non efficit animam rationalem, sed ad eam +disponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. + And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being + created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. + And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained + through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37118] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a +Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationem. +Et ideo, cum creatio importet respectum animae ad solum Deum, non +potest dici quod anima ex sua creatione inquinetur. Sed infusio +importat respectum et ad Deum infundentem, et ad carnem cui +infunditur anima. Et ideo, habito respectu ad Deum infundentem, non +potest dici quod anima per infusionem maculetur; sed solum habito +respectu ad corpus cui infunditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order + of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the + more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A4" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[4]</a>; + <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A3" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[118], A[3]</a>. + And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, + by means of grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="37119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37119] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod bonum commune praefertur bono singulari. Unde Deus, +secundum suam sapientiam, non praetermittit universalem ordinem +rerum, qui est ut tali corpori talis anima infundatur, ut vitetur +singularis infectio huius animae, praesertim cum natura animae hoc +habeat, ut esse non incipiat nisi in corpore, ut in primo habitum +est. Melius est autem ei sic esse secundum naturam, quam nullo modo +esse, praesertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A2-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 2. Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt + to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not + as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only + according to the powers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37120] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit per prius +in essentia animae quam in potentiis. Anima enim nata est esse +subiectum peccati, quantum ad id quod potest a voluntate moveri. +Sed anima non movetur a voluntate secundum suam essentiam, sed +solum secundum potentias. Ergo peccatum originale non est in anima +secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the + subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37121] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale opponitur originali iustitiae. Sed originalis +iustitia erat in aliqua potentia animae, quae est subiectum +virtutis. Ergo et peccatum originale est magis in potentia animae +quam in eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. + But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37122] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut a carne peccatum originale derivatur ad animam, ita ab +essentia animae derivatur ad potentias. Sed peccatum originale +magis est in anima quam in carne. Ergo etiam magis est in potentiis +animae quam in essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q83_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37123] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale dicitur esse concupiscentia, ut dictum est. Sed +concupiscentia est in potentiis animae. Ergo et peccatum +originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, + in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q76_A6" id="FS_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37124] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod peccatum originale dicitur esse peccatum naturale, ut +supra dictum est. Anima autem est forma et natura corporis secundum +essentiam suam, et non secundum potentias, ut in primo habitum est. +Ergo anima est subiectum originalis peccati principaliter secundum +suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the + motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows + that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our + origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the + primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of + the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q76_A6" id="FS_Q83_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 co."><a name="37125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37125] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod illud animae est principaliter subiectum alicuius +peccati, ad quod primo pertinet causa motiva illius peccati, sicut +si causa motiva ad peccandum sit delectatio sensus, quae pertinet +ad vim concupiscibilem sicut obiectum proprium eius, sequitur quod +vis concupiscibilis sit proprium subiectum illius peccati. +Manifestum est autem quod peccatum originale causatur per originem. +Unde illud animae quod primo attingitur ab origine hominis, est +primum subiectum originalis peccati. Attingit autem origo animam ut +terminum generationis, secundum quod est forma corporis; quod +quidem convenit ei secundum essentiam propriam, ut in primo habitum +est. Unde anima secundum essentiam est primum subiectum originalis +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will + of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37126] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod, sicut motio voluntatis alicuius propriae +pervenit ad potentias animae, non autem ad animae essentiam; ita +motio voluntatis primi generantis, per viam generationis, pervenit +primo ad animae essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which + the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the + principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37127] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod etiam originalis iustitia pertinebat primordialiter +ad essentiam animae, erat enim donum divinitus datum humanae +naturae, quam per prius respicit essentia animae quam potentiae. +Potentiae enim magis videntur pertinere ad personam, inquantum sunt +principia personalium actuum. Unde sunt propria subiecta peccatorum +actualium, quae sunt peccata personalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes + first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper + accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison + fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37128] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod corpus comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam, +quae etsi sit posterior ordine generationis, est tamen prior ordine +perfectionis et naturae. Essentia autem animae comparatur ad +potentias sicut subiecta ad accidentia propria, quae sunt +posteriora subiecto et ordine generationis et etiam perfectionis. +Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q83_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37129] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod concupiscentia se habet materialiter et ex +consequenti in peccato originali, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A3-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 3. Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power + by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to + the generative power more than to the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37130] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non per prius +inficiat voluntatem quam alias potentias. Omne enim peccatum +principaliter pertinet ad potentiam per cuius actum causatur. Sed +peccatum originale causatur per actum generativae potentiae. Ergo +inter ceteras potentias animae, videtur magis pertinere ad +generativam potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh + than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin + is in them more than in the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37131] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale per semen carnale traducitur. Sed aliae vires +animae propinquiores sunt carni quam voluntas, sicut patet de +omnibus sensitivis, quae utuntur organo corporali. Ergo in eis +magis est peccatum originale quam in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin + infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37132] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono +intellecto. Si ergo peccatum originale inficit omnes potentias +animae, videtur quod per prius inficiat intellectum, tanquam +priorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. + iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37133] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod iustitia originalis per prius respicit voluntatem, est +enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu +virginali. Ergo et peccatum originale, quod ei opponitur, per prius +respicit voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect + it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q83_A2" id="FS_Q83_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must + therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as + stated + above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 co."><a name="37134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37134] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in infectione peccati originalis duo est considerare. +Primo quidem, inhaerentiam eius ad subiectum, et secundum hoc primo +respicit essentiam animae, ut dictum est. Deinde oportet +considerare inclinationem eius ad actum, et hoc modo respicit +potentias animae. Oportet ergo quod illam per prius respiciat, quae +primam inclinationem habet ad peccandum. Haec autem est voluntas, +ut ex supradictis patet. Unde peccatum originale per prius respicit +voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. + Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37135] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale non causatur in homine per +potentiam generativam prolis, sed per actum potentiae generativae +parentis. Unde non oportet quod sua potentia generativa sit primum +subiectum originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former + follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive + powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, + the infection of original sin reaches it first. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37136] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum originale habet duplicem processum, unum +quidem a carne ad animam; alium vero ab essentia animae ad +potentias. Primus quidem processus est secundum ordinem +generationis, secundus autem secundum ordinem perfectionis. Et ideo +quamvis aliae potentiae, scilicet sensitivae, propinquiores sint +carni; quia tamen voluntas est propinquior essentiae animae, +tanquam superior potentia, primo pervenit ad ipsam infectio +originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, + in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37137] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod intellectus quodam modo praecedit voluntatem, +inquantum proponit ei suum obiectum. Alio vero modo voluntas +praecedit intellectum, secundum ordinem motionis ad actum, quae +quidem motio pertinet ad peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A4-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 4. Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to + pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the + will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37138] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedictae potentiae non sint magis +infectae quam aliae. Infectio enim originalis peccati magis videtur +pertinere ad illam animae partem quae prius potest esse subiectum +peccati. Haec autem est rationalis pars, et praecipue voluntas. +Ergo ipsa est magis infecta per peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot + obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37139] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nulla vis animae inficitur per culpam, nisi inquantum potest +obedire rationi. Generativa autem non potest obedire, ut dicitur in +I Ethic. Ergo generativa non est maxime infecta per originale +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number + of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected + than touch. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37140] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +visus inter alios sensus est spiritualior et propinquior rationi, +inquantum plures differentias rerum ostendit, ut dicitur in I +Metaphys. Sed infectio culpae primo est in ratione. Ergo visus +magis est infectus quam tactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the + members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, + wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection + of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the + concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37141] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod infectio +originalis culpae maxime apparet in motu genitalium membrorum, qui +rationi non subditur. Sed illa membra deserviunt generativae +virtuti in commixtione sexuum, in qua est delectatio secundum +tactum, quae maxime concupiscentiam movet. Ergo infectio originalis +peccati maxime pertinet ad ista tria, scilicet potentiam +generativam, vim concupiscibilem et sensum tactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject + to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption + of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves + the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most + powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original + sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 co."><a name="37142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37142] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod illa corruptio praecipue infectio nominari solet, +quae nata est in aliud transferri, unde et morbi contagiosi, sicut +lepra et scabies et huiusmodi, infectiones dicuntur. Corruptio +autem originalis peccati traducitur per actum generationis, sicut +supra dictum est. Unde potentiae quae ad huiusmodi actum +concurrunt, maxime dicuntur esse infectae. Huiusmodi autem actus +deservit generativae, inquantum ad generationem ordinatur, habet +autem in se delectationem tactus, quae est maximum obiectum +concupiscibilis. Et ideo, cum omnes partes animae dicantur esse +corruptae per peccatum originale, specialiter tres praedictae +dicuntur esse corruptae et infectae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q83_A3" id="FS_Q83_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37143] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale ex ea parte qua inclinat in +peccata actualia, praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem, ut dictum est. +Sed ex ea parte qua traducitur in prolem, pertinet propinque ad +potentias praedictas, ad voluntatem autem remote.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original + sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. + Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37144] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod infectio actualis culpae non pertinet nisi ad +potentias quae moventur a voluntate peccantis. Sed infectio +originalis culpae non derivatur a voluntate eius qui ipsam +contrahit, sed per originem naturae, cui deservit potentia +generativa. Et ideo in ea est infectio originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species + is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to + the touch rather than to the sight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37145] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod visus non pertinet ad actum generationis nisi +secundum dispositionem remotam, prout scilicet per visum apparet +species concupiscibilis. Sed delectatio perficitur in tactu. Et +ideo talis infectio magis attribuitur tactui quam visui.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q84" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q84-p0.1">Q. 84. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q84-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points + of inquiry: + </p><p id="FS_Q84-p3"><a href="#FS_Q84_A1"> (1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p4"><a href="#FS_Q84_A2"> (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p5"><a href="#FS_Q84_A3"> (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p6"><a href="#FS_Q84_A4"> (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 pr."><a name="37146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37146] +Iª-IIae q. 84 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa +peccati secundum quod unum peccatum est causa alterius. Et circa +hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cupiditas sit radix omnium +peccatorum. Secundo, utrum superbia sit initium omnis peccati. +Tertio, utrum praeter superbiam et avaritiam, debeant dici +capitalia vitia aliqua specialia peccata. Quarto, quot et quae sint +capitalia vitia.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q84_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A1-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 1. Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is + opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root + of all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37147] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod cupiditas non sit radix omnium +peccatorum. Cupiditas enim, quae est immoderatus appetitus +divitiarum, opponitur virtuti liberalitatis. Sed liberalitas non +est radix omnium virtutum. Ergo cupiditas non est radix omnium +peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, + are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all + sins, but proceeds from some deeper root. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37148] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, procedit ex appetitu finis. Sed +divitiae, quarum appetitus est cupiditas, non appetuntur nisi ut +utiles ad aliquem finem, sicut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo cupiditas +non est radix omnis peccati, sed procedit ex alia priori +radice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires + money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37149] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +frequenter invenitur quod avaritia, quae cupiditas nominatur, +oritur ex aliis peccatis, puta cum quis appetit pecuniam propter +ambitionem, vel ut satisfaciat gulae. Non ergo est radix omnium +peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>): "The desire of money is the root of all evil." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37150] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ult., <i>radix omnium malorum +est cupiditas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and + thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising + all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A2" id="FS_Q84_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[2]</a>). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods + inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which + draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A1-p7"> Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the + root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they "will become rich, fall into temptation, + and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is evident that he is speaking + of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as + denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the + whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for + any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv"> Eccles. 10:19</a>: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 co."><a name="37151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37151] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod secundum quosdam cupiditas multipliciter dicitur. Uno +modo, prout est appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et sic est +speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum quod significat inordinatum +appetitum cuiuscumque boni temporalis. Et sic est genus omnis +peccati, nam in omni peccato est inordinata conversio ad +commutabile bonum, ut dictum est. Tertio modo sumitur prout +significat quandam inclinationem naturae corruptae ad bona +corruptibilia inordinate appetenda. Et sic dicunt cupiditatem esse +radicem omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae +ex terra trahit alimentum, sic enim ex amore rerum temporalium omne +peccatum procedit. Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, non tamen +videntur esse secundum intentionem apostoli, qui dixit cupiditatem +esse radicem omnium peccatorum. Manifeste enim ibi loquitur contra +eos qui, <i>cum velint divites fieri, incidunt in tentationes et in +laqueum Diaboli, eo quod radix omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>, +unde manifestum est quod loquitur de cupiditate secundum quod est +appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et secundum hoc, dicendum est +quod cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, dicitur radix +omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae alimentum +praestat toti arbori. Videmus enim quod per divitias homo acquirit +facultatem perpetrandi quodcumque peccatum, et adimplendi +desiderium cuiuscumque peccati, eo quod ad habenda quaecumque +temporalia bona, potest homo per pecuniam iuvari; secundum quod +dicitur Eccle. X, <i>pecuniae obediunt omnia</i>. Et secundum hoc, +patet quod cupiditas divitiarum est radix omnium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire + of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire + for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37152] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non ab eodem oritur virtus et peccatum. Oritur +enim peccatum ex appetitu commutabilis boni, et ideo appetitus +illius boni quod iuvat ad consequenda omnia temporalia bona, radix +peccatorum dicitur. Virtus autem oritur ex appetitu incommutabilis +boni, et ideo caritas, quae est amor Dei, ponitur radix virtutum; +secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et +fundati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last + end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than + a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by + means of money. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37153] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod appetitus pecuniarum dicitur esse radix peccatorum, +non quia divitiae propter se quaerantur, tanquam ultimus finis, sed +quia multum quaeruntur ut utiles ad omnem temporalem finem. Et quia +universale bonum est appetibilius quam aliquod particulare bonum, +ideo magis movent appetitum quam quaedam bona singularia, quae +simul cum multis aliis per pecuniam haberi possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature + of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what + happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So + when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no + other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37154] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus non quaeritur quid semper +fiat, sed quid in pluribus accidit, eo quod natura corruptibilium +rerum impediri potest, ut non semper eodem modo operetur; ita etiam +in moralibus consideratur quod ut in pluribus est, non autem quod +est semper, eo quod voluntas non ex necessitate operatur. Non +igitur dicitur avaritia radix omnis mali, quin interdum aliquod +aliud malum sit radix eius, sed quia ex ipsa frequentius alia mala +oriuntur, ratione praedicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A2-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 2. Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning + of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37155] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit initium omnis +peccati. Radix enim est quoddam principium arboris, et ita videtur +idem esse radix peccati et initium peccati. Sed cupiditas est radix +omnis peccati, ut dictum est. Ergo ipsa etiam est initium omnis +peccati, non autem superbia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore + another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37156] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Eccli. X dicitur, <i>initium superbiae hominis apostatare a +Deo</i>. Sed apostasia a Deo est quoddam peccatum. Ergo aliquod +peccatum est initium superbiae, et ipsa non est initium omnis +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, + according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning + of every sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37157] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +illud videtur esse initium omnis peccati, quod facit omnia peccata. +Sed hoc est inordinatus amor sui, qui facit civitatem Babylonis, ut +Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo amor sui est initium +omnis peccati, non autem superbia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37158] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. X, <i>initium omnis peccati +superbia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin. + Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it + is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense + they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, + because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, + for which reason covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment + man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of evil consists in turning + away from God. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A2-p7"> Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel, + as is clear from what follows (verse 17): "God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the point of + nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the + beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, + and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18], + A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he + may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is + said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which + by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, + from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 co."><a name="37159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37159] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam dicunt superbiam dici tripliciter. Uno modo, +secundum quod superbia significat inordinatum appetitum propriae +excellentiae. Et sic est speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum +quod importat quendam actualem contemptum Dei, quantum ad hunc +effectum qui est non subdi eius praecepto. Et sic dicunt quod est +generale peccatum. Tertio modo, secundum quod importat quandam +inclinationem ad huiusmodi contemptum, ex corruptione naturae. Et +sic dicunt quod est initium omnis peccati. Et differt a cupiditate, +quia cupiditas respicit peccatum ex parte conversionis ad bonum +commutabile, ex quo peccatum quodammodo nutritur et fovetur, et +propter hoc cupiditas dicitur radix, sed superbia respicit peccatum +ex parte aversionis a Deo, cuius praecepto homo subdi recusat; et +ideo vocatur initium, quia ex parte aversionis incipit ratio mali. +Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, tamen non sunt secundum +intentionem sapientis, qui dixit, initium omnis peccati est +superbia. Manifeste enim loquitur de superbia secundum quod est +inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae, ut patet per hoc quod +subdit, <i>sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus</i>. Et de hac +materia fere loquitur in toto capitulo. Et ideo dicendum est quod +superbia, etiam secundum quod est speciale peccatum, est initium +omnis peccati. Considerandum est enim quod in actibus voluntariis, +cuiusmodi sunt peccata, duplex ordo invenitur, scilicet +intentionis, et executionis. In primo quidem ordine, habet rationem +principii finis, ut supra multoties dictum est. Finis autem in +omnibus bonis temporalibus acquirendis, est ut homo per illa +quandam perfectionem et excellentiam habeat. Et ideo ex hac parte +superbia, quae est appetitus excellentiae, ponitur initium omnis +peccati. Sed ex parte executionis, est primum id quod praebet +opportunitatem adimplendi omnia desideria peccati, quod habet +rationem radicis, scilicet divitiae. Et ideo ex hac parte avaritia +ponitur esse radix omnium malorum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37160] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc +patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the + fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. + Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of + every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that + apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic + of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted + up, in respect of the other species of pride. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37161] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae ex +parte aversionis, ex hoc enim quod homo non vult subdi Deo, +sequitur quod inordinate velit propriam excellentiam in rebus +temporalibus. Et sic apostasia a Deo non sumitur ibi quasi speciale +peccatum, sed magis ut quaedam conditio generalis omnis peccati, +quae est aversio ab incommutabili bono. Vel potest dici quod +apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae, quia est prima +superbiae species. Ad superbiam enim pertinet cuicumque superiori +nolle subiici, et praecipue nolle subdi Deo; ex quo contingit quod +homo supra seipsum indebite extollatur, quantum ad alias superbiae +species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently + it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37162] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in hoc homo se amat, quod sui excellentiam vult, idem +enim est se amare quod sibi velle bonum. Unde ad idem pertinet quod +ponatur initium omnis peccati superbia, vel amor proprius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A3-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 3. Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to + be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore + covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37163] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter superbiam et avaritiam, non +sint quaedam alia peccata specialia quae dicantur capitalia. <i>Ita +enim se videtur habere caput ad animalia, sicut radix ad +plantas</i>, ut dicitur in II de anima, nam radices sunt ori +similes. Si igitur cupiditas dicitur radix omnium malorum, videtur +quod ipsa sola debeat dici vitium capitale, et nullum aliud +peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from + the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called + capital. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37164] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +caput habet quendam ordinem ad alia membra, inquantum a capite +diffunditur quodammodo sensus et motus. Sed peccatum dicitur per +privationem ordinis. Ergo peccatum non habet rationem capitis. Et +ita non debent poni aliqua capitalia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished + thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37165] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +capitalia crimina dicuntur quae capite plectuntur. Sed tali poena +puniuntur quaedam peccata in singulis generibus. Ergo vitia +capitalia non sunt aliqua determinata secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37166] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., enumerat quaedam specialia vitia, +quae dicit esse capitalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which + is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even + men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head" + taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which + capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in + which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital + vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A6" id="FS_Q84_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[6]</a>). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director + and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander + in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 co."><a name="37167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37167] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod capitale a capite dicitur. Caput autem proprie quidem +est quoddam membrum animalis, quod est principium et directivum +totius animalis. Unde metaphorice omne principium caput vocatur, et +etiam homines qui alios dirigunt et gubernant, capita aliorum +dicuntur. Dicitur ergo vitium capitale uno modo a capite proprie +dicto, et secundum hoc, peccatum capitale dicitur peccatum quod +capitis poena punitur. Sed sic nunc non intendimus de capitalibus +peccatis, sed secundum quod alio modo dicitur peccatum capitale a +capite prout metaphorice significat principium vel directivum +aliorum. Et sic dicitur vitium capitale ex quo alia vitia oriuntur, +et praecipue secundum originem causae finalis, quae est formalis +origo, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo vitium capitale non solum est +principium aliorum, sed etiam est directivum et quodammodo ductivum +aliorum, semper enim ars vel habitus ad quem pertinet finis, +principatur et imperat circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde Gregorius, +XXXI Moral., huiusmodi vitia capitalia ducibus exercituum +comparat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some + property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have + the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but + also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37168] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod capitale dicitur denominative a capite, quod +quidem est per quandam derivationem vel participationem capitis, +sicut habens aliquam proprietatem capitis, non sicut simpliciter +caput. Et ideo capitalia vitia dicuntur non solum illa quae habent +rationem primae originis, sicut avaritia, quae dicitur radix, et +superbia, quae dicitur initium, sed etiam illa quae habent rationem +originis propinquae respectu plurium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine + (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it + regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37169] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum caret ordine ex parte aversionis, ex hac +enim parte habet rationem mali; <i>malum autem</i>, secundum +Augustinum, in libro de natura boni, <i>est privatio modi, speciei +et ordinis</i>. Sed ex parte conversionis, respicit quoddam bonum. +Et ideo ex hac parte potest habere ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37170] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de capitali peccato secundum quod +dicitur a reatu poenae. Sic autem hic non loquimur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A4-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 4. Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, + lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[2]</a>). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37171] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum septem esse vitia +capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, +avaritia, gula, luxuria. Peccata enim virtutibus opponuntur. +Virtutes autem principales sunt quatuor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +et vitia principalia, sive capitalia, non sunt nisi quatuor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77" id="FS_Q84_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[77])</a>. But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, + whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and + sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37172] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +passiones animae sunt quaedam causae peccati, ut supra dictum est. +Sed passiones animae principales sunt quatuor. De quarum duabus +nulla fit mentio inter praedicta peccata, scilicet de spe et +timore. Enumerantur autem aliqua vitia ad quae pertinet delectatio +et tristitia, nam delectatio pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam, +tristitia vero ad acediam et invidiam. Ergo inconvenienter +enumerantur principalia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37173] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +ira non est principalis passio. Non ergo debuit poni inter +principalia vitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37174] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut cupiditas, sive avaritia, est radix peccati, ita superbia est +peccati initium, ut supra dictum est. Sed avaritia ponitur unum de +septem vitiis capitalibus. Ergo superbia inter vitia capitalia +enumeranda esset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, + or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently + enumerated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="37175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37175] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +quaedam peccata committuntur quae ex nullo horum causari possunt, +sicut cum aliquis errat ex ignorantia; vel cum aliquis ex aliqua +bona intentione committit aliquod peccatum, puta cum aliquis +furatur ut det eleemosynam. Ergo insufficienter capitalia vitia +enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37176] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in +contrarium est auctoritas Gregorii sic enumerantis, XXXI +Moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A3" id="FS_Q84_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take + place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for + one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come + under the consideration of art, because man's + particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: + and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration + of art. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p9"> Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; + and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite + in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, + moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one + seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p10"> Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of + appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately + by "vainglory." Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. + meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual + intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness" + is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p11"> Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now + in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, + which is desired by "pride" or "vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in riches that give promise + thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, + 6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue. + </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p12"> On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect + of one's own good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily + labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to "envy," which + is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination + with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 co."><a name="37177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37177] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitia capitalia dicuntur ex quibus +alia oriuntur, praecipue secundum rationem causae finalis. +Huiusmodi autem origo potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, +secundum conditionem peccantis, qui sic dispositus est ut maxime +afficiatur ad unum finem, ex quo ut plurimum in alia peccata +procedat. Sed iste modus originis sub arte cadere non potest, eo +quod infinitae sunt particulares hominum dispositiones. Alio modo, +secundum naturalem habitudinem ipsorum finium ad invicem. Et +secundum hoc, ut in pluribus unum vitium ex alio oritur. Unde iste +modus originis sub arte cadere potest. Secundum hoc ergo, illa +vitia capitalia dicuntur, quorum fines habent quasdam primarias +rationes movendi appetitum, et secundum harum rationum +distinctionem, distinguuntur capitalia vitia. Movet autem aliquid +appetitum dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et per se, et hoc modo +bonum movet appetitum ad prosequendum, malum autem, secundum eandem +rationem, ad fugiendum. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per aliud, +sicut aliquis aliquod malum prosequitur propter aliquod bonum +adiunctum, vel aliquod bonum fugit propter aliquod malum adiunctum. +Bonum autem hominis est triplex. Est enim primo quoddam bonum +animae, quod scilicet ex sola apprehensione rationem +appetibilitatis habet, scilicet excellentia laudis vel honoris, et +hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur inanis gloria. Aliud est bonum +corporis, et hoc vel pertinet ad conservationem individui, sicut +cibus et potus, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur gula; aut ad +conservationem speciei, sicut coitus, et ad hoc ordinatur luxuria. +Tertium bonum est exterius, scilicet divitiae, et ad hoc ordinatur +avaritia. Et eadem quatuor vitia inordinate fugiunt mala contraria. +Vel aliter, bonum praecipue movet appetitum ex hoc quod participat +aliquid de proprietate felicitatis, quam naturaliter omnes +appetunt. De cuius ratione est quidem primo quaedam perfectio, nam +felicitas est perfectum bonum, ad quod pertinet excellentia vel +claritas, quam appetit superbia vel inanis gloria. Secundo de +ratione eius est sufficientia, quam appetit avaritia in divitiis +eam promittentibus. Tertio est de conditione eius delectatio, sine +qua felicitas esse non potest, ut dicitur in I et X Ethic., et hanc +appetunt gula et luxuria. Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter +aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc +est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de +bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de +bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad +invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum +propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad +vindictam, et sic est ira. Et ad eadem etiam vitia pertinet +prosecutio mali oppositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, + or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need + for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37178] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod non est eadem ratio originis in virtutibus et +vitiis, nam virtutes causantur per ordinem appetitus ad rationem, +vel etiam ad bonum incommutabile, quod est Deus; vitia autem +oriuntur ex appetitu boni commutabilis. Unde non oportet quod +principalia vitia opponantur principalibus virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible + part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among + the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A4" id="FS_Q84_A4-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[4]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37179] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod timor et spes sunt passiones irascibilis. Omnes autem +passiones irascibilis oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, quae +etiam omnes ordinantur quodammodo ad delectationem et tristitiam. +Et ideo delectatio et tristitia principaliter connumerantur in +peccatis capitalibus, tanquam principalissimae passiones, ut supra +habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special + kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. + of the right to vengeance. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37180] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ira, licet non sit principalis passio, quia tamen +habet specialem rationem appetitivi motus, prout aliquis impugnat +bonum alterius sub ratione honesti, idest iusti vindicativi; ideo +distinguitur ab aliis capitalibus vitiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q84_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>: and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal + vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27). + But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.2" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37181] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse initium omnis peccati secundum +rationem finis, ut dictum est. Et secundum eandem rationem +accipitur principalitas vitiorum capitalium. Et ideo superbia, +quasi universale vitium, non connumeratur, sed magis ponitur velut +regina quaedam omnium vitiorum, sicut Gregorius dicit. Avaritia +autem dicitur radix secundum aliam rationem, sicut supra dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from + arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, + to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the + ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should + not be done that good may come of it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="37182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37182] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod ista vitia dicuntur capitalia, quia ex eis ut +frequentius alia oriuntur. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua peccata +interdum ex aliis causis oriri. Potest tamen dici quod omnia +peccata quae ex ignorantia proveniunt, possunt reduci ad acediam, +ad quam pertinet negligentia qua aliquis recusat bona spiritualia +acquirere propter laborem, ignorantia enim quae potest esse causa +peccati, ex negligentia provenit, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem +aliquis committat aliquod peccatum ex bona intentione, videtur ad +ignorantiam pertinere, inquantum scilicet ignorat quod non sunt +facienda mala ut veniant bona.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q85" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q85-p0.1">Q. 85. OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q85-p2"> We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the + debt of punishment. + </p><p id="FS_Q85-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q85-p4"><a href="#FS_Q85_A1"> (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p5"><a href="#FS_Q85_A2"> (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p6"><a href="#FS_Q85_A3"> (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p7"><a href="#FS_Q85_A4"> (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p8"><a href="#FS_Q85_A5"> (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p9"><a href="#FS_Q85_A6"> (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 pr."><a name="37183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37183] +Iª-IIae q. 85 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +effectibus peccati. Et primo quidem, de corruptione boni naturae; +secundo, de macula animae; tertio, de reatu poenae. Circa primum +quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum naturae diminuatur per peccatum. +Secundo, utrum totaliter tolli possit. Tertio, de quatuor +vulneribus quae Beda ponit, quibus natura humana vulnerata est +propter peccatum. Quarto, utrum privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, +sit effectus peccati. Quinto, utrum mors et alii defectus +corporales sint effectus peccati. Sexto, utrum sint aliquo modo +homini naturales.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q85_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A1-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 1. Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good + remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of + human nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37184] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non diminuat bonum naturae. +Peccatum enim hominis non est gravius quam peccatum Daemonis. Sed +bona naturalia in Daemonibus manent integra post peccatum, ut +Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum etiam bonum +naturae humanae non diminuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when + its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary + act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37185] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +transmutato posteriori, non transmutatur prius, manet enim +substantia eadem, transmutatis accidentibus. Sed natura praeexistit +actioni voluntariae. Ergo, facta deordinatione circa actionem +voluntariam per peccatum, non transmutatur propter hoc natura, ita +quod bonum naturae diminuatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although + it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, + diminish the good of his nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37186] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum est actus quidam, diminutio autem passio. Nullum autem +agens, ex hoc ipso quod agit, patitur, potest autem contingere quod +in unum agat, et ab alio patiatur. Ergo ille qui peccat, per +peccatum non diminuit bonum suae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected + to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a + subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37187] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +nullum accidens agit in suum subiectum, quia quod patitur, est +potentia ens; quod autem subiicitur accidenti, iam est actu ens +secundum accidens illud. Sed peccatum est in bono naturae sicut +accidens in subiecto. Ergo peccatum non diminuit bonum naturae, +diminuere enim quoddam agere est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.30" target="asv">Lk. 10:30</a>), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the + Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37188] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. X, <i>homo descendens a Ierusalem in +Iericho, idest in defectum peccati, expoliatur gratuitis et +vulneratur in naturalibus</i>, ut Beda exponit. Ergo peccatum +diminuit bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties + that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[63], A[1]</a>), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of + human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A1-p8"> Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was + entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, + is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[1]</a>). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the + other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there + results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 co."><a name="37189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37189] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici. Primo, +ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus natura constituitur, et +proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae et alia +huiusmodi. Secundo, quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad +virtutem, ut supra habitum est, ipsa inclinatio ad virtutem est +quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae donum +originalis iustitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti +humanae naturae. Primum igitur bonum naturae nec tollitur nec +diminuitur per peccatum. Tertium vero bonum naturae totaliter est +ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturae, +scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, diminuitur per +peccatum. Per actus enim humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes +actus, ut supra habitum est. Oportet autem quod ex hoc quod aliquid +inclinatur ad unum contrariorum, diminuatur inclinatio eius ad +aliud. Unde cum peccatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod +homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae quod est inclinatio ad +virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone + may see who reads the context. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37190] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de bono primo naturae, quod +est esse, vivere et intelligere; ut patet eius verba intuenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not + changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed + to its term. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37191] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod natura, etsi sit prior quam voluntaria actio, tamen +habet inclinationem ad quandam voluntariam actionem. Unde ipsa +natura secundum se non variatur propter variationem voluntariae +actionis, sed ipsa inclinatio variatur ex illa parte qua ordinatur +ad terminum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something + is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits ( + <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q85_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37192] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actio voluntaria procedit ex diversis potentiis, +quarum una est activa et alia passiva. Et ex hoc contingit quod per +actiones voluntarias causatur aliquid, vel aufertur ab homine sic +agente, ut supra dictum est, cum de generatione habituum +ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness + makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as + sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness + of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the + fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive + appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[77], AA[1]</a>, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object + acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37193] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod accidens non agit effective in subiectum; agit tamen +formaliter in ipsum, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod albedo facit +album. Et sic nihil prohibet quod peccatum diminuat bonum naturae, +eo tamen modo quo est ipsa diminutio boni naturae, inquantum +pertinet ad inordinationem actus. Sed quantum ad inordinationem +agentis, oportet dicere quod talis inordinatio causatur per hoc +quod in actibus animae aliquid est activum et aliquid passivum, +sicut sensibile movet appetitum sensitivum, et appetitus sensitivus +inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc +causatur inordinatio, non quidem ita quod accidens agat in proprium +subiectum; sed secundum quod obiectum agit in potentiam, et una +potentia agit in aliam, et deordinat ipsam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A2-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 2. Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since + human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore + the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37194] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod totum bonum humanae naturae possit per +peccatum auferri. Bonum enim naturae humanae finitum est, cum et +ipsa natura humana sit finita. Sed quodlibet finitum totaliter +consumitur, facta continua ablatione. Cum ergo bonum naturae +continue per peccatum diminui possit, videtur quod possit quandoque +totaliter consumi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and + all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away + by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37195] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eorum quae sunt unius naturae, similis est ratio de toto et de +partibus, sicut patet in aere et in aqua et carne, et omnibus +corporibus similium partium. Sed bonum naturae est totaliter +uniforme. Cum igitur pars eius possit auferri per peccatum, totum +etiam per peccatum auferri posse videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in + some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can + take away the good of nature entirely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37196] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +bonum naturae quod per peccatum minuitur, est habilitas ad +virtutem. Sed in quibusdam propter peccatum habilitas praedicta +totaliter tollitur, ut patet in damnatis, qui reparari ad virtutem +non possunt, sicut nec caecus ad visum. Ergo peccatum potest +totaliter tollere bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good + of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does + not destroy it entirely. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37197] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non est nisi in +bono. Sed malum culpae non potest esse in bono virtutis vel +gratiae, quia est ei contrarium. Ergo oportet quod sit in bono +naturae. Non ergo totaliter tollit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the + very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act + virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be + capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible + for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p7"> Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made + use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher + says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at + last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, + however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, + as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, + provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question + at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it + be a more grievous sin. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p8"> We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle + term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its + term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, secondly, on the + part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated + above + <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were + diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. + Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident + that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, + inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this + inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, + from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, + although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 co."><a name="37198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37198] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum naturae quod per peccatum +diminuitur, est naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem. Quae quidem +convenit homini ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est, ex hoc enim habet +quod secundum rationem operetur, quod est agere secundum virtutem. +Per peccatum autem non potest totaliter ab homine tolli quod sit +rationalis, quia iam non esset capax peccati. Unde non est +possibile quod praedictum naturae bonum totaliter tollatur. Cum +autem inveniatur huiusmodi bonum continue diminui per peccatum, +quidam ad huius manifestationem usi sunt quodam exemplo, in quo +invenitur aliquod finitum in infinitum diminui, nunquam tamen +totaliter consumi. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Physic., quod si +ab aliqua magnitudine finita continue auferatur aliquid secundum +eandem quantitatem, totaliter tandem consumetur, puta si a +quacumque quantitate finita semper subtraxero mensuram palmi. Si +vero fiat subtractio semper secundum eandem proportionem, et non +secundum eandem quantitatem, poterit in infinitum subtrahi, puta, +si quantitas dividatur in duas partes, et a dimidio subtrahatur +dimidium, ita in infinitum poterit procedi; ita tamen quod semper +quod posterius subtrahitur, erit minus eo quod prius subtrahebatur. +Sed hoc in proposito non habet locum, non enim sequens peccatum +minus diminuit bonum naturae quam praecedens, sed forte magis, si +sit gravius. Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod praedicta inclinatio +intelligitur ut media inter duo, fundatur enim sicut in radice in +natura rationali, et tendit in bonum virtutis sicut in terminum et +finem. Dupliciter igitur potest intelligi eius diminutio, uno modo, +ex parte radicis; alio modo, ex parte termini. Primo quidem modo +non diminuitur per peccatum, eo quod peccatum non diminuit ipsam +naturam, ut supra dictum est. Sed diminuitur secundo modo, +inquantum scilicet ponitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum. Si +autem primo modo diminueretur, oporteret quod quandoque totaliter +consumeretur, natura rationali totaliter consumpta. Sed quia +diminuitur ex parte impedimenti quod apponitur ne pertingat ad +terminum, manifestum est quod diminui quidem potest in infinitum, +quia in infinitum possunt impedimenta apponi, secundum quod homo +potest in infinitum addere peccatum peccato, non tamen potest +totaliter consumi, quia semper manet radix talis inclinationis. +Sicut patet in diaphano corpore, quod quidem habet inclinationem ad +susceptionem lucis ex hoc ipso quod est diaphanum, diminuitur autem +haec inclinatio vel habilitas ex parte nebularum supervenientium, +cum tamen semper maneat in radice naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this + neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37199] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quando fit diminutio per +subtractionem. Hic autem fit diminutio per appositionem +impedimenti, quod neque tollit neque diminuit radicem +inclinationis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, + in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37200] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod inclinatio naturalis est quidem tota uniformis, sed +tamen habet respectum et ad principium et ad terminum, secundum +quam diversitatem quodammodo diminuitur et quodammodo non +diminuitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not + reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains + in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced + to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ + requisite for sight. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37201] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod etiam in damnatis manet naturalis inclinatio ad +virtutem, alioquin non esset in eis remorsus conscientiae. Sed quod +non reducatur in actum, contingit quia deest gratia, secundum +divinam iustitiam. Sicut etiam in caeco remanet aptitudo ad +videndum in ipsa radice naturae, inquantum est animal naturaliter +habens visum, sed non reducitur in actum, quia deest causa quae +reducere possit formando organum quod requiritur ad videndum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A3-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 3. Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent + upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as + appears from what has been said above ( + <a href="#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[77], AA[3]</a>,5; + <a href="#FS_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.3" shape="rect"> Q[78], A[1]</a>). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of + sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37202] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur vulnera +naturae esse, ex peccato consequentia, infirmitas, ignorantia, +malitia et concupiscentia. Non enim idem est effectus et causa +eiusdem. Sed ista ponuntur causae peccatorum, ut ex supradictis +patet. Ergo non debent poni effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37203] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +malitia nominat quoddam peccatum. Non ergo debet poni inter +effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should + not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37204] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +concupiscentia est quiddam naturale, cum sit actus virtutis +concupiscibilis. Sed illud quod est naturale, non debet poni vulnus +naturae. Ergo concupiscentia non debet poni vulnus naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it has been stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be + condivided with weakness. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37205] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dictum est quod idem est peccare ex infirmitate, et ex passione. +Sed concupiscentia passio quaedam est. Ergo non debet contra +infirmitatem dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, + viz. ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which four do not coincide with the four in question. + Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="37206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37206] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus, in libro de natura et gratia, ponit duo poenalia animae +peccanti, scilicet ignorantiam et difficultatem, ex quibus oritur +error et cruciatus, quae quidem quatuor non concordant istis +quatuor. Ergo videtur quod alterum eorum insufficienter +ponatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known]. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37207] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> In +contrarium est auctoritas Bedae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected + by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already + stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q85_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed + to virtue; which destitution is + called a wounding of nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p9"> Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q85_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[2]</a>), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, + the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; + in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in + so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible + is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p10"> Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since + the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in + practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult + and concupiscence more impetuous. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 co."><a name="37208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37208] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat +inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei +subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum +primi parentis, sicut iam dictum est. Et ideo omnes vires animae +remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter +ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae +dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae quae possunt esse +subiecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio, in qua est +prudentia; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est +fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo +ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; +inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus +malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad +arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia +destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus +concupiscentiae. Sic igitur ita quatuor sunt vulnera inflicta toti +humanae naturae ex peccato primi parentis. Sed quia inclinatio ad +bonum virtutis in unoquoque diminuitur per peccatum actuale, ut ex +dictis patet, et ista sunt quatuor vulnera ex aliis peccatis +consequentia, inquantum scilicet per peccatum et ratio hebetatur, +praecipue in agendis; et voluntas induratur ad bonum; et maior +difficultas bene agendi accrescit; et concupiscentia magis +exardescit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, + is more easily inclined to sin again. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37209] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est effectus unius +peccati, esse causam peccati alterius. Ex hoc enim quod anima +deordinatur per peccatum praecedens, facilius inclinatur ad +peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.8.21" target="asv"> Gn. 8:21</a>: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil + from his youth.']. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37210] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod malitia non sumitur hic pro peccato, sed pro quadam +pronitate voluntatis ad malum; secundum quod dicitur Gen. VIII, +<i>proni sunt sensus hominis ad malum ab adolescentia sua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the + bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37211] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, concupiscentia intantum est +naturalis homini, inquantum subditur rationi. Quod autem excedat +limites rationis, hoc est homini contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs + the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="37212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37212] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod infirmitas communiter potest dici omnis passio, +inquantum debilitat robur animae et impedit rationem. Sed Beda +accepit infirmitatem stricte, secundum quod opponitur fortitudini, +quae pertinet ad irascibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, + viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the + good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects + of his concupiscence. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="37213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37213] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum +dicendum quod difficultas quae ponitur in libro Augustini, includit +ista tria quae pertinent ad appetitivas potentias, scilicet +malitiam, infirmitatem et concupiscentiam, ex his enim tribus +contingit quod aliquis non facile tendit in bonum. Error autem et +dolor sunt vulnera consequentia, ex hoc enim aliquis dolet, quod +infirmatur circa ea quae concupiscit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A4-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 4. Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) + that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no + good at all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37214] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non +sit effectus peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de natura +boni, quod <i>ubi haec tria magna sunt, magnum bonum est; ubi +parva, parvum; ubi nulla, nullum</i>. Sed peccatum non annullat +bonum naturae. Ergo non privat modum, speciem et ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the "privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De + Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37215] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil est causa sui ipsius. Sed ipsum peccatum est privatio modi, +speciei et ordinis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni. +Ergo privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non est effectus +peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding + privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species + and order is not the effect of each sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37216] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +diversa peccata diversos habent effectus. Sed modus, species et +ordo, cum sint quaedam diversa, diversas privationes habere +videntur. Ergo per diversa peccata privantur. Non ergo est effectus +cuiuslibet peccati privatio modi, speciei et ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.3" target="asv"> Ps. 6:3, </a> "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37217] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod peccatum est in anima sicut infirmitas in corpore; +secundum illud Psalmi VI, <i>miserere mei, domine, quoniam infirmus +sum</i>. Sed infirmitas privat modum, speciem et ordinem ipsius +corporis. Ergo peccatum privat modum, speciem et ordinem +animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the + <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q85_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>, mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being + and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether substantial + or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms + of things are like numbers," so that + a form has a certain "mode" corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of "order" to + something else. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A4-p7"> Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there + is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed + nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and + this is diminished by sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a> ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. + Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. + Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of + which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes + mode, species and order. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 co."><a name="37218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37218] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, modus, species et ordo +consequuntur unumquodque bonum creatum inquantum huiusmodi, et +etiam unumquodque ens. Omne enim esse et bonum consideratur per +aliquam formam, secundum quam sumitur species. Forma autem +uniuscuiusque rei, qualiscumque sit, sive substantialis sive +accidentalis, est secundum aliquam mensuram, unde et in VIII +Metaphys. dicitur quod formae rerum sunt sicut numeri. Et ex hoc +habet modum quendam, qui mensuram respicit. Ex forma vero sua +unumquodque ordinatur ad aliud. Sic igitur secundum diversos gradus +bonorum, sunt diversi gradus modi, speciei et ordinis. Est ergo +quoddam bonum pertinens ad ipsam substantiam naturae, quod habet +suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et illud nec privatur nec +diminuitur per peccatum. Est etiam quoddam bonum naturalis +inclinationis, et hoc etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, +et hoc diminuitur per peccatum, ut dictum est, sed non totaliter +tollitur. Est etiam quoddam bonum virtutis et gratiae, quod etiam +habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc totaliter tollitur per +peccatum mortale. Est etiam quoddam bonum quod est ipse actus +ordinatus, quod etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et +huius privatio est essentialiter ipsum peccatum. Et sic patet +qualiter peccatum et est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis; et +privat vel diminuit modum, speciem et ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1&2:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37219] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad duo prima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37220] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod modus, species et ordo se consequuntur, sicut ex +dictis patet. Unde simul privantur et diminuuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A5-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 5. Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now + these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these + defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q82_A4" id="FS_Q85_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37221] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et alii corporales defectus non +sint effectus peccati. Si enim causa fuerit aequalis, et effectus +erit aequalis. Sed huiusmodi defectus non sunt aequales in omnibus, +sed in quibusdam huiusmodi defectus magis abundant, cum tamen +peccatum originale sit in omnibus aequale, sicut dictum est, cuius +videntur huiusmodi defectus maxime esse effectus. Ergo mors et +huiusmodi defectus non sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism + or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37222] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed remoto omni peccato per +Baptismum vel poenitentiam, non removentur huiusmodi defectus. Ergo +non sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of + the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects + are not the result of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37223] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum actuale habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale. Sed +peccatum actuale non transmutat naturam corporis ad aliquem +defectum. Ergo multo minus peccatum originale. Non ergo mors et +alii defectus corporales sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>), "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37224] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in +hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing + is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the + effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner, + it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one + thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by + displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause + of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken + away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder + whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the + soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q85_A3" id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[82], A[3]), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A5-p7"> Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, + death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the + sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 co."><a name="37225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37225] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliquid est causa alterius dupliciter, uno quidem +modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem est causa +alterius quod secundum virtutem suae naturae vel formae producit +effectum, unde sequitur quod effectus sit per se intentus a causa. +Unde cum mors et huiusmodi defectus sint praeter intentionem +peccantis, manifestum est quod peccatum non est per se causa +istorum defectuum. Per accidens autem aliquid est causa alterius, +si sit causa removendo prohibens, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic. +quod <i>divellens columnam, per accidens movet lapidem columnae +superpositum</i>. Et hoc modo peccatum primi parentis est causa +mortis et omnium huiusmodi defectuum in natura humana, inquantum +per peccatum primi parentis sublata est originalis iustitia, per +quam non solum inferiores animae vires continebantur sub ratione +absque omni deordinatione, sed totum corpus continebatur sub anima +absque omni defectu, ut in primo habitum est. Et ideo, subtracta +hac originali iustitia per peccatum primi parentis, sicut vulnerata +est humana natura quantum ad animam per deordinationem potentiarum, +ut supra dictum est; ita etiam est corruptibilis effecta per +deordinationem ipsius corporis. Subtractio autem originalis +iustitiae habet rationem poenae, sicut etiam subtractio gratiae. +Unde etiam mors, et omnes defectus corporales consequentes, sunt +quaedam poenae originalis peccati. Et quamvis huiusmodi defectus +non sint intenti a peccante, sunt tamen ordinati secundum iustitiam +Dei punientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, + the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing + a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will + be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the + greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, + when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, + some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37226] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod aequalitas causae per se, causat aequalem +effectum, augmentata enim vel diminuta causa per se, augetur vel +diminuitur effectus. Sed aequalitas causae removentis prohibens, +non ostendit aequalitatem effectuum. Si quis enim aequali impulsu +divellat duas columnas, non sequitur quod lapides superpositi +aequaliter moveantur, sed ille velocius movebitur qui gravior erit +secundum proprietatem suae naturae, cui relinquitur remoto +prohibente. Sic igitur, remota originali iustitia, natura corporis +humani relicta est sibi, et secundum hoc, secundum diversitatem +naturalis complexionis, quorundam corpora pluribus defectibus +subiacent, quorundam vero paucioribus, quamvis existente originali +peccato aequali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.11" target="asv">Rom. 8:11</a>): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according + to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's + sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility + of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time, + subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37227] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod culpa originalis et actualis removetur ab eodem a quo +etiam removentur et huiusmodi defectus, secundum illud apostoli, +Rom. VIII, <i>vivificabit mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem +spiritum eius in vobis</i>, sed utrumque fit secundum ordinem +divinae sapientiae, congruo tempore. Oportet enim quod ad +immortalitatem et impassibilitatem gloriae, quae in Christo +inchoata est, et per Christum nobis acquisita, perveniamus +conformati prius passionibus eius. Unde oportet quod ad tempus +passibilitas in nostris corporibus remaneat, ad impassibilitatem +gloriae promerendam conformiter Christo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of + the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, + it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects + of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those + defects, as original sin does. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37228] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccato actuali duo possumus considerare, scilicet +ipsam substantiam actus, et rationem culpae. Ex parte quidem +substantiae actus, potest peccatum actuale aliquem defectum +corporalem causare, sicut ex superfluo cibo aliqui infirmantur et +moriuntur. Sed ex parte culpae, privat gratiam quae datur homini ad +rectificandum animae actus, non autem ad cohibendum defectus +corporales, sicut originalis iustitia cohibebat. Et ideo peccatum +actuale non causat huiusmodi defectus, sicut originale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A6-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 6. Whether death and other defects are natural to man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" + (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally + corruptible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37229] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini +naturales. <i>Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile differunt +genere</i>, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed homo est eiusdem generis +cum aliis animalibus, quae sunt naturaliter corruptibilia. Ergo +homo est naturaliter corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But + such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37230] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +omne quod est compositum ex contrariis, est naturaliter +corruptibile, quasi habens in se causam corruptionis suae. Sed +corpus humanum est huiusmodi. Ergo est naturaliter +corruptibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore + the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and + such like defects are natural to man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37231] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +calidum naturaliter consumit humidum. Vita autem hominis +conservatur per calidum et humidum. Cum igitur operationes vitae +expleantur per actum caloris naturalis, ut dicitur in II de anima, +videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now "God made not death" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>). Therefore death is not natural to man. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p6"> (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable + to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q85_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore they are not natural to man. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p7"> (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated + above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A6" id="FS_Q85_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[6]</a>. Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1"><a name="37232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37232] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed +contra, quidquid est homini naturale, Deus in homine fecit. Sed +Deus mortem non fecit, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo mors non est homini +naturalis.</p><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2"><a name="37233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37233] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +id quod est secundum naturam, non potest dici poena nec malum, quia +unicuique rei est conveniens id quod est ei naturale. Sed mors et +huiusmodi defectus sunt poena peccati originalis, ut supra dictum +est. Ergo non sunt homini naturales.</p><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3"><a name="37234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37234] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +materia proportionatur formae, et quaelibet res suo fini. Finis +autem hominis est beatitudo perpetua, ut supra dictum est. Forma +etiam humani corporis est anima rationalis, quae est +incorruptibilis, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo corpus humanum est +naturaliter incorruptibile.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular + nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every + corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation + of the thing to which it belongs. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p9"> On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly + body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." + This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things + are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the + inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is + allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form + intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational + soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial + operation of its own, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q85_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that very + form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In + this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature + of his form. + </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p10"> The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore + in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility + is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect + of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold + condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition + of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to + be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and + inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he + would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the + purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, + in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact + that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an + incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, + and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q85_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 co."><a name="37235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37235] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de unaquaque re corruptibili dupliciter loqui +possumus, uno modo, secundum naturam universalem; alio modo, +secundum naturam particularem. Natura quidem particularis est +propria virtus activa et conservativa uniuscuiusque rei. Et +secundum hanc, omnis corruptio et defectus est contra naturam, ut +dicitur in II de caelo, quia huiusmodi virtus intendit esse et +conservationem eius cuius est. Natura vero universalis est virtus +activa in aliquo universali principio naturae, puta in aliquo +caelestium corporum; vel alicuius superioris substantiae, secundum +quod etiam Deus a quibusdam dicitur natura naturans. Quae quidem +virtus intendit bonum et conservationem universi, ad quod exigitur +alternatio generationis et corruptionis in rebus. Et secundum hoc, +corruptiones et defectus rerum sunt naturales, non quidem secundum +inclinationem formae, quae est principium essendi et perfectionis; +sed secundum inclinationem materiae, quae proportionaliter +attribuitur tali formae secundum distributionem universalis +agentis. Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse quantum +potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi +perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa non est +subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae formae; quinimmo +habet propriam operationem immaterialem, ut in primo habitum est. +Unde ex parte suae formae, naturalior est homini incorruptio quam +aliis rebus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et ipsa habet materiam ex +contrariis compositam, ex inclinatione materiae sequitur +corruptibilitas in toto. Et secundum hoc, homo est naturaliter +corruptibilis secundum naturam materiae sibi relictae, sed non +secundum naturam formae. Primae autem tres rationes procedunt ex +parte materiae, aliae vero tres procedunt ex parte formae. Unde ad +earum solutionem, considerandum est quod forma hominis, quae est +anima rationalis, secundum suam incorruptibilitatem proportionata +est suo fini, qui est beatitudo perpetua. Sed corpus humanum, quod +est corruptibile secundum suam naturam consideratum, quodammodo +proportionatum est suae formae, et quodammodo non. Duplex enim +conditio potest attendi in aliqua materia, una scilicet quam agens +eligit; alia quae non est ab agente electa, sed est secundum +conditionem naturalem materiae. Sicut faber ad faciendum cultellum +eligit materiam duram et ductilem, quae subtiliari possit ut sit +apta incisioni, et secundum hanc conditionem ferrum est materia +proportionata cultello, sed hoc quod ferrum sit frangibile et +rubiginem contrahens, consequitur ex naturali dispositione ferri, +nec hoc eligit artifex in ferro, sed magis repudiaret si posset. +Unde haec dispositio materiae non est proportionata intentioni +artificis, nec intentioni artis. Similiter corpus humanum est +materia electa a natura quantum ad hoc, quod est temperatae +complexionis, ut possit esse convenientissimum organum tactus et +aliarum virtutum sensitivarum et motivarum. Sed quod sit +corruptibile, hoc est ex conditione materiae, nec est electum a +natura, quin potius natura eligeret materiam incorruptibilem, si +posset. Sed Deus, cui subiacet omnis natura, in ipsa institutione +hominis supplevit defectum naturae, et dono iustitiae originalis +dedit corpori incorruptibilitatem quandam, ut in primo dictum est. +Et secundum hoc dicitur quod Deus mortem non fecit, et quod mors +est poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1--3:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 ad arg."