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+<h2 id="FS.v-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[55]-70)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q55">Q. 55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q56">Q. 56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q57">Q. 57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q58">Q. 58. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q59">Q. 59. OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q60">Q. 60. HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q61">Q. 61. OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q62">Q. 62. OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q63">Q. 63. OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q64">Q. 64. OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q65">Q. 65. OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q66">Q. 66. OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q67">Q. 67. OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q68">Q. 68. OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q69">Q. 69. OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q70">Q. 70. OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q71">Q. 71. EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q72">Q. 72. OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q73">Q. 73. OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q74">Q. 74. OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q75">Q. 75. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q76">Q. 76. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q77">Q. 77. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q78">Q. 78. OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q79">Q. 79. OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q80">Q. 80. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q81">Q. 81. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q82">Q. 82. OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q83">Q. 83. OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q84">Q. 84. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q85">Q. 85. OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q86">Q. 86. OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q87">Q. 87. OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q88">Q. 88. OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q89">Q. 89. OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
+<div id="FS_Q55" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q55-p0.1">Q. 55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q55-p2"> We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A3" id="FS_Q55-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters
+connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins.
+Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division
+of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.
+</p><p id="FS_Q55-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q55-p4"><a href="#FS_Q55_A1"> (1) Whether human virtue is a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p5"><a href="#FS_Q55_A2"> (2) Whether it is an operative habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p6"><a href="#FS_Q55_A3"> (3) Whether it is a good habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p7"><a href="#FS_Q55_A4"> (4) Of the definition of virtue.</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 pr."><a name="35787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35787]
+Iª-IIae q. 55 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
+habitibus in speciali. Et quia habitus, ut dictum est,
+distinguuntur per bonum et malum, primo dicendum est de habitibus
+bonis, qui sunt virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, scilicet dona,
+beatitudines et fructus; secundo, de habitibus malis, scilicet de
+vitiis et peccatis. Circa virtutes autem quinque consideranda sunt,
+primo, de essentia virtutis; secundo, de subiecto eius; tertio, de
+divisione virtutum; quarto, de causa virtutis; quinto, de quibusdam
+proprietatibus virtutis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo,
+utrum virtus humana sit habitus. Secundo, utrum sit habitus
+operativus. Tertio, utrum sit habitus bonus. Quarto, de definitione
+virtutis.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q55_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A1-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 1. Whether human virtue is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit
+of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore
+virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35788] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sit habitus. Virtus
+enim est <i>ultimum potentiae</i>, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed
+ultimum uniuscuiusque reducitur ad genus illud cuius est ultimum,
+sicut punctum ad genus lineae. Ergo virtus reducitur ad genus
+potentiae, et non ad genus habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will."
+But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35789] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in II de libero Arbit., quod <i>virtus est bonus
+usus liberi arbitrii</i>. Sed usus liberi arbitrii est actus. Ergo
+virtus non est habitus, sed actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But
+we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35790] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+habitibus non meremur, sed actibus, alioquin homo mereretur
+continue, etiam dormiendo. Sed virtutibus meremur. Ergo virtutes
+non sunt habitus, sed actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering
+which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering,
+denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="35791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35791] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod <i>virtus est
+ordo amoris</i>. Et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod
+<i>ordinatio quae virtus vocatur, est fruendis frui, et utendis
+uti</i>. Ordo autem, seu ordinatio, nominat vel actum, vel
+relationem. Ergo virtus non est habitus, sed actus vel relatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither
+therefore are human virtues habits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="35792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35792] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut inveniuntur virtutes humanae, ita et virtutes naturales. Sed
+virtutes naturales non sunt habitus, sed potentiae quaedam. Ergo
+etiam neque virtutes humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p7">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35793] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus, in libro Praedicament., scientiam et virtutem
+ponit esse habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A1-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But
+the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.
+</p><p id="FS_Q55_A1-p9"> Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And
+therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not
+determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of
+habits, as is clear from what we have said above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q55_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a> ). Therefore human virtues
+are habits.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 co."><a name="35794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35794] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem.
+Uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad
+suum finem. Finis autem potentiae actus est. Unde potentia dicitur
+esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum. Sunt autem
+quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos
+actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi
+potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes. Potentiae
+autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae
+ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem
+ad actus per habitus, sicut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo virtutes
+humanae habitus sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act:
+for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which
+we believe. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest
+point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a
+man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the original signification
+of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight,
+and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35795] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus,
+scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur
+quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque
+autem ipse habitus quo creditur. Unde quando dicitur quod virtus
+est ultimum potentiae, sumitur virtus pro obiecto virtutis. Id enim
+in quod ultimo potentia potest, est id ad quod dicitur virtus rei,
+sicut si aliquis potest ferre centum libras et non plus, virtus
+eius consideratur secundum centum libras, non autem secundum
+sexaginta. Obiectio autem procedebat ac si essentialiter virtus
+esset ultimum potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which
+virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35796] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii dicitur esse virtus,
+secundum eandem rationem, quia scilicet est id ad quod ordinatur
+virtus sicut ad proprium actum. Nihil est enim aliud actus virtutis
+quam bonus usus liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus
+we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run
+by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35797] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aliquo dicimur mereri dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut
+ipso merito, eo modo quo dicimur currere cursu, et hoc modo meremur
+actibus. Alio modo dicimur mereri aliquo sicut principio merendi,
+sicut dicimur currere potentia motiva, et sic dicimur mereri
+virtutibus et habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love
+is set in order by virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="35798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35798] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod virtus dicitur ordo vel ordinatio amoris, sicut id ad
+quod est virtus, per virtutem enim ordinatur amor in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we
+have said.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="35799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35799] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod potentiae naturales sunt de se determinatae ad unum,
+non autem potentiae rationales. Et ideo non est simile, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A2-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 2. Whether human virtue is an operative habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health
+and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither
+is virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35800] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis humanae
+quod sit habitus operativus. Dicit enim Tullius, in IV de Tuscul.
+quaest., quod sicut est sanitas et pulchritudo corporis, ita est
+virtus animae. Sed sanitas et pulchritudo non sunt habitus
+operativi. Ergo neque etiam virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from
+the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some
+definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue
+is referred not only to act, but also to being.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35801] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+in rebus naturalibus invenitur virtus non solum ad agere, sed etiam
+ad esse, ut patet per philosophum, in I de caelo, quod quaedam
+habent virtutem ut sint semper, quaedam vero non ad hoc quod sint
+semper, sed aliquo tempore determinato. Sed sicut se habet virtus
+naturalis in rebus naturalibus, ita se habet virtus humana in
+rationalibus. Ergo etiam virtus humana non solum est ad agere, sed
+etiam ad esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best."
+Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3" target="asv">Eccl. 3</a>,
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6" target="asv">6</a>,
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Eccl.14" target="asv">14</a>) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference
+to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not,
+therefore, an operative habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35802] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., quod virtus est dispositio
+perfecti ad optimum. Optimum autem ad quod hominem oportet disponi
+per virtutem, est ipse Deus, ut probat Augustinus in libro II de
+moribus Eccles.; ad quem disponitur anima per assimilationem ad
+ipsum. Ergo videtur quod virtus dicatur qualitas quaedam animae in
+ordine ad Deum, tanquam assimilativa ad ipsum, non autem in ordine
+ad operationem. Non igitur est habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35803] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus
+uniuscuiusque rei est quae opus eius bonum reddit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q55_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the
+second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these
+is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is
+potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything
+acts in so far as it is in act.
+</p><p id="FS_Q55_A2-p7"> Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common
+with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces
+which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are
+speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human
+virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative
+habit.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 co."><a name="35804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35804] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat quandam
+perfectionem potentiae, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum duplex sit
+potentia, scilicet potentia ad esse et potentia ad agere, utriusque
+potentiae perfectio virtus vocatur. Sed potentia ad esse se tenet
+ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad
+agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod
+unumquodque agit inquantum est actu. In constitutione autem
+hominis, corpus se habet sicut materia, anima vero sicut forma. Et
+quantum quidem ad corpus, homo communicat cum aliis animalibus; et
+similiter quantum ad vires quae sunt animae et corpori communes;
+solae autem illae vires quae sunt propriae animae, scilicet
+rationales, sunt hominis tantum. Et ideo virtus humana, de qua
+loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id
+quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem
+ad esse, sed magis ad agere. Et ideo de ratione virtutis humanae
+est quod sit habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue
+is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding
+disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so
+far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another,
+and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty,
+which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35805] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis,
+unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit
+principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante
+praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit
+autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam
+dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae
+animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra.
+Et ideo virtus, inquantum est conveniens dispositio animae,
+assimilatur sanitati et pulchritudini, quae sunt debitae
+dispositiones corporis. Sed per hoc non excluditur quin virtus
+etiam sit operationis principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which
+are proper to man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35806] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed
+solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria
+hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have
+said above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q55_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in
+an operation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35807] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio
+hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra
+dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo
+conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione
+consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A3-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 3. Whether human virtue is a good habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense.
+But there is a virtue even of sin; according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.56" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:56</a>: "The virtue [Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35808] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis quod sit
+habitus bonus. Peccatum enim in malo semper sumitur. Sed etiam
+peccati est aliqua virtus; secundum illud I ad Cor. XV, <i>virtus
+peccati lex</i>. Ergo virtus non semper est habitus bonus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5" target="asv">Is. 5</a>: "Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue also is referred to good and
+evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35809] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus potentiae respondet. Sed potentia non solum se habet ad
+bonum, sed etiam ad malum; secundum illud Isaiae V, <i>vae, qui
+potentes estis ad bibendum vinum, et viri fortes ad miscendam
+ebrietatem</i>. Ergo etiam virtus se habet et ad bonum et ad
+malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "Virtue [Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only
+to good, but also to evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35810] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum apostolum, II ad Cor. XII, virtus in infirmitate
+perficitur. Sed infirmitas est quoddam malum. Ergo virtus non solum
+se habet ad bonum, sed etiam ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35811] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., <i>nemo
+autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam</i>. Et
+philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus est quae bonum
+facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q55_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now
+the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every
+evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue
+which is an operative habit, is a
+good habit, productive of good works.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 co."><a name="35812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35812] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus importat perfectionem
+potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in
+quod res potest, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Ultimum autem in quod
+unaquaeque potentia potest, oportet quod sit bonum, nam omne malum
+defectum quendam importat; unde Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div.
+Nom., quod omne malum est infirmum. Et propter hoc oportet quod
+virtus cuiuslibet rei dicatur in ordine ad bonum. Unde virtus
+humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni
+operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or
+robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is
+applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through
+the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35813] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod sicut perfectum, ita et bonum dicitur
+metaphorice in malis, dicitur enim et perfectus fur sive latro, et
+bonus fur sive latro; ut patet per philosophum, in V Metaphys.
+Secundum hoc ergo, etiam virtus metaphorice in malis dicitur. Et
+sic virtus peccati dicitur lex, inquantum scilicet per legem
+occasionaliter est peccatum augmentatum, et quasi ad maximum suum
+posse pervenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together
+with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in
+direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible
+with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35814] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod malum ebrietatis et nimiae potationis, consistit in
+defectu ordinis rationis. Contingit autem, cum defectu rationis,
+esse aliquam potentiam inferiorem perfectam ad id quod est sui
+generis, etiam cum repugnantia vel cum defectu rationis. Perfectio
+autem talis potentiae, cum sit cum defectu rationis, non posset
+dici virtus humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of
+the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in
+infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35815] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod tanto ratio perfectior esse ostenditur, quanto
+infirmitates corporis et inferiorum partium magis potest vincere
+seu tolerare. Et ideo virtus humana, quae rationi attribuitur, in
+infirmitate perfici dicitur, non quidem rationis, sed in
+infirmitate corporis et inferiorum partium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A4-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 4. Whether virtue is suitably defined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind,
+by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness,
+since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is
+therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35816] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio virtutis
+quae solet assignari, scilicet, virtus est bona qualitas mentis,
+qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine
+nobis operatur. Virtus enim est bonitas hominis, ipsa enim est quae
+bonum facit habentem. Sed bonitas non videtur esse bona, sicut nec
+albedo est alba. Igitur inconvenienter dicitur quod virtus est bona
+qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than
+quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference
+of quality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35817] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nulla differentia est communior suo genere, cum sit generis
+divisiva. Sed bonum est communius quam qualitas, convertitur enim
+cum ente. Ergo bonum non debet poni in definitione virtutis, ut
+differentia qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the
+field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35818] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., <i>ubi primo occurrit
+aliquid quod non sit nobis pecoribusque commune, illud ad mentem
+pertinet</i>. Sed quaedam virtutes sunt etiam irrationabilium
+partium; ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Non ergo omnis virtus
+est bona qualitas mentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue.
+It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live
+righteously."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35819] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+rectitudo videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, unde idem dicuntur recti,
+et iusti. Sed iustitia est species virtutis. Inconvenienter ergo
+ponitur rectum in definitione virtutis, cum dicitur, qua recte
+vivitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule,
+that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of
+virtue."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="35820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35820] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+quicumque superbit de aliquo, male utitur eo. Sed multi superbiunt
+de virtute, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, <i>quod superbia
+etiam bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant</i>. Falsum est ergo
+quod nemo virtute male utatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7">
+<b>Objection 6:</b> Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.11" target="asv"> Jn. 15:11</a>: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb.
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.11" target="asv">Ap. 11</a>]: "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say that "God works
+virtue in us, without us."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="35821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35821] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
+homo per virtutem iustificatur. Sed Augustinus dicit, super illud
+Ioan., <i>maiora horum faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non
+iustificabit te sine te</i>. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod
+virtutem Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p8">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii,
+19.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35822] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio
+colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p9">
+<b>I answer that,</b> This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is
+gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue,
+as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the
+genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for
+"quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus.
+</p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p10"> Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which"
+it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object,
+and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here
+we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is
+mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind."
+</p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p11"> The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always
+referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred
+both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of
+virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live
+righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words,
+"of which no one makes bad use."
+</p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p12"> Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words
+"which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general,
+whether acquired or infused.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 co."><a name="35823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35823] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem
+virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex
+omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes
+causas virtutis. Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et
+cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum
+dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est,
+differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si
+loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum. Virtus
+autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed
+habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum.
+Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in
+praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur
+virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in
+communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur
+quod est bona qualitas mentis. Finis autem virtutis, cum sit
+habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum
+operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi;
+aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum, sicut opinio
+se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se
+habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper
+se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem
+discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad
+malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur. Causa autem efficiens
+virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod
+dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem
+particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus
+virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently
+as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and
+that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness
+and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with
+the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings,
+not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct
+goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something
+is good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35824] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde
+unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per
+consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente. Unde
+dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est
+ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate. Non autem hoc habet
+locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim
+omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus.
+Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non
+subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia
+eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua
+alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum.
+Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends
+further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of
+the soul is to be in accord with reason."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35825] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est
+bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam
+qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in
+IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>quod bonum animae est secundum rationem
+esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13).
+And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35826] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae,
+nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo
+ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the
+proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2];
+<a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q58_A8" id="FS_Q55_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[58], A[8]</a>). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated
+above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35827] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod iustitiae est propria rectitudo quae constituitur
+circa res exteriores quae in usum hominis veniunt, quae sunt
+propria materia iustitiae, ut infra patebit. Sed rectitudo quae
+importat ordinem ad finem debitum et ad legem divinam, quae est
+regula voluntatis humanae, ut supra dictum est, communis est omni
+virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p17">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or
+by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="35828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35828] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod virtute potest aliquis male uti tanquam obiecto, puta
+cum male sentit de virtute, cum odit eam, vel superbit de ea, non
+autem tanquam principio usus, ita scilicet quod malus sit actus
+virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p18">
+<b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the
+words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without
+action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="35829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35829] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum
+dicendum quod virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis
+agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est
+intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.
+Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis
+agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q56" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q56-p0.1">Q. 56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q56-p2"> We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q56-p3"><a href="#FS_Q56_A1"> (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p4"><a href="#FS_Q56_A2"> (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p5"><a href="#FS_Q56_A3"> (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p6"><a href="#FS_Q56_A4"> (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p7"><a href="#FS_Q56_A5"> (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p8"><a href="#FS_Q56_A6"> (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 pr."><a name="35830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35830]
+Iª-IIae q. 56 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+subiecto virtutis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum virtus
+sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Secundo, utrum una virtus
+possit esse in pluribus potentiis. Tertio, utrum intellectus possit
+esse subiectum virtutis. Quarto, utrum irascibilis et
+concupiscibilis. Quinto, utrum vires apprehensivae sensitivae.
+Sexto, utrum voluntas.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q56_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A1-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 1. Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue
+is that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue
+is not a power, but in the essence of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35831] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non sit in potentia animae
+sicut in subiecto. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II de Lib. Arbit.,
+quod virtus est qua recte vivitur. Vivere autem non est per
+potentiam animae, sed per eius essentiam. Ergo virtus non est in
+potentia animae, sed in eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise."
+But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong
+to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35832] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>virtus est quae bonum facit
+habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>. Sed sicut opus
+constituitur per potentiam, ita habens virtutem constituitur per
+essentiam animae. Ergo virtus non magis pertinet ad potentiam
+animae, quam ad eius essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35833] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+potentia est in secunda specie qualitatis. Virtus autem est quaedam
+qualitas, ut supra dictum est. Qualitatis autem non est qualitas.
+Ergo virtus non est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a
+power of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35834] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed ultimum
+est in eo cuius est ultimum. Ergo virtus est in potentia
+animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of
+virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue
+is an operative habit, as we have said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is
+best: for
+the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's
+power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 co."><a name="35835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35835] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtutem pertinere ad potentiam animae, ex tribus
+potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem, ex ipsa ratione virtutis,
+quae importat perfectionem potentiae, perfectio autem est in eo
+cuius est perfectio. Secundo, ex hoc quod est habitus operativus,
+ut supra dictum est, omnis autem operatio est ab anima per aliquam
+potentiam. Tertio, ex hoc quod disponit ad optimum, optimum autem
+est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per
+operationem a potentia egredientem. Unde virtus humana est in
+potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs
+to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for
+the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous
+actions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35836] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod vivere dupliciter sumitur. Quandoque enim
+dicitur vivere ipsum esse viventis, et sic pertinet ad essentiam
+animae, quae est viventi essendi principium. Alio modo vivere
+dicitur operatio viventis, et sic virtute recte vivitur, inquantum
+per eam aliquis recte operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work,
+this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35837] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bonum vel est finis, vel in ordine ad finem dicitur.
+Et ideo, cum bonum operantis consistat in operatione, hoc etiam
+ipsum quod virtus facit operantem bonum, refertur ad operationem,
+et per consequens ad potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident
+inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the
+subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35838] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod unum accidens dicitur esse in alio sicut in subiecto,
+non quia accidens per seipsum possit sustentare aliud accidens, sed
+quia unum accidens inhaeret substantiae mediante alio accidente, ut
+color corpori mediante superficie; unde superficies dicitur esse
+subiectum coloris. Et eo modo potentia animae dicitur esse
+subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A2-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 2. Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various
+way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive
+power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35839] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod una virtus possit esse in duabus
+potentiis. Habitus enim cognoscuntur per actus. Sed unus actus
+progreditur diversimode a diversis potentiis, sicut ambulatio
+procedit a ratione ut a dirigente, a voluntate sicut a movente, et
+a potentia motiva sicut ab exequente. Ergo etiam unus habitus
+virtutis potest esse in pluribus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to
+work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several
+powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35840] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem tria requiruntur,
+scilicet scire, velle et immobiliter operari. Sed scire pertinet ad
+intellectum, velle ad voluntatem. Ergo virtus potest esse in
+pluribus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in
+the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35841] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+prudentia est in ratione, cum sit recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur
+in VI Ethic. Est etiam in voluntate, quia non potest esse cum
+voluntate perversa, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo una virtus
+potest esse in duabus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot
+be in several powers of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35842] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+virtus est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Sed idem accidens
+non potest esse in pluribus subiectis. Ergo una virtus non potest
+esse in pluribus potentiis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way
+it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects,
+while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is
+diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or
+more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in
+one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved
+by another, and one power receives from another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 co."><a name="35843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35843] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliquid esse in duobus, contingit dupliciter. Uno
+modo, sic quod ex aequo sit in utroque. Et sic impossibile est unam
+virtutem esse in duabus potentiis, quia diversitas potentiarum
+attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas
+autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas
+potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur. Alio
+modo potest esse aliquid in duobus vel pluribus, non ex aequo, sed
+ordine quodam. Et sic una virtus pertinere potest ad plures
+potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad
+alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis; secundum
+quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia
+accipit ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various
+degrees.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35844] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem
+ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas
+rationes, et diverso ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue
+is essentially in the appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35845] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum
+virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter
+in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further
+on
+<a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q56_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[57], A[4]).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35846] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto,
+sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium, ut infra
+dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A3-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 3. Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is
+love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35847] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit subiectum
+virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod
+omnis virtus est amor. Subiectum autem amoris non est intellectus,
+sed solum vis appetitiva. Ergo nulla virtus est in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q56_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect,
+but the appetitive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35848] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut ex supradictis patet. Bonum autem
+non est obiectum intellectus, sed appetitivae virtutis. Ergo
+subiectum virtutis non est intellectus, sed appetitiva virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects
+the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his
+art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35849] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a>
+<i>Praeterea, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem</i>, ut
+philosophus dicit. Sed habitus perficiens intellectum non facit
+bonum habentem, non enim propter scientiam vel artem dicitur homo
+bonus. Ergo intellectus non est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given,
+of virtue (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35850] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod mens maxime dicitur intellectus. Subiectum autem virtutis
+est mens; ut patet ex definitione virtutis supra inducta. Ergo
+intellectus est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q56_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by
+the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly.
+But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism:
+and the case is the same
+with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness:
+for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.
+</p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p7"> And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of
+what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance,
+because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes
+its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they
+make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply:
+because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply.
+For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian
+or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are
+called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).
+</p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p8"> Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical
+intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that
+science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue
+simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is,
+that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1];
+Q[17], AA[1],5;
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q82_A4" id="FS_Q56_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do
+well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved
+by the will.
+</p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p9"> Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually,
+because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of
+virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect
+is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will"
+[*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right
+reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason
+of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just
+as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore
+as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to
+the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 co."><a name="35851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35851] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus est habitus quo quis
+bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum
+actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini
+facultas ad bonum actum, sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo
+facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo
+semper recte loquatur, potest enim grammaticus barbarizare aut
+soloecismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et
+artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem
+agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur, sicut
+iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta
+operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur. Et quia bonum, sicut
+et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in
+potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu; ideo ab huiusmodi
+habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus,
+puta quia est iustus vel temperatus; et eadem ratio est de
+similibus. Et quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus
+eius bonum reddit, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes,
+quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum
+habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes,
+quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec
+simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter
+aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur
+bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber.
+Et propter hoc, plerumque scientia et ars contra virtutem
+dividitur, quandoque autem virtutes dicuntur, ut patet in VI Ethic.
+Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest
+esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus
+speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem, sic enim
+philosophus, in VI Ethic., scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et
+etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes. Subiectum vero
+habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi
+voluntas; vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota a voluntate.
+Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias quae
+aliqualiter sunt rationales, ad suos actus, ut supra habitum est,
+et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet
+bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus quae facit bene agere in actu, non
+solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate; vel in
+aliqua potentia secundum quod est a voluntate mota. Contingit autem
+intellectum a voluntate moveri, sicut et alias potentias,
+considerat enim aliquis aliquid actu, eo quod vult. Et ideo
+intellectus, secundum quod habet ordinem ad voluntatem, potest esse
+subiectum virtutis simpliciter dictae. Et hoc modo intellectus
+speculativus, vel ratio, est subiectum fidei, movetur enim
+intellectus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei, ex imperio
+voluntatis; nullus enim credit nisi volens. Intellectus vero
+practicus est subiectum prudentiae. Cum enim prudentia sit recta
+ratio agibilium, requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat
+ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines; ad quos
+bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia
+speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis. Et ideo sicut
+subiectum scientiae, quae est ratio recta speculabilium, est
+intellectus speculativus in ordine ad intellectum agentem; ita
+subiectum prudentiae est intellectus practicus in ordine ad
+voluntatem rectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it
+depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above
+(Q[25], AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4];
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q56_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[20], A[1]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35852] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini intelligendum est de virtute
+simpliciter dicta non quod omnis talis virtus sit simpliciter amor;
+sed quia dependet aliqualiter ab amore, inquantum dependet a
+voluntate, cuius prima affectio est amor, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act
+of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative
+or practical, is a virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35853] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bonum uniuscuiusque est finis eius, et ideo, cum
+verum sit finis intellectus, cognoscere verum est bonus actus
+intellectus. Unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum
+cognoscendum, vel in speculativis vel in practicis, dicitur
+virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers virtue simply so called.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35854] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtute simpliciter dicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A4-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 4. Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to
+us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue.
+It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive
+appetite, as we have said in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q56_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35855] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non
+possint esse subiectum virtutis. Huiusmodi enim vires sunt communes
+nobis et brutis. Sed nunc loquimur de virtute secundum quod est
+propria homini, sic enim dicitur virtus humana. Non igitur humanae
+virtutis potest esse subiectum irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae
+sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's
+body: for the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35856] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+appetitus sensitivus est vis utens organo corporali. Sed bonum
+virtutis non potest esse in corpore hominis, dicit enim apostolus,
+Rom. VII, <i>scio quod non habitat in carne mea bonum</i>. Ergo
+appetitus sensitivus non potest esse subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body
+is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my
+coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me." But just as
+the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the
+irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which
+we live rightly," as we have said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35857] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus probat, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod virtus non est
+in corpore, sed in anima, eo quod per animam corpus regitur, unde
+quod aliquis corpore bene utatur, totum refertur ad animam;
+<i>sicut si mihi auriga obtemperans, equos quibus praeest, recte
+regit, hoc totum mihi debetur</i>. Sed sicut anima regit corpus,
+ita etiam ratio regit appetitum sensitivum. Ergo totum rationali
+parti debetur, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis recte regantur.
+Sed virtus est qua recte vivitur, ut supra dictum est. Virtus
+igitur non est in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed solum in parte
+rationali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible
+powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A2" id="FS_Q56_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[2]</a>). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35858] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+principalis actus virtutis moralis est electio, ut dicitur in VIII
+Ethic. Sed electio non est actus irascibilis et concupiscibilis,
+sed rationis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus moralis non est in
+irascibili et concupiscibili, sed in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
+10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35859] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod fortitudo ponitur esse in irascibili, temperantia autem in
+concupiscibili. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>hae
+virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A4-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of
+the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered
+as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or
+concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in
+the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.
+</p><p id="FS_Q56_A4-p8"> For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from
+one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for
+instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act.
+Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved
+by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible
+and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity
+with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but
+a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 co."><a name="35860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35860] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari
+possunt. Uno modo secundum se, inquantum sunt partes appetitus
+sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competit eis quod sint subiectum
+virtutis. Alio modo possunt considerari inquantum participant
+rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire. Et sic
+irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis
+humanae, sic enim est principium humani actus, inquantum participat
+rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes. Quod
+enim in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes, patet.
+Actus enim qui progreditur ab una potentia secundum quod est ab
+alia mota, non potest esse perfectus, nisi utraque potentia sit
+bene disposita ad actum, sicut actus artificis non potest esse
+congruus, nisi et artifex sit bene dispositus ad agendum, et etiam
+ipsum instrumentum. In his igitur circa quae operatur irascibilis
+et concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a ratione motae, necesse est
+ut aliquis habitus perficiens ad bene agendum sit non solum in
+ratione, sed etiam in irascibili et concupiscibili. Et quia bona
+dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum
+conformitatem ad potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in
+irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quaedam
+habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and
+dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man.
+And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35861] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se
+consideratae, prout sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, communes sunt
+nobis et brutis. Sed secundum quod sunt rationales per
+participationem, ut obedientes rationi, sic sunt propriae hominis.
+Et hoc modo possunt esse subiectum virtutis humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being
+moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed,
+have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason,
+the good of reason is begotten in them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35862] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut caro hominis ex se quidem non habet bonum
+virtutis, fit tamen instrumentum virtuosi actus, inquantum, movente
+ratione, membra nostra exhibemus ad serviendum iustitiae, ita etiam
+irascibilis et concupiscibilis ex se quidem non habent bonum
+virtutis sed magis infectionem fomitis; inquantum vero conformantur
+rationi, sic in eis adgeneratur bonum virtutis moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body
+obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul:
+whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave:
+wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this
+reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly;
+on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher
+says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which
+free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in
+the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35863] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod alia ratione regitur corpus ab anima, et irascibilis
+et concupiscibilis a ratione. Corpus enim ad nutum obedit animae
+absque contradictione, in his in quibus natum est ab anima moveri,
+unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus
+despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum. Et ideo totus
+motus corporis refertur ad animam. Et propter hoc in corpore non
+est virtus, sed solum in anima. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis
+non ad nutum obediunt rationi, sed habent proprios motus suos,
+quibus interdum rationi repugnant, unde in eodem libro philosophus
+dicit quod ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem principatu
+politico, quo scilicet reguntur liberi, qui habent in aliquibus
+propriam voluntatem. Et propter hoc etiam oportet in irascibili et
+concupiscibili esse aliquas virtutes, quibus bene disponantur ad
+actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential
+choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible
+powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers.
+And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are
+in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35864] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod in electione duo sunt, scilicet intentio finis, quae
+pertinet ad virtutem moralem; et praeacceptio eius quod est ad
+finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Quod
+autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones animae, hoc
+contingit ex bona dispositione irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Et
+ideo virtutes morales circa passiones, sunt in irascibili et
+concupiscibili, sed prudentia est in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A5-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 5. Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite
+can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason:
+for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf.
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q56_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35865] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis
+interius, possit esse aliqua virtus. Appetitus enim sensitivus
+potest esse subiectum virtutis, inquantum obedit rationi. Sed vires
+sensitivae apprehensivae interius, rationi obediunt, ad imperium
+enim rationis operatur et imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa.
+Ergo in his viribus potest esse virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so
+also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in
+the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35866] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas, in suo actu potest
+impediri, vel etiam adiuvari, per appetitum sensitivum; ita etiam
+intellectus vel ratio potest impediri, vel etiam iuvari, per vires
+praedictas. Sicut ergo in viribus sensitivis appetitivis potest
+esse virtus, ita etiam in apprehensivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the
+power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35867] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+prudentia est quaedam virtus, cuius partem ponit Tullius memoriam,
+in sua rhetorica. Ergo etiam in vi memorativa potest esse aliqua
+virtus. Et eadem ratione, in aliis interioribus apprehensivis
+viribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual
+virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive
+powers of apprehension.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35868] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod omnes virtutes vel sunt intellectuales, vel morales, ut
+dicitur in II Ethic. Morales autem virtutes omnes sunt in parte
+appetitiva, intellectuales autem in intellectu vel ratione, sicut
+patet in VI Ethic. Nulla ergo virtus est in viribus sensitivis
+apprehensivis interius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the
+Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second
+nature." Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says
+of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet,
+in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so
+called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A4" id="FS_Q56_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>, ad 3).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 co."><a name="35869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35869] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis interius,
+ponuntur aliqui habitus. Quod patet ex hoc praecipue quod
+philosophus dicit, in libro de memoria, <i>quod in memorando unum
+post aliud, operatur consuetudo, quae est quasi quaedam natura</i>,
+nihil autem est aliud habitus consuetudinalis quam habitudo
+acquisita per consuetudinem, quae est in modum naturae. Unde de
+virtute dicit Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod est <i>habitus in
+modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. In homine tamen id quod ex
+consuetudine acquiritur in memoria, et in aliis viribus sensitivis
+apprehensivis, non est habitus per se; sed aliquid annexum
+habitibus intellectivae partis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p7"> Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never
+happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the
+knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective
+knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these
+are rather in the intellect or reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed tamen si
+qui sunt habitus in talibus viribus, virtutes dici non possunt.
+Virtus enim est habitus perfectus, quo non contingit nisi bonum
+operari, unde oportet quod virtus sit in illa potentia quae est
+consummativa boni operis. Cognitio autem veri non consummatur in
+viribus sensitivis apprehensivis; sed huiusmodi vires sunt quasi
+praeparatoriae ad cognitionem intellectivam. Et ideo in huiusmodi
+viribus non sunt virtutes, quibus cognoscitur verum; sed magis in
+intellectu vel ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the
+act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject
+of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason
+that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight
+(De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive
+virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35870] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus se habet ad voluntatem,
+quae est appetitus rationis, sicut motus ab eo. Et ideo opus
+appetitivae virtutis consummatur in appetitu sensitivo. Et propter
+hoc, appetitus sensitivus est subiectum virtutis. Virtutes autem
+sensitivae apprehensivae magis se habent ut moventes respectu
+intellectus, eo quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam,
+sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo opus
+cognitionis in intellectu terminatur. Et propter hoc, virtutes
+cognoscitivae sunt in ipso intellectu vel ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p9"> And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35871] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of
+the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35872] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod memoria non ponitur pars prudentiae, sicut species
+est pars generis, quasi ipsa memoria sit quaedam virtus per se, sed
+quia unum eorum quae requiruntur ad prudentiam, est bonitas
+memoriae; ut sic quodammodo se habeat per modum partis
+integralis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A6-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 6. Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power
+by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the
+Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is
+ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his
+Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35873] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non sit subiectum alicuius
+virtutis. Ad id enim quod convenit potentiae ex ipsa ratione
+potentiae, non requiritur aliquis habitus. Sed de ipsa ratione
+voluntatis, cum sit in ratione, secundum philosophum in III de
+anima, est quod tendat in id quod est bonum secundum rationem, ad
+quod ordinatur omnis virtus, quia unumquodque naturaliter appetit
+proprium bonum, <i>virtus enim est habitus per modum naturae,
+consentaneus rationi</i>, ut Tullius dicit in sua rhetorica. Ergo
+voluntas non est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the
+intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which
+are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35874] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis virtus aut est intellectualis, aut moralis, ut dicitur in I
+et II Ethic. Sed virtus intellectualis est, sicut in subiecto, in
+intellectu et ratione, non autem in voluntate, virtus autem moralis
+est, sicut in subiecto, in irascibili et concupiscibili, quae sunt
+rationales per participationem. Ergo nulla virtus est in voluntate
+sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect
+of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there
+will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore
+the will cannot be the subject of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35875] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnes actus humani, ad quos virtutes ordinantur, sunt voluntarii.
+Si igitur respectu aliquorum humanorum actuum sit aliqua virtus in
+voluntate, pari ratione respectu omnium actuum humanorum erit
+virtus in voluntate. Aut ergo in nulla alia potentia erit aliqua
+virtus, aut ad eundem actum ordinabuntur duae virtutes, quod
+videtur inconveniens. Voluntas ergo non potest esse subiectum
+virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers.
+Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35876] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod maior perfectio requiritur in movente quam in moto. Sed
+voluntas movet irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Multo ergo magis
+debet esse virtus in voluntate, quam in irascibili et
+concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which
+habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose.
+</p><p id="FS_Q56_A6-p7"> Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q56_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue
+perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species,
+such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as
+regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as
+those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 co."><a name="35877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35877] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi
+indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem
+habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio
+potentiae. Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine
+ad obiectum. Unde cum, sicut dictum est, obiectum voluntati sit
+bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum, quantum ad hoc non indiget
+voluntas virtute perficiente. Sed si quod bonum immineat homini
+volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis; sive quantum ad totam
+speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites
+humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi;
+ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae
+ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum, sunt in
+voluntate sicut in subiecto; ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which
+are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A6" id="FS_Q56_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[6]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35878] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio illa habet locum de virtute quae ordinat
+ad bonum proprium ipsius volentis, sicut temperantia et fortitudo,
+quae sunt circa passiones humanas et alia huiusmodi, ut ex dictis
+patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e.
+in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the
+will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q56_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35879] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est
+irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed omnino, idest universaliter,
+appetitivum, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sub appetitivo autem
+comprehenditur voluntas. Et ideo, si qua virtus est in voluntate,
+erit moralis, nisi sit theologica, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases
+there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need
+exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35880] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod quaedam virtutes ordinantur ad bonum passionis
+moderatae, quod est proprium huius vel illius hominis, et in
+talibus non est necessarium quod sit aliqua virtus in voluntate,
+cum ad hoc sufficiat natura potentiae, ut dictum est. Sed hoc solum
+necessarium est in illis virtutibus quae ordinantur ad aliquod
+bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q57" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q57-p0.1">Q. 57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q57-p2"> We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological
+virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q57-p3"><a href="#FS_Q57_A1"> (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p4"><a href="#FS_Q57_A2"> (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p5"><a href="#FS_Q57_A3"> (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p6"><a href="#FS_Q57_A4"> (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p7"><a href="#FS_Q57_A5"> (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p8"><a href="#FS_Q57_A6"> (6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 pr."><a name="35881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35881]
+Iª-IIae q. 57 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+distinctione virtutum. Et primo, quantum ad virtutes
+intellectuales; secundo, quantum ad morales; tertio, quantum ad
+theologicas. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum habitus
+intellectuales speculativi sint virtutes. Secundo, utrum sint tres,
+scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Tertio, utrum habitus
+intellectualis qui est ars, sit virtus. Quarto, utrum prudentia sit
+virtus distincta ab arte. Quinto, utrum prudentia sit virtus
+necessaria homini. Sexto, utrum eubulia, synesis et gnome sint
+virtutes adiunctae prudentiae.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q57_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A1-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 1. Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have
+said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q57_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore
+the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35882] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus intellectuales speculativi non
+sint virtutes. Virtus enim est habitus operativus, ut supra dictum
+est. Sed habitus speculativi non sunt operativi, distinguitur enim
+speculativum a practico, idest operativo. Ergo habitus
+intellectuales speculativi non sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic.
+i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather
+things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35883] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus est eorum per quae fit homo felix sive beatus, eo quod
+felicitas est virtutis praemium, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed habitus
+intellectuales non considerant actus humanos, aut alia bona humana,
+per quae homo beatitudinem adipiscitur, sed magis res naturales et
+divinas. Ergo huiusmodi habitus virtutes dici non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate,
+as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35884] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+scientia est habitus speculativus. Sed scientia et virtus
+distinguuntur sicut diversa genera non subalternatim posita; ut
+patet per philosophum, in IV Topic. Ergo habitus speculativi non
+sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic.
+vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise
+than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35885] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+soli habitus speculativi considerant necessaria quae impossibile
+est aliter se habere. Sed philosophus ponit, in VI Ethic., quasdam
+virtutes intellectuales in parte animae quae considerat necessaria
+quae non possunt aliter se habere. Ergo habitus intellectuales
+speculativi sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a habit, as we have already observed (
+<a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness,
+it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), belongs to those habits alone which affect the
+appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective
+uses.
+</p><p id="FS_Q57_A1-p7"> Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only
+the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration
+of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they
+conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does
+not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has
+scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue
+which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there
+can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the
+"contemplative life has greater merit than the active life."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 co."><a name="35886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35886] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum omnis virtus dicatur in ordine ad bonum, sicut
+supra dictum est, duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus,
+ut supra dictum est, uno modo, quia facit facultatem bene operandi;
+alio modo, quia cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum. Et hoc,
+sicut supra dictum est, pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui
+respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est
+quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus. Cum igitur habitus
+intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec
+aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam; possunt
+quidem dici virtutes inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae
+operationis, quae est consideratio veri (hoc enim est bonum opus
+intellectus), non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi
+facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis
+habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum,
+sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam, sed
+quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo
+virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit
+etiam bene uti huiusmodi speculativis habitibus. Et secundum hoc
+etiam, in actibus horum habituum potest esse meritum, si ex
+caritate fiant, sicut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod
+<i>contemplativa est maioris meriti quam activa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative
+faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior
+act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35887] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod duplex est opus, scilicet exterius, et interius.
+Practicum ergo, vel operativum, quod dividitur contra speculativum,
+sumitur ab opere exteriori, ad quod non habet ordinem habitus
+speculativus. Sed tamen habet ordinem ad interius opus intellectus,
+quod est speculari verum. Et secundum hoc est habitus
+operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues
+are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient
+cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to
+be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those
+things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because
+they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A7" id="FS_Q57_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35888] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtus est aliquorum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut
+obiectorum. Et sic huiusmodi virtutes speculativae non sunt eorum
+per quae homo fit beatus; nisi forte secundum quod ly per dicit
+causam efficientem vel obiectum completae beatitudinis, quod est
+Deus, quod est summum speculabile. Alio modo dicitur virtus esse
+aliquorum sicut actuum. Et hoc modo virtutes intellectuales sunt
+eorum per quae homo fit beatus. Tum quia actus harum virtutum
+possunt esse meritorii, sicut dictum est. Tum etiam quia sunt
+quaedam inchoatio perfectae beatitudinis, quae in contemplatione
+veri consistit, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35889] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod scientia dividitur contra virtutem secundo modo
+dictam, quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A2-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 2. Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.
+Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science
+among the intellectual virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35890] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur tres
+virtutes intellectuales speculativae, scilicet sapientia, scientia
+et intellectus. Species enim non debet condividi generi. Sed
+sapientia est quaedam scientia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo
+sapientia non debet condividi scientiae, in numero virtutum
+intellectualium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of
+these objects, as we have already explained (
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q57_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now
+the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of
+principles
+should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35891] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+in distinctione potentiarum, habituum et actuum, quae attenditur
+secundum obiecta, attenditur principaliter distinctio quae est
+secundum rationem formalem obiectorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Non
+ergo diversi habitus debent distingui secundum materiale obiectum;
+sed secundum rationem formalem illius obiecti. Sed principium
+demonstrationis est ratio sciendi conclusiones. Non ergo
+intellectus principiorum debet poni habitus alius, aut alia virtus,
+a scientia conclusionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason
+employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science,
+which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35892] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus intellectualis dicitur quae est in ipso rationali per
+essentiam. Sed ratio, etiam speculativa, sicut ratiocinatur
+syllogizando demonstrative; ita etiam ratiocinatur syllogizando
+dialectice. Ergo sicut scientia, quae causatur ex syllogismo
+demonstrativo, ponitur virtus intellectualis speculativa; ita etiam
+et opinio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35893] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus, VI Ethic., ponit has solum tres virtutes
+intellectuales speculativas, scilicet sapientiam, scientiam et
+intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As already stated
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A1" id="FS_Q57_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth:
+for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as known through another.
+What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects
+the intellect for the consideration
+of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles.
+</p><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p7"> On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the
+reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus;
+secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint,
+are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with
+respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which
+considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order,
+because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which
+is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the
+different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 co."><a name="35894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35894] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, virtus intellectualis
+speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad
+considerandum verum, hoc enim est bonum opus eius. Verum autem est
+dupliciter considerabile, uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo,
+sicut per aliud notum. Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut
+principium; et percipitur statim ab intellectu. Et ideo habitus
+perficiens intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem, vocatur
+intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum. Verum autem quod est per
+aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu, sed per
+inquisitionem rationis, et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem
+potest esse dupliciter, uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere;
+alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae.
+<i>Et quia ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et
+magis nota secundum naturam</i>, ut dicitur in I Physic.; ideo id
+quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod
+est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa
+huiusmodi est sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas, ut
+dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de
+omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest
+nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. Ad id vero quod est ultimum
+in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perficit intellectum
+scientia. Et ideo secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi
+habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions
+from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all,
+not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35895] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet
+id quod est commune omnibus scientiis, ut scilicet ex principiis
+conclusiones demonstret. Sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra
+alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat; et non
+solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima
+principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam
+scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or
+power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color,
+and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand,
+the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the
+conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can
+be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the
+conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.
+</p><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p10"> Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another,
+but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for
+instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that
+science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as
+obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions
+of science, and of the principles on which they are based.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35896] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad
+potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae
+penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale, sicut ad eandem
+potentiam visivam pertinet videre colorem, et lumen, quod est ratio
+videndi colorem et simul cum ipso videtur. Principia vero
+demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod
+considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum
+conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur.
+Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam,
+quae considerat etiam conclusiones, sed considerare principia
+secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum. Unde, si quis recte
+consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab
+invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus,
+quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est
+perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc
+enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori.
+Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub
+se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus
+scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth,
+and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never
+tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they
+are not intellectual
+virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35897] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus virtutis determinate
+se habet ad bonum, nullo autem modo ad malum. Bonum autem
+intellectus est verum, malum autem eius est falsum. Unde soli illi
+habitus virtutes intellectuales dicuntur, quibus semper dicitur
+verum, et nunquam falsum. Opinio vero et suspicio possunt esse veri
+et falsi. Et ideo non sunt intellectuales virtutes, ut dicitur in
+VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A3-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 3. Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad
+use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore
+art is not a virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35898] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod ars non sit virtus intellectualis.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod virtute
+nullus male utitur. Sed arte aliquis male utitur, potest enim
+aliquis artifex, secundum scientiam artis suae, male operari. Ergo
+ars non est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore
+art is not a virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35899] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutis non est virtus. Artis autem est aliqua virtus, ut dicitur
+in VI Ethic. Ergo ars non est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are
+speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35900] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+artes liberales sunt excellentiores quam artes mechanicae. Sed
+sicut artes mechanicae sunt practicae, ita artes liberales sunt
+speculativae. Ergo si ars esset virtus intellectualis, deberet
+virtutibus speculativis annumerari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues,
+which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35901] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit artem esse virtutem; nec
+tamen connumerat eam virtutibus speculativis, quarum subiectum
+ponit scientificam partem animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not
+on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as
+such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly
+speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative
+habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human
+appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his
+appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we
+have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither
+art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects
+the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 co."><a name="35902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35902] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum
+faciendorum. Quorum tamen bonum non consistit in eo quod appetitus
+humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus quod fit,
+in se bonum est. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, inquantum
+artifex est, qua voluntate opus faciat; sed quale sit opus quod
+facit. Sic igitur ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et
+tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad
+ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam
+considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad
+illas. Dummodo enim verum geometra demonstret, non refert qualiter
+se habeat secundum appetitivam partem, utrum sit laetus vel iratus,
+sicut nec in artifice refert, ut dictum est. Et ideo eo modo ars
+habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi, inquantum
+scilicet nec ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus
+quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum;
+sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the
+art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto.
+Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this
+reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect
+virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although
+there cannot be a good use without the art.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35903] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis habens artem operatur malum
+artificium, hoc non est opus artis, immo est contra artem, sicut
+etiam cum aliquis sciens verum mentitur, hoc quod dicit non est
+secundum scientiam, sed contra scientiam. Unde sicut scientia se
+habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars, et secundum hoc
+dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis,
+quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud
+requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for
+this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires
+a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35904] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet,
+requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem;
+ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus, scilicet moralis,
+inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur.
+Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit
+voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or
+the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by
+a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained
+to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the
+body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences
+which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent,
+does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35905] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum
+cuiusdam operis, puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae
+aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi
+opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam
+similitudinem artes, sed liberales; ad differentiam illarum artium
+quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo
+serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo
+secundum animam est liber. Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum
+huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non
+autem artes. Nec oportet, si liberales artes sunt nobiliores, quod
+magis eis conveniat ratio artis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A4-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 4. Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity
+of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore
+prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35906] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit alia virtus ab arte.
+Ars enim est ratio recta aliquorum operum. Sed diversa genera
+operum non faciunt ut aliquid amittat rationem artis, sunt enim
+diversae artes circa opera valde diversa. Cum igitur etiam
+prudentia sit quaedam ratio recta operum, videtur quod etiam ipsa
+debeat dici ars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters
+that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore,
+should prudence be called an art.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35907] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus speculativi,
+utrumque enim eorum est circa contingens aliter se habere, ut
+dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed quidam habitus speculativi dicuntur artes.
+Ergo multo magis prudentia debet dici ars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also,
+as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct
+from art.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35908] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed
+etiam in quibusdam artibus consiliari contingit, ut dicitur in III
+Ethic., sicut in arte militari, et gubernativa, et medicinali. Ergo
+prudentia ab arte non distinguitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35909] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus distinguit prudentiam ab arte, in VI
+Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A1" id="FS_Q57_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[56], A[3]) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits
+are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the
+mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas
+prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the
+rectitude thereof.
+</p><p id="FS_Q57_A4-p7"> The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason
+of things to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing
+into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to
+see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions,
+consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things
+with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which
+reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the
+habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii,
+8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with
+regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue,
+which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good
+of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more
+praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence
+to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is
+evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 co."><a name="35910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35910] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ubi invenitur diversa ratio virtutis, ibi oportet
+virtutes distingui. Dictum est autem supra quod aliquis habitus
+habet rationem virtutis ex hoc solum quod facit facultatem boni
+operis, aliquis autem ex hoc quod facit non solum facultatem boni
+operis, sed etiam usum. Ars autem facit solum facultatem boni
+operis, quia non respicit appetitum. Prudentia autem non solum
+facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum, respicit enim
+appetitum, tanquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus. Cuius
+differentiae ratio est, quia ars est recta ratio factibilium;
+prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium. Differt autem facere et
+agere quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., factio est actus transiens
+in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare, et huiusmodi;
+agere autem est actus permanens in ipso agente, sicut videre,
+velle, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur hoc modo se habet prudentia ad
+huiusmodi actus humanos, qui sunt usus potentiarum et habituum,
+sicut se habet ars ad exteriores factiones, quia utraque est
+perfecta ratio respectu illorum ad quae comparatur. Perfectio autem
+et rectitudo rationis in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex
+quibus ratio syllogizat, sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab
+intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In
+humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in
+speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae
+est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus
+circa fines, quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad
+prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus
+rectus. Bonum autem artificialium non est bonum appetitus humani,
+sed bonum ipsorum operum artificialium, et ideo ars non
+praesupponit appetitum rectum. Et inde est quod magis laudatur
+artifex qui volens peccat, quam qui peccat nolens; magis autem
+contra prudentiam est quod aliquis peccet volens, quam nolens, quia
+rectitudo voluntatis est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de
+ratione artis. Sic igitur patet quod prudentia est virtus distincta
+ab arte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But
+prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35911] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra
+hominem, et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia
+est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum, unde diversificatur ratio
+virtutis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are
+both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues,
+then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35912] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus
+speculativi, quantum ad subiectum et materiam, utrumque enim est in
+opinativa parte animae, et circa contingens aliter se habere. Sed
+ars magis convenit cum habitibus speculativis in ratione virtutis,
+quam cum prudentia, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there
+is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in
+matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply
+prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35913] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent
+ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in
+artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines
+proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene
+consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes
+duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter, sed illi
+solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam
+vitam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A5-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 5. Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which
+it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence
+is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save
+in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence
+necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become
+virtuous.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35914] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit virtus necessaria ad
+bene vivendum. Sicut enim se habet ars ad factibilia, quorum est
+ratio recta; ita se habet prudentia ad agibilia, secundum quae vita
+hominis consideratur, est enim eorum recta ratio prudentia, ut
+dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed ars non est necessaria in rebus
+factibilibus nisi ad hoc quod fiant, non autem postquam sunt
+factae. Ergo nec prudentia est necessaria homini ad bene vivendum,
+postquam est virtuosus, sed forte solum quantum ad hoc quod
+virtuosus fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own,
+but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough
+that he follow the counsels of prudent men.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35915] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+prudentia est per quam recte consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.
+Sed homo potest ex bono consilio agere non solum proprio, sed etiam
+alieno. Ergo non est necessarium ad bene vivendum quod ipse homo
+habeat prudentiam; sed sufficit quod prudentum consilia
+sequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem
+to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions
+are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence
+should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35916] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus intellectualis est secundum quam contingit semper dicere
+verum, et nunquam falsum. Sed hoc non videtur contingere secundum
+prudentiam, non enim est humanum quod in consiliando de agendis
+nunquam erretur; cum humana agibilia sint contingentia aliter se
+habere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, <i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et
+incertae providentiae nostrae</i>. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non
+debeat poni intellectualis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have
+nothing more profitable in life."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35917] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Sap. VIII, connumeratur aliis virtutibus necessariis ad
+vitam humanam, cum dicitur de divina sapientia, <i>sobrietatem et
+prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est
+in vita hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds,
+it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from
+impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely,
+the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably
+directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the
+end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because
+counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue
+is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this
+virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 co."><a name="35918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35918] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod prudentia est virtus maxime necessaria ad vitam
+humanam. Bene enim vivere consistit in bene operari. Ad hoc autem
+quod aliquis bene operetur, non solum requiritur quid faciat, sed
+etiam quomodo faciat; ut scilicet secundum electionem rectam
+operetur, non solum ex impetu aut passione. Cum autem electio sit
+eorum quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo electionis duo requirit,
+scilicet debitum finem; et id quod convenienter ordinatur ad
+debitum finem. Ad debitum autem finem homo convenienter disponitur
+per virtutem quae perficit partem animae appetitivam, cuius
+obiectum est bonum et finis. Ad id autem quod convenienter in finem
+debitum ordinatur, oportet quod homo directe disponatur per habitum
+rationis, quia consiliari et eligere, quae sunt eorum quae sunt ad
+finem, sunt actus rationis. Et ideo necesse est in ratione esse
+aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficiatur ratio ad hoc
+quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec
+virtus est prudentia. Unde prudentia est virtus necessaria ad bene
+vivendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things
+to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing
+made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the
+good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its
+perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q57_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it
+be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were
+proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the
+craftsman
+needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence
+is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35919] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod bonum artis consideratur non in ipso artifice,
+sed magis in ipso artificiato, cum ars sit ratio recta factibilium,
+factio enim, in exteriorem materiam transiens, non est perfectio
+facientis, sed facti, sicut motus est actus mobilis; ars autem
+circa factibilia est. Sed prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso
+agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere, est enim prudentia recta
+ratio agibilium, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad artem non requiritur
+quod artifex bene operetur, sed quod bonum opus faciat.
+Requireretur autem magis quod ipsum artificiatum bene operaretur,
+sicut quod cultellus bene incideret, vel serra bene secaret; si
+proprie horum esset agere, et non magis agi, quia non habent
+dominium sui actus. Et ideo ars non est necessaria ad bene vivendum
+ipsi artificis; sed solum ad faciendum artificiatum bonum, et ad
+conservandum ipsum. Prudentia autem est necessaria homini ad bene
+vivendum, non solum ad hoc quod fiat bonus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as
+regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply;
+and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35920] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam
+rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius; nondum est omnino
+perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et
+quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen
+simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of
+the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly
+in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent
+things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary
+things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity
+has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected
+by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters
+that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and
+prudence, as regards things to be done.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35921] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur quam
+verum intellectus speculativi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Nam verum
+intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad
+rem. Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter conformari rebus
+in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis; ideo nullus habitus
+speculativus contingentium est intellectualis virtus, sed solum est
+circa necessaria. Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per
+conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in
+necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed
+solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint
+agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola
+contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia
+quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A6-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 6. Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? [*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}"
+is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic.
+vi, 9). Therefore "{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35922] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter adiungantur prudentiae
+eubulia, synesis et gnome. Eubulia enim est habitus quo bene
+consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed bene consiliari pertinet
+ad prudentiam, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo eubulia non est
+virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed magis est ipsa prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is
+judgment. Now "{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore "{synesis}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather
+is a principal virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35923] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad superiorem pertinet de inferioribus iudicare. Illa ergo virtus
+videtur suprema, cuius est actus iudicium. Sed synesis est bene
+iudicativa. Ergo synesis non est virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed
+magis ipsa est principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel.
+But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there
+is no need, besides "{synesis}" of the virtue of "{gnome}."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35924] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa
+sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum. Sed circa omnia consiliabilia
+ponitur una virtus, scilicet eubulia. Ergo ad bene iudicandum de
+agendis, non oportet ponere, praeter synesim, aliam virtutem,
+scilicet gnomen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of
+the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility,"
+and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="35925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35925] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+Tullius ponit, in sua rhetorica, tres alias partes prudentiae,
+scilicet memoriam praeteritorum, intelligentiam praesentium, et
+providentiam futurorum. Macrobius etiam ponit, super somnium
+Scipionis, quasdam alias partes prudentiae, scilicet cautionem,
+docilitatem, et alia huiusmodi. Non videntur igitur solae huiusmodi
+virtutes prudentiae adiungi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35926] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est auctoritas philosophi, in VI Ethic., qui has tres virtutes
+ponit prudentiae adiunctas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now
+there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the
+third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel
+is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far
+as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that
+in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue
+which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz.
+"{eustochia}," which perfects counsel; and "{synesis}" and "{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment,
+and of
+whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 co."><a name="35927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35927] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in omnibus potentiis ordinatis illa est principalior,
+quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana
+tres actus rationis inveniuntur, quorum primus est consiliari,
+secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere. Primi autem duo
+respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et
+iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus
+proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus, non
+enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt.
+Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt,
+principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur. Et ideo
+virtuti quae est bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentiae, tanquam
+principaliori, adiunguntur tanquam secundariae, eubulia, quae est
+bene consiliativa, et synesis et gnome, quae sunt partes
+iudicativae; de quarum distinctione dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it
+perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35928] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa, non quasi bene
+consiliari sit immediate actus eius, sed quia hunc actum perficit
+mediante virtute sibi subiecta, quae est eubulia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's
+judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded
+aright in the point of what has to be done.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35929] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod iudicium in agendis ad aliquid ulterius ordinatur,
+contingit enim aliquem bene iudicare de aliquo agendo, et tamen non
+recte exequi. Sed ultimum complementum est, quando ratio iam bene
+praecipit de agendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles:
+because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence
+only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is
+based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative
+matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce
+judgment, differ according to their different objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ in respect of the different rules
+on which judgment is based: for "{synesis}" judges of actions according to the common law; while "{gnome}" bases its judgment
+on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (
+<a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q51_A4" id="FS_Q57_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[51], A[4]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35930] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia
+eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia, quia his
+habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et
+ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem
+virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus
+principiis, sed in propriis. Unde et in speculativis una est
+dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus, scientiae autem demonstrativae,
+quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis. Distinguuntur
+autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur,
+nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem;
+gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus
+deficit lex communis; sicut plenius infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but
+are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective
+parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion,
+potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as
+secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="35931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35931] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia et providentia, similiter
+etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes
+diversae a prudentia, sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam sicut
+partes integrales, inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem
+prudentiae. Sunt etiam et quaedam partes subiectivae, seu species
+prudentiae, sicut oeconomica, regnativa, et huiusmodi. Sed
+praedicta tria sunt quasi partes potentiales prudentiae, quia
+ordinantur sicut secundarium ad principale. Et de his infra
+dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q58" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q58-p0.1">Q. 58. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q58-p2"> We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their
+distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues
+and the others.
+</p><p id="FS_Q58-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q58-p4"><a href="#FS_Q58_A1"> (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p5"><a href="#FS_Q58_A2"> (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p6"><a href="#FS_Q58_A3"> (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p7"><a href="#FS_Q58_A4"> (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p8"><a href="#FS_Q58_A5"> (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 pr."><a name="35932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35932]
+Iª-IIae q. 58 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+virtutibus moralibus. Et primo, de distinctione earum a virtutibus
+intellectualibus; secundo, de distinctione earum ab invicem,
+secundum propriam materiam; tertio, de distinctione principalium,
+vel cardinalium, ab aliis. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo,
+utrum omnis virtus sit virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum virtus
+moralis distinguatur ab intellectuali. Tertio, utrum sufficienter
+dividatur virtus per intellectualem et moralem. Quarto, utrum
+moralis virtus possit esse sine intellectuali. Quinto, utrum e
+converso, intellectualis virtus possit esse sine morali.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q58_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A1-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 1. Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now,
+we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35933] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus sit moralis. Virtus enim
+moralis dicitur a more, idest consuetudine. Sed omnium virtutum
+actus consuescere possumus. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue
+is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following
+the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (
+<a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[64], AA[1]</a>,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35934] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est habitus
+electivus in medietate rationis consistens</i>. Sed omnis virtus
+videtur esse habitus electivus, quia actus cuiuslibet virtutis
+possumus ex electione facere. Omnis etiam virtus aliqualiter in
+medio rationis consistit, ut infra patebit. Ergo omnis virtus est
+moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since
+every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees
+with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35935] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod <i>virtus est habitus in
+modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. Sed cum omnis virtus
+humana ordinetur ad bonum hominis, oportet quod sit consentanea
+rationi, cum bonum hominis sit secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius
+dicit. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that
+he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated
+above (
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q58_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[2]</a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35936] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., <i>dicentes de moribus,
+non dicimus quoniam sapiens vel intelligens; sed quoniam mitis vel
+sobrius</i>. Sic igitur sapientia et intellectus non sunt morales.
+Quae tamen sunt virtutes, sicut supra dictum est. Non ergo omnis
+virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q58_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able
+to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.1" target="asv">Acts 15:1</a>): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural
+inclination to do some particular action, in which
+sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.1.2" target="asv">2 Macc. 1:2</a>) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them":
+and the word is used in the same sense in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.7" target="asv">Ps. 67:7</a>, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one
+word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes
+with a long, and sometimes a short "e".
+</p><p id="FS_Q58_A1-p7"> Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action.
+And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination
+similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose
+function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9],
+A[1]
+</a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 co."><a name="35937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35937] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit
+mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus. Mos autem
+duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut
+dicitur Act. XV, <i>nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non
+poteritis salvi fieri</i>. Quandoque vero significat inclinationem
+quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde
+etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II
+Machab. XI, quod <i>leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt
+eos</i>. Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, <i>qui
+habitare facit unius moris in domo</i>. Et hae quidem duae
+significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad
+vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos
+morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per
+eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et
+scribitur per epsilon. Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more,
+secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel
+quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris
+propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam
+consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem
+similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum
+proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes
+potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo non omnis
+virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi
+appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35938] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de more, secundum quod
+significat consuetudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part
+of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects
+the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter
+of choice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35939] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod omnis actus virtutis potest ex electione agi, sed
+electionem rectam agit sola virtus quae est in appetitiva parte
+animae, dictum est enim supra quod eligere est actus appetitivae
+partis. Unde habitus electivus, qui scilicet est electionis
+principium, est solum ille qui perficit vim appetitivam, quamvis
+etiam aliorum habituum actus sub electione cadere possint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the
+appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which
+are in the appetitive faculty.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35940] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod natura est principium motus, sicut dicitur in II
+Physic. Movere autem ad agendum proprium est appetitivae partis. Et
+ideo assimilari naturae in consentiendo rationi, est proprium
+virtutum quae sunt in vi appetitiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A2-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 2. Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue
+is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35941] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis ab intellectuali non
+distinguatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Civ. Dei, quod
+<i>virtus est ars recte vivendi</i>. Sed ars est virtus
+intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis ab intellectuali non
+differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding
+those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his
+duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual
+virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35942] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+plerique in definitione virtutum moralium ponunt scientiam, sicut
+quidam definiunt quod perseverantia est scientia vel habitus eorum
+quibus est immanendum vel non immanendum; et sanctitas est scientia
+faciens fideles et servantes quae ad Deum iusta. Scientia autem est
+virtus intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis non debet distingui ab
+intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the
+intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35943] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quod <i>virtus est recta et
+perfecta ratio</i>. Sed hoc pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut
+patet in VI Ethic. ergo virtus moralis non est distincta ab
+intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the
+definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed
+by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual
+virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from
+intellectual.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="35944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35944] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+nihil distinguitur ab eo quod in eius definitione ponitur. Sed
+virtus intellectualis ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis,
+dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est
+habitus electivus existens in medietate determinata ratione, prout
+sapiens determinabit</i>. Huiusmodi autem recta ratio determinans
+medium virtutis moralis, pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut
+dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo virtus moralis non distinguitur ab
+intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35945] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur in I Ethic., <i>determinatur virtus secundum
+differentiam hanc, dicimus enim harum has quidem intellectuales,
+has vero morales</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason
+somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of
+the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action.
+Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e.
+as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate
+to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since
+virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that
+there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of
+prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin;
+and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 co."><a name="35946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35946] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est,
+et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur,
+quodammodo rationi obediunt; diversimode tamen. Nam quaedam rationi
+obediunt omnino ad nutum, absque omni contradictione, sicut
+corporis membra, si fuerint in sua natura consistentia; statim enim
+ad imperium rationis, manus aut pes movetur ad opus. Unde
+philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico
+principatu, idest sicut dominus servum, qui ius contradicendi non
+habet. Posuerunt igitur quidam quod omnia principia activa quae
+sunt in homine, hoc modo se habent ad rationem. Quod quidem si
+verum esset, sufficeret quod ratio esset perfecta, ad bene agendum.
+Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum,
+sequeretur quod in sola ratione esset, et sic nulla virtus esset
+nisi intellectualis. Et haec fuit opinio Socratis, qui dixit omnes
+virtutes esse prudentias, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ponebat quod
+homo, scientia in eo existente, peccare non poterat; sed quicumque
+peccabat, peccabat propter ignorantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8"> Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain
+power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic
+power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a> (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so
+far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And
+in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not
+sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc autem procedit ex
+suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino
+ad nutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione, unde philosophus dicit, in
+I Polit., quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo
+scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui habent ius in aliquo
+contradicendi. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Psalm., quod
+<i>interdum praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus
+affectus</i>, intantum quod quandoque passionibus vel habitibus
+appetitivae partis hoc agitur, ut usus rationis in particulari
+impediatur. Et secundum hoc, aliqualiter verum est quod Socrates
+dixit, quod scientia praesente, non peccatur, si tamen hoc
+extendatur usque ad usum rationis in particulari eligibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p9"> Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of
+intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs
+from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human
+acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in
+conformity with reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic
+igitur ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio
+sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam
+quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis
+moralis. Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus
+moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali. Unde sicut appetitus est
+principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter
+rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae,
+inquantum rationi conformatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right
+reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue
+is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as
+they are directed by prudence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35947] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus communiter accipit artem, pro
+qualibet recta ratione. Et sic sub arte includitur etiam prudentia,
+quae ita est recta ratio agibilium, sicut ars est recta ratio
+factibilium. Et secundum hoc, quod dicit quod virtus est ars recte
+vivendi, essentialiter convenit prudentiae, participative autem
+aliis virtutibus, prout secundum prudentiam diriguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we
+have said about art (ad 1).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35948] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod tales definitiones, a quibuscumque inveniantur datae,
+processerunt ex opinione Socratica, et sunt exponendae eo modo quo
+de arte praedictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>  The same applies to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35949] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence,
+but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction
+of prudence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="35950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35950] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod recta ratio, quae est secundum prudentiam, ponitur in
+definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae eius, sed
+sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus,
+inquantum prudentia dirigit omnes virtutes morales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A3-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 3. Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between
+moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by
+all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on (
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A1" id="FS_Q58_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[1]</a>). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there
+were no mean between them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35951] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sufficienter
+dividatur per virtutem moralem et intellectualem. Prudentia enim
+videtur esse aliquid medium inter virtutem moralem et
+intellectualem, connumeratur enim virtutibus intellectualibus in VI
+Ethic.; et etiam ab omnibus communiter connumeratur inter quatuor
+virtutes cardinales, quae sunt morales, ut infra patebit. Non ergo
+sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectualem et moralem, sicut
+per immediata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral
+virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue
+is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35952] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+continentia et perseverantia, et etiam patientia, non computantur
+inter virtutes intellectuales. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales,
+quia non tenent medium in passionibus, sed abundant in eis
+passiones. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per
+intellectuales et morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.
+science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q58_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[57], AA[2]</a> ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue.
+Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35953] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+fides, spes et caritas quaedam virtutes sunt. Non tamen sunt
+virtutes intellectuales, hae enim solum sunt quinque, scilicet
+scientia, sapientia, intellectus, prudentia et ars, ut dictum est.
+Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non sunt circa passiones,
+circa quas maxime est moralis virtus. Ergo virtus non sufficienter
+dividitur per intellectuales et morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35954] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>duplicem esse
+virtutem, hanc quidem intellectualem, illam autem moralem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human
+actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De
+Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if
+it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it
+will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that
+every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 co."><a name="35955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35955] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem
+ad bene operandum. Principium autem humanorum actuum in homine non
+est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus,
+haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima.
+Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius
+istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus
+speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus
+intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit
+virtus moralis. Unde relinquitur quod omnis virtus humana vel est
+intellectualis vel moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with
+the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q58_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[4]</a>). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35956] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est
+intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum
+virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra
+dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound
+in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making
+it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the
+passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since
+intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the
+end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this
+is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless
+each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing
+an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty,
+which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action
+will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting
+from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the
+Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35957] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod continentia et perseverantia non sunt perfectiones
+appetitivae virtutis sensitivae. Quod ex hoc patet, quod in
+continente et perseverante superabundant inordinatae passiones,
+quod non esset, si appetitus sensitivus esset perfectus aliquo
+habitu conformante ipsum rationi. Est autem continentia, seu
+perseverantia, perfectio rationalis partis, quae se tenet contra
+passiones ne deducatur. Deficit tamen a ratione virtutis, quia
+virtus intellectiva quae facit rationem se bene habere circa
+moralia, praesupponit appetitum rectum finis, ut recte se habeat
+circa principia, idest fines, ex quibus ratiocinatur; quod
+continenti et perseveranti deest. Neque etiam potest esse perfecta
+operatio quae a duabus potentiis procedit, nisi utraque potentia
+perficiatur per debitum habitum, sicut non sequitur perfecta actio
+alicuius agentis per instrumentum, si instrumentum non sit bene
+dispositum, quantumcumque principale agens sit perfectum. Unde si
+appetitus sensitivus, quem movet rationalis pars, non sit
+perfectus; quantumcumque rationalis pars sit perfecta, actio
+consequens non erit perfecta. Unde nec principium actionis erit
+virtus. Et propter hoc, continentia a delectationibus, et
+perseverantia a tristitiis, non sunt virtutes, sed aliquid minus
+virtute, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35958] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod fides, spes et caritas sunt supra virtutes humanas,
+sunt enim virtutes hominis prout est factus particeps divinae
+gratiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A4-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 4. Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is
+"a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves
+it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of
+knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining
+him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35959] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse sine
+intellectuali. <i>Virtus enim moralis</i>, ut dicit Tullius, <i>est
+habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. Sed natura etsi
+consentiat alicui superiori rationi moventi, non tamen oportet quod
+illa ratio naturae coniungatur in eodem, sicut patet in rebus
+naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Ergo potest esse in homine
+virtus moralis in modum naturae, inclinans ad consentiendum
+rationi, quamvis illius hominis ratio non sit perfecta per virtutem
+intellectualem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous
+and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35960] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+per virtutem intellectualem homo consequitur rationis usum
+perfectum. Sed quandoque contingit quod aliqui in quibus non multum
+viget usus rationis, sunt virtuosi et Deo accepti. Ergo videtur
+quod virtus moralis possit esse sine virtute intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural
+inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35961] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus moralis facit inclinationem ad bene operandum. Sed quidam
+habent naturalem inclinationem ad bene operandum, etiam absque
+rationis iudicio. Ergo virtutes morales possunt esse sine
+intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues."
+But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A5" id="FS_Q58_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[5]</a>). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35962] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXII Moral., quod <i>ceterae virtutes,
+nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam
+possunt</i>. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra
+dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non possunt esse sine
+intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding
+and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now
+in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done
+by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with
+reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot
+do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as
+stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A5" id="FS_Q58_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[57], AA[5]</a>,6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding.
+For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident
+principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far
+as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence,
+which is the right reason about things to be done.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 co."><a name="35963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35963] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam
+intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et
+arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia. Sine
+prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis
+virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad
+hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur. Primo, ut sit
+debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim
+appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis
+debitus. Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et
+hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem,
+iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad
+virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est. Unde virtus moralis
+sine prudentia esse non potest. Et per consequens nec sine
+intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter
+nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Unde sicut recta
+ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter
+cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum; ita etiam
+prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity
+require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires
+that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35964] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod inclinatio naturae in rebus carentibus ratione,
+est absque electione, et ideo talis inclinatio non requirit ex
+necessitate rationem. Sed inclinatio virtutis moralis est cum
+electione, et ideo ad suam perfectionem indiget quod sit ratio
+perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things
+which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple,
+through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.16" target="asv"> Mat. 10:16</a>: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35965] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in virtuoso non oportet quod vigeat usus rationis
+quantum ad omnia, sed solum quantum ad ea quae sunt agenda secundum
+virtutem. Et sic usus rationis viget in omnibus virtuosis. Unde
+etiam qui videntur simplices, eo quod carent mundana astutia,
+possunt esse prudentes; secundum illud Matth. X, <i>estote
+prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger
+this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice
+of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall,
+and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be
+not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which
+is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with
+right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35966] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam
+inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim
+inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior,
+nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae
+conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus,
+tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit. Et ideo,
+etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat; non
+tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id
+quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed
+etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in
+VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A5-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 5. Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on
+the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which
+is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be
+without it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35967] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus intellectualis possit esse sine
+virtute morali. Perfectio enim prioris non dependet a perfectione
+posterioris. Sed ratio est prior appetitu sensitivo, et movens
+ipsum. Ergo virtus intellectualis quae est perfectio rationis, non
+dependet a virtute morali, quae est perfectio appetitivae partis.