><a name="37236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37236] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 ad arg.</span></a> Unde patet +responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q86" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q86-p0.1">Q. 86. OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q86-p2"> We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q86-p3"><a href="#FS_Q86_A1"> (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q86-p4"><a href="#FS_Q86_A2"> (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 pr."><a name="37237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37237] +Iª-IIae q. 86 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +macula peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum macula +animae sit effectus peccati. Secundo, utrum remaneat in anima post +actum peccati.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q86_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q86_A1-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 1. Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: + hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the + human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a + stain from them by sinning. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37238] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non causet aliquam maculam in +anima. Natura enim superior non potest inquinari ex contactu +naturae inferioris, unde radius solaris non inquinatur per tactum +corporum fetidorum, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra quinque +haereses. Sed anima humana est multo superioris naturae quam res +commutabiles, ad quas peccando convertitur. Ergo ex eis maculam non +contrahit peccando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q86_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering + anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37239] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum est principaliter in voluntate, ut supra dictum est. +Voluntas autem est in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed +ratio, sive intellectus, non maculatur ex consideratione +quarumcumque rerum, sed magis perficitur. Ergo nec voluntas ex +peccato maculatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, + it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither + disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, + in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin + of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. + Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain + caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37240] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccatum maculam causat, aut macula illa est aliquid positive, +aut est privatio pura. Si sit aliquid positive, non potest esse +nisi dispositio vel habitus, nihil enim aliud videtur ex actu +causari. Dispositio autem et habitus non est, contingit enim, +remota dispositione vel habitu, adhuc remanere maculam; ut patet in +eo qui peccavit mortaliter prodigalitate, et postea transmutatur, +mortaliter peccando, in habitum vitii oppositi. Non ergo macula +ponit aliquid positive in anima. Similiter etiam nec est privatio +pura. Quia omnia peccata conveniunt ex parte aversionis et +privationis gratiae. Sequeretur ergo quod omnium peccatorum esset +macula una. Ergo macula non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Solomon ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.47.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 47:22</a>): "Thou hast stained thy glory": and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each case it is question of + the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37241] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur, Eccli. XLVII, Salomoni, <i>dedisti maculam in +gloria tua</i>. Et Ephes. V, <i>ut exhiberet sibi gloriosam +Ecclesiam non habentem maculam aut rugam</i>. Et utrobique loquitur +de macula peccati. Ergo macula est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, + e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's + soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; + the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby + man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there + is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the + Divine law, as shown above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q86_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 co."><a name="37242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37242] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod macula proprie dicitur in corporalibus, quando +aliquod corpus nitidum perdit suum nitorem ex contactu alterius +corporis, sicut vestis et aurum et argentum, aut aliud huiusmodi. +In rebus autem spiritualibus ad similitudinem huius oportet maculam +dici. Habet autem anima hominis duplicem nitorem, unum quidem ex +refulgentia luminis naturalis rationis, per quam dirigitur in suis +actibus; alium vero ex refulgentia divini luminis, scilicet +sapientiae et gratiae, per quam etiam homo perficitur ad bene et +decenter agendum. Est autem quasi quidam animae tactus, quando +inhaeret aliquibus rebus per amorem. Cum autem peccat, adhaeret +rebus aliquibus contra lumen rationis et divinae legis, ut ex +supradictis patet. Unde ipsum detrimentum nitoris ex tali contactu +proveniens, macula animae metaphorice vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, + by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37243] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod anima non inquinatur ex rebus inferioribus +virtute earum, quasi agentibus eis in animam, sed magis e converso +anima sua actione se inquinat, inordinate eis inhaerendo, contra +lumen rationis et divinae legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the + intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in + a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, + when it cleaves inordinately, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They . + . . became abominable as those things were which they loved." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37244] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod actio intellectus perficitur secundum quod res +intelligibiles sunt in intellectu per modum ipsius intellectus, et +ideo intellectus ex eis non inficitur, sed magis perficitur. Sed +actus voluntatis consistit in motu ad ipsas res, ita quod amor +conglutinat animam rei amatae. Et ex hoc anima maculatur, quando in +ordinate inhaeret; secundum illud Osee IX, <i>facti sunt +abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's + brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which + is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed + bodies. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37245] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod macula non est aliquid positive in anima, nec +significat privationem solam, sed significat privationem quandam +nitoris animae in ordine ad suam causam, quae est peccatum. Et ideo +diversa peccata diversas maculas inducunt. Et est simile de umbra, +quae est privatio luminis ex obiecto alicuius corporis, et secundum +diversitatem corporum obiectorum diversificantur umbrae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the + soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the + stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37246] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod macula non maneat in anima post actum +peccati. Nihil enim manet in anima post actum, nisi habitus vel +dispositio. Sed macula non est habitus vel dispositio, ut supra +habitum est. Ergo macula non manet in anima post actum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain + when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37247] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +hoc modo se habet macula ad peccatum, sicut umbra ad corpus, ut +supra dictum est. Sed transeunte corpore, non manet umbra. Ergo, +transeunte actu peccati, non manet macula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is + no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37248] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +omnis effectus dependet ex sua causa. Causa autem maculae est actus +peccati. Ergo, remoto actu peccati, non remanet macula in +anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.22.17" target="asv">Jos. 22:17</a>): "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] + to this day?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37249] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iosue XXII, <i>an parum vobis est quod peccastis +in Beelphegor, et usque in praesentem diem macula huius sceleris in +vobis permanet?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above + (A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the + Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved + by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. + For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once + return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous + movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as + the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 co."><a name="37250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37250] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod macula peccati remanet in anima, etiam transeunte +actu peccati. Cuius ratio est quia macula, sicut dictum est, +importat quendam defectum nitoris propter recessum a lumine +rationis vel divinae legis. Et ideo quandiu homo manet extra +huiusmodi lumen, manet in eo macula peccati, sed postquam redit ad +lumen divinum et ad lumen rationis, quod fit per gratiam, tunc +macula cessat. Licet autem cesset actus peccati, quo homo discessit +a lumine rationis vel legis divinae, non tamen statim homo ad illud +redit in quo fuerat, sed requiritur aliquis motus voluntatis +contrarius primo motui. Sicut si aliquis sit distans alicui per +aliquem motum, non statim cessante motu fit ei propinquus, sed +oportet quod appropinquet rediens per motum contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something + private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37251] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod post actum peccati nihil positive remanet in +anima nisi dispositio vel habitus, remanet tamen aliquid privative, +scilicet privatio coniunctionis ad divinum lumen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating + body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and + so there is no comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37252] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, transeunte obstaculo corporis, remanet corpus +diaphanum in aequali propinquitate et habitudine ad corpus +illuminans, et ideo statim umbra transit. Sed remoto actu peccati, +non remanet anima in eadem habitudine ad Deum. Unde non est similis +ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. + Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain + removed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37253] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod actus peccati facit distantiam a Deo, quam quidem +distantiam sequitur defectus nitoris, hoc modo sicut motus localis +facit localem distantiam. Unde sicut, cessante motu, non tollitur +distantia localis; ita nec, cessante actu peccati, tollitur +macula.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q87" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q87-p0.1">Q. 87. OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q87-p2"> We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ + in respect of the punishment due to them. + </p><p id="FS_Q87-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q87-p4"><a href="#FS_Q87_A1"> (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p5"><a href="#FS_Q87_A2"> (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p6"><a href="#FS_Q87_A3"> (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p7"><a href="#FS_Q87_A4"> (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p8"><a href="#FS_Q87_A5"> (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p9"><a href="#FS_Q87_A6"> (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p10"><a href="#FS_Q87_A7"> (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p11"><a href="#FS_Q87_A8"> (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 pr."><a name="37254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37254] +Iª-IIae q. 87 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de reatu +poenae. Et primo, de ipso reatu; secundo, de mortali et veniali +peccato, quae distinguuntur secundum reatum. Circa primum +quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum reatus poenae sit effectus peccati. +Secundo, utrum peccatum possit esse poena alterius peccati. Tertio, +utrum aliquod peccatum faciat reum aeterna poena. Quarto, utrum +faciat reum poena infinita secundum quantitatem. Quinto, utrum omne +peccatum faciat reum aeterna et infinita poena. Sexto, utrum reatus +poenae possit remanere post peccatum. Septimo, utrum omnis poena +inferatur pro aliquo peccato. Octavo, utrum unus sit reus poenae +pro peccato alterius.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q87_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A1-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 1. Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does + not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention + of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37255] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non sit effectus +peccati. Quod enim per accidens se habet ad aliquid, non videtur +esse proprius effectus eius. Sed reatus poenae per accidens se +habet ad peccatum, cum sit praeter intentionem peccantis. Ergo +reatus poenae non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an + effect of sin, which is evil. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37256] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +malum non est causa boni. Sed poena bona est, cum sit iusta, et a +Deo. Ergo non est effectus peccati, quod est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur + a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37257] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, in I Confess., quod <i>omnis inordinatus animus +sibi ipsi est poena</i>. Sed poena non causat reatum alterius +poenae, quia sic iretur in infinitum. Ergo peccatum non causat +reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.9" target="asv">Rom. 2:9</a>): "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a + punishment which is signified by the words "tribulation and anguish." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37258] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Rom. II, <i>tribulatio et angustia in animam omnem +operantis malum</i>. Sed operari malum est peccare. Ergo peccatum +inducit poenam, quae nomine tribulationis et angustiae +designatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment + therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which + reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man + is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things + contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up + against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident + that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which + repression is punishment. + </p><p id="FS_Q87_A1-p7"> Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is + subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order + of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; + thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is + disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold + punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 co."><a name="37259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37259] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod ex rebus naturalibus ad res humanas derivatur ut id +quod contra aliquid insurgit, ab eo detrimentum patiatur. Videmus +enim in rebus naturalibus quod unum contrarium vehementius agit, +altero contrario superveniente, propter quod aquae calefactae magis +congelantur, ut dicitur in I Meteor. Unde in hominibus hoc ex +naturali inclinatione invenitur, ut unusquisque deprimat eum qui +contra ipsum insurgit. Manifestum est autem quod quaecumque +continentur sub aliquo ordine, sunt quodammodo unum in ordine ad +principium ordinis. Unde quidquid contra ordinem aliquem insurgit, +consequens est ut ab ipso ordine, vel principe ordinis, deprimatur. +Cum autem peccatum sit actus inordinatus, manifestum est quod +quicumque peccat, contra aliquem ordinem agit. Et ideo ab ipso +ordine consequens est quod deprimatur. Quae quidem depressio poena +est. Unde secundum tres ordines quibus subditur humana voluntas, +triplici poena potest homo puniri. Primo quidem enim subditur +humana natura ordini propriae rationis; secundo, ordini exterioris +hominis gubernantis vel spiritualiter vel temporaliter, politice +seu oeconomice; tertio, subditur universali ordini divini +regiminis. Quilibet autem horum ordinum per peccatum pervertitur, +dum ille qui peccat, agit et contra rationem, et contra legem +humanam, et contra legem divinam. Unde triplicem poenam incurrit, +unam quidem a seipso, quae est conscientiae remorsus, aliam vero ab +homine, tertiam vero a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental + to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37260] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena consequitur peccatum inquantum malum est, +ratione suae inordinationis. Unde sicut malum est per accidens in +actu peccantis, praeter intentionem ipsius, ita et reatus +poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, + not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered + to be directly the effect of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37261] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod poena quidem iusta esse potest et a Deo et ab homine +inflicta, unde ipsa poena non est effectus peccati directe, sed +solum dispositive. Sed peccatum facit hominem esse reum poenae, +quod est malum, dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod +<i>puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum</i>. Unde reatus +poenae directe ponitur effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a + further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37262] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod poena illa inordinati animi debetur peccato ex hoc +quod ordinem rationis pervertit. Fit autem reus alterius poenae, +per hoc quod pervertit ordinem legis divinae vel humanae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A2-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 2. Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of + virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in + the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37263] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse poena +peccati. Poenae enim sunt inductae ut per eas homines reducantur ad +bonum virtutis, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Sed per +peccatum non reducitur homo in bonum virtutis, sed in oppositum. +Ergo peccatum non est poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. + Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37264] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +poenae iustae sunt a Deo, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro +octoginta trium quaest. Peccatum autem non est a Deo, et est +iniustum. Non ergo peccatum potest esse poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q87_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74], AA[1]</a> ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37265] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem. Sed peccatum est +a voluntate, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo peccatum non potest esse +poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37266] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod quaedam peccata sunt +poenae peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as + such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, + for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, + as stated in the + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Consequently it is evident that sin + regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 co."><a name="37267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37267] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod de peccato dupliciter loqui possumus, per se, et per +accidens. Per se quidem nullo modo peccatum potest esse poena +peccati. Peccatum enim per se consideratur secundum quod egreditur +a voluntate, sic enim habet rationem culpae. De ratione autem +poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, ut in primo habitum est. +Unde manifestum est quod nullo modo, per se loquendo, peccatum +potest esse poena peccati. Per accidens autem peccatum potest esse +poena peccati, tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte causae quae est +remotio prohibentis. Sunt enim causae inclinantes ad peccatum +passiones, tentatio Diaboli, et alia huiusmodi; quae quidem causae +impediuntur per auxilium divinae gratiae, quae subtrahitur per +peccatum. Unde cum ipsa subtractio gratiae sit quaedam poena, et a +Deo, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod per accidens etiam peccatum +quod ex hoc sequitur, poena dicatur. Et hoc modo loquitur +apostolus, Rom. I, dicens, <i>propter quod tradidit eos Deus in +desideria cordis eorum</i>, quae sunt animae passiones, quia +scilicet deserti homines ab auxilio divinae gratiae, vincuntur a +passionibus. Et hoc modo semper peccatum dicitur esse poena +praecedentis peccati. Alio modo ex parte substantiae actus, quae +afflictionem inducit, sive sit actus interior, ut patet in ira et +invidia; sive actus exterior, ut patet cum aliqui gravi labore +opprimuntur et damno, ut expleant actum peccati, secundum illud +Sap. V, <i>lassati sumus in via iniquitatis</i>. Tertio modo, ex +parte effectus, ut scilicet aliquod peccatum dicatur poena respectu +effectus consequentis. Et his duobus ultimis modis, unum peccatum +non solum est poena praecedentis peccati, sed etiam sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7"> On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, + by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded + by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, + and is from God, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q79_A3" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[3]</a>), the result is that the sin which ensues + from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.24" target="asv">Rom. 1:24</a>) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when + men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the + punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it + be an + interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable + trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.7" target="asv"> Wis. 5:7</a>: "We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment + by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with + regard to itself. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37268] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod hoc etiam quod aliqui puniuntur a Deo, dum +permittit eos in aliqua peccata profluere, ad bonum virtutis +ordinatur. Quandoque quidem etiam ipsorum qui peccant, cum scilicet +post peccatum humiliores et cautiores resurgunt. Semper autem est +ad emendationem aliorum, qui videntes aliquos ruere de peccato in +peccatum, magis reformidant peccare. In aliis autem duobus modis, +manifestum est quod poena ordinatur ad emendationem quia hoc ipsum +quod homo laborem et detrimentum patitur in peccando, natum est +retrahere homines a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed + it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always + for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the + other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's + amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37269] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato secundum se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37270] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A3-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 3. Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice + is equality: wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.8" target="asv">Is. 27:8</a>): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not + incur a debt of eternal punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37271] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum peccatum inducat reatum +aeternae poenae. Poena enim iusta adaequatur culpae, iustitia enim +aequalitas est. Unde dicitur Isaiae XXVII, <i>in mensura contra +mensuram, cum abiecta fuerit, iudicabit eam</i>. Sed peccatum est +temporale. Ergo non inducit reatum poenae aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed + to an end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment + should be infinite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37272] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +poenae medicinae quaedam sunt, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla +medicina debet esse infinita, quia ordinatur ad finem; <i>quod +autem ordinatur ad finem, non est infinitum</i>, ut philosophus +dicit, in I Polit. Ergo nulla poena debet esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction + of men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37273] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +nullus semper facit aliquid, nisi propter se in ipso delectetur. +<i>Sed Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum</i>, ut dicitur +Sap. I. Ergo non puniet homines poena sempiterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. + Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37274] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +nihil quod est per accidens, est infinitum. Sed poena est per +accidens, non est enim secundum naturam eius qui punitur. Ergo non +potest in infinitum durare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>): "These shall go into everlasting punishment"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.3.29" target="asv">Mk. 3:29</a>): "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37275] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, <i>ibunt hi in supplicium +aeternum</i>. Et Marc. III dicitur, <i>qui autem blasphemaverit in +spiritum sanctum, non habebit remissionem in aeternum, sed erit +reus aeterni delicti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A1" id="FS_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore + so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order + is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the + principle be saved, defects can be + repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except + by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, + these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently + if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to + be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this + order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, + considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 co."><a name="37276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37276] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum ex hoc inducit +reatum poenae, quod pervertit aliquem ordinem. Manente autem causa, +manet effectus. Unde quandiu perversitas ordinis remanet, necesse +est quod remaneat reatus poenae. Pervertit autem aliquis ordinem +quandoque quidem reparabiliter, quandoque autem irreparabiliter. +Semper enim defectus quo subtrahitur principium, irreparabilis est, +si autem salvetur principium, eius virtute defectus reparari +possunt. Sicut si corrumpatur principium visivum, non potest fieri +visionis reparatio, nisi sola virtute divina, si vero, salvo +principio visivo, aliqua impedimenta adveniant visioni, reparari +possunt per naturam vel per artem. Cuiuslibet autem ordinis est +aliquod principium, per quod aliquis fit particeps illius ordinis. +Et ideo si per peccatum corrumpatur principium ordinis quo voluntas +hominis subditur Deo, erit inordinatio, quantum est de se, +irreparabilis, etsi reparari possit virtute divina. Principium +autem huius ordinis est ultimus finis, cui homo inhaeret per +caritatem. Et ideo quaecumque peccata avertunt a Deo, caritatem +auferentia, quantum est de se, inducunt reatum aeternae poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that + adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes + by imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is + not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the + living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to + Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. + A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also + because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. + iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37277] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod poena peccato proportionatur secundum +acerbitatem, tam in iudicio divino quam in humano, sicut Augustinus +dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, in nullo iudicio requiritur ut poena +adaequetur culpae secundum durationem. Non enim quia adulterium vel +homicidium in momento committitur, propter hoc momentanea poena +punitur, sed quandoque quidem perpetuo carcere vel exilio, +quandoque etiam morte. In qua non consideratur occisionis mora, sed +potius quod in perpetuum auferatur a societate viventium, et sic +repraesentat suo modo aeternitatem poenae inflictae divinitus. +Iustum autem est, secundum Gregorium, quod qui in suo aeterno +peccavit contra Deum, in aeterno Dei puniatur. Dicitur autem +aliquis in suo aeterno peccasse, non solum secundum continuationem +actus in tota hominis vita durantis, sed quia ex hoc ipso quod +finem in peccato constituit, voluntatem habet in aeternum peccandi. +Unde dicit Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., quod <i>iniqui voluissent sine +fine vivere, ut sine fine potuissent in iniquitatibus +permanere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, + but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, + that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.19.25" target="asv">Prov. 19:25</a>: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments + inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.59.6" target="asv"> Ps. 59:6</a>: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37278] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod poena etiam quae secundum leges humanas infligitur, +non semper est medicinalis ei qui punitur, sed solum aliis, sicut +cum latro suspenditur, non ut ipse emendetur, sed propter alios, ut +saltem metu poenae peccare desistant; secundum illud Prov. XIX, +<i>pestilente flagellato, stultus sapientior erit</i>. Sic igitur +et aeternae poenae reproborum a Deo inflictae, sunt medicinales his +qui consideratione poenarum abstinent a peccatis; secundum illud +Psalmi LIX, <i>dedisti metuentibus te significationem, ut fugiant a +facie arcus, ut liberentur dilecti tui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37279] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in poenis propter ipsas; sed +delectatur in ordine suae iustitiae, quae haec requirit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, + and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="37280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37280] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod poena, etsi per accidens ordinetur ad naturam, per se +tamen ordinatur ad privationem ordinis et ad Dei iustitiam. Et +ideo, durante inordinatione, semper durat poena.