+Potest ergo esse sine ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper
+matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues,
+it seems most akin to the moral virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35968] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+moralia sunt materia prudentiae, sicut factibilia sunt materia
+artis. Sed ars potest esse sine propria materia, sicut faber sine
+ferro. Ergo et prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus,
+quae tamen inter omnes intellectuales virtutes, maxime moralibus
+coniuncta videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having
+the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35969] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+prudentia est virtus bene consiliativa, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed
+multi bene consiliantur, quibus tamen virtutes morales desunt. Ergo
+prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue.
+Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35970] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+velle malum facere opponitur directe virtuti morali; non autem
+opponitur alicui quod sine virtute morali esse potest. Opponitur
+autem prudentiae quod volens peccet, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non
+ergo prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the
+right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions
+are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases,
+it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of
+action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil;
+or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For
+it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a
+particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire
+seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding
+or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be
+rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits,
+whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the
+virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently
+the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 co."><a name="35971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35971] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali
+esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest.
+Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium; non
+autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt
+actiones. Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio
+procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non
+solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis
+particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo
+recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem
+homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam
+scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum
+circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi
+universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam,
+corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem, sicut
+concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum
+quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et
+ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia
+universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae;
+ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia
+agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos
+habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte
+iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, virtuosus enim
+recte iudicat de fine virtutis, <i>quia qualis unusquisque est,
+talis finis videtur ei</i>, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad
+rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo
+habeat virtutem moralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing
+about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles
+is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35972] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis,
+praecedit appetitum finis, sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem
+ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad
+prudentiam. Sicut etiam in speculativis, intellectus principiorum
+est principium rationis syllogizantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does,
+when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone.
+Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35973] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod principia artificialium non diiudicantur a nobis bene
+vel male secundum dispositionem appetitus nostri, sicut fines, qui
+sunt moralium principia, sed solum per considerationem rationis. Et
+ideo ars non requirit virtutem perficientem appetitum, sicut
+requirit prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment
+of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35974] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod prudentia non solum est bene consiliativa, sed etiam
+bene iudicativa et bene praeceptiva. Quod esse non potest, nisi
+removeatur impedimentum passionum corrumpentium iudicium et
+praeceptum prudentiae; et hoc per virtutem moralem.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q59" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q59-p0.1">Q. 59. OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q59-p2"> We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions,
+differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different
+kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q59-p3"><a href="#FS_Q59_A1"> (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p4"><a href="#FS_Q59_A2"> (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p5"><a href="#FS_Q59_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p6"><a href="#FS_Q59_A4"> (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p7"><a href="#FS_Q59_A5"> (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 pr."><a name="35975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35975]
+Iª-IIae q. 59 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+distinctione moralium virtutum ad invicem. Et quia virtutes morales
+quae sunt circa passiones, distinguuntur secundum diversitatem
+passionum, oportet primo considerare comparationem virtutis ad
+passionem; secundo, distinctionem moralium virtutum secundum
+passiones. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum virtus
+moralis sit passio. Secundo, utrum virtus moralis possit esse cum
+passione. Tertio, utrum possit esse cum tristitia. Quarto, utrum
+omnis virtus moralis sit circa passionem. Quinto, utrum aliqua
+virtus moralis possit esse sine passione.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q59_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A1-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 1. Whether moral virtue is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is
+a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35976] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis sit passio. Medium enim
+est eiusdem generis cum extremis. Sed virtus moralis est medium
+inter passiones. Ergo virtus moralis est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices,
+such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35977] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus et vitium, cum sint contraria, sunt in eodem genere. Sed
+quaedam passiones vitia esse dicuntur, ut invidia et ira. Ergo
+etiam quaedam passiones sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A8" id="FS_Q59_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore
+a passion may be a moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35978] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+misericordia quaedam passio est, est enim tristitia de alienis
+malis, ut supra dictum est. <i>Hanc autem Cicero, locutor egregius,
+non dubitavit appellare virtutem</i>; ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de
+Civ. Dei. Ergo passio potest esse virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35979] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur in II Ethic., quod <i>passiones neque virtutes
+sunt neque malitiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive
+appetite, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit.
+Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason:
+wherefore the passions,
+considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now
+nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement
+of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity
+with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite,
+inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit
+of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 co."><a name="35980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35980] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtus moralis non potest esse passio. Et hoc patet
+triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia passio est motus quidam
+appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non
+est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus
+quidam existens. Secundo quia passiones ex seipsis non habent
+rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum
+rationem, unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad
+bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non
+convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad
+bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est. Tertio quia, dato quod aliqua
+passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum
+aliquem modum; tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est,
+principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius
+conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e
+converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu,
+secundum quod a ratione movetur. Unde in definitione virtutis
+moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., <i>quod est habitus electivus in
+medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens
+determinabit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes
+the mean between passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35981] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtus, secundum suam essentiam, non est medium
+inter passiones, sed secundum suum effectum, quia scilicet inter
+passiones medium constituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean
+sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act
+of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35982] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, si vitium dicatur habitus secundum quem quis male
+operatur, manifestum est quod nulla passio est vitium. Si vero
+dicatur vitium peccatum, quod est actus vitiosus, sic nihil
+prohibet passionem esse vitium, et e contrario concurrere ad actum
+virtutis; secundum quod passio vel contrariatur rationi, vel
+sequitur actum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz.
+"when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says
+(De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders
+pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35983] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod misericordia dicitur esse virtus, idest virtutis
+actus, secundum quod <i>motus ille animi rationi servit, quando
+scilicet ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive
+cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur poenitenti</i>, ut
+Augustinus dicit ibidem. Si tamen misericordia dicatur aliquis
+habitus quo homo perficitur ad rationabiliter miserendum, nihil
+prohibet misericordiam sic dictam esse virtutem. Et eadem est ratio
+de similibus passionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A2-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 2. Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who
+is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues.
+Therefore all moral virtues are without passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35984] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis cum passione esse non
+possit. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Topic., quod <i>mitis est qui
+non patitur, patiens autem qui patitur et non deducitur</i>. Et
+eadem ratio est de omnibus virtutibus moralibus. Ergo omnis virtus
+moralis est sine passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue
+is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as
+he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35985] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus est quaedam recta habitudo animae, sicut sanitas corporis,
+ut dicitur in VII Physic., unde virtus quaedam sanitas animae esse
+videtur, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tuscul. quaest. Passiones autem
+animae dicuntur morbi quidam animae, ut in eodem libro Tullius
+dicit. Sanitas autem non compatitur secum morbum. Ergo neque virtus
+compatitur animae passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this:
+for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that
+"when they," i.e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth." Therefore passion is incompatible
+with moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35986] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus moralis requirit perfectum usum rationis etiam in
+particularibus. Sed hoc impeditur per passiones, dicit enim
+philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectationes corrumpunt
+existimationem prudentiae</i>; et Sallustius dicit, in Catilinario,
+quod non facile verum perspicit animus, ubi illa officiunt,
+scilicet animi passiones. Virtus ergo moralis non potest esse cum
+passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but
+if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral
+virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35987] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>si perversa est
+voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus</i>, scilicet passionum, si
+autem recta est, <i>non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles
+erunt</i>. Sed nullum laudabile excluditur per virtutem moralem.
+Virtus ergo moralis non excludit passiones, sed potest esse cum
+ipsis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the
+soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine
+says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.
+</p><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p7"> This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics,
+through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided
+into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of
+the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the
+soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being,
+as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose
+deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus
+Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions
+of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man,
+so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason
+without his approving of such things or consenting thereto."
+</p><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p8"> Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them
+deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can
+be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe
+virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should
+be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and
+time."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 co."><a name="35988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35988] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et
+Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim
+posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive
+virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit,
+ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones
+simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae. Haec
+autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat
+secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici
+non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas,
+et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et
+concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones
+animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint
+motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt
+passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur
+voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc
+quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi
+repugnantes. Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in
+virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in
+virtuoso potest accidere, <i>eo quod animi visa quae appellant
+phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant
+animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut
+sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel
+tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus
+rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque
+consentiunt</i>; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio
+dictum. Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones,
+non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis
+consentiatur; ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur
+quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso,
+secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in
+II Ethic., quod <i>non bene quidam determinant virtutes
+impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter
+dicunt</i>, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus
+quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind,
+but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the
+Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however,
+that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of
+inordinate passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35989] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod philosophus exemplum illud inducit, sicut et
+multa alia in libris logicalibus, non secundum opinionem propriam,
+sed secundum opinionem aliorum. Haec autem fuit opinio Stoicorum,
+quod virtutes essent sine passionibus animae. Quam opinionem
+philosophus excludit in II Ethic., dicens virtutes non esse
+impassibilitates. Potest tamen dici quod, cum dicitur quod mitis
+non patitur, intelligendum est secundum passionem inordinatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's
+command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35990] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa, et omnes similes quas Tullius ad hoc
+inducit in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., procedit de passionibus
+secundum quod significant inordinatas affectiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and
+the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution
+of reason's command.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35991] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo
+praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium
+rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad
+exequendum imperium rationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A3-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 3. Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv"> Wis. 8:7</a>: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom
+"hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35992] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus cum tristitia esse non possit.
+Virtutes enim sunt sapientiae effectus, secundum illud Sap. VIII,
+sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, scilicet divina sapientia,
+prudentiam et virtutem. Sed sapientiae convictus non habet
+amaritudinem, ut postea subditur. Ergo nec virtutes cum tristitia
+esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is
+incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35993] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+tristitia est impedimentum operationis; ut patet per philosophum,
+in VII et X Ethic. Sed impedimentum bonae operationis repugnat
+virtuti. Ergo tristitia repugnat virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue,
+which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35994] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+tristitia est quaedam animi aegritudo; ut Tullius eam vocat, in III
+de Tuscul. quaest. Sed aegritudo animae contrariatur virtuti, quae
+est bona animae habitudo. Ergo tristitia contrariatur virtuti, nec
+potest simul esse cum ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.38" target="asv">Mat. 26:38</a>): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35995] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Christus fuit perfectus virtute. Sed in eo fuit tristitia,
+dicit enim, ut habetur Matth. XXVI, <i>tristis est anima mea usque
+ad mortem</i>. Ergo tristitia potest esse cum virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e.
+"three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy";
+instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for
+two reasons.
+</p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p7"> First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they
+thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot
+be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve
+the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently
+the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous
+man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in
+a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily
+sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when
+moderated by reason.
+</p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p8"> Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even
+as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire
+to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a
+present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is
+unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected
+by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according
+as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad
+2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the
+sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.
+</p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p9"> Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices
+in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 co."><a name="35996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35996] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod sicut dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>Stoici
+voluerunt, pro tribus perturbationibus, in animo sapientis esse
+tres eupathias, idest tres bonas passiones, pro cupiditate scilicet
+voluntatem; pro laetitia, gaudium; pro metu, cautionem</i>. Pro
+tristitia vero, negaverunt posse aliquid esse in animo sapientis,
+duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia tristitia est de malo quod iam
+accidit. Nullum autem malum aestimant posse accidere sapienti,
+crediderunt enim quod, sicut solum hominis bonum est virtus, bona
+autem corporalia nulla bona hominis sunt; ita solum inhonestum est
+hominis malum, quod in virtuoso esse non potest. Sed hoc
+irrationabiliter dicitur. Cum enim homo sit ex anima et corpore
+compositus, id quod confert ad vitam corporis conservandam, aliquod
+bonum hominis est, non tamen maximum, quia eo potest homo male uti.
+Unde et malum huic bono contrarium in sapiente esse potest, et
+tristitiam moderatam inducere. Praeterea, etsi virtuosus sine gravi
+peccato esse possit, nullus tamen invenitur qui absque levibus
+peccatis vitam ducat, secundum illud I Ioan. I, <i>si dixerimus
+quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus</i>. Tertio, quia
+virtuosus, etsi peccatum non habeat, forte quandoque habuit. Et de
+hoc laudabiliter dolet; secundum illud II ad Cor. VII, <i>quae
+secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem
+operatur</i>. Quarto, quia potest etiam dolere laudabiliter de
+peccato alterius. Unde eo modo quo virtus moralis compatitur alias
+passiones ratione moderatas, compatitur etiam tristitiam. Secundo,
+movebantur ex hoc, quod tristitia est de praesenti malo, timor
+autem de malo futuro, sicut delectatio de bono praesenti,
+desiderium vero de bono futuro. Potest autem hoc ad virtutem
+pertinere, quod aliquis bono habito fruatur, vel non habitum habere
+desideret, vel quod etiam malum futurum caveat. Sed quod malo
+praesenti animus hominis substernatur, quod fit per tristitiam,
+omnino videtur contrarium rationi, unde cum virtute esse non
+potest. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Est enim aliquod malum
+quod potest esse virtuoso praesens, ut dictum est. Quod quidem
+malum ratio detestatur. Unde appetitus sensitivus in hoc sequitur
+detestationem rationis, quod de huiusmodi malo tristatur, moderate
+tamen, secundum rationis iudicium. Hoc autem pertinet ad virtutem,
+ut appetitus sensitivus rationi conformetur, ut dictum est. Unde ad
+virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est,
+sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic. Et hoc etiam utile est
+ad fugiendum mala. Sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius
+quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur. Sic
+igitur dicendum est quod tristitia de his quae conveniunt virtuti,
+non potest simul esse cum virtute, quia virtus in propriis
+delectatur. Sed de his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti,
+virtus moderate tristatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom.
+Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35997] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate habetur quod de sapientia
+sapiens non tristetur. Tristatur tamen de his quae sunt impeditiva
+sapientiae. Et ideo in beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum
+sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35998] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed
+adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the
+present state of life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35999] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia
+autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum
+statum praesentis vitae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A4-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 4. Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue
+is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>;
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[1]</a>;
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.3" shape="rect"> Q[35], AA[1]</a>, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36000] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus moralis sit circa
+passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod <i>circa
+voluptates et tristitias est moralis virtus</i>. Sed delectatio et
+tristitia sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus
+moralis est circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.
+i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36001] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+rationale per participationem est subiectum moralium virtutum, ut
+dicitur in I Ethic. Sed huiusmodi pars animae est in qua sunt
+passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est circa
+passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some
+are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about
+the passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36002] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+in omni virtute morali est invenire aliquam passionem. Aut ergo
+omnes sunt circa passiones, aut nulla. Sed aliquae sunt circa
+passiones, ut fortitudo et temperantia, ut dicitur in III Ethic.
+Ergo omnes virtutes morales sunt circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36003] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod iustitia, quae est virtus moralis, non est circa
+passiones, ut dicitur in V Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by
+reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject
+to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations
+of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a
+passion, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 co."><a name="36004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36004] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae
+ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est autem rationis bonum id quod
+est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum. Unde circa omne id
+quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse
+virtutem moralem. Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus
+sensitivi; sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi,
+qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum
+est. Et ideo non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones; sed
+quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting
+from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher,
+after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure
+or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as
+about something that results from virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36005] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes
+et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa
+aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur
+in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario. Unde philosophus post
+praemissa verba subdit quod, <i>si virtutes sunt circa actus et
+passiones; omni autem passioni et omni actui sequitur delectatio et
+tristitia; propter hoc virtus erit circa delectationes et
+tristitias</i>, scilicet sicut circa aliquid consequens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where
+there are no passions, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36006] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus
+sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum; sed etiam voluntas, in qua
+non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36007] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in quibusdam virtutibus sunt passiones sicut propria
+materia, in quibusdam autem non. Unde non est eadem ratio de
+omnibus, ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A5-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 5. Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the
+passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36008] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse absque
+passione. Quanto enim virtus moralis est perfectior, tanto magis
+superat passiones. Ergo in suo perfectissimo esse, est omnino
+absque passionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the
+passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) they are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36009] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+tunc unumquodque est perfectum, quando est remotum a suo contrario,
+et ab his quae ad contrarium inclinant. Sed passiones inclinant ad
+peccatum, quod virtuti contrariatur, unde Rom. VII, nominantur
+passiones peccatorum. Ergo perfecta virtus est omnino absque
+passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does
+all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36010] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum virtutem Deo conformamur; ut patet per Augustinum, in
+libro de moribus Eccles. Sed Deus omnia operatur sine passione.
+Ergo virtus perfectissima est absque omni passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot
+be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36011] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione, ut
+dicitur in I Ethic. Sed gaudium est passio. Ergo iustitia non
+potest esse sine passione. Et multo minus aliae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue
+is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues,
+which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise
+it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle:
+whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make
+them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to
+their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.
+</p><p id="FS_Q59_A5-p7"> Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue
+is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act
+of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of
+justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the
+higher, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A7" id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[7]</a>;
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q24_A3" id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[24], A[3]</a>). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 co."><a name="36012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36012] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut
+Stoici posuerunt; sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine
+passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus
+sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa
+passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non
+possunt. Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus
+moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad
+virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis
+actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios
+actus agendo. Unde sicut virtus membra corporis ordinat ad actus
+exteriores debitos, ita appetitum sensitivum ad motus proprios
+ordinatos. Virtutes vero morales quae non sunt circa passiones, sed
+circa operationes, possunt esse sine passionibus (et huiusmodi
+virtus est iustitia), quia per eas applicatur voluntas ad proprium
+actum, qui non est passio. Sed tamen ad actum iustitiae sequitur
+gaudium, ad minus in voluntate, quod non est passio. Et si hoc
+gaudium multiplicetur per iustitiae perfectionem, fiet gaudii
+redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum; secundum quod vires
+inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et sic
+per redundantiam huiusmodi, quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto
+magis passionem causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36013] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtus passiones inordinatas superat, moderatas
+autem producit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36014] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non
+autem si sunt moderatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as
+there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body:
+whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36015] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem
+suae naturae. In Deo autem et Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus,
+sicut est in homine. Et ideo bona operatio Dei et Angeli est omnino
+sine passione, sicut et sine corpore, bona autem operatio hominis
+est cum passione, sicut et cum corporis ministerio.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q60" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q60-p0.1">Q. 60. HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q60-p2"> We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q60-p3"><a href="#FS_Q60_A1"> (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p4"><a href="#FS_Q60_A2"> (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p5"><a href="#FS_Q60_A3"> (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p6"><a href="#FS_Q60_A4"> (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p7"><a href="#FS_Q60_A5"> (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 pr."><a name="36016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36016]
+Iª-IIae q. 60 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+distinctione virtutum moralium ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
+quinque. Primo, utrum sit tantum una virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum
+distinguantur virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, ab his
+quae sunt circa passiones. Tertio, utrum circa operationes sit una
+tantum moralis virtus. Quarto, utrum circa diversas passiones sint
+diversae morales virtutes. Quinto, utrum virtutes morales
+distinguantur secundum diversa obiecta passionum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q60_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A1-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 1. Whether there is only one moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which
+is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral
+virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one
+moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36017] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus. Sicut
+enim in actibus moralibus directio pertinet ad rationem, quae est
+subiectum intellectualium virtutum; ita inclinatio pertinet ad vim
+appetitivam, quae est subiectum moralium virtutum. Sed una est
+intellectualis virtus dirigens in omnibus moralibus actibus,
+scilicet prudentia. Ergo etiam una tantum est moralis virtus
+inclinans in omnibus moralibus actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now
+the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore,
+seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36018] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+habitus non distinguuntur secundum materialia obiecta, sed secundum
+formales rationes obiectorum. Formalis autem ratio boni ad quod
+ordinatur virtus moralis, est unum, scilicet modus rationis. Ergo
+videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q60_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite
+in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36019] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+moralia recipiunt speciem a fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed finis
+omnium virtutum moralium communis est unus, scilicet felicitas;
+proprii autem et propinqui sunt infiniti. Non sunt autem infinitae
+virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive
+part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[80], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36020] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod unus habitus non potest esse in diversis potentiis, ut
+supra dictum est. Sed subiectum virtutum moralium est pars
+appetitiva animae, quae per diversas potentias distinguitur, ut in
+primo dictum est. Ergo non potest esse una tantum virtus
+moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A1" id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], AA[1]</a>,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences
+of their objects, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the
+agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold
+relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that
+form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive
+a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however,
+the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with
+non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are
+not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance,
+we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various
+adaptability of matter.
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is
+commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational,
+not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong
+to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of
+various species and are not one only.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 co."><a name="36021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36021] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt
+habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt
+secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est.
+Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei,
+attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente. Est
+autem considerandum quod materia patientis se habet ad agens
+dupliciter. Quandoque enim recipit formam agentis secundum eandem
+rationem, prout est in agente, sicut est in omnibus agentibus
+univocis. Et sic necesse est quod, si agens est unum specie, quod
+materia recipiat formam unius speciei, sicut ab igne non generatur
+univoce nisi aliquid existens in specie ignis. Aliquando vero
+materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eandem rationem,
+prout est in agente, sicut patet in generantibus non univocis, ut
+animal generatur a sole. Et tunc formae receptae in materia ab
+eodem agente, non sunt unius speciei sed diversificantur secundum
+diversam proportionem materiae ad recipiendum influxum agentis,
+sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per
+putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum secundum diversam
+proportionem materiae. Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio
+est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut
+imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis
+quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per
+participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Unde appetibilia secundum
+motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum
+quod diversimode se habent ad rationem. Et ita sequitur quod
+virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una
+tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind
+of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of
+the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing
+power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36022] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem
+ratio veri in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia.
+Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia.
+Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est
+diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem
+dirigentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the
+various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36023] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illud formale est unum genere, propter unitatem
+agentis. Sed diversificatur specie, propter diversas habitudines
+recipientium, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be
+infinite in number, are not infinite in species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36024] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a
+finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen
+infiniti sunt specie.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A2-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 2. Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions.
+For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of
+pleasure or sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>;
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about
+operations, since it is an operative habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36025] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur ab
+invicem per hoc quod quaedam sunt circa operationes, quaedam circa
+passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod virtus
+moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias optimorum operativa.
+Sed voluptates et tristitiae sunt passiones quaedam, ut supra
+dictum est. Ergo eadem virtus quae est circa passiones, est etiam
+circa operationes, utpote operativa existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a
+consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36026] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+passiones sunt principia exteriorum operationum. Si ergo aliquae
+virtutes rectificant passiones, oportet quod etiam per consequens
+rectificent operationes. Eaedem ergo virtutes morales sunt circa
+passiones et operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite
+are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36027] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad omnem operationem exteriorem movetur appetitus sensitivus bene
+vel male. Sed motus appetitus sensitivi sunt passiones. Ergo eaedem
+virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, sunt circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic.
+ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36028] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes;
+temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa
+passiones quasdam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has
+some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q59_A4" id="FS_Q60_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>, ad 1).
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p7"> Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those
+moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that
+good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected
+towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In
+operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling,
+and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its
+parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only
+on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected
+to
+them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the
+passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p8"> It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some
+inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed:
+while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger,
+one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the
+immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 co."><a name="36029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36029] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod operatio et passio dupliciter potest comparari ad
+virtutem. Uno modo, sicut effectus. Et hoc modo, omnis moralis
+virtus habet aliquas operationes bonas, quarum est productiva; et
+delectationem aliquam vel tristitiam, quae sunt passiones, ut supra
+dictum est. Alio modo potest comparari operatio ad virtutem
+moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet
+alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa
+passiones. Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam
+operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo
+afficiatur ad eas, inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum
+accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in
+talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum
+secundum seipsas, sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi
+operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad
+alterum. Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa
+operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero
+operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum
+commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et
+malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa
+huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint
+principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae
+passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis
+huiusmodi. Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad
+alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi
+passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris
+operationis, est corruptio iustitiae, inquantum autem corrumpitur
+commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius
+virtutis. Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa
+percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia, in immoderantia vero
+irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other
+two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations,
+in others, about passions, for the reason given above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36030] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam prima ratio procedit de operatione,
+secundum quod est effectus virtutis. Aliae vero duae rationes
+procedunt ex hoc, quod ad idem concurrunt operatio et passio. Sed
+in quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in
+quibusdam circa passionem, ratione praedicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A3-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 3. Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems
+to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36031] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum virtus moralis circa
+operationes. Rectitudo enim omnium operationum exteriorum videtur
+ad iustitiam pertinere. Sed iustitia est una virtus. Ergo una sola
+virtus est circa operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the
+other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue
+which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does
+not cause a diversity of moral virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36032] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+operationes maxime differentes esse videntur quae ordinantur ad
+bonum unius, et quae ordinantur ad bonum multitudinis. Sed ista
+diversitas non diversificat virtutes morales, dicit enim
+philosophus, in V Ethic., quod iustitia legalis, quae ordinat actus
+hominum ad commune bonum, non est aliud a virtute quae ordinat
+actus hominis ad unum tantum, nisi secundum rationem. Ergo
+diversitas operationum non causat diversitatem virtutum
+moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity
+of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations,
+and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36033] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si sunt diversae virtutes morales circa diversas operationes,
+oporteret quod secundum diversitatem operationum, esset diversitas
+virtutum moralium. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, nam ad iustitiam
+pertinet in diversis generibus commutationum rectitudinem statuere,
+et etiam in distributionibus, ut patet in V Ethic. Non ergo
+diversae virtutes sunt diversarum operationum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36034] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod religio est alia virtus a pietate, quarum tamen utraque
+est circa operationes quasdam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something
+due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations,
+the order of reason is established, as we have stated
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A2" id="FS_Q60_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from
+which
+becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice
+that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice.
+But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior,
+in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a
+contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues:
+e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude,"
+whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 co."><a name="36035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36035] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes,
+conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae, quae attenditur
+secundum debitum ad alterum, distinguuntur autem secundum diversas
+speciales rationes. Cuius ratio est quia in operationibus
+exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non
+secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam
+convenientiam rei in seipsa; secundum quam convenientiam accipitur
+ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae, ad iustitiam
+enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes huiusmodi
+virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem
+iustitiae. Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter
+enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et
+aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto. Et
+secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes,
+puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam
+redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam
+redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But
+the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special
+virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36036] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod iustitia proprie dicta est una specialis virtus,
+quae attendit perfectam rationem debiti, quod secundum
+aequivalentiam potest restitui. Dicitur tamen et ampliato nomine
+iustitia, secundum quamcumque debiti redditionem. Et sic non est
+una specialis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual:
+wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs
+man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act
+of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the
+common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue
+does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active
+of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36037] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod iustitia quae intendit bonum commune, est alia virtus
+a iustitia quae ordinatur ad bonum privatum alicuius, unde et ius
+commune distinguitur a iure privato; et Tullius ponit unam
+specialem virtutem, pietatem, quae ordinat ad bonum patriae. Sed
+iustitia ordinans hominem ad bonum commune, est generalis per
+imperium, quia omnes actus virtutum ordinat ad finem suum, scilicet
+ad bonum commune. Virtus autem secundum quod a tali iustitia
+imperatur, etiam iustitiae nomen accipit. Et sic virtus a iustitia
+legali non differt nisi ratione, sicut sola ratione differt virtus
+operans secundum seipsam, et virtus operans ad imperium
+alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue
+of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative
+justice; but about this we shall inquire later on (
+<a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q61_A1" id="FS_Q60_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[61], A[1]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36038] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in omnibus operationibus ad iustitiam specialem
+pertinentibus, est eadem ratio debiti. Et ideo est eadem virtus
+iustitiae, praecipue quantum ad commutationes. Forte enim
+distributiva est alterius speciei a commutativa, sed de hoc infra
+quaeretur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A4-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 4. Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things
+that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one
+source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2,4;
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is but one moral
+virtue about all the passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36039] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa diversas passiones non sint
+diversae virtutes morales. Eorum enim quae conveniunt in principio
+et fine, unus est habitus, sicut patet maxime in scientiis. Sed
+omnium passionum unum est principium, scilicet amor; et omnes ad
+eundem finem terminantur, scilicet ad delectationem vel tristitiam;
+ut supra habitum est. Ergo circa omnes passiones est una tantum
+moralis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues
+as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude,
+about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about
+different passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36040] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+si circa diversas passiones essent diversae virtutes morales,
+sequeretur quod tot essent virtutes morales quot passiones. Sed hoc
+patet esse falsum, quia circa oppositas passiones est una et eadem
+virtus moralis, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias,
+temperantia circa delectationes et tristitias. Non ergo oportet
+quod circa diversas passiones sint diversae virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q60_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about
+different passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36041] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+amor, concupiscentia et delectatio sunt passiones specie
+differentes, ut supra habitum est. Sed circa omnes has est una
+virtus, scilicet temperantia. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt
+diversae circa diversas passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36042] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod fortitudo est circa timores et audacias; temperantia circa
+concupiscentias; mansuetudo circa iras; ut dicitur in III et IV
+Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power
+as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q60_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[1]</a>).
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A4-p7"> On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First,
+because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About
+such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists
+in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural
+order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions
+contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that
+which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral
+virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the
+attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure;
+and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the
+other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are
+about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary
+which
+has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible
+passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 co."><a name="36043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36043] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una
+sola virtus moralis, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas
+potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae
+ad concupiscibilem, ut supra dictum est. Nec tamen oportet quod
+omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales
+diversificandas. Primo quidem, quia quaedam passiones sunt quae
+sibi opponuntur secundum contrarietatem, sicut gaudium et
+tristitia, timor et audacia, et alia huiusmodi. Et circa huiusmodi
+passiones sic oppositas, oportet esse unam et eandem virtutem. Cum
+enim virtus moralis in quadam medietate consistat, medium in
+contrariis passionibus secundum eandem rationem instituitur, sicut
+et in naturalibus idem est medium inter contraria, ut inter album
+et nigrum. Secundo, quia diversae passiones inveniuntur secundum
+eundem modum rationi repugnantes, puta secundum impulsum ad id quod
+est contra rationem; vel secundum retractionem ab eo quod est
+secundum rationem. Et ideo diversae passiones concupiscibilis non
+pertinent ad diversas virtutes morales, quia earum motus secundum
+quendam ordinem se invicem consequuntur, utpote ad idem ordinati,
+scilicet ad consequendum bonum, vel ad fugiendum malum; sicut ex
+amore procedit concupiscentia, et ex concupiscentia pervenitur ad
+delectationem. Et eadem ratio est de oppositis, quia ex odio
+sequitur fuga vel abominatio, quae perducit ad tristitiam. Sed
+passiones irascibilis non sunt unius ordinis, sed ad diversa
+ordinantur, nam audacia et timor ordinantur ad aliquod magnum
+periculum; spes et desperatio ad aliquod bonum arduum; ira autem ad
+superandum aliquod contrarium quod nocumentum intulit. Et ideo
+circa has passiones diversae virtutes ordinantur, utpote
+temperantia circa passiones concupiscibilis; fortitudo circa
+timores et audacias; magnanimitas circa spem et desperationem;
+mansuetudo circa iras.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice
+for the unity of moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36044] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones conveniunt in uno principio et
+fine communi, non autem in uno proprio principio seu fine. Unde hoc
+non sufficit ad unitatem virtutis moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in
+the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which,
+like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36045] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut in naturalibus idem est principium quo
+receditur ab uno principio, et acceditur ad aliud; et in
+rationalibus est eadem ratio contrariorum, ita etiam virtus
+moralis, quae in modum naturae rationi consentit, est eadem
+contrariarum passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same
+virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36046] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illae tres passiones ad idem obiectum ordinantur
+secundum quendam ordinem, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad eandem virtutem
+moralem pertinent.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A5-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 5. Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects
+of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according
+to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue
+of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ
+according to the objects of those passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36047] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur
+secundum obiecta passionum. Sicut enim sunt obiecta passionum, ita
+sunt obiecta operationum. Sed virtutes morales quae sunt circa
+operationes, non distinguuntur secundum obiecta operationum, ad
+eandem enim virtutem iustitiae pertinet emere vel vendere domum, et
+equum. Ergo etiam nec virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones,
+diversificantur per obiecta passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate
+habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral
+virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36048] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+passiones sunt quidam actus vel motus appetitus sensitivi. Sed
+maior diversitas requiritur ad diversitatem habituum, quam ad
+diversitatem actuum. Diversa igitur obiecta quae non diversificant
+speciem passionis, non diversificabunt speciem virtutis moralis.
+Ita scilicet quod de omnibus delectabilibus erit una virtus
+moralis, et similiter est de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less
+pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful
+objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36049] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed diversa delectabilia
+non differunt nisi secundum magis et minus. Ergo omnia delectabilia
+pertinent ad unam speciem virtutis. Et eadem ratione, omnia
+terribilia, et similiter de aliis. Non ergo virtus moralis
+distinguitur secundum obiecta passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things:
+thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore
+there should be different virtues about fears of evils.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36050] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut virtus est operativa boni, ita est impeditiva mali. Sed circa
+concupiscentias bonorum sunt diversae virtutes, sicut temperantia
+circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, et eutrapelia circa
+delectationes ludi. Ergo etiam circa timores malorum debent esse
+diversae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36051] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod castitas est circa delectabilia venereorum; abstinentia
+vero est circa delectabilia ciborum; et eutrapelia circa
+delectabilia ludorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.
+Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their
+relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite,
+cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason,
+they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite.
+Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues,
+as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A4" id="FS_Q60_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several
+virtues are directed about one
+passion, e.g. pleasure.
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p8"> And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A4" id="FS_Q60_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues---for
+instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover
+since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to
+outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason,
+and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently
+is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure,
+may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed
+to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference,
+being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p9"> Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep
+of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it
+will belong to the virtue of "temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not
+present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is
+about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3).
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p10"> On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money
+and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension
+of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or
+as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction,
+however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far
+as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely,
+as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as
+being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence" [*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken
+absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}], i.e. "love of honor": while if we
+consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality and "philotimia"
+seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p11"> As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object
+of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious
+matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure,
+and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards
+another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs
+to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one
+man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv,
+7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than
+play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic.
+iv, 8).
+</p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p12"> It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,
+liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which
+differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there
+will be eleven in all.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 co."><a name="36052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36052] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio
+autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod
+virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones
+autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum. Obiecta igitur passionum,
+secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum,
+causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur
+ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum. Non est autem idem
+motus rationis, et appetitus sensitivi. Unde nihil prohibet aliquam
+differentiam obiectorum causare diversitatem passionum, quae non
+causat diversitatem virtutum, sicut quando una virtus est circa
+multas passiones, ut dictum est, et aliquam etiam differentiam
+obiectorum causare diversitatem virtutum, quae non causat
+diversitatem passionum, cum circa unam passionem, puta
+delectationem, diversae virtutes ordinentur. Et quia diversae
+passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes, semper pertinent ad
+diversas virtutes, ut dictum est; ideo diversitas obiectorum quae
+respicit diversitatem potentiarum, semper diversificat species
+virtutum; puta quod aliquid sit bonum absolute, et aliquid bonum
+cum aliqua arduitate. Et quia ordine quodam ratio inferiores
+hominis partes regit, et etiam se ad exteriora extendit; ideo etiam
+secundum quod unum obiectum passionis apprehenditur sensu vel
+imaginatione, aut etiam ratione; et secundum etiam quod pertinet ad
+animam, corpus, vel exteriores res; diversam habitudinem habet ad
+rationem; et per consequens natum est diversificare virtutes. Bonum
+igitur hominis, quod est obiectum amoris, concupiscentiae et
+delectationis, potest accipi vel ad sensum corporis pertinens; vel
+ad interiorem animae apprehensionem. Et hoc, sive ordinetur ad
+bonum hominis in seipso, vel quantum ad corpus vel quantum ad
+animam; sive ordinetur ad bonum hominis in ordine ad alios. Et
+omnis talis diversitas, propter diversum ordinem ad rationem,
+diversificat virtutem. Sic igitur si consideretur aliquod bonum, si
+quidem sit per sensum tactus apprehensum, et ad consistentiam
+humanae vitae pertinens in individuo vel in specie, sicut sunt
+delectabilia ciborum et venereorum; erit pertinens ad virtutem
+temperantiae. Delectationes autem aliorum sensuum, cum non sint
+vehementes, non praestant aliquam difficultatem rationi, et ideo
+circa eas non ponitur aliqua virtus, quae est circa difficile,
+sicut et ars, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Bonum autem non sensu, sed
+interiori virtute apprehensum, ad ipsum hominem pertinens secundum
+seipsum, est sicut pecunia et honor; quorum pecunia ordinabilis est
+de se ad bonum corporis; honor autem consistit in apprehensione
+animae. Et haec quidem bona considerari possunt vel absolute,
+secundum quod pertinent ad concupiscibilem; vel cum arduitate
+quadam, secundum quod pertinent ad irascibilem. Quae quidem
+distinctio non habet locum in bonis quae delectant tactum, quia
+huiusmodi sunt quaedam infima, et competunt homini secundum quod
+convenit cum brutis. Circa bonum igitur pecuniae absolute sumptum,
+secundum quod est obiectum concupiscentiae vel delectationis aut
+amoris, est liberalitas. Circa bonum autem huiusmodi cum arduitate
+sumptum, secundum quod est obiectum spei, est magnificentia. Circa
+bonum vero quod est honor, si quidem sit absolute sumptum, secundum
+quod est obiectum amoris, sic est quaedam virtus quae vocatur
+philotimia, idest amor honoris. Si vero cum arduitate consideretur,
+secundum quod est obiectum spei, sic est magnanimitas. Unde
+liberalitas et philotimia videntur esse in concupiscibili,
+magnificentia vero et magnanimitas in irascibili. Bonum vero
+hominis in ordine ad alium, non videtur arduitatem habere, sed
+accipitur ut absolute sumptum, prout est obiectum passionum
+concupiscibilis. Quod quidem bonum potest esse alicui delectabile
+secundum quod praebet se alteri vel in his quae serio fiunt, idest
+in actionibus per rationem ordinatis ad debitum finem; vel in his
+quae fiunt ludo, idest in actionibus ordinatis ad delectationem
+tantum, quae non eodem modo se habent ad rationem sicut prima. In
+seriis autem se exhibet aliquis alteri dupliciter. Uno modo, ut
+delectabilem decentibus verbis et factis, et hoc pertinet ad
+quandam virtutem quam Aristoteles nominat amicitiam; et potest dici
+affabilitas. Alio modo praebet se aliquis alteri ut manifestum, per
+dicta et facta, et hoc pertinet ad aliam virtutem, quam nominat
+veritatem. Manifestatio enim propinquius accedit ad rationem quam
+delectatio; et seria quam iocosa. Unde et circa delectationes
+ludorum est alia virtus, quam philosophus eutrapeliam nominat. Sic
+igitur patet quod, secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes
+morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia,
+liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo,
+amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas
+materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa
+obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes,
+erunt omnes undecim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific
+passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36053] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum
+speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia
+obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non
+repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36054] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod alia ratione diversificantur passiones, et alia
+virtutes, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36055] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod magis et minus non diversificant speciem, nisi
+propter diversam habitudinem ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div.
+Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being,
+seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of
+anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the
+other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion.
+Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36056] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod bonum fortius est ad movendum quam malum quia malum
+non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div.
+Nom. Unde malum non facit difficultatem rationi quae requirat
+virtutem, nisi sit excellens, quod videtur esse unum in uno genere
+passionis. Unde circa iras non ponitur nisi una virtus, scilicet
+mansuetudo, et similiter circa audacias una sola, scilicet
+fortitudo. Sed bonum ingerit difficultatem, quae requirit virtutem,
+etiam si non sit excellens in genere talis passionis. Et ideo circa
+concupiscentias ponuntur diversae virtutes morales, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q61" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q61-p0.1">Q. 61. OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q61-p2"> We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q61-p3"><a href="#FS_Q61_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p4"><a href="#FS_Q61_A2"> (2) Of their number;</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p5"><a href="#FS_Q61_A3"> (3) Which are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p6"><a href="#FS_Q61_A4"> (4) Whether they differ from one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p7"><a href="#FS_Q61_A5"> (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 pr."><a name="36057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36057]
+Iª-IIae q. 61 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+virtutibus cardinalibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo,
+utrum virtutes morales debeant dici cardinales, vel principales.
+Secundo, de numero earum. Tertio, quae sint. Quarto, utrum
+differant ab invicem. Quinto, utrum dividantur convenienter in
+virtutes politicas, et purgatorias, et purgati animi, et
+exemplares.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q61_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A1-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division
+are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite
+members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36058] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non debeant dici
+cardinales, seu principales. Quae enim ex opposito dividuntur, sunt
+simul natura, ut dicitur in praedicamentis, et sic unum non est
+altero principalius. Sed omnes virtutes ex opposito dividunt genus
+virtutis. Ergo nullae earum debent dici principales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues
+are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36059] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+finis principalior est his quae sunt ad finem. Sed virtutes
+theologicae sunt circa finem, virtutes autem morales circa ea quae
+sunt ad finem. Ergo virtutes morales non debent dici principales,
+seu cardinales; sed magis theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual
+virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation,
+as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[58] , A[3]</a>). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36060] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+principalius est quod est per essentiam, quam quod est per
+participationem. Sed virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationale
+per essentiam, virtutes autem morales ad rationale per
+participationem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non
+sunt principales, sed magis virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral
+virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36061] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, <i>beati
+pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet
+temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem</i>. Hae autem
+sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only
+confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one
+that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not
+require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be
+done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude
+of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues,
+for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[57], A[4]</a>). Consequently,
+those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 co."><a name="36062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36062] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum simpliciter de virtute loquimur, intelligimur
+loqui de virtute humana. Virtus autem humana, ut supra dictum est,
+secundum perfectam rationem virtutis dicitur, quae requirit
+rectitudinem appetitus, huiusmodi enim virtus non solum facit
+facultatem bene agendi, sed ipsum etiam usum boni operis causat.
+Sed secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis dicitur virtus quae non
+requirit rectitudinem appetitus, quia solum facit facultatem bene
+agendi, non autem causat boni operis usum. Constat autem quod
+perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae
+continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales. Huiusmodi
+autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola
+prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut
+ex supradictis patet, unde convenienter inter virtutes morales
+ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea;
+although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of
+other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to
+another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of
+the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division
+of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36063] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, quando genus univocum dividitur in suas
+species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum
+rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei, una species sit
+principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed
+quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus
+secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse
+principalius altero, etiam secundum communem rationem; sicut
+substantia principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est
+divisio virtutum in diversa genera virtutum, eo quod bonum rationis
+non secundum eundem ordinem invenitur in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues are above man, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36064] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sunt supra hominem, ut supra
+dictum est. Unde non proprie dicuntur virtutes humanae, sed
+superhumanae, vel divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they
+do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36065] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum, quod aliae virtutes intellectuales a prudentia, etsi sint
+principaliores quam morales quantum ad subiectum; non tamen sunt
+principaliores quantum ad rationem virtutis, quae respicit bonum,
+quod est obiectum appetitus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A2-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 2. Whether there are four cardinal virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues,
+as is clear from what has been said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q61_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36066] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quatuor virtutes cardinales.
+Prudentia enim est directiva aliarum virtutum moralium, ut ex
+supradictis patet. Sed id quod est directivum aliorum, principalius
+est. Ergo prudentia sola est virtus principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason,
+and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36067] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes principales sunt aliquo modo morales. Sed ad operationes
+morales ordinamur per rationem practicam, et appetitum rectum, ut
+dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo solae duae virtutes cardinales sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not
+to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36068] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+inter alias etiam virtutes una est principalior altera. Sed ad hoc
+quod virtus dicatur principalis, non requiritur quod sit
+principalis respectu omnium, sed respectu quarundam. Ergo videtur
+quod sint multo plures principales virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36069] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., <i>in quatuor virtutibus
+tota boni operis structura consurgit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and
+either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.
+</p><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p7"> For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two
+ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according
+as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and
+then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their
+thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions
+need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g.
+through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and
+to this end there is "Fortitude."
+</p><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p8"> In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue
+we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational
+by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and
+the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 co."><a name="36070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36070] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum
+principia formalia aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo
+inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes. Principium enim formale
+virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis bonum. Quod quidem
+dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod in ipsa
+consideratione rationis consistit. Et sic erit una virtus
+principalis, quae dicitur prudentia. Alio modo, secundum quod circa
+aliquid ponitur rationis ordo. Et hoc vel circa operationes, et sic
+est iustitia, vel circa passiones, et sic necesse est esse duas
+virtutes. Ordinem enim rationis necesse est ponere circa passiones,
+considerata repugnantia ipsarum ad rationem. Quae quidem potest
+esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod passio impellit ad aliquid
+contrarium rationi, et sic necesse est quod passio reprimatur, et
+ab hoc denominatur temperantia. Alio modo, secundum quod passio
+retrahit ab eo quod ratio dictat, sicut timor periculorum vel
+laborum, et sic necesse est quod homo firmetur in eo quod est
+rationis, ne recedat; et ab hoc denominatur fortitudo. Similiter
+secundum subiecta, idem numerus invenitur. Quadruplex enim
+invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet
+rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per
+participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae
+est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum
+temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum
+fortitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36071] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus.
+Sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36072] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod rationale per participationem dividitur in tria, ut
+dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as
+to the formal principle.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36073] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod omnes aliae virtutes, quarum una est principalior
+alia, reducuntur ad praedictas quatuor, et quantum ad subiectum, et
+quantum ad rationes formales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A3-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 3. Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal
+in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more
+than any be called a principal virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36074] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliae virtutes debeant dici magis
+principales quam istae. Id enim quod est maximum in unoquoque
+genere, videtur esse principalius. Sed magnanimitas operatur magnum
+in omnibus virtutibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas
+maxime debet dici principalis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for
+Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against
+the wind." Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36075] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+illud per quod aliae virtutes firmantur, videtur esse maxime
+principalis virtus. Sed humilitas est huiusmodi, dicit enim
+Gregorius quod <i>qui ceteras virtutes sine humilitate congregat,
+quasi paleas in ventum portat</i>. Ergo humilitas videtur esse
+maxime principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> James 1:4</a>: "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36076] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+illud videtur esse principale, quod est perfectissimum. Sed hoc
+pertinet ad patientiam; secundum illud Iacobi I, <i>patientia opus
+perfectum habet</i>. Ergo patientia debet poni principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36077] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias
+reducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q61_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now.
+These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found
+chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined
+by reason and put into our operations as
+something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of
+equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the
+pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found
+chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.
+</p><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p7"> Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In
+this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance,
+any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of
+right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called
+temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy
+doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under
+them. Wherefore all the objections fail.
+</p><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p8"> Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective
+matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the
+other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue
+which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the
+pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 co."><a name="36078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36078] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, huiusmodi quatuor virtutes
+cardinales accipiuntur secundum quatuor formales rationes virtutis
+de qua loquimur. Quae quidem in aliquibus actibus vel passionibus
+principaliter inveniuntur. Sicut bonum consistens in consideratione
+rationis, principaliter invenitur in ipso rationis imperio; non
+autem in consilio, neque in iudicio, ut supra dictum est. Similiter
+autem bonum rationis prout ponitur in operationibus secundum
+rationem recti et debiti, principaliter invenitur in
+commutationibus vel distributionibus quae sunt ad alterum cum
+aequalitate. Bonum autem refraenandi passiones principaliter
+invenitur in passionibus quas maxime difficile est reprimere,
+scilicet in delectationibus tactus. Bonum autem firmitatis ad
+standum in bono rationis contra impetum passionum, praecipue
+invenitur in periculis mortis, contra quae difficillimum est stare.
+Sic igitur praedictas quatuor virtutes dupliciter considerare
+possumus. Uno modo, secundum communes rationes formales. Et
+secundum hoc, dicuntur principales, quasi generales ad omnes
+virtutes, utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in
+consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis virtus
+quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur
+iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit,
+dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi
+contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo. Et sic multi
+loquuntur de istis virtutibus, tam sacri doctores quam etiam
+philosophi. Et sic aliae virtutes sub ipsis continentur unde
+cessant omnes obiectiones. Alio vero modo possunt accipi, secundum
+quod istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in
+unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias
+divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter
+principalitatem materiae, puta quod prudentia dicatur quae
+praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter
+aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum
+tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> Thus again do the objections fail:
+because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as
+stated above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36079] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et sic etiam
+cessant obiectiones, quia aliae virtutes possunt habere aliquas
+alias principalitates, sed istae dicuntur principales ratione
+materiae, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A4-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 4. Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1):
+"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent;
+no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance."
+But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the
+different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36080] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod quatuor praedictae virtutes non sint
+diversae virtutes, et ab invicem distinctae. Dicit enim Gregorius,
+in XXII Moral., <i>prudentia vera non est, quae iusta, temperans et
+fortis non est; nec perfecta temperantia, quae fortis, iusta et
+prudens non est; nec fortitudo integra, quae prudens, temperans et
+iusta non est; nec vera iustitia, quae prudens, fortis et temperans
+non est</i>. Hoc autem non contingeret, si praedictae quatuor
+virtutes essent ab invicem distinctae, diversae enim species
+eiusdem generis non denominant se invicem. Ergo praedictae virtutes
+non sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance
+is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself,
+and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the
+manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that
+these virtues are not distinct from one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36081] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+eorum quae ab invicem sunt distincta, quod est unius, non
+attribuitur alteri. Sed illud quod est temperantiae, attribuitur
+fortitudini, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I libro de Offic., <i>iure ea
+fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, nullis
+illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur</i>. De temperantia etiam
+dicit quod modum vel ordinem servat <i>omnium quae vel agenda vel
+dicenda arbitramur</i>. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi virtutes non
+sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should
+have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and
+act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things
+to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his
+passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end,
+implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs
+to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from
+one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36082] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem haec requiruntur,
+<i>primum quidem, si sciens; deinde, si eligens, et eligens propter
+hoc; tertium autem, si firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur</i>.
+Sed horum primum videtur ad prudentiam pertinere, quae est recta
+ratio agibilium; secundum, scilicet eligere, ad temperantiam, ut
+aliquis non ex passione, sed ex electione agat, passionibus
+refraenatis; tertium, ut aliquis propter debitum finem operetur,
+rectitudinem quandam continet, quae videtur ad iustitiam pertinere
+aliud, scilicet firmitas et immobilitas, pertinet ad fortitudinem.
+Ergo quaelibet harum virtutum est generalis ad omnes virtutes. Ergo
+non distinguuntur ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he
+applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36083] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod
+<i>quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario
+affectu</i>, et subiungit de praedictis quatuor virtutibus.
+Praedictae ergo quatuor virtutes sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q61_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions
+of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in
+any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters;
+temperance, a disposition of the mind,
+moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is
+strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations.
+To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous
+habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a
+certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as
+it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice.
+Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and
+does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion,
+which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially
+to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions
+or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these
+would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and
+moral virtue.
+</p><p id="FS_Q61_A4-p7"> Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each
+of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken
+as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q61_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 co."><a name="36084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36084] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praedictae quatuor virtutes
+dupliciter a diversis accipiuntur. Quidam enim accipiunt eas, prout
+significant quasdam generales conditiones humani animi, quae
+inveniuntur in omnibus virtutibus, ita scilicet quod prudentia
+nihil sit aliud quam quaedam rectitudo discretionis in quibuscumque
+actibus vel materiis; iustitia vero sit quaedam rectitudo animi,
+per quam homo operatur quod debet in quacumque materia; temperantia
+vero sit quaedam dispositio animi quae modum quibuscumque
+passionibus vel operationibus imponit, ne ultra debitum efferantur;
+fortitudo vero sit quaedam dispositio animae per quam firmetur in
+eo quod est secundum rationem, contra quoscumque impetus passionum
+vel operationum labores. Haec autem quatuor sic distincta, non
+important diversitatem habituum virtuosorum quantum ad iustitiam,
+temperantiam et fortitudinem. Cuilibet enim virtuti morali, ex hoc
+quod est habitus, convenit quaedam firmitas, ut a contrario non
+moveatur, quod dictum est ad fortitudinem pertinere. Ex hoc vero
+quod est virtus, habet quod ordinetur ad bonum, in quo importatur
+ratio recti vel debiti, quod dicebatur ad iustitiam pertinere. In
+hoc vero quod est virtus moralis rationem participans, habet quod
+modum rationis in omnibus servet, et ultra se non extendat, quod
+dicebatur pertinere ad temperantiam. Solum autem hoc quod est
+discretionem habere, quod attribuebatur prudentiae, videtur
+distingui ab aliis tribus, inquantum hoc est ipsius rationis per
+essentiam; alia vero tria important quandam participationem
+rationis, per modum applicationis cuiusdam ad passiones vel
+operationes. Sic igitur, secundum praedicta, prudentia quidem esset
+virtus distincta ab aliis tribus, sed aliae tres non essent
+virtutes distinctae ab invicem; manifestum est enim quod una et
+eadem virtus et est habitus, et est virtus, et est moralis. Alii
+vero, et melius, accipiunt has quatuor virtutes secundum quod
+determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad
+unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis
+conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est. Et
+secundum hoc, manifestum est quod praedictae virtutes sunt diversi
+habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify
+one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed
+by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what
+is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures
+of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his
+daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate.
+Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose
+mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to
+remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be
+unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered
+by toil."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36085] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur de praedictis quatuor
+virtutibus secundum primam acceptionem. Vel potest dici quod istae
+quatuor virtutes denominantur ab invicem per redundantiam quandam.
+Id enim quod est prudentiae, redundat in alias virtutes, inquantum
+a prudentia diriguntur. Unaquaeque vero aliarum redundat in alias
+ea ratione, quod qui potest quod est difficilius, potest et id quod
+minus est difficile. Unde qui potest refraenare concupiscentias
+delectabilium secundum tactum, ne modum excedant, quod est
+difficillimum; ex hoc ipso redditur habilior ut refraenet audaciam
+in periculis mortis, ne ultra modum procedat, quod est longe
+facilius; et secundum hoc, fortitudo dicitur temperata. Temperantia
+etiam dicitur fortis, ex redundantia fortitudinis in temperantiam,
+inquantum scilicet ille qui per fortitudinem habet animum firmum
+contra pericula mortis, quod est difficillimum, est habilior ut
+retineat animi firmitatem contra impetus delectationum; quia, ut
+dicit Tullius in I de Offic., <i>non est consentaneum ut qui metu
+non frangitur, cupiditate frangatur; nec qui invictum se a labore
+praestiterit, vinci a voluptate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>  From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps
+the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions
+of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36086] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc
+etiam patet responsio ad secundum. Sic enim temperantia in omnibus
+modum servat, et fortitudo contra illecebras voluptatum animum
+servat inflexum, vel inquantum istae virtutes denominant quasdam
+generales conditiones virtutum; vel per redundantiam
+praedictam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however,
+be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36087] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illae quatuor generales virtutum conditiones quas
+ponit philosophus, non sunt propriae praedictis virtutibus. Sed
+possunt eis appropriari, secundum modum iam dictum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A5-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 5. Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues,
+and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God."
+Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God."
+Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36088] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter huiusmodi quatuor
+virtutes dividantur in virtutes exemplares, purgati animi,
+purgatorias, et politicas. Ut enim Macrobius dicit, in I super
+somnium Scipionis, <i>virtutes exemplares sunt quae in ipsa divina
+mente consistunt</i>. Sed philosophus, in X Ethic., dicit quod
+<i>ridiculum est Deo iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et
+prudentiam attribuere</i>. Ergo virtutes huiusmodi non possunt esse
+exemplares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in
+a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows
+nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q59_A5" id="FS_Q61_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[5]</a>) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as
+"perfect" virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36089] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes purgati animi dicuntur quae sunt absque passionibus, dicit
+enim ibidem Macrobius quod <i>temperantiae purgati animi est
+terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci;
+fortitudinis autem passiones ignorare, non vincere</i>. Dictum est
+autem supra quod huiusmodi virtutes sine passionibus esse non
+possunt. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes purgati animi esse non
+possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human
+affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i):
+"I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz.
+power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36090] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes purgatorias dicit esse eorum <i>qui quadam humanorum fuga
+solis se inserunt divinis</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse vitiosum, dicit
+enim Tullius, in I de Offic., <i>quod qui despicere se dicunt ea
+quae plerique mirantur imperia et magistratus, his non modo non
+laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto</i>. Ergo non sunt aliquae
+virtutes purgatoriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good
+of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the
+Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36091] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes politicas esse dicit <i>quibus boni viri reipublicae
+consulunt, urbesque tuentur</i>. Sed ad bonum commune sola iustitia
+legalis ordinatur; ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo aliae
+virtutes non debent dici politicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four
+kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes
+purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues
+of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf.
+Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not
+shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of
+the truth, lives for the common weal."]
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36092] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Macrobius ibidem dicit, <i>Plotinus, inter philosophiae
+professores cum Platone princeps, quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum
+genera virtutum. Ex his primae politicae vocantur; secundae,
+purgatoriae; tertiae autem, iam purgati animi; quartae,
+exemplares</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something
+is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just
+as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus
+we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called
+prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to
+reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus
+states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).
+</p><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p8"> Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in
+him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves
+himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.
+</p><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p9"> But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in
+Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect"
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these
+virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are
+virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues.
+Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts
+of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul
+from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted
+consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine
+similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows
+no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by
+an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of
+perfection.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 co."><a name="36093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36093] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles.,
+<i>oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit
+virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene
+vivimus</i>. Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo
+praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic
+igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo,
+et sic dicuntur virtutes exemplares. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina
+mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae
+intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc
+quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est
+eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae
+in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit. Et quia homo secundum suam
+naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine
+existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur,
+prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus
+humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus
+locuti sumus. Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se
+trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et
+hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est
+illud Matth. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis
+perfectus est</i>, necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter
+politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt
+virtutes divinae. Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum
+diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt
+virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et
+hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia
+omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae
+cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat,
+inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis
+autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et
+accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad
+huius propositi viam. Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium
+divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi.
+Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia
+terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia
+cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando.
+Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac
+vita perfectissimorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying
+and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36094] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus secundum
+quod sunt circa res humanas, puta iustitia circa emptiones et
+venditiones, fortitudo circa timores, temperantia circa
+concupiscentias. Sic enim ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those
+who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the
+social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues,
+"uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while
+it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said
+that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36095] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet
+virtutes hominum in hoc mundo conversantium. Sed virtutes eorum qui
+plenam beatitudinem assequuntur, sunt absque passionibus. Unde
+Plotinus dicit quod passiones politicae virtutes molliunt, idest ad
+medium reducunt; secundae, scilicet purgatoriae, auferunt; tertiae,
+quae sunt purgati animi, obliviscuntur; in quartis, scilicet
+exemplaribus, nefas est nominari. Quamvis dici possit quod loquitur
+hic de passionibus secundum quod significant aliquos inordinatos
+motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier:
+"Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning;
+as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when
+such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with
+what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works.
+If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid
+on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36096] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur,
+vitiosum est, alias est virtuosum. Unde parum supra Tullius
+praemittit, <i>his forsitan concedendum est rempublicam non
+capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae se dederunt; et his
+qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua graviori causa
+impediti, a republica recesserunt; cum eius administrandae
+potestatem aliis laudemque concederent</i>. Quod consonat ei quod
+Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>otium sanctum quaerit caritas
+veritatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam
+sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum
+est veritati, si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter
+caritatis necessitatem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service
+of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as
+we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards
+the household, or even towards one individual.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36097] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod sola iustitia legalis directe respicit bonum commune,
+sed per imperium omnes alias virtutes ad bonum commune trahit, ut
+in V Ethic. dicit philosophus. Est enim considerandum quod ad
+politicas virtutes, secundum quod hic dicuntur, pertinet non solum
+bene operari ad commune, sed etiam bene operari ad partes communis,
+scilicet ad domum, vel aliquam singularem personam.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q62" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q62-p0.1">Q. 62. OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q62-p2"> We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q62-p3"><a href="#FS_Q62_A1"> (1) Whether there are any theological virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p4"><a href="#FS_Q62_A2"> (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p5"><a href="#FS_Q62_A3"> (3) How many, and which are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p6"><a href="#FS_Q62_A4"> (4) Of their order.</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 pr."><a name="36098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36098]
+Iª-IIae q. 62 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+virtutibus theologicis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo,
+utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Secundo, utrum virtutes
+theologicae distinguantur ab intellectualibus et moralibus. Tertio,
+quot, et quae sint. Quarto, de ordine earum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q62_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A1-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 1. Whether there are any theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition
+of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which
+is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36099] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes theologicae.
+Ut enim dicitur in VII Physic., <i>virtus est dispositio perfecti
+ad optimum, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum
+naturam</i>. Sed id quod est divinum, est supra naturam hominis.
+Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A5" id="FS_Q62_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[5]</a>), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36100] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes theologicae dicuntur quasi virtutes divinae. Sed virtutes
+divinae sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quae quidem non sunt in
+nobis, sed in Deo. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes
+hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of
+all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore
+there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36101] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes theologicae dicuntur quibus ordinamur in Deum, qui est
+primum principium et ultimus finis rerum. Sed homo ex ipsa natura
+rationis et voluntatis, habet ordinem ad primum principium et
+ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum
+theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and
+charity: for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.2.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 2:8, </a> seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and
+charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36102] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de actibus
+fidei, spei et caritatis dantur praecepta in lege divina, dicitur
+enim Eccli. II, qui timetis Deum, credite illi; item, sperate in
+illum; item, diligite illum. Ergo fides, spes et caritas sunt
+virtutes in Deum ordinantes. Sunt ergo theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A7" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[7]</a>). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The
+other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a
+kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the
+Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him
+to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man
+to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed
+to his
+connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called
+"theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they
+are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained
+in Holy Writ.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 co."><a name="36103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36103] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in
+beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex
+hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem
+proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire
+potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam
+hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire
+potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod
+dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae
+naturae. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae
+excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene
+agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum
+hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur
+homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad
+beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia
+ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino.
+Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia
+habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum;
+tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina
+revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass
+the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion,
+man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of
+the Nature of which he is made a partaker.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36104] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei
+dupliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter, et sic huiusmodi virtutes
+theologicae excedunt hominis naturam. Alio modo, participative,
+sicut lignum ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo
+fit homo particeps divinae naturae, ut dictum est. Et sic istae
+virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous,
+and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36105] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod istae virtutes non dicuntur divinae, sicut quibus
+Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a Deo,
+et in ordine ad Deum. Unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to
+nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object
+of supernatural happiness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36106] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout
+est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem
+naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis
+supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non
+ordinantur sufficienter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A2-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 2. Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological
+virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now
+the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part,
+are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and
+intellectual virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36107] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes theologicae non distinguantur
+a moralibus et intellectualibus. Virtutes enim theologicae, si sunt
+in anima humana, oportet quod perficiant ipsam vel secundum partem
+intellectivam vel secundum partem appetitivam. Sed virtutes quae
+perficiunt partem intellectivam, dicuntur intellectuales, virtutes
+autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam, sunt morales. Ergo
+virtutes theologicae non distinguuntur a virtutibus moralibus et
+intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which
+directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological
+virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36108] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes theologicae dicuntur quae ordinant nos ad Deum. Sed inter
+intellectuales virtutes est aliqua quae ordinat nos ad Deum,
+scilicet sapientia, quae est de divinis, utpote causam altissimam
+considerans. Ergo virtutes theologicae ab intellectualibus
+virtutibus non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity,
+which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36109] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., manifestat in quatuor
+virtutibus cardinalibus quod sunt ordo amoris. Sed amor est
+caritas, quae ponitur virtus theologica. Ergo virtutes morales non
+distinguuntur a theologicis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are
+above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q62_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>). Therefore they are distinct from one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36110] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+id quod est supra naturam hominis, distinguitur ab eo quod est
+secundum naturam hominis. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt super
+naturam hominis, cui secundum naturam conveniunt virtutes
+intellectuales et morales, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo
+distinguuntur ab invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q62_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object
+of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other
+hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological
+virtues are specifically
+distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 co."><a name="36111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36111] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur
+secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum. Obiectum autem
+theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis,
+prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum
+intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione
+comprehendi potest. Unde virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur
+a moralibus et intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological
+virtues, supernaturally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36112] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt
+intellectum et appetitum hominis secundum proportionem naturae
+humanae, sed theologicae supernaturaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they
+are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they
+surpass human reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36113] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod sapientia quae a philosopho ponitur intellectualis
+virtus, considerat divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione
+humana. Sed theologica virtus est circa ea secundum quod rationem
+humanam excedunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love,
+this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly
+so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions;
+and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4];
+Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other
+virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q[65],
+AA[2],5;
+<a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q23_A7" id="FS_Q62_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[23], A[7]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36114] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est
+caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest
+intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis. Si
+de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo
+amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur
+ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est
+amor, ut supra dictum est. Si autem intelligatur de amore
+caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus
+essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes
+aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A3-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 3. Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological
+virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among
+the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore
+there should be but one theological virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36115] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur tres virtutes
+theologicae, fides, spes et caritas. Virtutes enim theologicae se
+habent in ordine ad beatitudinem divinam, sicut inclinatio naturae
+ad finem connaturalem. Sed inter virtutes ordinatas ad finem
+connaturalem, ponitur una sola virtus naturalis, scilicet
+intellectus principiorum. Ergo debet poni una sola virtus
+theologica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among
+the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned
+among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned
+as theological virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36116] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+theologicae virtutes sunt perfectiores virtutibus intellectualibus
+et moralibus. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes fides non ponitur,
+sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit cognitio imperfecta.
+Similiter etiam inter virtutes morales non ponitur spes, sed est
+aliquid minus virtute, cum sit passio. Ergo multo minus debent poni
+virtutes theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective
+part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect,
+the other, the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36117] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes theologicae ordinant animam hominis ad Deum. Sed ad Deum
+non potest anima hominis ordinari nisi per intellectivam partem, in
+qua est intellectus et voluntas. Ergo non debent esse nisi duae
+virtutes theologicae, una quae perficiat intellectum, alia quae
+perficiat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36118] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>nunc autem manent
+fides, spes, caritas, tria haec</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q62_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q62_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed
+to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so
+far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are
+reason's starting-point, both in
+speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined
+by reason.
+</p><p id="FS_Q62_A3-p7"> But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for
+them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural
+to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which
+are
+held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to
+this end, both as to that end as something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby
+the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and
+tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 co."><a name="36119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36119] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes theologicae hoc
+modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per
+naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem.
+Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. Primo quidem, secundum rationem
+vel intellectum, inquantum continet prima principia universalia
+cognita nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit
+ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis. Secundo, per rectitudinem
+voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis. Sed haec duo
+deficiunt ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis; secundum illud I
+ad Cor. II, <i>oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor
+hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se</i>.
+Unde oportuit quod quantum ad utrumque, aliquid homini
+supernaturaliter adderetur, ad ordinandum ipsum in finem
+supernaturalem. Et primo quidem, quantum ad intellectum, adduntur
+homini quaedam principia supernaturalia, quae divino lumine
+capiuntur, et haec sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides. Secundo
+vero, voluntas ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum
+intentionis, in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile
+consequi, quod pertinet ad spem, et quantum ad unionem quandam
+spiritualem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem, quod
+fit per caritatem. Appetitus enim uniuscuiusque rei naturaliter
+movetur et tendit in finem sibi connaturalem, et iste motus
+provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition
+to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention
+of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects,
+for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there
+was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36120] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibilibus,
+per quas intelligat, et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis
+habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa natura
+voluntatis sufficit ad naturalem ordinem in finem, sive quantum ad
+intentionem finis, sive quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum. Sed in
+ordine ad ea quae supra naturam sunt, ad nihil horum sufficit
+natura potentiae. Et ideo oportet fieri superadditionem habitus
+supernaturalis quantum ad utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith
+and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which
+are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:25</a>: "The weakness of God is stronger than men."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36121] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod fides et spes imperfectionem quandam important, quia
+fides est de his quae non videntur, et spes de his quae non
+habentur. Unde habere fidem et spem de his quae subduntur humanae
+potestati, deficit a ratione virtutis. Sed habere fidem et spem de
+his quae sunt supra facultatem naturae humanae, excedit omnem
+virtutem homini proportionatam; secundum illud I ad Cor. I, <i>quod
+infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must
+needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36122] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ad appetitum duo pertinent, scilicet motus in finem;
+et conformatio ad finem per amorem. Et sic oportet quod in appetitu
+humano duae virtutes theologicae ponantur, scilicet spes et
+caritas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A4-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 4. Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes
+that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36123] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit hic ordo theologicarum
+virtutum, quod fides sit prior spe, et spes prior caritate. Radix
+enim est prior eo quod est ex radice. Sed caritas est radix omnium
+virtutum; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et
+fundati</i>. Ergo caritas est prior aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and
+loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36124] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., <i>non potest aliquis
+diligere quod esse non crediderit. Porro si credit et diligit, bene
+agendo efficit ut etiam speret</i>. Ergo videtur quod fides
+praecedat caritatem, et caritas spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it
+is a passion, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q62_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36125] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+amor est principium omnis affectionis, ut supra dictum est. Sed
+spes nominat quandam affectionem; est enim quaedam passio, ut supra
+dictum est. Ergo caritas, quae est amor, est prior spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle enumerates them thus (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36126] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est ordo quo apostolus ista enumerat, dicens, <i>nunc autem manent
+fides, spes, caritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q62_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes
+form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts:
+because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving,
+unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith
+that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity.
+In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able
+to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason
+that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards
+their respective acts.
+</p><p id="FS_Q62_A4-p7"> But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and
+receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch
+as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on (
+<a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q23_A8" id="FS_Q62_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[23], A[8]</a>).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 co."><a name="36127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36127] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod duplex est ordo, scilicet generationis, et
+perfectionis. Ordine quidem generationis, quo materia est prior
+forma, et imperfectum perfecto, in uno et eodem; fides praecedit
+spem, et spes caritatem, secundum actus (nam habitus simul
+infunduntur). Non enim potest in aliquid motus appetitivus tendere
+vel sperando vel amando, nisi quod est apprehensum sensu aut
+intellectu. Per fidem autem apprehendit intellectus ea quae sperat
+et amat. Unde oportet quod, ordine generationis, fides praecedat
+spem et caritatem. Similiter autem ex hoc homo aliquid amat, quod
+apprehendit illud ut bonum suum. Per hoc autem quod homo ab aliquo
+sperat se bonum consequi posse, reputat ipsum in quo spem habet,
+quoddam bonum suum. Unde ex hoc ipso quod homo sperat de aliquo,
+procedit ad amandum ipsum. Et sic, ordine generationis, secundum
+actus, spes praecedit caritatem. Ordine vero perfectionis, caritas
+praecedit fidem et spem, eo quod tam fides quam spes per caritatem
+formatur, et perfectionem virtutis acquirit. Sic enim caritas est
+mater omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum
+forma, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36128] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs
+to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not
+already possessed, but which he hopes to possess.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36129] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de spe qua quis sperat ex meritis
+iam habitis se ad beatitudinem perventurum, quod est spei formatae,
+quae sequitur caritatem. Potest autem aliquis sperare antequam
+habeat caritatem, non ex meritis quae iam habet, sed quae sperat se
+habiturum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q62_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[7]</a>), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard
+to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person
+from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards
+hope is increased by love.
+Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact
+that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36130] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur,
+spes respicit duo. Unum quidem sicut principale obiectum, scilicet
+bonum quod speratur. Et respectu huius, semper amor praecedit spem,
+nunquam enim speratur aliquod bonum nisi desideratum et amatum.
+Respicit etiam spes illum a quo se sperat posse consequi bonum. Et
+respectu huius, primo quidem spes praecedit amorem; quamvis postea
+ex ipso amore spes augeatur. Per hoc enim quod aliquis reputat per
+aliquem se posse consequi aliquod bonum, incipit amare ipsum, et ex
+hoc ipso quod ipsum amat, postea fortius de eo sperat.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q63" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q63-p0.1">Q. 63. OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q63-p2"> We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q63-p3"><a href="#FS_Q63_A1"> (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p4"><a href="#FS_Q63_A2"> (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p5"><a href="#FS_Q63_A3"> (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p6"><a href="#FS_Q63_A4"> (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 pr."><a name="36131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36131]
+Iª-IIae q. 63 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
+virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum virtus sit
+in nobis a natura. Secundo, utrum aliqua virtus causetur in nobis
+ex assuetudine operum. Tertio, utrum aliquae virtutes morales sint
+in nobis per infusionem. Quarto, utrum virtus quam acquirimus ex
+assuetudine operum, sit eiusdem speciei cum virtute infusa.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q63_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A1-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 1. Whether virtue is in us by nature? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and
+are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if
+it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.23" target="asv"> Mat. 4:23, </a> "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36132] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus sit in nobis a natura. Dicit
+enim Damascenus, in III libro, <i>naturales sunt virtutes, et
+aequaliter insunt omnibus</i>. Et Antonius dicit, in sermone ad
+monachos, <i>si naturam voluntas mutaverit, perversitas est;
+conditio servetur, et virtus est</i>. Et Matth. IV, super illud,
+<i>circuibat Iesus</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>docet naturales
+iustitias, scilicet castitatem, iustitiam, humilitatem, quas
+naturaliter habet homo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q63_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in
+man by nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36133] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum virtutis est secundum rationem esse, ut ex dictis patet. Sed
+id quod est secundum rationem, est homini naturale, cum ratio sit
+hominis natura. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.18" target="asv">Job 31:18</a>): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36134] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+illud dicitur esse nobis naturale, quod nobis a nativitate inest.
+Sed virtutes quibusdam a nativitate insunt, dicitur enim Iob XXXI,
+<i>ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est
+mecum</i>. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain,
+as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36135] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+id quod inest homini a natura, est omnibus hominibus commune, et
+non tollitur per peccatum, quia etiam in Daemonibus bona naturalia
+manent, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed virtus non
+inest omnibus hominibus; et abiicitur per peccatum. Ergo non inest
+homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance,
+who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf.
+<a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q45_A8" id="FS_Q63_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[45], A[8]</a>; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated
+from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they
+pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent.
+</p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p7"> In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences
+would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed
+down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of
+the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active
+intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted
+to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.
+</p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p8"> To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is
+according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species
+from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his
+body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific
+nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of
+his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be
+referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul.
+</p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p9"> In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's
+reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the
+nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance
+with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in
+the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain
+parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts,
+and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural
+aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral
+virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while
+the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the
+various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances.
+</p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p10"> It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to
+perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 co."><a name="36136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36136] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod circa formas corporales, aliqui dixerunt quod sunt
+totaliter ab intrinseco, sicut ponentes latitationem formarum.
+Aliqui vero, quod totaliter sint ab extrinseco, sicut ponentes
+formas corporales esse ab aliqua causa separata. Aliqui vero, quod
+partim sint ab intrinseco, inquantum scilicet praeexistunt in
+materia in potentia; et partim ab extrinseco, inquantum scilicet
+reducuntur ad actum per agens. Ita etiam circa scientias et
+virtutes, aliqui quidem posuerunt eas totaliter esse ab intrinseco,
+ita scilicet quod omnes virtutes et scientiae naturaliter
+praeexistunt in anima; sed per disciplinam et exercitium
+impedimenta scientiae et virtutis tolluntur, quae adveniunt animae
+ex corporis gravitate; sicut cum ferrum clarificatur per
+limationem. Et haec fuit opinio Platonicorum. Alii vero dixerunt
+quod sunt totaliter ab extrinseco, idest ex influentia
+intelligentiae agentis, ut ponit Avicenna. Alii vero dixerunt quod
+secundum aptitudinem scientiae et virtutes sunt in nobis a natura,
+non autem secundum perfectionem, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic.
+Et hoc verius est. Ad cuius manifestationem, oportet considerare
+quod aliquid dicitur alicui homini naturale dupliciter, uno modo,
+ex natura speciei; alio modo, ex natura individui. Et quia
+unumquodque habet speciem secundum suam formam, individuatur vero
+secundum materiam; forma vero hominis est anima rationalis, materia
+vero corpus, id quod convenit homini secundum animam rationalem,
+est ei naturale secundum rationem speciei; id vero quod est ei
+naturale secundum determinatam corporis complexionem, est ei
+naturale secundum naturam individui. Quod enim est naturale homini
+ex parte corporis secundum speciem, quodammodo refertur ad animam,
+inquantum scilicet tale corpus est tali animae proportionatum.
+Utroque autem modo virtus est homini naturalis secundum quandam
+inchoationem. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, inquantum in ratione
+homini insunt naturaliter quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam
+scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia
+intellectualium virtutum et moralium; et inquantum in voluntate
+inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni quod est secundum rationem.
+Secundum vero naturam individui, inquantum ex corporis dispositione
+aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel peius ad quasdam virtutes,
+prout scilicet vires quaedam sensitivae actus sunt quarundam
+partium corporis, ex quarum dispositione adiuvantur vel impediuntur
+huiusmodi vires in suis actibus, et per consequens vires
+rationales, quibus huiusmodi sensitivae vires deserviunt. Et
+secundum hoc, unus homo habet naturalem aptitudinem ad scientiam,
+alius ad fortitudinem, alius ad temperantiam. Et his modis tam
+virtutes intellectuales quam morales, secundum quandam aptitudinis
+inchoationem, sunt in nobis a natura. Non autem consummatio earum.
+Quia natura determinatur ad unum, consummatio autem huiusmodi
+virtutum non est secundum unum modum actionis, sed diversimode,
+secundum diversas materias in quibus virtutes operantur, et
+secundum diversas circumstantias. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes in
+nobis sunt a natura secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, non autem
+secundum perfectionem, praeter virtutes theologicas, quae sunt
+totaliter ab extrinseco.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by
+nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition
+which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36137] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam primae duae rationes procedunt
+secundum quod seminalia virtutum insunt nobis a natura, inquantum
+rationales sumus. Tertia vero ratio procedit secundum quod ex
+naturali dispositione corporis, quam habet ex nativitate, unus
+habet aptitudinem ad miserendum, alius ad temperate vivendum, alius
+ad aliam virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A2-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 2. Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi
+cvi.] commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign
+Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired
+by means of works, but is
+caused in us by God, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36138] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes in nobis causari non possint
+ex assuetudine operum. Quia super illud Rom. XIV, <i>omne quod non
+est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, dicit Glossa Augustini, <i>omnis
+infidelium vita peccatum est; et nihil est bonum sine summo bono.
+Ubi deest cognitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in optimis
+moribus</i>. Sed fides non potest acquiri ex operibus, sed causatur
+in nobis a Deo; secundum illud Ephes. II, <i>gratia estis salvati
+per fidem</i>. Ergo nulla virtus potest in nobis acquiri ex
+assuetudine operum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,
+according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.21" target="asv"> Wis. 8:21</a>: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us
+by habituation, but only by the gift of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36139] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum, cum contrarietur virtuti, non compatitur secum virtutem.
+Sed homo non potest vitare peccatum nisi per gratiam Dei; secundum
+illud Sap. VIII, <i>didici quod non possum esse aliter continens,
+nisi Deus det</i>. Ergo nec virtutes aliquae possunt in nobis
+causari ex assuetudine operum; sed solum dono Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause.
+Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36140] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus qui sunt in virtutem, deficiunt a perfectione virtutis. Sed
+effectus non potest esse perfectior causa. Ergo virtus non potest
+causari ex actibus praecedentibus virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more,
+therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36141] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum est
+virtuosius quam malum. Sed ex malis actibus causantur habitus
+vitiorum. Ergo multo magis ex bonis actibus possunt causari habitus
+virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> We have spoken above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[51], AA[2]</a>,3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation
+to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as
+Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight, and
+measure," as expressed in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv"> Wis. 11:21, </a> man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever
+is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 co."><a name="36142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36142] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod de generatione habituum ex actibus, supra in generali
+dictum est. Nunc autem specialiter quantum ad virtutem,
+considerandum est quod sicut supra dictum est, virtus hominis
+perficit ipsum ad bonum. Cum autem ratio boni consistat in modo,
+specie et ordine, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni; sive
+in numero, pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap. XI, oportet quod
+bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulam consideretur. Quae quidem
+est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana, et lex
+divina. Et quia lex divina est superior regula, ideo ad plura se
+extendit, ita quod quidquid regulatur ratione humana, regulatur
+etiam lege divina, sed non convertitur. Virtus igitur hominis
+ordinata ad bonum quod modificatur secundum regulam rationis
+humanae, potest ex actibus humanis causari, inquantum huiusmodi
+actus procedunt a ratione, sub cuius potestate et regula tale bonum
+consistit. Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum secundum quod
+modificatur per legem divinam, et non per rationem humanam, non
+potest causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio, sed
+causatur solum in nobis per operationem divinam. Et ideo, huiusmodi
+virtutem definiens, Augustinus posuit in definitione virtutis, quam
+Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7"> It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by
+human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other
+hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts,
+the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in
+giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works in us without us" (Super
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36143] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et de
+huiusmodi etiam virtutibus prima ratio procedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual
+sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as
+stated above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary
+to a habit. Wherefore, though
+man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue,
+whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain
+mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues,
+which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later (
+<a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q109_A4" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[109], A[4]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36144] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtus divinitus infusa, maxime si in sua perfectione
+consideretur, non compatitur secum aliquod peccatum mortale. Sed
+virtus humanitus acquisita potest secum compati aliquem actum
+peccati, etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae
+voluntati subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per unum actum
+peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis acquisitae; habitui enim non
+contrariatur directe actus, sed habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia
+homo non possit peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet
+mortaliter; non tamen impeditur quin possit habitum virtutis
+acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et
+praecipue ab his quae sunt valde rationi contraria. Sunt etiam
+quaedam peccata mortalia quae homo sine gratia nullo modo potest
+vitare, quae scilicet directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis,
+quae ex dono gratiae sunt in nobis. Hoc tamen infra manifestius
+fiet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q63_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent
+than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science
+of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results
+through the appetite partaking
+of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles,
+can cause acquired human virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36145] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, virtutum acquisitarum praeexistunt
+in nobis quaedam semina sive principia, secundum naturam. Quae
+quidem principia sunt nobiliora virtutibus eorum virtute
+acquisitis, sicut intellectus principiorum speculabilium est
+nobilior scientia conclusionum; et naturalis rectitudo rationis est
+nobilior rectificatione appetitus quae fit per participationem
+rationis, quae quidem rectificatio pertinet ad virtutem moralem.
+Sic igitur actus humani, inquantum procedunt ex altioribus
+principiis, possunt causare virtutes acquisitas humanas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A3-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 3. Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself,
+save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv),
+"it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our
+acts, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q63_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is not reasonable that
+they should be caused in us by infusion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36146] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter virtutes theologicas, non sint
+aliae virtutes nobis infusae a Deo. Ea enim quae possunt fieri a
+causis secundis, non fiunt immediate a Deo, nisi forte aliquando
+miraculose, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, lex divinitatis est ultima
+per media adducere. Sed virtutes intellectuales et morales possunt
+in nobis causari per nostros actus, ut dictum est. Non ergo
+convenienter causantur in nobis per infusionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to
+direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36147] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+in operibus Dei multo minus est aliquid superfluum quam in operibus
+naturae. Sed ad ordinandum nos in bonum supernaturale, sufficiunt
+virtutes theologicae. Ergo non sunt aliae virtutes supernaturales,
+quas oporteat in nobis causari a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our
+souls, according to a gloss on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1" target="asv">Heb. 1</a> [*Cf. Jerome on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.15" target="asv"> Gal. 1: 15,16</a>]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36148] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+natura non facit per duo, quod potest facere per unum, et multo
+minus Deus. Sed Deus inseruit animae nostrae semina virtutum, ut
+dicit Glossa Heb. I. Ergo non oportet quod alias virtutes in nobis
+per infusionem causet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36149] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, <i>sobrietatem et iustitiam docet,
+prudentiam et virtutem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired
+by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated
+<a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q63_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to
+a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive from God other
+habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the
+moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 co."><a name="36150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36150] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis
+proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam
+morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex
+quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus, ut
+supra dictum est. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur
+nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem
+supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod his etiam
+virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus
+divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes
+theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad
+principia naturalia virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological
+virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36151] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod aliquae quidem virtutes morales et
+intellectuales possunt causari in nobis ex nostris actibus, tamen
+illae non sunt proportionatae virtutibus theologicis. Et ideo
+oportet alias, eis proportionatas, immediate a Deo causari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But
+the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36152] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sufficienter nos ordinant in
+finem supernaturalem, secundum quandam inchoationem, quantum
+scilicet ad ipsum Deum immediate. Sed oportet quod per alias
+virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen
+ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in
+addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36153] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum,
+non se extendit ultra proportionem naturae. Et ideo in ordine ad
+finem supernaturalem, indiget homo perfici per alia principia
+superaddita.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A4-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 4. Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues,
+according to what has been said
+<a href="#FS_Q63_A3" id="FS_Q63_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but
+by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36154] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes infusae non sint alterius
+speciei a virtutibus acquisitis. Virtus enim acquisita et virtus
+infusa, secundum praedicta, non videntur differre nisi secundum
+ordinem ad ultimum finem. Sed habitus et actus humani non recipiunt
+speciem ab ultimo fine, sed a proximo. Non ergo virtutes morales
+vel intellectuales infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires
+of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36155] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+habitus per actus cognoscuntur. Sed idem est actus temperantiae
+infusae, et acquisitae, scilicet moderari concupiscentias tactus.
+Ergo non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a
+creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the
+man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to
+the same species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36156] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus acquisita et infusa differunt secundum illud quod est
+immediate a Deo factum, et a creatura. Sed idem est specie homo
+quem Deus formavit, et quem generat natura; et oculus quem caeco
+nato dedit, et quem virtus formativa causat. Ergo videtur quod est
+eadem specie virtus acquisita, et infusa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition
+of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q63_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36157] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+quaelibet differentia in definitione posita, mutata diversificat
+speciem. Sed in definitione virtutis infusae ponitur, quam Deus in
+nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus
+acquisita, cui hoc non convenit, non est eiusdem speciei cum
+infusa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q63_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q56_A2" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[56], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as
+in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence
+of touch. The
+formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something
+on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according
+to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance,
+in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body,
+nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into
+subjection" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.27" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:27</a>), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species;
+and the same applies to the other virtues.
+</p><p id="FS_Q63_A4-p7"> The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a
+horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are
+directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are
+well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men
+behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God"
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.19" target="asv">Eph. 2:19</a>), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 co."><a name="36158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36158] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo,
+sicut praedictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes
+obiectorum. Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum
+consideratum in materia propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est
+bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti
+formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his
+concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte
+concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem quod alterius rationis est
+modus qui imponitur in huiusmodi concupiscentiis secundum regulam
+rationis humanae, et secundum regulam divinam. Puta in sumptione
+ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini
+corporis, nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem regulam legis
+divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, et in
+servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum
+huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita
+differunt specie, et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus. Alio modo
+habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur, non
+enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas
+naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit philosophus, in III
+Polit., quod diversae sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se
+habent ad diversas politias. Et per hunc etiam modum differunt
+specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in
+ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae
+virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad
+res humanas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects,
+as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36159] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt
+secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem; sed etiam secundum ordinem ad
+propria obiecta, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore
+their respective acts are not identical.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36160] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod alia ratione modificat concupiscentias delectabilium
+tactus temperantia acquisita, et temperantia infusa, ut dictum est.
+Unde non habent eundem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it
+was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired
+by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36161] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod oculum caeci nati Deus fecit ad eundem actum ad quem
+formantur alii oculi secundum naturam, et ideo fuit eiusdem
+speciei. Et eadem ratio esset, si Deus vellet miraculose causare in
+homine virtutes quales acquiruntur ex actibus. Sed ita non est in
+proposito, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q64" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q64-p0.1">Q. 64. OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q64-p2"> We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality
+of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q64-p3"><a href="#FS_Q64_A1"> (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p4"><a href="#FS_Q64_A2"> (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p5"><a href="#FS_Q64_A3"> (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p6"><a href="#FS_Q64_A4"> (4) Whether the theological virtues do?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 pr."><a name="36162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36162]
+Iª-IIae q. 64 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+proprietatibus virtutum. Et primo quidem, de medio virtutum;
+secundo, de connexione virtutum; tertio, de aequalitate earum;
+quarto, de ipsarum duratione. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor.
+Primo, utrum virtutes morales sint in medio. Secundo, utrum medium
+virtutis moralis sit medium rei, vel rationis. Tertio, utrum
+intellectuales virtutes consistant in medio. Quarto, utrum virtutes
+theologicae.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q64_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A1-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 1. Whether moral virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme.
+Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore
+moral virtue does not observe the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36163] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis non consistat in medio.
+Ultimum enim repugnat rationi medii. Sed de ratione virtutis est
+ultimum, dicitur enim in I de caelo, quod virtus est ultimum
+potentiae. Ergo virtus moralis non consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors,
+and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36164] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+illud quod est maximum, non est medium. Sed quaedam virtutes
+morales tendunt in aliquod maximum, sicut magnanimitas est circa
+maximos honores, et magnificentia circa maximos sumptus, ut dicitur
+in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis virtus moralis est in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the
+contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme;
+thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give
+all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is
+not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36165] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si de ratione virtutis moralis sit in medio esse, oportet quod
+virtus moralis non perficiatur, sed magis corrumpatur, per hoc quod
+tendit ad extremum. Sed quaedam virtutes morales perficiuntur per
+hoc quod tendunt ad extremum, sicut virginitas, quae abstinet ab
+omni delectabili venereo, et sic tenet extremum, et est
+perfectissima castitas. Et dare omnia pauperibus est perfectissima
+misericordia vel liberalitas. Ergo videtur quod non sit de ratione
+virtutis moralis esse in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36166] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis
+est habitus electivus in medietate existens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As already explained (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q64_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive
+part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible
+objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the
+good things made by art is
+that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure.
+Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things
+ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it
+is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral
+virtue observes the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 co."><a name="36167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36167] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtus de sui ratione
+ordinat hominem ad bonum. Moralis autem virtus proprie est
+perfectiva appetitivae partis animae circa aliquam determinatam
+materiam. Mensura autem et regula appetitivi motus circa
+appetibilia, est ipsa ratio. Bonum autem cuiuslibet mensurati et
+regulati consistit in hoc quod conformetur suae regulae, sicut
+bonum in artificiatis est ut consequantur regulam artis. Malum
+autem per consequens in huiusmodi est per hoc quod aliquid
+discordat a sua regula vel mensura. Quod quidem contingit vel per
+hoc quod superexcedit mensuram, vel per hoc quod deficit ab ea,
+sicut manifeste apparet in omnibus regulatis et mensuratis. Et ideo
+patet quod bonum virtutis moralis consistit in adaequatione ad
+mensuram rationis. Manifestum est autem quod inter excessum et
+defectum medium est aequalitas sive conformitas. Unde manifeste
+apparet quod virtus moralis in medio consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore
+we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme,
+viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral
+virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes
+the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a
+mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best'
+and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36168] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtus moralis bonitatem habet ex regula
+rationis, pro materia autem habet passiones vel operationes. Si
+ergo comparetur virtus moralis ad rationem, sic, secundum id quod
+rationis est, habet rationem extremi unius, quod est conformitas,
+excessus vero et defectus habet rationem alterius extremi, quod est
+difformitas. Si vero consideretur virtus moralis secundum suam
+materiam, sic habet rationem medii, inquantum passionem reducit ad
+regulam rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus
+secundum substantiam medietas est, inquantum regula virtutis
+ponitur circa propriam materiam, secundum optimum autem et bene,
+est extremitas, scilicet secundum conformitatem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being
+extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through
+being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity
+of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and
+a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since
+these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and
+for an "end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or "where" it is not
+right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when" one
+aught.
+This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity,
+but the mean in the right mode of his action."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36169] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod medium et extrema considerantur in actionibus et
+passionibus secundum diversas circumstantias, unde nihil prohibet
+in aliqua virtute esse extremum secundum unam circumstantiam, quod
+tamen est medium secundum alias circumstantias, per conformitatem
+ad rationem. Et sic est in magnificentia et magnanimitate. Nam si
+consideretur quantitas absoluta eius in quod tendit magnificus et
+magnanimus, dicetur extremum et maximum, sed si consideretur hoc
+ipsum per comparationem ad alias circumstantias, sic habet rationem
+medii; quia in hoc tendunt huiusmodi virtutes secundum regulam
+rationis, idest ubi oportet, et quando oportet, et propter quod
+oportet. Excessus autem, si in hoc maximum tendatur quando non
+oportet, vel ubi non oportet, vel propter quod non oportet;
+defectus autem est, si non tendatur in hoc maximum ubi oportet, et
+quando oportet. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic.,
+quod <i>magnanimus est quidem magnitudine extremus; eo autem quod
+ut oportet, medius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty
+from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But
+if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if
+it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a
+vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36170] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod eadem ratio est de virginitate et paupertate, quae
+est de magnanimitate. Abstinet enim virginitas ab omnibus venereis,
+et paupertas ab omnibus divitiis, propter quod oportet, et secundum
+quod oportet; idest secundum mandatum Dei, et propter vitam
+aeternam. Si autem hoc fiat secundum quod non oportet, idest
+secundum aliquam superstitionem illicitam, vel etiam propter inanem
+gloriam; erit superfluum. Si autem non fiat quando oportet, vel
+secundum quod oportet, est vitium per defectum, ut patet in
+transgredientibus votum virginitatis vel paupertatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A2-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 2. Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists
+in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral
+virtue is a real mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36171] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod medium virtutis moralis non sit medium
+rationis, sed medium rei. Bonum enim virtutis moralis consistit in
+hoc quod est in medio. Bonum autem, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys., est
+in rebus ipsis. Ergo medium virtutis moralis est medium rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather
+a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36172] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ratio est vis apprehensiva. Sed virtus moralis non consistit in
+medio apprehensionum; sed magis in medio operationum et passionum.
+Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis, sed medium
+rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean
+of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36173] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+medium quod accipitur secundum proportionem arithmeticam vel
+geometricam, est medium rei. Sed tale est medium iustitiae, ut
+dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium
+rationis, sed rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36174] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis in
+medio consistit quoad nos, determinata ratione</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as
+though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason,
+but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be
+considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every
+mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated
+<a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason.
+</p><p id="FS_Q64_A2-p7"> But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real
+mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in
+relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations,
+which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above
+(
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A2" id="FS_Q64_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[2]</a>): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his
+due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established
+in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established
+in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the
+passions.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 co."><a name="36175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36175] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod medium rationis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno
+modo, secundum quod medium in ipso actu rationis existit, quasi
+ipse actus rationis ad medium reducatur. Et sic, quia virtus
+moralis non perficit actum rationis, sed actum virtutis
+appetitivae; medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis. Alio
+modo potest dici medium rationis id quod a ratione ponitur in
+aliqua materia. Et sic omne medium virtutis moralis est medium
+rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, virtus moralis dicitur consistere
+in medio, per conformitatem ad rationem rectam. Sed quandoque
+contingit quod medium rationis est etiam medium rei, et tunc
+oportet quod virtutis moralis medium sit medium rei; sicut est in
+iustitia. Quandoque autem medium rationis non est medium rei, sed
+accipitur per comparationem ad nos, et sic est medium in omnibus
+aliis virtutibus moralibus. Cuius ratio est quia iustitia est circa
+operationes, quae consistunt in rebus exterioribus, in quibus
+rectum institui debet simpliciter et secundum se, ut supra dictum
+est, et ideo medium rationis in iustitia est idem cum medio rei,
+inquantum scilicet iustitia dat unicuique quod debet, et non plus
+nec minus. Aliae vero virtutes morales consistunt circa passiones
+interiores, in quibus non potest rectum constitui eodem modo,
+propter hoc quod homines diversimode se habent ad passiones, et
+ideo oportet quod rectitudo rationis in passionibus instituatur per
+respectum ad nos, qui afficimur secundum passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objections:</b>  This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very
+act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36176] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam, primae duae rationes procedunt de
+medio rationis quod scilicet invenitur in ipso actu rationis.
+Tertia vero ratio procedit de medio iustitiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A3-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 3. Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming
+to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore
+the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36177] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non consistant
+in medio. Virtutes enim morales consistunt in medio, inquantum
+conformantur regulae rationis. Sed virtutes intellectuales sunt in
+ipsa ratione; et sic non videntur habere superiorem regulam. Ergo
+virtutes intellectuales non consistunt in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue observes
+the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean,
+this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36178] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+medium virtutis moralis determinatur a virtute intellectuali,
+dicitur enim in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus consistit in medietate
+determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit</i>. Si igitur
+virtus intellectualis iterum consistat in medio, oportet quod
+determinetur sibi medium per aliquam aliam virtutem. Et sic
+procedetur in infinitum in virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there
+seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition
+to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual
+virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36179] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+medium proprie est inter contraria; ut patet per philosophum, in X
+Metaphys. Sed in intellectu non videtur esse aliqua contrarietas,
+cum etiam ipsa contraria, secundum quod sunt in intellectu, non
+sint contraria, sed simul intelligantur, ut album et nigrum, sanum
+et aegrum. Ergo in intellectualibus virtutibus non est medium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes
+the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36180] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod ars est virtus intellectualis, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.; et
+tamen artis est aliquod medium, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo etiam
+virtus intellectualis consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may
+happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an
+intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual
+virtue is
+the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue,
+it is the true in conformity with a right appetite.
+</p><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p7"> Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure
+of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing
+is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with
+things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are
+not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something
+were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas
+in reality it is.
+</p><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p8"> The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured;
+so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we
+consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason
+is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as
+ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 co."><a name="36181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36181] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod bonum alicuius rei consistit in medio, secundum quod
+conformatur regulae vel mensurae quam contingit transcendere et ab
+ea deficere, sicut dictum est. Virtus autem intellectualis
+ordinatur ad bonum, sicut et moralis, ut supra dictum est. Unde
+secundum quod bonum virtutis intellectualis se habet ad mensuram,
+sic se habet ad rationem medii. Bonum autem virtutis intellectualis
+est verum, speculativae quidem virtutis, verum absolute, ut in VI
+Ethic. dicitur; practicae autem virtutis, verum secundum
+conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Verum autem intellectus nostri
+absolute consideratum, est sicut mensuratum a re, res enim est
+mensura intellectus nostri, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.; ex eo enim
+quod res est vel non est, veritas est in opinione et in oratione.
+Sic igitur bonum virtutis intellectualis speculativae consistit in
+quodam medio, per conformitatem ad ipsam rem, secundum quod dicit
+esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; in quo ratio veri
+consistit. Excessus autem est secundum affirmationem falsam, per
+quam dicitur esse quod non est, defectus autem accipitur secundum
+negationem falsam, per quam dicitur non esse quod est. Verum autem
+virtutis intellectualis practicae, comparatum quidem ad rem, habet
+rationem mensurati. Et sic eodem modo accipitur medium per
+conformitatem ad rem, in virtutibus intellectualibus practicis,
+sicut in speculativis. Sed respectu appetitus, habet rationem
+regulae et mensurae. Unde idem medium, quod est virtutis moralis,
+etiam est ipsius prudentiae, scilicet rectitudo rationis, sed
+prudentiae quidem est istud medium ut regulantis et mensurantis;
+virtutis autem moralis, ut mensuratae et regulatae. Similiter
+excessus et defectus accipitur diversimode utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36182] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod etiam virtus intellectualis habet suam mensuram,
+ut dictum est, et per conformitatem ad ipsam, accipitur in ipsa
+medium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another
+kind of virtue, but things themselves.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36183] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non est necesse in infinitum procedere in virtutibus,
+quia mensura et regula intellectualis virtutis non est aliquod
+aliud genus virtutis, sed ipsa res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other:
+nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end
+of Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another,
+so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we
+have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something
+positive in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary
+to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36184] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ipsae res contrariae non habent contrarietatem in
+anima, quia unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et tamen in
+intellectu est contrarietas affirmationis et negationis, quae sunt
+contraria, ut dicitur in fine peri hermeneias. Quamvis enim esse et
+non esse non sint contraria, sed contradictorie opposita, si
+considerentur ipsa significata prout sunt in rebus, quia alterum
+est ens, et alterum est pure non ens, tamen si referantur ad actum
+animae, utrumque ponit aliquid. Unde esse et non esse sunt
+contradictoria, sed opinio qua opinamur quod bonum est bonum, est
+contraria opinioni qua opinamur quod bonum non est bonum. Et inter
+huiusmodi contraria medium est virtus intellectualis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A4-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 4. Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean.
+Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36185] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus theologica consistat in medio.
+Bonum enim aliarum virtutum consistit in medio. Sed virtus
+theologica excedit in bonitate alias virtutes. Ergo virtus
+theologica multo magis est in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists
+in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q64_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36186] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+medium virtutis accipitur, moralis quidem secundum quod appetitus
+regulatur per rationem; intellectualis vero secundum quod
+intellectus noster mensuratur a re. Sed virtus theologica et
+perficit intellectum, et appetitum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam
+virtus theologica consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course
+between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ,
+we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the
+heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue
+observes the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36187] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+spes quae est virtus theologica, medium est inter desperationem et
+praesumptionem. Similiter etiam fides incedit media inter
+contrarias haereses, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis,
+quod enim confitemur in Christo unam personam et duas naturas,
+medium est inter haeresim Nestorii, qui dicit duas personas et duas
+naturas; et haeresim Eutychis, qui dicit unam personam et unam
+naturam. Ergo virtus theologica consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess
+against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.33" target="asv">Ecclus. 43:33</a>): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not observe
+the mean.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36188] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+in omnibus in quibus consistit virtus in medio, contingit peccare
+per excessum, sicut et per defectum. Sed circa Deum, qui est
+obiectum virtutis theologicae, non contingit peccare per excessum,
+dicitur enim Eccli. XLIII, <i>benedicentes Deum, exaltate illum
+quantum potestis, maior enim est omni laude</i>. Ergo virtus
+theologica non consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that
+rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure
+and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to
+His goodness; hope, according to the
+immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as
+much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in
+such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit.
+</p><p id="FS_Q64_A4-p7"> The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as
+much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition.
+Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 co."><a name="36189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36189] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, medium virtutis accipitur per
+conformitatem ad suam regulam vel mensuram, secundum quod contingit
+ipsam transcendere vel ab ea deficere. Virtutis autem theologicae
+duplex potest accipi mensura. Una quidem secundum ipsam rationem
+virtutis. Et sic mensura et regula virtutis theologicae est ipse
+Deus, fides enim nostra regulatur secundum veritatem divinam,
+caritas autem secundum bonitatem eius, spes autem secundum
+magnitudinem omnipotentiae et pietatis eius. Et ista est mensura
+excellens omnem humanam facultatem, unde nunquam potest homo tantum
+diligere Deum quantum diligi debet, nec tantum credere aut sperare
+in ipsum, quantum debet. Unde multo minus potest ibi esse excessus.
+Et sic bonum talis virtutis non consistit in medio, sed tanto est
+melius, quanto magis acceditur ad summum. Alia vero regula vel
+mensura virtutis theologicae est ex parte nostra, quia etsi non
+possumus ferri in Deum quantum debemus, debemus tamen ferri in
+ipsum credendo, sperando et amando, secundum mensuram nostrae
+conditionis. Unde per accidens potest in virtute theologica
+considerari medium et extrema, ex parte nostra.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded:
+whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36190] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod bonum virtutum intellectualium et moralium
+consistit in medio per conformitatem ad regulam vel mensuram quam
+transcendere contingit. Quod non est in virtutibus theologicis, per
+se loquendo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the
+theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36191] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtutes morales et intellectuales perficiunt
+intellectum et appetitum nostrum in ordine ad mensuram et regulam
+creatam, virtutes autem theologicae in ordine ad mensuram et
+regulam increatam. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous,
+through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which
+according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is
+infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary
+heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion
+itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36192] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod spes est media inter praesumptionem et desperationem,
+ex parte nostra, inquantum scilicet aliquis praesumere dicitur ex
+eo quod sperat a Deo bonum quod excedit suam conditionem; vel non
+sperat quod secundum suam conditionem sperare posset. Non autem
+potest esse superabundantia spei ex parte Dei, cuius bonitas est
+infinita. Similiter etiam fides est media inter contrarias
+haereses, non per comparationem ad obiectum, quod est Deus, cui non
+potest aliquis nimis credere, sed inquantum ipsa opinio humana est
+media inter contrarias opiniones, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q65" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q65-p0.1">Q. 65. OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q65-p2"> We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q65-p3"><a href="#FS_Q65_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p4"><a href="#FS_Q65_A2"> (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p5"><a href="#FS_Q65_A3"> (3) Whether charity can be without them?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p6"><a href="#FS_Q65_A4"> (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p7"><a href="#FS_Q65_A5"> (5) Whether charity can be without them?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 pr."><a name="36193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36193]
+Iª-IIae q. 65 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+connexione virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum
+virtutes morales sint ad invicem connexae. Secundo, utrum virtutes
+morales possint esse sine caritate. Tertio, utrum caritas possit
+esse sine eis. Quarto, utrum fides et spes possint esse sine
+caritate. Quinto, utrum caritas possit esse sine eis.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q65_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A1-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the
+exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising
+himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36194] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non sint ex
+necessitate connexae. Virtutes enim morales quandoque causantur ex
+exercitio actuum, ut probatur in II Ethic. Sed homo potest
+exercitari in actibus alicuius virtutis sine hoc quod exercitetur
+in actibus alterius virtutis. Ergo una virtus moralis potest haberi
+sine altera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence
+or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other
+virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous."
+Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36195] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+magnificentia et magnanimitas sunt quaedam virtutes morales. Sed
+aliquis potest habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habeat
+magnificentiam et magnanimitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in IV
+Ethic., quod inops non potest esse magnificus, qui tamen potest
+habere quasdam alias virtutes; et quod <i>ille qui parvis est
+dignus, et his se dignificat, temperatus est, magnanimus autem non
+est</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt connexae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective
+part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither,
+therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36196] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut virtutes morales perficiunt partem appetitivam animae, ita
+virtutes intellectuales perficiunt partem intellectivam. Sed
+virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae, potest enim aliquis
+habere unam scientiam, sine hoc quod habeat aliam. Ergo etiam neque
+virtutes morales sunt connexae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But
+this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in
+relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making
+certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about
+things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36197] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+si virtutes morales sint connexae, hoc non est nisi quia
+connectuntur in prudentia. Sed hoc non sufficit ad connexionem
+virtutum moralium. Videtur enim quod aliquis possit esse prudens
+circa agibilia quae pertinent ad unam virtutem, sine hoc quod sit
+prudens in his quae pertinent ad aliam, sicut etiam aliquis potest
+habere artem circa quaedam factibilia, sine hoc quod habeat artem
+circa alia. Prudentia autem est recta ratio agibilium. Ergo non est
+necessarium virtutes morales esse connexas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20</a>: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De
+Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral.
+xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest.
+Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having
+one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36198] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, <i>connexae sibi sunt,
+concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet, plures habere
+videatur</i>. Augustinus etiam dicit, in VI de Trin., quod
+<i>virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, nullo modo separantur ab
+invicem</i>. Et Gregorius dicit, XXII Moral., quod <i>una virtus
+sine aliis aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta</i>. Et Tullius
+dicit, in II de Tuscul. quaest., <i>si unam virtutem confessus es
+te non habere, nullam necesse est te habiturum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or
+fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or
+by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament
+or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in
+doing deeds of chastity.
+</p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p8"> But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way,
+we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding
+to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by
+saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude,
+in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength
+of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is
+the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue,
+"if
+isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to
+speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf.
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A4" id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[61], A[4]</a>, OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).
+</p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p9"> Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the
+reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q65_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective
+habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue,
+but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands
+in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since
+prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to
+which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the
+understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly
+that the moral virtues are connected with one another.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 co."><a name="36199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36199] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtus moralis potest accipi vel perfecta vel
+imperfecta. Imperfecta quidem moralis virtus, ut temperantia vel
+fortitudo, nihil aliud est quam aliqua inclinatio in nobis existens
+ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum, sive talis inclinatio
+sit in nobis a natura, sive ex assuetudine. Et hoc modo accipiendo
+virtutes morales, non sunt connexae, videmus enim aliquem ex
+naturali complexione, vel ex aliqua consuetudine, esse promptum ad
+opera liberalitatis, qui tamen non est promptus ad opera
+castitatis. Perfecta autem virtus moralis est habitus inclinans in
+bonum opus bene agendum. Et sic accipiendo virtutes morales,
+dicendum est eas connexas esse; ut fere ab omnibus ponitur. Cuius
+ratio duplex assignatur, secundum quod diversimode aliqui virtutes
+cardinales distinguunt. Ut enim dictum est, quidam distinguunt eas
+secundum quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, utpote quod
+discretio pertineat ad prudentiam, rectitudo ad iustitiam,
+moderantia ad temperantiam, firmitas animi ad fortitudinem, in
+quacumque materia ista considerentur. Et secundum hoc, manifeste
+apparet ratio connexionis, non enim firmitas habet laudem virtutis,
+si sit sine moderatione, vel rectitudine, aut discretione; et eadem
+ratio est de aliis. Et hanc rationem connexionis assignat
+Gregorius, XXII Moral., dicens quod <i>virtutes, si sint
+disiunctae, non possunt esse perfectae</i>, secundum rationem
+virtutis, <i>quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et
+fortis non est</i>; et idem subdit de aliis virtutibus. Et similem
+rationem assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin. Alii vero distinguunt
+praedictas virtutes secundum materias. Et secundum hoc assignatur
+ratio connexionis ab Aristotele, in VI Ethic. Quia sicut supra
+dictum est, nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi, eo
+quod proprium virtutis moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum
+sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem electionem non solum
+sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem, quod est directe per habitum
+virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae
+sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et
+iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem. Similiter etiam
+prudentia non potest haberi nisi habeantur virtutes morales, cum
+prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, quae, sicut ex principiis,
+procedit ex finibus agibilium, ad quos aliquis recte se habet per
+virtutes morales. Unde sicut scientia speculativa non potest haberi
+sine intellectu principiorum, ita nec prudentia sine virtutibus
+moralibus. Ex quo manifeste sequitur virtutes morales esse
+connexas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be
+done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues.
+And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if
+he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to
+another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a
+certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which
+is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue,
+if prudence be lacking.
+</p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p11"> But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity;
+and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have
+the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless,
+when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because
+when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of
+money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study,
+acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having
+a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which
+is
+scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36200] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem
+secundum communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in
+omni vita hominum occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul
+exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem
+circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquiret habitus omnium
+virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando circa unam
+materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras,
+non autem circa concupiscentias; acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad
+refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter
+defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur. Sicut
+etiam naturales inclinationes non habent perfectam rationem
+virtutis, si prudentia desit. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt
+quae perficiunt hominem secundum aliquem eminentem statum, sicut
+magnificentia, et magnanimitas. Et quia exercitium circa materias
+harum virtutum non occurrit unicuique communiter, potest aliquis
+habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habitus harum virtutum
+habeat actu, loquendo de virtutibus acquisitis. Sed tamen,
+acquisitis aliis virtutibus, habet istas virtutes in potentia
+propinqua. Cum enim aliquis per exercitium adeptus est
+liberalitatem circa mediocres donationes et sumptus, si superveniat
+ei abundantia pecuniarum, modico exercitio acquiret magnificentiae
+habitum, sicut geometer modico studio acquirit scientiam alicuius
+conclusionis quam nunquam consideravit. Illud autem habere dicimur,
+quod in promptu est ut habeamus; secundum illud philosophi, in II
+Physic., <i>quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36201] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various
+sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about
+passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial
+passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure
+and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions.
+Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.
+</p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p14"> Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend
+on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal
+principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are
+the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the
+appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A5" id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.2" shape="rect"> Q[58], A[5]</a>, ad 1).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36202] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales sunt circa diversas materias
+ad invicem non ordinatas, sicut patet in diversis scientiis et
+artibus. Et ideo non invenitur in eis connexio quae invenitur in
+virtutibus moralibus existentibus circa passiones et operationes,
+quae manifeste habent ordinem ad invicem. Nam omnes passiones, a
+quibusdam primis procedentes, scilicet amore et odio, ad quasdam
+alias terminantur, scilicet delectationem et tristitiam. Et
+similiter omnes operationes quae sunt virtutis moralis materia,
+habent ordinem ad invicem, et etiam ad passiones. Et ideo tota
+materia moralium virtutum sub una ratione prudentiae cadit. Habent
+tamen omnia intelligibilia ordinem ad prima principia. Et secundum
+hoc, omnes virtutes intellectuales dependent ab intellectu
+principiorum; sicut prudentia a virtutibus moralibus, ut dictum
+est. Principia autem universalia, quorum est intellectus
+principiorum, non dependent a conclusionibus, de quibus sunt
+reliquae intellectuales virtutes; sicut morales dependent a
+prudentia, eo quod appetitus movet quodammodo rationem, et ratio
+appetitum, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the
+principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in
+another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong
+about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the
+science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related
+to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things
+to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36203] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod ea ad quae inclinant virtutes morales, se habent ad
+prudentiam sicut principia, non autem factibilia se habent ad artem
+sicut principia, sed solum sicut materia. Manifestum est autem
+quod, etsi ratio possit esse recta in una parte materiae, et non in
+alia; nullo tamen modo potest dici ratio recta, si sit defectus
+cuiuscumque principii. Sicut si quis erraret circa hoc principium,
+omne totum est maius sua parte, non posset habere scientiam
+geometricam, quia oporteret multum recedere a veritate in
+sequentibus. Et praeterea, agibilia sunt ordinata ad invicem; non
+autem factibilia, ut dictum est. Et ideo defectus prudentiae circa
+unam partem agibilium, induceret defectum etiam circa alia
+agibilia. Quod in factibilibus non contingit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A2-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 2. Whether moral virtues can be without charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every
+virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same
+book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36204] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales possint esse sine
+caritate. Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, quod
+<i>omnis virtus praeter caritatem, potest esse communis bonis et
+malis</i>. Sed caritas non potest esse nisi in bonis, ut dicitur
+ibidem. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt haberi sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had
+otherwise than by infusion, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have
+the other virtues without charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36205] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes morales possunt acquiri ex actibus humanis, ut dicitur in
+II Ethic. Sed caritas non habetur nisi ex infusione; secundum illud
+Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum
+sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt
+haberi sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence;
+indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and
+can be without it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36206] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes morales connectuntur ad invicem, inquantum dependent a
+prudentia. Sed caritas non dependet a prudentia; immo prudentiam
+excedit, secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>supereminentem scientiae
+caritatem Christi</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non connectuntur
+caritati, sed sine ea esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.14" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:14</a>): "He that loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is "by them" that
+"we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36207] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>qui non diligit, manet in
+morte</i>. Sed per virtutes perficitur vita spiritualis, ipsae enim
+sunt quibus recte vivitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Lib.
+Arbit. Ergo non possunt esse sine dilectione caritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce
+good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can
+be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a
+supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot
+be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q65_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[58], AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues,
+because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now
+for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed
+towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is
+the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle,
+that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be
+without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.
+</p><p id="FS_Q65_A2-p7"> It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues
+simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues
+in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action,
+but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on
+the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 co."><a name="36208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36208] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales prout sunt
+operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem
+naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic
+acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis
+gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad
+ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem
+virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a
+Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt.
+Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse
+sine prudentia; prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus
+moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad
+quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae. Ad rectam autem
+rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat
+circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios
+fines, quod fit per virtutes morales, sicut ratio recta in
+speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod
+est contradictoria non simul esse vera. Unde manifestum fit quod
+nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine caritate; nec aliae virtutes
+morales consequenter, quae sine prudentia esse non possunt. Patet
+igitur ex dictis quod solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et
+simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem
+ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt
+secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter, ordinant enim
+hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem
+respectu finis ultimi simpliciter. Unde Rom. XIV super illud,
+<i>omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, dicit Glossa
+Augustini, <i>ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam
+in bonis moribus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor
+good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36209] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtutes ibi accipiuntur secundum imperfectam
+rationem virtutis. Alioquin, si virtus moralis secundum perfectam
+rationem virtutis accipiatur, bonum facit habentem; et per
+consequens in malis esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36210] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtutibus moralibus
+acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the
+infused moral virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36211] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, etsi caritas excedat scientiam et prudentiam, tamen
+prudentia dependet a caritate, ut dictum est. Et per consequens,
+omnes virtutes morales infusae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A3-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 3. Whether charity can be without moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is
+superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4, </a> seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36212] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas sine aliis virtutibus
+moralibus haberi possit. Ad id enim ad quod sufficit unum,
+indebitum est quod plura ordinentur. Sed sola caritas sufficit ad
+omnia opera virtutis implenda, ut patet per id quod dicitur I ad
+Cor. XIII, <i>caritas patiens est, benigna est,</i> et cetera. Ergo
+videtur quod, habita caritate, aliae virtutes superfluerent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for
+their own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from
+mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake,
+but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36213] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt
+virtutis, et ei secundum se placent, unde et signum habitus est
+delectatio quae fit in opere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed multi
+habent caritatem, absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen
+difficultatem in operibus virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se
+placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad caritatem. Ergo
+multi habent caritatem, qui non habent alias virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says
+(on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.10" target="asv"> Lk. 17:10</a>) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have.
+Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36214] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+caritas in omnibus sanctis invenitur. Sed quidam sunt sancti qui
+tamen aliquibus virtutibus carent, dicit enim Beda quod sancti
+magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam de virtutibus
+quas habent, glorientur. Ergo non est necessarium quod qui habet
+caritatem, omnes virtutes morales habeat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all
+the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that
+has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi
+de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36215] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod per caritatem tota lex impletur, dicitur enim Rom. XIII,
+<i>qui diligit proximum, legem implevit</i>. Sed tota lex impleri
+non potest nisi per omnes virtutes morales, quia lex praecipit de
+omnibus actibus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo qui habet
+caritatem, habet omnes virtutes morales. Augustinus etiam dicit, in
+quadam epistola, quod caritas includit in se omnes virtutes
+cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works
+of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain
+works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the
+actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as
+it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the
+moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind
+of good work.
+</p><p id="FS_Q65_A3-p7"> It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity:
+and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 co."><a name="36216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36216] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod cum caritate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes
+morales. Cuius ratio est quia Deus non minus perfecte operatur in
+operibus gratiae, quam in operibus naturae. Sic autem videmus in
+operibus naturae, quod non invenitur principium aliquorum operum in
+aliqua re, quin inveniantur in ea quae sunt necessaria ad huiusmodi
+opera perficienda, sicut in animalibus inveniuntur organa quibus
+perfici possunt opera ad quae peragenda anima habet potestatem.
+Manifestum est autem quod caritas, inquantum ordinat hominem ad
+finem ultimum, est principium omnium bonorum operum quae in finem
+ultimum ordinari possunt. Unde oportet quod cum caritate simul
+infundantur omnes virtutes morales, quibus homo perficit singula
+genera bonorum operum. Et sic patet quod virtutes morales infusae
+non solum habent connexionem propter prudentiam; sed etiam propter
+caritatem. Et quod qui amittit caritatem per peccatum mortale,
+amittit omnes virtutes morales infusas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower
+power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well
+disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him
+well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is
+referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that
+are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36217] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ad hoc quod actus inferioris potentiae sit
+perfectus, requiritur quod non solum adsit perfectio in superiori
+potentia, sed etiam in inferiori, si enim principale agens debito
+modo se haberet, non sequeretur actio perfecta, si instrumentum non
+esset bene dispositum. Unde oportet ad hoc quod homo bene operetur
+in his quae sunt ad finem, quod non solum habeat virtutem qua bene
+se habeat circa finem, sed etiam virtutes quibus bene se habeat
+circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nam virtus quae est circa finem, se
+habet ut principalis et motiva respectu earum quae sunt ad finem.
+Et ideo cum caritate necesse est etiam habere alias virtutes
+morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently
+feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a
+habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of
+moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary
+dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the
+repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36218] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis habens habitum,
+patitur difficultatem in operando, et per consequens non sentit
+delectationem et complacentiam in actu, propter aliquod
+impedimentum extrinsecus superveniens, sicut ille qui habet habitum
+scientiae, patitur difficultatem in intelligendo, propter
+somnolentiam vel aliquam infirmitatem. Et similiter habitus
+moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum difficultatem in
+operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex
+praecedentibus actibus relictas. Quae quidem difficultas non ita
+accidit in virtutibus moralibus acquisitis, quia per exercitium
+actuum, quo acquiruntur, tolluntur etiam contrariae
+dispositiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues,
+for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36219] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aliqui sancti dicuntur aliquas virtutes non habere,
+inquantum patiuntur difficultatem in actibus earum, ratione iam
+dicta; quamvis habitus omnium virtutum habeant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A4-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 4. Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be
+more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore
+can faith and hope be without charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36220] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides et spes nunquam sint sine
+caritate. Cum enim sint virtutes theologicae, digniores esse
+videntur virtutibus moralibus, etiam infusis. Sed virtutes morales
+infusae non possunt esse sine caritate. Ergo neque fides et
+spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection
+thereof, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q65_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36221] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus credit nisi volens, sed caritas est in voluntate ut
+Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Sicut perfectio eius, ut supra dictum
+est. Ergo fides non potest esse sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this
+love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36222] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>spes sine amore esse non
+potest</i>. Amor autem est caritas, de hoc enim amore ibi loquitur.
+Ergo spes non potest esse sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore
+faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36223] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Matth. I, dicitur in Glossa quod <i>fides generat spem,
+spes vero caritatem</i>. Sed generans est prius generato, et potest
+esse sine eo. Ergo fides potest esse sine spe; et spes sine
+caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete
+virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing
+a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done
+is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that
+is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does
+is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result
+of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.
+</p><p id="FS_Q65_A4-p7"> Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue
+without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own
+free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which
+perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be
+without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act
+is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through
+merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is
+possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues
+properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we
+should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 co."><a name="36224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36224] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod fides et spes, sicut et virtutes morales, dupliciter
+considerari possunt. Uno modo, secundum inchoationem quandam; alio
+modo, secundum perfectum esse virtutis. Cum enim virtus ordinetur
+ad bonum opus agendum, virtus quidem perfecta dicitur ex hoc quod
+potest in opus perfecte bonum, quod quidem est dum non solum bonum
+est quod fit, sed etiam bene fit. Alioquin, si bonum sit quod fit,
+non autem bene fiat, non erit perfecte bonum, unde nec habitus qui
+est talis operis principium, habebit perfecte rationem virtutis.
+Sicut si aliquis operetur iusta, bonum quidem facit, sed non erit
+opus perfectae virtutis, nisi hoc bene faciat, idest secundum
+electionem rectam, quod est per prudentiam, et ideo iustitia sine
+prudentia non potest esse virtus perfecta. Sic igitur fides et spes
+sine caritate possunt quidem aliqualiter esse, perfectae autem
+virtutis rationem sine caritate non habent. Cum enim fidei opus sit
+credere Deo; credere autem sit alicui propria voluntate assentire,
+si non debito modo velit, non erit fidei opus perfectum. Quod autem
+debito modo velit, hoc est per caritatem, quae perficit voluntatem,
+omnis enim rectus motus voluntatis ex recto amore procedit, ut
+Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur fides est quidem
+sine caritate, sed non perfecta virtus, sicut temperantia vel
+fortitudo sine prudentia. Et similiter dicendum est de spe. Nam
+actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo. Qui quidem
+actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quae quis habet, quod non
+potest esse sine caritate. Si autem hoc expectet ex meritis quae
+nondum habet, sed proponit in futurum acquirere, erit actus
+imperfectus, et hoc potest esse sine caritate. Et ideo fides et
+spes possunt esse sine caritate, sed sine caritate, proprie
+loquendo, virtutes non sunt; nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut
+non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene, ut
+dicitur in II Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves
+the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not
+depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity,
+as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36225] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia,
+prudentia autem infusa nec rationem prudentiae habere potest absque
+caritate, utpote deficiente debita habitudine ad primum principium,
+quod est ultimus finis. Fides autem et spes, secundum proprias
+rationes, nec a prudentia nec a caritate dependent. Et ideo sine
+caritate esse possunt; licet non sint virtutes sine caritate, ut
+dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36226] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fide quae habet perfectam
+rationem virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this
+is not without charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36227] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de spe, secundum quod aliquis
+expectat futuram beatitudinem per merita quae iam habet, quod non
+est sine caritate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A5-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 5. Whether charity can be without faith and hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love
+God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36228] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas possit esse sine fide et spe.
+Caritas enim est amor Dei. Sed Deus potest a nobis amari
+naturaliter, etiam non praesupposita fide, vel spe futurae
+beatitudinis. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without
+faith and hope, and the other virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36229] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in
+caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Sed radix aliquando est sine
+ramis. Ergo caritas potest esse aliquando sine fide et spe et aliis
+virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor,
+as we shall explain further on (
+<a href="TP_ii.html#TP_Q7_A3" id="FS_Q65_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">TP, Q[7], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36230] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+in Christo fuit perfecta caritas. Ipse tamen non habuit fidem et
+spem, quia fuit perfectus comprehensor, ut infra dicetur. Ergo
+caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.17" target="asv"> Prov. 8:17</a>: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.3" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36231] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, <i>sine fide impossibile est
+placere Deo</i>; quod maxime pertinet ad caritatem, ut patet;
+secundum illud Proverb. VIII, <i>ego diligentes me diligo</i>. Spes
+etiam est quae introducit ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
+caritas non potest haberi sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain
+mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident
+from
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:9, </a> where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the
+fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun
+here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and
+hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility
+of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as
+to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite
+impossible without faith and hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 co."><a name="36232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36232] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam
+amicitiam quandam ad ipsum; quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam
+redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione, ut dicitur in VIII
+Ethic. Et quod hoc ad caritatem pertineat, patet per id quod
+dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus
+in eo</i>. Et I ad Cor. I dicitur, <i>fidelis Deus, per quem vocati
+estis in societatem filii eius</i>. Haec autem societas hominis ad
+Deum, quae est quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur
+quidem hic in praesenti per gratiam, perficietur autem in futuro
+per gloriam, quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut
+aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel
+desperaret se posse habere aliquam societatem vel familiarem
+conversationem cum ipso; ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad
+Deum, quae est caritas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat
+huiusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret
+se ad hanc societatem pertinere. Et sic caritas sine fide et spe
+nullo modo esse potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object
+we are directed by faith and hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36233] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod caritas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor
+Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis obiectum, ad quod ordinamur per
+fidem et spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are
+the precursors of charity, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q65_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>), and so charity is impossible without them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36234] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod caritas est radix fidei et spei, inquantum dat eis
+perfectionem virtutis. Sed fides et spes, secundum rationem
+propriam, praesupponuntur ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Et sic
+caritas sine eis esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest
+vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A3" id="FS_Q65_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">, Q[4], A[3]</a>]: so that in Him was perfect charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36235] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Christo defuit fides et spes, propter id quod est
+imperfectionis in eis. Sed loco fidei, habuit apertam visionem; et
+loco spei, plenam comprehensionem. Et sic fuit perfecta caritas in
+eo.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q66" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q66-p0.1">Q. 66. OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q66-p2"> We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q66-p3"><a href="#FS_Q66_A1"> (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p4"><a href="#FS_Q66_A2"> (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p5"><a href="#FS_Q66_A3"> (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p6"><a href="#FS_Q66_A4"> (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p7"><a href="#FS_Q66_A5"> (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p8"><a href="#FS_Q66_A6"> (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 pr."><a name="36236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36236]
+Iª-IIae q. 66 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+aequalitate virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum
+virtus possit esse maior vel minor. Secundo, utrum omnes virtutes
+simul in eodem existentes, sint aequales. Tertio, de comparatione
+virtutum moralium ad intellectuales. Quarto, de comparatione
+virtutum moralium ad invicem. Quinto, de comparatione virtutum
+intellectualium ad invicem. Sexto, de comparatione virtutum
+theologicarum ad invicem.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q66_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A1-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 1. Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.16" target="asv">Apoc. 21:16</a>) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues
+are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36237] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior vel
+minor. Dicitur enim in Apoc. XXI, quod latera civitatis Ierusalem
+sunt aequalia. Per haec autem significantur virtutes, ut Glossa
+dicit ibidem. Ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. Non ergo potest
+esse virtus maior virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in
+a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib.
+Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue
+cannot be greater or less than another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36238] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne illud cuius ratio consistit in maximo, non potest esse maius
+vel minus. Sed ratio virtutis consistit in maximo, est enim virtus
+ultimum potentiae, ut philosophus dicit in I de caelo; et
+Augustinus etiam dicit, in II de Lib. Arb., quod <i>virtutes sunt
+maxima bona, quibus nullus potest male uti</i>. Ergo videtur quod
+virtus non possit esse maior neque minor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God
+Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36239] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quantitas effectus pensatur secundum virtutem agentis. Sed virtutes
+perfectae, quae sunt virtutes infusae, sunt a Deo, cuius virtus est
+uniformis et infinita. Ergo videtur quod virtus non possit esse
+maior virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and
+increase: for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20</a>): "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven":
+and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv">Prov. 15:5</a>): "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or
+less than another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36240] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+ubicumque potest esse augmentum et superabundantia, potest esse
+inaequalitas. Sed in virtutibus invenitur superabundantia et
+augmentum, dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>nisi abundaverit iustitia
+vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in
+regnum caelorum</i>; et Proverb. XV dicitur, <i>in abundanti
+iustitia virtus maxima est</i>. Ergo videtur quod virtus possit
+esse maior vel minor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying
+to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always
+more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from
+what has been said (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[61],
+A[2]
+</a>) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the
+other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better
+than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining
+moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the
+concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6.
+</p><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p7"> The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was
+said above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q66_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[1]</a> ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself;
+secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little,
+according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a
+virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art:
+for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius
+states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature
+of virtue consists in a maximum.
+</p><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p8"> If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different
+times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined
+by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning
+judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of
+the giving of Christ," as stated in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.9" target="asv"> Eph. 4:9.</a> And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed
+to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were
+an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6.
+Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly
+and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 co."><a name="36241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36241] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod cum quaeritur utrum virtus una possit esse maior
+alia, dupliciter intelligi potest quaestio. Uno modo, in virtutibus
+specie differentibus. Et sic manifestum est quod una virtus est
+alia maior. Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu, et in
+effectibus, tanto aliquid est potius, quanto est causae
+propinquius. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod causa et radix
+humani boni est ratio. Et ideo prudentia, quae perficit rationem,
+praefertur in bonitate aliis virtutibus moralibus, perficientibus
+vim appetitivam inquantum participat rationem. Et in his etiam
+tanto est una altera melior, quanto magis ad rationem accedit. Unde
+et iustitia, quae est in voluntate, praefertur aliis virtutibus
+moralibus, et fortitudo, quae est in irascibili, praefertur
+temperantiae, quae est in concupiscibili, quae minus participat
+rationem, ut patet in VII Ethic. Alio modo potest intelligi
+quaestio in virtute eiusdem speciei. Et sic, secundum ea quae dicta
+sunt supra, cum de intensionibus habituum ageretur, virtus potest
+dupliciter dici maior et minor, uno modo, secundum seipsam; alio
+modo, ex parte participantis subiecti. Si igitur secundum seipsam
+consideretur, magnitudo vel parvitas eius attenditur secundum ea ad
+quae se extendit. Quicumque autem habet aliquam virtutem, puta
+temperantiam, habet ipsam quantum ad omnia ad quae se temperantia
+extendit. Quod de scientia et arte non contingit, non enim
+quicumque est grammaticus, scit omnia quae ad grammaticam
+pertinent. Et secundum hoc bene dixerunt Stoici, ut Simplicius
+dicit in commento praedicamentorum, quod virtus non recipit magis
+et minus, sicut scientia vel ars; eo quod ratio virtutis consistit
+in maximo. Si vero consideretur virtus ex parte subiecti
+participantis, sic contingit virtutem esse maiorem vel minorem,
+sive secundum diversa tempora, in eodem; sive in diversis
+hominibus. Quia ad attingendum medium virtutis, quod est secundum
+rationem rectam, unus est melius dispositus quam alius, vel propter
+maiorem assuetudinem, vel propter meliorem dispositionem naturae,
+vel propter perspicacius iudicium rationis, aut etiam propter maius
+gratiae donum, quod unicuique donatur secundum mensuram donationis
+Christi, ut dicitur ad Ephes. IV. Et in hoc deficiebant Stoici,
+aestimantes nullum esse virtuosum dicendum, nisi qui summe fuerit
+dispositus ad virtutem. Non enim exigitur ad rationem virtutis,
+quod attingat rectae rationis medium in indivisibili, sicut Stoici
+putabant, sed sufficit prope medium esse, ut in II Ethic. dicitur.
+Idem etiam indivisibile signum unus propinquius et promptius
+attingit quam alius, sicut etiam patet in sagittatoribus
+trahentibus ad certum signum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we
+shall see further on
+<a href="#FS_Q66_A2" id="FS_Q66_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36242] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod aequalitas illa non est secundum quantitatem
+absolutam, sed est secundum proportionem intelligenda, quia omnes
+virtutes proportionaliter crescunt in homine, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained above:
+since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36243] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illud ultimum quod pertinet ad virtutem, potest
+habere rationem magis vel minus boni secundum praedictos modos, cum
+non sit ultimum indivisibile, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures
+of virtue, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv"> Eph. 4:7</a>: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36244] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Deus non operatur secundum necessitatem naturae, sed
+secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, secundum quam diversam mensuram
+virtutis hominibus largitur, secundum illud ad Ephes. IV,
+<i>unicuique vestrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis
+Christi</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A2-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 2. Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:7</a>): "Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that." Now one gift would not be more
+proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are
+not all equal in one and the same man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36245] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes virtutes in uno et eodem
+sint aequaliter intensae. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII,
+<i>unusquisque habet proprium donum a Deo, alius quidem sic, alius
+autem sic</i>. Non esset autem unum donum magis proprium alicui
+quam aliud, si omnes virtutes dono Dei infusas quilibet aequaliter
+haberet. Ergo videtur quod non omnes virtutes sint aequales in uno
+et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another
+in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised
+for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4" target="asv">Rom. 4</a>), Moses for his meekness (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Num.7.3" target="asv">Num. 7:3</a>), Job for his patience (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Tob.2.12" target="asv">Tob. 2:12</a>). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings:
+"There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)],
+since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36246] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+si omnes virtutes essent aeque intensae in uno et eodem, sequeretur
+quod quicumque excederet aliquem in una virtute, excederet ipsum in
+omnibus aliis virtutibus. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, quia diversi
+sancti de diversis virtutibus praecipue laudantur; sicut Abraham de
+fide, Moyses de mansuetudine, Iob de patientia. Unde et de quolibet
+confessore cantatur in Ecclesia, <i>non est inventus similis illi,
+qui conservaret legem excelsi</i>; eo quod quilibet habuit
+praerogativam alicuius virtutis. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt
+aequales in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows
+that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in
+one and the same man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36247] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quanto habitus est intensior, tanto homo secundum ipsum
+delectabilius et promptius operatur. Sed experimento patet quod
+unus homo delectabilius et promptius operatur actum unius virtutis
+quam actum alterius. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales in uno
+et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on.
+Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36248] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod <i>quicumque sunt
+aequales in fortitudine, aequales sunt in prudentia et
+temperantia</i>; et sic de aliis. Hoc autem non esset, nisi omnes
+virtutes unius hominis essent aequales. Ergo omnes virtutes unius
+hominis sunt aequales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As explained above
+<a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in
+this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly,
+it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss
+in its subject. In this sense all
+the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers
+are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.
+</p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p7"> Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues
+is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these
+four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this
+way
+virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind
+of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than
+the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude,
+since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all
+in
+the same way."
+</p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p8"> The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper
+respective matters (
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[65] , AA[1]</a>,2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and
+not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can
+also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the
+same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right
+reason in each matter of virtue.
+</p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p9"> But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier
+to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again
+by the grace of God.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 co."><a name="36249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36249] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod quantitas virtutum, sicut ex dictis patet, potest
+attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem speciei. Et sic non
+est dubium quod una virtus unius hominis sit maior quam alia, sicut
+caritas fide et spe. Alio modo potest attendi secundum
+participationem subiecti, prout scilicet intenditur vel remittitur
+in subiecto. Et secundum hoc, omnes virtutes unius hominis sunt
+aequales quadam aequalitate proportionis, inquantum aequaliter
+crescunt in homine, sicut digiti manus sunt inaequales secundum
+quantitatem, sed sunt aequales secundum proportionem, cum
+proportionaliter augeantur. Huiusmodi autem aequalitatis oportet
+eodem modo rationem accipere, sicut et connexionis, aequalitas enim
+est quaedam connexio virtutum secundum quantitatem. Dictum est
+autem supra quod ratio connexionis virtutum dupliciter assignari
+potest. Uno modo, secundum intellectum eorum qui intelligunt per
+has quatuor virtutes, quatuor conditiones generales virtutum,
+quarum una simul invenitur cum aliis in qualibet materia. Et sic
+virtus in qualibet materia non potest aequalis dici, nisi habeat
+omnes istas conditiones aequales. Et hanc rationem aequalitatis
+virtutum assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin., dicens, <i>si dixeris
+aequales esse istos fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia;
+sequitur quod huius fortitudo minus prudens sit. Ac per hoc, nec
+fortitudine aequales sunt, quando est illius fortitudo prudentior.
+Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem
+consideratione percurras</i>. Alio modo assignata est ratio
+connexionis virtutum secundum eos qui intelligunt huiusmodi
+virtutes habere materias determinatas. Et secundum hoc, ratio
+connexionis virtutum moralium accipitur ex parte prudentiae, et ex
+parte caritatis quantum ad virtutes infusas, non autem ex parte
+inclinationis, quae est ex parte subiecti, ut supra dictum est. Sic
+igitur et ratio aequalitatis virtutum potest accipi ex parte
+prudentiae, quantum ad id quod est formale in omnibus virtutibus
+moralibus, existente enim ratione aequaliter perfecta in uno et
+eodem, oportet quod proportionaliter secundum rationem rectam
+medium constituatur in qualibet materia virtutum. Quantum vero ad
+id quod est materiale in virtutibus moralibus, scilicet
+inclinationem ipsam ad actum virtutis; potest esse unus homo magis
+promptus ad actum unius virtutis quam ad actum alterius, vel ex
+natura, vel ex consuetudine, vel etiam ex gratiae dono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all
+of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of
+which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence,
+or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36250] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli potest intelligi de donis
+gratiae gratis datae, quae non sunt communia omnibus, nec omnia
+aequalia in uno et eodem. Vel potest dici quod refertur ad mensuram
+gratiae gratum facientis; secundum quam unus abundat in omnibus
+virtutibus plus quam alius, propter maiorem abundantiam prudentiae,
+vel etiam caritatis, in qua connectuntur omnes virtutes
+infusae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness
+for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36251] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod unus sanctus laudatur praecipue de una virtute, et
+alius de alia, propter excellentiorem promptitudinem ad actum unius
+virtutis, quam ad actum alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b>  This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36252] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc
+etiam patet responsio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A3-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 3. Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting,
+is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and,
+moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36253] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales praeemineant
+intellectualibus. Quod enim magis est necessarium, et permanentius,
+est melius. Sed virtutes morales sunt permanentiores etiam
+disciplinis, quae sunt virtutes intellectuales, et sunt etiam magis
+necessariae ad vitam humanam. Ergo sunt praeferendae virtutibus
+intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue,
+and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual
+virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36254] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+de ratione virtutis est quod bonum faciat habentem. Sed secundum
+virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus, non autem secundum virtutes
+intellectuales, nisi forte secundum solam prudentiam. Ergo virtus
+moralis est melior quam intellectualis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of
+the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which
+is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36255] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+finis est nobilior his quae sunt ad finem. Sed sicut dicitur in VI
+Ethic., <i>virtus moralis facit rectam intentionem finis; prudentia
+autem facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem</i>. Ergo
+virtus moralis est nobilior prudentia, quae est virtus
+intellectualis circa moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially
+rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore
+intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36256] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+virtus moralis est in rationali per participationem; virtus autem
+intellectualis in rationali per essentiam, sicut dicitur in I
+Ethic. Sed rationale per essentiam est nobilius quam rationale per
+participationem. Ergo virtus intellectualis est nobilior virtute
+morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something
+from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle,
+Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes
+its species from its object, as explained above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the
+object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal,
+while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply,
+the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues,
+which perfect the appetite.
+</p><p id="FS_Q66_A3-p7"> But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to
+move the other powers to act, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q66_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power,
+it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues
+are more excellent
+habits, simply speaking.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 co."><a name="36257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36257] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliquid potest dici maius vel minus, dupliciter, uno
+modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Nihil enim prohibet
+aliquid esse melius simpliciter, ut philosophari quam ditari, quod
+tamen non est melius secundum quid, idest necessitatem patienti.
+Simpliciter autem consideratur unumquodque, quando consideratur
+secundum propriam rationem suae speciei. Habet autem virtus speciem
+ex obiecto, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, illa
+virtus nobilior est quae habet nobilius obiectum. Manifestum est
+autem quod obiectum rationis est nobilius quam obiectum appetitus,
+ratio enim apprehendit aliquid in universali; sed appetitus tendit
+in res, quae habent esse particulare. Unde, simpliciter loquendo,
+virtutes intellectuales, quae perficiunt rationem, sunt nobiliores
+quam morales, quae perficiunt appetitum. Sed si consideretur virtus
+in ordine ad actum, sic virtus moralis, quae perficit appetitum,
+cuius est movere alias potentias ad actum, ut supra dictum est,
+nobilior est. Et quia virtus dicitur ex eo quod est principium
+alicuius actus, cum sit perfectio potentiae, sequitur etiam quod
+ratio virtutis magis competat virtutibus moralibus quam virtutibus
+intellectualibus, quamvis virtutes intellectuales sint nobiliores
+habitus simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the
+life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting
+than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary
+for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively.
+Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful
+thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness
+which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A6" id="FS_Q66_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[6]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36258] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales sunt magis permanentes quam
+intellectuales, propter exercitium earum in his quae pertinent ad
+vitam communem. Sed manifestum est quod obiecta disciplinarum, quae
+sunt necessaria et semper eodem modo se habentia, sunt
+permanentiora quam obiecta virtutum moralium, quae sunt quaedam
+particularia agibilia. Quod autem virtutes morales sunt magis
+necessariae ad vitam humanam, non ostendit eas esse nobiliores
+simpliciter, sed quoad hoc. Quinimmo virtutes intellectuales
+speculativae, ex hoc ipso quod non ordinantur ad aliud sicut utile
+ordinatur ad finem, sunt digniores. Hoc enim contingit quia
+secundum eas quodammodo inchoatur in nobis beatitudo, quae
+consistit in cognitione veritatis, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because
+the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q66_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36259] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus
+simpliciter, et non secundum intellectuales, ea ratione, quia
+appetitus movet alias potentias ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est.
+Unde per hoc etiam non probatur nisi quod virtus moralis sit melior
+secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each
+moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling
+of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36260] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in
+eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem.
+Est autem finis uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis attingere medium in
+propria materia, quod quidem medium determinatur secundum rectam
+rationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in II et VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A4-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 4. Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what
+is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than
+justice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36261] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia non sit praecipua inter
+virtutes morales. Maius enim est dare alicui de proprio, quam
+reddere alicui quod ei debetur. Sed primum pertinet ad
+liberalitatem; secundum autem ad iustitiam. Ergo videtur quod
+liberalitas sit maior virtus quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> Jam. 1:4, </a> "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36262] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+illud videtur esse maximum in unoquoque, quod est perfectissimum in
+ipso. Sed sicut dicitur Iac. I, <i>patientia opus perfectum
+habet</i>. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit maior quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice.
+Therefore it is greater than justice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36263] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a>
+<i>Praeterea, magnanimitas operatur magnum, in omnibus
+virtutibus</i>, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnificat etiam ipsam
+iustitiam. Est igitur maior quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36264] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod <i>iustitia est
+praeclarissima virtutum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply,
+whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q66_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by
+considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite,
+as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order
+not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among
+the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected
+to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is
+life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters
+of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice.
+Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue
+is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e.
+fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance,
+which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species,
+viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence
+also.