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A4-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 4. Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now God's anger or fury + signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as + to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, + sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37281] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccato debeatur poena infinita +secundum quantitatem. Dicitur enim Ierem. X, <i>corripe me, domine, +veruntamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum +redigas me</i>. Ira autem vel furor Dei metaphorice significat +vindictam divinae iustitiae, redigi autem in nihilum est poena +infinita, sicut et ex nihilo aliquid facere est virtutis infinitae. +Ergo secundum vindictam divinam, peccatum punitur poena infinita +secundum quantitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against God, + is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a + more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is infinite. + Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37282] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quantitati culpae respondet quantitas poenae; secundum illud +Deuteron. XXV, <i>pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus</i>. +Sed peccatum quod contra Deum committitur, est infinitum, tanto +enim gravius est peccatum, quanto maior est persona contra quam +peccatur, sicut gravius peccatum est percutere principem quam +percutere hominem privatum; Dei autem magnitudo est infinita. Ergo +poena infinita debetur pro peccato quod contra Deum +committitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore + it is infinite in quantity also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37283] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +dupliciter est aliquid infinitum, duratione scilicet, et +quantitate. Sed duratione est poena infinita. Ergo et +quantitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37284] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia secundum hoc omnium mortalium peccatorum poenae essent +aequales, non enim est infinitum infinito maius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, + which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. + In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards + it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin + consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also is infinite, because + it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment + is the "pain of sense," which is also finite. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 co."><a name="37285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37285] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod poena proportionatur peccato. In peccato autem duo +sunt. Quorum unum est aversio ab incommutabili bono, quod est +infinitum, unde ex hac parte peccatum est infinitum. Aliud quod est +in peccato, est inordinata conversio ad commutabile bonum. Et ex +hac parte peccatum est finitum, tum quia ipsum bonum commutabile +est finitum; tum quia ipsa conversio est finita, non enim possunt +esse actus creaturae infiniti. Ex parte igitur aversionis, +respondet peccato poena damni, quae etiam est infinita, est enim +amissio infiniti boni, scilicet Dei. Ex parte autem inordinatae +conversionis, respondet ei poena sensus, quae etiam est finita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible + with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37286] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod omnino redigi in nihilum eum qui peccat, non +convenit divinae iustitiae, quia repugnat perpetuitati poenae, quae +est secundum divinam iustitiam, ut dictum est. Sed in nihilum +redigi dicitur qui spiritualibus bonis privatur; secundum illud I +Cor. XIII, <i>si non habuero caritatem, nihil sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37287] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato ex parte aversionis, +sic enim homo contra Deum peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for + as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And + a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But + it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it + does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37288] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod duratio poenae respondet durationi culpae, non quidem +ex parte actus, sed ex parte maculae, qua durante manet reatus +poenae. Sed acerbitas poenae respondet gravitati culpae. Culpa +autem quae est irreparabilis, de se habet quod perpetuo duret, et +ideo debetur ei poena aeterna. Non autem ex parte conversionis +habet infinitatem, et ideo non debetur ei ex hac parte poena +infinita secundum quantitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A5-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 5. Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A4" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, + differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur + a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A4" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37289] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod omne peccatum inducat reatum poenae +aeternae. Poena enim, ut dictum est, proportionatur culpae. Sed +poena aeterna differt a temporali in infinitum. Nullum autem +peccatum differre videtur ab altero in infinitum, cum omne peccatum +sit humanus actus, qui infinitus esse non potest. Cum ergo alicui +peccato debeatur poena aeterna, sicut dictum est, videtur quod +nulli peccato debeatur poena temporalis tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment + is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children + who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.3" target="asv">Jn. 3:3</a>): " Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of + God." Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37290] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum originale est minimum peccatorum, unde et Augustinus +dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>mitissima poena est eorum qui pro solo +peccato originali puniuntur</i>. Sed peccato originali debetur +poena perpetua, nunquam enim videbunt regnum Dei pueri qui sine +Baptismo decesserunt cum originali peccato; ut patet per id quod +dominus dicit, Ioan. III, <i>nisi quis renatus fuerit denuo, non +potest videre regnum Dei</i>. Ergo multo magis omnium aliorum +peccatorum poena erit aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its + punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because + in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment + is not due for any sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37291] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccato non debetur maior poena ex hoc quod alteri peccato +adiungitur, cum utrumque peccatum suam habeat poenam taxatam +secundum divinam iustitiam. Sed peccato veniali debetur poena +aeterna, si cum mortali peccato inveniatur in aliquo damnato, quia +in Inferno nulla potest esse remissio. Ergo peccato veniali +simpliciter debetur poena aeterna. Nulli ergo peccato debetur poena +temporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished + eternally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37292] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog., quod quaedam leviores +culpae post hanc vitam remittuntur. Non ergo omnia peccata aeterna +poena puniuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, + through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is + disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable + to the end, in so far as one is too much or + too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some + temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not + incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 co."><a name="37293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37293] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum causat reatum +poenae aeternae, inquantum irreparabiliter repugnat ordini divinae +iustitiae, per hoc scilicet quod contrariatur ipsi principio +ordinis, quod est ultimus finis. Manifestum est autem quod in +quibusdam peccatis est quidem aliqua inordinatio, non tamen per +contrarietatem ad ultimum finem, sed solum circa ea quae sunt ad +finem, inquantum plus vel minus debite eis intenditur, salvato +tamen ordine ad ultimum finem, puta cum homo, etsi nimis ad aliquam +rem temporalem afficiatur, non tamen pro ea vellet Deum offendere, +aliquid contra praeceptum eius faciendo. Unde huiusmodi peccatis +non debetur aeterna poena, sed temporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance + of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist + in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs + infinitely from the things that are referred to it. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37294] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata non differunt in infinitum ex parte +conversionis ad bonum commutabile, in qua consistit substantia +actus, differunt autem in infinitum ex parte aversionis. Nam +quaedam peccata committuntur per aversionem ab ultimo fine, quaedam +vero per inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem +ultimus ab his quae sunt ad finem, in infinitum differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, + viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37295] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccato originali non debetur poena aeterna ratione +suae gravitatis, sed ratione conditionis subiecti, scilicet hominis +qui sine gratia invenitur, per quam solam fit remissio poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p9"> The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the + quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37296] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter +dicendum est ad tertium, de veniali peccato. Aeternitas enim poenae +non respondet quantitati culpae, sed irremissibilitati ipsius, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A6-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 6. Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But + sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37297] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non remaneat post +peccatum. Remota enim causa, removetur effectus. Sed peccatum est +causa reatus poenae. Ergo, remoto peccato, cessat reatus +poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when + sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37298] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum removetur per hoc quod homo ad virtutem redit. Sed +virtuoso non debetur poena, sed magis praemium. Ergo, remoto +peccato, non remanet reatus poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. + Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37299] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +poenae sunt medicinae, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed postquam aliquis +iam est ab infirmitate curatus, non adhibetur sibi medicina. Ergo, +remoto peccato, non remanet debitum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.12.13" target="asv">2 Kings xii. 13,14</a>): "David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; + thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child + that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment + remains, when the sin has been removed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37300] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur II Reg. XII, quod <i>David dixit ad Nathan, +peccavi domino. Dixitque Nathan ad David, dominus quoque transtulit +peccatum tuum, non morieris. Veruntamen quia blasphemare fecisti +inimicos nomen domini, filius qui natus est tibi, morte +morietur</i>. Punitur ergo aliquis a Deo etiam postquam ei peccatum +dimittitur. Et sic reatus poenae remanet, peccato remoto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, + when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as + he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which + restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he + who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something + contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in + injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still + remains the debt of punishment. + </p><p id="FS_Q87_A6-p7"> But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, + without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, + in which the stain consists, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q86_A1" id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the + order of Divine justice, + that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the + punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, + it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory + punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular + purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained + when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A6" id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[6], A[6]</a>). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed + of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 co."><a name="37301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37301] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod in peccato duo possunt considerari, scilicet actus +culpae, et macula sequens. Planum est autem quod, cessante actu +peccati, remanet reatus, in omnibus peccatis actualibus. Actus enim +peccati facit hominem reum poenae, inquantum transgreditur ordinem +divinae iustitiae; ad quem non redit nisi per quandam +recompensationem poenae, quae ad aequalitatem iustitiae reducit; ut +scilicet qui plus voluntati suae indulsit quam debuit, contra +mandatum Dei agens, secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, aliquid +contra illud quod vellet, spontaneus vel invitus patiatur. Quod +etiam in iniuriis hominibus factis observatur, ut per +recompensationem poenae reintegretur aequalitas iustitiae. Unde +patet quod, cessante actu peccati vel iniuriae illatae, adhuc +remanet debitum poenae. Sed si loquamur de ablatione peccati +quantum ad maculam, sic manifestum est quod macula peccati ab anima +auferri non potest, nisi per hoc quod anima Deo coniungitur, per +cuius distantiam detrimentum proprii nitoris incurrebat, quod est +macula, ut supra dictum est. Coniungitur autem homo Deo per +voluntatem. Unde macula peccati ab homine tolli non potest nisi +voluntas hominis ordinem divinae iustitiae acceptet, ut scilicet +vel ipse poenam sibi spontaneus assumat in recompensationem culpae +praeteritae, vel etiam a Deo illatam patienter sustineat, utroque +enim modo poena rationem satisfactionis habet. Poena autem +satisfactoria diminuit aliquid de ratione poenae. Est enim de +ratione poenae quod sit contra voluntatem. Poena autem +satisfactoria, etsi secundum absolutam considerationem sit contra +voluntatem, tamen tunc, et pro hoc, est voluntaria. Unde +simpliciter est voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria, sicut +patet ex his quae supra de voluntario et involuntario dicta sunt. +Dicendum est ergo quod, remota macula culpae, potest quidem +remanere reatus non poenae simpliciter, sed satisfactoriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q86_A2" id="FS_Q87_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[2]</a>), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain + in the same way, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37302] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod sicut, cessante actu peccati, remanet macula, ut +supra dictum est; ita etiam potest remanere reatus. Cessante vero +macula, non remanet reatus secundum eandem rationem, ut dictum +est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands + that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37303] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod virtuoso non debetur poena simpliciter, potest tamen +sibi deberi poena ut satisfactoria, quia hoc ipsum ad virtutem +pertinet, ut satisfaciat pro his in quibus offendit vel Deum vel +hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that + the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder + may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality + of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were + scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37304] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, remota macula, sanatum est vulnus peccati quantum ad +voluntatem. Requiritur autem adhuc poena ad sanationem aliarum +virium animae, quae per peccatum praecedens deordinatae fuerunt, ut +scilicet per contraria curentur. Requiritur etiam ad restituendum +aequalitatem iustitiae; et ad amovendum scandalum aliorum, ut +aedificentur in poena qui sunt scandalizati in culpa; ut patet ex +exemplo de David inducto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A7-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 7. Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.3" target="asv">Jn. 9:3</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.2" target="asv">2</a>) about the man born blind: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In like manner + we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical + possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover + before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore + not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="37305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37305] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis poena sit propter aliquam +culpam. Dicitur enim Ioan. IX, de caeco nato, <i>neque hic +peccavit, neque parentes eius, ut nasceretur caecus</i>. Et +similiter videmus quod multi pueri, etiam baptizati, graves poenas +patiuntur, ut puta febres, Daemonum oppressiones, et multa +huiusmodi, cum tamen in eis non sit peccatum, postquam sunt +baptizati. Et antequam sint baptizati, non est in eis plus de +peccato quam in aliis pueris, qui haec non patiuntur. Non ergo +omnis poena est pro peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of + these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.5" target="asv">Ps. 72:5</a>): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.7" target="asv">Job 21:7</a>): "[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in + brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hab.1.13" target="asv">Hab. 1:13</a>): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man + oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for + a sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="37306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37306] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod peccatores prosperentur, et quod +aliqui innocentes puniantur. Utrumque autem in rebus humanis +frequenter invenimus, dicitur enim de iniquis in Psalmo LXXII, +<i>in labore hominum non sunt, et cum hominibus non +flagellabuntur</i>; et Iob XXI, <i>impii vivunt, sublevati sunt, +confortatique divitiis</i>; et Habacuc I, dicitur, <i>quare +respicis contemptores et taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se?</i> +Non ergo omnis poena infligitur pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written of Christ ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.22" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:22</a>) that "He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.21" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:21</a>) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="37307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37307] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +de Christo dicitur I Pet. II, quod <i>peccatum non fecit, nec +inventus est dolus in ore eius</i>. Et tamen ibidem dicitur quod +<i>passus est pro nobis</i>. Ergo non semper poena a Deo +dispensatur pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.7" target="asv">Job 4:7, </a> seqq.): "Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity + . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is inflicted for + a sin." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 s. c."><a name="37308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37308] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Iob IV, <i>quis unquam innocens periit? Aut quando +recti deleti sunt? Quin potius vidi eos qui operantur iniquitatem, +flante Deo, periisse</i>. Et Augustinus dicit, in I Retract., quod +<i>omnis poena iusta est, et pro peccato aliquo impenditur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated + <a href="#FS_Q87_A6" id="FS_Q87_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, punishment can be considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. + And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who + has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another + upon themselves. If, however, we + speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. + Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes + it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original sin + is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result + from + this defect in human nature. + </p><p id="FS_Q87_A7-p7"> Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species + of evil, as stated in the + <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, + it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers + loss of money for the sake of bodily health, + or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, + not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because + a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments + properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact + that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment + of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; + so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 co."><a name="37309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37309] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, poena potest dupliciter +considerari, simpliciter, et inquantum est satisfactoria. Poena +quidem satisfactoria est quodammodo voluntaria. Et quia contingit +eos qui differunt in reatu poenae, esse unum secundum voluntatem +unione amoris, inde est quod interdum aliquis qui non peccavit, +poenam voluntarius pro alio portat, sicut etiam in rebus humanis +videmus quod aliquis in se transfert alterius debitum. Si vero +loquamur de poena simpliciter, secundum quod habet rationem poenae, +sic semper habet ordinem ad culpam propriam, sed quandoque quidem +ad culpam actualem, puta quando aliquis vel a Deo vel ab homine pro +peccato commisso punitur; quandoque vero ad culpam originalem. Et +hoc quidem vel principaliter, vel consequenter. Principaliter +quidem poena originalis peccati est quod natura humana sibi +relinquitur, destituta auxilio originalis iustitiae, sed ad hoc +consequuntur omnes poenalitates quae ex defectu naturae in +hominibus contingunt. Sciendum tamen est quod quandoque aliquid +videtur esse poenale, quod tamen non habet simpliciter rationem +poenae. Poena enim est species mali, ut in primo dictum est. Malum +autem est privatio boni. Cum autem sint plura hominis bona, +scilicet animae, corporis, et exteriorum rerum; contingit interdum +quod homo patiatur detrimentum in minori bono, ut augeatur in +maiori, sicut cum patitur detrimentum pecuniae propter sanitatem +corporis, vel in utroque horum propter salutem animae et propter +gloriam Dei. Et tunc tale detrimentum non est simpliciter malum +hominis, sed secundum quid. Unde non dicit simpliciter rationem +poenae, sed medicinae, nam et medici austeras potiones propinant +infirmis, ut conferant sanitatem. Et quia huiusmodi non proprie +habent rationem poenae, non reducuntur ad culpam sicut ad causam, +nisi pro tanto, quia hoc ipsum quod oportet humanae naturae +medicinas poenales exhibere, est ex corruptione naturae, quae est +poena originalis peccati. In statu enim innocentiae non oportuisset +aliquem ad profectum virtutis inducere per poenalia exercitia. Unde +hoc ipsum quod est poenale in talibus reducitur ad originalem +culpam sicut ad causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of + original sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above + ( + <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad + 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others + who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="37310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37310] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi defectus eorum qui nascuntur, vel +etiam puerorum, sunt effectus et poenae originalis peccati, ut +dictum est. Et manent etiam post Baptismum, propter causam superius +dictam. Et quod non sint aequaliter in omnibus, contingit propter +naturae diversitatem, quae sibi relinquitur, ut supra dictum est. +Ordinantur tamen huiusmodi defectus, secundum divinam providentiam, +ad salutem hominum, vel eorum qui patiuntur, vel aliorum, qui +poenis admonentur; et etiam ad gloriam Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief + goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal + goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude + of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive + temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath + held them fast." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="37311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37311] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod bona temporalia et corporalia sunt quidem aliqua bona +hominis, sed parva, bona vero spiritualia sunt magna hominis bona. +Pertinet igitur ad divinam iustitiam ut virtuosis det spiritualia +bona; et de temporalibus bonis vel malis tantum det eis, quantum +sufficit ad virtutem, ut enim Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div. +Nom., <i>divinae iustitiae est non emollire optimorum fortitudinem +materialium donationibus</i>. Aliis vero hoc ipsum quod temporalia +dantur, in malum spiritualium cedit. Unde in Psalmo LXXII +concluditur, <i>ideo tenuit eos superbia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="37312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37312] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod Christus poenam sustinuit satisfactoriam non pro +suis, sed pro nostris peccatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A8-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 8. Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation + of them that hate Me"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.35" target="asv">Mat. 23:35</a>): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="37313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37313] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis puniatur pro peccato alterius. +Dicitur enim Exodi XX, <i>ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans +iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem, +his qui oderunt me</i>. Et Matth. XXIII dicitur, <i>ut veniat super +vos omnis sanguis iustus qui effusus est super terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for + their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="37314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37314] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +iustitia humana derivatur a iustitia divina. Sed secundum iustitiam +humanam aliquando filii puniuntur pro parentibus, sicut patet in +crimine laesae maiestatis. Ergo etiam secundum divinam iustitiam, +unus punitur pro peccato alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his + father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those + whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their + parents. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="37315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37315] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si dicatur filius non puniri pro peccato patris, sed pro peccato +proprio, inquantum imitatur malitiam paternam, non magis hoc +diceretur de filiis quam de extraneis, qui simili poena puniuntur +his quorum peccata imitantur. Non ergo videtur quod filii pro +peccatis propriis puniantur, sed pro peccatis parentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 s. c."><a name="37316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37316] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, <i>filius non portabit iniquitatem +patris</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, + in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q87_A7" id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for + his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this + way it + does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated + <a href="#FS_Q87_A7" id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a> that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the + soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either + by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property + so to speak; in such a + way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in + regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character + of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely + medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he + bears it patiently. + </p><p id="FS_Q87_A8-p7"> With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet + higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine + says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin, because, as + regards the soul, the son is not the father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying + (Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine." + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 co."