+</p><p id="FS_Q66_A4-p7"> A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is
+more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far
+as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 co."><a name="36265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36265] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtus aliqua secundum suam speciem potest dici maior
+vel minor, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem
+virtus dicitur maior, secundum quod in ea maius bonum rationis
+relucet, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, iustitia inter omnes
+virtutes morales praecellit, tanquam propinquior rationi. Quod
+patet et ex subiecto, et ex obiecto. Ex subiecto quidem, quia est
+in voluntate sicut in subiecto, voluntas autem est appetitus
+rationalis, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum autem obiectum sive
+materiam, quia est circa operationes, quibus homo ordinatur non
+solum in seipso, sed etiam ad alterum. Unde iustitia est
+praeclarissima virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Inter alias autem
+virtutes morales, quae sunt circa passiones, tanto in unaquaque
+magis relucet rationis bonum, quanto circa maiora motus appetitivus
+subditur rationi. Maximum autem in his quae ad hominem pertinent,
+est vita, a qua omnia alia dependent. Et ideo fortitudo, quae
+appetitivum motum subdit rationi in his quae ad mortem et vitam
+pertinent, primum locum tenet inter virtutes morales quae sunt
+circa passiones, tamen ordinatur infra iustitiam. Unde philosophus
+dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod <i>necesse est maximas esse virtutes,
+quae sunt aliis honoratissimae, siquidem est virtus potentia
+benefactiva. Propter hoc, fortes et iustos maxime honorant, haec
+quidem enim in bello, scilicet fortitudo; haec autem, scilicet
+iustitia, et in bello et in pace utilis est</i>. Post fortitudinem
+autem ordinatur temperantia, quae subiicit rationi appetitum circa
+ea quae immediate ordinantur ad vitam, vel in eodem secundum
+numerum, vel in eodem secundum speciem, scilicet in cibis et
+venereis. Et sic istae tres virtutes, simul cum prudentia, dicuntur
+esse principales etiam dignitate. Secundum quid autem dicitur
+aliqua virtus esse maior, secundum quod adminiculum vel ornamentum
+praebet principali virtuti. Sicut substantia est simpliciter
+dignior accidente; aliquod tamen accidens est secundum quid dignius
+substantia, inquantum perficit substantiam in aliquo esse
+accidentali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his
+own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas
+justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being
+its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and
+an addition to justice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36266] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod actus liberalitatis oportet quod fundetur super
+actum iustitiae, <i>non enim esset liberalis datio, si non de
+proprio daret</i>, ut in II Polit. dicitur. Unde liberalitas sine
+iustitia esse non posset, quae secernit suum a non suo. Iustitia
+autem potest esse sine liberalitate. Unde iustitia simpliciter est
+maior liberalitate, tanquam communior, et fundamentum ipsius,
+liberalitas autem est secundum quid maior, cum sit quidam ornatus
+iustitiae, et complementum eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also
+excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness;
+but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking
+up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues
+simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence
+whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36267] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in tolerantia
+malorum, in quibus non solum excludit iniustam vindictam, quam
+etiam excludit iustitia; neque solum odium quod facit caritas;
+neque solum iram, quod facit mansuetudo; sed etiam excludit
+tristitiam inordinatam, quae est radix omnium praedictorum. Et ideo
+in hoc est perfectior et maior, quod in hac materia extirpat
+radicem. Non autem est simpliciter perfectior omnibus aliis
+virtutibus. Quia fortitudo non solum sustinet molestias absque
+perturbatione, quod est patientiae, sed etiam ingerit se eis, cum
+opus fuerit. Unde quicumque est fortis, est patiens, sed non
+convertitur, est enim patientia quaedam fortitudinis pars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament,
+so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36268] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod magnanimitas non potest esse nisi aliis virtutibus
+praeexistentibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Unde comparatur ad alias
+sicut ornatus earum. Et sic secundum quid est maior omnibus aliis,
+non tamen simpliciter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A5-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 5. Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one
+commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to
+prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should
+devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that
+prudence is greater than wisdom.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36269] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod sapientia non sit maxima inter
+virtutes intellectuales. Imperans enim maius est eo cui imperatur.
+Sed prudentia videtur imperare sapientiae, dicitur enim I Ethic.,
+quod <i>quales disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, et
+quales unumquemque addiscere, et usquequo, haec praeordinat</i>,
+scilicet politica, quae ad prudentiam pertinet, ut dicitur in VI
+Ethic. Cum igitur inter disciplinas etiam sapientia contineatur,
+videtur quod prudentia sit maior quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing
+to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby
+man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence
+is a greater virtue than wisdom.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36270] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+de ratione virtutis est quod ordinet hominem ad felicitatem, est
+enim virtus dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII
+Physic. Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, per quae homo ad
+felicitatem perducitur, sapientia autem non considerat humanos
+actus, quibus ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Ergo prudentia est maior
+virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs,
+which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by
+Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.26.26" target="asv"> Job 26:26</a>: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than
+wisdom.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36271] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quanto cognitio est perfectior, tanto videtur esse maior. Sed
+perfectiorem cognitionem habere possumus de rebus humanis, de
+quibus est scientia, quam de rebus divinis, de quibus est
+sapientia, ut distinguit Augustinus in XII de Trin., quia divina
+incomprehensibilia sunt, secundum illud Iob XXXVI, <i>ecce Deus
+magnus, vincens scientiam nostram</i>. Ergo scientia est maior
+virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable
+principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater
+virtue than wisdom.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36272] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+cognitio principiorum est dignior quam cognitio conclusionum. Sed
+sapientia concludit ex principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est
+intellectus; sicut et aliae scientiae. Ergo intellectus est maior
+virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36273] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod sapientia est sicut
+caput inter virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q66_A3" id="FS_Q66_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of
+all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the
+Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects;
+hence it is that wisdom exercises
+judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 co."><a name="36274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36274] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam
+speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Obiectum autem sapientiae
+praecellit inter obiecta omnium virtutum intellectualium,
+considerat enim causam altissimam, quae Deus est, ut dicitur in
+principio Metaphys. Et quia per causam iudicatur de effectu, et per
+causam superiorem de causis inferioribus; inde est quod sapientia
+habet iudicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus; et
+eius est ordinare omnes; et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectu
+omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater
+virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say,
+as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man
+judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor.
+2:15
+</a>). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed
+to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom;
+for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36275] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, cum prudentia sit circa res humanas, sapientia
+vero circa causam altissimam; impossibile est quod prudentia sit
+maior virtus quam sapientia, <i>nisi</i>, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.,
+<i>maximum eorum quae sunt in mundo, esset homo</i>. Unde dicendum
+est, sicut in eodem libro dicitur, quod prudentia non imperat ipsi
+sapientiae, sed potius e converso, quia <i>spiritualis iudicat
+omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur</i>, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Non
+enim prudentia habet se intromittere de altissimis, quae considerat
+sapientia, sed imperat de his quae ordinantur ad sapientiam,
+scilicet quomodo homines debeant ad sapientiam pervenire. Unde in
+hoc est prudentia, seu politica, ministra sapientiae, introducit
+enim ad eam, praeparans ei viam, sicut ostiarius ad regem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme
+Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness
+in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God,
+it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future
+happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36276] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod prudentia considerat ea quibus pervenitur ad
+felicitatem, sed sapientia considerat ipsum obiectum felicitatis,
+quod est altissimum intelligibile. Et si quidem esset perfecta
+consideratio sapientiae respectu sui obiecti, esset perfecta
+felicitas in actu sapientiae. Sed quia actus sapientiae in hac vita
+est imperfectus respectu principalis obiecti, quod est Deus; ideo
+actus sapientiae est quaedam inchoatio seu participatio futurae
+felicitatis. Et sic propinquius se habet ad felicitatem quam
+prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher
+object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which
+possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that
+which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the
+Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though
+it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime
+things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man,
+especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this
+little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36277] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de anima, <i>una
+notitia praefertur alteri aut ex eo quod est nobiliorum, aut
+propter certitudinem</i>. Si igitur subiecta sint aequalia in
+bonitate et nobilitate, illa quae est certior, erit maior virtus.
+Sed illa quae est minus certa de altioribus et maioribus,
+praefertur ei quae est magis certa de inferioribus rebus. Unde
+philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod magnum est de rebus
+caelestibus aliquid posse cognoscere etiam debili et topica
+ratione. Et in I de partibus Animal., dicit quod <i>amabile est
+magis parvum aliquid cognoscere de rebus nobilioribus quam multa
+cognoscere de rebus ignobilioribus</i>. Sapientia igitur ad quam
+pertinet Dei cognitio, homini, maxime in statu huius vitae, non
+potest perfecte advenire, ut sit quasi eius possessio; sed hoc
+solius Dei est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed tamen illa modica
+cognitio quae per sapientiam de Deo haberi potest, omni alii
+cognitioni praefertur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is
+a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and
+non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles
+are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper
+effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding,
+not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating
+them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36278] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium
+dependet ex ratione terminorum, cognito enim quid est totum et quid
+pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte.
+Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis,
+et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis
+constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam,
+quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet
+Dei. Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis
+indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis,
+sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando
+contra negantes. Unde sequitur quod sapientia sit maior virtus quam
+intellectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A6-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 6. Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while
+hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral
+virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q66_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36279] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit maxima inter virtutes
+theologicas. Cum enim fides sit in intellectu, spes autem et
+caritas in vi appetitiva, ut supra dictum est; videtur quod fides
+comparetur ad spem et caritatem, sicut virtus intellectualis ad
+moralem. Sed virtus intellectualis est maior morali, ut ex dictis
+patet. Ergo fides est maior spe et caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added
+to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward
+to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36280] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse maius eo. Sed
+spes, ut videtur, se habet ex additione ad caritatem, praesupponit
+enim spes amorem, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid.; addit autem
+quendam motum protensionis in rem amatam. Ergo spes est maior
+caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.3" target="asv"> Mat. 1:3 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36281] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+causa est potior effectu. Sed fides et spes sunt causa caritatis,
+dicitur enim Matth. I, in Glossa, quod <i>fides generat spem, et
+spes caritatem</i>. Ergo fides et spes sunt maiores caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36282] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>nunc autem manent
+fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est
+caritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q66_A3" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at
+God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater
+object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than
+the others. Because the others, in their
+very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed.
+But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again,
+the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 co."><a name="36283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36283] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum
+suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Cum autem tres virtutes
+theologicae respiciant Deum sicut proprium obiectum, non potest una
+earum dici maior altera ex hoc quod sit circa maius obiectum; sed
+ex eo quod una se habet propinquius ad obiectum quam alia. Et hoc
+modo caritas est maior aliis. Nam aliae important in sui ratione
+quandam distantiam ab obiecto, est enim fides de non visis, spes
+autem de non habitis. Sed amor caritatis est de eo quod iam
+habetur, est enim amatum quodammodo in amante, et etiam amans per
+affectum trahitur ad unionem amati; propter quod dicitur I Ioan.
+IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because
+the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things
+beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected
+by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being
+drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according
+to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the
+appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God,
+which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its
+object surpasses human knowledge, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36284] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non hoc modo se habent fides et spes ad
+caritatem, sicut prudentia ad virtutem moralem. Et hoc propter duo.
+Primo quidem, quia virtutes theologicae habent obiectum quod est
+supra animam humanam, sed prudentia et virtutes morales sunt circa
+ea quae sunt infra hominem. In his autem quae sunt supra hominem,
+nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio. Perficitur enim cognitio,
+secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente, dilectio vero, secundum
+quod diligens trahitur ad rem dilectam. Id autem quod est supra
+hominem, nobilius est in seipso quam sit in homine, quia
+unumquodque est in altero per modum eius in quo est. E converso
+autem est in his quae sunt infra hominem. Secundo, quia prudentia
+moderatur motus appetitivos ad morales virtutes pertinentes, sed
+fides non moderatur motum appetitivum tendentem in Deum, qui
+pertinet ad virtutes theologicas; sed solum ostendit obiectum.
+Motus autem appetitivus in obiectum, excedit cognitionem humanam;
+secundum illud ad Ephes. III, <i>supereminentem scientiae caritatem
+Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires
+good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led
+by hope, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q66_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36285] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se
+sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae, quo quidem amore magis se
+amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem
+importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe, ut supra dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more
+noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in
+the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36286] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod causa perficiens est potior effectu, non autem causa
+disponens. Sic enim calor ignis esset potior quam anima, ad quam
+disponit materiam, quod patet esse falsum. Sic autem fides generat
+spem, et spes caritatem, secundum scilicet quod una disponit ad
+alteram.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q67" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q67-p0.1">Q. 67. OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q67-p2"> We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q67-p3"><a href="#FS_Q67_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p4"><a href="#FS_Q67_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p5"><a href="#FS_Q67_A3"> (3) Whether faith remains?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p6"><a href="#FS_Q67_A4"> (4) Whether hope remains?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p7"><a href="#FS_Q67_A5"> (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p8"><a href="#FS_Q67_A6"> (6) Whether charity remains?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 pr."><a name="36287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36287]
+Iª-IIae q. 67 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+duratione virtutum post hanc vitam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex.
+Primo, utrum virtutes morales maneant post hanc vitam. Secundo,
+utrum virtutes intellectuales. Tertio, utrum fides. Quarto, utrum
+remaneat spes. Quinto, utrum aliquid fidei maneat, vel spei. Sexto,
+utrum maneat caritas.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q67_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A1-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels,
+according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv"> Mat. 22:30.</a> But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods"
+(Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36288] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non maneant post hanc
+vitam. Homines enim in statu futurae gloriae erunt similes Angelis,
+ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Sed ridiculum est in Angelis ponere
+virtutes morales, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo neque in hominibus,
+post hanc vitam, erunt virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says
+(Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this
+life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36289] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes morales perficiunt hominem in vita activa. Sed vita activa
+non manet post hanc vitam, dicit enim Gregorius, in VI Moral.,
+<i>activae vitae opera cum corpore transeunt</i>. Ergo virtutes
+morales non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states
+(Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily
+organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36290] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+temperantia et fortitudo, quae sunt virtutes morales, sunt
+irrationalium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Sed
+irrationales partes animae corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore, eo quod
+sunt actus organorum corporalium. Ergo videtur quod virtutes
+morales non maneant post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>) that "justice is perpetual and immortal."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36291] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Sap. I, quod <i>iustitia perpetua est et
+immortalis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine
+says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is
+better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain
+in the future life, but after a different manner.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 co."><a name="36292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36292] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., Tullius
+posuit post hanc vitam quatuor virtutes cardinales non esse; sed in
+alia vita homines esse beatos sola cognitione naturae, in qua nihil
+est melius aut amabilius, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem, ea natura
+quae creavit omnes naturas. Ipse autem postea determinat huiusmodi
+quatuor virtutes in futura vita existere, tamen alio modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p7"> In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element.
+The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according
+to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Ad cuius
+evidentiam, sciendum est quod in huiusmodi virtutibus aliquid est
+formale; et aliquid quasi materiale. Materiale quidem est in his
+virtutibus inclinatio quaedam partis appetitivae ad passiones vel
+operationes secundum modum aliquem. Sed quia iste modus
+determinatur a ratione, ideo formale in omnibus virtutibus est ipse
+ordo rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p8"> Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For
+in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers
+of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element,
+they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most
+perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved
+entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9)
+that "prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance,
+without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere
+to
+Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident
+what will be its act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this life subjection to a superior is part
+of justice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi virtutes
+morales in futura vita non manent, quantum ad id quod est materiale
+in eis. Non enim habebunt in futura vita locum concupiscentiae et
+delectationes ciborum et venereorum; neque etiam timores et
+audaciae circa pericula mortis; neque etiam distributiones et
+communicationes rerum quae veniunt in usum praesentis vitae. Sed
+quantum ad id quod est formale, remanebunt in beatis perfectissimae
+post hanc vitam, inquantum ratio uniuscuiusque rectissima erit
+circa ea quae ad ipsum pertinent secundum statum illum; et vis
+appetitiva omnino movebitur secundum ordinem rationis, in his quae
+ad statum illum pertinent. Unde Augustinus ibidem dicit quod
+<i>prudentia ibi erit sine ullo periculo erroris; fortitudo, sine
+molestia tolerandorum malorum; temperantia, sine repugnatione
+libidinum. Ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel
+aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo
+defectu noxio delectari</i>. De iustitia vero manifestius est quem
+actum ibi habebit, scilicet esse subditum Deo, quia etiam in hac
+vita ad iustitiam pertinet esse subditum superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards
+"commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36293] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur ibi de huiusmodi virtutibus
+moralibus, quantum ad id quod materiale est in eis, sicut de
+iustitia, quantum ad commutationes et depositiones; de fortitudine,
+quantum ad terribilia et pericula; de temperantia, quantum ad
+concupiscentias pravas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of
+the virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36294] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum est ad secundum. Ea enim quae sunt activae vitae,
+materialiter se habent ad virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body;
+the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational
+powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible,
+and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be
+perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the
+soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A8" id="FS_Q67_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[8]</a>. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain
+nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence
+of justice it is
+specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because
+its act will not change, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36295] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod status post hanc vitam est duplex, unus quidem ante
+resurrectionem, quando animae erunt a corporibus separatae; alius
+autem post resurrectionem, quando animae iterato corporibus suis
+unientur. In illo ergo resurrectionis statu, erunt vires
+irrationales in organis corporis, sicut et nunc sunt. Unde et
+poterit in irascibili esse fortitudo, et in concupiscibili
+temperantia, inquantum utraque vis perfecte erit disposita ad
+obediendum rationi. Sed in statu ante resurrectionem, partes
+irrationales non erunt actu in anima, sed solum radicaliter in
+essentia ipsius, ut in primo dictum est. Unde nec huiusmodi
+virtutes erunt in actu nisi in radice, scilicet in ratione et
+voluntate, in quibus sunt seminalia quaedam harum virtutum, ut
+dictum est. Sed iustitia, quae est in voluntate, etiam actu
+remanebit. Unde specialiter de ea dictum est quod est perpetua et
+immortalis, tum ratione subiecti, quia voluntas incorruptibilis
+est; tum etiam propter similitudinem actus, ut prius dictum
+est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A2-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 2. Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8,9</a>) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge
+of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts.
+Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36296] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non maneant
+post hanc vitam. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, quod
+scientia destruetur, et ratio est quia ex parte cognoscimus. Sed
+sicut cognitio scientiae est ex parte, idest imperfecta; ita etiam
+cognitio aliarum virtutum intellectualium, quandiu haec vita durat.
+Ergo omnes virtutes intellectuales post hanc vitam cessabunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is
+not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore
+science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36297] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod scientia, cum sit
+habitus, est qualitas difficile mobilis, non enim de facili
+amittitur, nisi ex aliqua forti transmutatione vel aegritudine. Sed
+nulla est tanta transmutatio corporis humani sicut per mortem. Ergo
+scientia et aliae virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc
+vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be
+no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30);
+and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual
+virtues do not remain after this life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36298] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes intellectuales perficiunt intellectum ad bene operandum
+proprium actum. Sed actus intellectus non videtur esse post hanc
+vitam, eo quod nihil intelligit anima sine phantasmate, ut dicitur
+in III de anima; phantasmata autem post hanc vitam non manent, cum
+non sint nisi in organis corporeis. Ergo virtutes intellectuales
+non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the
+knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered,
+according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv"> Lk. 16:25</a>: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore,
+does the knowledge of universal and
+necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36299] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod firmior est cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quam
+particularium et contingentium. Sed in homine remanet post hanc
+vitam cognitio particularium contingentium, puta eorum quae quis
+fecit vel passus est; secundum illud Luc. XVI, <i>recordare quia
+recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala</i>. Ergo
+multo magis remanet cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quae
+pertinent ad scientiam et ad alias virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A6" id="FS_Q67_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[6]</a> some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands;
+and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts
+of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently,
+according to this opinion,
+neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted.
+</p><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p7"> But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is
+in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually."
+It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according
+to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima
+iii) because it preserves the intelligible species.
+</p><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p8"> And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as
+stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>;
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[85], A[1]</a>, ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material
+element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species,
+which are in the
+"possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues.
+Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues
+<a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 co."><a name="36300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36300] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, quidam posuerunt quod
+species intelligibiles non permanent in intellectu possibili nisi
+quandiu actu intelligit, nec est aliqua conservatio specierum,
+cessante consideratione actuali, nisi in viribus sensitivis, quae
+sunt actus corporalium organorum, scilicet in imaginativa et
+memorativa. Huiusmodi autem vires corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore.
+Et ideo secundum hoc, scientia nullo modo post hanc vitam
+remanebit, corpore corrupto; neque aliqua alia intellectualis
+virtus. Sed haec opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui in
+III de anima dicit quod <i>intellectus possibilis est in actu, cum
+fit singula, sicut sciens; cum tamen sit in potentia ad
+considerandum in actu</i>. Est etiam contra rationem, quia species
+intelligibiles recipiuntur in intellectu possibili immobiliter,
+secundum modum recipientis. Unde et intellectus possibilis dicitur
+locus specierum, quasi species intelligibiles conservans. Sed
+phantasmata, ad quae respiciendo homo intelligit in hac vita,
+applicando ad ipsa species intelligibiles, ut in primo dictum est,
+corrupto corpore corrumpuntur. Unde quantum ad ipsa phantasmata,
+quae sunt quasi materialia in virtutibus intellectualibus, virtutes
+intellectuales destruuntur, destructo corpore, sed quantum ad
+species intelligibiles, quae sunt in intellectu possibili, virtutes
+intellectuales manent. Species autem se habent in virtutibus
+intellectualibus sicut formales. Unde intellectuales virtutes
+manent post hanc vitam, quantum ad id quod est formale in eis, non
+autem quantum ad id quod est materiale, sicut et de moralibus
+dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding;
+because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the
+phantasms.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36301] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli est intelligendum quantum ad id
+quod est materiale in scientia, et quantum ad modum intelligendi,
+quia scilicet neque phantasmata remanebunt, destructo corpore;
+neque erit usus scientiae per conversionem ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species,
+which are in the "possible" intellect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36302] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod per aegritudinem corrumpitur habitus scientiae
+quantum ad id quod est materiale in eo, scilicet quantum ad
+phantasmata, non autem quantum ad species intelligibiles, quae sunt
+in intellectu possibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q89_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a> the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet
+not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues
+<a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36303] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod anima separata post mortem habet alium modum
+intelligendi quam per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut in primo
+dictum est. Et sic scientia manet, non tamen secundum eundem modum
+operandi, sicut et de virtutibus moralibus dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A3-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 3. Whether faith remains after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after
+this life, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q67_A2" id="FS_Q67_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore faith remains also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36304] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides maneat post hanc vitam. Nobilior
+enim est fides quam scientia. Sed scientia manet post hanc vitam,
+ut dictum est. Ergo et fides.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:11</a>): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the
+foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other
+virtue remains.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36305] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+I ad Cor. III, dicitur, <i>fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere,
+praeter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Iesus</i>, idest
+fides Christi Iesu. Sed sublato fundamento, non remanet id quod
+superaedificatur. Ergo, si fides non remanet post hanc vitam, nulla
+alia virtus remaneret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible
+with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and "morning" knowledge [*Cf.
+<a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A6" id="FS_Q67_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[6]</a>]; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about
+one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with
+the knowledge of glory.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36306] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+cognitio fidei et cognitio gloriae differunt secundum perfectum et
+imperfectum. Sed cognitio imperfecta potest esse simul cum
+cognitione perfecta, sicut in Angelo simul potest esse cognitio
+vespertina cum cognitione matutina; et aliquis homo potest simul
+habere de eadem conclusione scientiam per syllogismum
+demonstrativum, et opinionem per syllogismum dialecticum. Ergo
+etiam fides simul esse potest, post hanc vitam, cum cognitione
+gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6,7</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight." But those who are in glory
+are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36307] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. V, <i>quandiu sumus in
+corpore, peregrinamur a domino, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non
+per speciem</i>. Sed illi qui sunt in gloria, non peregrinantur a
+domino, sed sunt ei praesentes. Ergo fides non manet post hanc
+vitam in gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things
+are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect
+of contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection:
+wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when
+a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another,
+it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 co."><a name="36308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36308] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod oppositio est per se et propria causa quod unum
+excludatur ab alio, inquantum scilicet in omnibus oppositis
+includitur oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Invenitur autem
+in quibusdam oppositio secundum contrarias formas, sicut in
+coloribus album et nigrum. In quibusdam autem, secundum perfectum
+et imperfectum, unde in alterationibus magis et minus accipiuntur
+ut contraria, ut cum de minus calido fit magis calidum, ut dicitur
+in V Physic. Et quia perfectum et imperfectum opponuntur,
+impossibile est quod simul, secundum idem, sit perfectio et
+imperfectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p7"> Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack
+of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically,
+cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is
+changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the
+imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even
+as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason;
+and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Est autem considerandum quod imperfectio quidem
+quandoque est de ratione rei, et pertinet ad speciem ipsius, sicut
+defectus rationis pertinet ad rationem speciei equi vel bovis. Et
+quia unum et idem numero manens non potest transferri de una specie
+in aliam, inde est quod, tali imperfectione sublata, tollitur
+species rei, sicut iam non esset bos vel equus, si esset
+rationalis. Quandoque vero imperfectio non pertinet ad rationem
+speciei, sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud, sicut alicui
+homini quandoque accidit defectus rationis, inquantum impeditur in
+eo rationis usus, propter somnum vel ebrietatem vel aliquid
+huiusmodi. Patet autem quod, tali imperfectione remota, nihilominus
+substantia rei manet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8"> Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith
+being defined as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Where is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect knowledge
+that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of
+faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Manifestum est autem quod imperfectio
+cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Ponitur enim in eius definitione,
+<i>fides enim est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non
+apparentium</i>, ut dicitur ad Heb. XI. Et Augustinus dicit,
+<i>quid est fides? Credere quod non vides</i>. Quod autem cognitio
+sit sine apparitione vel visione, hoc ad imperfectionem cognitionis
+pertinet. Et sic imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Unde
+manifestum est quod fides non potest esse perfecta cognitio, eadem
+numero manens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p9"> But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect
+knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three
+ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject.
+The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the
+"morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" knowledge is about things according to the being which
+they have in the Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which
+being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified
+in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the
+subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion
+that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is
+essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding
+of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls
+short of science in so far as it lacks vision.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sed ulterius considerandum est utrum simul possit
+esse cum cognitione perfecta, nihil enim prohibet aliquam
+cognitionem imperfectam simul esse aliquando cum cognitione
+perfecta. Est igitur considerandum quod cognitio potest esse
+imperfecta tripliciter, uno modo, ex parte obiecti cognoscibilis;
+alio modo, ex parte medii; tertio modo, ex parte subiecti. Ex parte
+quidem obiecti cognoscibilis, differunt secundum perfectum et
+imperfectum cognitio matutina et vespertina in Angelis, nam
+cognitio matutina est de rebus secundum quod habent esse in verbo;
+cognitio autem vespertina est de eis secundum quod habent esse in
+propria natura, quod est imperfectum respectu primi esse. Ex parte
+vero medii, differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum cognitio
+quae est de aliqua conclusione per medium demonstrativum, et per
+medium probabile. Ex parte vero subiecti differunt secundum
+perfectum et imperfectum opinio, fides et scientia. Nam de ratione
+opinionis est quod accipiatur unum cum formidine alterius oppositi,
+unde non habet firmam inhaesionem. De ratione vero scientiae est
+quod habeat firmam inhaesionem cum visione intellectiva, habet enim
+certitudinem procedentem ex intellectu principiorum. Fides autem
+medio modo se habet, excedit enim opinionem, in hoc quod habet
+firmam inhaesionem; deficit vero a scientia, in hoc quod non habet
+visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p10"> Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect
+and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect
+on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with
+one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and
+the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect,
+e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible
+with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the
+same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium.
+Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject.
+Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he
+believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that
+which makes them happy, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q67_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are
+incompatible in one and the same subject.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Manifestum est autem quod perfectum et imperfectum non
+possunt simul esse secundum idem, sed ea quae differunt secundum
+perfectum et imperfectum, secundum aliquid idem possunt simul esse
+in aliquo alio eodem. Sic igitur cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex
+parte obiecti, nullo modo possunt esse de eodem obiecto. Possunt
+tamen convenire in eodem medio, et in eodem subiecto, nihil enim
+prohibet quod unus homo simul et semel per unum et idem medium
+habeat cognitionem de duobus, quorum unum est perfectum et aliud
+imperfectum, sicut de sanitate et aegritudine, et bono et malo.
+Similiter etiam impossibile est quod cognitio perfecta et
+imperfecta ex parte medii, conveniant in uno medio. Sed nihil
+prohibet quin conveniant in uno obiecto, et in uno subiecto, potest
+enim unus homo cognoscere eandem conclusionem per medium probabile,
+et demonstrativum. Et est similiter impossibile quod cognitio
+perfecta et imperfecta ex parte subiecti, sint simul in eodem
+subiecto. Fides autem in sui ratione habet imperfectionem quae est
+ex parte subiecti, ut scilicet credens non videat id quod credit,
+beatitudo autem de sui ratione habet perfectionem ex parte
+subiecti, ut scilicet beatus videat id quo beatificatur, ut supra
+dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod impossibile est quod fides
+maneat simul cum beatitudine in eodem subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a
+more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the
+mode of faith is incompatible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36309] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod fides est nobilior quam scientia, ex parte
+obiecti, quia eius obiectum est veritas prima. Sed scientia habet
+perfectiorem modum cognoscendi, qui non repugnat perfectioni
+beatitudinis, scilicet visioni, sicut repugnat ei modus fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will
+be perfected also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36310] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod fides est fundamentum quantum ad id quod habet de
+cognitione. Et ideo quando perficietur cognitio, erit perfectius
+fundamentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36311] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A4-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 4. Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent
+manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9).
+Much more then does hope remain.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36312] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes maneat post mortem in statu
+gloriae. Spes enim nobiliori modo perficit appetitum humanum quam
+virtutes morales. Sed virtutes morales manent post hanc vitam, ut
+patet per Augustinum, in XIV de Trin. Ergo multo magis spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in
+the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36313] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+spei opponitur timor. Sed timor manet post hanc vitam, et in beatis
+quidem timor filialis, qui manet in saeculum; et in damnatis timor
+poenarum. Ergo spes, pari ratione, potest permanere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory
+of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the
+soul, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that
+there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36314] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut spes est futuri boni, ita et desiderium. Sed in beatis est
+desiderium futuri boni, et quantum ad gloriam corporis, quam animae
+beatorum desiderant, ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt.;
+et etiam quantum ad gloriam animae, secundum illud Eccli. XXIV,
+<i>qui edunt me, adhuc esurient, et qui bibunt me, adhuc
+sitient</i>; et I Petr. I, dicitur, <i>in quem desiderant Angeli
+prospicere</i>. Ergo videtur quod possit esse spes post hanc vitam
+in beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they
+do not hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36315] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, <i>quod videt quis, quid
+sperat?</i> Sed beati vident id quod est obiectum spei, scilicet
+Deum. Ergo non sperant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that
+subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of
+that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement
+ceases; for a thing does not continue to
+become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from
+what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz.
+the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 co."><a name="36316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36316] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, id quod de ratione sui importat
+imperfectionem subiecti, non potest simul stare cum subiecto
+opposita perfectione perfecto. Sicut patet quod motus in ratione
+sui importat imperfectionem subiecti, est enim actus existentis in
+potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, unde quando illa potentia reducitur
+ad actum, iam cessat motus; non enim adhuc albatur, postquam iam
+aliquid factum est album. Spes autem importat motum quendam in id
+quod non habetur; ut patet ex his quae supra de passione spei
+diximus. Et ideo quando habebitur id quod speratur, scilicet divina
+fruitio, iam spes esse non poterit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with
+the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not
+remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something
+which is in our actual possession.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36317] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod spes est nobilior virtutibus moralibus quantum
+ad obiectum, quod est Deus. Sed actus virtutum moralium non
+repugnant perfectioni beatitudinis, sicut actus spei; nisi forte
+ratione materiae, secundum quam non manent. Non enim virtus moralis
+perficit appetitum solum in id quod nondum habetur; sed etiam circa
+id quod praesentialiter habetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on (
+<a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[19], A[2]</a>). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility
+of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the
+other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain.
+Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.33" target="asv"> Prov. 1:33</a>: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated
+above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there
+can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a
+succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory
+of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past
+nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42],
+A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear
+in
+them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36318] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod timor est duplex, servilis et filialis, ut infra
+dicetur. Servilis quidem est timor poenae, qui non poterit esse in
+gloria, nulla possibilitate ad poenam remanente. Timor vero
+filialis habet duos actus, scilicet revereri Deum, et quantum ad
+hunc actum manet; et timere separationem ab ipso, et quantum ad
+hunc actum non manet. Separari enim a Deo habet rationem mali,
+nullum autem malum ibi timebitur, secundum illud Proverb. I,
+<i>abundantia perfruetur, malorum timore sublato</i>. Timor autem
+opponitur spei oppositione boni et mali, ut supra dictum est, et
+ideo timor qui remanet in gloria, non opponitur spei. In damnatis
+autem magis potest esse timor poenae, quam in beatis spes gloriae.
+Quia in damnatis erit successio poenarum, et sic remanet ibi ratio
+futuri, quod est obiectum timoris, sed gloria sanctorum est absque
+successione, secundum quandam aeternitatis participationem, in qua
+non est praeteritum et futurum, sed solum praesens. Et tamen nec
+etiam in damnatis est proprie timor. Nam sicut supra dictum est,
+timor nunquam est sine aliqua spe evasionis, quae omnino in
+damnatis non erit. Unde nec timor; nisi communiter loquendo,
+secundum quod quaelibet expectatio mali futuri dicitur timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the
+reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason
+desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints,
+but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object
+is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated
+above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q67_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money
+is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are
+not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to
+desire it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36319] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod quantum ad gloriam animae, non potest esse in beatis
+desiderium, secundum quod respicit futurum, ratione iam dicta.
+Dicitur autem ibi esse esuries et sitis, per remotionem fastidii,
+et eadem ratione dicitur esse desiderium in Angelis. Respectu autem
+gloriae corporis, in animabus sanctorum potest quidem esse
+desiderium, non tamen spes, proprie loquendo, neque secundum quod
+spes est virtus theologica, sic enim eius obiectum est Deus, non
+autem aliquod bonum creatum; neque secundum quod communiter
+sumitur. Quia obiectum spei est arduum, ut supra dictum est, bonum
+autem cuius iam inevitabilem causam habemus, non comparatur ad nos
+in ratione ardui. Unde non proprie dicitur aliquis qui habet
+argentum, sperare se habiturum aliquid quod statim in potestate
+eius est ut emat. Et similiter illi qui habent gloriam animae, non
+proprie dicuntur sperare gloriam corporis; sed solum
+desiderare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A5-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 5. Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there
+remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you
+remove living, there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge:
+and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner.
+Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36320] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid fidei vel spei remaneat in
+gloria. Remoto enim eo quod est proprium, remanet id quod est
+commune, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, quod, <i>remoto
+rationali, remanet vivum; et remoto vivo, remanet ens</i>. Sed in
+fide est aliquid quod habet commune cum beatitudine, scilicet ipsa
+cognitio, aliquid autem quod est sibi proprium, scilicet aenigma;
+est enim fides cognitio aenigmatica. Ergo, remoto aenigmate fidei,
+adhuc remanet ipsa cognitio fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv"> Eph. 1:17,18</a>: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light
+of glory, of which it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not
+extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it
+seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36321] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+fides est quoddam spirituale lumen animae, secundum illud Ephes. I,
+<i>illuminatos oculos cordis vestri in agnitionem Dei</i>; sed hoc
+lumen est imperfectum respectu luminis gloriae, de quo dicitur in
+Psalmo XXXV, <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>. Lumen autem
+imperfectum remanet, superveniente lumine perfecto, non enim
+candela extinguitur, claritate solis superveniente. Ergo videtur
+quod ipsum lumen fidei maneat cum lumine gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of
+liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen.
+Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36322] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+substantia habitus non tollitur per hoc quod subtrahitur materia,
+potest enim homo habitum liberalitatis retinere, etiam amissa
+pecunia; sed actum habere non potest. Obiectum autem fidei est
+veritas prima non visa. Ergo, hoc remoto per hoc quod videtur
+veritas prima, adhuc potest remanere ipse habitus fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does
+not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, it seems that it is withdrawn entirely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36323] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod fides est quidam habitus simplex. Simplex autem vel totum
+tollitur, vel totum manet. Cum igitur fides non totaliter maneat,
+sed evacuetur, ut dictum est; videtur quod totaliter tollatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains
+in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically
+but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other
+hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to
+the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement.
+</p><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p7"> But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible.
+Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you
+remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical
+color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not
+related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference
+is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are
+not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e.
+the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the
+whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying
+both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has
+a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same
+whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect.
+</p><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p8"> It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed,
+the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute
+the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is
+therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the
+same, but only generically.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 co."><a name="36324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36324] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod spes totaliter tollitur, fides
+autem partim tollitur, scilicet quantum ad aenigma, et partim
+manet, scilicet quantum ad substantiam cognitionis. Quod quidem si
+sic intelligatur quod maneat non idem numero, sed idem genere,
+verissime dictum est, fides enim cum visione patriae convenit in
+genere, quod est cognitio. Spes autem non convenit cum beatitudine
+in genere, comparatur enim spes ad beatitudinis fruitionem, sicut
+motus ad quietem in termino. Si autem intelligatur quod eadem
+numero cognitio quae est fidei, maneat in patria; hoc est omnino
+impossibile. Non enim, remota differentia alicuius speciei, remanet
+substantia generis eadem numero, sicut, remota differentia
+constitutiva albedinis, non remanet eadem substantia coloris
+numero, ut sic idem numero color sit quandoque albedo, quandoque
+vero nigredo. Non enim comparatur genus ad differentiam sicut
+materia ad formam, ut remaneat substantia generis eadem numero,
+differentia remota; sicut remanet eadem numero substantia materiae,
+remota forma. Genus enim et differentia non sunt partes speciei,
+alioquin non praedicarentur de specie. Sed sicut species significat
+totum, idest compositum ex materia et forma in rebus materialibus,
+ita differentia significat totum, et similiter genus, sed genus
+denominat totum ab eo quod est sicut materia; differentia vero ab
+eo quod est sicut forma; species vero ab utroque. Sicut in homine
+sensitiva natura materialiter se habet ad intellectivam, animal
+autem dicitur quod habet naturam sensitivam; rationale quod habet
+intellectivam; homo vero quod habet utrumque. Et sic idem totum
+significatur per haec tria, sed non ab eodem. Unde patet quod, cum
+differentia non sit nisi designativa generis, remota differentia,
+non potest substantia generis eadem remanere, non enim remanet
+eadem animalitas, si sit alia anima constituens animal. Unde non
+potest esse quod eadem numero cognitio, quae prius fuit
+aenigmatica, postea fiat visio aperta. Et sic patet quod nihil idem
+numero vel specie quod est in fide, remanet in patria; sed solum
+idem genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36325] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, remoto rationali, non remanet vivum idem
+numero, sed idem genere, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject:
+whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently
+they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36326] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod imperfectio luminis candelae non opponitur
+perfectioni solaris luminis, quia non respiciunt idem subiectum.
+Sed imperfectio fidei et perfectio gloriae opponuntur ad invicem,
+et respiciunt idem subiectum. Unde non possunt esse simul, sicut
+nec claritas aeris cum obscuritate eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit
+of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually,
+but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36327] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ille qui amittit pecuniam, non amittit possibilitatem
+habendi pecuniam, et ideo convenienter remanet habitus
+liberalitatis. Sed in statu gloriae non solum actu tollitur
+obiectum fidei, quod est non visum; sed etiam secundum
+possibilitatem, propter beatitudinis stabilitatem. Et ideo frustra
+talis habitus remaneret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A6-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 6. Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10, </a> "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the
+charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36328] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non maneat post hanc vitam in
+gloria. Quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, <i>cum venerit quod
+perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est</i>, idest quod est
+imperfectum. Sed caritas viae est imperfecta. Ergo evacuabitur,
+adveniente perfectione gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore
+the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same
+in both cases.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36329] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+habitus et actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum
+amoris est bonum apprehensum. Cum ergo alia sit apprehensio
+praesentis vitae, et alia apprehensio futurae vitae; videtur quod
+non maneat eadem caritas utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the
+wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the
+charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36330] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+eorum quae sunt unius rationis, imperfectum potest venire ad
+aequalitatem perfectionis, per continuum augmentum. Sed caritas
+viae nunquam potest pervenire ad aequalitatem caritatis patriae,
+quantumcumque augeatur. Ergo videtur quod caritas viae non remaneat
+in patria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>): "Charity never falleth away."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36331] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>caritas nunquam
+excidit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing
+passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love,
+the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either
+seen or not seen. Therefore charity is
+not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 co."><a name="36332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36332] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando imperfectio alicuius
+rei non est de ratione speciei ipsius, nihil prohibet idem numero
+quod prius fuit imperfectum, postea perfectum esse, sicut homo per
+augmentum perficitur, et albedo per intensionem. Caritas autem est
+amor; de cuius ratione non est aliqua imperfectio, potest enim esse
+et habiti et non habiti, et visi et non visi. Unde caritas non
+evacuatur per gloriae perfectionem, sed eadem numero manet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although
+that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away,
+charity itself is not done away.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36333] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod imperfectio caritatis per accidens se habet ad
+ipsam, quia non est de ratione amoris imperfectio. Remoto autem eo
+quod est per accidens, nihilominus remanet substantia rei. Unde,
+evacuata imperfectione caritatis, non evacuatur ipsa caritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity
+of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36334] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod caritas non habet pro obiecto ipsam cognitionem, sic
+enim non esset eadem in via et in patria. Sed habet pro obiecto
+ipsam rem cognitam, quae est eadem, scilicet ipsum Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part
+of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly
+we love Him.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36335] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod caritas viae per augmentum non potest pervenire ad
+aequalitatem caritatis patriae, propter differentiam quae est ex
+parte causae, visio enim est quaedam causa amoris, ut dicitur in IX
+Ethic. Deus autem quanto perfectius cognoscitur, tanto perfectius
+amatur.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q68" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q68-p0.1">Q. 68. OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q68-p2"> We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q68-p3"><a href="#FS_Q68_A1"> (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p4"><a href="#FS_Q68_A2"> (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p5"><a href="#FS_Q68_A3"> (3) Whether the Gifts are habits?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p6"><a href="#FS_Q68_A4"> (4) Which, and how many are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p7"><a href="#FS_Q68_A5"> (5) Whether the Gifts are connected?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p8"><a href="#FS_Q68_A6"> (6) Whether they remain in heaven?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p9"><a href="#FS_Q68_A7"> (7) Of their comparison with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p10"><a href="#FS_Q68_A8"> (8) Of their comparison with the virtues.</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 pr."><a name="36336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36336]
+Iª-IIae q. 68 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
+donis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum dona differant a
+virtutibus. Secundo, de necessitate donorum. Tertio, utrum dona
+sint habitus. Quarto, quae, et quot sint. Quinto, utrum dona sint
+connexa. Sexto, utrum maneant in patria. Septimo, de comparatione
+eorum ad invicem. Octavo, de comparatione eorum ad virtutes.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q68_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A1-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 1. Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.2" target="asv"> Job 1:2, </a> "There were born to him seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly
+thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of
+the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36337] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non distinguantur a virtutibus.
+Dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., exponens illud Iob, <i>nati sunt
+ei septem filii, septem nobis nascuntur filii, cum per conceptionem
+bonae cogitationis, sancti spiritus septem in nobis virtutes
+oriuntur</i>. Et inducit illud quod habetur Isaiae XI, requiescet
+super eum spiritus intellectus etc., ubi enumerantur septem
+spiritus sancti dona. Ergo septem dona spiritus sancti sunt
+virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.45" target="asv"> Mat. 12:45, </a> "Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed
+to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly
+so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36338] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in libro de Quaestionib. Evang., exponens illud
+quod habetur Matth. XII, <i>tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios
+spiritus etc., septem vitia sunt contraria septem virtutibus
+spiritus sancti</i>, idest septem donis. Sunt autem septem vitia
+contraria virtutibus communiter dictis. Ergo dona non distinguuntur
+a virtutibus communiter dictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts;
+for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [*Cf.
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q68_A1-p4.1" shape="rect"> Q[55], A[4]</a>]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to
+the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one
+another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36339] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quorum est definitio eadem, ipsa quoque sunt eadem. Sed definitio
+virtutis convenit donis, unumquodque enim donum est bona qualitas
+mentis qua recte vivitur, et cetera. Similiter definitio doni
+convenit virtutibus infusis, est enim donum datio irreddibilis,
+secundum philosophum. Ergo virtutes et dona non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q68_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[2]</a>), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice,
+and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36340] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+plura eorum quae enumerantur inter dona, sunt virtutes. Nam sicut
+supra dictum est, sapientia et intellectus et scientia sunt
+virtutes intellectuales; consilium autem ad prudentiam pertinet;
+pietas autem species est iustitiae; fortitudo autem quaedam virtus
+est moralis. Ergo videtur quod virtutes non distinguantur a
+donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three
+theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same
+seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36341] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius, I Moral., distinguit septem dona, quae dicit
+significari per septem filios Iob, a tribus virtutibus theologicis,
+quas dicit significari per tres filias Iob. Et in II Moral.,
+distinguit eadem septem dona a quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus,
+quae dicit significari per quatuor angulos domus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between
+them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers
+to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect
+another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q63_A3" id="FS_Q68_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[63],
+A[3]
+</a>) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently
+some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them
+to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear,
+for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p8"> Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned
+a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the
+gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding
+and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the
+free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed
+only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections.
+If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p9"> Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with
+prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His
+sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation.
+But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the
+sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard
+to charity, of which it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.7" target="asv">Cant 8:7</a>): "Many waters cannot quench charity."
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p10"> Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3, </a> said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly
+with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear
+to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly
+in humility and meekness, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv"> Mat. 11:29</a>: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.15.12" target="asv"> Jn. 15:12</a>: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion.
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p11"> Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses
+itself, for we find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For thus it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are clearly given
+to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now
+inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within
+him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A4" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[4]</a>,6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8).
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p12"> Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists
+in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect
+must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect
+disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues
+perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently
+man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only
+because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according
+to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.50.5" target="asv"> Is. 50:5</a>: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the
+Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there
+is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a
+principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher
+than acts of virtue.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 co."><a name="36342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36342] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, si loquamur de dono et virtute secundum nominis
+rationem, sic nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem. Nam ratio
+virtutis sumitur secundum quod perficit hominem ad bene agendum, ut
+supra dictum est, ratio autem doni sumitur secundum comparationem
+ad causam a qua est. Nihil autem prohibet illud quod est ab alio ut
+donum, esse perfectivum alicuius ad bene operandum, praesertim cum
+supra dixerimus quod virtutes quaedam nobis sunt infusae a Deo.
+Unde secundum hoc, donum a virtute distingui non potest. Et ideo
+quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a virtutibus distinguenda.
+Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, ut scilicet rationem
+assignent quare quaedam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et
+quare aliqua computantur inter dona, quae non computantur inter
+virtutes, ut patet de timore. Unde alii dixerunt dona a virtutibus
+esse distinguenda; sed non assignaverunt convenientem distinctionis
+causam, quae scilicet ita communis esset virtutibus, quod nullo
+modo donis, aut e converso. Considerantes enim aliqui quod, inter
+septem dona, quatuor pertinent ad rationem, scilicet sapientia
+scientia, intellectus et consilium; et tria ad vim appetitivam,
+scilicet fortitudo, pietas et timor; posuerunt quod dona
+perficiebant liberum arbitrium secundum quod est facultas rationis,
+virtutes vero secundum quod est facultas voluntatis, quia
+invenerunt duas solas virtutes in ratione vel intellectu, scilicet
+fidem et prudentiam, alias vero in vi appetitiva vel affectiva.
+Oporteret autem, si haec distinctio esset conveniens, quod omnes
+virtutes essent in vi appetitiva, et omnia dona in ratione. Quidam
+vero, considerantes quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod
+<i>donum spiritus sancti, quod in mente sibi subiecta format
+temperantiam, prudentiam, iustitiam et fortitudinem; eandem mentem
+munit contra singula tentamenta per septem dona</i>, dixerunt quod
+virtutes ordinantur ad bene operandum, dona vero ad resistendum
+tentationibus. Sed nec ista distinctio sufficit. Quia etiam
+virtutes tentationibus resistunt, inducentibus ad peccata, quae
+contrariantur virtutibus, unumquodque enim resistit naturaliter suo
+contrario. Quod praecipue patet de caritate, de qua dicitur Cantic.
+VIII, <i>aquae multae non potuerunt extinguere caritatem</i>. Alii
+vero, considerantes quod ista dona traduntur in Scriptura secundum
+quod fuerunt in Christo, ut patet Isaiae XI; dixerunt quod virtutes
+ordinantur simpliciter ad bene operandum; sed dona ordinantur ad
+hoc ut per ea conformemur Christo, praecipue quantum ad ea quae
+passus est, quia in passione eius praecipue huiusmodi dona
+resplenduerunt. Sed hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens. Quia
+ipse dominus praecipue nos inducit ad sui conformitatem secundum
+humilitatem et mansuetudinem, Matth. XI, <i>discite a me, quia
+mitis sum et humilis corde</i>; et secundum caritatem, ut Ioan. XV,
+<i>diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos</i>. Et hae etiam virtutes
+praecipue in passione Christi refulserunt. Et ideo ad distinguendum
+dona a virtutibus, debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae, in qua
+nobis traduntur non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine
+spirituum, sic enim dicitur Isaiae XI, <i>requiescet super eum
+spiritus sapientiae et intellectus,</i> et cetera. Ex quibus verbis
+manifeste datur intelligi quod ista septem enumerantur ibi,
+secundum quod sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. Inspiratio
+autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori. Est enim
+considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens, unum
+quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est
+Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam philosophus hoc dicit, in cap.
+de bona fortuna. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur,
+necesse est proportionatum esse motori, et haec est perfectio
+mobilis inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod
+bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto
+necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur,
+sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum,
+ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam capiat a docente. Manifestum est
+autem quod virtutes humanae perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo
+natus est moveri per rationem in his quae interius vel exterius
+agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones, secundum
+quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istae
+perfectiones vocantur dona, non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed
+quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab
+inspiratione divina, sicut dicitur Isaiae l, <i>dominus aperuit
+mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico, retrorsum non abii</i>. Et
+philosophus etiam dicit, in cap. de bona fortuna, quod his qui
+moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit consiliari secundum
+rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum, quia
+moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est quod
+quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam
+sint actus virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above
+the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the
+Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike
+kai theia}]," in respect of which some men are called "divine."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36343] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi dona nominantur quandoque virtutes,
+secundum communem rationem virtutis. Habent tamen aliquid
+supereminens rationi communi virtutis, inquantum sunt quaedam
+divinae virtutes, perficientes hominem inquantum est a Deo motus.
+Unde et philosophus, in VII Ethic., supra virtutem communem ponit
+quandam virtutem heroicam vel divinam, secundum quam dicuntur
+aliqui divini viri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed
+to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason,
+whose light flows from God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36344] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod vitia, inquantum sunt contra bonum rationis,
+contrariantur virtutibus, inquantum autem sunt contra divinum
+instinctum, contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo et
+rationi, cuius lumen a Deo derivatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished
+from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured
+by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation
+to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the
+promptings of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36345] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod definitio illa datur de virtute secundum communem
+modum virtutis. Unde si volumus definitionem restringere ad
+virtutes prout distinguuntur a donis, dicemus quod hoc quod
+dicitur, qua recte vivitur, intelligendum est de rectitudine vitae
+quae accipitur secundum regulam rationis. Similiter autem donum,
+prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a
+Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet facit hominem bene
+sequentem suos instinctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according
+as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36346] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod sapientia dicitur intellectualis virtus, secundum
+quod procedit ex iudicio rationis, dicitur autem donum, secundum
+quod operatur ex instinctu divino. Et similiter dicendum est de
+aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A2-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 2. Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing
+the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing
+the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the
+gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36347] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint necessaria homini ad
+salutem. Dona enim ordinantur ad quandam perfectionem ultra
+communem perfectionem virtutis. Non autem est homini necessarium ad
+salutem ut huiusmodi perfectionem consequatur, quae est ultra
+communem statum virtutis, quia huiusmodi perfectio non cadit sub
+praecepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini
+ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now
+man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues.
+Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36348] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad salutem hominis sufficit quod homo se bene habeat et circa
+divina et circa humana. Sed per virtutes theologicas homo se habet
+bene circa divina; per virtutes autem morales, circa humana. Ergo
+dona non sunt homini necessaria ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel
+against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against
+pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary
+to man for salvation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36349] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod <i>spiritus sanctus dat
+sapientiam contra stultitiam, intellectum contra hebetudinem,
+consilium contra praecipitationem, fortitudinem contra timorem,
+scientiam contra ignorantiam, pietatem contra duritiam, timorem
+contra superbiam</i>. Sed sufficiens remedium potest adhiberi ad
+omnia ista tollenda per virtutes. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria
+homini ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since
+of wisdom it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:28</a>): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary
+for salvation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36350] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+inter dona summum videtur esse sapientia, infimum autem timor.
+Utrumque autem horum necessarium est ad salutem, quia de sapientia
+dicitur, Sap. VII, <i>neminem diligit Deus nisi eum qui cum
+sapientia inhabitat</i>; et de timore dicitur, Eccli. I, <i>qui
+sine timore est, non poterit iustificari</i>. Ergo etiam alia dona
+media sunt necessaria ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those
+matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is,
+in consequence, need for a gift.
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p7"> Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason;
+secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q68_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[1]</a>). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner
+than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter
+imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue
+perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every
+nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work,
+unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has
+the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can
+work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions
+from him.
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p8"> Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment
+of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be
+out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues,
+had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason
+moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does
+not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>,
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.17" target="asv">17</a>: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.142.10" target="asv"> Ps. 142:10</a>: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that
+land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it
+is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 co."><a name="36351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36351] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam hominis
+perfectiones, quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur
+instinctum divinum. Unde in his in quibus non sufficit instinctus
+rationis, sed est necessarius spiritus sancti instinctus, per
+consequens est necessarium donum. Ratio autem hominis est perfecta
+dupliciter a Deo, primo quidem, naturali perfectione, scilicet
+secundum lumen naturale rationis; alio modo, quadam supernaturali
+perfectione, per virtutes theologicas, ut dictum est supra. Et
+quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit maior quam prima, tamen prima
+perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda, nam prima habetur
+ab homine quasi plena possessio, secunda autem habetur quasi
+imperfecta; imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum.
+Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque quod perfecte habet naturam
+vel formam aliquam aut virtutem, potest per se secundum illam
+operari, non tamen exclusa operatione Dei, qui in omni natura et
+voluntate interius operatur. Sed id quod imperfecte habet naturam
+aliquam vel formam aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab
+altero moveatur. Sicut sol, quia est perfecte lucidus, per seipsum
+potest illuminare, luna autem, in qua est imperfecte natura lucis,
+non illuminat nisi illuminata. Medicus etiam, qui perfecte novit
+artem medicinae, potest per se operari, sed discipulus eius, qui
+nondum est plene instructus, non potest per se operari, nisi ab eo
+instruatur. Sic igitur quantum ad ea quae subsunt humanae rationi,
+in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini; homo potest
+operari, per iudicium rationis. Si tamen etiam in hoc homo
+adiuvetur a Deo per specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis
+bonitatis, unde secundum philosophos, non quicumque habebat
+virtutes morales acquisitas, habebat virtutes heroicas vel divinas.
+Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet
+secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per virtutes
+theologicas; non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit
+instinctus et motio spiritus sancti; secundum illud Rom. VIII,
+<i>qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt; et si filii, et
+haeredes</i>, et in Psalmo CXLII, dicitur, <i>spiritus tuus bonus
+deducet me in terram rectam</i>; quia scilicet in haereditatem
+illius terrae beatorum nullus potest pervenire, nisi moveatur et
+deducatur a spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum,
+necessarium est homini habere donum spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments),
+but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36352] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod dona excedunt communem perfectionem virtutum,
+non quantum ad genus operum, eo modo quo consilia excedunt
+praecepta, sed quantum ad modum operandi, secundum quod movetur
+homo ab altiori principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need
+of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36353] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita
+perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin semper indigeat
+moveri quodam superiori instinctu spiritus sancti, ratione iam
+dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does
+not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in
+the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly,
+ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the
+gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36354] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod rationi humanae non sunt omnia cognita, neque omnia
+possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta perfectione naturali, sive
+accipiatur ut perfecta theologicis virtutibus. Unde non potest
+quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus
+ibi fit mentio. Sed Deus cuius scientiae et potestati omnia
+subsunt, sua motione ab omni stultitia et ignorantia et hebetudine
+et duritia et ceteris huiusmodi, nos tutos reddit. Et ideo dona
+spiritus sancti, quae faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ipsius,
+dicuntur contra huiusmodi defectus dari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A3-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 3. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined
+as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts
+of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory
+comments as
+follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator."
+Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36355] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non sint habitus.
+Habitus enim est qualitas in homine manens, est enim qualitas
+difficile mobilis, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed proprium
+Christi est quod dona spiritus sancti in eo requiescant; ut dicitur
+Isaiae XI. Et Ioan. I, dicitur, <i>super quem videris spiritum
+descendentem, et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat</i>, quod
+exponens Gregorius, in II Moral., dicit, <i>in cunctis fidelibus
+spiritus sanctus venit; sed in solo mediatore semper singulariter
+permanet</i>. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected
+by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36356] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem secundum quod agitur a
+spiritu Dei, sicut dictum est. Sed inquantum homo agitur a spiritu
+Dei, se habet quodammodo ut instrumentum respectu eius. Non autem
+convenit ut instrumentum perficiatur per habitum, sed principale
+agens. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a
+habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither,
+therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36357] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut dona spiritus sancti sunt ex inspiratione divina, ita et
+donum prophetiae. Sed prophetia non est habitus, non enim semper
+spiritus prophetiae adest prophetis, ut Gregorius dicit, in I
+homilia Ezechielis. Ergo neque etiam dona spiritus sancti sunt
+habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts
+abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36358] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dominus dicit discipulis, de spiritu sancto loquens, Ioan.
+XIV, <i>apud vos manebit, et in vobis erit</i>. Spiritus autem
+sanctus non est in hominibus absque donis eius. Ergo dona eius
+manent in hominibus. Ergo non solum sunt actus vel passiones, sed
+etiam habitus permanentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from
+what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it
+partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly
+the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as
+compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related
+to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly.
+Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 co."><a name="36359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36359] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam perfectiones
+hominis, quibus disponitur ad hoc quod homo bene sequatur
+instinctum spiritus sancti. Manifestum est autem ex supradictis
+quod virtutes morales perficiunt vim appetitivam secundum quod
+participat aliqualiter rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri
+per imperium rationis. Hoc igitur modo dona spiritus sancti se
+habent ad hominem in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum, sicut
+virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparatione ad
+rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires
+appetitivae disponuntur ad prompte obediendum rationi. Unde et dona
+spiritus sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad
+prompte obediendum spiritui sancto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy
+Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A2" id="FS_Q68_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36360] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Gregorius ibidem solvit, dicens quod <i>in illis
+donis sine quibus ad vitam perveniri non potest, spiritus sanctus
+in electis omnibus semper manet, sed in aliis non semper manet</i>.
+Septem autem dona sunt necessaria ad salutem, ut dictum est. Unde
+quantum ad ea, spiritus sanctus semper manet in sanctis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is
+not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has
+a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36361] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de instrumento cuius non est
+agere, sed solum agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic
+agitur a spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi
+arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the
+comparison fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36362] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod prophetia est de donis quae sunt ad manifestationem
+spiritus, non autem ad necessitatem salutis. Unde non est
+simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A4-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 4. Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding
+to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing
+is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to
+justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of
+fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36363] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter septem dona spiritus
+sancti enumerentur. In illa enim enumeratione ponuntur quatuor
+pertinentia ad virtutes intellectuales, scilicet sapientia,
+intellectus, scientia et consilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam,
+nihil autem ibi ponitur quod pertineat ad artem, quae est quinta
+virtus intellectualis. Similiter etiam ponitur aliquid pertinens ad
+iustitiam, scilicet pietas, et aliquid pertinens ad fortitudinem,
+scilicet donum fortitudinis, nihil autem ponitur ibi pertinens ad
+temperantiam. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore
+justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36364] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+pietas est pars iustitiae. Sed circa fortitudinem non ponitur
+aliqua pars eius, sed ipsa fortitudo. Ergo non debuit poni pietas,
+sed ipsa iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is
+moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36365] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes theologicae maxime ordinant nos ad Deum. Cum ergo dona
+perficiant hominem secundum quod movetur a Deo, videtur quod
+debuissent poni aliqua dona pertinentia ad theologicas
+virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided
+with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36366] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut Deus timetur, ita etiam amatur, et in ipsum aliquis sperat,
+et de eo delectatur. Amor autem, spes et delectatio sunt passiones
+condivisae timori. Ergo, sicut timor ponitur donum, ita et alia
+tria debent poni dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore,
+some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably
+enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="36367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36367] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+intellectui adiungitur sapientia quae regit ipsum; fortitudini
+autem consilium, pietati vero scientia. Ergo et timori debuit addi
+aliquod donum directivum. Inconvenienter ergo septem dona spiritus
+sancti enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Holy Writ (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36368] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in
+contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae, Isaiae XI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A4-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues
+perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved
+by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior
+power. Therefore whatever powers in man
+can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the
+reason and appetite.
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A4-p9"> Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery
+of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected
+by "understanding"; the practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom";
+the practical reason by "knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to
+another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers;
+and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.27" target="asv"> Prov. 15:27</a>: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," and
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv"> Ps. 118:120</a>: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all
+those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and
+moral, extend.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 co."><a name="36369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36369] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quidam habitus
+perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum
+spiritus sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires
+appetitivas ad obediendum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae
+natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae
+natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori
+potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse
+principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt
+dona, scilicet in ratione, et in vi appetitiva. Ratio autem est
+speculativa et practica, et in utraque consideratur apprehensio
+veritatis, quae pertinet ad inventionem; et iudicium de veritate.
+Ad apprehensionem igitur veritatis, perficitur speculativa ratio
+per intellectum; practica vero per consilium. Ad recte autem
+iudicandum, speculativa quidem per sapientiam, practica vero per
+scientiam perficitur. Appetitiva autem virtus, in his quidem quae
+sunt ad alterum, perficitur per pietatem. In his autem quae sunt ad
+seipsum, perficitur per fortitudinem contra terrorem periculorum,
+contra concupiscentiam vero inordinatam delectabilium, per timorem,
+secundum illud Proverb. XV, <i>per timorem domini declinat omnis a
+malo</i>; et in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>confige timore tuo carnes meas, a
+iudiciis enim tuis timui</i>. Et sic patet quod haec dona extendunt
+se ad omnia ad quae se extendunt virtutes tam intellectuales quam
+morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but
+to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made
+(Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost,
+Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He
+moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking,
+to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to
+withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36370] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem in his
+quae pertinent ad bene vivendum, ad quae non ordinatur ars, sed ad
+exteriora factibilia; est enim ars ratio recta non agibilium, sed
+factibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Potest tamen dici quod,
+quantum ad infusionem donorum, ars pertinet ad spiritum sanctum,
+qui est principaliter movens; non autem ad homines, qui sunt
+quaedam organa eius dum ab eo moventur. Temperantiae autem
+respondet quodammodo donum timoris. Sicut enim ad virtutem
+temperantiae pertinet, secundum eius propriam rationem, ut aliquis
+recedat a delectationibus pravis propter bonum rationis; ita ad
+donum timoris pertinet quod aliquis recedat a delectationibus
+pravis propter Dei timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name
+of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship
+of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for
+God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36371] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod nomen iustitiae imponitur a rectitudine rationis, et
+ideo nomen virtutis est convenientius quam nomen doni. Sed nomen
+pietatis importat reverentiam quam habemus ad patrem et ad patriam.
+Et quia pater omnium Deus est, etiam cultus Dei pietas nominatur;
+ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Et ideo convenienter donum quo
+aliquis propter reverentiam Dei bonum operatur ad omnes, pietas
+nominatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved
+by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is
+by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore
+all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36372] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod animus hominis non movetur a spiritu sancto, nisi ei
+secundum aliquem modum uniatur, sicut instrumentum non movetur ab
+artifice nisi per contactum, aut per aliquam aliam unionem. Prima
+autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et caritatem. Unde istae
+virtutes praesupponuntur ad dona, sicut radices quaedam donorum.
+Unde omnia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, sicut quaedam
+derivationes praedictarum virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred
+to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to
+God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does
+not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws
+us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36373] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod amor et spes et delectatio habent bonum pro obiecto.
+Summum autem bonum Deus est, unde nomina harum passionum
+transferuntur ad virtutes theologicas, quibus anima coniungitur
+Deo. Timoris autem obiectum est malum, quod Deo nullo modo
+competit, unde non importat coniunctionem ad Deum, sed magis
+recessum ab aliquibus rebus propter reverentiam Dei. Et ideo non
+est nomen virtutis theologicae, sed doni, quod eminentius retrahit
+a malis quam virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their
+directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear.
+Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="36374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36374] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod per sapientiam dirigitur et hominis intellectus, et
+hominis affectus. Et ideo ponuntur duo correspondentia sapientiae
+tanquam directivo, ex parte quidem intellectus, donum intellectus;
+ex parte autem affectus, donum timoris. Ratio enim timendi Deum
+praecipue sumitur ex consideratione excellentiae divinae, quam
+considerat sapientia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A5-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 5. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same
+Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are
+given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36375] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint connexa. Dicit enim
+apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, <i>alii datur per spiritum sermo
+sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum</i>. Sed
+sapientia et scientia inter dona spiritus sancti computantur. Ergo
+dona spiritus sancti dantur diversis, et non connectuntur sibi
+invicem in eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some
+of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected
+together in one and the same man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36376] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod <i>scientia non pollent
+fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide</i>. Sed fidem
+concomitatur aliquod de donis, ad minus donum timoris. Ergo videtur
+quod dona non sint ex necessitate connexa in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless
+if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude
+is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is
+very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it
+has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that it is possible to
+have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36377] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Gregorius, in I Moral., dicit quod <i>minor est sapientia, si
+intellectu careat; et valde inutilis est intellectus, si ex
+sapientia non subsistat. Vile est consilium, cui opus fortitudinis
+deest; et valde fortitudo destruitur, nisi per consilium fulciatur.
+Nulla est scientia, si utilitatem pietatis non habet; et valde
+inutilis est pietas, si scientiae discretione caret. Timor quoque
+ipse, si non has virtutes habuerit, ad nullum opus bonae actionis
+surgit</i>. Ex quibus videtur quod unum donum possit sine alio
+haberi. Non ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons,
+that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore
+the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36378] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod ibidem Gregorius praemittit, dicens, <i>illud in hoc
+filiorum convivio perscrutandum videtur, quod semetipsos invicem
+pascunt</i>. Per filios autem Iob, de quibus loquitur, designantur
+dona spiritus sancti. Ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa, per
+hoc quod se invicem reficiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers
+of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity,
+according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is
+poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore,
+just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity:
+so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 co."><a name="36379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36379] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas de facili ex praemissis
+potest haberi. Dictum est enim supra quod sicut vires appetitivae
+disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione ad regimen
+rationis, ita omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in
+comparatione ad spiritum sanctum moventem. Spiritus autem sanctus
+habitat in nobis per caritatem, secundum illud Rom. V, <i>caritas
+Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus
+est nobis</i>, sicut et ratio nostra perficitur per prudentiam.
+Unde sicut virtutes morales connectuntur sibi invicem in prudentia,
+ita dona spiritus sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate, ita
+scilicet quod qui caritatem habet, omnia dona spiritus sancti
+habet; quorum nullum sine caritate haberi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge
+of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense
+that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and
+the "word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the
+Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the
+promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in
+all who are possessed of charity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36380] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod sapientia et scientia uno modo possunt
+considerari secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae, prout scilicet
+aliquis abundat intantum in cognitione rerum divinarum et
+humanarum, ut possit et fideles instruere et adversarios confutare.
+Et sic loquitur ibi apostolus de sapientia et scientia, unde
+signanter fit mentio de sermone sapientiae et scientiae. Alio modo
+possunt accipi prout sunt dona spiritus sancti. Et sic sapientia et
+scientia nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam perfectiones humanae mentis,
+secundum quas disponitur ad sequendum instinctus spiritus sancti in
+cognitione divinorum vel humanorum. Et sic patet quod huiusmodi
+dona sunt in omnibus habentibus caritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring
+to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it
+is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life;
+and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it
+against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36381] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de scientia exponens
+praedictam auctoritatem apostoli, unde loquitur de scientia
+praedicto modo accepta, secundum quod est gratia gratis data. Quod
+patet ex hoc quod subdit, <i>aliud enim est scire tantummodo quid
+homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quae non
+nisi aeterna est; aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis
+opituletur, et contra impios defendatur; quam proprio appellare
+vocabulo scientiam videtur apostolus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by
+another, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q68_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without
+the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend
+its support to
+another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without
+wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36382] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut uno modo connexio virtutum cardinalium
+probatur per hoc quod una earum perficitur quodammodo per aliam, ut
+supra dictum est; ita Gregorius eodem modo vult probare connexionem
+donorum, per hoc quod unum sine alio non potest esse perfectum.
+Unde praemittit dicens, <i>valde singula quaelibet destituitur, si
+non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur</i>. Non ergo datur
+intelligi quod unum donum possit esse sine alio, sed quod
+intellectus, si esset sine sapientia, non esset donum; sicut
+temperantia, si esset sine iustitia, non esset virtus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A6-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 6. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of
+His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven,
+according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.9" target="asv"> Is. 11:9</a>: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in
+heaven.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36383] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non maneant in
+patria. Dicit enim Gregorius, in II Moral., quod <i>spiritus
+sanctus contra singula tentamenta septem donis erudit mentem</i>.
+Sed in patria non erunt aliqua tentamenta; secundum illud Isaiae
+XI, <i>non nocebunt et non occident in universo monte sancto
+meo</i>. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non erunt in patria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory
+says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly
+. . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of
+which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36384] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+dona spiritus sancti sunt habitus quidam, ut supra dictum est.
+Frustra autem essent habitus, ubi actus esse non possunt. Actus
+autem quorundam donorum in patria esse non possunt, dicit enim
+Gregorius, in I Moral., quod <i>intellectus facit audita penetrare,
+et consilium prohibet esse praecipitem, et fortitudo facit non
+metuere adversa, et pietas replet cordis viscera operibus
+misericordiae</i>; haec autem non competunt statui patriae. Ergo
+huiusmodi dona non erunt in statu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life,
+e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of
+the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36385] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+donorum quaedam perficiunt hominem in vita contemplativa, ut
+sapientia et intellectus; quaedam in vita activa, ut pietas et
+fortitudo. Sed activa vita cum hac vita terminatur; ut Gregorius
+dicit, in VI Moral. Ergo in statu gloriae non erunt omnia dona
+spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly
+river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more
+abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36386] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>civitas
+Dei illa, Ierusalem caelestis, non meatu alicuius fluvii terrestris
+abluitur; sed ex vitae fonte procedens spiritus sanctus, cuius nos
+brevi satiamur haustu, in illis caelestibus spiritibus redundantius
+videtur affluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens
+meatu</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may
+be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human
+mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all"
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may
+be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation
+about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not
+remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues (
+<a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[67], A[1]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 co."><a name="36387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36387] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod de donis dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno modo, quantum
+ad essentiam donorum, et sic perfectissime erunt in patria, sicut
+patet per auctoritatem Ambrosii inductam. Cuius ratio est quia dona
+spiritus sancti perficiunt mentem humanam ad sequendam motionem
+spiritus sancti, quod praecipue erit in patria, quando Deus erit
+omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, et quando homo erit
+totaliter subditus Deo. Alio modo possunt considerari quantum ad
+materiam circa quam operantur, et sic in praesenti habent
+operationem circa aliquam materiam circa quam non habebunt
+operationem in statu gloriae. Et secundum hoc, non manebunt in
+patria, sicut supra de virtutibus cardinalibus dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they
+afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected
+in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36388] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur ibi de donis secundum quod
+competunt statui praesenti, sic enim donis protegimur contra
+tentamenta malorum. Sed in statu gloriae, cessantibus malis, per
+dona spiritus sancti perficiemur in bono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in
+the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two,
+hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and
+enlightening its darkness," of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach
+no more every man . . . his brother" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3,4</a>); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is necessary
+in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude
+he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands
+of confidence," which remains also in the
+future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers
+to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge,
+which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words
+taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost
+heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say
+that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens
+it with the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to
+the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36389] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Gregorius quasi in singulis donis ponit aliquid quod
+transit cum statu praesenti, et aliquid quod permanet etiam in
+futuro. Dicit enim quod sapientia mentem de aeternorum spe et
+certitudine reficit, quorum duorum spes transit, sed certitudo
+remanet. Et de intellectu dicit quod in eo quod audita penetrat,
+reficiendo cor, tenebras eius illustrat, quorum auditus transit,
+quia non docebit vir fratrem suum, ut dicitur Ierem. XXXI; sed
+illustratio mentis manebit. De consilio autem dicit quod prohibet
+esse praecipitem, quod est necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod
+ratione animum replet, quod est necessarium etiam in futuro. De
+fortitudine vero dicit quod adversa non metuit, quod est
+necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod confidentiae cibos
+apponit, quod permanet etiam in futuro. De scientia vero unum
+tantum ponit, scilicet quod ignorantiae ieiunium superat, quod
+pertinet ad statum praesentem. Sed quod addit, in ventre mentis,
+potest figuraliter intelligi repletio cognitionis, quae pertinet
+etiam ad statum futurum. De pietate vero dicit quod cordis viscera
+misericordiae operibus replet. Quod quidem secundum verba, pertinet
+tantum ad statum praesentem. Sed ipse intimus affectus proximorum,
+per viscera designatus, pertinet etiam ad futurum statum; in quo
+pietas non exhibebit misericordiae opera, sed congratulationis
+affectum. De timore vero dicit quod premit mentem, ne de
+praesentibus superbiat, quod pertinet ad statum praesentem; et quod
+de futuris cibo spei confortat, quod etiam pertinet ad statum
+praesentem, quantum ad spem; sed potest etiam ad statum futurum
+pertinere, quantum ad confortationem de rebus hic speratis, et ibi
+obtentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life;
+but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of
+heavenly bliss.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36390] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de donis quantum ad materiam.
+Opera enim activae vitae non erunt materia donorum, sed omnia
+habebunt actus suos circa ea quae pertinent ad vitam
+contemplativam, quae est vita beata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A7-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 7. Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly,
+that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is
+written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malachi 1:6</a>): "If . . . I be a master, where is My
+fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36391] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod dignitas donorum non attenditur
+secundum enumerationem qua enumerantur Isaiae XI. Illud enim
+videtur esse potissimum in donis, quod maxime Deus ab homine
+requirit. Sed maxime requirit Deus ab homine timorem, dicitur enim
+Deut. X, <i>et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te,
+nisi ut timeas dominum Deum tuum?</i> Et Malach. I, dicitur, <i>si
+ego dominus, ubi timor meus?</i> Ergo videtur quod timor, qui
+enumeratur ultimo, non sit infimum donorum, sed maximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore
+piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36392] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+pietas videtur esse quoddam bonum universale, dicit enim apostolus,
+I ad Tim. IV, quod <i>pietas ad omnia utilis est</i>. Sed bonum
+universale praefertur particularibus bonis. Ergo pietas, quae
+penultimo enumeratur, videtur esse potissimum donorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.
+Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36393] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+scientia perficit iudicium hominis; consilium autem ad
+inquisitionem pertinet. Sed iudicium praeeminet inquisitioni. Ergo
+scientia est potius donum quam consilium, cum tamen post
+enumeretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power
+than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence.
+Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="36394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36394] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+fortitudo pertinet ad vim appetitivam; scientia autem ad rationem.
+Sed ratio est eminentior quam vis appetitiva. Ergo et scientia est
+eminentius donum quam fortitudo, quae tamen primo enumeratur. Non
+ergo dignitas donorum attenditur secundum ordinem enumerationis
+eorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias
+speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.3" target="asv"> Mat. 5:3</a>]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here,
+with the lower gifts."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36395] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte,
+<i>videtur mihi septiformis operatio spiritus sancti, de qua Isaias
+loquitur, his gradibus sententiisque congruere</i> (de quibus fit
+mentio Matth. V); sed interest ordinis. Nam ibi (scilicet in Isaia)
+<i>enumeratio ab excellentioribus coepit, hic vero, ab
+inferioribus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding
+from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts
+simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for
+all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A4" id="FS_Q68_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative
+are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before
+understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom,
+understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and
+fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude
+temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel
+are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of
+the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference
+to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and
+piety, it is considered with regard to their matter.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 co."><a name="36396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36396] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod dignitas donorum dupliciter potest attendi, uno modo,
+simpliciter, scilicet per comparationem ad proprios actus prout
+procedunt a suis principiis; alio modo, secundum quid, scilicet per
+comparationem ad materiam. Simpliciter autem loquendo de dignitate
+donorum, eadem est ratio comparationis in ipsis et in virtutibus,
+quia dona ad omnes actus potentiarum animae perficiunt hominem, ad
+quos perficiunt virtutes, ut supra dictum est. Unde sicut virtutes
+intellectuales praeferuntur virtutibus moralibus; et in ipsis
+virtutibus intellectualibus contemplativae praeferuntur activis, ut
+sapientia intellectui, et scientia prudentiae et arti; ita tamen
+quod sapientia praefertur intellectui, et intellectus scientiae,
+sicut prudentia et synesis eubuliae, ita etiam in donis sapientia
+et intellectus, scientia et consilium, praeferuntur pietati et
+fortitudini et timori; in quibus etiam pietas praefertur
+fortitudini, et fortitudo timori, sicut iustitia fortitudini, et
+fortitudo temperantiae. Sed quantum ad materiam, fortitudo et
+consilium praeferuntur scientiae et pietati, quia scilicet
+fortitudo et consilium in arduis locum habent; pietas autem, et
+etiam scientia, in communibus. Sic igitur donorum dignitas ordini
+enumerationis respondet, partim quidem simpliciter, secundum quod
+sapientia et intellectus omnibus praeferuntur, partim autem
+secundum ordinem materiae, secundum quod consilium et fortitudo
+praeferuntur scientiae et pietati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the
+Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.10" target="asv">Ps. 110:10</a>;
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.16" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:16</a>), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on
+account of fear (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.16" target="asv">Prov. 16:16</a>), before doing good works, and which result from the other
+gifts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36397] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod timor maxime requiritur quasi primordium quoddam
+perfectionis donorum, quia initium sapientiae timor domini, non
+propter hoc quod sit ceteris dignius. Prius enim est, secundum
+ordinem generationis, ut aliquis recedat a malo, quod fit per
+timorem, ut dicitur Proverb. XVI; quam quod operetur bonum, quod
+fit per alia dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which
+he had said it "is profitable to little."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36398] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod pietas non comparatur in verbis apostoli, omnibus
+donis Dei, sed soli corporali exercitationi, de qua praemittit quod
+ad modicum utilis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter:
+for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36399] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod scientia etsi praeferatur consilio ratione iudicii,
+tamen consilium praefertur ratione materiae, nam consilium non
+habet locum nisi in arduis, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; sed iudicium
+scientiae in omnibus locum habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation
+to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled.
+But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge
+united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of
+difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason
+of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="36400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36400] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod dona directiva, quae pertinent ad rationem, donis
+exequentibus digniora sunt, si considerentur per comparationem ad
+actus prout egrediuntur a potentiis, ratio enim appetitivae
+praeeminet, ut regulans regulato. Sed ratione materiae, adiungitur
+consilium fortitudini, sicut directivum exequenti, et similiter
+scientia pietati, quia scilicet consilium et fortitudo in arduis
+locum habent, scientia autem et pietas etiam in communibus. Et ideo
+consilium simul cum fortitudine, ratione materiae, numeratur ante
+scientiam et pietatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A8-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 8. Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of
+charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from
+the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing."
+But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy
+Ghost.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36401] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes sint praeferendae donis.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, in XV de Trin., de caritate loquens,
+<i>nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. Solum est quod dividit
+inter filios regni aeterni, et filios perditionis aeternae, dantur
+et alia per spiritum sanctum munera, sed sine caritate nihil
+prosunt</i>. Sed caritas est virtus. Ergo virtus est potior donis
+spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost;
+for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence,
+fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly
+to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against
+fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues
+are more excellent than the gifts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36402] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ea quae sunt priora naturaliter, videntur esse potiora. Sed
+virtutes sunt priores donis spiritus sancti, dicit enim Gregorius,
+in II Moral., quod <i>donum spiritus sancti in subiecta mente ante
+alia iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam format, et
+sic eandem mentem septem mox virtutibus</i> (idest donis)
+<i>temperat, ut contra stultitiam, sapientiam; contra hebetudinem,
+intellectum; contra praecipitationem, consilium; contra timorem,
+fortitudinem; contra ignorantiam, scientiam; contra duritiam,
+pietatem; contra superbiam, det timorem</i>. Ergo virtutes sunt
+potiores donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make
+evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift;
+or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion;
+that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while
+it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and
+lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than
+the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36403] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutibus nullus male uti potest, ut Augustinus dicit. Donis autem
+potest aliquis male uti, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod
+<i>hostiam nostrae precis immolamus ne sapientia elevet; ne
+intellectus, dum subtiliter currit, oberret; ne consilium, dum se
+multiplicat, confundat; ne fortitudo, dum fiduciam praebet,
+praecipitet; ne scientia, dum novit et non diligit, inflet; ne
+pietas, dum se extra rectitudinem inclinat, intorqueat; ne timor,
+dum plus iusto trepidat, in desperationis foveam mergat</i>. Ergo
+virtutes sunt digniores donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so
+that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36404] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dona dantur in adiutorium virtutum contra defectus, ut
+patet in auctoritate inducta; et sic videtur quod perficiant quod
+virtutes perficere non possunt. Sunt ergo dona potiora
+virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[62], A[1]</a>), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues
+are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and
+the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of
+the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p7"> Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover,
+in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle
+of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so
+the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory
+says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all
+they do be done in faith, hope, and charity."
+</p><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p8"> But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues.
+Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either
+the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more
+excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect
+than the virtues.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 co."><a name="36405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36405] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtutes in tria genera
+distinguuntur, sunt enim quaedam virtutes theologicae, quaedam
+intellectuales, quaedam morales. Virtutes quidem theologicae sunt
+quibus mens humana Deo coniungitur; virtutes autem intellectuales
+sunt quibus ratio ipsa perficitur; virtutes autem morales sunt
+quibus vires appetitivae perficiuntur ad obediendum rationi. Dona
+autem spiritus sancti sunt quibus omnes vires animae disponuntur ad
+hoc quod subdantur motioni divinae. Sic ergo eadem videtur esse
+comparatio donorum ad virtutes theologicas, per quas homo unitur
+spiritui sancto moventi; sicut virtutum moralium ad virtutes
+intellectuales, per quas perficitur ratio, quae est virtutum
+moralium motiva. Unde sicut virtutes intellectuales praeferuntur
+virtutibus moralibus, et regulant eas; ita virtutes theologicae
+praeferuntur donis spiritus sancti, et regulant ea. Unde Gregorius
+dicit, in I Moral., quod <i>neque ad denarii perfectionem septem
+filii</i> (idest septem dona) <i>perveniunt, nisi in fide, spe et
+caritate fuerit omne quod agunt</i>. Sed si comparemus dona ad
+alias virtutes intellectuales vel morales, dona praeferuntur
+virtutibus. Quia dona perficiunt vires animae in comparatione ad
+spiritum sanctum moventem, virtutes autem perficiunt vel ipsam
+rationem, vel alias vires in ordine ad rationem. Manifestum est
+autem quod ad altiorem motorem oportet maiori perfectione mobile
+esse dispositum. Unde perfectiora sunt dona virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36406] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod caritas est virtus theologica; de qua concedimus
+quod sit potior donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes
+love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues.
+The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act:
+and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man,
+through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36407] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod aliquid est prius altero dupliciter. Uno modo, ordine
+perfectionis et dignitatis, sicut dilectio Dei est prior dilectione
+proximi. Et hoc modo dona sunt priora virtutibus intellectualibus
+et moralibus, posteriora vero virtutibus theologicis. Alio modo,
+ordine generationis seu dispositionis, sicut dilectio proximi
+praecedit dilectionem Dei, quantum ad actum. Et sic virtutes
+morales et intellectuales praecedunt dona, quia per hoc quod homo
+bene se habet circa rationem propriam, disponitur ad hoc quod se
+bene habeat in ordine ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth
+not perversely" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy
+Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36408] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod sapientia et intellectus et alia huiusmodi sunt dona
+spiritus sancti, secundum quod caritate informantur; quae non agit
+perperam, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Et ideo sapientia et
+intellectu et aliis huiusmodi nullus male utitur, secundum quod
+sunt dona spiritus sancti. Sed ad hoc quod a caritatis perfectione
+non recedant, unum ab altero adiuvatur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius
+dicere intendit.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q69" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q69-p0.1">Q. 69. OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q69-p2"> We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q69-p3"><a href="#FS_Q69_A1"> (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p4"><a href="#FS_Q69_A2"> (2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p5"><a href="#FS_Q69_A3"> (3) Of the number of the beatitudes;</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p6"><a href="#FS_Q69_A4"> (4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 pr."><a name="36409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36409]
+Iª-IIae q. 69 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+beatitudinibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum
+beatitudines a donis et virtutibus distinguantur. Secundo, de
+praemiis beatitudinum, utrum pertineant ad hanc vitam. Tertio, de
+numero beatitudinum. Quarto, de convenientia praemiorum quae eis
+attribuuntur.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q69_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A1-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 1. Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns
+the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Luke 6:20, </a> seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from
+the virtues and gifts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36410] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudines a virtutibus et donis non
+distinguantur. Augustinus enim, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte,
+attribuit beatitudines in Matthaeo enumeratas, donis spiritus
+sancti, Ambrosius autem, super Lucam, attribuit beatitudines ibi
+enumeratas quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus. Ergo beatitudines non
+distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>;
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q21_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[21], A[1]</a>). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy
+Ghost, as is clear from what has been said (
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.3" shape="rect">Q[68], AA[1]</a>,3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of
+the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36411] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+humanae voluntatis non est nisi duplex regula, scilicet ratio, et
+lex aeterna, ut supra habitum est. Sed virtutes perficiunt hominem
+in ordine ad rationem; dona autem in ordine ad legem aeternam
+spiritus sancti, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo non potest esse aliquid
+aliud pertinens ad rectitudinem voluntatis humanae, praeter
+virtutes et dona. Non ergo beatitudines ab eis distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes
+do not differ from the virtues and gifts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36412] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+in enumeratione beatitudinum ponitur mititas, et iustitia, et
+misericordia; quae dicuntur esse quaedam virtutes. Ergo
+beatitudines non distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace.
+Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36413] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod quaedam enumerantur inter beatitudines, quae nec sunt
+virtutes nec dona; sicut paupertas, et luctus, et pax. Differunt
+ergo beatitudines et a virtutibus et a donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[7]</a>;
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[3], A[1]</a>), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore
+the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved
+towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy
+end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is
+not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow
+him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 co."><a name="36414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36414] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, beatitudo est ultimus finis
+humanae vitae. Dicitur autem aliquis iam finem habere, propter spem
+finis obtinendi, unde et philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod
+<i>pueri dicuntur beati propter spem</i>; et apostolus dicit, Rom.
+VIII, <i>spe salvi facti sumus</i>. Spes autem de fine consequendo
+insurgit ex hoc quod aliquis convenienter movetur ad finem, et
+appropinquat ad ipsum, quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad
+finem autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et appropinquat per
+operationes virtutum; et praecipue per operationes donorum, si
+loquamur de beatitudine aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in
+eam inducit spiritus sanctus, ad cuius obedientiam et sequelam per
+dona perficimur. Et ideo beatitudines distinguuntur quidem a
+virtutibus et donis, non sicut habitus ab eis distincti, sed sicut
+actus distinguuntur ab habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more
+excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A8" id="FS_Q69_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[68], A[8]</a>). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas
+Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more
+perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36415] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus et Ambrosius attribuunt beatitudines
+donis et virtutibus, sicut actus attribuuntur habitibus. Dona autem
+sunt eminentiora virtutibus cardinalibus, ut supra dictum est. Et
+ideo Ambrosius, exponens beatitudines turbis propositas, attribuit
+eas virtutibus cardinalibus; Augustinus autem, exponens
+beatitudines discipulis propositas in monte, tanquam
+perfectioribus, attribuit eas donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36416] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod non sunt alii habitus
+rectificantes humanam vitam, praeter virtutes et dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might
+seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues
+perfect him, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q68_A2" id="FS_Q69_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[68], A[2]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36417] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod mititas accipitur pro actu mansuetudinis, et
+similiter dicendum est de iustitia et de misericordia. Et quamvis
+haec videantur esse virtutes, attribuuntur tamen donis, quia etiam
+dona perficiunt hominem circa omnia circa quae perficiunt virtutes,
+ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A2-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 2. Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because
+they hope for a reward, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q69_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36418] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia quae attribuuntur
+beatitudinibus, non pertineant ad hanc vitam. Dicuntur enim aliqui
+beati propter spem praemiorum, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum spei
+beatitudo est futura. Ergo praemia ista pertinent ad vitam
+futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes,
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.25" target="asv"> Lk. 6:25, </a> where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep."
+Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.13" target="asv"> Job 21:13</a>: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes
+refer to this life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36419] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Luc. VI, ponuntur quaedam poenae per oppositum ad beatitudines, cum
+dicitur, <i>vae vobis qui saturati estis, quia esurietis. Vae vobis
+qui ridetis nunc, quia lugebitis et flebitis</i>. Sed istae poenae
+non intelliguntur in hac vita, quia frequenter homines in hac vita
+non puniuntur, secundum illud Iob XXI, <i>ducunt in bonis dies
+suos</i>. Ergo nec praemia beatitudinum pertinent ad hanc
+vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De
+Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according
+to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv"> Ps. 16:15</a>: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall
+see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made
+manifest, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall
+be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36420] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+regnum caelorum, quod ponitur praemium paupertatis, est beatitudo
+caelestis; ut Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei. Plena etiam
+saturitas non nisi in futura vita habetur; secundum illud Psalmi
+XVI, <i>satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua</i>. Visio etiam Dei, et
+manifestatio filiationis divinae, ad vitam futuram pertinent;
+secundum illud I Ioan. III, <i>nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum
+apparuit quid erimus. Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei
+erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est</i>. Ergo praemia illa
+pertinent ad vitam futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been
+fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised
+to us after this life."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36421] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, <i>ista
+quidem in hac vita compleri possunt, sicut completa esse in
+apostolis credimus. Nam illa omnimoda, et in angelicam formam
+mutatio, quae post hanc vitam promittitur, nullis verbis exponi
+potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all
+these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present
+life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life.
+</p><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p7"> In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by
+reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a
+kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree
+will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.
+</p><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to
+happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to
+refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which
+case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and
+gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 co."><a name="36422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36422] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod circa ista praemia expositores sacrae Scripturae
+diversimode sunt locuti. Quidam enim omnia ista praemia ad futuram
+beatitudinem pertinere dicunt, sicut Ambrosius, super Lucam.
+Augustinus vero dicit ea ad praesentem vitam pertinere.
+Chrysostomus autem, in suis homiliis, quaedam eorum dicit pertinere
+ad futuram vitam, quaedam autem ad praesentem. Ad cuius evidentiam,
+considerandum est quod spes futurae beatitudinis potest esse in
+nobis propter duo, primo quidem, propter aliquam praeparationem vel
+dispositionem ad futuram beatitudinem, quod est per modum meriti;
+alio modo, per quandam inchoationem imperfectam futurae
+beatitudinis in viris sanctis, etiam in hac vita. Aliter enim
+habetur spes fructificationis arboris cum virescit frondibus, et
+aliter cum iam primordia fructuum incipiunt apparere. Sic igitur ea
+quae in beatitudinibus tanguntur tanquam merita, sunt quaedam
+praeparationes vel dispositiones ad beatitudinem, vel perfectam vel
+inchoatam. Ea vero quae ponuntur tanquam praemia, possunt esse vel
+ipsa beatitudo perfecta, et sic pertinent ad futuram vitam, vel
+aliqua inchoatio beatitudinis, sicut est in viris perfectis, et sic
+praemia pertinent ad praesentem vitam. Cum enim aliquis incipit
+proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod
+perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that
+end, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.27.7" target="asv"> Ps. 27:7</a>: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36423] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod spes est de futura beatitudine sicut de ultimo
+fine, potest etiam esse et de auxilio gratiae, sicut de eo quod
+ducit ad finem, secundum illud Psalmi XXVII, <i>in Deo speravit cor
+meum, et adiutus sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence
+Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment."
+The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this
+way, another that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a
+man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes
+do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.29" target="asv"> Mat. 19:29, </a> and
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: "Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36424] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod mali, etsi interdum in hac vita temporales poenas non
+patiantur, patiuntur tamen spirituales. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I
+Confess., <i>iussisti, domine, et sic est, ut poena sibi sit
+inordinatus animus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., de
+malis, quod <i>contendit ipsorum anima, et hoc quidem huc trahit,
+illud autem illuc</i>; et postea concludit, <i>si autem sic miserum
+est malum esse, fugiendum est malitiam intense</i>. Et similiter e
+converso boni, etsi in hac vita quandoque non habeant corporalia
+praemia, nunquam tamen deficiunt a spiritualibus, etiam in hac
+vita; secundum illud Matth. XIX, et Marc. X, <i>centuplum
+accipietis etiam in hoc saeculo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this
+life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote
+the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the
+well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation
+of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is
+called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.34" target="asv">Jn. 4:34</a>): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being
+cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those
+who are the "peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children of God." Nevertheless
+these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36425] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod omnia illa praemia perfecte quidem consummabuntur in
+vita futura, sed interim etiam in hac vita quodammodo inchoantur.
+Nam regnum caelorum, ut Augustinus dicit, potest intelligi
+perfectae sapientiae initium, secundum quod incipit in eis spiritus
+regnare. Possessio etiam terrae significat affectum bonum animae
+requiescentis per desiderium in stabilitate haereditatis perpetuae,
+per terram significatae. Consolantur autem in hac vita, spiritum
+sanctum, qui Paracletus, idest consolator, dicitur, participando.
+Saturantur etiam in hac vita illo cibo de quo dominus dicit,
+<i>meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem patris mei</i>. In hac etiam
+vita consequuntur homines misericordiam Dei. In hac etiam vita,
+purgato oculo per donum intellectus, Deus quodammodo videri potest.
+Similiter etiam in hac vita qui motus suos pacificant, ad
+similitudinem Dei accedentes, filii Dei nominantur. Tamen haec
+perfectius erunt in patria.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A3-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 3. Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above
+(A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is
+assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes
+are insufficiently enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36426] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur
+beatitudines. Attribuuntur enim beatitudines donis, ut dictum est.
+Donorum autem quaedam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam, scilicet
+sapientia et intellectus, nulla autem beatitudo ponitur in actu
+contemplationis, sed omnes in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam.
+Ergo insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge
+and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the
+beatitudes are insufficiently indicated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36427] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad vitam activam non solum pertinent dona exequentia; sed etiam
+quaedam dona dirigentia, ut scientia et consilium. Nihil autem
+ponitur inter beatitudines quod directe ad actum scientiae vel
+consilii pertinere videatur. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines
+tanguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety
+seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes
+are insufficiently enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36428] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+inter dona exequentia in vita activa, timor ponitur ad paupertatem
+pertinere; pietas autem videtur pertinere ad beatitudinem
+misericordiae. Nihil autem ponitur directe ad fortitudinem
+pertinens. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.17" target="asv">Job 5:17</a>): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the
+ungodly"; and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.13" target="asv">Prov. 3:13</a>): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="36429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36429] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+in sacra Scriptura tanguntur multae aliae beatitudines, sicut Iob
+V, dicitur, <i>beatus homo qui corripitur a domino</i>; et in
+Psalmo I, <i>beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum</i>; et
+Proverb. III, <i>beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam</i>. Ergo
+insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes
+are indicated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1"><a name="36430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36430] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed
+contra, videtur quod superflue enumerentur. Sunt enim septem dona
+spiritus sancti. Beatitudines autem tanguntur octo.</p><p title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2"><a name="36431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36431] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Luc. VI, ponuntur quatuor tantum beatitudines. Superflue ergo
+enumerantur septem, vel octo, in Matthaeo.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7">
+<b>Objection 6:</b> Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Matthew 5</a> are too many.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 co."><a name="36432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36432] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod beatitudines istae convenientissime enumerantur. Ad
+cuius evidentiam, est considerandum quod triplicem beatitudinem
+aliqui posuerunt, quidam enim posuerunt beatitudinem in vita
+voluptuosa; quidam in vita activa; quidam vero in vita
+contemplativa. Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad
+beatitudinem futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic beati. Nam beatitudo
+voluptuosa, quia falsa est et rationi contraria, impedimentum est
+beatitudinis futurae. Beatitudo vero activae vitae dispositiva est
+ad beatitudinem futuram. Beatitudo autem contemplativa, si sit
+perfecta, est essentialiter ipsa futura beatitudo, si autem sit
+imperfecta, est quaedam inchoatio eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist
+in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative
+life [*See Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which
+we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason,
+is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative
+happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof.
+</p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p9"> And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life
+of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is
+withdrawn---by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them
+altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the
+contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following
+the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn---by
+a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a gift, in a more excellent manner,
+so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed are
+the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation---and
+by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
+of sorrow [*Cf.
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A3" id="FS_Q69_A3-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[3]</a>]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn."
+</p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p10"> Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity.
+To the former we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and
+by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry
+and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are
+they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give
+where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and
+by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty:
+hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv">Lk. 14:12,13</a>): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends,
+nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth
+beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful."
+</p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p11"> Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore
+they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man
+for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and
+gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the
+passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man
+is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17</a>: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Et ideo dominus primo
+quidem posuit quasdam beatitudines quasi removentes impedimentum
+voluptuosae beatitudinis. Consistit enim voluptuosa vita in duobus.
+Primo quidem, in affluentia exteriorum bonorum, sive sint divitiae,
+sive sint honores. A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic
+ut moderate eis utatur, per donum autem excellentiori modo, ut
+scilicet homo totaliter ea contemnat. Unde prima beatitudo ponitur,
+beati pauperes spiritu, quod potest referri vel ad contemptum
+divitiarum; vel ad contemptum honorum, quod fit per humilitatem.
+Secundo vero voluptuosa vita consistit in sequendo proprias
+passiones, sive irascibilis sive concupiscibilis. A sequela autem
+passionum irascibilis, retrahit virtus ne homo in eis superfluat,
+secundum regulam rationis, donum autem excellentiori modo, ut
+scilicet homo, secundum voluntatem divinam, totaliter ab eis
+tranquillus reddatur. Unde secunda beatitudo ponitur, beati mites.
+A sequela vero passionum concupiscibilis, retrahit virtus, moderate
+huiusmodi passionibus utendo, donum vero, eas, si necesse fuerit,
+totaliter abiiciendo; quinimmo, si necessarium fuerit, voluntarium
+luctum assumendo. Unde tertia beatitudo ponitur, beati qui lugent.
+Activa vero vita in his consistit praecipue quae proximis
+exhibemus, vel sub ratione debiti, vel sub ratione spontanei
+beneficii. Et ad primum quidem nos virtus disponit, ut ea quae
+debemus proximis, non recusemus exhibere, quod pertinet ad
+iustitiam. Donum autem ad hoc ipsum abundantiori quodam affectu nos
+inducit, ut scilicet ferventi desiderio opera iustitiae impleamus,
+sicut ferventi desiderio esuriens et sitiens cupit cibum vel potum.
+Unde quarta beatitudo ponitur, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt
+iustitiam. Circa spontanea vero dona nos perficit virtus ut illis
+donemus quibus ratio dictat esse donandum, puta amicis aut aliis
+nobis coniunctis, quod pertinet ad virtutem liberalitatis. Sed
+donum, propter Dei reverentiam, solam necessitatem considerat in
+his quibus gratuita beneficia praestat, unde dicitur Luc. XIV,
+<i>cum facis prandium aut coenam, noli vocare amicos neque fratres
+tuos etc., sed voca pauperes et debiles</i> etc., quod proprie est
+misereri. Et ideo quinta beatitudo ponitur, beati misericordes. Ea
+vero quae ad contemplativam vitam pertinent, vel sunt ipsa
+beatitudo finalis, vel aliqua inchoatio eius, et ideo non ponuntur
+in beatitudinibus tanquam merita, sed tanquam praemia. Ponuntur
+autem tanquam merita effectus activae vitae, quibus homo disponitur
+ad contemplativam vitam. Effectus autem activae vitae, quantum ad
+virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in seipso, est munditia
+cordis, ut scilicet mens hominis passionibus non inquinetur. Unde
+sexta beatitudo ponitur, beati mundo corde. Quantum vero ad
+virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in comparatione ad
+proximum, effectus activae vitae est pax; secundum illud Isaiae
+XXXII, <i>opus iustitiae pax</i>. Et ideo septima beatitudo
+ponitur, beati pacifici.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to
+the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift
+of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36433] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod actus donorum pertinentium ad vitam activam,
+exprimuntur in ipsis meritis, sed actus donorum pertinentium ad
+vitam contemplativam, exprimuntur in praemiis, ratione iam dicta.
+Videre enim Deum respondet dono intellectus; et conformari Deo
+quadam filiatione adoptiva, pertinet ad donum sapientiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even
+the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include
+the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to
+counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the
+other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge,
+and mercy in respect of counsel.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36434] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in his quae pertinent ad activam vitam, cognitio non
+quaeritur propter seipsam, sed propter operationem, ut etiam
+philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Et ideo, quia beatitudo aliquid
+ultimum importat, non computantur inter beatitudines actus donorum
+dirigentium in vita activa, quos scilicet eliciunt, sicut
+consiliari est actus consilii, et iudicare est actus scientiae, sed
+magis attribuuntur eis actus operativi in quibus dirigunt, sicut
+scientiae lugere, et consilio misereri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first
+five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed
+among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects
+man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.22" target="asv">
+Lk. 6:22
+</a>: "It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions:
+poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world.
+</p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p15"> Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently.
+Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge,
+whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv"> Eccles. 1:18</a>: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive for hungering after the works of
+justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv">Dan. 4:24</a>: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities
+with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36435] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in attributione beatitudinum ad dona, possunt duo
+considerari. Quorum unum est conformitas materiae. Et secundum hoc,
+omnes primae quinque beatitudines possunt attribui scientiae et
+consilio, tanquam dirigentibus. Sed inter dona exequentia
+distribuuntur, ita scilicet quod esuries et sitis iustitiae, et
+etiam misericordia, pertineant ad pietatem, quae perficit hominem
+in his quae sunt ad alterum; mititas autem ad fortitudinem, dicit
+enim Ambrosius, super Lucam, quod <i>fortitudinis est iram vincere,
+indignationem cohibere</i>, est enim fortitudo circa passiones
+irascibilis; paupertas vero et luctus ad donum timoris, quo homo se
+retrahit a cupiditatibus et delectationibus mundi. Alio modo
+possumus in his beatitudinibus considerare motiva ipsarum, et sic,
+quantum ad aliqua eorum, oportet aliter attribuere. Praecipue enim
+ad mansuetudinem movet reverentia ad Deum; quae pertinet ad
+pietatem. Ad lugendum autem movet praecipue scientia, per quam homo
+cognoscit defectus suos et rerum mundanarum; secundum illud Eccle.
+I, <i>qui addit scientiam, addit et dolorem</i>. Ad esuriendum
+autem iustitiae opera, praecipue movet animi fortitudo. Ad
+miserendum vero praecipue movet consilium Dei; secundum illud Dan.
+IV, <i>consilium meum regi placeat, peccata tua eleemosynis redime,
+et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum</i>. Et hunc modum
+attributionis sequitur Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in
+monte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because
+they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom
+the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked
+in the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we
+read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies
+to all others that can be adduced.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36436] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod necesse est beatitudines omnes quae in sacra
+Scriptura ponuntur, ad has reduci vel quantum ad merita, vel
+quantum ad praemia, quia necesse est quod omnes pertineant aliquo
+modo vel ad vitam activam, vel ad vitam contemplativam. Unde quod
+dicitur, beatus vir qui corripitur a domino, pertinet ad
+beatitudinem luctus. Quod vero dicitur, beatus vir qui non abiit in
+consilio impiorum, pertinet ad munditiam cordis. Quod vero dicitur,
+beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam, pertinet ad praemium septimae
+beatitudinis. Et idem patet de omnibus aliis quae possunt
+induci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p17">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is
+confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence
+the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="36437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36437] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod octava beatitudo est quaedam confirmatio et
+manifestatio omnium praecedentium. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis est
+confirmatus in paupertate spiritus et mititate et aliis
+sequentibus, provenit quod ab his bonis propter nullam
+persecutionem recedit. Unde octava beatitudo quodammodo ad septem
+praecedentes pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18">
+<b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.17" target="asv">Lk. 6:17</a>). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure,
+temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness.
+The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The
+second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place:
+"Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside
+by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly:
+"Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20, </a> "poverty corresponds
+to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion
+gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="36438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36438] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum
+dicendum quod Lucas narrat sermonem domini factum esse ad turbas.
+Unde beatitudines numerantur ab eo secundum capacitatem turbarum,
+quae solam voluptuosam et temporalem et terrenam beatitudinem
+noverunt. Unde dominus per quatuor beatitudines quatuor excludit
+quae ad praedictam beatitudinem pertinere videntur. Quorum primum
+est abundantia bonorum exteriorum, quod excludit per hoc quod
+dicit, beati pauperes. Secundum est quod sit bene homini quantum ad
+corpus, in cibis et potibus et aliis huiusmodi, et hoc excludit per
+secundum quod ponit, beati qui esuritis. Tertium est quod sit
+homini bene quantum ad cordis iucunditatem, et hoc excludit tertio,
+dicens, beati qui nunc fletis. Quartum est exterior hominum favor,
+et hoc excludit quarto, dicens, beati eritis cum vos oderint
+homines. Et sicut Ambrosius dicit, <i>paupertas pertinet ad
+temperantiam, quae illecebrosa non quaerit; esuries ad iustitiam,
+quia qui esurit, compatitur, et, compatiendo, largitur; fletus ad
+prudentiam, cuius est flere occidua; pati odium hominum, ad
+fortitudinem</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A4-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 4. Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal
+life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36439] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia beatitudinum inconvenienter
+enumerentur. In regno enim caelorum, quod est vita aeterna, bona
+omnia continentur. Posito ergo regno caelorum, non oportuit alia
+praemia ponere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the
+same ground it should have been assigned to all.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36440] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+regnum caelorum ponitur pro praemio et in prima beatitudine et in
+octava. Ergo, eadem ratione, debuit poni in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas
+the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of
+heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36441] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+in beatitudinibus proceditur ascendendo, sicut Augustinus dicit. In
+praemiis autem videtur procedi descendendo, nam possessio terrae
+est minus quam regnum caelorum. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi
+praemia assignantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36442] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est auctoritas ipsius domini, praemia huiusmodi proponentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness
+indicated above
+<a href="#FS_Q69_A3" id="FS_Q69_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which
+happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal
+and perishable things. Wherefore the
+rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men
+seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom
+of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven
+to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain
+security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby
+the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts
+and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
+</p><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p7"> Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations
+to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns
+to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede
+from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may
+abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some,
+again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that
+they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery.
+</p><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p8"> The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence
+with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart
+are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower
+of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship,
+consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 co."><a name="36443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36443] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod praemia ista convenientissime assignantur,
+considerata conditione beatitudinum secundum tres beatitudines
+supra assignatas. Tres enim primae beatitudines accipiuntur per
+retractionem ab his in quibus voluptuosa beatitudo consistit, quam
+homo desiderat quaerens id quod naturaliter desideratur, non ubi
+quaerere debet, scilicet in Deo, sed in rebus temporalibus et
+caducis. Et ideo praemia trium primarum beatitudinum accipiuntur
+secundum ea quae in beatitudine terrena aliqui quaerunt. Quaerunt
+enim homines in rebus exterioribus, scilicet divitiis et honoribus,
+excellentiam quandam et abundantiam, quorum utrumque importat
+regnum caelorum, per quod homo consequitur excellentiam et
+abundantiam bonorum in Deo. Et ideo regnum caelorum dominus
+pauperibus spiritu repromisit. Quaerunt autem homines feroces et
+immites per litigia et bella securitatem sibi acquirere, inimicos
+suos destruendo. Unde dominus repromisit mitibus securam et quietam
+possessionem terrae viventium, per quam significatur soliditas
+aeternorum bonorum. Quaerunt autem homines in concupiscentiis et
+delectationibus mundi, habere consolationem contra praesentis vitae
+labores. Et ideo dominus consolationem lugentibus repromittit.
+Aliae vero duae beatitudines pertinent ad opera activae
+beatitudinis, quae sunt opera virtutum ordinantium hominem ad
+proximum, a quibus operibus aliqui retrahuntur propter inordinatum
+amorem proprii boni. Et ideo dominus attribuit illa praemia his
+beatitudinibus, propter quae homines ab eis discedunt. Discedunt
+enim aliqui ab operibus iustitiae, non reddentes debitum, sed
+potius aliena rapientes ut bonis temporalibus repleantur. Et ideo
+dominus esurientibus iustitiam, saturitatem repromisit. Discedunt
+etiam aliqui ab operibus misericordiae, ne se immisceant miseriis
+alienis. Et ideo dominus misericordibus repromittit misericordiam,
+per quam ab omni miseria liberentur. Aliae vero duae ultimae
+beatitudines pertinent ad contemplativam felicitatem seu
+beatitudinem, et ideo secundum convenientiam dispositionum quae
+ponuntur in merito, praemia redduntur. Nam munditia oculi disponit
+ad clare videndum, unde mundis corde divina visio repromittitur.
+Constituere vero pacem vel in seipso vel inter alios, manifestat
+hominem esse Dei imitatorem, qui est Deus unitatis et pacis. Et
+ideo pro praemio redditur ei gloria divinae filiationis, quae est
+in perfecta coniunctione ad Deum per sapientiam consummatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect
+cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion
+to the merits to which those rewards are assigned.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36444] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, omnia praemia ista
+unum sunt in re, scilicet beatitudo aeterna; quam intellectus
+humanus non capit. Et ideo oportuit quod per diversa bona nobis
+nota, describeretur, observata convenientia ad merita quibus
+praemia attribuuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence
+it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according
+to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but
+to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the
+glory of the body.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36445] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut octava beatitudo est firmitas quaedam omnium
+beatitudinum, ita debentur sibi omnium beatitudinum praemia. Et
+ideo redit ad caput, ut intelligantur sibi consequenter omnia
+praemia attribui. Vel, secundum Ambrosium, pauperibus spiritu
+repromittitur regnum caelorum, quantum ad gloriam animae, sed
+passis persecutionem in corpore, quantum ad gloriam corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply
+to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in
+the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again,
+it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies
+abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And
+yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance.
+Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36446] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod etiam praemia secundum additionem se habent ad
+invicem. Nam plus est possidere terram regni caelorum, quam
+simpliciter habere, multa enim habemus quae non firmiter et
+pacifice possidemus. Plus est etiam consolari in regno, quam habere
+et possidere, multa enim cum dolore possidemus. Plus est etiam
+saturari quam simpliciter consolari, nam saturitas abundantiam
+consolationis importat. Misericordia vero excedit saturitatem, ut
+plus scilicet homo accipiat quam meruerit, vel desiderare potuerit.
+Adhuc autem maius est Deum videre, sicut maior est qui in curia
+regis non solum prandet, sed etiam faciem regis videt. Summam autem
+dignitatem in domo regia filius regis habet.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q70" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q70-p0.1">Q. 70. OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q70-p2"> We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q70-p3"><a href="#FS_Q70_A1"> (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p4"><a href="#FS_Q70_A2"> (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p5"><a href="#FS_Q70_A3"> (3) Of their number?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p6"><a href="#FS_Q70_A4"> (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 pr."><a name="36447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36447]
+Iª-IIae q. 70 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+fructibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum fructus
+spiritus sancti sint actus. Secundo, utrum differant a
+beatitudinibus. Tertio, de eorum numero. Quarto, de oppositione
+eorum ad opera carnis.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q70_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 1. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5" target="asv">Gal. 5</a>) are acts?
+</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our
+actions bear fruit: for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.15" target="asv">Wis. 3:15</a>): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#John.4.36" target="asv">Jn. 4:36</a>): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting."
+Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36448] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus spiritus sancti quos apostolus
+nominat ad Galat. V, non sint actus. Id enim cuius est alius
+fructus, non debet dici fructus, sic enim in infinitum iretur. Sed
+actuum nostrorum est aliquis fructus, dicitur enim Sap. III,
+<i>bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus</i>; et Ioan. IV, <i>qui
+metit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat in vitam
+aeternam</i>. Ergo ipsi actus nostri non dicuntur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English
+'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their
+own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36449] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>fruimur cognitis in
+quibus voluntas propter ipsa delectata conquiescit</i>. Sed
+voluntas nostra non debet conquiescere in actibus nostris propter
+se. Ergo actus nostri fructus dici non debent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity.
+Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q70_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[1]</a>). Therefore the fruits are not actions.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36450] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+inter fructus spiritus sancti enumerantur ab apostolo aliquae
+virtutes scilicet caritas, mansuetudo, fides et castitas. Virtutes
+autem non sunt actus, sed habitus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
+fructus non sunt actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv">Mat. 12:33</a>): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore
+human actions are called fruits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36451] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Matth. XII, <i>ex fructu arbor cognoscitur</i>;
+idest, ex operibus suis homo, ut ibi exponitur a sanctis. Ergo ipsi
+actus humani dicuntur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the
+product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree
+that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word
+"fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that
+which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 co."><a name="36452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36452] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod nomen fructus a corporalibus ad spiritualia est
+translatum. Dicitur autem in corporalibus fructus, quod ex planta
+producitur cum ad perfectionem pervenerit, et quandam in se
+suavitatem habet. Qui quidem fructus ad duo comparari potest,
+scilicet ad arborem producentem ipsum; et ad hominem qui fructum ex
+arbore adipiscitur. Secundum hoc igitur, nomen fructus in rebus
+spiritualibus dupliciter accipere possumus, uno modo, ut dicatur
+fructus hominis, quasi arboris, id quod ab eo producitur; alio
+modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis id quod homo adipiscitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p7"> Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree,
+and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field
+and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Non
+autem omne id quod adipiscitur homo, habet rationem fructus, sed id
+quod est ultimum, delectationem habens. Habet enim homo et agrum et
+arborem, quae fructus non dicuntur; sed solum id quod est ultimum,
+quod scilicet ex agro et arbore homo intendit habere. Et secundum
+hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo debet frui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8"> If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the
+second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue
+of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is
+the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine
+seed, for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">
+Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine producitur, sic
+ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur, operatio enim est actus
+secundus operantis, et delectationem habet, si sit conveniens
+operanti. Si igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum
+facultatem suae rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus rationis. Si
+vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem virtutem, quae est virtus
+spiritus sancti; sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus spiritus
+sancti, quasi cuiusdam divini seminis, dicitur enim I Ioan. III,
+<i>omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen
+ipsius in eo manet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate
+to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as
+they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:23</a>): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36453] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, cum fructus habeat quodammodo rationem ultimi
+et finis, nihil prohibet alicuius fructus esse alium fructum, sicut
+finis ad finem ordinatur. Opera igitur nostra inquantum sunt
+effectus quidam spiritus sancti in nobis operantis, habent rationem
+fructus, sed inquantum ordinantur ad finem vitae aeternae, sic
+magis habent rationem florum. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXIV, <i>flores
+mei fructus honoris et honestatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression
+"for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except
+the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful
+by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health,
+for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine,
+nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for
+His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness
+which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they
+refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36454] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum dicitur voluntas in aliquo propter se delectari,
+potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod ly propter
+dicit causam finalem, et sic propter se non delectatur aliquis nisi
+in ultimo fine. Alio modo, secundum quod designat causam formalem,
+et sic propter se aliquis potest delectari in omni eo quod
+delectabile est secundum suam formam. Sicut patet quod infirmus
+delectatur in sanitate propter se, sicut in fine; in medicina autem
+suavi, non sicut in fine, sed sicut in habente saporem
+delectabilem; in medicina autem austera, nullo modo propter se, sed
+solum propter aliud. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in Deo delectari
+debet homo propter se, sicut propter ultimum finem, in actibus
+autem virtuosis, non sicut propter finem, sed propter honestatem
+quam continent, delectabilem virtuosis. Unde Ambrosius dicit quod
+opera virtutum dicuntur fructus, <i>quia suos possessores sancta et
+sincera delectatione reficiunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to
+believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our
+neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36455] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod nomina virtutum sumuntur quandoque pro actibus earum,
+sicut Augustinus dicit quod <i>fides est credere quod non vides; et
+caritas est motus animi ad diligendum Deum et proximum</i>. Et hoc
+modo sumuntur nomina virtutum in enumeratione fructuum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A2-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 2. Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
+above (
+<a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits
+of the Holy Ghost.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36456] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus a beatitudinibus non
+differant. Beatitudines enim attribuuntur donis, ut supra dictum
+est. Sed dona perficiunt hominem secundum quod movetur a spiritu
+sancto. Ergo beatitudines ipsae sunt fructus spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the
+present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with
+future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36457] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut se habet fructus vitae aeternae ad beatitudinem futuram, quae
+est rei; ita se habent fructus praesentis vitae ad beatitudines
+praesentis vitae, quae sunt spei. Sed fructus vitae aeternae est
+ipsa beatitudo futura. Ergo fructus vitae praesentis sunt ipsae
+beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above
+(
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>;
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[4], A[1]</a>). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36458] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+de ratione fructus est quod sit quiddam ultimum et delectabile. Sed
+hoc pertinet ad rationem beatitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
+eadem ratio est fructus et beatitudinis. Ergo non debent ab invicem
+distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts,
+as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36459] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+quorum species sunt diversae, ipsa quoque sunt diversa. Sed in
+diversas partes dividuntur et fructus et beatitudines; ut patet per
+numerationem utrorumque. Ergo fructus differunt a
+beatitudinibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful;
+whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not
+vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works,
+and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to
+the virtues, as already stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 co."><a name="36460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36460] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod plus requiritur ad rationem beatitudinis, quam ad
+rationem fructus. Nam ad rationem fructus sufficit quod sit aliquid
+habens rationem ultimi et delectabilis, sed ad rationem
+beatitudinis, ulterius requiritur quod sit aliquid perfectum et
+excellens. Unde omnes beatitudines possunt dici fructus, sed non
+convertitur. Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in quibus
+homo delectatur. Sed beatitudines dicuntur solum perfecta opera,
+quae etiam, ratione suae perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis
+quam virtutibus, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36461] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod beatitudines sint
+fructus, non autem quod omnes fructus beatitudines sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand
+the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36462] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod fructus vitae aeternae est simpliciter ultimus et
+perfectus, et ideo in nullo distinguitur a beatitudine futura.
+Fructus autem praesentis vitae non sunt simpliciter ultimi et
+perfecti, et ideo non omnes fructus sunt beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36463] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aliquid amplius est de ratione beatitudinis quam de
+ratione fructus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A3-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 3. Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv"> Rom. 6:22</a>: "You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36464] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod apostolus inconvenienter enumeret, ad
+Galat. V, duodecim fructus. Alibi enim dicit esse tantum unum
+fructum praesentis vitae; secundum illud Rom. VI, habetis fructum
+vestrum in sanctificatione et Isaiae XXVII dicitur, <i>hic est
+omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum</i>. Non ergo ponendi sunt
+duodecim fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.23" target="asv">Mat. 13:23</a>) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore
+one should not reckon twelve fruits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36465] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+fructus est qui ex spirituali semine exoritur, ut dictum est. Sed
+dominus, Matth. XIII, ponit triplicem terrae bonae fructum ex
+spirituali semine provenientem, scilicet centesimum, et
+sexagesimum, et trigesimum. Ergo non sunt ponendi duodecim
+fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned
+by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but
+rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36466] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+fructus habet in sui ratione quod sit ultimum et delectabile. Sed
+ratio ista non invenitur in omnibus fructibus ab apostolo
+enumeratis, patientia enim et longanimitas videntur in rebus
+contristantibus esse; fides autem non habet rationem ultimi, sed
+magis rationem primi fundamenti. Superflue igitur huiusmodi fructus
+enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated
+<a href="#FS_Q70_A2" id="FS_Q70_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the
+acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36467] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+videtur quod insufficienter et diminute enumerentur. Dictum est
+enim quod omnes beatitudines fructus dici possunt, sed non omnes
+hic enumerantur. Nihil etiam hic ponitur ad actum sapientiae
+pertinens, et multarum aliarum virtutum. Ergo videtur quod
+insufficienter enumerentur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve
+fruits of which it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.2" target="asv">Apoc. 22:2</a>): "On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from
+a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy
+Ghost proceeds in us:
+which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard
+to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it.
+</p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p7"> Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards
+evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions
+and the root of them all, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a>). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner,
+as in His own likeness,
+since He Himself is love. Hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love
+of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in
+God Whom it loves, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection
+of joy
+is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in
+the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one
+object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv">Ps. 118:165</a>): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external
+things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not
+perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be
+not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace"
+is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being
+disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are
+delayed; which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3).
+</p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p8"> Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this
+belongs "goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs "benignity," for the benign are those
+in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his
+suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger.
+Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or
+deceit. To this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in
+God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that
+is his, to God.
+</p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p9"> Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe
+the "mode" in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and "chastity": whether these two differ
+because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is
+subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from
+them.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 co."><a name="36468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36468] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod numerus duodecim fructuum ab apostolo enumeratorum,
+conveniens est, et possunt significari per duodecim fructus de
+quibus dicitur Apoc. ult., <i>ex utraque parte fluminis lignum
+vitae, afferens fructus duodecim</i>. Quia vero fructus dicitur
+quod ex aliquo principio procedit sicut ex semine vel radice,
+attendenda est distinctio horum fructuum secundum diversum
+processum spiritus sancti in nobis. Qui quidem processus attenditur
+secundum hoc, ut primo mens hominis in seipsa ordinetur; secundo
+vero, ordinetur ad ea quae sunt iuxta; tertio vero, ad ea quae sunt
+infra. Tunc autem bene mens hominis disponitur in seipsa, quando
+mens hominis bene se habet et in bonis et in malis. Prima autem
+dispositio mentis humanae ad bonum, est per amorem, qui est prima
+affectio et omnium affectionum radix, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo
+inter fructus spiritus primo ponitur caritas; in qua specialiter
+spiritus sanctus datur, sicut in propria similitudine, cum et ipse
+sit amor. Unde dicitur Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in
+cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>. Ad
+amorem autem caritatis ex necessitate sequitur gaudium. Omnis enim
+amans gaudet ex coniunctione amati. Caritas autem semper habet
+praesentem Deum, quem amat; secundum illud I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet
+in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>. Unde sequela
+caritatis est gaudium. Perfectio autem gaudii est pax, quantum ad
+duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad quietem ab exterioribus
+conturbantibus, non enim potest perfecte gaudere de bono amato, qui
+in eius fruitione ab aliis perturbatur; et iterum, qui perfecte cor
+habet in uno pacatum, a nullo alio molestari potest, cum alia quasi
+nihil reputet; unde dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>pax multa
+diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum</i>, quia
+scilicet ab exterioribus non perturbantur, quin Deo fruantur.
+Secundo, quantum ad sedationem desiderii fluctuantis, non enim
+perfecte gaudet de aliquo, cui non sufficit id de quo gaudet. Haec
+autem duo importat pax, scilicet ut neque ab exterioribus
+perturbemur; et ut desideria nostra conquiescant in uno. Unde post
+caritatem et gaudium, tertio ponitur pax. In malis autem bene se
+habet mens quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, ut non perturbetur mens
+per imminentiam malorum, quod pertinet ad patientiam. Secundo, ut
+non perturbetur in dilatione bonorum, quod pertinet ad
+longanimitatem, nam carere bono habet rationem mali, ut dicitur in
+V Ethic. Ad id autem quod est iuxta hominem, scilicet proximum,
+bene disponitur mens hominis, primo quidem, quantum ad voluntatem
+bene faciendi. Et ad hoc pertinet bonitas. Secundo, quantum ad
+beneficentiae executionem. Et ad hoc pertinet benignitas, dicuntur
+enim benigni quos bonus ignis amoris fervere facit ad benefaciendum
+proximis. Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod aequanimiter tolerentur mala
+ab eis illata. Et ad hoc pertinet mansuetudo, quae cohibet iras.
+Quarto, quantum ad hoc quod non solum per iram proximis non
+noceamus, sed etiam neque per fraudem vel per dolum. Et ad hoc
+pertinet fides, si pro fidelitate sumatur. Sed si sumatur pro fide
+qua creditur in Deum, sic per hanc ordinatur homo ad id quod est
+supra se, ut scilicet homo intellectum suum Deo subiiciat, et per
+consequens omnia quae ipsius sunt. Sed ad id quod infra est, bene
+disponitur homo, primo quidem, quantum ad exteriores actiones, per
+modestiam, quae in omnibus dictis et factis modum observat. Quantum
+ad interiores concupiscentias, per continentiam et castitatem, sive
+haec duo distinguantur per hoc, quod castitas refrenat hominem ad
+illicitis, continentia vero etiam a licitis; sive per hoc quod
+continens patitur concupiscentias sed non deducitur, castus autem
+neque patitur neque deducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in
+the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36469] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod sanctificatio fit per omnes virtutes per quas
+etiam peccata tolluntur. Unde fructus ibi singulariter nominatur
+propter unitatem generis, quod in multas species dividitur,
+secundum quas dicuntur multi fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees
+of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit;
+the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other
+ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the
+three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to
+its beginning, its middle, and its end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36470] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod fructus centesimus, sexagesimus et trigesimus non
+diversificantur secundum diversas species virtuosorum actuum, sed
+secundum diversos perfectionis gradus etiam unius virtutis. Sicut
+continentia coniugalis dicitur significari per fructum trigesimum;
+continentia vidualis per sexagesimum; virginalis autem per
+centesimum. Et aliis etiam modis sancti distinguunt tres
+evangelicos fructus secundum tres gradus virtutis. Et ponuntur tres
+gradus, quia cuiuslibet rei perfectio attenditur secundum
+principium, medium et finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation,
+it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith,
+which is certainly about the unseen."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36471] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ipsum quod est in tristitiis non perturbari, rationem
+delectabilis habet. Et fides etiam si accipiatur prout est
+fundamentum, habet quandam rationem ultimi et delectabilis,
+secundum quod continet certitudinem, unde Glossa exponit, <i>fides,
+idest de invisibilibus certitudo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but
+to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been
+mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in
+so far as all the virtues and
+gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing
+to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either
+enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36472] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super epistolam ad Galat.,
+<i>apostolus non hoc ita suscepit, ut doceret quod sunt</i> (vel
+opera carnis, vel fructus spiritus); sed <i>ut ostenderet in quo
+genere illa vitanda, illa vero sectanda sint</i>. Unde potuissent
+vel plures, vel etiam pauciores fructus enumerari. Et tamen omnes
+donorum et virtutum actus possunt secundum quandam convenientiam ad
+haec reduci, secundum quod omnes virtutes et dona necesse est quod
+ordinent mentem aliquo praedictorum modorum. Unde et actus
+sapientiae, et quorumcumque donorum ordinantium ad bonum,
+reducuntur ad caritatem, gaudium et pacem. Ideo tamen potius haec
+quam alia enumeravit, quia hic enumerata magis important vel
+fruitionem bonorum, vel sedationem malorum; quod videtur ad
+rationem fructus pertinere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A4-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 4. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19, </a> seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits
+of the Spirit are not contrary to them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36473] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus non contrarientur operibus
+carnis quae apostolus enumerat. Contraria enim sunt in eodem
+genere. Sed opera carnis non dicuntur fructus. Ergo fructus
+spiritus eis non contrariantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore
+the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36474] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+unum uni est contrarium. Sed plura enumerat apostolus opera carnis
+quam fructus spiritus. Ergo fructus spiritus et opera carnis non
+contrariantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness,
+and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary
+to the works of the flesh.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36475] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+inter fructus spiritus primo ponuntur caritas, gaudium, pax, quibus
+non correspondent ea quae primo enumerantur inter opera carnis,
+quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia. Ergo fructus
+spiritus non contrariantur operibus carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv">Gal. 5:17</a>) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36476] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit ibidem, quod <i>caro concupiscit adversus
+spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q70_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits
+of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind
+to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive,
+appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and
+downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits
+of the Spirit.
+</p><p id="FS_Q70_A4-p7"> Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And
+in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend
+to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which
+is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein
+also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy
+of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against
+witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils
+inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them.
+In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 co."><a name="36477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36477] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod opera carnis et fructus spiritus possunt accipi
+dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem. Et hoc modo in
+communi fructus spiritus sancti contrariantur operibus carnis.
+Spiritus enim sanctus movet humanam mentem ad id quod est secundum
+rationem, vel potius ad id quod est supra rationem, appetitus autem
+carnis, qui est appetitus sensitivus, trahit ad bona sensibilia,
+quae sunt infra hominem. Unde sicut motus sursum et motus deorsum
+contrariantur in naturalibus, ita in operibus humanis contrariantur
+opera carnis fructibus spiritus. Alio modo possunt considerari
+secundum proprias rationes singulorum fructuum enumeratorum, et
+operum carnis. Et sic non oportet quod singula singulis
+contraponantur, quia, sicut dictum est, apostolus non intendit
+enumerare omnia opera spiritualia, nec omnia opera carnalia. Sed
+tamen, secundum quandam adaptationem, Augustinus, super epistolam
+ad Galat., contraponit singulis operibus carnis singulos fructus.
+<i>Sicut fornicationi, quae est amor explendae libidinis a legitimo
+connubio solutus, opponitur caritas, per quam anima coniungitur Deo
+in qua etiam est vera castitas. Immunditiae autem sunt omnes
+perturbationes de illa fornicatione conceptae, quibus gaudium
+tranquillitatis opponitur. Idolorum autem servitus, propter quam
+bellum est gestum adversus Evangelium Dei, opponitur paci. Contra
+veneficia autem, et inimicitias et contentiones et aemulationes,
+animositates et dissensiones, opponuntur longanimitas, ad
+sustinendum mala hominum inter quos vivimus; et ad curandum,
+benignitas; et ad ignoscendum, bonitas. Haeresibus autem opponitur
+fides, invidiae, mansuetudo; ebrietatibus et comessationibus,
+continentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since
+works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue
+are called fruits, but not so works of vice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36478] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod id quod procedit ab arbore contra naturam
+arboris, non dicitur esse fructus eius, sed magis corruptio
+quaedam. Et quia virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera
+vero vitiorum sunt contra rationem; ideo opera virtutum fructus
+dicuntur, non autem opera vitiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices
+are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36479] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod <i>bonum contingit uno modo, malum vero
+omnifariam</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., unde et
+uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur. Et propter hoc, non est mirum
+si plura ponuntur opera carnis quam fructus spiritus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36480] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+patet solutio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q71" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q71-p0.1">Q. 71. EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q71-p2">OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)</p><p id="FS_Q71-p3"> We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered
+in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin;
+(6) the effect of sin.
+</p><p id="FS_Q71-p4"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q71-p5"><a href="#FS_Q71_A1"> (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p6"><a href="#FS_Q71_A2"> (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p7"><a href="#FS_Q71_A3"> (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p8"><a href="#FS_Q71_A4"> (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p9"><a href="#FS_Q71_A5"> (5) Whether every sin includes action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p10"><a href="#FS_Q71_A6"> (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal
+law."
+</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 pr."><a name="36481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36481]
+Iª-IIae q. 71 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
+vitiis et peccatis. Circa quae sex consideranda occurrunt, primo
+quidem, de ipsis vitiis et peccatis secundum se; secundo, de
+distinctione eorum; tertio, de comparatione eorum ad invicem;
+quarto, de subiecto peccati; quinto, de causa eius; sexto, de
+effectu ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum vitium
+contrarietur virtuti. Secundo, utrum vitium sit contra naturam.
+Tertio, quid sit peius, utrum vitium vel actus vitiosus. Quarto,
+utrum actus vitiosus possit esse simul cum virtute. Quinto, utrum
+in omni peccato sit aliquis actus. Sexto, de definitione peccati
+quam Augustinus ponit, XXII contra Faustum, <i>peccatum est dictum
+vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam</i>.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q71_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A1-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 1. Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now
+sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition
+of bodily members or of any things whatever.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36482] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non contrarietur virtuti. Uni
+enim unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed virtuti
+contrariantur peccatum et malitia. Non ergo contrariatur ei vitium,
+quia vitium dicitur etiam si sit indebita dispositio membrorum
+corporalium, vel quarumcumque rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice
+is not contrary to virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36483] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtus nominat quandam perfectionem potentiae. Sed vitium nihil
+nominat ad potentiam pertinens. Ergo vitium non contrariatur
+virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice,
+is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36484] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod <i>virtus est
+quaedam sanitas animae</i>. Sanitati autem opponitur aegritudo vel
+morbus, magis quam vitium. Ergo virtuti non contrariatur
+vitium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality
+which makes its subject good," as was shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q71_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36485] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod
+<i>vitium est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus</i>. Virtus
+autem est qualitas quae facit bonum habentem, ut ex supradictis
+patet. Ergo vitium contrariatur virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue
+we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby
+the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that
+"virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I
+mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness:
+because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue
+is directed is a good act, as was shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q71_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>).
+</p><p id="FS_Q71_A1-p7"> Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect
+of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is
+an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary
+of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary
+is "vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine
+says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 co."><a name="36486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36486] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod circa virtutem duo possumus considerare, scilicet
+ipsam essentiam virtutis; et id ad quod est virtus. In essentia
+quidem virtutis aliquid considerari potest directe; et aliquid ex
+consequenti. Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quandam
+alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae, unde
+philosophus dicit, in VII Physic. quod <i>virtus est dispositio
+perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum
+secundum naturam</i>. Ex consequenti autem sequitur quod virtus sit
+bonitas quaedam, in hoc enim consistit uniuscuiusque rei bonitas,
+quod convenienter se habeat secundum modum suae naturae. Id autem
+ad quod virtus ordinatur, est actus bonus, ut ex supradictis patet.
+Secundum hoc igitur tria inveniuntur opponi virtuti. Quorum unum
+est peccatum, quod opponitur sibi ex parte eius ad quod virtus
+ordinatur, nam peccatum proprie nominat actum inordinatum, sicut
+actus virtutis est actus ordinatus et debitus. Secundum autem quod
+ad rationem virtutis consequitur quod sit bonitas quaedam,
+opponitur virtuti malitia. Sed secundum id quod directe est de
+ratione virtutis, opponitur virtuti vitium, vitium enim
+uniuscuiusque rei esse videtur quod non sit disposita secundum quod
+convenit suae naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb.,
+<i>quod perfectioni naturae deesse perspexeris, id voca
+vitium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter
+is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly
+as such.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36487] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod illa tria non contrariantur virtuti secundum
+idem, sed peccatum quidem contrariatur secundum quod virtus est
+operativa boni; malitia autem secundum quod est bonitas quaedam;
+vitium autem proprie secundum quod est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason
+for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce
+a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36488] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtus non solum importat perfectionem potentiae quae
+est principium agendi, sed etiam importat debitam dispositionem
+eius cuius est virtus, et hoc ideo quia unumquodque operatur
+secundum quod actu est. Requiritur ergo quod aliquid sit in se bene
+dispositum, quod debet esse boni operativum. Et secundum hoc
+virtuti vitium opponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he calls
+it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease
+is attended with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well compacted together." And although at times there
+may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden
+complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things
+are indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection,
+he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according
+to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv"> Mat. 12:33.</a> But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of
+the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness,
+e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue
+extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice
+is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36489] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest.,
+morbi et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis, in corporibus enim
+morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem, puta febrem vel
+aliquid huiusmodi; aegrotationem vero, morbum cum imbecillitate;
+vitium autem, cum partes corporis inter se dissident. Et quamvis in
+corpore quandoque sit morbus sine aegrotatione, puta cum aliquis
+est interius male dispositus, non tamen exterius praepeditur a
+solitis operationibus; in animo tamen, ut ipse dicit, haec duo non
+possunt nisi cogitatione secerni. Necesse est enim quod
+quandocumque aliquis interius est male dispositus, habens
+inordinatum affectum, quod ex hoc imbecillis reddatur ad debitas
+operationes exercendas, quia unaquaeque arbor ex suo fructu
+cognoscitur, idest homo ex opere, ut dicitur Matth. XII. <i>Sed
+vitium animi</i>, ut Tullius ibidem dicit, <i>est habitus aut
+affectio animi in tota vita inconstans, et a seipsa
+dissentiens</i>. Quod quidem invenitur etiam absque morbo vel
+aegrotatione, ut puta cum aliquis ex infirmitate vel ex passione
+peccat. Unde in plus se habet vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus,
+sicut etiam virtus in plus se habet quam sanitas, nam sanitas etiam
+quaedam virtus ponitur in VII Physic. Et ideo virtuti convenientius
+opponitur vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A2-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 2. Whether vice is contrary to nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is
+not contrary to nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36490] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non sit contra naturam. Vitium
+enim contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes non sunt in
+nobis a natura, sed causantur in nobis per infusionem aut ab
+assuetudine, ut dictum est. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated
+to upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36491] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ea quae sunt contra naturam, non possunt assuefieri, sicut lapis
+nunquam assuescit ferri sursum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliqui
+assuefiunt ad vitia. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice
+is found in the greater number of men; for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv">Mat. 7:13</a>): "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to
+nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36492] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nihil quod est contra naturam, invenitur in habentibus illam
+naturam ut in pluribus. Sed vitia inveniuntur in hominibus ut in
+pluribus, quia, sicut dicitur Matth. VII, <i>lata est via quae
+ducit ad perditionem, et multi vadunt per eam</i>. Ergo vitium non
+est contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27).
+But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36493] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum comparatur ad vitium sicut actus ad habitum, ut ex
+supradictis patet. Sed peccatum definitur esse dictum vel factum
+vel concupitum contra legem Dei; ut patet per Augustinum, XXII
+contra Faustum. Lex autem Dei est supra naturam. Magis ergo
+dicendum est quod vitium sit contra legem, quam sit contra
+naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36494] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>omne vitium, eo
+ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A2-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature,
+as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is
+that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14).
+</p><p id="FS_Q71_A2-p8"> But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man
+derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking,
+contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man.
+Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states
+(Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as
+much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 co."><a name="36495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36495] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitium virtuti contrariatur.
+Virtus autem uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene
+disposita secundum convenientiam suae naturae, ut supra dictum est.
+Unde oportet quod in qualibet re vitium dicatur ex hoc quod est
+disposita contra id quod convenit naturae. Unde et de hoc
+unaquaeque res vituperatur, <i>a vitio autem nomen vituperationis
+tractum creditur</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb. Sed
+considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma
+secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie
+constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra
+ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est
+homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam
+hominis inquantum est homo. <i>Bonum autem hominis est secundum
+rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse</i>, ut
+Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde virtus humana, quae
+hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est
+secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi, vitium autem
+intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem
+rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords
+with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason,
+like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that
+vice is contrary to nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36496] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod virtutes, etsi non causentur a natura secundum
+suum esse perfectum, tamen inclinant ad id quod est secundum
+naturam, idest secundum ordinem rationis, dicit enim Tullius, in
+sua rhetorica, quod <i>virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationi
+consentaneus</i>. Et hoc modo virtus dicitur esse secundum naturam,
+et per contrarium intelligitur quod vitium sit contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being
+from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense
+virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36497] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de his quae sunt contra
+naturam, secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est
+esse a natura, non autem secundum quod esse contra naturam
+opponitur ei quod est esse secundum naturam, eo modo quo virtutes
+dicuntur esse secundum naturam, inquantum inclinant ad id quod
+naturae convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his
+senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than
+who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence
+of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his
+sensitive nature against the order of his reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36498] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in homine est duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et
+sensitiva. Et quia per operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus
+rationis, ideo plures sequuntur inclinationes naturae sensitivae
+quam ordinem rationis, plures enim sunt qui assequuntur principium
+rei, quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et
+peccata in hominibus proveniunt, quod sequuntur inclinationem
+naturae sensitivae contra ordinem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared
+to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the
+order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every
+nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the
+Divine art whereby it was made."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36499] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod quidquid est contra rationem artificiati, est etiam
+contra naturam artis, qua artificiatum producitur. Lex autem
+aeterna comparatur ad ordinem rationis humanae sicut ars ad
+artificiatum. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod vitium et peccatum sit
+contra ordinem rationis humanae, et quod sit contra legem aeternam.
+Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., quod <i>a Deo habent
+omnes naturae quod naturae sunt, et intantum sunt vitiosae,
+inquantum ab eius, qua factae sunt, arte discedunt</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A3-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 3. Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better
+it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith.
+Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36500] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium, idest habitus malus sit peius
+quam peccatum, idest actus malus. Sicut enim bonum quod est
+diuturnius, est melius; ita malum quod est diuturnius, est peius.
+Sed habitus vitiosus est diuturnior quam actus vitiosi, qui statim
+transeunt. Ergo habitus vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore
+a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36501] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+plura mala sunt magis fugienda quam unum malum. Sed habitus malus
+virtualiter est causa multorum malorum actuum. Ergo habitus
+vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their
+badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36502] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+causa est potior quam effectus. Sed habitus perficit actum tam in
+bonitate quam in malitia. Ergo habitus est potior actu et in
+bonitate et in malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action
+is worse than a vicious habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36503] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+pro actu vitioso aliquis iuste punitur, non autem pro habitu
+vitioso, si non procedat ad actum. Ergo actus vitiosus est peior
+quam habitus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated
+in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do
+evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between
+power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding
+power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that
+a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or
+bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the
+cause of a thing being such, is yet more so."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 co."><a name="36504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36504] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod habitus medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum.
+Manifestum est autem quod actus in bono et in malo praeeminet
+potentiae, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., melius est enim bene agere
+quam posse bene agere; et similiter vituperabilius est male agere
+quam posse male agere. Unde etiam sequitur quod habitus in bonitate
+et in malitia medium gradum obtineat inter potentiam et actum, ut
+scilicet, sicut habitus bonus vel malus praeeminet in bonitate vel
+malitia potentiae, ita etiam subdatur actui. Quod etiam ex hoc
+apparet, quod habitus non dicitur bonus vel malus nisi ex hoc quod
+inclinat ad actum bonum vel malum. Unde propter bonitatem vel
+malitiam actus, dicitur habitus bonus vel malus. Et sic potior est
+actus in bonitate vel malitia quam habitus, quia propter quod
+unumquodque tale, et illud magis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another
+simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses
+it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses
+habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more
+lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always
+be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but
+habit excels in a certain respect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36505] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter altero
+potius, quod tamen secundum quid ab eo deficit. Simpliciter enim
+potius iudicatur quod praeeminet quantum ad id quod per se
+consideratur in utroque, secundum quid autem quod praeeminet
+secundum id quod per accidens se habet ad utrumque. Ostensum est
+autem ex ipsa ratione actus et habitus, quod actus est potior in
+bonitate et malitia quam habitus. Quod autem habitus sit diuturnior
+quam actus, accidit ex eo quod utrumque invenitur in tali natura
+quae non potest semper agere, et cuius actio est in motu
+transeunte. Unde simpliciter actus est potior tam in bonitate quam
+in malitia, sed habitus est potior secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes
+act simply, both in goodness and in badness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36506] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod habitus non est simpliciter plures actus, sed
+secundum quid, idest virtute. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod
+habitus sit simpliciter potior in bonitate vel malitia quam
+actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider
+the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36507] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod habitus est causa actus in genere causae efficientis,
+sed actus est causa habitus in genere causae finalis, secundum quam
+consideratur ratio boni et mali. Et ideo in bonitate et malitia
+actus praeeminet habitui.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A4-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 4. Whether sin is compatible with virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject.
+Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36508] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus vitiosus, sive peccatum, non
+possit simul esse cum virtute. Contraria enim non possunt esse
+simul in eodem. Sed peccatum quodammodo contrariatur virtuti, ut
+dictum est. Ergo peccatum non potest simul esse cum virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither,
+therefore, can sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36509] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum est peius quam vitium, idest actus malus quam habitus
+malus. Sed vitium non potest simul esse in eodem cum virtute. Ergo
+neque peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural
+things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in
+the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue
+in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36510] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut peccatum accidit in rebus voluntariis, ita et in rebus
+naturalibus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed nunquam in rebus
+naturalibus accidit peccatum nisi per aliquam corruptionem virtutis
+naturalis, sicut monstra accidunt corrupto aliquo principio in
+semine, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo etiam in rebus voluntariis
+non accidit peccatum nisi corrupta aliqua virtute animae. Et sic
+peccatum et virtus non possunt esse in eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act
+does not cause a virtue, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A3" id="FS_Q71_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[3]</a>): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36511] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod per contraria virtus
+generatur et corrumpitur. Sed unus actus virtuosus non causat
+virtutem, ut supra habitum est. Ergo neque unus actus peccati
+tollit virtutem. Possunt ergo simul in eodem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of
+a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore
+a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness
+with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover):
+whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills.
+Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having
+a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare
+the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by
+one
+act as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q71_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed
+by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues;
+and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as
+virtues." And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain
+unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary
+to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are
+not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.
+</p><p id="FS_Q71_A4-p7"> Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin
+is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 co."><a name="36512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36512] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum comparatur ad virtutem sicut actus malus ad
+habitum bonum. Aliter autem se habet habitus in anima, et forma in
+re naturali. Forma enim naturalis ex necessitate producit
+operationem sibi convenientem, unde non potest esse simul cum forma
+naturali actus formae contrariae; sicut non potest esse cum calore
+actus infrigidationis, neque simul cum levitate motus descensionis,
+nisi forte ex violentia exterioris moventis. Sed habitus in anima
+non ex necessitate producit suam operationem, sed homo utitur eo
+cum voluerit. Unde simul habitu in homine existente, potest non uti
+habitu, aut agere contrarium actum. Et sic potest habens virtutem
+procedere ad actum peccati. Actus autem peccati, si comparetur ad
+ipsam virtutem prout est habitus quidam, non potest ipsam
+corrumpere, si sit unus tantum, sicut enim non generatur habitus
+per unum actum, ita nec per unum actum corrumpitur, ut supra dictum
+est. Sed si comparetur actus peccati ad causam virtutum, sic
+possibile est quod per unum actum peccati aliquae virtutes
+corrumpantur. Quodlibet enim peccatum mortale contrariatur
+caritati, quae est radix omnium virtutum infusarum, inquantum sunt
+virtutes, et ideo per unum actum peccati mortalis, exclusa
+caritate, excluduntur per consequens omnes virtutes infusae,
+quantum ad hoc quod sunt virtutes. Et hoc dico propter fidem et
+spem, quarum habitus remanent informes post peccatum mortale, et
+sic non sunt virtutes. Sed peccatum veniale, quod non contrariatur
+caritati nec excludit ipsam, per consequens etiam non excludit
+alias virtutes. Virtutes vero acquisitae non tolluntur per unum
+actum cuiuscumque peccati. Sic igitur peccatum mortale non potest
+simul esse cum virtutibus infusis, potest tamen simul esse cum
+virtutibus acquisitis. Peccatum vero veniale potest simul esse et
+cum virtutibus infusis, et cum acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but
+not with the habit, of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36513] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccatum non contrariatur virtuti secundum se,
+sed secundum suum actum. Et ideo peccatum non potest simul esse cum
+actu virtutis, potest tamen simul esse cum habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts
+of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36514] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod vitium directe contrariatur virtuti, sicut et
+peccatum actui virtuoso. Et ideo vitium excludit virtutem, sicut
+peccatum excludit actum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the
+other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36515] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod virtutes naturales agunt ex necessitate, et ideo,
+integra existente virtute, nunquam peccatum potest in actu
+inveniri. Sed virtutes animae non producunt actus ex necessitate,
+unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A5-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 5. Whether every sin includes an action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice.
+Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36516] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod in quolibet peccato sit aliquis actus.
+Sicut enim meritum comparatur ad virtutem, ita peccatum ad vitium
+comparatur. Sed meritum non potest esse absque aliquo actu. Ergo
+nec peccatum potest esse absque aliquo actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that,
+unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every
+sin implies an act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36517] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>omne peccatum adeo
+est voluntarium, quod si non sit voluntarium, non est peccatum</i>.
+Sed non potest esse aliquid voluntarium nisi per actum voluntatis.
+Ergo omne peccatum habet aliquem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who
+never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually;
+and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36518] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si peccatum esset absque aliquo actu, sequeretur quod ex hoc ipso
+quod aliquis cessat ab actu debito, peccaret. Sed continue aliquis
+cessat ab actu debito, ille scilicet qui nunquam actum debitum
+operatur. Ergo sequeretur quod continue peccaret, quod est falsum.
+Non ergo est aliquod peccatum absque actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv">James 4:17</a>): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore
+sin can be without act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36519] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Iac. IV, <i>scienti bonum facere et non facienti,
+peccatum est illi</i>. Sed non facere non importat aliquem actum.
+Ergo peccatum potest esse absque actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For
+some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not
+to go to church," when he is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or
+even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a
+way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently,
+to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that
+which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin
+of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.
+</p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p7"> Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence
+of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills "not to go to church":
+while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound
+to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church.
+</p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p8"> If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission
+must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we
+turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission
+or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone
+omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful;
+and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which
+act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and
+in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of
+itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something
+else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills
+to play at the time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the
+result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to
+the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental
+(Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding
+the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
+</p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p9"> Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and
+consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential
+to other actual sins.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 co."><a name="36520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36520] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod quaestio ista principaliter movetur propter peccatum
+omissionis, de quo aliqui diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt
+quod in omni peccato omissionis est aliquis actus vel interior vel
+exterior. Interior quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult non ire ad
+Ecclesiam quando ire tenetur. Exterior autem, sicut cum aliquis
+illa hora qua ad Ecclesiam ire tenetur, vel etiam ante, occupat se
+talibus quibus ab eundo ad Ecclesiam impeditur. Et hoc quodammodo
+videtur in primum redire, qui enim vult aliquid cum quo aliud simul
+esse non potest, ex consequenti vult illo carere; nisi forte non
+perpendat quod per hoc quod vult facere, impeditur ab eo quod
+facere tenetur; in quo casu posset per negligentiam culpabilis
+iudicari. Alii vero dicunt quod in peccato omissionis non
+requiritur aliquis actus, ipsum enim non facere quod quis facere
+tenetur, peccatum est. Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid
+veritatem habet. Si enim intelligatur in peccato omissionis illud
+solum quod per se pertinet ad rationem peccati, sic quandoque
+omissionis peccatum est cum actu interiori, ut cum aliquis vult non
+ire ad Ecclesiam, quandoque vero absque omni actu vel interiori vel
+exteriori, sicut cum aliquis hora qua tenetur ire ad Ecclesiam,
+nihil cogitat de eundo vel non eundo ad Ecclesiam. Si vero in
+peccato omissionis intelligantur etiam causae vel occasiones
+omittendi, sic necesse est in peccato omissionis aliquem actum
+esse. Non enim est peccatum omissionis nisi cum aliquis
+praetermittit quod potest facere et non facere. Quod autem aliquis
+declinet ad non faciendum illud quod potest facere et non facere,
+non est nisi ex aliqua causa vel occasione coniuncta vel
+praecedente. Et si quidem causa illa non sit in potestate hominis,
+omissio non habet rationem peccati, sicut cum aliquis propter
+infirmitatem praetermittit ad Ecclesiam ire. Si vero causa vel
+occasio omittendi subiaceat voluntati, omissio habet rationem
+peccati, et tunc semper oportet quod ista causa, inquantum est
+voluntaria, habeat aliquem actum, ad minus interiorem voluntatis.
+Qui quidem actus quandoque directe fertur in ipsam omissionem, puta
+cum aliquis vult non ire ad Ecclesiam, vitans laborem. Et tunc
+talis actus per se pertinet ad omissionem, voluntas enim
+cuiuscumque peccati per se pertinet ad peccatum illud, eo quod
+voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Quandoque autem actus
+voluntatis directe fertur in aliud, per quod homo impeditur ab actu
+debito, sive illud in quod fertur voluntas, sit coniunctum
+omissioni, puta cum aliquis vult ludere quando ad Ecclesiam debet
+ire; sive etiam sit praecedens, puta cum aliquis vult diu vigilare
+de sero, ex quo sequitur quod non vadat hora matutinali ad
+Ecclesiam. Et tunc actus iste interior vel exterior per accidens se
+habet ad omissionem, quia omissio sequitur praeter intentionem; hoc
+autem dicimus per accidens esse, quod est praeter intentionem, ut
+patet in II Physic. Unde manifestum est quod tunc peccatum
+omissionis habet quidem aliquem actum coniunctum vel praecedentem,
+qui tamen per accidens se habet ad peccatum omissionis. Iudicium
+autem de rebus dandum est secundum illud quod est per se, et non
+secundum illud quod est per accidens. Unde verius dici potest quod
+aliquod peccatum possit esse absque omni actu. Alioquin etiam ad
+essentiam aliorum peccatorum actualium pertinerent actus et
+occasiones circumstantes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> More things are required for good than for evil, since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results
+from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or
+by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there
+can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36521] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod plura requiruntur ad bonum quam ad malum, eo
+quod <i>bonum contingit ex tota integra causa, malum autem ex
+singularibus defectibus</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div.
+Nom. Et ideo peccatum potest contingere sive aliquis faciat quod
+non debet, sive non faciendo quod debet, sed meritum non potest
+esse nisi aliquis faciat voluntarie quod debet. Et ideo meritum non
+potest esse sine actu, sed peccatum potest esse sine actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which
+we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far
+as man has it in his power to will, and not to will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36522] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium non solum quia cadit
+super ipsum actus voluntatis, sed quia in potestate nostra est ut
+fiat vel non fiat, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde etiam ipsum non
+velle potest dici voluntarium, inquantum in potestate hominis est
+velle et non velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act,
+a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36523] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod peccatum omissionis contrariatur praecepto
+affirmativo, quod obligat semper, sed non ad semper. Et ideo solum
+pro tempore illo aliquis cessando ab actu peccat, pro quo
+praeceptum affirmativum obligat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A6-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 6. Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because
+"Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q71_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore this definition does not include every sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36524] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiatur peccatum,
+cum dicitur, peccatum est <i>dictum vel factum vel concupitum
+contra legem aeternam</i>. Dictum enim, vel factum, vel concupitum,
+importat aliquem actum. Sed non omne peccatum importat aliquem
+actum, ut dictum est. Ergo haec definitio non includit omne
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised
+under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary
+to the eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36525] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in libro de duabus animabus, <i>peccatum est
+voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat</i>. Sed
+voluntas sub concupiscentia comprehenditur, secundum quod
+concupiscentia largo modo sumitur, pro omni appetitu. Ergo
+suffecisset dicere, peccatum est concupitum contra legem aeternam;
+nec oportuit addere, dictum vel factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard
+to the end as explained above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>;
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6;
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A2" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.3" shape="rect"> Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to
+neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he
+says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should
+use." Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition
+of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36526] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum proprie consistere videtur in aversione a fine, nam bonum
+et malum principaliter considerantur secundum finem, ut ex
+supradictis patet. Unde et Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., per
+comparationem ad finem definit peccatum, dicens quod <i>peccare
+nihil est aliud quam, neglectis rebus aeternis, temporalia
+sectari</i>, et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod
+<i>omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis et frui utendis</i>.
+Sed in praemissa definitione nulla fit mentio de aversione a debito
+fine. Ergo insufficienter definitur peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden,
+but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="36527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36527] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse prohibitum, quia legi contrariatur. Sed
+non omnia peccata sunt mala quia prohibita, sed quaedam sunt
+prohibita quia mala. Non ergo in communi definitione peccati debuit
+poni quod sit contra legem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that
+sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5"><a name="36528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36528] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum significat malum hominis actum, ut ex dictis patet. Sed
+malum hominis est contra rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap.
+de Div. Nom. Ergo potius debuit dici quod peccatum sit contra
+rationem, quam quod peccatum sit contra legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p7">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36529] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> In
+contrarium sufficit auctoritas Augustini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above
+(Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by
+the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its
+due measure: and conformity of measure in a
+thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will:
+one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's
+reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining
+to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire";
+the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal
+law."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 co."><a name="36530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36530] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, peccatum nihil aliud est quam
+actus humanus malus. Quod autem aliquis actus sit humanus, habet ex
+hoc quod est voluntarius, sicut ex supradictis patet, sive sit
+voluntarius quasi a voluntate elicitus, ut ipsum velle et eligere;
+sive quasi a voluntate imperatus, ut exteriores actus vel
+locutionis vel operationis. Habet autem actus humanus quod sit
+malus, ex eo quod caret debita commensuratione. Omnis autem
+commensuratio cuiuscumque rei attenditur per comparationem ad
+aliquam regulam, a qua si divertat, incommensurata erit. Regula
+autem voluntatis humanae est duplex, una propinqua et homogenea,
+scilicet ipsa humana ratio; alia vero est prima regula, scilicet
+lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei. Et ideo Augustinus in
+definitione peccati posuit duo, unum quod pertinet ad substantiam
+actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato, cum dixit,
+dictum vel factum vel concupitum; aliud autem quod pertinet ad
+rationem mali, quod est quasi formale in peccato, cum dixit, contra
+legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the
+genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is
+not said, what is done and what is not done.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36531] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod affirmatio et negatio reducuntur ad idem genus,
+sicut in divinis genitum et ingenitum ad relationem, ut Augustinus
+dicit, in V de Trin. Et ideo pro eodem est accipiendum dictum et
+non dictum, factum et non factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it
+is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance
+of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external
+action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36532] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod prima causa peccati est in voluntate, quae imperat
+omnes actus voluntarios, in quibus solum invenitur peccatum, et
+ideo Augustinus quandoque per solam voluntatem definit peccatum.
+Sed quia etiam ipsi exteriores actus pertinent ad substantiam
+peccati, cum sint secundum se mali, ut dictum est, necesse fuit
+quod in definitione peccati poneretur etiam aliquid pertinens ad
+exteriores actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to
+things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end
+and all other forms of inordinateness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36533] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod lex aeterna primo et principaliter ordinat hominem ad
+finem, consequenter autem facit hominem bene se habere circa ea
+quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo in hoc quod dicit contra legem
+aeternam, tangit aversionem a fine, et omnes alias
+inordinationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law.
+If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily
+in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural
+law, precisely because it is inordinate.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="36534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36534] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod non omne peccatum ideo est malum
+quia est prohibitum, intelligitur de prohibitione facta per ius
+positivum. Si autem referatur ad ius naturale, quod continetur
+primo quidem in lege aeterna, secundario vero in naturali
+iudicatorio rationis humanae, tunc omne peccatum est malum quia
+prohibitum, ex hoc enim ipso quod est inordinatum, iuri naturali
+repugnat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason.
+Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference
+to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g.
+in matters of faith.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 5"><a name="36535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36535] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod a theologis consideratur peccatum praecipue secundum
+quod est offensa contra Deum, a philosopho autem morali, secundum
+quod contrariatur rationi. Et ideo Augustinus convenientius definit
+peccatum ex hoc quod est contra legem aeternam, quam ex hoc quod
+est contra rationem, praecipue cum per legem aeternam regulemur in
+multis quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut in his quae sunt
+fidei.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q72" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q72-p0.1">Q. 72. OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q72-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q72-p3"><a href="#FS_Q72_A1"> (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p4"><a href="#FS_Q72_A2"> (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p5"><a href="#FS_Q72_A3"> (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p6"><a href="#FS_Q72_A4"> (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p7"><a href="#FS_Q72_A5"> (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p8"><a href="#FS_Q72_A6"> (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p9"><a href="#FS_Q72_A7"> (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p10"><a href="#FS_Q72_A8"> (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p11"><a href="#FS_Q72_A9"> (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 pr."><a name="36536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36536]
+Iª-IIae q. 72 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+distinctione peccatorum vel vitiorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
+novem. Primo, utrum peccata distinguantur specie secundum obiecta.
+Secundo, de distinctione peccatorum spiritualium et carnalium.
+Tertio, utrum secundum causas. Quarto, utrum secundum eos in quos
+peccatur. Quinto, utrum secundum diversitatem reatus. Sexto, utrum
+secundum omissionem et commissionem. Septimo, utrum secundum
+diversum processum peccati. Octavo, utrum secundum abundantiam et
+defectum. Nono, utrum secundum diversas circumstantias.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q72_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A1-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 1. Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation,
+chiefly, to their end, as shown above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>;
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.3" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36537] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata non differant specie secundum
+obiecta. Actus enim humani praecipue dicuntur boni vel mali per
+comparationem ad finem, ut supra ostensum est. Cum igitur peccatum
+nihil aliud sit quam actus hominis malus, sicut dictum est, videtur
+quod secundum fines peccata debeant distingui specie, magis quam
+secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil
+in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their
+objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36538] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+malum, cum sit privatio, distinguitur specie secundum diversas
+species oppositorum. Sed peccatum est quoddam malum in genere
+humanorum actuum. Ergo peccata magis distinguuntur specie secundum
+opposita, quam secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with
+diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral.
+xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36539] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si peccata specie differrent secundum obiecta, impossibile esset
+idem peccatum specie circa diversa obiecta inveniri. Sed
+inveniuntur aliqua huiusmodi peccata, nam superbia est et in rebus
+spiritualibus et in corporalibus, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro
+XXXIV Moral.; avaritia etiam est circa diversa genera rerum. Ergo
+peccata non distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various
+objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q72_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a> ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36540] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem
+Dei. Sed dicta vel facta vel concupita distinguuntur specie
+secundum diversa obiecta, quia actus per obiecta distinguuntur, ut
+supra dictum est. Ergo etiam peccata secundum obiecta specie
+distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from
+God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter;
+while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one
+acts intending evil," as Dionysius
+declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that
+which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the
+part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according
+to their objects, as was proved above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Therefore it follows that sins are properly
+distinguished in species by their objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 co."><a name="36541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36541] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem peccati duo
+concurrunt, scilicet actus voluntarius; et inordinatio eius, quae
+est per recessum a lege Dei. Horum autem duorum unum per se
+comparatur ad peccantem, qui intendit talem actum voluntarium
+exercere in tali materia, aliud autem, scilicet inordinatio actus,
+per accidens se habet ad intentionem peccantis; nullus enim
+intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div.
+Nom. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque, consequitur speciem
+secundum illud quod est per se, non autem secundum id quod est per
+accidens, quia ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt extra rationem
+speciei. Et ideo peccata specie distinguuntur ex parte actuum
+voluntariorum, magis quam ex parte inordinationis in peccato
+existentis. Actus autem voluntarii distinguuntur specie secundum
+obiecta, ut in superioribus ostensum est. Unde sequitur quod
+peccata proprie distinguantur specie secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the
+will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their
+ends.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36542] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod finis principaliter habet rationem boni, et ideo
+comparatur ad actum voluntatis, qui est primordialis in omni
+peccato, sicut obiectum. Unde in idem redit quod peccata differant
+secundum obiecta, vel secundum fines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects
+of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite
+virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q72_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36543] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito
+ordine privatus. Et ideo peccata magis distinguuntur specie
+secundum obiecta actuum, quam secundum opposita. Quamvis etiam si
+distinguantur secundum oppositas virtutes, in idem rediret,
+virtutes enim distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut supra
+habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which
+aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks
+abundance of things adapted to human use.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36544] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod nihil prohibet in diversis rebus specie vel genere
+differentibus, invenire unam formalem rationem obiecti, a qua
+peccatum speciem recipit. Et hoc modo superbia circa diversas res
+excellentiam quaerit, avaritia vero abundantiam eorum quae usui
+humano accommodantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A2-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 2. Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc.
+from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore
+carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36545] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur peccata
+spiritualia a carnalibus. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Galat. V,
+<i>manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia,
+impudicitia, luxuria, idolorum servitus, veneficia,</i> etc., ex
+quo videtur quod omnia peccatorum genera sunt opera carnis. Sed
+peccata carnalia dicuntur opera carnis. Ergo non sunt distinguenda
+peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.13" target="asv"> Rom. 8:13</a>: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live."
+Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not
+be distinguished from spiritual sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36546] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quicumque peccat, secundum carnem ambulat, secundum illud Rom.
+VIII, <i>si secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini; si autem spiritu
+facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis</i>. Sed vivere vel ambulare
+secundum carnem, videtur pertinere ad rationem peccati carnalis.
+Ergo omnia peccata sunt carnalia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda
+peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv"> Eph. 4:23</a>: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed
+in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason,
+as we shall state further on (
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[74], A[7]</a>).
+Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36547] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+superior pars animae, quae est mens vel ratio, spiritus nominatur,
+secundum illud Ephes. IV, <i>renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae</i>,
+ubi spiritus pro ratione ponitur, ut ibi Glossa dicit. Sed omne
+peccatum quod secundum carnem committitur, a ratione derivatur per
+consensum, quia superioris rationis est consentire in actum
+peccati, ut infra dicetur. Ergo eadem peccata sunt carnalia et
+spiritualia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against
+his own body. But, according to the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>), "every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore
+fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv">Eph. 5:3</a>) reckons covetousness with the carnal
+sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36548] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+si aliqua peccata specialiter sunt carnalia, hoc potissime
+intelligendum videtur de illis peccatis quibus aliquis in corpus
+suum peccat. Sed sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, <i>omne
+peccatum quodcumque fecerit homo, extra corpus est, qui autem
+fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat</i>. Ergo sola fornicatio esset
+peccatum carnale, cum tamen apostolus, ad Ephes. V, etiam avaritiam
+carnalibus peccatis annumeret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36549] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., dicit quod <i>septem capitalium
+vitiorum quinque sunt spiritualia, et duo carnalia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A2-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has
+an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure
+is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire;
+this can also be called spiritual
+pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized
+in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure.
+</p><p id="FS_Q72_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal
+pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in
+sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:1</a>): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 co."><a name="36550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36550] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccata recipiunt speciem ex
+obiectis. Omne autem peccatum consistit in appetitu alicuius
+commutabilis boni quod inordinate appetitur, et per consequens in
+eo iam habito inordinate aliquis delectatur. Ut autem ex
+superioribus patet, duplex est delectatio. Una quidem animalis,
+quae consummatur in sola apprehensione alicuius rei ad votum
+habitae, et haec etiam potest dici delectatio spiritualis, sicut
+cum aliquis delectatur in laude humana, vel in aliquo huiusmodi.
+Alia vero delectatio est corporalis, sive naturalis, quae in ipso
+tactu corporali perficitur, quae potest etiam dici delectatio
+carnalis. Sic igitur illa peccata quae perficiuntur in delectatione
+spirituali, vocantur peccata spiritualia, illa vero quae
+perficiuntur in delectatione carnali, vocantur peccata carnalia;
+sicut gula, quae perficitur in delectatione ciborum, et luxuria,
+quae perficitur in delectatione venereorum. Unde et apostolus dicit
+II ad Cor. VII. <i>Emundemus nos ab omni inquinamento, carnis et
+spiritus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure;
+but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says
+(De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36551] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, illa vitia dicuntur
+opera carnis, <i>non quia in voluptate carnis perficiantur, sed
+caro sumitur ibi pro homine, qui dum secundum se vivit, secundum
+carnem vivere dicitur</i>; ut etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ.
+Dei. Et huius ratio est ex hoc, quod omnis rationis humanae
+defectus ex sensu carnali aliquo modo initium habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36552] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc
+etiam patet responsio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are
+named, is carnal pleasure.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36553] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in peccatis etiam carnalibus est aliquis actus
+spiritualis, scilicet actus rationis, sed finis horum peccatorum, a
+quo denominantur, est delectatio carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning
+it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It
+may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin
+alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness,
+which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again,
+it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness
+is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory
+says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36554] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, <i>specialiter in
+fornicationis peccato servit anima corpori, intantum ut nihil aliud
+in ipso momento cogitare homini liceat</i>. Delectatio autem gulae,
+etsi sit carnalis, non ita absorbet rationem. Vel potest dici quod
+in hoc peccato etiam quaedam iniuria fit corpori, dum inordinate
+maculatur. Et ideo per hoc solum peccatum dicitur specialiter homo
+in corpus peccare. Avaritia vero quae in carnalibus peccatis
+connumeratur, pro adulterio ponitur, quod est iniusta usurpatio
+uxoris alienae. Vel potest dici quod res in qua delectatur avarus,
+corporale quoddam est, et quantum ad hoc, connumeratur peccatis
+carnalibus. Sed ipsa delectatio non pertinet ad carnem, sed ad
+spiritum, et ideo secundum Gregorium, est spirituale peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A3-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 3. Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence
+it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore
+they differ specifically in reference to their causes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36555] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata distinguantur specie secundum
+causas. Ab eodem enim habet res speciem, a quo habet esse. Sed
+peccata habent esse ex suis causis. Ergo ab eis etiam speciem
+sortiuntur. Differunt ergo specie secundum diversitatem
+causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like
+its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they
+differ in reference to their other causes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36556] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+inter alias causas minus videtur pertinere ad speciem causa
+materialis. Sed obiectum in peccato est sicut causa materialis. Cum
+ergo secundum obiecta peccata specie distinguantur, videtur quod
+peccata multo magis secundum alias causas distinguantur specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine, commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling
+us to undue ardor." For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.:
+'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on
+account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory,
+too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes
+of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36557] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit
+quod <i>omne peccatum est ex timore male humiliante, vel ex amore
+male inflammante</i>. Dicitur etiam I Ioan. II, quod <i>omne quod
+est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia
+oculorum, aut superbia vitae</i>, dicitur autem aliquid esse in
+mundo, propter peccatum, secundum quod mundi nomine amatores mundi
+significantur, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Gregorius etiam,
+XXXI Moral., distinguit omnia peccata secundum septem vitia
+capitalia. Omnes autem huiusmodi divisiones respiciunt causas
+peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod peccata differant specie secundum
+diversitatem causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>) that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore
+sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36558] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quia secundum hoc omnia peccata essent unius speciei, cum ex
+una causa causentur, dicitur enim Eccli. X, quod <i>initium omnis
+peccati est superbia</i>; et I ad Tim. ult., quod <i>radix omnium
+malorum est cupiditas</i>. Manifestum est autem esse diversas
+species peccatorum. Non ergo peccata distinguuntur specie secundum
+diversitates causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the
+"material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and
+form, both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements
+and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however,
+because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts
+are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus
+heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in
+voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or
+motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft,
+or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue
+ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only
+in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>;
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6) that human acts take their species from the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 co."><a name="36559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36559] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum quatuor sint causarum genera, diversimode
+diversis attribuuntur. Causa enim formalis et materialis respiciunt
+proprie substantiam rei, et ideo substantiae secundum formam et
+materiam specie et genere distinguuntur. Agens autem et finis
+respiciunt directe motum et operationem, et ideo motus et
+operationes secundum huiusmodi causas specie distinguuntur;
+diversimode tamen. Nam principia activa naturalia sunt determinata
+semper ad eosdem actus, et ideo diversae species in actibus
+naturalibus attenduntur non solum secundum obiecta, quae sunt fines
+vel termini, sed etiam secundum principia activa; sicut calefacere
+et infrigidare distinguuntur specie secundum calidum et frigidum.
+Sed principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cuiusmodi sunt actus
+peccatorum, non se habent ex necessitate ad unum, et ideo ex uno
+principio activo vel motivo possunt diversae species peccatorum
+procedere; sicut ex timore male humiliante potest procedere quod
+homo furetur, et quod occidat, et quod deserat gregem sibi
+commissum; et haec eadem possunt procedere ex amore. Unde
+manifestum est quod peccata non differant specie secundum diversas
+causas activas vel motivas; sed solum secundum diversitatem causae
+finalis. Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis, ostensum est enim
+supra quod actus humani habent speciem ex fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts,
+unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and
+consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36560] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cum non
+sint determinata ad unum, non sufficiunt ad producendum humanos
+actus, nisi determinetur voluntas ad unum per intentionem finis; ut
+patet per philosophum, in IX Metaphys. Et ideo a fine perficitur et
+esse et species peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of
+the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered
+as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic.
+x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has
+the character of end.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36561] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod obiecta, secundum quod comparantur ad actus
+exteriores, habent rationem materiae circa quam, sed secundum quod
+comparantur ad actum interiorem voluntatis, habent rationem finium;
+et ex hoc habent quod dent speciem actui. Quamvis etiam secundum
+quod sunt materia circa quam, habeant rationem terminorum; a quibus
+motus specificantur, ut dicitur in V Physic. et in X Ethic. Sed
+tamen etiam termini motus dant speciem motibus, inquantum habent
+rationem finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36562] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illae divisiones peccatorum non dantur ad
+distinguendas species peccatorum; sed ad manifestandas diversas
+causas eorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A4-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 4. Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that
+which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against
+God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q66_A6" id="FS_Q72_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[6]</a>). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of
+sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36563] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccatum distinguatur
+per peccatum quod est in Deum, in proximum, et in seipsum. Illud
+enim quod est commune omni peccato, non debet poni quasi pars in
+divisione peccati. Sed commune est omni peccato quod sit contra
+Deum, ponitur enim in definitione peccati quod sit contra legem
+Dei, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo peccatum in Deum debet poni
+quasi pars in divisione peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed
+to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly
+divided into these three.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36564] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis divisio debet fieri per opposita. Sed ista tria genera
+peccatorum non sunt opposita, quicumque enim peccat in proximum,
+peccat etiam in seipsum et in Deum. Non ergo peccatum convenienter
+dividitur secundum haec tria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are
+not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36565] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ea quae sunt extrinsecus, non conferunt speciem. Sed Deus et
+proximus sunt extra nos. Ergo per haec non distinguuntur peccata
+secundum speciem. Inconvenienter igitur secundum haec tria peccatum
+dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and
+against his neighbor."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36566] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Isidorus, in libro de summo bono, distinguens peccata,
+dicit quod <i>homo dicitur peccare in se, in Deum, et in
+proximum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so
+far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule
+of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold
+order would suffice. But since man is
+naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed
+in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever
+things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised
+under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he
+that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the
+first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor,
+we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation
+to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against
+himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he
+is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God,
+his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which
+the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins:
+because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from
+what has been said (
+<a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[62], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his
+neighbor.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 co."><a name="36567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36567] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum est actus
+inordinatus. Triplex autem ordo in homine debet esse. Unus quidem
+secundum comparationem ad regulam rationis, prout scilicet omnes
+actiones et passiones nostrae debent secundum regulam rationis
+commensurari. Alius autem ordo est per comparationem ad regulam
+divinae legis, per quam homo in omnibus dirigi debet. Et si quidem
+homo naturaliter esset animal solitarium, hic duplex ordo
+sufficeret, sed quia homo est naturaliter animal politicum et
+sociale, ut probatur in I Polit., ideo necesse est quod sit tertius
+ordo, quo homo ordinetur ad alios homines, quibus convivere debet.
+Horum autem ordinum secundus continet primum, et excedit ipsum.
+Quaecumque enim continentur sub ordine rationis, continentur sub
+ordine ipsius Dei, sed quaedam continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei,
+quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et quae
+debentur soli Deo. Unde qui in talibus peccat, dicitur in Deum
+peccare, sicut haereticus et sacrilegus et blasphemus. Similiter
+etiam secundus ordo includit tertium, et excedit ipsum. Quia in
+omnibus in quibus ordinamur ad proximum, oportet nos dirigi
+secundum regulam rationis, sed in quibusdam dirigimur secundum
+rationem quantum ad nos tantum, non autem quantum ad proximum. Et
+quando in his peccatur, dicitur homo peccare in seipsum, sicut
+patet de guloso, luxurioso et prodigo. Quando vero peccat homo in
+his quibus ad proximum ordinatur, dicitur peccare in proximum,
+sicut patet de fure et homicida. Sunt autem diversa quibus homo
+ordinatur ad Deum, et ad proximum, et ad seipsum. Unde haec
+distinctio peccatorum est secundum obiecta, secundum quae
+diversificantur species peccatorum. Unde haec distinctio peccatorum
+proprie est secundum diversas peccatorum species. Nam et virtutes,
+quibus peccata opponuntur, secundum hanc differentiam specie
+distinguuntur, manifestum est enim ex dictis quod virtutibus
+theologicis homo ordinatur ad Deum, temperantia vero et fortitudine
+ad seipsum, iustitia autem ad proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order
+to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36568] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccare in Deum, secundum quod ordo qui est ad
+Deum, includit omnem humanum ordinem, commune est omni peccato. Sed
+quantum ad id quod ordo Dei excedit alios duos ordines, sic
+peccatum in Deum est speciale genus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer,
+not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers
+and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in
+respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the
+numbers three and four.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36569] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod quando aliqua quorum unum includit alterum, ab
+invicem distinguuntur, intelligitur fieri distinctio non secundum
+illud quod unum continetur in altero, sed secundum illud quod unum
+excedit alterum. Sicut patet in divisione numerorum et figurarum,
+non enim triangulus dividitur contra quadratum secundum quod
+continetur in eo, sed secundum quod exceditur ab eo; et similiter
+est de ternario et quaternario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related
+to it as to its object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36570] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Deus et proximus, quamvis sint exteriora respectu
+ipsius peccantis, non tamen sunt extranea respectu actus peccati;
+sed comparantur ad ipsum sicut propria obiecta ipsius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A5-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 5. Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when
+sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even
+to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal
+punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity
+of the fault, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are
+not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36571] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod divisio peccatorum quae est secundum
+reatum, diversificet speciem, puta cum dividitur secundum veniale
+et mortale. Ea enim quae in infinitum differunt, non possunt esse
+unius speciei, nec etiam unius generis. Sed veniale et mortale
+peccatum differunt in infinitum, veniali enim debetur poena
+temporalis, mortali poena aeterna; mensura autem poenae respondet
+quantitati culpae, secundum illud Deut. XXV, <i>pro mensura delicti
+erit et plagarum modus</i>. Ergo veniale et mortale non sunt unius
+generis, nedum quod sint unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder
+and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial
+and mortal sins differ specifically.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36572] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quaedam peccata sunt mortalia ex genere, sicut homicidium et
+adulterium, quaedam vero ex suo genere sunt peccata venialia, sicut
+verbum otiosum et risus superfluus. Ergo peccatum veniale et
+mortale specie differunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward
+is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their
+ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36573] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut se habet actus virtuosus ad praemium, ita se habet peccatum
+ad poenam. Sed praemium est finis virtuosi actus. Ergo et poena est
+finis peccati. Sed peccata distinguuntur specie secundum fines, ut
+dictum est. Ergo etiam distinguuntur specie secundum reatum
+poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as
+the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36574] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+ea quae constituunt speciem, sunt priora, sicut differentiae
+specificae. Sed poena sequitur culpam, sicut effectus eius. Ergo
+peccata non differunt specie secundum reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to
+be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is
+consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it
+may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific
+diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man.
+</p><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p7"> We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of
+punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and
+what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the
+intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it
+is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to
+the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific
+diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.
+</p><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p8"> Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes
+the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying
+the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame
+may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while,
+on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now
+the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable
+principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away
+from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without
+turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction
+of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of
+the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible
+to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the
+truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider
+the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas
+when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle
+of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to
+deserve to be punished eternally.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 co."><a name="36575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36575] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod eorum quae specie differunt, duplex differentia
+invenitur. Una quidem quae constituit diversitatem specierum, et
+talis differentia nunquam invenitur nisi in speciebus diversis;
+sicut rationale et irrationale, animatum et inanimatum. Alia autem
+differentia est consequens diversitatem speciei, et talis
+differentia, etsi in aliquibus consequatur diversitatem speciei, in
+aliis tamen potest inveniri in eadem specie; sicut album et nigrum
+consequuntur diversitatem speciei corvi et cygni, tamen invenitur
+huiusmodi differentia in eadem hominis specie. Dicendum est ergo
+quod differentia venialis et mortalis peccati, vel quaecumque alia
+differentia sumitur penes reatum, non potest esse differentia
+constituens diversitatem speciei. Nunquam enim id quod est per
+accidens, constituit speciem. Id autem quod est praeter intentionem
+agentis, est per accidens, ut patet in II Physic. Manifestum est
+autem quod poena est praeter intentionem peccantis. Unde per
+accidens se habet ad peccatum, ex parte ipsius peccantis. Ordinatur
+tamen ad peccatum ab exteriori, scilicet ex iustitia iudicantis,
+qui secundum diversas conditiones peccatorum diversas poenas
+infligit. Unde differentia quae est ex reatu poenae, potest
+consequi diversam speciem peccatorum; non autem constituit
+diversitatem speciei. Differentia autem peccati venialis et
+mortalis consequitur diversitatem inordinationis, quae complet
+rationem peccati. Duplex enim est inordinatio, una per
+subtractionem principii ordinis; alia qua, salvato principio
+ordinis, fit inordinatio circa ea quae sunt post principium. Sicut
+in corpore animalis quandoque quidem inordinatio complexionis
+procedit usque ad destructionem principii vitalis, et haec est
+mors, quandoque vero, salvo principio vitae, fit inordinatio
+quaedam in humoribus, et tunc est aegritudo. Principium autem
+totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus, qui ita se habet in
+operativis, sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis, ut
+dicitur in VII Ethic. Unde quando anima deordinatur per peccatum
+usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unimur per
+caritatem, tunc est peccatum mortale, quando vero fit deordinatio
+citra aversionem a Deo, tunc est peccatum veniale. Sicut enim in
+corporalibus deordinatio mortis, quae est per remotionem principii
+vitae, est irreparabilis secundum naturam; inordinatio autem
+aegritudinis reparari potest, propter id quod salvatur principium
+vitae; similiter est in his quae pertinent ad animam. Nam in
+speculativis qui errat circa principia, impersuasibilis est, qui
+autem errat salvatis principiis, per ipsa principia revocari
+potest. Et similiter in operativis qui peccando avertitur ab ultimo
+fine, quantum est ex natura peccati, habet lapsum irreparabilem, et
+ideo dicitur peccare mortaliter, aeternaliter puniendus. Qui vero
+peccat citra aversionem a Deo, ex ipsa ratione peccati
+reparabiliter deordinatur, quia salvatur principium, et ideo
+dicitur peccare venialiter, quia scilicet non ita peccat ut
+mereatur interminabilem poenam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz.
+the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance,
+in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may
+even be a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36576] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in
+infinitum ex parte aversionis, non autem ex parte conversionis, per
+quam respicit obiectum, unde peccatum speciem habet. Unde nihil
+prohibet in eadem specie inveniri aliquod peccatum mortale et
+veniale, sicut primus motus in genere adulterii est peccatum
+veniale; et verbum otiosum, quod plerumque est veniale, potest
+etiam esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that
+this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may
+be found even in things of the same species, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36577] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ex hoc quod invenitur aliquod peccatum mortale ex
+genere, et aliquod peccatum veniale ex genere, sequitur quod talis
+differentia consequatur diversitatem peccatorum secundum speciem,
+non autem quod causet eam. Talis autem differentia potest inveniri
+etiam in his quae sunt eiusdem speciei, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on
+the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36578] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod praemium est de intentione merentis vel virtuose
+agentis, sed poena non est de intentione peccantis, sed magis est
+contra voluntatem ipsius. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A6-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 6. Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.1" target="asv">Eph. 2:1</a>), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,'
+by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here
+denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of
+commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36579] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum commissionis et omissionis
+specie differant. Delictum enim contra peccatum dividitur, Ephes.
+II, ubi dicitur, <i>cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis
+vestris</i>. Et exponit ibi Glossa, <i>delictis, idest dimittendo
+quae iubentur; et peccatis, scilicet agendo prohibita</i>, ex quo
+patet quod per delictum intelligitur peccatum omissionis, per
+peccatum, peccatum commissionis. Differunt igitur specie, cum ex
+opposito dividantur, tanquam diversae species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been
+said (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q72_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts,
+against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36580] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccato per se convenit quod sit contra legem Dei, ponitur enim in
+eius definitione, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed in lege Dei alia
+sunt praecepta affirmativa, contra quae est peccatum omissionis; et
+alia praecepta negativa, contra quae est peccatum commissionis.
+Ergo peccatum omissionis et peccatum commissionis differunt
+specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species,
+since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys.
+iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36581] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omissio et commissio differunt sicut affirmatio et negatio. Sed
+affirmatio et negatio non possunt esse unius speciei, quia negatio
+non habet speciem; non entis enim non sunt neque species neque
+differentiae, ut philosophus dicit. Ergo omissio et commissio non
+possunt esse unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which
+is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and
+commission do not differ specifically.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36582] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+in eadem specie peccati invenitur omissio et commissio, avarus enim
+et aliena rapit, quod est peccatum commissionis; et sua non dat
+quibus dare debet, quod est peccatum omissionis. Ergo omissio et
+commissio non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed
+in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which
+is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which
+are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed
+to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves
+differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission
+and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species.
+But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because
+they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs,
+and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the
+prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner,
+is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not
+give forth cold.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 co."><a name="36583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36583] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in peccatis invenitur duplex differentia, una
+materialis, et alia formalis. Materialis quidem attenditur secundum
+naturalem speciem actuum peccati, formalis autem secundum ordinem
+ad unum finem proprium, quod est obiectum proprium. Unde
+inveniuntur aliqui actus materialiter specie differentes, qui tamen
+formaliter sunt in eadem specie peccati, quia ad idem ordinantur,
+sicut ad eandem speciem homicidii pertinet iugulatio, lapidatio et
+perforatio, quamvis actus sint specie differentes secundum speciem
+naturae. Sic ergo si loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et
+commissionis materialiter, differunt specie, large tamen loquendo
+de specie, secundum quod negatio vel privatio speciem habere
+potest. Si autem loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et
+commissionis formaliter, sic non differunt specie, quia ad idem
+ordinantur, et ex eodem motivo procedunt. Avarus enim ad
+congregandum pecuniam et rapit, et non dat ea quae dare debet; et
+similiter gulosus ad satisfaciendum gulae, et superflua comedit, et
+ieiunia debita praetermittit; et idem est videre in ceteris. Semper
+enim in rebus negatio fundatur super aliqua affirmatione, quae est
+quodammodo causa eius, unde etiam in rebus naturalibus eiusdem
+rationis est quod ignis calefaciat, et quod non infrigidet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to
+material species, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36584] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod illa divisio quae est per commissionem et
+omissionem, non est secundum diversas species formales, sed
+materiales tantum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue,
+first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are
+induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but
+to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed
+to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is
+a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically
+according to the various precepts of the Law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36585] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod necesse fuit in lege Dei proponi diversa praecepta
+affirmativa et negativa, ut gradatim homines introducerentur ad
+virtutem, prius quidem abstinendo a malo, ad quod inducimur per
+praecepta negativa; et postmodum faciendo bonum, ad quod inducimur
+per praecepta affirmativa. Et sic praecepta affirmativa et negativa
+non pertinent ad diversas virtutes, sed ad diversos gradus
+virtutis. Et per consequens non oportet quod contrarientur diversis
+peccatis secundum speciem. Peccatum etiam non habet speciem ex
+parte aversionis, quia secundum hoc est negatio vel privatio, sed
+ex parte conversionis, secundum quod est actus quidam. Unde
+secundum diversa praecepta legis non diversificantur peccata
+secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking,
+negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36586] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de materiali diversitate
+speciei. Sciendum est tamen quod negatio, etsi proprie non sit in
+specie, constituitur tamen in specie per reductionem ad aliquam
+affirmationem quam sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A7-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 7. Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes
+three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second
+stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to
+the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to
+reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36587] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur peccatum in
+peccatum cordis, oris, et operis. Augustinus enim, in XII de Trin.,
+ponit tres gradus peccati, quorum primus est, cum carnalis sensus
+illecebram quandam ingerit, quod est peccatum cogitationis,
+secundus gradus est, quando sola cogitationis delectatione aliquis
+contentus est; tertius gradus est, quando faciendum decernitur per
+consensum. Sed tria haec pertinent ad peccatum cordis. Ergo
+inconvenienter peccatum cordis ponitur quasi unum genus
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second,
+"when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume
+on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and
+two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36588] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Gregorius, in IV Moral., ponit quatuor gradus peccati, quorum
+primus est culpa latens in corde; secundus, cum exterius
+publicatur; tertius est, cum consuetudine roboratur; quartus est,
+cum usque ad praesumptionem divinae misericordiae, vel ad
+desperationem, homo procedit. Ubi non distinguitur peccatum operis
+a peccato oris; et adduntur duo alii peccatorum gradus. Ergo
+inconveniens fuit prima divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically.
+Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36589] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+non potest esse peccatum in ore vel in opere, nisi fiat prius in
+corde. Ergo ista peccata specie non differunt. Non ergo debent
+contra se invicem dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome in commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36590] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Hieronymus dicit, super Ezech., <i>tria sunt generalia
+delicta quibus humanum subiacet genus, aut enim cogitatione, aut
+sermone, aut opere peccamus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically:
+secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is
+the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species,
+as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the
+generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various
+complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first
+beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as
+man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the
+deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three
+belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance,
+is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the
+same applies to lust and to any other sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 co."><a name="36591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36591] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliqua inveniuntur differre specie dupliciter. Uno
+modo, ex eo quod utrumque habet speciem completam, sicut equus et
+bos differunt specie. Alio modo, secundum diversos gradus in aliqua
+generatione vel motu accipiuntur diversae species, sicut
+aedificatio est completa generatio domus, collocatio autem
+fundamenti et erectio parietis sunt species incompletae, ut patet
+per philosophum, in X Ethic.; et idem etiam potest dici in
+generationibus animalium. Sic igitur peccatum dividitur per haec
+tria, scilicet peccatum oris, cordis et operis, non sicut per
+diversas species completas, nam consummatio peccati est in opere,
+unde peccatum operis habet speciem completam. Sed prima inchoatio
+eius est quasi fundatio in corde; secundus autem gradus eius est in
+ore, secundum quod homo prorumpit facile ad manifestandum conceptum
+cordis; tertius autem gradus iam est in consummatione operis. Et
+sic haec tria differunt secundum diversos gradus peccati. Patet
+tamen quod haec tria pertinent ad unam perfectam peccati speciem,
+cum ab eodem motivo procedant, iracundus enim, ex hoc quod appetit
+vindictam, primo quidem perturbatur in corde; secundo, in verba
+contumeliosa prorumpit; tertio vero, procedit usque ad facta
+iniuriosa. Et idem patet in luxuria, et in quolibet alio
+peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided
+into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36592] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod omne peccatum cordis convenit in ratione
+occulti, et secundum hoc ponitur unus gradus. Qui tamen per tres
+gradus distinguitur, scilicet cogitationis, delectationis et
+consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas
+Jerome (in commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while
+in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation
+is by way of sequel.
+Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation
+of a man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36593] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum oris et operis conveniunt in manifestatione,
+et propter hoc a Gregorio sub uno computantur. Hieronymus autem
+distinguit ea, quia in peccato oris est manifestatio tantum, et
+principaliter intenta, in peccato vero operis est principaliter
+expletio interioris conceptus cordis, sed manifestatio est ex
+consequenti. Consuetudo vero et desperatio sunt gradus consequentes
+post speciem perfectam peccati, sicut adolescentia et iuventus post
+perfectam hominis generationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each
+is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous,
+but only when there is a break in the movement.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36594] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod peccatum cordis et oris non distinguuntur a peccato
+operis, quando simul cum eo coniunguntur, sed prout quodlibet horum
+per se invenitur. Sicut etiam pars motus non distinguitur a toto
+motu, quando motus est continuus, sed solum quando motus sistit in
+medio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A8-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 8. Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect
+of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species
+of sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36595] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod superabundantia et defectus non
+diversificent species peccatorum. Superabundantia enim et defectus
+differunt secundum magis et minus. Sed magis et minus non
+diversificant speciem. Ergo superabundantia et defectus non
+diversificant speciem peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative
+matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more
+or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude
+of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36596] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut peccatum in agibilibus est ex hoc quod receditur a
+rectitudine rationis, ita falsitas in speculativis est ex hoc quod
+receditur a veritate rei. Sed non diversificatur species falsitatis
+ex hoc quod aliquis dicit plus vel minus esse quam sit in re. Ergo
+etiam non diversificatur species peccati ex hoc quod recedit a
+rectitudine rationis in plus vel in minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency
+are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality,
+by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36597] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a>
+<i>Praeterea, ex duabus speciebus non constituitur una species</i>,
+ut Porphyrius dicit. Sed superabundantia et defectus uniuntur in
+uno peccato, sunt enim simul quidam illiberales et prodigi, quorum
+duorum illiberalitas est peccatum secundum defectum, prodigalitas
+autem secundum superabundantiam. Ergo superabundantia et defectus
+non diversificant speciem peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices
+that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they
+differ specifically.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36598] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+contraria differunt secundum speciem, nam contrarietas est
+differentia secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed vitia
+quae differunt secundum superabundantiam et defectum, sunt
+contraria, sicut illiberalitas prodigalitati. Ergo differunt
+secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order
+of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention,
+as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently
+wherever we find a
+different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive
+for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary
+to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of
+insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 co."><a name="36599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36599] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum in peccato sint duo, scilicet ipse actus, et
+inordinatio eius, prout receditur ab ordine rationis et legis
+divinae; species peccati attenditur non ex parte inordinationis,
+quae est praeter intentionem peccantis, ut supra dictum est; sed
+magis ex parte ipsius actus, secundum quod terminatur ad obiectum,
+in quod fertur intentio peccantis. Et ideo ubicumque occurrit
+diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est
+diversa species peccati. Manifestum est autem quod non est idem
+motivum ad peccandum in peccatis quae sunt secundum
+superabundantiam, et in peccatis quae sunt secundum defectum;
+quinimmo sunt contraria motiva; sicut motivum in peccato
+intemperantiae est amor delectationum corporalium, motivum autem in
+peccato insensibilitatis est odium earum. Unde huiusmodi peccata
+non solum differunt specie, sed etiam sunt sibi invicem
+contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in
+so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says
+(Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree,
+were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short
+thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36600] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod magis et minus, etsi non sint causa diversitatis
+speciei, consequuntur tamen quandoque species differentes, prout
+proveniunt ex diversis formis, sicut si dicatur quod ignis est
+levior aere. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod qui
+posuerunt non esse diversas species amicitiarum propter hoc quod
+dicuntur secundum magis et minus, non sufficienti crediderunt
+signo. Et hoc modo superexcedere rationem, vel deficere ab ea,
+pertinet ad diversa peccata secundum speciem, inquantum
+consequuntur diversa motiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through
+departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth,
+wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside
+the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to
+tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds
+in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his
+debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36601] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod intentio peccantis non est ut recedat a ratione, et
+ideo non efficitur eiusdem rationis peccatum superabundantiae et
+defectus propter recessum ab eadem rationis rectitudine. Sed
+quandoque ille qui dicit falsum, intendit veritatem occultare, unde
+quantum ad hoc, non refert utrum dicat vel plus vel minus. Si tamen
+recedere a veritate sit praeter intentionem, tunc manifestum est
+quod ex diversis causis aliquis movetur ad dicendum plus vel minus,
+et secundum hoc diversa est ratio falsitatis. Sicut patet de
+iactatore, qui superexcedit dicendo falsum, quaerens gloriam; et de
+deceptore, qui diminuit, evadens debiti solutionem. Unde et quaedam
+falsae opiniones sunt sibi invicem contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf.
+<a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q119_A1" id="FS_Q72_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[119], A[1]</a>, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36602] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod prodigus et illiberalis potest esse aliquis secundum
+diversa, ut scilicet sit aliquis illiberalis in accipiendo quae non
+debet, et prodigus in dando quae non debet. Nihil autem prohibet
+contraria inesse eidem secundum diversa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A9-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 9. Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil
+results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption
+of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36603] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitia et peccata diversificentur
+specie secundum diversas circumstantias. Quia, ut dicit Dionysius,
+IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>malum contingit ex singularibus
+defectibus</i>. Singulares autem defectus sunt corruptiones
+singularum circumstantiarum. Ergo ex singulis circumstantiis
+corruptis singulae species peccatorum consequuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q72_A9-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36604] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccata sunt quidam actus humani. Sed actus humani interdum
+accipiunt speciem a circumstantiis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo
+peccata differunt specie secundum quod diversae circumstantiae
+corrumpuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse:
+</p><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p5"> 'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner
+than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according
+to the various circumstances.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36605] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+diversae species gulae assignantur secundum particulas quae in hoc
+versiculo continentur, <i>praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter,
+studiose</i>. Haec autem pertinent ad diversas circumstantias, nam
+praepropere est antequam oportet, nimis plus quam oportet, et idem
+patet in aliis. Ergo species peccati diversificantur secundum
+diversas circumstantias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not";
+and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36606] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in III et IV Ethic., quod singula vitia
+peccant agendo et plus quam oportet, et quando non oportet, et
+similiter secundum omnes alias circumstantias. Non ergo secundum
+hoc diversificantur peccatorum species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A8" id="FS_Q72_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the
+end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive:
+thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on
+with the circumstances, since he does
+this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not
+diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species.
+</p><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p8"> Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat
+hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive
+humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due
+to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances
+entails different species of sins.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 co."><a name="36607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36607] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi occurrit aliud motivum ad
+peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species, quia motivum ad peccandum
+est finis et obiectum. Contingit autem quandoque quod in
+corruptionibus diversarum circumstantiarum est idem motivum, sicut
+illiberalis ab eodem movetur quod accipiat quando non oportet, et
+ubi non oportet, et plus quam oportet, et similiter de aliis
+circumstantiis; hoc enim facit propter inordinatum appetitum
+pecuniae congregandae. Et in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum
+corruptiones non diversificant species peccatorum, sed pertinent ad
+unam et eandem peccati speciem. Quandoque vero contingit quod
+corruptiones diversarum circumstantiarum proveniunt a diversis
+motivis. Puta quod aliquis praepropere comedat, potest provenire ex
+hoc quod homo non potest ferre dilationem cibi, propter facilem
+consumptionem humiditatis; quod vero appetat immoderatum cibum,
+potest contingere propter virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum
+multum cibum; quod autem aliquis appetat cibos deliciosos,
+contingit propter appetitum delectationis quae est in cibo. Unde in
+talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones inducunt diversas
+peccati species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even
+as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A9-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, but from turning to the object of the act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36608] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod malum, inquantum huiusmodi, privatio est, et
+ideo diversificatur specie secundum ea quae privantur, sicut et
+ceterae privationes. Sed peccatum non sortitur speciem ex parte
+privationis vel aversionis, ut supra dictum est; sed ex conversione
+ad obiectum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36609] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod circumstantia nunquam transfert actum in aliam
+speciem, nisi quando est aliud motivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36610] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in diversis speciebus gulae diversa sunt motiva,
+sicut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q73" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q73-p0.1">Q. 73. OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q73-p2"> We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q73-p3"><a href="#FS_Q73_A1"> (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p4"><a href="#FS_Q73_A2"> (2) Whether all are equal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p5"><a href="#FS_Q73_A3"> (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p6"><a href="#FS_Q73_A4"> (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p7"><a href="#FS_Q73_A5"> (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p8"><a href="#FS_Q73_A6"> (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p9"><a href="#FS_Q73_A7"> (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p10"><a href="#FS_Q73_A8"> (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p11"><a href="#FS_Q73_A9"> (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p12"><a href="#FS_Q73_A10"> (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 pr."><a name="36611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36611]
+Iª-IIae q. 73 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+comparatione peccatorum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem.
+Primo, utrum omnia peccata et vitia sint connexa. Secundo, utrum
+omnia sint paria. Tertio, utrum gravitas peccatorum attendatur
+secundum obiecta. Quarto, utrum secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus
+peccata opponuntur. Quinto, utrum peccata carnalia sint graviora
+quam spiritualia. Sexto, utrum secundum causas peccatorum
+attendatur gravitas peccatorum. Septimo, utrum secundum
+circumstantias. Octavo, utrum secundum quantitatem nocumenti. Nono,
+utrum secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Decimo, utrum
+propter magnitudinem personae peccantis aggravetur peccatum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q73_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A1-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 1. Whether all sins are connected with one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.10" target="asv">James 2:10</a>): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing
+all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression
+of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of
+all.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36612] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint connexa. Dicitur
+enim Iac. II, <i>quicumque totam legem servaverit, offendat autem
+in uno, factus est omnium reus</i>. Sed idem est esse reum omnium
+mandatorum legis, quod habere omnia peccata, quia, sicut Ambrosius
+dicit, <i>peccatum est transgressio legis divinae, et caelestium
+inobedientia mandatorum</i>. Ergo quicumque peccat uno peccato,
+subiicitur omnibus peccatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all
+sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36613] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quodlibet peccatum excludit virtutem sibi oppositam. Sed qui caret
+una virtute, caret omnibus, ut patet ex supradictis. Ergo qui
+peccat uno peccato, privatur omnibus virtutibus. Sed qui caret
+virtute, habet vitium sibi oppositum. Ergo qui habet unum peccatum,
+habet omnia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[65], AA[1]</a>,2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God,
+is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as
+Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected
+so that whoever has one, has them all.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36614] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+virtutes omnes sunt connexae quae conveniunt in uno principio, ut
+supra habitum est. Sed sicut virtutes conveniunt in uno principio,
+ita et peccata, quia sicut amor Dei, qui facit civitatem Dei, est
+principium et radix omnium virtutum, ita amor sui, qui facit
+civitatem Babylonis, est radix omnium peccatorum; ut patet per
+Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo etiam omnia vitia et peccata sunt
+connexa, ita ut qui unum habet, habeat omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the
+same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36615] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+quaedam vitia sunt sibi invicem contraria, ut patet per
+philosophum, in II Ethic. Sed impossibile est contraria simul
+inesse eidem. Ergo impossibile est omnia peccata et vitia esse sibi
+invicem connexa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the
+sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule
+of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together
+in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed
+to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed
+when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one
+another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is
+evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not
+consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the
+one for the many.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 co."><a name="36616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36616] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliter se habet intentio agentis secundum virtutem ad
+sequendum rationem, et aliter intentio peccantis ad divertendum a
+ratione. Cuiuslibet enim agentis secundum virtutem intentio est ut
+rationis regulam sequatur, et ideo omnium virtutum intentio in idem
+tendit. Et propter hoc omnes virtutes habent connexionem ad invicem
+in ratione recta agibilium, quae est prudentia, sicut supra dictum
+est. Sed intentio peccantis non est ad hoc quod recedat ab eo quod
+est secundum rationem, sed potius ut tendat in aliquod bonum
+appetibile, a quo speciem sortitur. Huiusmodi autem bona in quae
+tendit intentio peccantis a ratione recedens, sunt diversa, nullam
+connexionem habentia ad invicem, immo etiam interdum sunt
+contraria. Cum igitur vitia et peccata speciem habeant secundum
+illud ad quod convertuntur, manifestum est quod, secundum illud
+quod perficit speciem peccatorum, nullam connexionem habent peccata
+ad invicem. Non enim peccatum committitur in accedendo a
+multitudine ad unitatem, sicut accidit in virtutibus quae sunt
+connexae, sed potius in recedendo ab unitate ad multitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated
+above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[72] , A[1]</a>), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now
+all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised
+in every sin; and in this sense he
+says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt
+of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36617] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Iacobus loquitur de peccato non ex parte
+conversionis, secundum quod peccata distinguuntur, sicut dictum
+est, sed loquitur de eis ex parte aversionis, inquantum scilicet
+homo peccando recedit a legis mandato. Omnia autem legis mandata
+sunt ab uno et eodem, ut ipse ibidem dicit, et ideo idem Deus
+contemnitur in omni peccato. Et ex hac parte dicit quod qui
+offendit in uno, factus est omnium reus, quia scilicet uno peccato
+peccando, incurrit poenae reatum ex hoc quod contemnit Deum, ex
+cuius contemptu provenit omnium peccatorum reatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A4" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[4]</a>), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys
+infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue;
+though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction
+of which entails
+the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue
+is possible, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.3" shape="rect"> Q[65], A[1]</a>). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far
+as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues.
+Nevertheless it
+does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue,
+so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed
+to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.4" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36618] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non per quemlibet actum
+peccati tollitur virtus opposita, nam peccatum veniale virtutem non
+tollit; peccatum autem mortale tollit virtutem infusam, inquantum
+avertit a Deo; sed unus actus peccati etiam mortalis, non tollit
+habitum virtutis acquisitae. Sed si multiplicentur actus intantum
+quod generetur contrarius habitus, excluditur habitus virtutis
+acquisitae. Qua exclusa, excluditur prudentia, quia cum homo agit
+contra quamcumque virtutem, agit contra prudentiam. Sine prudentia
+autem nulla virtus moralis esse potest, ut supra habitum est. Et
+ideo per consequens excluduntur omnes virtutes morales, quantum ad
+perfectum et formale esse virtutis, quod habent secundum quod
+participant prudentiam, remanent tamen inclinationes ad actus
+virtutum, non habentes rationem virtutis. Sed non sequitur quod
+propter hoc homo incurrat omnia vitia vel peccata. Primo quidem,
+quia uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur, ita quod virtus potest
+privari per unum eorum, etsi alterum non adsit. Secundo, quia
+peccatum directe opponitur virtuti quantum ad inclinationem
+virtutis ad actum, ut supra dictum est, unde, remanentibus
+aliquibus inclinationibus virtuosis, non potest dici quod homo
+habeat vitia vel peccata opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which
+flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so
+far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins,
+which arise from self-love, are not connected together.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36619] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod amor Dei est congregativus, inquantum affectum
+hominis a multis ducit in unum, et ideo virtutes, quae ex amore Dei
+causantur, connexionem habent. Sed amor sui disgregat affectum
+hominis in diversa, prout scilicet homo se amat appetendo sibi bona
+temporalia, quae sunt varia et diversa, et ideo vitia et peccata,
+quae causantur ex amore sui, non sunt connexa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A2-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 2. Whether all sins are equal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one
+and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36620] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint paria. Hoc enim est
+peccare, facere quod non licet. Sed facere quod non licet, uno et
+eodem modo in omnibus reprehenditur. Ergo peccare uno et eodem modo
+reprehenditur. Non ergo unum peccatum est alio gravius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things.
+Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one
+go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36621] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne peccatum consistit in hoc quod homo transgreditur regulam
+rationis, quae ita se habet ad actus humanos, sicut regula linearis
+in corporalibus rebus. Ergo peccare simile est ei quod est lineas
+transilire. Sed lineas transilire est aequaliter et uno modo, etiam
+si aliquis longius recedat vel propinquius stet, quia privationes
+non recipiunt magis et minus. Ergo omnia peccata sunt aequalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are
+equal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36622] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccata virtutibus opponuntur. Sed omnes virtutes aequales sunt, ut
+Tullius dicit, in paradoxis. Ergo omnia peccata sunt paria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to Pilate (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.11" target="asv">Jn. 19:11</a>): "He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore
+one sin is greater than another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36623] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dominus dicit ad Pilatum, Ioan. XIX, <i>qui tradidit me
+tibi, maius peccatum habet</i>. Et tamen constat quod Pilatus
+aliquod peccatum habuit. Ergo unum peccatum est maius alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from
+which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the
+pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through
+looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from
+reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if
+we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation,
+which consists, so to speak, in "being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such
+like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead
+on
+the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and,
+in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade
+shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite
+habit; it consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due
+commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and
+the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary
+habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors
+or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such
+as
+not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance
+of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it
+matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must
+say that sins are not all equal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 co."><a name="36624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36624] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod opinio Stoicorum fuit, quam Tullius prosequitur in
+paradoxis, quod omnia peccata sunt paria. Et ex hoc etiam derivatus
+est quorundam haereticorum error, qui, ponentes omnia peccata esse
+paria, dicunt etiam omnes poenas Inferni esse pares. Et quantum ex
+verbis Tullii perspici potest, Stoici movebantur ex hoc quod
+considerabant peccatum ex parte privationis tantum, prout scilicet
+est recessus a ratione, unde simpliciter aestimantes quod nulla
+privatio susciperet magis et minus, posuerunt omnia peccata esse
+paria. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, inveniet duplex
+privationum genus. Est enim quaedam simplex et pura privatio, quae
+consistit quasi in corruptum esse, sicut mors est privatio vitae,
+et tenebra est privatio luminis. Et tales privationes non recipiunt
+magis et minus, quia nihil residuum est de habitu opposito. Unde
+non minus est mortuus aliquis primo die mortis, et tertio vel
+quarto, quam post annum, quando iam cadaver fuerit resolutum. Et
+similiter non est magis tenebrosa domus, si lucerna sit operta
+pluribus velaminibus, quam si sit operta uno solo velamine totum
+lumen intercludente. Est autem alia privatio non simplex, sed
+aliquid retinens de habitu opposito; quae quidem privatio magis
+consistit in corrumpi, quam in corruptum esse, sicut aegritudo,
+quae privat debitam commensurationem humorum, ita tamen quod
+aliquid eius remanet, alioquin non remaneret animal vivum; et
+simile est de turpitudine, et aliis huiusmodi. Huiusmodi autem
+privationes recipiunt magis et minus ex parte eius quod remanet de
+habitu contrario, multum enim refert ad aegritudinem vel
+turpitudinem, utrum plus vel minus a debita commensuratione humorum
+vel membrorum recedatur. Et similiter dicendum est de vitiis et
+peccatis, sic enim in eis privatur debita commensuratio rationis,
+ut non totaliter ordo rationis tollatur; alioquin malum, si sit
+integrum, destruit seipsum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.; non enim
+posset remanere substantia actus, vel affectio agentis, nisi
+aliquid remaneret de ordine rationis. Et ideo multum interest ad
+gravitatem peccati, utrum plus vel minus recedatur a rectitudine
+rationis. Et secundum hoc dicendum est quod non omnia peccata sunt
+paria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness
+are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36625] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccata committere non licet, propter aliquam
+deordinationem quam habent. Unde illa quae maiorem deordinationem
+continent, sunt magis illicita; et per consequens graviora
+peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36626] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato, ac si esset privatio
+pura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to
+its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q73_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[66], AA[1]</a>,2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices
+or sins are not.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36627] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod virtutes sunt aequales proportionaliter in uno et
+eodem, tamen una virtus praecedit aliam dignitate secundum suam
+speciem; et unus etiam homo est alio virtuosior in eadem specie
+virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Et tamen si virtutes essent pares,
+non sequeretur vitia esse paria, quia virtutes habent connexionem,
+non autem vitia seu peccata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A3-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 3. Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to
+its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to
+their various objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36628] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatorum gravitas non varietur
+secundum obiecta. Gravitas enim peccati pertinet ad modum vel
+qualitatem ipsius peccati. Sed obiectum est materia ipsius peccati.
+Ergo secundum diversa obiecta, peccatorum gravitas non
+variatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to
+which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of
+sins does not vary according to their various objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36629] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+gravitas peccati est intensio malitiae ipsius. Peccatum autem non
+habet rationem malitiae ex parte conversionis ad proprium obiectum,
+quod est quoddam bonum appetibile; sed magis ex parte aversionis.
+Ergo gravitas peccatorum non variatur secundum diversa obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one
+another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference
+of objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36630] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccata quae habent diversa obiecta, sunt diversorum generum. Sed
+ea quae sunt diversorum generum, non sunt comparabilia, ut probatur
+in VII Physic. Ergo unum peccatum non est gravius altero secundum
+diversitatem obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[1]</a>). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity
+of sins varies according to their objects.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36631] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+peccata recipiunt speciem ex obiectis, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed
+aliquorum peccatorum unum est gravius altero secundum suam speciem,
+sicut homicidium furto. Ergo gravitas peccatorum differt secundum
+obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[5]</a>), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists
+in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain
+commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder
+of which
+causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart,
+which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the
+graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason
+directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin.
+Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A3" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things
+are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very
+substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin
+committed directly against God, e.g.
+unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it
+is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity
+which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 co."><a name="36632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36632] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, gravitas peccatorum
+differt eo modo quo una aegritudo est alia gravior, sicut enim
+bonum sanitatis consistit in quadam commensuratione humorum per
+convenientiam ad naturam animalis, ita bonum virtutis consistit in
+quadam commensuratione humani actus secundum convenientiam ad
+regulam rationis. Manifestum est autem quod tanto est gravior
+aegritudo, quanto tollitur debita humorum commensuratio per
+commensurationem prioris principii, sicut aegritudo quae provenit
+in corpore humano ex corde, quod est principium vitae, vel ex
+aliquo quod appropinquat cordi, periculosior est. Unde oportet
+etiam quod peccatum sit tanto gravius, quanto deordinatio contingit
+circa aliquod principium quod est prius in ordine rationis. Ratio
+autem ordinat omnia in agibilibus ex fine. Et ideo quanto peccatum
+contingit in actibus humanis ex altiori fine, tanto peccatum est
+gravius. Obiecta autem actuum sunt fines eorum, ut ex supradictis
+patet. Et ideo secundum diversitatem obiectorum attenditur
+diversitas gravitatis in peccatis. Sicut patet quod res exteriores
+ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem; homo autem ordinatur ulterius
+in Deum sicut in finem. Unde peccatum quod est circa ipsam
+substantiam hominis, sicut homicidium est gravius peccato quod est
+circa res exteriores, sicut furtum; et adhuc est gravius peccatum
+quod immediate contra Deum committitur, sicut infidelitas,
+blasphemia et huiusmodi. Et in ordine quorumlibet horum peccatorum
+unum peccatum est gravius altero, secundum quod est circa aliquid
+principalius vel minus principale. Et quia peccata habent speciem
+ex obiectis, differentia gravitatis quae attenditur penes obiecta,
+est prima et principalis, quasi consequens speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention
+of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A3" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A6" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[72], A[6]</a>;
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.3" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36633] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod obiectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur
+actus, habet tamen rationem finis, secundum quod intentio agentis
+fertur in ipsum, ut supra dictum est. Forma autem actus moralis
+dependet ex fine, ut ex superioribus patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which
+aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those
+things to which man turns.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36634] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ex ipsa indebita conversione ad aliquod bonum
+commutabile, sequitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, in qua
+perficitur ratio mali. Et ideo oportet quod secundum diversitatem
+eorum quae pertinent ad conversionem, sequatur diversa gravitas
+malitiae in peccatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as
+they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36635] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod omnia obiecta humanorum actuum habent ordinem ad
+invicem, et ideo omnes actus humani quodammodo conveniunt in uno
+genere, secundum quod ordinantur ad ultimum finem. Et ideo nihil
+prohibet omnia peccata esse comparabilia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A4-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 4. Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed,
+so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv"> Prov. 15:5, </a> "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20, </a> seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice
+restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36636] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non differat
+secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus peccata opponuntur, ut scilicet
+maiori virtuti gravius peccatum opponatur. Quia ut dicitur Prov.
+XV, <i>in abundanti iustitia virtus maxima est</i>. Sed sicut dicit
+dominus, Matth. V, abundans iustitia cohibet iram; quae est minus
+peccatum quam homicidium, quod cohibet minor iustitia. Ergo maximae
+virtuti opponitur minimum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the
+greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what
+is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36637] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+in II Ethic. dicitur quod virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ex
+quo videtur quod maior virtus sit circa magis difficile. Sed minus
+est peccatum si homo deficiat in magis difficili, quam si deficiat
+in minus difficili. Ergo maiori virtuti minus peccatum
+opponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope.
+Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36638] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+caritas est maior virtus quam fides et spes, ut dicitur I ad Cor.
+XIII. Odium autem, quod opponitur caritati, est minus peccatum quam
+infidelitas vel desperatio, quae opponuntur fidei et spei. Ergo
+maiori virtuti opponitur minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue;
+and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36639] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod <i>pessimum optimo
+contrarium est</i>. Optimum autem in moralibus est maxima virtus;
+pessimum autem, gravissimum peccatum. Ergo maximae virtuti
+opponitur gravissimum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object:
+because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue:
+because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both
+sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[72], A[1]</a>). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in
+the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue
+in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not
+only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it.
+And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more
+perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the
+greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 co."><a name="36640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36640] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod virtuti opponitur aliquod peccatum, uno quidem modo
+principaliter et directe, quod scilicet est circa idem obiectum,
+nam contraria circa idem sunt. Et hoc modo oportet quod maiori
+virtuti opponatur gravius peccatum. Sicut enim ex parte obiecti
+attenditur maior gravitas peccati, ita etiam maior dignitas
+virtutis, utrumque enim ex obiecto speciem sortitur, ut ex
+supradictis patet. Unde oportet quod maximae virtuti directe
+contrarietur maximum peccatum, quasi maxime ab eo distans in eodem
+genere. Alio modo potest considerari oppositio virtutis ad
+peccatum, secundum quandam extensionem virtutis cohibentis
+peccatum, quanto enim fuerit virtus maior, tanto magis elongat
+hominem a peccato sibi contrario, ita quod non solum ipsum
+peccatum, sed etiam inducentia ad peccatum cohibet. Et sic
+manifestum est quod quanto aliqua virtus fuerit maior, tanto etiam
+minora peccata cohibet, sicut etiam sanitas, quanto fuerit maior,
+tanto etiam minores distemperantias excludit. Et per hunc modum
+maiori virtuti minus peccatum opponitur ex parte effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor
+sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36641] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de oppositione quae
+attenditur secundum cohibitionem peccati, sic enim abundans
+iustitia etiam minora peccata cohibet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil.
+For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not
+being overcome by the difficulty.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36642] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod maiori virtuti, quae est circa bonum magis difficile,
+contrariatur directe peccatum quod est circa malum magis difficile.
+Utrobique enim invenitur quaedam eminentia, ex hoc quod ostenditur
+voluntas proclivior in bonum vel in malum, ex hoc quod difficultate
+non vincitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred
+of God, which is the most grievous of all sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36643] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod caritas non est quicumque amor, sed amor Dei. Unde
+non opponitur ei quodcumque odium directe, sed odium Dei, quod est
+gravissimum peccatorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A5-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 5. Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft:
+for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv">Prov. 6:30</a>,
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.32" target="asv">32</a>): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy
+his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal
+sin. Therefore carnal sins are
+of greater guilt than spiritual sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36644] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata carnalia non sint minoris
+culpae quam peccata spiritualia. Adulterium enim gravius peccatum
+est quam furtum, dicitur enim Prov. VI, <i>non grandis est culpae
+cum quis furatus fuerit. Qui autem adulter est, propter cordis
+inopiam perdet animam suam</i>. Sed furtum pertinet ad avaritiam,
+quae est peccatum spirituale; adulterium autem ad luxuriam, quae
+est peccatum carnale. Ergo peccata carnalia sunt maioris
+culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil
+rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it
+seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36645] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, super Levit., quod Diabolus maxime gaudet de
+peccato luxuriae et idololatriae. Sed de maiori culpa magis gaudet.