><a name="37317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37317] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, si loquamur de poena satisfactoria, quae voluntarie +assumitur, contingit quod unus portet poenam alterius inquantum +sunt quodammodo unum, sicut iam dictum est. Si autem loquamur de +poena pro peccato inflicta, inquantum habet rationem poenae, sic +solum unusquisque pro peccato suo punitur, quia actus peccati +aliquid personale est. Si autem loquamur de poena quae habet +rationem medicinae, sic contingit quod unus punitur pro peccato +alterius. Dictum est enim quod detrimenta corporalium rerum, vel +etiam ipsius corporis, sunt quaedam poenales medicinae ordinatae ad +salutem animae. Unde nihil prohibet talibus poenis aliquem puniri +pro peccato alterius, vel a Deo vel ab homine, utpote filios pro +patribus, et subditos pro dominis, inquantum sunt quaedam res +eorum. Ita tamen quod, si filius vel subditus est particeps culpae, +huiusmodi poenalis defectus habet rationem poenae quantum ad +utrumque, scilicet eum qui punitur, et eum pro quo punitur. Si vero +non sit particeps culpae, habet rationem poenae quantum ad eum pro +quo punitur, quantum vero ad eum qui punitur, rationem medicinae +tantum, nisi per accidens, inquantum peccato alterius consentit; +ordinatur enim ei ad bonum animae, si patienter sustineat. Poenae +vero spirituales non sunt medicinales tantum, quia bonum animae non +ordinatur ad aliud melius bonum. Unde in bonis animae nullus +patitur detrimentum sine culpa propria. Et propter hoc etiam +talibus poenis, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad avitum, unus non +punitur pro alio, quia quantum ad animam, filius non est res +patris. Unde et huius causam dominus assignans, dicit, Ezech. +XVIII, <i>omnes animae meae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the + property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must + be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and + in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure + of your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone + to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents' + example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their + parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live + long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate + them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="37318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37318] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod utrumque dictum videtur esse referendum ad +poenas temporales vel corporales, inquantum filii sunt res quaedam +parentum, et successores praedecessorum. Vel si referatur ad poenas +spirituales, hoc dicitur propter imitationem culpae, unde in Exodo +additur, <i>his qui oderunt me</i>; et in Matthaeo dicitur, <i>et +vos implete mensuram patrum vestrorum</i>. Dicit autem puniri +peccata patrum in filiis, quia filii, in peccatis parentum nutriti, +proniores sunt ad peccandum, tum propter consuetudinem; tum etiam +propter exemplum, patrum quasi auctoritatem sequentes. Sunt etiam +maiori poena digni, si, poenas patrum videntes, correcti non sunt. +Ideo autem addidit, in tertiam et quartam generationem, quia tantum +consueverunt homines vivere, ut tertiam et quartam generationem +videant; et sic mutuo videre possunt et filii peccata patrum ad +imitandum, et patres poenas filiorum ad dolendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or + medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="37319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37319] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod poenae illae sunt corporales et temporales quas +iustitia humana uni pro peccato alterius infligit. Et sunt remedia +quaedam, vel medicinae, contra culpas sequentes, ut vel ipsi qui +puniuntur, vel alii, cohibeantur a similibus culpis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment + of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and + because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought + up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is + not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="37320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37320] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod magis dicuntur puniri pro peccatis aliorum propinqui +quam extranei, tum quia poena propinquorum quodammodo redundat in +illos qui peccaverunt, ut dictum est, inquantum filius est quaedam +res patris. Tum etiam quia et domestica exempla, et domesticae +poenae, magis movent. Unde quando aliquis nutritus est in peccatis +parentum, vehementius ea sequitur; et si ex eorum poenis non est +deterritus, obstinatior videtur; unde et maiori poena dignus.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q88" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q88-p0.1">Q. 88. OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q88-p2"> In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, + we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself. + </p><p id="FS_Q88-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q88-p4"><a href="#FS_Q88_A1"> (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p5"><a href="#FS_Q88_A2"> (2) Whether they differ generically?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p6"><a href="#FS_Q88_A3"> (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p7"><a href="#FS_Q88_A4"> (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p8"><a href="#FS_Q88_A5"> (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p9"><a href="#FS_Q88_A6"> (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 pr."><a name="37321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37321] +Iª-IIae q. 88 pr.</span></a> Deinde, quia peccatum veniale et +mortale distinguuntur secundum reatum, considerandum est de eis. Et +primo, considerandum est de veniali per comparationem ad mortale; +secundo, de veniali secundum se. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. +Primo, utrum veniale peccatum convenienter dividatur contra +mortale. Secundo, utrum distinguantur genere. Tertio, utrum veniale +peccatum sit dispositio ad mortale. Quarto, utrum veniale peccatum +possit fieri mortale. Quinto, utrum circumstantia aggravans possit +de veniali peccato facere mortale. Sexto, utrum peccatum mortale +possit fieri veniale.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q88_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A1-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 1. Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin + is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. + Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37322] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod veniale peccatum non convenienter +dividatur contra mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXII libro contra +Faustum, <i>peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra +legem aeternam</i>. Sed esse contra legem aeternam, dat peccato +quod sit mortale. Ergo omne peccatum est mortale. Non ergo peccatum +veniale dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, + because sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that + whoever sins, sins mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37323] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +apostolus dicit, I Cor. X, <i>sive manducatis, sive bibitis, sive +aliquid aliud facitis, omnia in gloriam Dei facite</i>. Sed contra +hoc praeceptum facit quicumque peccat, non enim peccatum fit +propter gloriam Dei. Cum ergo facere contra praeceptum sit peccatum +mortale, videtur quod quicumque peccat, mortaliter peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. + Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good + which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore + whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," + as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow, + to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37324] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque amore alicui rei inhaeret, inhaeret ei vel sicut fruens, +vel sicut utens; ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doctr. Christ. +Sed nullus peccans inhaeret bono commutabili quasi utens, non enim +refert ipsum ad bonum quod nos beatos facit, quod proprie est uti, +ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Ergo quicumque peccat, fruitur bono +commutabili. <i>Sed frui rebus utendis est humana perversitas</i>, +ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Cum ergo +perversitas peccatum mortale nominet, videtur quod quicumque +peccat, mortaliter peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable + good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly + condivided with mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37325] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque accedit ad unum terminum, ex hoc ipso recedit ab alio. +Sed quicumque peccat, accedit ad bonum commutabile. Ergo recedit a +bono incommutabili. Ergo peccat mortaliter. Non ergo convenienter +peccatum veniale contra mortale dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But + a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37326] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus dicit, in Homil. XLI super Ioan., <i>quod +crimen est quod damnationem meretur, veniale autem est quod non +meretur damnationem</i>. Sed crimen nominat peccatum mortale. Ergo +veniale peccatum convenienter dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: + thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and + fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of + the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. + But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p8"> For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>, ad 3; + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[72], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q74_A9" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.3" shape="rect"> Q[74], A[9]</a>, ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect + consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.4" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is + the order to the last end, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.5" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>; + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.6" shape="rect"> Q[87], A[3]</a>): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.7" shape="rect">Q[87], A[3]</a>), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be + repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end + cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such + sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, + the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal + [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above ( + <a href="#FS_Q87_A6" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.8" shape="rect">Q[87], A[6]</a>). + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p9"> Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic + principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial + sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 co."><a name="37327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37327] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod aliqua, secundum quod proprie accipiuntur, non +videntur esse opposita, quae si metaphorice accipiantur, opponi +inveniuntur, sicut ridere non opponitur ei quod est arescere; sed +secundum quod ridere metaphorice de prato dicitur propter eius +floritionem et virorem, opponitur ei quod est arescere. Similiter +si mortale proprie accipiatur, prout refertur ad mortem corporalem, +non videtur oppositionem habere cum veniali, nec ad idem genus +pertinere. Sed si mortale accipiatur metaphorice, secundum quod +dicitur in peccatis, mortale opponitur ei quod est veniale. Cum +enim peccatum sit quaedam infirmitas animae, ut supra habitum est, +peccatum aliquod mortale dicitur ad similitudinem morbi, qui +dicitur mortalis ex eo quod inducit defectum irreparabilem per +destitutionem alicuius principii, ut dictum est. Principium autem +spiritualis vitae, quae est secundum virtutem, est ordo ad ultimum +finem, ut supra dictum est. Qui quidem si destitutus fuerit, +reparari non potest per aliquod principium intrinsecum, sed solum +per virtutem divinam, ut supra dictum est, quia inordinationes +eorum quae sunt ad finem, reparantur ex fine, sicut error qui +accidit circa conclusiones, per veritatem principiorum. Defectus +ergo ordinis ultimi finis non potest per aliquid aliud reparari +quod sit principalius; sicut nec error qui est circa principia. Et +ideo huiusmodi peccata dicuntur mortalia, quasi irreparabilia. +Peccata autem quae habent inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad +finem, conservato ordine ad ultimum finem, reparabilia sunt. Et +haec dicuntur venialia, tunc enim peccatum veniam habet, quando +reatus poenae tollitur, qui cessat cessante peccato, ut dictum est. +Secundum hoc ergo, mortale et veniale opponuntur sicut reparabile +et irreparabile. Et hoc dico per principium interius, non autem per +comparationem ad virtutem divinam, quae omnem morbum et corporalem +et spiritualem potest reparare. Et propter hoc veniale peccatum +convenienter dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the + generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and + of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other + hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in + relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion + of being. For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the + law prescribes to be done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37328] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod divisio peccati venialis et mortalis non est +divisio generis in species, quae aequaliter participent rationem +generis, sed analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secundum prius et +posterius. Et ideo perfecta ratio peccati, quam Augustinus ponit, +convenit peccato mortali. Peccatum autem veniale dicitur peccatum +secundum rationem imperfectam, et in ordine ad peccatum mortale, +sicut accidens dicitur ens in ordine ad substantiam, secundum +imperfectam rationem entis. Non enim est contra legem, quia +venialiter peccans non facit quod lex prohibet, nec praetermittit +id ad quod lex per praeceptum obligat; sed facit praeter legem, +quia non observat modum rationis quem lex intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually + refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal + sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has + to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human + act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore + it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37329] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illud praeceptum apostoli est affirmativum, unde non +obligat ad semper. Et sic non facit contra hoc praeceptum quicumque +non actu refert in gloriam Dei omne quod facit. Sufficit ergo quod +aliquis habitualiter referat se et omnia sua in Deum, ad hoc quod +non semper mortaliter peccet, cum aliquem actum non refert in +gloriam Dei actualiter. Veniale autem peccatum non excludit +habitualem ordinationem actus humani in gloriam Dei, sed solum +actualem, quia non excludit caritatem, quae habitualiter ordinat in +Deum. Unde non sequitur quod ille qui peccat venialiter, peccet +mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using + it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37330] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ille qui peccat venialiter, inhaeret bono temporali +non ut fruens, quia non constituit in eo finem; sed ut utens, +referens in Deum non actu, sed habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because + what is referred to the end has not the character of finality. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37331] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod bonum commutabile non accipitur ut terminus +contrapositus incommutabili bono, nisi quando constituitur in eo +finis. Quod enim est ad finem, non habet rationem termini.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A2-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 2. Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically + venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above + ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q88_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, + either less than God, which may be a venial + sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37332] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale et mortale non +differant genere, ita scilicet quod aliquod sit peccatum mortale ex +genere, et aliquod veniale ex genere. Bonum enim et malum ex genere +in actibus humanis accipitur per comparationem ad materiam sive ad +obiectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum quodlibet obiectum vel +materiam, contingit peccare mortaliter et venialiter, quodlibet +enim bonum commutabile potest homo diligere vel infra Deum, quod +est peccare venialiter, vel supra Deum quod est peccare mortaliter. +Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non differunt genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability + belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed + through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice + differs from sin committed + through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], + ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37333] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dictum est supra, peccatum mortale dicitur quod est +irreparabile, peccatum autem veniale quod est reparabile. Sed esse +irreparabile convenit peccato quod fit ex malitia, quod secundum +quosdam irremissibile dicitur, esse autem reparabile convenit +peccato quod fit per infirmitatem vel ignorantiam, quod dicitur +remissibile. Ergo peccatum mortale et veniale differunt sicut +peccatum quod est ex malitia commissum, vel ex infirmitate et +ignorantia. Sed secundum hoc non differunt peccata genere, sed +causa, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non +differunt genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A3" id="FS_Q88_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[3]</a>, ad 3; A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur + in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37334] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +supra dictum est quod subiti motus tam sensualitatis quam rationis, +sunt peccata venialia. Sed subiti motus inveniuntur in quolibet +peccati genere. Ergo non sunt aliqua peccata venialia ex +genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic + mortal sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37335] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod Augustinus, in sermone de Purgatorio, enumerat quaedam +genera peccatorum venialium, et quaedam genera peccatorum +mortalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been + pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, + a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, + as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through + weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, + wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p7"> For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, + can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the + genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary + to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently + it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against + the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. + Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary + to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason + of their genus. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from + some disposition of the agent, as stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q88_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the + agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own + genus; for example, if a man + direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically + mortal because venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle + of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 co."><a name="37336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37336] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum veniale a venia dicitur. Potest igitur +aliquod peccatum dici veniale uno modo, quia est veniam consecutum, +et sic dicit Ambrosius quod <i>omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit +veniale</i>. Et hoc dicitur veniale ex eventu. Alio modo dicitur +veniale, quia non habet in se unde veniam non consequatur vel +totaliter vel in parte. In parte quidem, sicut cum habet in se +aliquid diminuens culpam, ut cum fit ex infirmitate vel ignorantia. +Et hoc dicitur veniale ex causa. In toto autem, ex eo quod non +tollit ordinem ad ultimum finem, unde non meretur poenam aeternam, +sed temporalem. Et de hoc veniali ad praesens intendimus. De primis +enim duobus constat quod non habent genus aliquod determinatum. Sed +veniale tertio modo dictum, potest habere genus determinatum, ita +quod aliquod peccatum dicatur veniale ex genere, et aliquod mortale +ex genere, secundum quod genus vel species actus determinantur ex +obiecto. Cum enim voluntas fertur in aliquid quod secundum se +repugnat caritati, per quam homo ordinatur in ultimum finem, +peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale. Unde est mortale ex +genere, sive sit contra dilectionem Dei, sicut blasphemia, +periurium, et huiusmodi; sive contra dilectionem proximi, sicut +homicidium, adulterium, et similia. Unde huiusmodi sunt peccata +mortalia ex suo genere. Quandoque vero voluntas peccantis fertur in +id quod in se continet quandam inordinationem, non tamen +contrariatur dilectioni Dei et proximi, sicut verbum otiosum, risus +superfluus, et alia huiusmodi. Et talia sunt peccata venialia ex +suo genere. Sed quia actus morales recipiunt rationem boni et mali +non solum ex obiecto, sed etiam ex aliqua dispositione agentis, ut +supra habitum est; contingit quandoque quod id quod est peccatum +veniale ex genere ratione sui obiecti, fit mortale ex parte +agentis, vel quia in eo constituit finem ultimum, vel quia ordinat +ipsum ad aliquid quod est peccatum mortale ex genere, puta cum +aliquis ordinat verbum otiosum ad adulterium committendum. +Similiter etiam ex parte agentis contingit quod aliquod peccatum +quod ex suo genere est mortale, fit veniale, propter hoc scilicet +quod actus est imperfectus, idest non deliberatus ratione, quae est +principium proprium mali actus, sicut supra dictum est de subitis +motibus infidelitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of + God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves + contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37337] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod aliquis eligit id quod repugnat +divinae caritati, convincitur praeferre illud caritati divinae, et +per consequens plus amare ipsum quam Deum. Et ideo aliqua peccata +ex genere, quae de se repugnant caritati, habent quod aliquid +diligatur supra Deum. Et sic sunt ex genere suo mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37338] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato veniali ex causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37339] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato quod est veniale +propter imperfectionem actus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A3-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 3. Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial + and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37340] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale non sit dispositio ad +mortale. Unum enim oppositum non disponit ad aliud. Sed peccatum +veniale et mortale ex opposito dividuntur, ut dictum est. Ergo +peccatum veniale non est dispositio ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like + dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37341] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +actus disponit ad aliquid simile in specie sibi, unde in II Ethic. +dicitur quod <i>ex similibus actibus generantur similes +dispositiones et habitus</i>. Sed peccatum mortale et veniale +differunt genere seu specie, ut dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale +non disponit ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is + a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies + in wait for good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37342] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +si peccatum dicatur veniale quia disponit ad mortale, oportebit +quod quaecumque disponunt ad mortale peccatum, sint peccata +venialia. Sed omnia bona opera disponunt ad peccatum mortale, dicit +enim Augustinus, in regula, quod superbia bonis operibus +insidiatur, ut pereant. Ergo etiam bona opera erunt peccata +venialia, quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:1</a>): "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things. + Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37343] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Eccli. XIX, <i>qui spernit minima, paulatim +defluit</i>. Sed ille qui peccat venialiter, videtur minima +spernere. Ergo paulatim disponitur ad hoc quod totaliter defluat +per peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition. + For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which + moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly + an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it + disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to + a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of + consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened + by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end + for one + who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, + he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this + way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns + aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is + disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 co."><a name="37344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37344] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod disponens est quodammodo causa. Unde secundum +duplicem modum causae, est duplex dispositionis modus. Est enim +causa quaedam movens directe ad effectum, sicut calidum calefacit. +Est etiam causa indirecte movens, removendo prohibens, sicut +removens columnam dicitur removere lapidem superpositum. Et +secundum hoc, actus peccati dupliciter ad aliquid disponit. Uno +quidem modo, directe, et sic disponit ad actum similem secundum +speciem. Et hoc modo, primo et per se peccatum veniale ex genere +non disponit ad mortale ex genere, cum differant specie. Sed per +hunc modum peccatum veniale potest disponere, per quandam +consequentiam, ad peccatum quod est mortale ex parte agentis. +Augmentata enim dispositione vel habitu per actus peccatorum +venialium, intantum potest libido peccandi crescere, quod ille qui +peccat, finem suum constituet in peccato veniali, nam unicuique +habenti habitum, inquantum huiusmodi, finis est operatio secundum +habitum. Et sic, multoties peccando venialiter, disponetur ad +peccatum mortale. Alio modo actus humanus disponit ad aliquid +removendo prohibens. Et hoc modo peccatum veniale ex genere potest +disponere ad peccatum mortale ex genere. Qui enim peccat venialiter +ex genere, praetermittit aliquem ordinem, et ex hoc quod consuescit +voluntatem suam in minoribus debito ordini non subiicere, +disponitur ad hoc quod etiam voluntatem suam non subiiciat ordini +ultimi finis, eligendo id quod est peccatum mortale ex genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated + above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial + form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37345] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccatum veniale et mortale non dividuntur ex +opposito, sicut duae species unius generis, ut dictum est, sed +sicut accidens contra substantiam dividitur. Unde sicut accidens +potest esse dispositio ad formam substantialem, ita et veniale +peccatum ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit + in different ways, as stated ( + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37346] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod peccatum veniale non est simile mortali in specie, +est tamen simile ei in genere, inquantum utrumque importat defectum +debiti ordinis, licet aliter et aliter, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; + whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37347] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod opus bonum non est per se dispositio ad mortale +peccatum, potest tamen esse materia vel occasio peccati mortalis +per accidens. Sed peccatum veniale per se disponit ad mortale, ut +dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A4-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 4. Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.36" target="asv"> Jn. 3:36</a>: "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill + if we make little of them." Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial + sin can become mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37348] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit fieri mortale. +Dicit enim Augustinus, exponens illud Ioan. III, <i>qui incredulus +est filio, non videbit vitam</i>, peccata minima (idest venialia), +si negligantur, occidunt. Sed ex hoc dicitur peccatum mortale, quod +spiritualiter occidit animam. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, + as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q74_A8" id="FS_Q88_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[8]</a>, ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37349] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +motus sensualitatis ante consensum rationis est peccatum veniale, +post consensum vero est peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo +peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37350] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum veniale et mortale differunt sicut morbus curabilis et +incurabilis, ut dictum est. Sed morbus curabilis potest fieri +incurabilis. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated + <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37351] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +dispositio potest fieri habitus. Sed peccatum veniale est +dispositio ad mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo veniale peccatum potest +fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> +Those which differ infinitely, are not be transformed one to another. But a mortal sin +differs infinitely from a venial sin, as is apparent from the above <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a" shape="rect">(Q[87] A[5])</a>. +Therefore venial [sin] cannot become mortal. [HST translation, missing +from original]</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37352] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, +ea quae differunt in infinitum, non transmutantur in invicem. Sed +peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in infinitum, ut ex +praedictis patet. Ergo veniale non potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be + at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act + of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however, + the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p7"> Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may + fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p8"> Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning + that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur + a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal + sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated + above ( + <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[87], AA[3]</a>,5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing + God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards + the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate + to one another. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p9"> If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above + + <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 co."><a name="37353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37353] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod peccatum veniale fieri mortale, potest tripliciter +intelligi. Uno modo sic quod idem actus numero, primo sit peccatum +veniale, et postea mortale. Et hoc esse non potest. Quia peccatum +principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, sicut et quilibet actus +moralis. Unde non dicitur unus actus moraliter, si voluntas +mutetur, quamvis etiam actio secundum naturam sit continua. Si +autem voluntas non mutetur, non potest esse quod de veniali fiat +mortale. Alio modo potest intelligi ut id quod est veniale ex +genere, fiat mortale. Et hoc quidem possibile est, inquantum +constituitur in eo finis, vel inquantum refertur ad mortale +peccatum sicut ad finem, ut dictum est. Tertio modo potest +intelligi ita quod multa venialia peccata constituant unum peccatum +mortale. Quod si sic intelligatur quod ex multis peccatis +venialibus integraliter constituatur unum peccatum mortale, falsum +est. Non enim omnia peccata venialia de mundo, possunt habere +tantum de reatu, quantum unum peccatum mortale. Quod patet ex parte +durationis, quia peccatum mortale habet reatum poenae aeternae, +peccatum autem veniale reatum poenae temporalis, ut dictum est. +Patet etiam ex parte poenae damni, quia peccatum mortale meretur +carentiam visionis divinae, cui nulla alia poena comparari potest +ut Chrysostomus dicit. Patet etiam ex parte poenae sensus, quantum +ad vermem conscientiae, licet forte quantum ad poenam ignis, non +sint improportionales poenae. Si vero intelligatur quod multa +peccata venialia faciunt unum mortale dispositive, sic verum est, +sicut supra ostensum est, secundum duos modos dispositionis, quo +peccatum veniale disponit ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37354] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in illo sensu, quod multa +peccata venialia dispositive causant mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement + of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37355] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod ille idem motus sensualitatis qui praecessit +consensum rationis nunquam fiet peccatum mortale, sed ipse actus +rationis consentientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo + change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison + fails. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37356] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod morbus corporalis non est actus, sed dispositio +quaedam permanens, unde eadem manens, potest mutari. Sed peccatum +veniale est actus transiens, qui resumi non potest. Et quantum ad +hoc, non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, + becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which + disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37357] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod dispositio quae fit habitus, est sicut imperfectum in +eadem specie, sicut imperfecta scientia, dum perficitur, fit +habitus. Sed veniale peccatum est dispositio alterius generis, +sicut accidens ad formam substantialem, in quam nunquam +mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A5-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 5. Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, + serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and + drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes + a venial sin to be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37358] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia possit de veniali +peccato facere mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de +Purgatorio, quod <i>si diu teneatur iracundia, et ebrietas si +assidua sit, transeunt in numerum peccatorum mortalium</i>. Sed ira +et ebrietas non sunt ex suo genere peccata mortalia, sed venialia, +alioquin semper essent mortalia. Ergo circumstantia facit peccatum +veniale esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See + <a href="#FS_Q74_A6" id="FS_Q88_A5-p3.1" shape="rect"> Q[74], A[6]</a>], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance + makes a venial sin to be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37359] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Magister dicit, XXIV dist. II libri Sent., quod delectatio, si sit +morosa, est peccatum mortale; si autem non sit morosa, est peccatum +veniale. Sed morositas est quaedam circumstantia. Ergo +circumstantia facit de peccato veniali mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes + a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37360] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +plus differunt malum et bonum quam veniale peccatum et mortale, +quorum utrumque est in genere mali. Sed circumstantia facit de actu +bono malum, sicut patet cum quis dat eleemosynam propter inanem +gloriam. Ergo multo magis potest facere de peccato veniali +mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because + the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by + reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what + has been said ( + <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>, ad 1; + <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.2" shape="rect"> Q[87], + A[5] + </a>, ad 1). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37361] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod, cum circumstantia sit accidens, quantitas eius non potest +excedere quantitatem ipsius actus, quam habet ex suo genere, semper +enim subiectum praeeminet accidenti. Si igitur actus ex suo genere +sit peccatum veniale, non poterit per circumstantiam fieri peccatum +mortale, cum peccatum mortale in infinitum quodammodo excedat +quantitatem venialis, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; + <a href="#FS_Q88_A10" id="FS_Q88_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[10]</a> ,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance + may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes + the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man + has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another + man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly + this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p7"> It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another + species. For it has been stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity + of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial + sin to be mortal, so long as it + remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference + of the moral act. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 co."><a name="37362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37362] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de circumstantiis +ageretur, circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, est accidens actus +moralis, contingit tamen circumstantiam accipi ut differentiam +specificam actus moralis, et tunc amittit rationem circumstantiae, +et constituit speciem moralis actus. Hoc autem contingit in +peccatis quando circumstantia addit deformitatem alterius generis +sicut cum aliquis accedit ad non suam, est actus deformis +deformitate opposita castitati; sed si accedat ad non suam quae est +alterius uxor, additur deformitas opposita iustitiae, contra quam +est ut aliquis usurpet rem alienam; et secundum hoc huiusmodi +circumstantia constituit novam speciem peccati, quae dicitur +adulterium. Impossibile est autem quod circumstantia de peccato +veniali faciat mortale, nisi afferat deformitatem alterius generis. +Dictum est enim quod peccatum veniale habet deformitatem per hoc +quod importat deordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, peccatum +autem mortale habet deformitatem per hoc quod importat +deordinationem respectu ultimi finis. Unde manifestum est quod +circumstantia non potest de veniali peccato facere mortale, manens +circumstantia, sed solum tunc quando transfert in aliam speciem, et +fit quodammodo differentia specifica moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something + accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance + something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p9"> We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's + neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will + be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is + a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through + the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for + instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the + anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to + great scandal or something of the kind. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p10"> With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and + through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing + many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a + man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, + for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk + frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than + to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37363] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod diuturnitas non est circumstantia trahens in +aliam speciem, similiter nec frequentia vel assiduitas, nisi forte +per accidens ex aliquo supervenienti. Non enim aliquid acquirit +novam speciem ex hoc quod multiplicatur vel protelatur, nisi forte +in actu protelato vel multiplicato superveniat aliquid quod variet +speciem, puta inobedientia vel contemptus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. +Dicendum est ergo quod, cum ira sit motus animi ad nocendum +proximo, si sit tale nocumentum in quod tendit motus irae, quod ex +genere suo sit peccatum mortale, sicut homicidium vel furtum, talis +ira ex genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod sit peccatum +veniale, habet ex imperfectione actus, inquantum est motus subitus +sensualitatis. Si vero sit diuturna, redit ad naturam sui generis +per consensum rationis. Si vero nocumentum in quod tendit motus +irae, esset veniale ex genere suo, puta cum aliquis in hoc +irascitur contra aliquem, quod vult ei dicere aliquod verbum leve +et iocosum, quod modicum ipsum contristet; non erit ira peccatum +mortale, quantumcumque sit diuturna; nisi forte per accidens, puta +si ex hoc grave scandalum oriatur, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. +De ebrietate vero dicendum est quod secundum suam rationem habet +quod sit peccatum mortale, quod enim homo absque necessitate reddat +se impotentem ad utendum ratione, per quam homo in Deum ordinatur +et multa peccata occurrentia vitat, ex sola voluptate vini, +expresse contrariatur virtuti. Sed quod sit peccatum veniale, +contingit propter ignorantiam quandam vel infirmitatem, puta cum +homo nescit virtutem vini, aut propriam debilitatem, unde non putat +se inebriari, tunc enim non imputatur ei ebrietas ad peccatum, sed +solum superabundantia potus. Sed quando frequenter inebriatur, non +potest per hanc ignorantiam excusari quin videatur voluntas eius +eligere magis pati ebrietatem, quam abstinere a vino superfluo. +Unde redit peccatum ad suam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the + delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad + 1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37364] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod delectatio morosa non dicitur esse peccatum mortale, +nisi in his quae ex suo genere sunt peccata mortalia; in quibus si +delectatio non morosa sit, peccatum veniale est ex imperfectione +actus, sicut et de ira dictum est. Dicitur enim ira diuturna, et +delectatio morosa, propter approbationem rationis deliberantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above ( + <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a> , ad 4). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37365] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod circumstantia non facit de bono actu malum, nisi +constituens speciem peccati, ut supra etiam habitum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A6-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 6. Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from + venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A5" id="FS_Q88_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37366] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum mortale possit fieri veniale. +Aequaliter enim distat peccatum veniale a mortali, et e contrario. +Sed peccatum veniale fit mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam +peccatum mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while + he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, + loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary + to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love + of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his + will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37367] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum veniale et mortale ponuntur differre secundum hoc, quod +peccans mortaliter diligit creaturam plus quam Deum, peccans autem +venialiter diligit creaturam infra Deum. Contingit autem quod +aliquis committens id quod est ex genere suo peccatum mortale, +diligat creaturam infra Deum, puta si aliquis, nesciens +fornicationem simplicem esse peccatum mortale et contrariam divino +amori, fornicetur, ita tamen quod propter divinum amorem paratus +esset fornicationem praetermittere, si sciret fornicando se contra +divinum amorem agere. Ergo peccabit venialiter. Et sic peccatum +mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is + evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much + more therefore can a mortal sin become venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37368] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +sicut dictum est, plus differt bonum a malo quam veniale a mortali. +Sed actus qui est de se malus, potest fieri bonus, sicut homicidium +potest fieri actus iustitiae, sicut patet in iudice qui occidit +latronem. Ergo multo magis peccatum mortale potest fieri +veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal + punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37369] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod aeternum nunquam potest fieri temporale. Sed peccatum +mortale meretur poenam aeternam, peccatum autem veniale poenam +temporalem. Ergo peccatum mortale nunquam potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can + become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity + pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, + the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become + venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit + fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity. + </p><p id="FS_Q88_A6-p7"> Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then + it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident + from what we have said above + <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate + reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the + species of the act is destroyed. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 co."><a name="37370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37370] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod veniale et mortale differunt sicut perfectum et +imperfectum in genere peccati, ut dictum est. Imperfectum autem per +aliquam additionem potest ad perfectionem venire. Unde et veniale, +per hoc quod additur ei deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati +mortalis, efficitur mortale, sicut cum quis dicit verbum otiosum ut +fornicetur. Sed id quod est perfectum, non potest fieri imperfectum +per additionem. Et ideo peccatum mortale non fit veniale per hoc +quod additur ei aliqua deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati +venialis, non enim diminuitur peccatum eius qui fornicatur ut dicat +verbum otiosum, sed magis aggravatur propter deformitatem +adiunctam. Potest tamen id quod est ex genere mortale, esse veniale +propter imperfectionem actus, quia non perfecte pertingit ad +rationem actus moralis, cum non sit deliberatus sed subitus, ut ex +dictis patet. Et hoc fit per subtractionem quandam, scilicet +deliberatae rationis. Et quia a ratione deliberata habet speciem +moralis actus, inde est quod per talem subtractionem solvitur +species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not + vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37371] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale differt a mortali sicut imperfectum a +perfecto, ut puer a viro. Fit autem ex puero vir, sed non +convertitur. Unde ratio non cogit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication + in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance + itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things + whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37372] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod, si sit talis ignorantia quae peccatum omnino +excuset, sicut est furiosi vel amentis, tunc ex tali ignorantia +fornicationem committens nec mortaliter nec venialiter peccat. Si +vero sit ignorantia non invincibilis, tunc ignorantia ipsa est +peccatum, et continet in se defectum divini amoris, inquantum +negligit homo addiscere ea per quae potest se in divino amore +conservare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." + Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), + the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37373] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, +<i>ea quae sunt secundum se mala, nullo fine bene fieri +possunt</i>. Homicidium autem est occisio innocentis, et hoc nullo +modo bene fieri potest. Sed iudex qui occidit latronem, vel miles +qui occidit hostem reipublicae, non appellantur homicidae, ut +Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio.</p></div></div></div></div> + <div id="FS_Q89" class="div3"> +<h3 id="FS_Q89-p0.1">Q. 89. OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> +<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> +<p id="FS_Q89-p2"> We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q89-p3"><a href="#FS_Q89_A1"> (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p4"><a href="#FS_Q89_A2"> (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>); + </a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p5"><a href="#FS_Q89_A3"> (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p6"><a href="#FS_Q89_A4"> (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p7"><a href="#FS_Q89_A5"> (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p8"><a href="#FS_Q89_A6"> (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?</a></p> +</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 pr."><a name="37374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37374] +Iª-IIae q. 89 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de +peccato veniali secundum se. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, +utrum peccatum veniale causet maculam in anima. Secundo, de +distinctione peccati venialis, prout figuratur per lignum, faenum +et stipulam, I Cor. III. Tertio, utrum homo in statu innocentiae +potuerit peccare venialiter. Quarto, utrum Angelus bonus vel malus +possit peccare venialiter. Quinto, utrum primi motus infidelium +sint peccata venialia. Sexto, utrum peccatum veniale possit esse in +aliquo simul cum solo peccato originali.</p></div></div></div> +<div id="FS_Q89_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A1-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 1. Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that + if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. + But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37375] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale causet maculam in +anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Poenit., quod peccata +venialia, si multiplicentur, decorem nostrum ita exterminant, ut a +caelestis sponsi amplexibus nos separent. Sed nihil aliud est +macula quam detrimentum decoris. Ergo peccata venialia causant +maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. + But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the + soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37376] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum mortale causat maculam in anima propter inordinationem +actus et affectus ipsius peccantis. Sed in peccato veniali est +quaedam deordinatio actus et affectus. Ergo peccatum veniale causat +maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q86_A1" id="FS_Q89_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings + a stain on the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37377] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +macula animae causatur ex contactu rei temporalis per amorem, ut +supra dictum est. Sed in peccato veniali anima inordinato amore +contingit rem temporalem. Ergo peccatum veniale inducit maculam in +anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written, ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some + grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37378] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Ephes. V, <i>ut exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam +Ecclesiam non habentem maculam</i>; Glossa, <i>idest aliquod +peccatum criminale</i>. Ergo proprium peccati mortalis esse videtur +quod maculam in anima causet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p6"> I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be + seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the + body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting + from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to + speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but + not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we + shall show further on ( + <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q24_A10" id="FS_Q89_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[24], A[10]</a>; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, + wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual + rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, + we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness + that results from acts of virtue. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 co."><a name="37379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37379] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, macula importat detrimentum +nitoris ex aliquo contactu, sicut in corporalibus patet, ex quibus +per similitudinem nomen maculae ad animam transfertur. Sicut autem +in corpore est duplex nitor, unus quidem ex intrinseca dispositione +membrorum et coloris, alius autem ex exteriori claritate +superveniente; ita etiam in anima est duplex nitor, unus quidem +habitualis, quasi intrinsecus, alius autem actualis, quasi exterior +fulgor. Peccatum autem veniale impedit quidem nitorem actualem, non +tamen habitualem, quia non excludit neque diminuit habitum +caritatis et aliarum virtutum, ut infra patebit, sed solum impedit +earum actum. Macula autem importat aliquid manens in re maculata, +unde magis videtur pertinere ad detrimentum habitualis nitoris quam +actualis. Unde, proprie loquendo, peccatum veniale non causat +maculam in anima. Et si alicubi dicatur maculam inducere, hoc est +secundum quid, inquantum impedit nitorem qui est ex actibus +virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would + not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37380] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in eo casu in quo multa +peccata venialia dispositive inducunt ad mortale. Aliter enim non +separarent ab amplexu caelestis sponsi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37381] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod inordinatio actus in peccato mortali corrumpit +habitum virtutis, non autem in peccato veniali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which + accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man + does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37382] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod in peccato mortali anima per amorem contingit rem +temporalem quasi finem, et per hoc totaliter impeditur influxus +splendoris gratiae, qui provenit in eos qui Deo adhaerent ut ultimo +fini per caritatem. Sed in peccato veniali non adhaeret homo +creaturae tanquam fini ultimo. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are + said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions + are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37383] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccata venialia per +lignum, faenum et stipulam designentur. Lignum enim, faenum et +stipula dicuntur superaedificari spirituali fundamento. Sed peccata +venialia sunt praeter spirituale aedificium, sicut etiam quaelibet +falsae opiniones sunt praeter scientiam. Ergo peccata venialia non +convenienter designantur per lignum, faenum et stipulam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to + which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37384] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, sic salvus erit +quasi per ignem. Sed quandoque ille qui committit peccata venialia, +non erit salvus etiam per ignem, puta cum peccata venialia +inveniuntur in eo qui decedit cum peccato mortali. Ergo +inconvenienter per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata venialia +designantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those + who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably + designated by these three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37385] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +secundum apostolum, alii sunt qui aedificant aurum, argentum, +lapides pretiosos, idest amorem Dei et proximi et bona opera; et +alii qui aedificant lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sed peccata +venialia committunt etiam illi qui diligunt Deum et proximum, et +bona opera faciunt, dicitur enim I Ioan. I, <i>si dixerimus quia +peccatum non habemus, nosipsos seducimus</i>. Ergo non convenienter +designantur peccata venialia per ista tria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under + these three. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37386] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, +multo plures differentiae et gradus sunt peccatorum venialium quam +tres. Ergo inconvenienter sub his tribus comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment, + but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[87], A[5]</a>). Therefore these three signify venial sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37387] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod apostolus dicit de eo qui superaedificat lignum, faenum et +stipulam, quod salvus erit quasi per ignem, et sic patietur poenam, +sed non aeternam. Reatus autem poenae temporalis proprie pertinet +ad peccatum veniale, ut dictum est. Ergo per illa tria +significantur peccata venialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and + precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine + disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the + Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble + cannot be understood to denote mortal sins. + </p><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p8"> Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed + with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or + of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of + these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be + reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are + designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble." + </p><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p9"> We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, + are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the + house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice + remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, + and yet he is saved for ever. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 co."><a name="37388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37388] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt fundamentum esse fidem informem, +super quam aliqui aedificant bona opera, quae significantur per +aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos; quidam vero peccata etiam +mortalia, quae significantur, secundum eos, per lignum, faenum et +stipulam. Sed hanc expositionem improbat Augustinus, in libro de +fide et operibus, quia, ut apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, qui opera +carnis facit, regnum Dei non consequetur, quod est salvum fieri; +apostolus autem dicit quod ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et +stipulam, salvus erit quasi per ignem. Unde non potest intelligi +quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata mortalia designentur. +Quidam vero dicunt quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam +significantur opera bona, quae superaedificantur quidem spirituali +aedificio, sed tamen commiscent se eis peccata venialia sicut, cum +aliquis habet curam rei familiaris, quod bonum est, commiscet se +superfluus amor vel uxoris vel filiorum vel possessionum, sub Deo +tamen, ita scilicet quod pro his homo nihil vellet facere contra +Deum. Sed hoc iterum non videtur convenienter dici. Manifestum est +enim quod omnia opera bona referuntur ad caritatem Dei et proximi, +unde pertinent ad aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos. Non ergo ad +lignum, faenum et stipulam. Et ideo dicendum est quod ipsa peccata +venialia quae admiscent se procurantibus terrena, significantur per +lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sicut enim huiusmodi congregantur in +domo, et non pertinent ad substantiam aedificii, et possunt comburi +aedificio remanente; ita etiam peccata venialia multiplicantur in +homine, manente spirituali aedificio; et pro istis patitur ignem +vel temporalis tribulationis in hac vita, vel Purgatorii post hanc +vitam; et tamen salutem consequitur aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because + they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.136.1" target="asv">Ps. 136:1</a>): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37389] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non dicuntur superaedificari +spirituali fundamento quasi directe supra ipsum posita, sed quia +ponuntur iuxta ipsum; sicut accipitur ibi, super flumina Babylonis, +idest iuxta. Quia peccata venialia non destruunt spirituale +aedificium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" + the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, + but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and + consequently he will not be saved so as by fire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37390] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non dicitur de quocumque aedificante lignum, faenum +et stipulam, quod salvus sit quasi per ignem, sed solum de eo qui +aedificat supra fundamentum. Quod quidem non est fides informis, ut +quidam aestimabant, sed fides formata caritate, secundum illud +Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Ille ergo qui +decedit cum peccato mortali et venialibus, habet quidem lignum, +faenum et stipulam, sed non superaedificata supra fundamentum +spirituale. Et ideo non erit salvus sic quasi per ignem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial + sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these + do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable + to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove + them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37391] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illi qui sunt abstracti a cura temporalium rerum, +etsi aliquando venialiter peccent, tamen levia peccata venialia +committunt, et frequentissime per fervorem caritatis purgantur. +Unde tales non superaedificant venialia, quia in eis modicum +manent. Sed peccata venialia ipsorum qui circa terrena occupantur, +diutius manent, quia non ita frequenter recurrere possunt ad +huiusmodi peccata delenda per caritatis fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." + Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," + which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, + according as man is more or less attached to them. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37392] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum +dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo, omnia tribus +includuntur, scilicet principio, medio et fine. Et secundum hoc, +omnes gradus venialium peccatorum ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad +lignum, quod diutius manet in igne; ad stipulam, quae citissime +expeditur; ad faenum, quod medio modo se habet. Secundum enim quod +peccata venialia sunt maioris vel minoris adhaerentiae vel +gravitatis, citius vel tardius per ignem purgantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A3-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 3. Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14, </a> "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken + as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial + sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37393] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium +sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae potuerit +peccare venialiter. Quia super illud I ad Tim. II, <i>Adam non est +seductus</i>, dicit Glossa, <i>inexpertus divinae severitatis, in +eo falli potuit, ut crederet veniale esse commissum</i>. Sed hoc +non credidisset, nisi venialiter peccare potuisset. Ergo venialiter +peccare potuit, non peccando mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first + of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded + man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like + manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of + making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to + have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.3" target="asv">Gn. 3:3</a>): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed + a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37394] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., <i>non est arbitrandum +quod esset hominem deiecturus tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima +hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda</i>. Elatio autem deiectionem +praecedens, quae facta est per peccatum mortale, non potuit esse +nisi peccatum veniale. Similiter etiam in eodem Augustinus dicit +quod <i>virum sollicitavit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum +mulierem videret, sumpto vetito pomo, non esse mortuam</i>. Videtur +etiam in Eva fuisse aliquis infidelitatis motus, in hoc quod de +verbis domini dubitavit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, ne forte +moriamur, ut habetur Gen. III. Haec autem videntur esse venialia +peccata. Ergo homo potuit venialiter peccare, antequam mortaliter +peccaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally + notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37395] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +peccatum mortale magis opponitur integritati primi status quam +peccatum veniale. Sed homo potuit peccare mortaliter, non obstante +integritate primi status. Ergo etiam potuit peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. + Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not + change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37396] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod cuilibet peccato debetur aliqua poena. Sed nihil poenale +esse potuit in statu innocentiae, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. +Dei. Ergo non potuit peccare aliquo peccato quo non eiiceretur ab +illo integritatis statu. Sed peccatum veniale non mutat statum +hominis. Ergo non potuit peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q89_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood + as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he + had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another + species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow + or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into + mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin + venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the + original state by sinning mortally. + </p><p id="FS_Q89_A3-p7"> The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden + movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order + of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers + not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the + sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the + fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, + as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order + of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the + end, + which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], + AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q95_A1" id="FS_Q89_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a>, there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained + subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all + the + highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of + innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin. + </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 co."><a name="37397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37397] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod communiter ponitur quod homo in statu innocentiae non +potuit venialiter peccare. Hoc autem non est sic intelligendum, +quasi id quod nobis est veniale, si ipse committeret, esset sibi +mortale, propter altitudinem sui status. Dignitas enim personae est +quaedam circumstantia aggravans peccatum, non tamen transfert in +aliam speciem, nisi forte superveniente deformitate inobedientiae +vel voti, vel alicuius huiusmodi, quod in proposito dici non +potest. Unde id quod est de se veniale, non potuit transferri in +mortale, propter dignitatem primi status. Sic ergo intelligendum +est quod non potuit peccare venialiter, quia non potuit esse ut +committeret aliquid quod esset de se veniale, antequam integritatem +primi status amitteret peccando mortaliter. Cuius ratio est quia +peccatum veniale in nobis contingit vel propter imperfectionem +actus, sicut subiti motus in genere peccatorum mortalium, vel +propter inordinationem existentem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, +servato debito ordine ad finem. Utrumque autem horum contingit +propter quendam defectum ordinis, ex eo quod inferius non +continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat +subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non +est omnino subdita rationi. Quod vero insurgat subitus motus in +ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus +rationis non subditur deliberationi quae est ex altiori bono, ut +supra dictum est. Quod vero humanus animus inordinetur circa ea +quae sunt ad finem, servato debito ordine ad finem, provenit ex hoc +quod ea quae sunt ad finem non ordinantur infallibiliter sub fine, +qui tenet summum locum, quasi principium in appetibilibus, ut supra +dictum est. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in primo habitum est, +erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur +sub superiori, quandiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut +etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Et ideo oportebat quod +inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum +hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale. Ex quo +patet quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit peccare venialiter, +antequam peccaret mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily + forgiven. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37398] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale non sumitur ibi secundum quod nunc de +veniali loquimur, sed dicitur veniale quod est facile +remissibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into + the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by + doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be + held in check by the precept. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37399] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod illa elatio quae praecessit in animo hominis, fuit +primum hominis peccatum mortale, dicitur autem praecessisse +deiectionem eius in exteriorem actum peccati. Huiusmodi autem +elationem subsecuta est et experiendi cupiditas in viro, et +dubitatio in muliere; quae ex hoc solo in quandam elationem +prorupit, quod praecepti mentionem a serpente audivit, quasi nollet +sub praecepto contineri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin + cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is + that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37400] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod peccatum mortale intantum opponitur integritati primi +status, quod corrumpit ipsum, quod peccatum veniale facere non +potest. Et quia non potest simul esse quaecumque inordinatio cum +integritate primi status, consequens est quod primus homo non +potuerit peccare venialiter, antequam peccaret mortaliter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A4-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 4. Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul + which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." + But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37401] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus bonus vel malus possit peccare +venialiter. Homo enim cum Angelis convenit in superiori animae +parte, quae mens vocatur; secundum illud Gregorii, in Homil., +<i>homo intelligit cum Angelis</i>. Sed homo secundum superiorem +partem animae potest peccare venialiter. Ergo et Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. + Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37402] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +quicumque potest quod est plus, potest etiam quod est minus. Sed +Angelus potuit diligere bonum creatum plus quam Deum, quod fecit +peccando mortaliter. Ergo etiam potuit bonum creatum diligere infra +Deum inordinate, venialiter peccando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like + frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above + <a href="#FS_Q89_A3" id="FS_Q89_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37403] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Angeli mali videntur aliqua facere quae sunt ex genere suo venialia +peccata, provocando homines ad risum, et ad alias huiusmodi +levitates. Sed circumstantia personae non facit de veniali mortale, +ut dictum est, nisi speciali prohibitione superveniente, quod non +est in proposito. Ergo Angelus potest peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive + state, and much less, therefore, can an angel. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37404] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod maior est perfectio Angeli quam perfectio hominis in primo +statu. Sed homo in primo statu non potuit peccare venialiter. Ergo +multo minus Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> An angel's intellect, as stated above in the + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A8" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>, is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. + Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. + Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], + A[5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, + except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in + respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. + Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts + are + acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination + to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does + not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ( + <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q63_A4" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[63], A[4]</a>; Q[64], A[2], ad 5). + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 co."><a name="37405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37405] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod intellectus Angeli, sicut in primo dictum est, non +est discursivus, ut scilicet procedat a principiis in conclusiones, +seorsum utrumque intelligens, sicut in nobis contingit. Unde +oportet quod quandocumque considerat conclusiones, consideret eas +prout sunt in principiis. In appetibilibus autem, sicut multoties +dictum est, fines sunt sicut principia; ea vero quae sunt ad finem, +sunt sicut conclusiones. Unde mens Angeli non fertur in ea quae +sunt ad finem, nisi secundum quod constant sub ordine finis. +Propter hoc ex natura sua habent quod non possit in eis esse +deordinatio circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi simul sit deordinatio +circa finem ipsum, quod est per peccatum mortale. Sed Angeli boni +non moventur in ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi in ordine ad finem +debitum, qui est Deus. Et propter hoc omnes eorum actus sunt actus +caritatis. Et sic in eis non potest esse peccatum veniale. Angeli +vero mali in nihil moventur nisi in ordine ad finem peccati +superbiae ipsorum. Et ideo in omnibus peccant mortaliter, +quaecumque propria voluntate agunt. Secus autem est de appetitu +naturalis boni qui est in eis, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37406] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod homo convenit quidem cum Angelis in mente, sive +in intellectu; sed differt in modo intelligendi, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, + or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37407] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod Angelus non potuit minus diligere creaturam quam +Deum, nisi simul referens eam in Deum, sicut in ultimum finem, vel +aliquem finem inordinatum, ratione iam dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal + sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37408] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod omnia illa quae videntur esse venialia, Daemones +procurant ut homines ad sui familiaritatem attrahant, et sic +deducant eos in peccatum mortale. Unde in omnibus talibus +mortaliter peccant, propter intentionem finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A5-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 5. Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.1" target="asv">Rom. 8:1</a>) that "there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking + there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the + flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. + Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37409] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod primi motus sensualitatis in +infidelibus sint peccata mortalia. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. +VIII, quod <i>nihil est damnationis his qui sunt in Christo Iesu, +qui non secundum carnem ambulant</i>, et loquitur ibi de +concupiscentia sensualitatis, ut ex praemissis apparet. Haec ergo +causa est quare concupiscere non sit damnabile his qui non secundum +carnem ambulant, consentiendo scilicet concupiscentiae, quia sunt +in Christo Iesu. Sed infideles non sunt in Christo Iesu. Ergo in +infidelibus est damnabile. Primi igitur motus infidelium sunt +peccata mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow + the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, + since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence + in unbelievers are mortal sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37410] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +Anselmus dicit, in libro de gratia et Lib. Arb., <i>qui non sunt in +Christo, sentientes carnem, sequuntur damnationem, etiam si non +secundum carnem ambulant</i>. Sed damnatio non debetur nisi peccato +mortali. Ergo, cum homo sentiat carnem secundum primum motum +concupiscentiae, videtur quod primus motus concupiscentiae in +infidelibus sit peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this + liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence + in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37411] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +Anselmus dicit, in eodem libro, <i>sic factus est homo, ut +concupiscentiam sentire non deberet</i>. Hoc autem debitum videtur +homini remissum per gratiam baptismalem, quam infideles non habent. +Ergo quandocumque infidelis concupiscit, etiam si non consentiat, +peccat mortaliter, contra debitum faciens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34 </a>that "God is not a respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to + another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to + unbelievers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37412] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quod dicitur Act. X, <i>non est personarum acceptor Deus</i>. +Quod ergo uni non imputat ad damnationem, nec alteri. Sed primos +motus fidelibus non imputat ad damnationem. Ergo etiam nec +infidelibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This + is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q79_A4" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements + of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. + Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, + increases it, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q73_A10" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[73], A[10]</a>). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever + are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in + my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.29" target="asv"> Heb. 10:29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, + by which he was sanctified?" + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 co."><a name="37413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37413] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod irrationabiliter dicitur quod primi motus infidelium +sint peccata mortalia, si eis non consentiatur. Et hoc patet +dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia ipsa sensualitas non potest esse +subiectum peccati mortalis, ut supra habitum est. Est autem eadem +natura sensualitatis in infidelibus et fidelibus. Unde non potest +esse quod solus motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sit peccatum +mortale. Alio modo, ex statu ipsius peccantis. Nunquam enim +dignitas personae diminuit peccatum, sed magis auget, ut ex supra +dictis patet. Unde nec peccatum est minus in fideli quam in +infideli, sed multo maius. Nam et infidelium peccata magis merentur +veniam, propter ignorantiam, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, +<i>misericordiam Dei consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in +incredulitate mea</i>; et peccata fidelium aggravantur propter +gratiae sacramenta, secundum illud Heb. X, <i>quanto magis putatis +deteriora mereri supplicia, qui sanguinem testamenti, in quo +sanctificatus est, pollutum duxerit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, + although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them + a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37414] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de damnatione debita peccato +originali, quae aufertur per gratiam Iesu Christi, quamvis maneat +concupiscentiae fomes. Unde hoc quod fideles concupiscunt, non est +in eis signum damnationis originalis peccati, sicut est in +infidelibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p8"> In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37415] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Et hoc etiam +modo intelligendum est dictum Anselmi. Unde patet solutio ad +secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability + pertains, not to actual but to original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37416] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod illud debitum non concupiscendi erat per originalem +iustitiam. Unde id quod opponitur tali debito, non pertinet ad +peccatum actuale, sed ad peccatum originale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A6-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 6. Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is + a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ( + <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q89_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[3]</a>). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes + unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37417] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum +sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit esse in aliquo +cum solo originali. Dispositio enim praecedit habitum. Sed veniale +est dispositio ad mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo veniale in +infideli, cui non remittitur originale, invenitur ante mortale. Et +sic quandoque infideles habent peccata venialia cum originali, sine +mortalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an + unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit + a venial sin without committing a mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37418] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, +minus habet de connexione et convenientia veniale cum mortali, quam +mortale peccatum cum mortali. Sed infidelis subiectus originali +peccato, potest committere unum peccatum mortale et non aliud. Ergo +etiam potest committere peccatum veniale, et non mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes + to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. + Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin + can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37419] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, +determinari potest tempus in quo puer primo potest esse actor +peccati actualis. Ad quod tempus cum pervenerit, potest ad minus +per aliquod breve spatium stare, quin peccet mortaliter, quia hoc +etiam in maximis sceleratis contingit. In illo autem spatio, +quantumcumque brevi, potest peccare venialiter. Ergo peccatum +veniale potest esse in aliquo cum originali peccato, absque +mortali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on ( + <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q69_A6" id="FS_Q89_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[69], A[6]</a>): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished + for venial sin with no other than original sin. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37420] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra +est quia pro peccato originali puniuntur homines in Limbo puerorum, +ubi non est poena sensus, ut infra dicetur. In Inferno autem +detruduntur homines propter solum peccatum mortale. Ergo non erit +locus in quo possit puniri ille qui habet peccatum veniale cum +originali solo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because + before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, + wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins + to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal + sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself + to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself + to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing + that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until + afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 co."><a name="37421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37421] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo +dicendum quod impossibile est quod peccatum veniale sit in aliquo +cum originali peccato, absque mortali. Cuius ratio est quia +antequam ad annos discretionis perveniat, defectus aetatis, +prohibens usum rationis, excusat eum a peccato mortali, unde multo +magis excusat eum a peccato veniali, si committat aliquid quod sit +ex genere suo tale. Cum vero usum rationis habere inceperit, non +omnino excusatur a culpa venialis et mortalis peccati. Sed primum +quod tunc homini cogitandum occurrit, est deliberare de seipso. Et +si quidem seipsum ordinaverit ad debitum finem, per gratiam +consequetur remissionem originalis peccati. Si vero non ordinet +seipsum ad debitum finem, secundum quod in illa aetate est capax +discretionis, peccabit mortaliter, non faciens quod in se est. Et +ex tunc non erit in eo peccatum veniale sine mortali, nisi postquam +totum fuerit sibi per gratiam remissum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes + to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37422] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum +ergo dicendum quod veniale non est dispositio ex necessitate +praecedens mortale, sed contingenter, sicut labor disponit +quandoque ad febrem, non autem sicut calor disponit ad formam +ignis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on + account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above. + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37423] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum +dicendum quod non impeditur peccatum veniale esse simul cum solo +originali propter distantiam eius vel convenientiam; sed propter +defectum usus rationis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from + the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has + discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing + in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's + affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." + </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37424] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium +dicendum quod ab aliis peccatis mortalibus potest puer incipiens +habere usum rationis, per aliquod tempus abstinere, sed a peccato +omissionis praedictae non liberatur, nisi quam cito potest, se +convertat ad Deum. Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem +habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad +finem, finis enim est prior in intentione. Et ideo hoc est tempus +pro quo obligatur ex Dei praecepto affirmativo, quo dominus dicit, +<i>convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos</i>, Zachariae +I.</p></div></div></div></div> + + + ` + </div> + </body> + </html>