+Ergo, cum luxuria sit peccatum carnale, videtur quod peccata
+carnalia sint maximae culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger
+is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more
+grievous than spiritual sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36646] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus probat, in VII Ethic., quod <i>incontinens
+concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae</i>. Sed ira est
+peccatum spirituale, secundum Gregorium, XXXI Moral.;
+concupiscentia autem pertinet ad peccata carnalia. Ergo peccatum
+carnale est gravius quam peccatum spirituale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36647] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius dicit, quod peccata carnalia sunt minoris
+culpae, et maioris infamiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt
+than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous
+than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject:
+because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to
+turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs
+to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason, implies
+a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for
+this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is
+committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity,
+than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater
+guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we
+shall state further on
+<a href="#FS_Q73_A6" id="FS_Q73_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate
+concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 co."><a name="36648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36648] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccata spiritualia sunt maioris culpae quam peccata
+carnalia. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi quodlibet peccatum
+spirituale sit maioris culpae quolibet peccato carnali, sed quia,
+considerata hac sola differentia spiritualitatis et carnalitatis,
+graviora sunt quam cetera peccata, ceteris paribus. Cuius ratio
+triplex potest assignari. Prima quidem ex parte subiecti. Nam
+peccata spiritualia pertinent ad spiritum, cuius est converti ad
+Deum et ab eo averti, peccata vero carnalia consummantur in
+delectatione carnalis appetitus, ad quem principaliter pertinet ad
+bonum corporale converti. Et ideo peccatum carnale, inquantum
+huiusmodi, plus habet de conversione, propter quod etiam est
+maioris adhaesionis, sed peccatum spirituale habet plus de
+aversione, ex qua procedit ratio culpae. Et ideo peccatum
+spirituale, inquantum huiusmodi, est maioris culpae. Secunda ratio
+potest sumi ex parte eius in quem peccatur. Nam peccatum carnale,
+inquantum huiusmodi, est in corpus proprium; quod est minus
+diligendum, secundum ordinem caritatis, quam Deus et proximus, in
+quos peccatur per peccata spiritualia. Et ideo peccata spiritualia,
+inquantum huiusmodi, sunt maioris culpae. Tertia ratio potest sumi
+ex parte motivi. Quia quanto est gravius impulsivum ad peccandum,
+tanto homo minus peccat, ut infra dicetur. Peccata autem carnalia
+habent vehementius impulsivum, idest ipsam concupiscentiam carnis
+nobis innatam. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, inquantum huiusmodi,
+sunt maioris culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under
+the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv"> Eph. 5:5.</a> "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves
+his wife more than his chattels.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36649] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod adulterium non solum pertinet ad peccatum
+luxuriae, sed etiam pertinet ad peccatum iniustitiae. Et quantum ad
+hoc, potest ad avaritiam reduci; ut Glossa dicit, ad Ephes., super
+illud, <i>omnis fornicator, aut immundus, aut avarus</i>. Et tunc
+gravius est adulterium quam furtum, quanto homini carior est uxor
+quam res possessa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty
+be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36650] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Diabolus dicitur maxime gaudere de peccato luxuriae,
+quia est maximae adhaerentiae, et difficile ab eo homo potest
+eripi, insatiabilis est enim delectabilis appetitus ut philosophus
+dicit, in III Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger,
+is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy
+of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man
+is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi,
+17) that they are more shameful.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36651] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod philosophus dicit, turpiorem esse incontinentem
+concupiscentiae quam incontinentem irae, quia minus participat de
+ratione. Et secundum hoc etiam dicit, in III Ethic., quod peccata
+intemperantiae sunt maxime exprobrabilia, quia sunt circa illas
+delectationes quae sunt communes nobis et brutis, unde quodammodo
+per ista peccata homo brutalis redditur. Et inde est quod, sicut
+Gregorius dicit, sunt maioris infamiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A6-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 6. Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly
+it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist;
+for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous.
+Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36652] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non attendatur
+secundum causam peccati. Quanto enim peccati causa fuerit maior,
+tanto vehementius movet ad peccandum, et ita difficilius potest ei
+resisti. Sed peccatum diminuitur ex hoc quod ei difficilius
+resistitur, hoc enim pertinet ad infirmitatem peccantis, ut non
+facile resistat peccato; peccatum autem quod est ex infirmitate,
+levius iudicatur. Non ergo peccatum habet gravitatem ex parte suae
+causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv"> Rom. 7:7, </a> "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now
+the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished
+by the greatness of its cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36653] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+concupiscentia est generalis quaedam causa peccati, unde dicit
+Glossa, super illud Rom. VII, <i>nam concupiscentiam nesciebam
+etc., bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum
+prohibet</i>. Sed quanto homo fuerit victus maiori concupiscentia,
+tanto est minus peccatum. Gravitas ergo peccati diminuitur ex
+magnitudine causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin.
+Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether
+excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased
+by the greatness of its cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36654] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut rectitudo rationis est causa virtuosi actus, ita defectus
+rationis videtur esse causa peccati. Sed defectus rationis, quanto
+fuerit maior, tanto est minus peccatum, intantum quod qui carent
+usu rationis, omnino excusentur a peccato; et qui ex ignorantia
+peccat, levius peccat. Ergo gravitas peccati non augetur ex
+magnitudine causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36655] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Ergo, si causa peccati
+maior fuerit, peccatum erit gravius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin,
+and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv"> Mat. 7:18, </a> "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the
+greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin.
+</p><p id="FS_Q73_A6-p7"> The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these
+causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such
+is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins
+more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will
+to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with
+the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free
+movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its
+voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 co."><a name="36656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36656] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in genere peccati, sicut et in quolibet alio genere,
+potest accipi duplex causa. Una quae est propria et per se causa
+peccati, quae est ipsa voluntas peccandi, comparatur enim ad actum
+peccati sicut arbor ad fructum, ut dicitur in Glossa, super illud
+Matth. VII, <i>non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere</i>. Et
+huiusmodi causa quanto fuerit maior, tanto peccatum erit gravius,
+quanto enim voluntas fuerit maior ad peccandum, tanto homo gravius
+peccat. Aliae vero causae peccati accipiuntur quasi extrinsecae et
+remotae, ex quibus scilicet voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum. Et in
+his causis est distinguendum. Quaedam enim harum inducunt
+voluntatem ad peccandum, secundum ipsam naturam voluntatis, sicut
+finis, quod est proprium obiectum voluntatis. Et ex tali causa
+augetur peccatum, gravius enim peccat cuius voluntas ex intentione
+peioris finis inclinatur ad peccandum. Aliae vero causae sunt quae
+inclinant voluntatem ad peccandum, praeter naturam et ordinem
+ipsius voluntatis, quae nata est moveri libere ex seipsa secundum
+iudicium rationis. Unde causae quae diminuunt iudicium rationis,
+sicut ignorantia; vel quae diminuunt liberum motum voluntatis,
+sicut infirmitas vel violentia aut metus, aut aliquid huiusmodi,
+diminuunt peccatum, sicut et diminuunt voluntarium, intantum quod
+si actus sit omnino involuntarius, non habet rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes
+the sin, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36657] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de causa movente
+extrinseca, quae diminuit voluntarium, cuius quidem causae
+augmentum diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is
+a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater
+concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins,
+being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous
+temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment
+of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement
+of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36658] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod si sub concupiscentia includatur etiam ipse motus
+voluntatis, sic ubi est maior concupiscentia, est maius peccatum.
+Si vero concupiscentia dicatur passio quaedam, quae est motus vis
+concupiscibilis, sic maior concupiscentia praecedens iudicium
+rationis et motum voluntatis, diminuit peccatum, quia qui maiori
+concupiscentia stimulatus peccat, cadit ex graviori tentatione;
+unde minus ei imputatur. Si vero concupiscentia sic sumpta sequatur
+iudicium rationis et motum voluntatis, sic ubi est maior
+concupiscentia, est maius peccatum, insurgit enim interdum maior
+concupiscentiae motus ex hoc quod voluntas ineffrenate tendit in
+suum obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36659] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa quae causat
+involuntarium, et haec diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A7-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 7. Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance
+does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36660] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non aggravet peccatum.
+Peccatum enim habet gravitatem ex sua specie. Circumstantia autem
+non dat speciem peccato, cum sit quoddam accidens eius. Ergo
+gravitas peccati non consideratur ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil,
+it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36661] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+aut circumstantia est mala, aut non. Si circumstantia mala est,
+ipsa per se causat quandam speciem mali, si vero non sit mala, non
+habet unde augeat malum. Ergo circumstantia nullo modo auget
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the
+object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36662] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+malitia peccati est ex parte aversionis. Sed circumstantiae
+consequuntur peccatum ex parte conversionis. Ergo non augent
+malitiam peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven
+(Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin
+more grievous.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36663] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod ignorantia circumstantiae diminuit peccatum, qui enim
+peccat ex ignorantia circumstantiae, meretur veniam, ut dicitur in
+III Ethic. Hoc autem non esset, nisi circumstantia aggravaret
+peccatum. Ergo circumstantia peccatum aggravat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that
+which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs
+from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it
+is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in
+three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of
+a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin
+is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is
+a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but
+only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give,
+he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason
+his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox.
+iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who
+educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin
+by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the
+sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous;
+although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 co."><a name="36664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36664] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod unumquodque ex eodem natum est augeri, ex quo
+causatur; sicut philosophus dicit de habitu virtutis, in II Ethic.
+Manifestum est autem quod peccatum causatur ex defectu alicuius
+circumstantiae, ex hoc enim receditur ab ordine rationis, quod
+aliquis in operando non observat debitas circumstantias. Unde
+manifestum est quod peccatum natum est aggravari per
+circumstantiam. Sed hoc quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno quidem
+modo, inquantum circumstantia transfert in aliud genus peccati.
+Sicut peccatum fornicationis consistit in hoc quod homo accedit ad
+non suam, si autem addatur haec circumstantia, ut illa ad quam
+accedit sit alterius uxor, transfertur iam in aliud genus peccati,
+scilicet in iniustitiam, inquantum homo usurpat rem alterius. Et
+secundum hoc, adulterium est gravius peccatum quam fornicatio.
+Aliquando vero circumstantia non aggravat peccatum quasi trahens in
+aliud genus peccati, sed solum quia multiplicat rationem peccati.
+Sicut si prodigus det quando non debet, et cui non debet,
+multiplicius peccat eodem genere peccati, quam si solum det cui non
+debet. Et ex hoc ipso peccatum fit gravius, sicut etiam aegritudo
+est gravior quae plures partes corporis inficit. Unde et Tullius
+dicit, in paradoxis, quod <i>in patris vita violanda, multa
+peccantur, violatur enim is qui procreavit, qui aluit, qui
+erudivit, qui in sede ac domo, atque in republica collocavit</i>.
+Tertio modo circumstantia aggravat peccatum ex eo quod auget
+deformitatem provenientem ex alia circumstantia. Sicut accipere
+alienum constituit peccatum furti, si autem addatur haec
+circumstantia, ut multum accipiat de alieno, est peccatum gravius;
+quamvis accipere multum vel parum, de se non dicat rationem boni
+vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q73_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing
+is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured,
+not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36665] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod aliqua circumstantia dat speciem actui morali,
+ut supra habitum est. Et tamen circumstantia quae non dat speciem,
+potest aggravare peccatum. Quia sicut bonitas rei non solum
+pensatur ex sua specie, sed etiam ex aliquo accidente; ita malitia
+actus non solum pensatur ex specie actus, sed etiam ex
+circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species;
+because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate
+a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36666] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod utroque modo circumstantia potest aggravare peccatum.
+Si enim sit mala, non tamen propter hoc oportet quod semper
+constituat speciem peccati, potest enim addere rationem malitiae in
+eadem specie, ut dictum est. Si autem non sit mala, potest
+aggravare peccatum in ordine ad malitiam alterius
+circumstantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may
+turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one
+ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside
+from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man
+ought to be united by right reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36667] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio debet ordinare actum non solum quantum ad
+obiectum, sed etiam quantum ad omnes circumstantias. Et ideo
+aversio quaedam a regula rationis attenditur secundum corruptionem
+cuiuslibet circumstantiae, puta si aliquis operetur quando non
+debet, vel ubi non debet. Et huiusmodi aversio sufficit ad rationem
+mali. Hanc autem aversionem a regula rationis, sequitur aversio a
+Deo, cui debet homo per rectam rationem coniungi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A8-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 8. Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent
+to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A5" id="FS_Q73_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[5]</a>). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36668] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccati non augeatur secundum
+maius nocumentum. Nocumentum enim est quidam eventus consequens
+actum peccati. Sed eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel
+malitiam actus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur
+propter maius nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God,
+according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>,
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.8" target="asv">8</a>: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee."
+If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous
+than sins against God or oneself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36669] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nocumentum maxime invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum,
+quia sibi ipsi nemo vult nocere; Deo autem nemo potest nocere,
+secundum illud Iob XXXV, <i>si multiplicatae fuerint iniquitates
+tuae, quid facies contra illum? Homini, qui similis tibi est,
+nocebit impietas tua</i>. Si ergo peccatum aggravaretur propter
+maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod peccatum quo quis peccat in
+proximum, esset gravius peccato quo quis peccat in Deum vel in
+seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life;
+because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose
+the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace
+by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its
+causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is
+evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36670] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+maius nocumentum infertur alicui cum privatur vita gratiae, quam
+cum privatur vita naturae, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita
+naturae, intantum quod homo debet vitam naturae contemnere ne
+amittat vitam gratiae. Sed ille qui inducit aliquam mulierem ad
+fornicandum, quantum est de se, privat eam vita gratiae, inducens
+eam ad peccatum mortale. Si ergo peccatum esset gravius propter
+maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod simplex fornicator gravius
+peccaret quam homicida, quod est manifeste falsum. Non ergo
+peccatum est gravius propter maius nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes
+the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as
+it does more harm.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36671] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>quia vitium
+naturae adversatur, tantum additur malitiae vitiorum, quantum
+integritati naturarum minuitur</i>. Sed diminutio integritatis
+naturae est nocumentum. Ergo tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto
+maius est nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when
+a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates
+the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended;
+for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he
+knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case
+again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will
+being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not
+wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin
+accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue,
+a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly
+from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly
+consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious
+fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen
+by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.
+</p><p id="FS_Q73_A8-p7"> But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected
+with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity
+of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly
+consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not
+make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has
+heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but
+his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer,
+who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire
+to
+sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 co."><a name="36672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36672] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod nocumentum tripliciter se habere potest ad peccatum.
+Quandoque enim nocumentum quod provenit ex peccato, est praevisum
+et intentum, sicut cum aliquis aliquid operatur animo nocendi
+alteri, ut homicida vel fur. Et tunc directe quantitas nocumenti
+adauget gravitatem peccati, quia tunc nocumentum est per se
+obiectum peccati. Quandoque autem nocumentum est praevisum, sed non
+intentum, sicut cum aliquis transiens per agrum ut compendiosius
+vadat ad fornicandum, infert nocumentum his quae sunt seminata in
+agro, scienter, licet non animo nocendi. Et sic etiam quantitas
+nocumenti aggravat peccatum, sed indirecte, inquantum scilicet ex
+voluntate multum inclinata ad peccandum, procedit quod aliquis non
+praetermittat facere damnum sibi vel alii, quod simpliciter non
+vellet. Quandoque autem nocumentum nec est praevisum nec intentum.
+Et tunc si per accidens se habeat ad peccatum, non aggravat
+peccatum directe, sed propter negligentiam considerandi nocumenta
+quae consequi possent, imputantur homini ad poenam mala quae
+eveniunt praeter eius intentionem, si dabat operam rei illicitae.
+Si vero nocumentum per se sequatur ex actu peccati, licet non sit
+intentum nec praevisum, directe peccatum aggravat, quia quaecumque
+per se consequuntur ad peccatum, pertinent quodammodo ad ipsam
+peccati speciem. Puta si aliquis publice fornicetur, sequitur
+scandalum plurimorum, quod quamvis ipse non intendat, nec forte
+praevideat, directe per hoc aggravatur peccatum. Aliter tamen
+videtur se habere circa nocumentum poenale, quod incurrit ipse qui
+peccat. Huiusmodi enim nocumentum, si per accidens se habeat ad
+actum peccati, et non sit praevisum nec intentum, non aggravat
+peccatum, neque sequitur maiorem gravitatem peccati, sicut si
+aliquis currens ad occidendum, impingat et laedat sibi pedem. Si
+vero tale nocumentum per se consequatur ad actum peccati, licet
+forte nec sit praevisum nec intentum, tunc maius nocumentum non
+facit gravius peccatum; sed e converso gravius peccatum inducit
+gravius nocumentum. Sicut aliquis infidelis, qui nihil audivit de
+poenis Inferni, graviorem poenam in Inferno patietur pro peccato
+homicidii quam pro peccato furti, quia enim hoc nec intendit nec
+praevidet, non aggravatur ex hoc peccatum (sicut contingit circa
+fidelem, qui ex hoc ipso videtur peccare gravius, quod maiores
+poenas contemnit ut impleat voluntatem peccati), sed gravitas
+huiusmodi nocumenti solum causatur ex gravitate peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have already stated (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A5" id="FS_Q73_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[5]</a>), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the
+goodness and malice of an act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36673] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut etiam supra dictum est, cum de bonitate
+et malitia exteriorum actuum ageretur, eventus sequens, si sit
+praevisus et intentus, addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness
+which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the
+act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such
+sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to
+be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although
+no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith,
+by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself,
+as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some
+anxiety.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36674] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, quamvis nocumentum aggravet peccatum, non tamen
+sequitur quod ex solo nocumento peccatum aggravetur, quinimmo
+peccatum per se est gravius propter inordinationem, ut supra dictum
+est. Unde et ipsum nocumentum aggravat peccatum, inquantum facit
+actum esse magis inordinatum. Unde non sequitur quod, si nocumentum
+maxime habeat locum in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, quod
+illa peccata sunt gravissima, quia multo maior inordinatio
+invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra Deum, et in quibusdam eorum
+quae sunt contra seipsum. Et tamen potest dici quod, etsi Deo
+nullus possit nocere quantum ad eius substantiam, potest tamen
+nocumentum attentare in his quae Dei sunt, sicut extirpando fidem,
+violando sacra, quae sunt peccata gravissima. Sibi etiam aliquis
+quandoque scienter et volenter infert nocumentum, sicut patet in
+his qui se interimunt, licet finaliter hoc referant ad aliquod
+bonum apparens, puta ad hoc quod liberentur ab aliqua angustia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors;
+whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and
+sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because
+no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36675] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illa ratio non sequitur, propter duo. Primo quidem,
+quia homicida intendit directe nocumentum proximi, fornicator autem
+qui provocat mulierem, non intendit nocumentum, sed delectationem.
+Secundo, quia homicida est per se et sufficiens causa corporalis
+mortis, spiritualis autem mortis nullus potest esse alteri causa
+per se et sufficiens; quia nullus spiritualiter moritur nisi
+propria voluntate peccando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A9-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 9. Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this
+were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate
+a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through
+being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against
+whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36676] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod propter conditionem personae in quam
+peccatur, peccatum non aggravetur. Si enim hoc esset, maxime
+aggravaretur ex hoc quod aliquis peccat contra aliquem virum iustum
+et sanctum. Sed ex hoc non aggravatur peccatum, minus enim laeditur
+ex iniuria illata virtuosus, qui aequanimiter tolerat, quam alii,
+qui etiam interius scandalizati laeduntur. Ergo conditio personae
+in quam peccatur, non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin,
+because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many
+times." But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to
+himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than
+another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate
+the sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36677] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+si conditio personae aggravaret peccatum, maxime aggravaretur ex
+propinquitate, quia sicut Tullius dicit in paradoxis, <i>in servo
+necando semel peccatur, in patris vita violanda multa
+peccantur</i>. Sed propinquitas personae in quam peccatur, non
+videtur aggravare peccatum, quia unusquisque sibi ipsi maxime est
+propinquus; et tamen minus peccat qui aliquod damnum sibi infert,
+quam si inferret alteri, puta si occideret equum suum, quam si
+occideret equum alterius, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic.
+Ergo propinquitas personae non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according
+to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in
+like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position
+and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a
+poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.25" target="asv">Col. 3:25</a>), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does
+not aggravate the sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36678] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+conditio personae peccantis praecipue aggravat peccatum ratione
+dignitatis vel scientiae, secundum illud Sap. VI, <i>potentes
+potenter tormenta patientur</i>; et Luc. XII, <i>servus sciens
+voluntatem domini, et non faciens, plagis vapulabit multis</i>.
+Ergo, pari ratione, ex parte personae in quam peccatur, magis
+aggravaret peccatum dignitas aut scientia personae in quam
+peccatur. Sed non videtur gravius peccare qui facit iniuriam
+personae ditiori vel potentiori, quam alicui pauperi, quia non est
+personarum acceptio apud Deum, secundum cuius iudicium gravitas
+peccati pensatur. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, non
+aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin
+committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.6" target="asv"> Micah 7:6</a>: "the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother." Furthermore
+sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Job.34.18" target="asv">Job 34:18</a>): "Who saith to the king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore the condition of the person sinned
+against aggravates the sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36679] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod in sacra Scriptura specialiter vituperatur peccatum quod
+contra servos Dei committitur, sicut III Reg. XIX, <i>altaria tua
+destruxerunt, et prophetas tuos occiderunt gladio</i>. Vituperatur
+etiam specialiter peccatum commissum contra personas propinquas,
+secundum illud Mich. VII, <i>filius contumeliam facit patri, filia
+consurgit adversus matrem suam</i>. Vituperatur etiam specialiter
+peccatum quod committitur contra personas in dignitate constitutas,
+ut patet Iob XXXIV, <i>qui dicit regi, apostata; qui vocat duces
+impios</i>. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, aggravat
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A9-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q73_A3" id="FS_Q73_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its
+object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever
+we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate
+to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered
+on the part of these three.
+</p><p id="FS_Q73_A9-p7"> First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that
+an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.2.8" target="asv"> Zech. 2:8</a>: "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed
+against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself,
+it is evident
+that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through
+natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and,
+for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.14.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 14:5</a>: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according
+as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin
+committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous
+than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence,
+is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 co."><a name="36680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36680] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod persona in quam peccatur, est quodammodo obiectum
+peccati. Dictum est autem supra quod prima gravitas peccati
+attenditur ex parte obiecti. Ex quo quidem tanto attenditur maior
+gravitas in peccato, quanto obiectum eius est principalior finis.
+Fines autem principales humanorum actuum sunt Deus, ipse homo, et
+proximus, quidquid enim facimus, propter aliquod horum facimus;
+quamvis etiam horum trium unum sub altero ordinetur. Potest igitur
+ex parte horum trium considerari maior vel minor gravitas in
+peccato secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Primo
+quidem, ex parte Dei, cui tanto magis aliquis homo coniungitur,
+quanto est virtuosior vel Deo sacratior. Et ideo iniuria tali
+personae illata, magis redundat in Deum, secundum illud Zach. II,
+<i>qui vos tetigerit, tangit pupillam oculi mei</i>. Unde peccatum
+fit gravius ex hoc quod peccatur in personam magis Deo coniunctam,
+vel ratione virtutis vel ratione officii. Ex parte vero sui ipsius,
+manifestum est quod tanto aliquis gravius peccat, quanto in magis
+coniunctam personam, seu naturali necessitudine, seu beneficiis,
+seu quacumque coniunctione, peccaverit, quia videtur in seipsum
+magis peccare, et pro tanto gravius peccat, secundum illud Eccli.
+XIV, <i>qui sibi nequam est, cui bonus erit?</i> Ex parte vero
+proximi, tanto gravius peccatur, quanto peccatum plures tangit. Et
+ideo peccatum quod fit in personam publicam, puta regem vel
+principem, qui gerit personam totius multitudinis, est gravius quam
+peccatum quod committitur contra unam personam privatam, unde
+specialiter dicitur Exod. XXII, <i>principi populi tui non
+maledices</i>. Et similiter iniuria quae fit alicui famosae
+personae, videtur esse gravior, ex hoc quod in scandalum et in
+turbationem plurimorum redundat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that
+the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36681] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ille qui infert iniuriam virtuoso, quantum est
+in se, turbat eum et interius et exterius. Sed quod iste interius
+non turbetur, contingit ex eius bonitate, quae non diminuit
+peccatum iniuriantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his
+possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things
+that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury
+on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since,
+however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect
+of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing,
+or give his approval.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36682] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod nocumentum quod quis sibi ipsi infert in his quae
+subsunt dominio propriae voluntatis, sicut in rebus possessis,
+habet minus de peccato quam si alteri inferatur, quia propria
+voluntate hoc agit. Sed in his quae non subduntur dominio
+voluntatis, sicut sunt naturalia et spiritualia bona, est gravius
+peccatum nocumentum sibi ipsi inferre, gravius enim peccat qui
+occidit seipsum, quam qui occidit alterum. Sed quia res
+propinquorum nostrorum non subduntur voluntatis nostrae dominio,
+non procedit ratio quantum ad nocumenta rebus illorum illata, quod
+circa ea minus peccetur; nisi forte velint, vel ratum habeant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is
+done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36683] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si Deus gravius punit
+peccantem contra excellentiores personas, hoc enim fit propter hoc
+quod hoc redundat in plurium nocumentum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A10-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 10. Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving
+to God, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.13" target="asv"> Ecclus. 25:13</a>: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man
+cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.30.18" target="asv">2 Paral. 30: 18,19</a>): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all
+them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not
+sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="36684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36684] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnitudo personae peccantis non
+aggravet peccatum. Homo enim maxime redditur magnus ex hoc quod Deo
+adhaeret, secundum illud Eccli. XXV, <i>quam magnus est qui invenit
+sapientiam et scientiam. Sed non est super timentem Deum</i>. Sed
+quanto aliquis magis Deo adhaeret, tanto minus imputatur ei aliquid
+ad peccatum, dicitur enim II Paralip. XXX, <i>dominus bonus
+propitiabitur cunctis qui in toto corde requirunt dominum Deum
+patrum suorum, et non imputabitur eis quod minus sanctificati
+sunt</i>. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur ex magnitudine personae
+peccantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by
+the excellence of the person sinning.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="36685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36685] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+non est personarum acceptio apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom. II. Ergo non
+magis punit pro uno et eodem peccato, unum quam alium. Non ergo
+aggravatur ex magnitudine personae peccantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his
+goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="36686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36686] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus debet ex bono incommodum reportare. Reportaret autem, si id
+quod agit, magis ei imputaretur ad culpam. Ergo propter
+magnitudinem personae peccantis non aggravatur peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent
+person."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 s. c."><a name="36687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36687] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Isidorus dicit, in II de summo bono, <i>tanto maius
+cognoscitur peccatum esse, quanto maior qui peccat habetur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are
+less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human
+weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins
+are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned
+for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin;
+hence Our Lord said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv">Lk. 12:47</a>) that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly,
+on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins:
+and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a
+sin, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence
+of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice,
+or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal;
+because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more
+scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont
+to bear them with more indignation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 co."><a name="36688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36688] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod duplex est peccatum. Quoddam ex subreptione
+proveniens, propter infirmitatem humanae naturae. Et tale peccatum
+minus imputatur ei qui est maior in virtute, eo quod minus negligit
+huiusmodi peccata reprimere, quae tamen omnino subterfugere
+infirmitas humana non sinit. Alia vero peccata sunt ex
+deliberatione procedentia. Et ista peccata tanto magis alicui
+imputantur, quanto maior est. Et hoc potest esse propter quatuor.
+Primo quidem, quia facilius possunt resistere peccato maiores, puta
+qui excedunt in scientia et virtute. Unde dominus dicit, Luc. XII,
+quod <i>servus sciens voluntatem domini sui, et non faciens, plagis
+vapulabit multis</i>. Secundo, propter ingratitudinem, quia omne
+bonum quo quis magnificatur, est Dei beneficium, cui homo fit
+ingratus peccando. Et quantum ad hoc, quaelibet maioritas, etiam in
+temporalibus bonis peccatum aggravat, secundum illud Sap. VI,
+<i>potentes potenter tormenta patientur</i>. Tertio, propter
+specialem repugnantiam actus peccati ad magnitudinem personae,
+sicut si princeps iustitiam violet, qui ponitur iustitiae custos;
+et si sacerdos fornicetur, qui castitatem vovit. Quarto, propter
+exemplum, sive scandalum, quia, ut Gregorius dicit in pastorali,
+<i>in exemplum culpa vehementer extenditur, quando pro reverentia
+gradus peccator honoratur</i>. Ad plurium etiam notitiam perveniunt
+peccata magnorum; et magis homines ea indigne ferunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="36689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36689] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de his quae per
+subreptionem infirmitatis humanae negligenter aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their
+sin, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="36690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36690] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Deus non accipit personas, si maiores plus punit,
+quia ipsorum maioritas facit ad gravitatem peccati, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="36691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36691] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod homo magnus non reportat incommodum ex bono quod
+habet, sed ex malo usu illius.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q74" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q74-p0.1">Q. 74. OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q74-p2"> We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q74-p3"><a href="#FS_Q74_A1"> (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p4"><a href="#FS_Q74_A2"> (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p5"><a href="#FS_Q74_A3"> (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p6"><a href="#FS_Q74_A4"> (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p7"><a href="#FS_Q74_A5"> (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p8"><a href="#FS_Q74_A6"> (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p9"><a href="#FS_Q74_A7"> (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p10"><a href="#FS_Q74_A8"> (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p11"><a href="#FS_Q74_A9"> (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p12"><a href="#FS_Q74_A10"> (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 pr."><a name="36692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36692]
+Iª-IIae q. 74 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+subiecto vitiorum, sive peccatorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem.
+Primo, utrum voluntas possit esse subiectum peccati. Secundo, utrum
+voluntas sola sit peccati subiectum. Tertio, utrum sensualitas
+possit esse subiectum peccati. Quarto, utrum possit esse subiectum
+peccati mortalis. Quinto, utrum ratio possit esse subiectum
+peccati. Sexto, utrum delectatio morosa, vel non morosa, sit in
+ratione inferiori sicut in subiecto. Septimo, utrum peccatum
+consensus in actum sit in superiori ratione sicut in subiecto.
+Octavo, utrum ratio inferior possit esse subiectum peccati
+mortalis. Nono, utrum ratio superior possit esse subiectum peccati
+venialis. Decimo, utrum in ratione superiori possit esse peccatum
+veniale circa proprium obiectum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q74_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A1-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 1. Whether the will is a subject of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will
+and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36693] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non possit esse subiectum
+peccati. Dicit enim Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod
+<i>malum est praeter voluntatem et intentionem</i>. Sed peccatum
+habet rationem mali. Ergo peccatum non potest esse in
+voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does
+not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than
+in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36694] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas est boni, vel apparentis boni. Ex hoc autem quod voluntas
+vult bonum, non peccat, hoc autem quod vult apparens bonum quod non
+est vere bonum, magis pertinere videtur ad defectum virtutis
+apprehensivae quam ad defectum voluntatis. Ergo peccatum nullo modo
+est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause
+do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the
+will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36695] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+non potest esse idem subiectum peccati, et causa efficiens, quia
+causa efficiens et materialis non incidunt in idem, ut dicitur in
+II Physic. Sed voluntas est causa efficiens peccati, prima enim
+causa peccandi est voluntas, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de
+duabus animabus. Ergo non est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36696] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod <i>voluntas est
+qua peccatur, et recte vivitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an act, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject,
+the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the
+thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the
+agent, e.g. "to
+desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must
+needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated
+above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a> ;
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the
+principle of sins. Therefore it follows that
+sin is in the will as its subject.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 co."><a name="36697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36697] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum quidam actus est, sicut supra dictum est.
+Actuum autem quidam transeunt in exteriorem materiam, ut urere et
+secare, et huiusmodi actus habent pro materia et subiecto id in
+quod transit actio; sicut philosophus dicit, in III Physic., quod
+motus est actus mobilis a movente. Quidam vero actus sunt non
+transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut
+appetere et cognoscere, et tales actus sunt omnes actus morales,
+sive sint actus virtutum, sive peccatorum. Unde oportet quod
+proprium subiectum actus peccati sit potentia quae est principium
+actus. Cum autem proprium sit actuum moralium quod sint voluntarii,
+ut supra habitum est; sequitur quod voluntas, quae est principium
+actuum voluntariorum, sive bonorum sive malorum, quae sunt peccata,
+sit principium peccatorum. Et ideo sequitur quod peccatum sit in
+voluntate sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is
+an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36698] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod malum dicitur esse praeter voluntatem, quia
+voluntas non tendit in ipsum sub ratione mali. Sed quia aliquod
+malum est apparens bonum, ideo voluntas aliquando appetit aliquod
+malum. Et secundum hoc peccatum est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in
+the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in
+the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36699] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod si defectus apprehensivae virtutis nullo modo
+subiaceret voluntati, non esset peccatum nec in voluntate nec in
+apprehensiva virtute, sicut patet in his qui habent ignorantiam
+invincibilem. Et ideo relinquitur quod etiam defectus apprehensivae
+virtutis subiacens voluntati, deputetur in peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves,
+but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36700] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit in causis efficientibus quarum
+actiones transeunt in materiam exteriorem, et quae non movent se,
+sed alia. Cuius contrarium est in voluntate. Unde ratio non
+sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A2-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 2. Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except
+by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36701] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod sola voluntas sit subiectum peccati.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de duabus animabus, quod <i>non
+nisi voluntate peccatur</i>. Sed peccatum est sicut in subiecto in
+potentia qua peccatur. Ergo sola voluntas est subiectum
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore
+the will alone is the subject of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36702] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum est quoddam malum contra rationem. Sed bonum et malum ad
+rationem pertinens, est obiectum solius voluntatis. Ergo sola
+voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so
+true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers
+are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject
+of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will,
+would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36703] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne peccatum est actus voluntarius, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, in
+libro de Lib. Arb., <i>peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non
+sit voluntarium, non est peccatum</i>. Sed actus aliarum virium non
+sunt voluntarii nisi inquantum illae vires moventur a voluntate.
+Hoc autem non sufficit ad hoc quod sint subiectum peccati, quia
+secundum hoc etiam membra exteriora, quae moventur a voluntate,
+essent subiectum peccati; quod patet esse falsum. Ergo sola
+voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are
+the subject of virtues, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q56" id="FS_Q74_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[56])</a>. Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36704] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+peccatum virtuti contrariatur. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. Sed
+aliae etiam vires animae praeter voluntatem, sunt subiecta
+virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non sola voluntas est subiectum
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited
+by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of voluntariness.
+Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained
+from their acts, by the will; and
+these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 co."><a name="36705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36705] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, omne quod est principium
+voluntarii actus, est subiectum peccati. Actus autem voluntarii
+dicuntur non solum illi qui eliciuntur a voluntate, sed etiam illi
+qui a voluntate imperantur; ut supra dictum est, cum de voluntario
+ageretur. Unde non sola voluntas potest esse subiectum peccati, sed
+omnes illae potentiae quae possunt moveri ad suos actus, vel ab eis
+reprimi, per voluntatem. Et eaedem etiam potentiae sunt subiecta
+habituum moralium bonorum vel malorum, quia eiusdem est actus et
+habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36706] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non peccatur nisi voluntate sicut primo movente,
+aliis autem potentiis peccatur sicut ab ea motis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by
+reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36707] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bonum et malum pertinent ad voluntatem sicut per se
+obiecta ipsius, sed aliae potentiae habent aliquod determinatum
+bonum et malum, ratione cuius potest in eis esse et virtus et
+vitium et peccatum, secundum quod participant voluntate et
+ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves
+them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason
+as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external
+members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow
+that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36708] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod membra corporis non sunt principia actuum, sed solum
+organa, unde et comparantur ad animam moventem sicut servus, qui
+agitur et non agit. Potentiae autem appetitivae interiores
+comparantur ad rationem quasi liberae, quia agunt quodammodo et
+aguntur, ut patet per id quod dicitur I Polit. Et praeterea actus
+exteriorum membrorum sunt actiones in exteriorem materiam
+transeuntes, sicut patet de percussione in peccato homicidii. Et
+propter hoc non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A3-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 3. Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions.
+Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36709] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate non possit esse
+peccatum. Peccatum enim est proprium homini, qui ex suis actibus
+laudatur vel vituperatur. Sed sensualitas est communis nobis et
+brutis. Ergo in sensualitate non potest esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement
+of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life;
+wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement
+of the sensuality is not a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36710] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a>
+<i>Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest</i>; sicut
+Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb. Sed homo non potest vitare
+quin actus sensualitatis sit inordinatus, est enim sensualitas
+perpetuae corruptionis, quandiu in hac mortali vita vivimus; unde
+et per serpentem significatur, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin.
+Ergo inordinatio motus sensualitatis non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which
+we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality,
+which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36711] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+illud quod homo ipse non facit, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed
+hoc solum videmur nos ipsi facere, quod cum deliberatione rationis
+facimus; ut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Ergo motus
+sensualitatis qui est sine deliberatione rationis, non imputatur
+homini ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian.
+iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality.
+Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36712] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago;
+sed quod odi malum, illud facio</i>, quod exponit Augustinus de
+malo concupiscentiae, quam constat esse motum quendam
+sensualitatis. Ergo in sensualitate est aliquod peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A2" id="FS_Q74_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is
+evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it
+follows that sin can be in the sensuality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 co."><a name="36713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36713] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum potest inveniri in
+qualibet potentia cuius actus potest esse voluntarius et
+inordinatus, in quo consistit ratio peccati. Manifestum est autem
+quod actus sensualitatis potest esse voluntarius, inquantum
+sensualitas, idest appetitus sensitivus, nata est a voluntate
+moveri. Unde relinquitur quod in sensualitate possit esse
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have
+a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as
+we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q74_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain
+excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary
+action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36714] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod aliquae vires sensitivae partis, etsi sint
+communes nobis et brutis, tamen in nobis habent aliquam
+excellentiam ex hoc quod rationi iunguntur, sicut nos, prae aliis
+animalibus, habemus in parte sensitiva cogitativam et
+reminiscentiam, ut in primo dictum est. Et per hunc modum etiam
+appetitus sensitivus in nobis prae aliis animalibus habet quandam
+excellentiam, scilicet quod natus est obedire rationi. Et quantum
+ad hoc, potest esse principium actus voluntarii; et per consequens
+subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed
+in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes"
+does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for
+instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his
+thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements
+of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated
+movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption:
+but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36715] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod perpetua corruptio sensualitatis est intelligenda
+quantum ad fomitem, qui nunquam totaliter tollitur in hac vita,
+transit enim peccatum originale reatu, et remanet actu. Sed talis
+corruptio fomitis non impedit quin homo rationabili voluntate
+possit reprimere singulos motus inordinatos sensualitatis, si
+praesentiat, puta divertendo cogitationem ad alia. Sed dum homo ad
+aliud cogitationem divertit, potest etiam circa illud aliquis
+inordinatus motus insurgere, sicut cum aliquis transfert
+cogitationem suam a delectabilibus carnis, volens concupiscentiae
+motus vitare, ad speculationem scientiae, insurgit quandoque
+aliquis motus inanis gloriae impraemeditatus. Et ideo non potest
+homo vitare omnes huiusmodi motus, propter corruptionem praedictam,
+sed hoc solum sufficit ad rationem peccati voluntarii, quod possit
+vitare singulos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing
+therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but
+is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin,
+which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36716] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illud quod homo facit sine deliberatione rationis,
+non perfecte ipse facit, quia nihil operatur ibi id quod est
+principale in homine. Unde non est perfecte actus humanus. Et per
+consequens non potest esse perfecte actus virtutis vel peccati, sed
+aliquid imperfectum in genere horum. Unde talis motus sensualitatis
+rationem praeveniens, est peccatum veniale, quod est quiddam
+imperfectum in genere peccati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A4-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 4. Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to
+commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality
+can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36717] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate possit esse peccatum
+mortale. Actus enim ex obiecto cognoscitur. Sed circa obiecta
+sensualitatis contingit peccare mortaliter, sicut circa
+delectabilia carnis. Ergo actus sensualitatis potest esse peccatum
+mortale. Et ita in sensualitate peccatum mortale invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of
+the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about
+the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36718] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum mortale contrariatur virtuti. Sed virtus potest esse in
+sensualitate, temperantia enim et fortitudo sunt virtutes
+irrationabilium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Ergo
+in sensualitate potest esse peccatum mortale, cum contraria sint
+nata fieri circa idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial
+sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be there also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36719] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+veniale peccatum est dispositio ad mortale. Sed dispositio et
+habitus sunt in eodem. Cum igitur veniale peccatum sit in
+sensualitate, ut dictum est; etiam mortale peccatum esse poterit in
+eadem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even
+be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement
+of the sensuality is not a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36720] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., et habetur in Glossa
+Rom. VII, inordinatus concupiscentiae motus (qui est peccatum
+sensualitatis) potest etiam esse in his qui sunt in gratia, in
+quibus tamen peccatum mortale non invenitur. Ergo inordinatus motus
+sensualitatis non est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys
+the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q74_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of
+the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to
+order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 co."><a name="36721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36721] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut inordinatio corrumpens principium vitae
+corporalis, causat corporalem mortem; ita etiam inordinatio
+corrumpens principium spiritualis vitae, quod est finis ultimus,
+causat mortem spiritualem peccati mortalis, ut supra dictum est.
+Ordinare autem aliquid in finem non est sensualitatis, sed solum
+rationis. Inordinatio autem a fine non est nisi eius cuius est
+ordinare in finem. Unde peccatum mortale non potest esse in
+sensualitate, sed solum in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being
+an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal
+sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36722] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod actus sensualitatis potest concurrere ad
+peccatum mortale, sed tamen actus peccati mortalis non habet quod
+sit peccatum mortale, ex eo quod est sensualitatis; sed ex eo quod
+est rationis, cuius est ordinare in finem. Et ideo peccatum mortale
+non attribuitur sensualitati, sed rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an
+act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice:
+wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which
+perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36723] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod etiam actus virtutis non perficitur per id quod est
+sensualitatis tantum, sed magis per id quod est rationis et
+voluntatis, cuius est eligere, nam actus virtutis moralis non est
+sine electione. Unde semper cum actu virtutis moralis, quae
+perficit vim appetitivam, est etiam actus prudentiae, quae perficit
+vim rationalem. Et idem est etiam de peccato mortali, sicut dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the
+same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the
+same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject,
+as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can
+arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In
+this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36724] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod dispositio tripliciter se habet ad id ad quod
+disponit. Quandoque enim est idem et in eodem, sicut scientia
+inchoata dicitur esse dispositio ad scientiam perfectam. Quandoque
+autem est in eodem, sed non idem, sicut calor est dispositio ad
+formam ignis. Quandoque vero nec idem nec in eodem, sicut in his
+quae habent ordinem ad invicem ut ex uno perveniatur in aliud,
+sicut bonitas imaginationis est dispositio ad scientiam, quae est
+in intellectu. Et hoc modo veniale peccatum, quod est in
+sensualitate, potest esse dispositio ad peccatum mortale, quod est
+in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A5-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 5. Whether sin can be in the reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason
+is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot
+be in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36725] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse in ratione.
+Cuiuslibet enim potentiae peccatum est aliquis defectus ipsius. Sed
+defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed magis excusat peccatum,
+excusatur enim aliquis a peccato propter ignorantiam. Ergo in
+ratione non potest esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36726] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+primum subiectum peccati est voluntas, ut dictum est. Sed ratio
+praecedit voluntatem, cum sit directiva ipsius. Ergo peccatum esse
+non potest in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not
+among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore
+no sin is in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36727] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+non potest esse peccatum nisi circa ea quae sunt in nobis. Sed
+perfectio et defectus rationis non est eorum quae sunt in nobis,
+quidam enim sunt naturaliter ratione deficientes, vel ratione
+solertes. Ergo in ratione non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36728] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro XII de Trin., quod peccatum est
+in ratione inferiori et in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown (
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing
+the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the
+reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when
+it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements
+of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 co."><a name="36729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36729] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in actu
+ipsius, sicut ex dictis patet. Habet autem ratio duplicem actum,
+unum quidem secundum se, in comparatione ad proprium obiectum, quod
+est cognoscere aliquod verum; alius autem actus rationis est
+inquantum est directiva aliarum virium. Utroque igitur modo
+contingit esse peccatum in ratione. Et primo quidem, inquantum
+errat in cognitione veri, quod quidem tunc imputatur ei ad
+peccatum, quando habet ignorantiam vel errorem circa id quod potest
+et debet scire. Secundo, quando inordinatos actus inferiorum virium
+vel imperat, vel etiam post deliberationem non coercet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the
+case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a
+sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about
+something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin,
+and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always
+imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36730] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de defectu rationis qui
+pertinet ad actum proprium respectu proprii obiecti, et hoc quando
+est defectus cognitionis eius quod quis non potest scire. Tunc enim
+talis defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed excusat a peccato,
+sicut patet in his quae per furiosos committuntur. Si vero sit
+defectus rationis circa id quod homo potest et debet scire, non
+omnino homo excusatur a peccato, sed ipse defectus imputatur ei ad
+peccatum. Defectus autem qui est solum in dirigendo alias vires,
+semper imputatur ei ad peccatum, quia huic defectui occurrere
+potest per proprium actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason
+moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason,
+voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason
+being the
+principle of the will's act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36731] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de actibus voluntatis et
+rationis ageretur, voluntas quodammodo movet et praecedit rationem,
+et ratio quodammodo voluntatem, unde et motus voluntatis dici
+potest rationalis, et actus rationis potest dici voluntarius. Et
+secundum hoc in ratione invenitur peccatum, vel prout est defectus
+eius voluntarius, vel prout actus rationis est principium actus
+voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36732] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A6-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 6. Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive
+power, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q74_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not
+in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36733] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum morosae delectationis non sit
+in ratione. Delectatio enim importat motum appetitivae virtutis, ut
+supra dictum est. Sed vis appetitiva distinguitur a ratione, quae
+est vis apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio morosa non est in
+ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object.
+Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose
+delectation is not in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36734] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ex obiectis cognosci potest ad quam potentiam actus pertineat, per
+quem potentia ordinatur ad obiectum. Sed quandoque est delectatio
+morosa circa bona sensibilia, et non circa bona rationis. Ergo
+peccatum delectationis morosae non est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin 'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time
+is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36735] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+morosum dicitur aliquid propter diuturnitatem temporis. Sed
+diuturnitas temporis non est ratio quod aliquis actus pertineat ad
+aliquam potentiam. Ergo delectatio morosa non pertinet ad
+rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of
+the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes
+the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36736] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod <i>consensus
+illecebrae si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, sic
+habendum existimo velut cibum vetitum mulier sola comederit</i>.
+Per mulierem autem intelligitur ratio inferior, sicut ibidem ipse
+exponit. Ergo peccatum morosae delectationis est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A5" id="FS_Q74_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions.
+Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails
+in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions.
+Now it fails, in two ways, in directing
+internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a
+movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man,
+having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur]
+upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 co."><a name="36737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36737] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum contingit esse in
+ratione quandoque quidem inquantum est directiva humanorum actuum.
+Manifestum est autem quod ratio non solum est directiva exteriorum
+actuum, sed etiam interiorum passionum. Et ideo quando deficit
+ratio in directione interiorum passionum, dicitur esse peccatum in
+ratione, sicut etiam quando deficit in directione exteriorum
+actuum. Deficit autem in directione passionum interiorum
+dupliciter. Uno modo, quando imperat illicitas passiones, sicut
+quando homo ex deliberatione provocat sibi motum irae vel
+concupiscentiae. Alio modo, quando non reprimit illicitum passionis
+motum, sicut cum aliquis, postquam deliberavit quod motus passionis
+insurgens est inordinatus, nihilominus circa ipsum immoratur, et
+ipsum non expellit. Et secundum hoc dicitur peccatum delectationis
+morosae esse in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in
+accordance with what has been stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36738] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod delectatio quidem est in vi appetitiva sicut in
+proximo principio, sed in ratione est sicut in primo motivo,
+secundum hoc quod supra dictum est, quod actiones quae non
+transeunt in exteriorem materiam, sunt sicut in subiecto in suis
+principiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower
+powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction
+of reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36739] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio actum proprium illicitum habet circa proprium
+obiectum, sed directionem habet circa omnia obiecta inferiorum
+virium quae per rationem dirigi possunt. Et secundum hoc etiam
+delectatio circa sensibilia obiecta pertinet ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon,
+and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched
+the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36740] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod delectatio dicitur morosa non ex mora temporis; sed
+ex eo quod ratio deliberans circa eam immoratur, nec tamen eam
+repellit, <i>tenens et volvens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt
+animum, respui debuerunt</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A7-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 7. Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power,
+as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q15_A1" id="FS_Q74_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[1]</a>): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36741] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum consensus in actum non sit in
+ratione superiori. Consentire enim est actus appetitivae virtutis,
+ut supra habitum est. Sed ratio est vis apprehensiva. Ergo peccatum
+consensus in actum non est in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii,
+7). [*'Rationes aeternae,' cf.
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A2" id="FS_Q74_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[15], AA[2]</a>,[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the
+Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal
+law, (cf. A[8],
+OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think
+about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36742] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ratio superior intendit rationibus aeternis inspiciendis et
+consulendis, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Sed quandoque
+consentitur in actum non consultis rationibus aeternis, non enim
+semper homo cogitat de rebus divinis, quando consentit in aliquem
+actum. Ergo peccatum consensus in actum non semper est in ratione
+superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures
+or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine
+states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36743] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut per rationes aeternas potest homo regulare actus exteriores,
+ita etiam interiores delectationes, vel alias passiones. Sed
+consensus in delectationem absque hoc quod opere statuatur
+implendum, est rationis inferioris; ut dicit Augustinus, XII de
+Trin. Ergo etiam consensus in actum peccati debet interdum attribui
+rationi inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds
+to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation,
+he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher
+reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="36744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36744] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut ratio superior excedit inferiorem, ita ratio excedit vim
+imaginativam. Sed quandoque procedit homo in actum per
+apprehensionem virtutis imaginativae, absque omni deliberatione
+rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex impraemeditato movet manum aut
+pedem. Ergo etiam quandoque potest ratio inferior consentire in
+actum peccati, absque ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses,
+so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has
+offered the forbidden fruit to her husband."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36745] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>si in consensione male
+utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur, ita decernitur
+quodcumque peccatum, ut, si potestas sit, etiam corpore compleatur,
+intelligenda est mulier cibum illicitum viro dedisse</i>, per quem
+superior ratio significatur. Ergo ad rationem superiorem pertinet
+consentire in actum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers
+its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now
+we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see
+that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by
+referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted
+to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that
+human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally;
+and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A4" id="FS_Q74_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>).
+Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment
+is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced
+on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last,
+and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action
+belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower
+reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever
+is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 co."><a name="36746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36746] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod consensus importat iudicium quoddam de eo in quod
+consentitur, sicut enim ratio speculativa iudicat et sententiat de
+rebus intelligibilibus, ita ratio practica iudicat et sententiat de
+agendis. Est autem considerandum quod in omni iudicio ultima
+sententia pertinet ad supremum iudicatorium, sicut videmus in
+speculativis quod ultima sententia de aliqua propositione datur per
+resolutionem ad prima principia. Quandiu enim remanet aliquod
+principium altius, adhuc per ipsum potest examinari id de quo
+quaeritur, unde adhuc est suspensum iudicium, quasi nondum data
+finali sententia. Manifestum est autem quod actus humani regulari
+possunt ex regula rationis humanae, quae sumitur ex rebus creatis,
+quas naturaliter homo cognoscit; et ulterius ex regula legis
+divinae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum regula legis divinae sit
+superior, consequens est ut ultima sententia, per quam iudicium
+finaliter terminatur, pertineat ad rationem superiorem, quae
+intendit rationibus aeternis. Cum autem de pluribus occurrit
+iudicandum, finale iudicium est de eo quod ultimo occurrit. In
+actibus autem humanis ultimo occurrit ipse actus; praeambulum autem
+est delectatio, quae inducit ad actum. Et ideo ad rationem
+superiorem proprie pertinet consensus in actum; ad rationem vero
+inferiorem, quae habet inferius iudicium, pertinet iudicium
+praeambulum, quod est de delectatione. Quamvis etiam et de
+delectatione superior ratio iudicare possit, quia quidquid iudicio
+subditur inferioris, subditur etiam iudicio superioris, sed non
+convertitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging,
+as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q15_A3" id="FS_Q74_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[3]</a>). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which
+the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36747] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis non
+absolute, sed consequenter ad actum rationis deliberantis et
+iudicantis, ut supra dictum est, in hoc enim terminatur consensus,
+quod voluntas tendit in id quod est ratione iudicatum. Unde
+consensus potest attribui et voluntati et rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law,
+whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it
+neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because,
+as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the
+commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining
+them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36748] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ratio superior non dirigit actus
+humanos secundum legem divinam, impediens actum peccati, dicitur
+ipsa consentire; sive cogitet de lege aeterna, sive non. Cum enim
+cogitat de lege Dei, actu eam contemnit, cum vero non cogitat, eam
+negligit per modum omissionis cuiusdam. Unde omnibus modis
+consensus in actum peccati procedit ex superiori ratione, quia, ut
+Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>non potest peccatum efficaciter
+perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio penes quam
+summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi,
+malae actioni cedat aut serviat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct
+or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while
+deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent
+to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the
+eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36749] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio superior, per considerationem legis aeternae,
+sicut potest dirigere vel cohibere actum exteriorem, ita etiam
+delectationem interiorem. Sed tamen antequam ad iudicium superioris
+rationis deveniatur, statim ut sensualitas proponit delectationem,
+inferior ratio, per rationes temporales deliberans, quandoque
+huiusmodi delectationem acceptat, et tunc consensus in
+delectationem pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Si vero etiam
+consideratis rationibus aeternis, homo in eodem consensu
+perseveret, iam talis consensus ad superiorem rationem
+pertinebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher
+or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which
+the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly
+by imputed to it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="36750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36750] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod apprehensio virtutis imaginativae est subita et sine
+deliberatione, et ideo potest aliquem actum causare antequam
+superior vel inferior ratio etiam habeat tempus deliberandi. Sed
+iudicium rationis inferioris est cum deliberatione, quae indiget
+tempore, in quo etiam ratio superior deliberare potest. Unde si non
+cohibeat ab actu peccati per suam deliberationem, ei imputatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A8-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 8. Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which
+does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal
+sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q74_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36751] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus in delectationem non sit
+peccatum mortale. Consentire enim in delectationem pertinet ad
+rationem inferiorem, cuius non est intendere rationibus aeternis
+vel legi divinae, et per consequens nec ab eis averti. Sed omne
+peccatum mortale est per aversionem a lege divina; ut patet per
+definitionem Augustini, de peccato mortali datam, quae supra posita
+est. Ergo consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being
+such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than
+his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to
+the delectation a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36752] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+consentire in aliquid non est malum nisi quia illud est malum in
+quod consentitur. Sed propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, vel
+saltem non minus. Non ergo illud in quod consentitur, potest esse
+minus malum quam consensus. Sed delectatio sine opere non est
+peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum. Ergo nec consensus in
+delectationem est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states
+(Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation
+consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward
+thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference
+of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither
+is the consent to the delectation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36753] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+delectationes differunt in bonitate et malitia secundum
+differentiam operationum, ut dicit philosophus, in X Ethic. Sed
+alia operatio est interior cogitatio, et alia actus exterior, puta
+fornicationis. Ergo et delectatio consequens actum interioris
+cogitationis, tantum differt a delectatione fornicationis in
+bonitate vel malitia, quantum differt cogitatio interior ab actu
+exteriori. Et per consequens etiam eodem modo differt consentire in
+utrumque. Sed cogitatio interior non est peccatum mortale; nec
+etiam consensus in cogitationem. Ergo per consequens nec consensus
+in delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found
+also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does
+not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="36754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36754] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+exterior actus fornicationis vel adulterii non est peccatum mortale
+ratione delectationis, quae etiam invenitur in actu matrimoniali;
+sed ratione inordinationis ipsius actus. Sed ille qui consentit in
+delectationem, non propter hoc consentit in deordinationem actus.
+Ergo non videtur mortaliter peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation
+resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from
+the thought of fornication.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="36755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36755] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum homicidii est gravius quam simplicis fornicationis. Sed
+consentire in delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de
+homicidio, non est peccatum mortale. Ergo multo minus consentire in
+delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de fornicatione, est
+peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p7">
+<b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii).
+Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin.
+xii, 12) that "this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon
+for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our
+trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6"><a name="36756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36756] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
+oratio dominica quotidie dicitur pro remissione venialium, ut
+Augustinus dicit. Sed consensum in delectationem Augustinus docet
+esse abolendum per orationem dominicam, dicit enim, in XII de
+Trin., quod <i>hoc est longe minus peccatum quam si opere statuatur
+implendum, et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda
+est, pectusque percutiendum, atque dicendum, dimitte nobis debita
+nostra</i>. Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum
+veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p8">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven
+those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them."
+But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36757] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus post pauca subdit, <i>totus homo damnabitur,
+nisi haec quae, sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate
+animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse
+peccata, per mediatoris gratiam remittantur</i>. Sed nullus
+damnatur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo consensus in delectationem
+est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q74_A8-p9">
+<b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only
+a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must
+take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation
+may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to
+the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because
+the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action
+itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs
+to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and
+delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g.
+a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination
+of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication,
+may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the
+delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not
+in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and
+sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute
+about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue
+of
+its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such
+a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true.
+</p><p id="FS_Q74_A8-p10"> But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this
+act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination
+of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it
+is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin.
+Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 co."><a name="36758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36758] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui diversimode opinati sunt. Quidam
+enim dixerunt quod consensus in delectationem non est peccatum
+mortale, sed veniale tantum. Alii vero dixerunt quod est peccatum
+mortale, et haec opinio est communior et verisimilior. Est enim
+considerandum quod, cum omnis delectatio consequatur aliquam
+operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic.; et iterum cum omnis delectatio
+habeat aliquod obiectum, delectatio quaelibet potest comparari ad
+duo, scilicet ad operationem quam consequitur, et ad obiectum in
+quo quis delectatur. Contingit autem quod aliqua operatio sit
+obiectum delectationis, sicut et aliqua alia res, quia ipsa
+operatio potest accipi ut bonum et finis, in quo quis delectatus
+requiescit. Et quandoque quidem ipsamet operatio quam consequitur
+delectatio, est obiectum delectationis, inquantum scilicet vis
+appetitiva, cuius est delectari, reflectitur in ipsam operationem
+sicut in quoddam bonum; puta cum aliquis cogitat, et delectatur de
+hoc ipso quod cogitat, inquantum sua cogitatio placet. Quandoque
+vero delectatio consequens unam operationem, puta cogitationem
+aliquam, habet pro obiecto aliam operationem quasi rem cogitatam,
+et tunc talis delectatio procedit ex inclinatione appetitus non
+quidem in cogitationem, sed in operationem cogitatam. Sic igitur
+aliquis de fornicatione cogitans, de duobus potest delectari, uno
+modo, de ipsa cogitatione; alio modo, de fornicatione cogitata.
+Delectatio autem de cogitatione ipsa sequitur inclinationem
+affectus in cogitationem ipsam. Cogitatio autem ipsa secundum se
+non est peccatum mortale, immo quandoque est veniale tantum, puta
+cum aliquis inutiliter cogitat; quandoque autem sine peccato
+omnino, puta cum aliquis utiliter de ea cogitat, sicut cum vult de
+ea praedicare vel disputare. Et ideo per consequens affectio et
+delectatio quae sic est de cogitatione fornicationis, non est de
+genere peccati mortalis; sed quandoque est peccatum veniale,
+quandoque nullum. Unde nec consensus in talem delectationem est
+peccatum mortale. Et secundum hoc prima opinio habet veritatem.
+Quod autem aliquis cogitans de fornicatione, delectetur de ipso
+actu cogitato, hoc contingit ex hoc quod affectio eius inclinata
+est in hunc actum. Unde quod aliquis consentiat in talem
+delectationem, hoc nihil aliud est quam quod ipse consentiat in hoc
+quod affectus suus sit inclinatus in fornicationem, nullus enim
+delectatur nisi in eo quod est conforme appetitui eius. Quod autem
+aliquis ex deliberatione eligat quod affectus suus conformetur his
+quae secundum se sunt peccata mortalia, est peccatum mortale. Unde
+talis consensus in delectationem peccati mortalis, est peccatum
+mortale; ut secunda opinio ponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q74_A8-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating
+according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them:
+and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even
+the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason
+fails in directing them according to the eternal types.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36759] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod consensus in delectationem potest esse non solum
+rationis inferioris, sed etiam superioris, ut dictum est. Et tamen
+ipsa etiam ratio inferior potest averti a rationibus aeternis. Quia
+etsi non intendit eis ut secundum eas regulans, quod est proprium
+superioris rationis; intendit tamen eis ut secundum eas regulata.
+Et hoc modo, ab eis se avertens, potest peccare mortaliter. Nam et
+actus inferiorum virium, et etiam exteriorum membrorum, possunt
+esse peccata mortalia, secundum quod deficit ordinatio superioris
+rationis regulantis eos secundum rationes aeternas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to
+take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is,
+in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the
+incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent
+has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36760] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod consensus in peccatum quod est veniale ex genere, est
+veniale peccatum. Et secundum hoc potest concludi quod consensus in
+delectationem quae est de ipsa vana cogitatione fornicationis, est
+peccatum veniale. Sed delectatio quae est in ipso actu
+fornicationis, de genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod ante
+consensum sit veniale peccatum tantum, hoc est per accidens,
+scilicet propter imperfectionem actus. Quae quidem imperfectio
+tollitur per consensum deliberatum supervenientem. Unde ex hoc
+adducitur in suam naturam, ut sit peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36761] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de delectatione quae habet
+cogitationem pro obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even
+though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate,
+and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="36762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36762] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod delectatio quae habet actum exteriorem pro obiecto,
+non potest esse absque complacentia exterioris actus secundum se;
+etiam si non statuatur implendum, propter prohibitionem alicuius
+superioris. Unde actus fit inordinatus, et per consequens
+delectatio erit inordinata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the
+consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="36763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36763] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod etiam consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex
+complacentia ipsius actus homicidii cogitati, est peccatum mortale.
+Non autem consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex complacentia
+cogitationis de homicidio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 6"><a name="36764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36764] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum
+dicendum quod oratio dominica non solum contra peccata venialia
+dicenda est, sed etiam contra mortalia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A9-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 9. Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a
+sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal
+law." But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal
+sin in the higher reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36765] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse
+peccatum veniale, secundum quod est directiva inferiorum virium,
+idest secundum quod consentit in actum peccati. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in XII de Trin., quod ratio superior inhaeret
+rationibus aeternis. Sed peccare mortaliter est per aversionem a
+rationibus aeternis. Ergo videtur quod in superiori ratione non
+possit esse peccatum nisi mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of
+the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36766] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+superior ratio se habet in vita spirituali tanquam principium;
+sicut et cor in vita corporali. Sed infirmitates cordis sunt
+mortales. Ergo peccata superioris rationis sunt mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial
+sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration
+of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36767] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum veniale fit mortale, si fiat ex contemptu. Sed hoc non
+videtur esse sine contemptu, quod aliquis ex deliberatione peccet
+etiam venialiter. Cum ergo consensus rationis superioris semper sit
+cum deliberatione legis divinae, videtur quod non possit esse sine
+peccato mortali, propter contemptum divinae legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q74_A9-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36768] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+consensus in actum peccati pertinet ad rationem superiorem, ut
+supra dictum est. Sed consensus in actum peccati venialis est
+peccatum veniale. Ergo in superiori ratione potest esse peccatum
+veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason "is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it contemplates
+it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the
+fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the
+inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law,
+in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act
+of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal
+law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 co."><a name="36769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36769] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., ratio
+superior <i>inhaeret rationibus aeternis conspiciendis aut
+consulendis</i>, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod earum
+veritatem speculatur; consulendis autem, secundum quod per rationes
+aeternas de aliis iudicat et ordinat; ad quod pertinet quod,
+deliberando per rationes aeternas, consentit in aliquem actum, vel
+dissentit ab eo. Contingit autem quod inordinatio actus in quem
+consentit, non contrariatur rationibus aeternis, quia non est cum
+aversione a fine ultimo, sicut contrariatur actus peccati mortalis,
+sed est praeter eas, sicut actus peccati venialis. Unde quando
+ratio superior in actum peccati venialis consentit, non avertitur a
+rationibus aeternis. Unde non peccat mortaliter, sed
+venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36770] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and
+such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or
+of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher
+reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is
+the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36771] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod duplex est infirmitas cordis. Una quae est in ipsa
+substantia cordis, et immutat naturalem complexionem ipsius, et
+talis infirmitas semper est mortalis. Alia est autem infirmitas
+cordis propter aliquam inordinationem vel motus eius, vel alicuius
+eorum quae circumstant cor, et talis infirmitas non semper est
+mortalis. Et similiter in ratione superiori semper est peccatum
+mortale, quando tollitur ipsa ordinatio rationis superioris ad
+proprium obiectum, quod est rationes aeternae. Sed quando est
+inordinatio circa hoc, non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the
+Divine law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36772] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod deliberatus consensus in peccatum non semper pertinet
+ad contemptum legis divinae, sed solum quando peccatum legi divinae
+contrariatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A10-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 10. Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of
+a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher
+reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial
+sin in the higher reason as such.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="36773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36773] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse
+peccatum veniale secundum seipsam, idest secundum quod inspicit
+rationes aeternas. Actus enim potentiae non invenitur esse
+deficiens, nisi per hoc quod inordinate se habet circa suum
+obiectum. Sed obiectum superioris rationis sunt aeternae rationes,
+a quibus deordinari non est sine peccato mortali. Ergo in superiori
+ratione non potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate
+movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason
+as such.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="36774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36774] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+cum ratio sit vis deliberativa, actus rationis semper est cum
+deliberatione. Sed omnis inordinatus motus in his quae Dei sunt, si
+sit cum deliberatione, est peccatum mortale. Ergo in ratione
+superiori secundum seipsam, nunquam est peccatum veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin,
+through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously;
+just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God,
+it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to
+moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement
+that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly
+false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="36775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36775] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+contingit quandoque quod peccatum ex subreptione est peccatum
+veniale, peccatum autem ex deliberatione est peccatum mortale, per
+hoc quod ratio deliberans recurrit ad aliquod maius bonum, contra
+quod homo agens gravius peccat, sicut cum de actu delectabili
+inordinato ratio deliberat quod est contra legem Dei, gravius
+peccat consentiendo, quam si solum consideraret quod est contra
+virtutem moralem. Sed ratio superior non potest recurrere ad
+aliquod altius quam sit suum obiectum. Ergo si motus ex subreptione
+non sit peccatum mortale, neque etiam deliberatio superveniens
+faciet ipsum esse peccatum mortale, quod patet esse falsum. Non
+ergo in ratione superiori secundum seipsam, potest esse peccatum
+veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial
+sin in the higher reason as such.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 s. c."><a name="36776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36776] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+motus subreptitius infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. Sed pertinet
+ad superiorem rationem secundum seipsam. Ergo in ratione superiori
+potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q74_A10-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason.
+For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so
+it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself
+a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of
+the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.
+</p><p id="FS_Q74_A10-p7"> With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple "intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again
+consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about
+Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin,
+yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the
+law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other
+aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when
+a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended
+it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine
+law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements,
+the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin
+mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things
+which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 co."><a name="36777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36777] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ratio superior aliter fertur in suum obiectum, atque
+aliter in obiecta inferiorum virium quae per ipsam diriguntur. In
+obiecta enim inferiorum virium non fertur nisi inquantum de eis
+consulit rationes aeternas. Unde non fertur in ea nisi per modum
+deliberationis. Deliberatus autem consensus in his quae ex genere
+suo sunt mortalia, est mortale peccatum. Et ideo ratio superior
+semper mortaliter peccat, si actus inferiorum virium in quos
+consentit, sint peccata mortalia. Sed circa proprium obiectum habet
+duos actus, scilicet simplicem intuitum; et deliberationem,
+secundum quod etiam de proprio obiecto consulit rationes aeternas.
+Secundum autem simplicem intuitum, potest aliquem inordinatum motum
+habere circa divina, puta cum quis patitur subitum infidelitatis
+motum. Et quamvis infidelitas secundum suum genus sit peccatum
+mortale, tamen subitus motus infidelitatis est peccatum veniale.
+Quia peccatum mortale non est nisi sit contra legem Dei, potest
+autem aliquid eorum quae pertinent ad fidem, subito rationi
+occurrere sub quadam alia ratione, antequam super hoc consulatur,
+vel consuli possit, ratio aeterna, idest lex Dei; puta cum quis
+resurrectionem mortuorum subito apprehendit ut impossibilem
+secundum naturam, et simul apprehendendo renititur, antequam tempus
+habeat deliberandi quod hoc est nobis traditum ut credendum
+secundum legem divinam. Si vero post hanc deliberationem motus
+infidelitatis maneat, est peccatum mortale. Et ideo circa proprium
+obiectum, etsi sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest ratio
+superior peccare venialiter in subitis motibus; vel etiam
+mortaliter per deliberatum consensum. In his autem quae pertinent
+ad inferiores vires, semper peccat mortaliter in his quae sunt
+peccata mortalia ex suo genere, non autem in his quae secundum suum
+genus sunt venialia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness
+of a sudden action, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="36778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36778] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccatum quod est contra rationes aeternas, etsi
+sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest tamen esse peccatum veniale
+propter imperfectionem actus subiti, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as
+well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions:
+consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="36779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36779] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in operativis ad rationem, ad quam pertinet
+deliberatio, pertinet etiam simplex intuitus eorum ex quibus
+deliberatio procedit, sicut etiam in speculativis ad rationem
+pertinet et syllogizare, et propositiones formare. Et ideo etiam
+ratio potest habere subitum motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence
+of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation,
+which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime,
+yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that
+which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into
+the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="36780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36780] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod una et eadem res potest diversas considerationes
+habere, quarum una est altera altior, sicut Deum esse potest
+considerari vel inquantum est cognoscibile ratione humana, vel
+inquantum creditur revelatione divina, quae est consideratio
+altior. Et ideo quamvis obiectum rationis superioris sit quiddam
+secundum naturam rei altissimum, tamen potest etiam reduci in
+quandam altiorem considerationem. Et hac ratione, quod in motu
+subito non erat peccatum mortale, per deliberationem reducentem in
+altiorem considerationem fit peccatum mortale, sicut supra
+expositum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q75" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q75-p0.1">Q. 75. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q75-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of
+inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q75-p3"><a href="#FS_Q75_A1"> (1) Whether sin has a cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p4"><a href="#FS_Q75_A2"> (2) Whether it has an internal cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p5"><a href="#FS_Q75_A3"> (3) Whether it has an external cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p6"><a href="#FS_Q75_A4"> (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 pr."><a name="36781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36781]
+Iª-IIae q. 75 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+causis peccatorum. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali.
+Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum peccatum habeat
+causam. Secundo, utrum habeat causam interiorem. Tertio, utrum
+habeat causam exteriorem. Quarto, utrum peccatum sit causa
+peccati.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q75_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A1-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 1. Whether sin has a cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q75_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36782] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam. Peccatum
+enim habet rationem mali, ut dictum est. Sed malum non habet
+causam, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum non
+habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for
+every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36783] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+causa est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud. Sed quod est ex
+necessitate, non videtur esse peccatum, eo quod omne peccatum est
+voluntarium. Ergo peccatum non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good,
+for "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt
+is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36784] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si peccatum habet causam, aut habet pro causa bonum, aut malum. Non
+autem bonum, quia bonum non facit nisi bonum; <i>non enim potest
+arbor bona fructus malos facere</i>, ut dicitur Matth. VII
+similiter autem nec malum potest esse causa peccati, quia malum
+poenae sequitur ad peccatum; malum autem culpae est idem quod
+peccatum. Peccatum igitur non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.6" target="asv">Job 5:6</a>, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the
+law of God." Therefore sin has a cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36785] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+omne quod fit, habet causam, quia, ut dicitur Iob V, nihil in terra
+sine causa fit. Sed peccatum fit, est enim dictum vel factum vel
+concupitum contra legem Dei. Ergo peccatum habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but,
+so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may
+be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself,
+is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the
+removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation,
+of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of
+its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But,
+since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought
+naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought
+to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil,
+which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause
+is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and
+on
+the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act.
+Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good,
+causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order
+in the act results from the lack of direction in the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 co."><a name="36786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36786] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum est quidam actus inordinatus. Ex parte
+igitur actus, potest habere per se causam, sicut et quilibet alius
+actus. Ex parte autem inordinationis, habet causam eo modo quo
+negatio vel privatio potest habere causam. Negationis autem
+alicuius potest duplex causa assignari. Primo quidem, defectus
+causae, idest ipsius causae negatio, est causa negationis secundum
+seipsam, ad remotionem enim causae sequitur remotio effectus; sicut
+obscuritatis causa est absentia solis. Alio modo, causa
+affirmationis ad quam sequitur negatio, est per accidens causa
+negationis consequentis, sicut ignis, causando calorem ex
+principali intentione, consequenter causat privationem
+frigiditatis. Quorum primum potest sufficere ad simplicem
+negationem. Sed cum inordinatio peccati, et quodlibet malum, non
+sit simplex negatio, sed privatio eius quod quid natum est et debet
+habere; necesse est quod talis inordinatio habeat causam agentem
+per accidens, quod enim natum est inesse et debet, nunquam abesset
+nisi propter causam aliquam impedientem. Et secundum hoc consuevit
+dici quod malum, quod in quadam privatione consistit, habet causam
+deficientem, vel agentem per accidens. Omnis autem causa per
+accidens reducitur ad causam per se. Cum igitur peccatum ex parte
+inordinationis habeat causam agentem per accidens, ex parte autem
+actus habeat causam agentem per se; sequitur quod inordinatio
+peccati consequatur ex ipsa causa actus. Sic igitur voluntas carens
+directione regulae rationis et legis divinae, intendens aliquod
+bonum commutabile, causat actum quidem peccati per se, sed
+inordinationem actus per accidens et praeter intentionem, provenit
+enim defectus ordinis in actu, ex defectu directionis in
+voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject
+of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36787] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccatum non solum significat ipsam privationem
+boni, quae est inordinatio; sed significat actum sub tali
+privatione, quae habet rationem mali. Quod quidem qualiter habeat
+causam, dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not
+impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity,
+on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph.
+vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that
+this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36788] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, si illa definitio causae universaliter debeat
+verificari, oportet ut intelligatur de causa sufficienti et non
+impedita. Contingit enim aliquid esse causam sufficientem alterius,
+et tamen non ex necessitate sequitur effectus, propter aliquod
+impedimentum superveniens, alioquin sequeretur quod omnia ex
+necessitate contingerent, ut patet in VI Metaphys. Sic igitur, etsi
+peccatum habeat causam, non tamen sequitur quod sit necessaria,
+quia effectus potest impediri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact
+of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of
+guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking
+some other good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36789] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, voluntas sine adhibitione regulae
+rationis vel legis divinae, est causa peccati. Hoc autem quod est
+non adhibere regulam rationis vel legis divinae, secundum se non
+habet rationem mali, nec poenae nec culpae, antequam applicetur ad
+actum. Unde secundum hoc, peccati primi non est causa aliquod
+malum, sed bonum aliquod cum absentia alicuius alterius boni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A2-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 2. Whether sin has an internal cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal
+cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36790] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam interiorem.
+Id enim quod est interius alicui rei, semper adest ei. Si igitur
+peccatum habeat causam interiorem, semper homo peccaret, cum,
+posita causa, ponatur effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of
+sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36791] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed interiores motus hominis sunt
+peccatum. Ergo non sunt causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for
+sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate,
+is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36792] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid est intra hominem, aut est naturale, aut voluntarium. Sed
+id quod est naturale, non potest esse peccati causa, quia peccatum
+est contra naturam, ut dicit Damascenus. Quod autem est
+voluntarium, si sit inordinatum, iam est peccatum. Non ergo aliquid
+intrinsecum potest esse causa primi peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36793] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, quod voluntas est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q75_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q75_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human
+acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of
+which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite.
+For just as it is due to the judgment of
+reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the
+sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain
+further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason
+and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.
+</p><p id="FS_Q75_A2-p7"> But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive,
+viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses
+and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and
+the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the
+conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 co."><a name="36794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36794] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, per se causam peccati oportet
+accipere ex parte ipsius actus. Actus autem humani potest accipi
+causa interior et mediata, et immediata. Immediata quidem causa
+humani actus est ratio et voluntas, secundum quam homo est liber
+arbitrio. Causa autem remota est apprehensio sensitivae partis, et
+etiam appetitus sensitivus, sicut enim ex iudicio rationis voluntas
+movetur ad aliquid secundum rationem, ita etiam ex apprehensione
+sensus appetitus sensitivus in aliquid inclinatur. Quae quidem
+inclinatio interdum trahit voluntatem et rationem, sicut infra
+patebit. Sic igitur duplex causa peccati interior potest assignari,
+una proxima, ex parte rationis et voluntatis; alia vero remota, ex
+parte imaginationis vel appetitus sensitivi. Sed quia supra dictum
+est quod causa peccati est aliquod bonum apparens motivum cum
+defectu debiti motivi, scilicet regulae rationis vel legis divinae;
+ipsum motivum quod est apparens bonum, pertinet ad apprehensionem
+sensus et appetitum. Ipsa autem absentia debitae regulae pertinet
+ad rationem, quae nata est huiusmodi regulam considerare. Sed ipsa
+perfectio voluntarii actus peccati pertinet ad voluntatem, ita quod
+ipse voluntatis actus, praemissis suppositis, iam est quoddam
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the
+appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made
+actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is
+because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is
+inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore
+the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36795] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod id quod est intrinsecum sicut potentia
+naturalis, semper inest, id autem quod est intrinsecum sicut actus
+interior appetitivae vel apprehensivae virtutis, non semper inest.
+Ipsa autem potentia voluntatis est causa peccati in potentia, sed
+reducitur in actum per motus praecedentes et sensitivae partis
+primo, et rationis consequenter. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid
+proponitur ut appetibile secundum sensum et appetitus sensitivus
+inclinatur in illud, ratio interdum cessat a consideratione regulae
+debitae, et sic voluntas producit actum peccati. Quia igitur motus
+praecedentes non semper sunt in actu, neque peccatum semper est in
+actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the
+will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36796] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non omnes motus interiores sunt de substantia
+peccati, quod consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis, sed
+quidam praecedunt, et quidam consequuntur ipsum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which
+sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being
+unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36797] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illud quod est causa peccati sicut potentia producens
+actum, est naturale. Motus etiam sensitivae partis, ex quo sequitur
+peccatum, interdum est naturalis, sicut cum propter appetitum cibi
+aliquis peccat. Sed efficitur peccatum innaturale ex hoc ipso quod
+deficit regula naturalis, quam homo secundum naturam suam debet
+attendere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A3-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 3. Whether sin has an external cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are
+within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36798] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam exteriorem.
+Peccatum enim est actus voluntarius. Voluntaria autem sunt eorum
+quae sunt in nobis; et ita non habent exteriorem causam. Ergo
+peccatum non habet exteriorem causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal
+cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order,
+sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36799] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut natura est principium interius, ita etiam voluntas. Sed
+peccatum in rebus naturalibus nunquam accidit nisi ex aliqua
+interiori causa, ut puta monstruosi partus proveniunt ex
+corruptione alicuius principii interioris. Ergo neque in moralibus
+potest contingere peccatum nisi ex interiori causa. Non ergo habet
+peccatum causam exteriorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements
+to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36800] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed quanto plura sunt
+et maiora exterius inducentia ad peccandum, tanto minus id quod
+quis inordinate agit, ei imputatur ad peccatum. Ergo nihil exterius
+est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.21.16" target="asv">Num. 21:16</a>): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the
+Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36801] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Num. XXXI, <i>nonne istae sunt quae deceperunt
+filios Israel, et praevaricari vos fecerunt in domino super peccato
+Phogor?</i> Ergo aliquid exterius potest esse causa faciens
+peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the
+appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the
+will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10],
+A[4]), none can move the will inwardly
+save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing external
+can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite,
+as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action,
+nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto
+in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external
+can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive
+cause of sin being accomplished.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 co."><a name="36802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36802] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, causa interior peccati est
+et voluntas, ut perficiens actum peccati; et ratio, quantum ad
+carentiam debitae regulae; et appetitus sensitivus inclinans. Sic
+ergo aliquid extrinsecum tripliciter posset esse causa peccati, vel
+quia moveret immediate ipsam voluntatem; vel quia moveret rationem;
+vel quia moveret appetitum sensitivum. Voluntatem autem, ut supra
+dictum est, interius movere non potest nisi Deus; qui non potest
+esse causa peccati, ut infra ostendetur. Unde relinquitur quod
+nihil exterius potest esse causa peccati, nisi vel inquantum movet
+rationem, sicut homo vel Daemon persuadens peccatum; vel sicut
+movens appetitum sensitivum, sicut aliqua sensibilia exteriora
+movent appetitum sensitivum. Sed neque persuasio exterior in rebus
+agendis ex necessitate movet rationem; neque etiam res exterius
+propositae ex necessitate movent appetitum sensitivum, nisi forte
+aliquo modo dispositum; et tamen etiam appetitus sensitivus non ex
+necessitate movet rationem et voluntatem. Unde aliquid exterius
+potest esse aliqua causa movens ad peccandum, non tamen
+sufficienter ad peccatum inducens, sed causa sufficienter complens
+peccatum est sola voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that
+it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36803] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod exteriora moventia ad peccandum
+non sufficienter et ex necessitate inducunt, sequitur quod remaneat
+in nobis peccare et non peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of
+sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36804] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod per hoc quod ponitur interior causa peccati, non
+excluditur exterior, non enim id quod est exterius est causa
+peccati, nisi mediante causa interiori, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful
+act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on
+the act being voluntary and in our power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36805] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, multiplicatis exterioribus causis inclinantibus ad
+peccandum, multiplicantur actus peccati, quia plures ex illis
+causis, et pluries, inclinantur ad actus peccati. Sed tamen
+minuitur ratio culpae, quae consistit in hoc quod aliquid sit
+voluntarium et in nobis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A4-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 4. Whether one sin is a cause of another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with
+one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character
+of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless,"
+as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have
+no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a
+formal cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36806] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non sit causa peccati. Sunt
+enim quatuor genera causarum, quorum nullum potest ad hoc congruere
+quod peccatum sit causa peccati. Finis enim habet rationem boni,
+quod non competit peccato, quod de sua ratione est malum. Et eadem
+ratione nec peccatum potest esse causa efficiens, quia malum non
+est causa agens, sed est infirmum et impotens, ut Dionysius dicit,
+IV cap. de Div. Nom. Causa autem materialis et formalis videntur
+habere solum locum in naturalibus corporibus quae sunt composita ex
+materia et forma. Ergo peccatum non potest habere causam materialem
+et formalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially
+something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36807] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+agere sibi simile est rei perfectae, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed
+peccatum de sui ratione est imperfectum. Ergo peccatum non potest
+esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus
+we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36808] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si huius peccati sit causa aliud peccatum, eadem ratione et illius
+erit causa aliquod aliud peccatum, et sic procedetur in infinitum,
+quod est inconveniens. Non ergo peccatum est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36809] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., <i>peccatum quod per
+poenitentiam citius non deletur, peccatum est et causa
+peccati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the
+same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of
+the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly,
+as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man,
+by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into
+another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed
+to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after
+the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the
+matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause,
+one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty
+of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters,
+as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>;
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it follows that one sin is
+also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material
+while the latter is formal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 co."><a name="36810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36810] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, cum peccatum habeat causam ex parte actus, hoc modo
+unum peccatum posset esse causa alterius, sicut unus actus humanus
+potest esse causa alterius. Contingit igitur unum peccatum esse
+causam alterius secundum quatuor genera causarum. Primo quidem,
+secundum modum causae efficientis vel moventis, et per se et per
+accidens. Per accidens quidem, sicut removens prohibens dicitur
+movens per accidens, cum enim per unum actum peccati homo amittit
+gratiam, vel caritatem, vel verecundiam, vel quodcumque aliud
+retrahens a peccato, incidit ex hoc in aliud peccatum; et sic
+primum peccatum est causa secundi per accidens. Per se autem, sicut
+cum ex uno actu peccati homo disponitur ad hoc quod alium actum
+consimilem facilius committit, ex actibus enim causantur
+dispositiones et habitus inclinantes ad similes actus. Secundum
+vero genus causae materialis, unum peccatum est causa alterius,
+inquantum praeparat ei materiam, sicut avaritia praeparat materiam
+litigio, quod plerumque est de divitiis congregatis. Secundum vero
+genus causae finalis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, inquantum
+propter finem unius peccati aliquis committit aliud peccatum, sicut
+cum aliquis committit simoniam propter finem ambitionis, vel
+fornicationem propter furtum. Et quia finis dat formam in
+moralibus, ut supra habitum est, ex hoc etiam sequitur quod unum
+peccatum sit formalis causa alterius, in actu enim fornicationis
+quae propter furtum committitur, est quidem fornicatio sicut
+materiale, furtum vero sicut formale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least
+apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of
+another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one
+sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated
+above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36811] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccatum, inquantum est inordinatum, habet
+rationem mali, sed inquantum est actus quidam, habet aliquod bonum,
+saltem apparens, pro fine. Et ita ex parte actus potest esse causa
+et finalis et effectiva alterius peccati, licet non ex parte
+inordinationis. Materiam autem habet peccatum non ex qua, sed circa
+quam. Formam autem habet ex fine. Et ideo secundum quatuor genera
+causarum peccatum potest dici causa peccati, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act
+it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36812] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum est imperfectum imperfectione morali ex
+parte inordinationis, sed ex parte actus potest habere perfectionem
+naturae. Et secundum hoc potest esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is
+not caused by another sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36813] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non omnis causa peccati est peccatum. Unde non
+oportet quod procedatur in infinitum; sed potest perveniri ad
+aliquod primum peccatum, cuius causa non est aliud peccatum.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q76" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q76-p0.1">Q. 76. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q76-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3)
+sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above
+<a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q76-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of
+sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite;
+thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.
+</p><p id="FS_Q76-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q76-p4"><a href="#FS_Q76_A1"> (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p5"><a href="#FS_Q76_A2"> (2) Whether ignorance is a sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p6"><a href="#FS_Q76_A3"> (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p7"><a href="#FS_Q76_A4"> (4) Whether it diminishes sin?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 pr."><a name="36814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36814]
+Iª-IIae q. 76 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+causis peccati in speciali. Et primo, de causis interioribus
+peccati; secundo, de exterioribus; tertio, de peccatis quae sunt
+causa aliorum peccatorum. Prima autem consideratio, secundum
+praemissa, erit tripartita, nam primo, agetur de ignorantia, quae
+est causa peccati ex parte rationis; secundo, de infirmitate seu
+passione, quae est causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi;
+tertio, de malitia, quae est causa peccati ex parte voluntatis.
+Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ignorantia sit causa
+peccati. Secundo, utrum ignorantia sit peccatum. Tertio, utrum
+totaliter a peccato excuset. Quarto, utrum diminuat peccatum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q76_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A1-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 1. Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is
+a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36815] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non possit esse causa
+peccati. Quia quod non est, nullius est causa. Sed ignorantia est
+non ens, cum sit privatio quaedam scientiae. Ergo ignorantia non
+est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36816] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+causae peccati sunt accipiendae ex parte conversionis, ut ex
+supradictis patet. Sed ignorantia videtur respicere aversionem.
+Ergo non debet poni causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the
+good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36817] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne peccatum in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Sed
+voluntas non fertur nisi in aliquod cognitum, quia bonum
+apprehensum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo ignorantia non potest
+esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36818] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, quod
+quidam per ignorantiam peccant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that
+moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that
+removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a
+sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act
+of sin, in so far as it directs human acts.
+</p><p id="FS_Q76_A1-p7"> Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular:
+because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or
+of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular
+proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of
+a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's
+father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle
+which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not
+every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful
+act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he
+recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with
+the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1).
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 co."><a name="36819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36819] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VIII Physic., causa movens
+est duplex, una per se, et alia per accidens. Per se quidem, quae
+propria virtute movet, sicut generans est causa movens gravia et
+levia. Per accidens autem, sicut removens prohibens, vel sicut ipsa
+remotio prohibentis. Et hoc modo ignorantia potest esse causa actus
+peccati, est enim privatio scientiae perficientis rationem, quae
+prohibet actum peccati, inquantum dirigit actus humanos.
+Considerandum est autem quod ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est
+humanorum actuum directiva, scilicet secundum scientiam
+universalem, et particularem. Conferens enim de agendis, utitur
+quodam syllogismo, cuius conclusio est iudicium seu electio vel
+operatio. Actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Unde conclusio
+syllogismi operativi est singularis. Singularis autem propositio
+non concluditur ex universali nisi mediante aliqua propositione
+singulari, sicut homo prohibetur ab actu parricidii per hoc quod
+scit patrem non esse occidendum, et per hoc quod scit hunc esse
+patrem. Utriusque ergo ignorantia potest causare parricidii actum,
+scilicet et universalis principii, quod est quaedam regula
+rationis; et singularis circumstantiae. Unde patet quod non
+quaelibet ignorantia peccantis est causa peccati, sed illa tantum
+quae tollit scientiam prohibentem actum peccati. Unde si voluntas
+alicuius esset sic disposita quod non prohiberetur ab actu
+parricidii, etiam si patrem agnosceret; ignorantia patris non est
+huic causa peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum. Et ideo
+talis non peccat propter ignorantiam, sed peccat ignorans, secundum
+philosophum, in III Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36820] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non ens non potest esse alicuius causa per se,
+potest tamen esse causa per accidens, sicut remotio
+prohibentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect
+of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36821] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod sicut scientia quam tollit ignorantia, respicit
+peccatum ex parte conversionis; ita etiam ignorantia ex parte
+conversionis est causa peccati ut removens prohibens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another,
+the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing
+is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36822] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in illud quod est quantum ad omnia ignotum, non
+potest ferri voluntas, sed si aliquid est secundum aliquid notum et
+secundum aliquid ignotum, potest voluntas illud velle. Et hoc modo
+ignorantia est causa peccati, sicut cum aliquis scit hunc quem
+occidit, esse hominem, sed nescit eum esse patrem; vel cum aliquis
+scit aliquem actum esse delectabilem, nescit tamen eum esse
+peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A2-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 2. Whether ignorance is a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[5]</a>). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36823] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non sit peccatum. Peccatum
+enim est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei, ut
+supra habitum est. Sed ignorantia non importat aliquem actum, neque
+interiorem neque exteriorem. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting
+from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36824] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum directius opponitur gratiae quam scientiae. Sed privatio
+gratiae non est peccatum, sed magis poena quaedam consequens
+peccatum. Ergo ignorantia, quae est privatio scientiae, non est
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary,
+it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will
+not be a sin, but rather a result of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36825] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si ignorantia est peccatum, hoc non est nisi inquantum est
+voluntaria. Sed si ignorantia sit peccatum inquantum est
+voluntaria, videtur peccatum in ipso actu voluntatis consistere
+magis quam in ignorantia. Ergo ignorantia non erit peccatum, sed
+magis aliquid consequens ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain
+in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore
+ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36826] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne peccatum per poenitentiam tollitur; nec aliquod peccatum
+transiens reatu remanet actu, nisi solum originale. Ignorantia
+autem non tollitur per poenitentiam, sed adhuc remanet actu, omni
+reatu per poenitentiam remoto. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum,
+nisi forte sit originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual
+in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance
+would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="36827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36827] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+si ipsa ignorantia sit peccatum, quandiu ignorantia remaneret in
+homine, tandiu actu peccaret. Sed continue manet ignorantia in
+ignorante. Ergo ignorans continue peccaret. Quod patet esse falsum,
+quia sic ignorantia esset gravissimum. Non ergo ignorantia est
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36828] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+nihil meretur poenam nisi peccatum. Sed ignorantia meretur poenam,
+secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, <i>si quis ignorat, ignorabitur</i>.
+Ergo ignorantia est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge
+about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii).
+On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural
+aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without
+the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles
+of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state.
+Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as
+the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects
+to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one
+is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently
+ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance,
+not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no
+invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know;
+but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 co."><a name="36829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36829] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ignorantia in hoc a nescientia differt, quod
+nescientia dicit simplicem scientiae negationem, unde cuicumque
+deest aliquarum rerum scientia, potest dici nescire illas; secundum
+quem modum Dionysius in Angelis nescientiam ponit, VII cap. Cael.
+Hier. Ignorantia vero importat scientiae privationem, dum scilicet
+alicui deest scientia eorum quae aptus natus est scire. Horum autem
+quaedam aliquis scire tenetur, illa scilicet sine quorum scientia
+non potest debitum actum recte exercere. Unde omnes tenentur scire
+communiter ea quae sunt fidei, et universalia iuris praecepta,
+singuli autem ea quae ad eorum statum vel officium spectant.
+Quaedam vero sunt quae etsi aliquis natus est scire, non tamen ea
+scire tenetur, sicut theoremata geometriae, et contingentia
+particularia, nisi in casu. Manifestum est autem quod quicumque
+negligit habere vel facere id quod tenetur habere vel facere,
+peccat peccato omissionis. Unde propter negligentiam, ignorantia
+eorum quae aliquis scire tenetur, est peccatum. Non autem imputatur
+homini ad negligentiam, si nesciat ea quae scire non potest. Unde
+horum ignorantia invincibilis dicitur, quia scilicet studio
+superari non potest. Et propter hoc talis ignorantia, cum non sit
+voluntaria, eo quod non est in potestate nostra eam repellere, non
+est peccatum. Ex quo patet quod nulla ignorantia invincibilis est
+peccatum, ignorantia autem vincibilis est peccatum, si sit eorum
+quae aliquis scire tenetur; non autem si sit eorum quae quis scire
+non tenetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q76_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions
+have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin;
+in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the
+knowledge which we ought to
+have.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36830] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in hoc quod dicitur
+dictum vel factum vel concupitum, sunt intelligendae etiam
+negationes oppositae, secundum quod omissio habet rationem peccati.
+Et ita negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia est peccatum,
+continetur sub praedicta definitione peccati, inquantum
+praetermittitur aliquid quod debuit dici vel fieri vel concupisci,
+ad scientiam debitam acquirendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have
+the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by
+his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36831] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod privatio gratiae, etsi secundum se non sit peccatum,
+tamen ratione negligentiae praeparandi se ad gratiam, potest habere
+rationem peccati, sicut et ignorantia. Et tamen quantum ad hoc est
+dissimile, quia homo potest aliquam scientiam acquirere per suos
+actus, gratia vero non acquiritur ex nostris actibus, sed ex Dei
+munere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is
+commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as
+it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36832] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut in peccato transgressionis peccatum non
+consistit in solo actu voluntatis, sed etiam in actu volito qui est
+imperatus a voluntate; ita in peccato omissionis non solum actus
+voluntatis est peccatum, sed etiam ipsa omissio, inquantum est
+aliqualiter voluntaria. Et hoc modo ipsa negligentia sciendi, vel
+inconsideratio, est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge,
+nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36833] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod licet, transeunte reatu per poenitentiam, remaneat
+ignorantia secundum quod est privatio scientiae; non tamen remanet
+negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia peccatum dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is
+it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring
+the knowledge that he ought to have.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="36834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36834] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod, sicut in aliis peccatis omissionis solo illo tempore
+homo actu peccat, pro quo praeceptum affirmativum obligat; ita est
+etiam de peccato ignorantiae. Non enim continuo ignorans actu
+peccat, sed solum quando est tempus acquirendi scientiam quam
+habere tenetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A3-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 3. Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary.
+Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36835] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia, ex toto excuset a peccato.
+Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, omne peccatum voluntarium est. Sed
+ignorantia causat involuntarium ut supra habitum est. Ergo
+ignorantia totaliter excusat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.
+Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species.
+Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36836] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+id quod aliquis facit praeter intentionem, per accidens agit. Sed
+intentio non potest esse de eo quod est ignotum. Ergo id quod per
+ignorantiam homo agit, per accidens se habet in actibus humanis.
+Sed quod est per accidens, non dat speciem. Nihil ergo quod est per
+ignorantiam factum, debet iudicari peccatum vel virtuosum in
+humanis actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which
+perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36837] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+homo est subiectum virtutis et peccati inquantum est particeps
+rationis. Sed ignorantia excludit scientiam, per quam ratio
+perficitur. Ergo ignorantia totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone
+are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether
+excuse from sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36838] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>quaedam
+per ignorantiam facta, recte improbantur</i>. Sed solum illa recte
+improbantur quae sunt peccata. Ergo quaedam per ignorantiam facta,
+sunt peccata. Non ergo ignorantia omnino excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q76_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge
+were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which
+is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of
+the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated
+in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make
+the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or
+accompanies the sinful act.
+</p><p id="FS_Q76_A3-p7"> On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses
+from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons.
+First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known
+to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which
+circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge
+is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man
+(which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting
+another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and
+that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though
+this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin.
+Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly,
+as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when
+a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For
+such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able
+to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely
+involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance
+excuses from sin altogether.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 co."><a name="36839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36839] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ignorantia de se habet quod faciat actum quem causat,
+involuntarium esse. Iam autem dictum est quod ignorantia dicitur
+causare actum quem scientia opposita prohibebat. Et ita talis
+actus, si scientia adesset, esset contrarius voluntati, quod
+importat nomen involuntarii. Si vero scientia quae per ignorantiam
+privatur, non prohiberet actum, propter inclinationem voluntatis in
+ipsum; ignorantia huius scientiae non facit hominem involuntarium,
+sed non volentem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et talis ignorantia,
+quae non est causa actus peccati, ut dictum est, quia non causat
+involuntarium, non excusat a peccato. Et eadem ratio est de
+quacumque ignorantia non causante, sed consequente vel concomitante
+actum peccati. Sed ignorantia quae est causa actus, quia causat
+involuntarium, de se habet quod excuset a peccato, eo quod
+voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Sed quod aliquando non
+totaliter excuset a peccato, potest contingere ex duobus. Uno modo,
+ex parte ipsius rei ignoratae. Intantum enim ignorantia excusat a
+peccato, inquantum ignoratur aliquid esse peccatum. Potest autem
+contingere quod aliquis ignoret quidem aliquam circumstantiam
+peccati, quam si sciret, retraheretur a peccando, sive illa
+circumstantia faciat ad rationem peccati sive non; et tamen adhuc
+remanet in eius scientia aliquid per quod cognoscit illud esse
+actum peccati. Puta si aliquis percutiens aliquem, sciat quidem
+ipsum esse hominem, quod sufficit ad rationem peccati; non tamen
+scit eum esse patrem, quod est circumstantia constituens novam
+speciem peccati; vel forte nescit quod ille se defendens
+repercutiat eum, quod si sciret, non percuteret, quod non pertinet
+ad rationem peccati. Unde licet talis propter ignorantiam peccet,
+non tamen totaliter excusatur a peccato, quia adhuc remanet ei
+cognitio peccati. Alio modo potest hoc contingere ex parte ipsius
+ignorantiae, quia scilicet ipsa ignorantia est voluntaria, vel
+directe, sicut cum aliquis studiose vult nescire aliqua, ut
+liberius peccet; vel indirecte, sicut cum aliquis propter laborem,
+vel propter alias occupationes, negligit addiscere id per quod a
+peccato retraheretur. Talis enim negligentia facit ignorantiam
+ipsam esse voluntariam et peccatum, dummodo sit eorum quae quis
+scire tenetur et potest. Et ideo talis ignorantia non totaliter
+excusat a peccato. Si vero sit talis ignorantia quae omnino sit
+involuntaria, sive quia est invincibilis, sive quia est eius quod
+quis scire non tenetur; talis ignorantia omnino excusat a
+peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q76_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36840] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non omnis ignorantia causat involuntarium, sicut
+supra dictum est. Unde non omnis ignorantia totaliter excusat a
+peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his
+sin is not accidental.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36841] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod inquantum remanet in ignorante de voluntario,
+intantum remanet de intentione peccati. Et secundum hoc, non erit
+per accidens peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen
+and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36842] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, si esset talis ignorantia quae totaliter usum
+rationis excluderet, omnino a peccato excusaret, sicut patet in
+furiosis et amentibus. Non autem semper ignorantia causans peccatum
+est talis. Et ideo non semper totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A4-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 4. Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance
+is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does
+not diminish sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36843] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non diminuat peccatum.
+Illud enim quod est commune in omni peccato, non diminuit peccatum.
+Sed ignorantia est communis in omni peccato, dicit enim
+philosophus, in III Ethic., quod omnis malus est ignorans. Ergo
+ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q76_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it does not diminish a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36844] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum additum peccato facit maius peccatum. Sed ipsa ignorantia
+est peccatum, ut dictum est. Ergo non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.4" target="asv"> Rom. 2:4, </a> "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not."
+Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36845] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+non est eiusdem aggravare et diminuere peccatum. Sed ignorantia
+aggravat peccatum, quoniam super illud apostoli, <i>ignoras quoniam
+benignitas Dei,</i> etc., dicit Ambrosius, <i>gravissime peccas, si
+ignoras</i>. Ergo ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which
+removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher
+says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36846] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+si aliqua ignorantia diminuit peccatum, hoc maxime videtur de illa
+quae totaliter tollit usum rationis. Sed huiusmodi ignorantia non
+minuit peccatum, sed magis auget, dicit enim philosophus, in III
+Ethic., quod <i>ebrius meretur duplices maledictiones</i>. Ergo
+ignorantia non minuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36847] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+quidquid est ratio remissionis peccati, alleviat peccatum. Sed
+ignorantia est huiusmodi, ut patet I ad Tim. I, <i>misericordiam
+consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci</i>. Ergo ignorantia diminuit,
+vel alleviat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A4-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not
+render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether
+(through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance
+which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it,
+neither diminishes nor increases the sin.
+</p><p id="FS_Q76_A4-p8"> Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does
+not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary,
+as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more
+voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the
+hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being
+committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies,
+the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk
+and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not
+known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case
+there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 co."><a name="36848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36848] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium, intantum
+ignorantia potest diminuere peccatum, inquantum diminuit
+voluntarium, si autem voluntarium non diminuat, nullo modo diminuet
+peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod ignorantia quae totaliter a
+peccato excusat, quia totaliter voluntarium tollit, peccatum non
+minuit, sed omnino aufert. Ignorantia vero quae non est causa
+peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum, nec minuit
+peccatum nec auget. Illa igitur sola ignorantia potest peccatum
+minuere, quae est causa peccati, et tamen totaliter a peccato non
+excusat. Contingit autem quandoque quod talis ignorantia directe et
+per se est voluntaria, sicut cum aliquis sua sponte nescit aliquid,
+ut liberius peccet. Et talis ignorantia videtur augere voluntarium
+et peccatum, ex intensione enim voluntatis ad peccandum provenit
+quod aliquis vult subire ignorantiae damnum, propter libertatem
+peccandi. Quandoque vero ignorantia quae est causa peccati, non est
+directe voluntaria, sed indirecte vel per accidens, puta cum
+aliquis non vult laborare in studio, ex quo sequitur eum esse
+ignorantem; vel cum aliquis vult bibere vinum immoderate, ex quo
+sequitur eum inebriari et discretione carere. Et talis ignorantia
+diminuit voluntarium, et per consequens peccatum. Cum enim aliquid
+non cognoscitur esse peccatum, non potest dici quod voluntas
+directe et per se feratur in peccatum, sed per accidens, unde est
+ibi minor contemptus, et per consequens minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from
+that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36849] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ignorantia secundum quam omnis malus est
+ignorans, non est causa peccati; sed aliquid consequens ad causam,
+scilicet ad passionem vel habitum inclinantem in peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do
+not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same
+gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed
+by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because
+drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36850] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum peccato additum facit plura peccata, non
+tamen facit semper maius peccatum, quia forte non coincidunt in
+idem peccatum, sed sunt plura. Et potest contingere, si primum
+diminuat secundum, quod ambo simul non habeant tantam gravitatem
+quantam unum solum haberet. Sicut homicidium gravius peccatum est a
+sobrio homine factum, quam si fiat ab ebrio, quamvis haec sint duo
+peccata, quia ebrietas plus diminuit de ratione sequentis peccati,
+quam sit sua gravitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species
+of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they
+may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36851] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod verbum Ambrosii potest intelligi de ignorantia
+simpliciter affectata. Vel potest intelligi in genere peccati
+ingratitudinis, in qua summus gradus est quod homo etiam beneficia
+non recognoscat. Vel potest intelligi de ignorantia infidelitatis,
+quae fundamentum spiritualis aedificii subvertit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results
+from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin,
+and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words
+quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered
+drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might
+claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36852] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod ebrius meretur quidem duplices maledictiones, propter
+duo peccata quae committit, scilicet ebrietatem et aliud peccatum
+quod ex ebrietate sequitur. Tamen ebrietas, ratione ignorantiae
+adiunctae, diminuit sequens peccatum, et forte plus quam sit
+gravitas ipsius ebrietatis, ut dictum est. Vel potest dici quod
+illud verbum inducitur secundum ordinationem cuiusdam Pittaci
+legislatoris, qui statuit <i>ebrios, si percusserint, amplius
+puniendos; non ad veniam respiciens, quam ebrii debent magis
+habere; sed ad utilitatem, quia plures iniuriantur ebrii quam
+sobrii</i>; ut patet per philosophum, in II politicorum.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q77" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q77-p0.1">Q. 77. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q77-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be
+a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q77-p3"><a href="#FS_Q77_A1"> (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p4"><a href="#FS_Q77_A2"> (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p5"><a href="#FS_Q77_A3"> (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p6"><a href="#FS_Q77_A4"> (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p7"><a href="#FS_Q77_A5"> (5) Of three causes mentioned in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life."
+</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p8"><a href="#FS_Q77_A6"> (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p9"><a href="#FS_Q77_A7"> (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p10"><a href="#FS_Q77_A8"> (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 pr."><a name="36853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36853]
+Iª-IIae q. 77 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
+peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi, utrum passio animae sit causa
+peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum passio
+appetitus sensitivi possit movere vel inclinare voluntatem.
+Secundo, utrum possit superare rationem contra eius scientiam.
+Tertio, utrum peccatum quod ex passione provenit, sit peccatum ex
+infirmitate. Quarto, utrum haec passio quae est amor sui, sit causa
+omnis peccati. Quinto, de illis tribus causis quae ponuntur I Ioan.
+II, <i>concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, et superbia
+vitae</i>. Sexto, utrum passio quae est causa peccati, diminuat
+ipsum. Septimo, utrum totaliter excuset. Octavo, utrum peccatum
+quod ex passione est, possit esse mortale.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q77_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A1-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 1. Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by
+its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of
+the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive
+appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive
+appetite does not move the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36854] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur a passione
+appetitus sensitivi. Nulla enim potentia passiva movetur nisi a suo
+obiecto. Voluntas autem est potentia passiva et activa simul,
+inquantum est movens et mota, sicut in III de anima philosophus
+dicit universaliter de vi appetitiva. Cum ergo obiectum voluntatis
+non sit passio appetitus sensitivi, sed magis bonum rationis;
+videtur quod passio appetitus sensitivi non moveat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational
+appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.
+57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another."
+Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36855] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+superior motor non movetur ab inferiori, sicut anima non movetur a
+corpore. Sed voluntas, quae est appetitus rationis, comparatur ad
+appetitum sensitivum sicut motor superior ad inferiorem, dicit enim
+philosophus, in III de anima, quod <i>appetitus rationis movet
+appetitum sensitivum, sicut in corporibus caelestibus sphaera movet
+sphaeram</i>. Ergo voluntas non potest moveri a passione appetitus
+sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does
+not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite
+is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move
+the intellective appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36856] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullum immateriale potest moveri ab aliquo materiali. Sed voluntas
+est quaedam potentia immaterialis, non enim utitur organo
+corporali, cum sit in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima.
+Appetitus autem sensitivus est vis materialis, utpote fundata in
+organo corporali. Ergo passio appetitus sensitivi non potest movere
+appetitum intellectivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv">Dan. 13:56</a>): "Lust hath perverted thy heart."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36857] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Dan. XIII, <i>concupiscentia subvertit cor
+tuum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways.
+First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows
+of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its
+act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the
+contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of
+the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another.
+In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever,
+the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.
+</p><p id="FS_Q77_A1-p7"> Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and
+apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of
+the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination
+and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of
+the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do
+not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason
+often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a
+natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 co."><a name="36858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36858] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere
+aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno
+quidem modo, secundum quandam abstractionem. Cum enim omnes
+potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est
+quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu
+remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediatur. Tum quia omnis virtus
+ad plura dispersa fit minor, unde e contrario, quando intenditur
+circa unum, minus potest ad alia dispergi. Tum quia in operibus
+animae requiritur quaedam intentio, quae dum vehementer applicatur
+ad unum, non potest alteri vehementer attendere. Et secundum hunc
+modum, per quandam distractionem, quando motus appetitus sensitivi
+fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod
+remittatur, vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitus
+rationalis, qui est voluntas. Alio modo, ex parte obiecti
+voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim
+iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam
+apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut
+patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus
+sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium
+aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium
+gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes,
+non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur.
+Unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem
+appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus
+est sequi iudicium rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in
+the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36859] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod per passionem appetitus sensitivi fit aliqua
+immutatio circa iudicium de obiecto voluntatis, sicut dictum est;
+quamvis ipsa passio appetitus sensitivi non sit directe voluntatis
+obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36860] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod superius non movetur ab inferiori directe, sed
+indirecte quodammodo moveri potest, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36861] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A2-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 2. Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by
+the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a
+passion, which is weak and soon passes away.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36862] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio non possit superari a passione
+contra suam scientiam. Fortius enim non vincitur a debiliori. Sed
+scientia, propter suam certitudinem, est fortissimum eorum quae in
+nobis sunt. Ergo non potest superari a passione, quae est debilis
+et cito transiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which
+is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently,
+but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of
+the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36863] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+voluntas non est nisi boni vel apparentis boni. Sed cum passio
+trahit voluntatem in id quod est vere bonum, non inclinat rationem
+contra scientiam. Cum autem trahit eam in id quod est apparens
+bonum et non existens, trahit eam in id quod rationi videtur, hoc
+autem est in scientia rationis, quod ei videtur. Ergo passio
+nunquam inclinat rationem contra suam scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about
+a particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction,
+e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated
+in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were
+to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36864] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur
+quod trahit rationem scientem aliquid in universali, ut contrarium
+iudicet in particulari, contra, universalis et particularis
+propositio, si opponantur, opponuntur secundum contradictionem,
+sicut omnis homo et non omnis homo. Sed duae opiniones quae sunt
+contradictoriarum, sunt contrariae, ut dicitur in II peri Herm. Si
+igitur aliquis sciens aliquid in universali, iudicaret oppositum in
+singulari, sequeretur quod haberet simul contrarias opiniones, quod
+est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who
+knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear
+from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition
+to contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of
+fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36865] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+quicumque scit universale, scit etiam particulare quod novit sub
+universali contineri; sicut quicumque scit omnem mulam esse
+sterilem, scit hoc animal esse sterile, dummodo sciat quod sit
+mula; ut patet per id quod dicitur in I Poster. Sed ille qui scit
+aliquid in universali, puta nullam fornicationem esse faciendam,
+scit hoc particulare sub universali contineri, puta hunc actum esse
+fornicarium. Ergo videtur quod etiam in particulari sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that
+man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he
+has knowledge, even in particular.
+</p><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p7"> Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for
+it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="36866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36866] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+ea quae sunt in voce, sunt signa intellectus animae, secundum
+philosophum. Sed homo in passione existens frequenter confitetur id
+quod eligit esse malum etiam in particulari. Ergo etiam in
+particulari habet scientiam. Sic igitur videtur quod passiones non
+possint trahere rationem contra scientiam universalem, quia non
+potest esse quod habeat scientiam universalem, et existimet
+oppositum in particulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law
+that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion,
+it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36867] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris
+meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege
+peccati</i>. Lex autem quae est in membris, est concupiscentia, de
+qua supra locutus fuerat. Cum igitur concupiscentia sit passio
+quaedam, videtur quod passio trahat rationem etiam contra hoc quod
+scit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p9">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore
+he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because,
+since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear
+good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil,
+unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil."
+</p><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p10"> Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority,
+according to the words of
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv"> James 4:17</a>: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and
+it is necessary, with the
+Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge,
+viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as
+stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful,
+and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will
+not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known
+habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general
+but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for
+a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what
+he
+knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the
+consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually
+what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity;
+and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far
+as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly,
+by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely;
+even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body,
+fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions
+are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or
+anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 co."><a name="36868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36868] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod opinio Socratis fuit, ut philosophus dicit in VII
+Ethic., quod scientia nunquam posset superari a passione. Unde
+ponebat omnes virtutes esse scientias, et omnia peccata esse
+ignorantias. In quo quidem aliqualiter recte sapiebat. Quia cum
+voluntas sit boni vel apparentis boni, nunquam voluntas in malum
+moveretur, nisi id quod non est bonum, aliqualiter rationi bonum
+appareret, et propter hoc voluntas nunquam in malum tenderet, nisi
+cum aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis. Unde dicitur Prov. XIV,
+<i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Sed quia experimento patet quod
+multi agunt contra ea quorum scientiam habent; et hoc etiam
+auctoritate divina confirmatur, secundum illud Luc. XII, <i>servus
+qui cognovit voluntatem domini sui et non fecit, plagis vapulabit
+multis</i>; et Iac. IV dicitur, scienti bonum facere et non
+facienti, peccatum est illi, non simpliciter verum dixit, sed
+oportet distinguere, ut philosophus tradit in VII Ethic. Cum enim
+ad recte agendum homo dirigatur duplici scientia, scilicet
+universali et particulari; utriusque defectus sufficit ad hoc quod
+impediatur rectitudo operis et voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.
+Contingit igitur quod aliquis habeat scientiam in universali, puta
+nullam fornicationem esse faciendam; sed tamen non cognoscat in
+particulari hunc actum qui est fornicatio, non esse faciendum. Et
+hoc sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas non sequatur universalem
+scientiam rationis. Iterum considerandum est quod nihil prohibet
+aliquid sciri in habitu, quod tamen actu non consideratur. Potest
+igitur contingere quod aliquis etiam rectam scientiam habeat in
+singulari, et non solum in universali, sed tamen in actu non
+consideret. Et tunc non videtur difficile quod praeter id quod actu
+non considerat, homo agat. Quod autem homo non consideret in
+particulari id quod habitualiter scit, quandoque quidem contingit
+ex solo defectu intentionis, puta cum homo sciens geometriam, non
+intendit ad considerandum geometriae conclusiones, quas statim in
+promptu habet considerare. Quandoque autem homo non considerat id
+quod habet in habitu propter aliquod impedimentum superveniens,
+puta propter aliquam occupationem exteriorem, vel propter aliquam
+infirmitatem corporalem. Et hoc modo ille qui est in passione
+constitutus, non considerat in particulari id quod scit in
+universali, inquantum passio impedit talem considerationem. Impedit
+autem tripliciter. Primo, per quandam distractionem, sicut supra
+expositum est. Secundo, per contrarietatem, quia plerumque passio
+inclinat ad contrarium huius quod scientia universalis habet.
+Tertio, per quandam immutationem corporalem, ex qua ratio
+quodammodo ligatur, ne libere in actum exeat, sicut etiam somnus
+vel ebrietas, quadam corporali transmutatione facta, ligant usum
+rationis. Et quod hoc contingat in passionibus, patet ex hoc quod
+aliquando, cum passiones multum intenduntur, homo amittit totaliter
+usum rationis, multi enim propter abundantiam amoris et irae, sunt
+in insaniam conversi. Et per hunc modum passio trahit rationem ad
+iudicandum in particulari contra scientiam quam habet in
+universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge,
+since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal
+knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36869] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod scientia universalis, quae est certissima, non
+habet principalitatem in operatione, sed magis scientia
+particularis, eo quod operationes sunt circa singularia. Unde non
+est mirum si in operabilibus passio agit contra scientiam
+universalem, absente consideratione in particulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this
+particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36870] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod rationi videatur in particulari
+aliquid bonum quod non est bonum, contingit ex aliqua passione. Et
+tamen hoc particulare iudicium est contra universalem scientiam
+rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at
+the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has
+true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative:
+because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36871] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod non posset contingere quod aliquis haberet simul in
+actu scientiam aut opinionem veram de universali affirmativo, et
+opinionem falsam de particulari negativo, aut e converso. Sed bene
+potest contingere quod aliquis habeat veram scientiam habitualiter
+de universali affirmativo, et falsam opinionem in actu de
+particulari negativo, actus enim directe non contrariatur habitui,
+sed actui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to
+draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws
+his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions,
+two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g.
+No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and
+hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and
+concludes under the second.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36872] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod ille qui habet scientiam in universali, propter
+passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad
+conclusionem pervenire, sed assumit sub alia universali, quam
+suggerit inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde
+philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod syllogismus incontinentis
+habet quatuor propositiones, duas universales, quarum una est
+rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committendam; alia est
+passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat
+rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima, unde, ea durante,
+assumit et concludit sub secunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge,
+his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do
+so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="36873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36873] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod, sicut ebrius quandoque proferre potest verba
+significantia profundas sententias, quas tamen mente diiudicare non
+potest, ebrietate prohibente; ita in passione existens, etsi ore
+proferat hoc non esse faciendum, tamen interius hoc animo sentit
+quod sit faciendum, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A3-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 3. Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement
+of the sensitive appetite, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should
+not be called a sin of weakness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36874] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non
+debeat dici ex infirmitate. Passio enim est quidam vehemens motus
+appetitus sensitivi, ut dictum est. Vehementia autem motus magis
+attestatur fortitudini quam infirmitati. Ergo peccatum quod est ex
+passione, non debet dici ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.77.39" target="asv">Ps. 77:39</a>): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather
+than those which are due to a passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36875] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+infirmitas hominis maxime attenditur secundum illud quod est in eo
+fragilius. Hoc autem est caro, unde dicitur in Psalmo LXXVII,
+<i>recordatus est quia caro sunt</i>. Ergo magis debet dici
+peccatum ex infirmitate quod est ex aliquo corporis defectu, quam
+quod est ex animae passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will,
+whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it."
+Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36876] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ad ea non videtur homo esse infirmus, quae eius voluntati
+subduntur. Sed facere vel non facere ea ad quae passio inclinat,
+hominis voluntati subditur, secundum illud Gen. IV, <i>sub te erit
+appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius</i>. Ergo peccatum quod
+est ex passione, non est ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore
+a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36877] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Tullius, in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., passiones animae
+aegritudines vocat. Aegritudines autem alio nomine infirmitates
+dicuntur. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, debet dici ex
+infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way
+of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution
+of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to
+be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when
+it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De
+Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account
+of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order
+of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for
+the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by
+any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due
+action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an
+epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 co."><a name="36878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36878] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod causa peccati propria est ex parte animae in qua
+principaliter est peccatum. Potest autem dici infirmitas in anima
+ad similitudinem infirmitatis corporis. Dicitur autem corpus
+hominis esse infirmum, quando debilitatur vel impeditur in
+executione propriae operationis, propter aliquam inordinationem
+partium corporis, ita scilicet quod humores et membra hominis non
+subduntur virtuti regitivae et motivae corporis. Unde et membrum
+dicitur esse infirmum, quando non potest perficere operationem
+membri sani, sicut oculus quando non potest clare videre, ut dicit
+philosophus, in X de historiis animalium. Unde et infirmitas animae
+dicitur quando impeditur anima in propria operatione, propter
+inordinationem partium ipsius. Sicut autem partes corporis dicuntur
+esse inordinatae, quando non sequuntur ordinem naturae; ita et
+partes animae dicuntur inordinatae, quando non subduntur ordini
+rationis, ratio enim est vis regitiva partium animae. Sic ergo
+quando extra ordinem rationis vis concupiscibilis aut irascibilis
+aliqua passione afficitur, et per hoc impedimentum praestatur modo
+praedicto debitae actioni hominis, dicitur peccatum esse ex
+infirmitate. Unde et philosophus, in I Ethic., comparat
+incontinentem paralytico, cuius partes moventur in contrarium eius
+quod ipse disponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger
+the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36879] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut quanto fuerit motus fortior in corpore
+praeter ordinem naturae, tanto est maior infirmitas; ita quanto
+fuerit motus fortior passionis praeter ordinem rationis, tanto est
+maior infirmitas animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may
+have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul
+is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the
+passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36880] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis,
+qui non impeditur per corporis infirmitatem, potest enim qui est
+corpore infirmus, promptam habere voluntatem ad aliquid faciendum.
+Impeditur autem per passionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum
+dicitur peccatum esse ex infirmitate, magis est referendum ad
+infirmitatem animae quam ad infirmitatem corporis. Dicitur tamen
+etiam ipsa infirmitas animae infirmitas carnis, inquantum ex
+conditione carnis passiones animae insurgunt in nobis, eo quod
+appetitus sensitivus est virtus utens organo corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our
+appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36881] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in potestate quidem voluntatis est assentire vel non
+assentire his in quae passio inclinat, et pro tanto dicitur noster
+appetitus sub nobis esse. Sed tamen ipse assensus vel dissensus
+voluntatis impeditur per passionem, modo praedicto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A4-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 4. Whether self-love is the source of every sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper
+cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36882] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sui non sit principium omnis
+peccati. Id enim quod est secundum se bonum et debitum, non est
+propria causa peccati. Sed amor sui est secundum se bonum et
+debitum, unde et praecipitur homini ut diligat proximum sicut
+seipsum, Levit. XIX. Ergo amor sui non potest esse propria causa
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the
+law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause
+of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.3" shape="rect"> Q[23], A[4]</a>).
+Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36883] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>occasione accepta, peccatum per
+mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam</i>, ubi Glossa
+dicit quod <i>bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet,
+omne malum prohibet</i>, quod dicitur propter hoc, quia
+concupiscentia est causa omnis peccati. Sed concupiscentia est alia
+passio ab amore, ut supra habitum est. Ergo amor sui non est causa
+omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine in commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing
+false humility." Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36884] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit
+quod omne peccatum est <i>ex amore male inflammante, vel ex timore
+male humiliante</i>. Non ergo solus amor sui est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor.
+Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36885] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut homo quandoque peccat propter inordinatum sui amorem, ita
+etiam interdum peccat propter inordinatum amorem proximi. Ergo amor
+sui non est causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every
+sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36886] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>amor sui usque
+ad contemptum Dei, facit civitatem Babylonis</i>. Sed per quodlibet
+peccatum pertinet homo ad civitatem Babylonis. Ergo amor sui est
+causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q77_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect
+every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good
+inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore
+it is evident that inordinate love of
+self is the cause of every sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 co."><a name="36887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36887] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, propria et per se causa
+peccati accipienda est ex parte conversionis ad commutabile bonum;
+ex qua quidem parte omnis actus peccati procedit ex aliquo
+inordinato appetitu alicuius temporalis boni. Quod autem aliquis
+appetat inordinate aliquod temporale bonum, procedit ex hoc quod
+inordinate amat seipsum, hoc enim est amare aliquem, velle ei
+bonum. Unde manifestum est quod inordinatus amor sui est causa
+omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love,
+leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36888] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis, ita
+scilicet quod velit sibi bonum quod congruit. Sed amor sui
+inordinatus, qui perducit ad contemptum Dei, ponitur esse causa
+peccati secundum Augustinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36889] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod concupiscentia, qua aliquis appetit sibi bonum,
+reducitur ad amorem sui sicut ad causam, ut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed
+to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance
+of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But
+each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man
+either desires good things, or avoids evil things.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36890] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aliquis dicitur amare et illud bonum quod optat sibi,
+et se, cui bonum optat. Amor igitur secundum quod dicitur eius esse
+quod optatur, puta quod aliquis dicitur amare vinum vel pecuniam,
+recipit pro causa timorem, qui pertinet ad fugam mali. Omne enim
+peccatum provenit vel ex inordinato appetitu alicuius boni, vel ex
+inordinata fuga alicuius mali. Sed utrumque horum reducitur ad
+amorem sui. Propter hoc enim homo vel appetit bona vel fugit mala,
+quia amat seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed
+through self-love.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36891] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod amicus est quasi alter ipse. Et ideo quod peccatur
+propter amorem amici, videtur propter amorem sui peccari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A5-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 5. Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as
+causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness.
+Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36892] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur causae
+peccatorum esse concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, et
+superbia vitae. Quia secundum apostolum, I ad Tim. ult., <i>radix
+omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>. Sed superbia vitae sub cupiditate
+non continetur. Ergo non oportet poni inter causas peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv"> Dan. 13:56</a>: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36893] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+concupiscentia carnis maxime ex visione oculorum excitatur,
+secundum illud Dan. XIII, <i>species decepit te</i>. Ergo non debet
+dividi concupiscentia oculorum contra concupiscentiam carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q30_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of
+the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36894] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+concupiscentia est delectabilis appetitus, ut supra habitum est.
+Delectationes autem contingunt non solum secundum visum, sed etiam
+secundum alios sensus. Ergo deberet etiam poni concupiscentia
+auditus, et aliorum sensuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance
+of evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the
+causes of sin are insufficiently described.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36895] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut homo inducitur ad peccandum ex inordinata concupiscentia
+boni, ita etiam ex inordinata fuga mali, ut dictum est. Sed nihil
+hic enumeratur pertinens ad fugam mali. Ergo insufficienter causae
+peccatorum tanguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in
+the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.19" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:19</a>): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36896] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur I Ioan. II, <i>omne quod est in mundo, aut est
+concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia
+vitae</i>. In mundo autem dicitur aliquid esse propter peccatum,
+unde et ibidem, dicit quod <i>totus mundus in maligno positus
+est</i>. Ergo praedicta tria sunt causae peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A4" id="FS_Q77_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good
+for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways,
+the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as
+it is the object of the concupiscible part;
+secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]).
+Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain
+the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards
+the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called
+"concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation
+or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar
+mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the
+eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote
+curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly
+to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.
+</p><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p8"> The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence,
+as we shall state further on (Q[84], A[2];
+<a href="SS_iii.html#SS_Q162_A1" id="FS_Q77_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[162], A[1]</a>).
+</p><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p9"> It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of
+the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided
+into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 co."><a name="36897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36897] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, inordinatus amor sui est causa
+omnis peccati. In amore autem sui includitur inordinatus appetitus
+boni, unusquisque enim appetit bonum ei quem amat. Unde manifestum
+est quod inordinatus appetitus boni est causa omnis peccati. Bonum
+autem dupliciter est obiectum sensibilis appetitus, in quo sunt
+animae passiones, quae sunt causa peccati, uno modo, absolute,
+secundum quod est obiectum concupiscibilis; alio modo, sub ratione
+ardui, prout est obiectum irascibilis, ut supra dictum est. Est
+autem duplex concupiscentia, sicut supra habitum est. Una quidem
+naturalis, quae est eorum quibus natura corporis sustentatur; sive
+quantum ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus et alia
+huiusmodi; sive quantum ad conservationem speciei, sicut in
+venereis. Et horum inordinatus appetitus dicitur concupiscentia
+carnis. Alia est concupiscentia animalis, eorum scilicet quae per
+sensum carnis sustentationem aut delectationem non afferunt, sed
+sunt delectabilia secundum apprehensionem imaginationis, aut
+alicuius huiusmodi acceptionis, sicut sunt pecunia, ornatus
+vestium, et alia huiusmodi. Et haec quidem animalis concupiscentia
+vocatur concupiscentia oculorum, sive intelligatur concupiscentia
+oculorum, idest ipsius visionis, quae fit per oculos, ut referatur
+ad curiositatem, secundum quod Augustinus exponit, X Confess.; sive
+referatur ad concupiscentiam rerum quae exterius oculis
+proponuntur, ut referatur ad cupiditatem, secundum quod ab aliis
+exponitur. Appetitus autem inordinatus boni ardui pertinet ad
+superbiam vitae, nam superbia est appetitus inordinatus
+excellentiae, ut inferius dicetur. Et sic patet quod ad ista tria
+reduci possunt omnes passiones, quae sunt causa peccati. Nam ad duo
+prima reducuntur omnes passiones concupiscibilis, ad tertium autem
+omnes passiones irascibilis; quod ideo non dividitur in duo, quia
+omnes passiones irascibilis conformantur concupiscentiae
+animali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How
+covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further
+on (
+<a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q77_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[1]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36898] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod secundum quod cupiditas importat universaliter
+appetitum cuiuscumque boni, sic etiam superbia vitae continetur sub
+cupiditate. Quomodo autem cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale
+vitium, quod avaritia nominatur, sit radix omnium peccatorum, infra
+dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for
+such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36899] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod concupiscentia oculorum non dicitur hic
+concupiscentia omnium rerum quae oculis videri possunt, sed solum
+earum in quibus non quaeritur delectatio carnis, quae est secundum
+tactum, sed solum delectatio oculi, idest cuiuscumque apprehensivae
+virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its
+name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm.
+xxxiii).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36900] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod sensus visus est excellentior inter omnes sensus, et
+ad plura se extendens, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Et ideo nomen eius
+transfertur ad omnes alios sensus, et etiam ad omnes interiores
+apprehensiones, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q39_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.2" shape="rect"> Q[39], A[2]</a>); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately
+the avoidance of evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36901] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod fuga mali causatur ex appetitu boni, ut supra dictum
+est. Et ideo ponuntur solum passiones inclinantes ad bonum, tanquam
+causae earum quae faciunt inordinate fugam mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A6-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 6. Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing
+causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A5" id="FS_Q77_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36902] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non allevietur propter
+passionem. Augmentum enim causae auget effectum, si enim calidum
+dissolvit, magis calidum magis dissolvit. Sed passio est causa
+peccati, ut habitum est. Ergo quanto est intensior passio, tanto
+est maius peccatum. Passio igitur non minuit peccatum, sed
+auget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases
+merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil
+passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36903] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut se habet passio bona ad meritum, ita se habet mala passio ad
+peccatum. Sed bona passio auget meritum, tanto enim aliquis magis
+videtur mereri, quanto ex maiori misericordia pauperi subvenit.
+Ergo etiam mala passio magis aggravat peccatum quam alleviat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels
+the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36904] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quanto intensiori voluntate aliquis facit peccatum, tanto gravius
+videtur peccare. Sed passio impellens voluntatem, facit eam
+vehementius ferri in actum peccati. Ergo passio aggravat
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the
+less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36905] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+passio ipsa concupiscentiae vocatur tentatio carnis. Sed quanto
+aliquis maiori tentatione prosternitur, tanto minus peccat, ut
+patet per Augustinum. Ergo passio diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement
+of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently,
+according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the
+higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a
+passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.
+</p><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p7"> Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so
+far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and
+therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more
+is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its
+voluntariness.
+</p><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p8"> On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity,
+in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure
+or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 co."><a name="36906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36906] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum essentialiter consistit in actu liberi
+arbitrii, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Passio autem
+est motus appetitus sensitivi. Appetitus autem sensitivus potest se
+habere ad liberum arbitrium et antecedenter, et consequenter.
+Antecedenter quidem, secundum quod passio appetitus sensitivi
+trahit vel inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est.
+Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint
+vehementes, redundant in inferiores, non enim potest voluntas
+intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu
+sensitivo. Si igitur accipiatur passio secundum quod praecedit
+actum peccati, sic necesse est quod diminuat peccatum. Actus enim
+intantum est peccatum, inquantum est voluntarium et in nobis
+existens. In nobis autem aliquid esse dicitur per rationem et
+voluntatem. Unde quanto ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid agunt, non
+ex impulsu passionis, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens.
+Et secundum hoc passio minuit peccatum, inquantum minuit
+voluntarium. Passio autem consequens non diminuit peccatum, sed
+magis auget, vel potius est signum magnitudinis eius, inquantum
+scilicet demonstrat intensionem voluntatis ad actum peccati. Et sic
+verum est quod quanto aliquis maiori libidine vel concupiscentia
+peccat, tanto magis peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part
+of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his
+intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36907] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis.
+Gravitas autem peccati magis attenditur ex parte aversionis; quae
+quidem ex conversione sequitur per accidens, idest praeter
+intentionem peccantis. Causae autem per accidens augmentatae non
+augmentant effectus, sed solum causae per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well,
+rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his
+action.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36908] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bona passio consequens iudicium rationis, augmentat
+meritum. Si autem praecedat, ut scilicet homo magis ex passione
+quam ex iudicio rationis moveatur ad bene agendum, talis passio
+diminuit bonitatem et laudem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement,
+as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36909] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, etsi motus voluntatis sit intensior ex passione
+incitatus, non tamen ita est voluntatis proprius, sicut si sola
+ratione moveretur ad peccandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A7-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 7. Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether.
+But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv"> Gal. 5:17</a>: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore passion excuses from
+sin altogether.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36910] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio totaliter excuset a peccato.
+Quidquid enim causat involuntarium, excusat totaliter a peccato.
+Sed concupiscentia carnis, quae est quaedam passio, causat
+involuntarium, secundum illud Gal. V, <i>caro concupiscit adversus
+spiritum, ut non quaecumque vultis, illa faciatis</i>. Ergo passio
+totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A2" id="FS_Q77_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion
+excuses from sin altogether.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36911] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+passio causat ignorantiam quandam in particulari, ut dictum est.
+Sed ignorantia particularis totaliter excusat a peccato, sicut
+supra habitum est. Ergo passio totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the
+case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36912] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+infirmitas animae gravior est quam infirmitas corporis. Sed
+infirmitas corporis totaliter excusat a peccato, ut patet in
+phreneticis. Ergo multo magis passio, quae est infirmitas
+animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) speaks of the passions as "passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case
+if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36913] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus, Rom. VII, vocat passiones peccatorum, non nisi
+quia peccata causant. Quod non esset, si a peccato totaliter
+excusarent. Ergo passiones non totaliter a peccato excusant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary.
+Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin;
+otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be
+voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause,"
+when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in
+that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing
+is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could
+have prevented it, but did not.
+</p><p id="FS_Q77_A7-p7"> Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason
+altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the
+beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness.
+If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause
+fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely
+excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason
+can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members
+are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A9" id="FS_Q77_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[9]</a>): wherefore such a
+passion does not excuse from sin altogether.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 co."><a name="36914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36914] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod secundum hoc solum actus aliquis qui de genere suo
+est malus, totaliter a peccato excusatur, quod totaliter
+involuntarius redditur. Unde si sit talis passio quae totaliter
+involuntarium reddat actum sequentem, totaliter a peccato excusat,
+alioquin, non totaliter. Circa quod duo consideranda videntur.
+Primo quidem, quod aliquid potest esse voluntarium vel secundum se,
+sicut quando voluntas directe in ipsum fertur, vel secundum suam
+causam, quando voluntas fertur in causam et non in effectum, ut
+patet in eo qui voluntarie inebriatur; ex hoc enim quasi
+voluntarium ei imputatur quod per ebrietatem committit. Secundo
+considerandum est quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium directe, vel
+indirecte, directe quidem, id in quod voluntas fertur; indirecte
+autem, illud quod voluntas potuit prohibere, sed non prohibet.
+Secundum hoc igitur distinguendum est. Quia passio quandoque quidem
+est tanta quod totaliter aufert usum rationis, sicut patet in his
+qui propter amorem vel iram insaniunt. Et tunc si talis passio a
+principio fuit voluntaria, imputatur actus ad peccatum, quia est
+voluntarius in sua causa, sicut etiam de ebrietate dictum est. Si
+vero causa non fuit voluntaria, sed naturalis, puta cum aliquis ex
+aegritudine, vel aliqua huiusmodi causa, incidit in talem passionem
+quae totaliter aufert usum rationis; actus omnino redditur
+involuntarius, et per consequens totaliter a peccato excusatur.
+Quandoque vero passio non est tanta quod totaliter intercipiat usum
+rationis. Et tunc ratio potest passionem excludere, divertendo ad
+alias cogitationes; vel impedire ne suum consequatur effectum, quia
+membra non applicantur operi nisi per consensum rationis, ut supra
+dictum est. Unde talis passio non totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement
+of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv"> Rom. 7:19</a>: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case
+with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on
+account of their concupiscence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36915] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur, <i>ut non quaecumque vultis,
+illa faciatis</i>, non est referendum ad ea quae fiunt per
+exteriorem actum, sed ad interiorem concupiscentiae motum, vellet
+enim homo nunquam concupiscere malum. Sicut etiam exponitur id quod
+dicitur Rom. VII, quod <i>odi malum, illud facio</i>. Vel potest
+referri ad voluntatem praecedentem passionem, ut patet in
+continentibus qui contra suum propositum agunt propter suam
+concupiscentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after
+taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being
+applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36916] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ignorantia particularis quae totaliter excusat, est
+ignorantia circumstantiae quam quidem quis scire non potest, debita
+diligentia adhibita. Sed passio causat ignorantiam iuris in
+particulari, dum impedit applicationem communis scientiae ad
+particularem actum. Quam quidem passionem ratio repellere potest,
+ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness,
+which is a kind of bodily disease.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36917] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod infirmitas corporis est involuntaria. Esset autem
+simile, si esset voluntaria, sicut de ebrietate dictum est, quae
+est quaedam corporalis infirmitas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A8-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 8. Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now
+sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through
+passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36918] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non
+possit esse mortale. Veniale enim peccatum dividitur contra
+mortale. Sed peccatum quod est ex infirmitate, est veniale, cum
+habeat in se causam veniae. Cum igitur peccatum quod est ex
+passione, sit ex infirmitate, videtur quod non possit esse
+mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the
+sensuality, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A4" id="FS_Q77_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[4]</a>). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36919] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+causa non est potior effectu. Sed passio non potest esse peccatum
+mortale, non enim in sensualitate est peccatum mortale, ut supra
+habitum est. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, non potest esse
+mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above (
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore
+a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36920] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+passio abducit a ratione, ut ex dictis patet. Sed rationis est
+converti ad Deum vel averti ab eo, in quo consistit ratio peccati
+mortalis. Peccatum ergo quod est ex passione, non potest esse
+mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) that "the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is
+proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36921] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, quod <i>passiones peccatorum
+operantur in membris nostris ad fructificandum morti</i>. Hoc autem
+est proprium mortalis peccati, quod fructificet morti. Ergo
+peccatum quod est ex passione, potest esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Mortal sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q77_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function
+it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin,
+only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone
+proceeds from passion to a
+sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue
+here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it
+does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed
+through passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 co."><a name="36922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36922] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est, consistit in
+aversione ab ultimo fine, qui est Deus, quae quidem aversio
+pertinet ad rationem deliberantem, cuius etiam est ordinare in
+finem. Hoc igitur solo modo potest contingere quod inclinatio
+animae in aliquid quod contrariatur ultimo fini, non sit peccatum
+mortale quia ratio deliberans non potest occurrere, quod contingit
+in subitis motibus. Cum autem ex passione aliquis procedit ad actum
+peccati, vel ad consensum deliberatum, hoc non fit subito. Unde
+ratio deliberans potest hic occurrere, potest enim excludere, vel
+saltem impedire passionem, ut dictum est. Unde si non occurrat, est
+peccatum mortale, sicut videmus quod multa homicidia et adulteria
+per passionem committuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens
+the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus
+every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This
+is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection
+regards the first kind.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36923] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod veniale dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, ex causa,
+quia scilicet habet aliquam causam veniae, quae diminuit peccatum,
+et sic peccatum ex infirmitate et ignorantia dicitur veniale. Alio
+modo, ex eventu, sicut omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit veniale,
+idest veniam consecutum. Tertio modo dicitur veniale ex genere,
+sicut verbum otiosum. Et hoc solum veniale opponitur mortali,
+obiectio autem procedit de primo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows
+accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the argument does not prove.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36924] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. Quod
+autem sit mortale, est ex parte aversionis, quae per accidens
+sequitur ad conversionem, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non
+sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will,
+so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer
+either mortal or venial.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36925] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio non semper in suo actu totaliter a passione
+impeditur, unde remanet ei liberum arbitrium, ut possit averti vel
+converti ad Deum. Si autem totaliter tolleretur usus rationis, iam
+non esset peccatum nec mortale nec veniale.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q78" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q78-p0.1">Q. 78. OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q78-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of
+inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q78-p3"><a href="#FS_Q78_A1"> (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p4"><a href="#FS_Q78_A2"> (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p5"><a href="#FS_Q78_A3"> (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p6"><a href="#FS_Q78_A4"> (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 pr."><a name="36926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36926]
+Iª-IIae q. 78 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
+peccati quae est ex parte voluntatis, quae dicitur malitia. Et
+circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis possit ex certa
+malitia, seu industria, peccare. Secundo, utrum quicumque peccat ex
+habitu, peccet ex certa malitia. Tertio, utrum quicumque peccat ex
+certa malitia, peccet ex habitu. Quarto, utrum ille qui peccat ex
+certa malitia, gravius peccet quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q78_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A1-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 1. Whether anyone sins through certain malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice.
+Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36927] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus peccet ex industria, sive ex
+certa malitia. Ignorantia enim opponitur industriae, seu certae
+malitiae. Sed omnis malus est ignorans, secundum philosophum. Et
+Prov. XIV, dicitur, <i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Ergo nullus
+peccat ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the
+intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act
+is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36928] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>nullus intendens ad
+malum operatur</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse peccare ex malitia,
+intendere malum in peccando, quod enim est praeter intentionem, est
+quasi per accidens, et non denominat actum. Ergo nullus ex malitia
+peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely,
+which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36929] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+malitia ipsa peccatum est. Si igitur malitia sit causa peccati,
+sequetur quod peccatum sit causa peccati in infinitum, quod est
+inconveniens. Nullus igitur ex malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.27" target="asv">Job 34:27</a>): "[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His ways." Now to revolt
+from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36930] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, <i>quasi de industria recesserunt a
+Deo, et vias eius intelligere noluerunt</i>. Sed recedere a Deo est
+peccare. Ergo aliqui peccant ex industria, seu ex certa
+malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due
+to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things.
+Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore
+even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when
+anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion,
+so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more
+the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order
+to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life
+which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the
+order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of
+some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good;
+and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order
+to
+possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 co."><a name="36931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36931] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod homo, sicut et quaelibet alia res, naturaliter habet
+appetitum boni. Unde quod ad malum eius appetitus declinet,
+contingit ex aliqua corruptione seu inordinatione in aliquo
+principiorum hominis, sic enim in actionibus rerum naturalium
+peccatum invenitur. Principia autem humanorum actuum sunt
+intellectus et appetitus, tam rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas,
+quam sensitivus. Peccatum igitur in humanis actibus contingit
+quandoque, sicut ex defectu intellectus, puta cum aliquis per
+ignorantiam peccat; et ex defectu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum
+aliquis ex passione peccat; ita etiam ex defectu voluntatis, qui
+est inordinatio ipsius. Est autem voluntas inordinata, quando minus
+bonum magis amat. Consequens autem est ut aliquis eligat pati
+detrimentum in bono minus amato, ad hoc quod potiatur bono magis
+amato, sicut cum homo vult pati abscissionem membri etiam scienter,
+ut conservet vitam, quam magis amat. Et per hunc modum, quando
+aliqua inordinata voluntas aliquod bonum temporale plus amat, puta
+divitias vel voluptatem, quam ordinem rationis vel legis divinae,
+vel caritatem Dei, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sequitur quod velit
+dispendium pati in aliquo spiritualium bonorum, ut potiatur aliquo
+temporali bono. Nihil autem est aliud malum quam privatio alicuius
+boni. Et secundum hoc aliquis scienter vult aliquod malum
+spirituale, quod est malum simpliciter, per quod bonum spirituale
+privatur, ut bono temporali potiatur. Unde dicitur ex certa
+malitia, vel ex industria peccare, quasi scienter malum
+eligens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance:
+sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion:
+and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular
+good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that
+a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36932] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ignorantia quandoque quidem excludit scientiam
+qua aliquis simpliciter scit hoc esse malum quod agitur, et tunc
+dicitur ex ignorantia peccare. Quandoque autem excludit scientiam
+qua homo scit hoc nunc esse malum, sicut cum ex passione peccatur.
+Quandoque autem excludit scientiam qua aliquis scit hoc malum non
+sustinendum esse propter consecutionem illius boni, scit tamen
+simpliciter hoc esse malum, et sic dicitur ignorare qui ex certa
+malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining
+another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering
+loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before
+him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's
+anger, to being deprived of the pleasure.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36933] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod malum non potest esse secundum se intentum ab aliquo,
+potest tamen esse intentum ad vitandum aliud malum, vel ad
+consequendum aliud bonum, ut dictum est. Et in tali casu aliquis
+eligeret consequi bonum per se intentum, absque hoc quod pateretur
+detrimentum alterius boni. Sicut aliquis lascivus vellet frui
+delectatione absque offensa Dei, sed duobus propositis, magis vult
+peccando incurrere offensam Dei, quam delectatione privetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic.
+v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to
+sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we
+mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so
+far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent
+fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for
+the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we
+can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above (
+<a href="#FS_Q75_A4" id="FS_Q78_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>, ad 3).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36934] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod malitia ex qua aliquis dicitur peccare, potest
+intelligi malitia habitualis, secundum quod habitus malus a
+philosopho nominatur malitia, sicut habitus bonus nominatur virtus.
+Et secundum hoc aliquis dicitur ex malitia peccare, quia peccat ex
+inclinatione habitus. Potest etiam intelligi malitia actualis. Sive
+ipsa mali electio malitia nominetur, et sic dicitur aliquis ex
+malitia peccare, inquantum ex mali electione peccat. Sive etiam
+malitia dicatur aliqua praecedens culpa, ex qua oritur subsequens
+culpa, sicut cum aliquis impugnat fraternam gratiam ex invidia. Et
+tunc idem non est causa sui ipsius, sed actus interior est causa
+actus exterioris. Et unum peccatum est causa alterius, non tamen in
+infinitum, quia est devenire ad aliquod primum peccatum, quod non
+causatur ex aliquo priori peccato, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain
+malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters
+an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36935] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis qui peccat ex habitu, peccet
+ex certa malitia. Peccatum enim quod est ex certa malitia, videtur
+esse gravissimum. Sed quandoque homo aliquod leve peccatum
+committit ex habitu, sicut cum dicit verbum otiosum. Non ergo omne
+peccatum quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts
+which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed
+through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36936] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a>
+<i>Praeterea, actus ex habitu procedentes sunt similes actibus ex
+quibus habitus generantur</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed actus
+praecedentes habitum vitiosum non sunt ex certa malitia. Ergo etiam
+peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv"> Prov. 2:14</a>: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what
+we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful
+after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious
+habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36937] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+in his quae aliquis ex certa malitia committit, gaudet postquam
+commisit, secundum illud Prov. II, <i>qui laetantur cum male
+fecerint et exultant in rebus pessimis</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia
+unicuique est delectabile cum consequitur id quod intendit, et qui
+operatur quod est ei quodammodo connaturale secundum habitum. Sed
+illi qui peccant ex habitu, post peccatum commissum dolent,
+poenitudine enim replentur pravi, idest habentes habitum vitiosum,
+ut dicitur in IX Ethic. Ergo peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt
+ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to
+which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from
+habit is committed through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36938] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+peccatum ex certa malitia dicitur esse quod est ex electione mali.
+Sed unicuique est eligibile id ad quod inclinatur per proprium
+habitum; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. de habitu virtuoso. Ergo peccatum
+quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary
+to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something
+we use when we will," as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q78_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[1]</a>). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit
+does not
+corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are
+generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through
+the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain
+malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something
+lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the
+very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being
+that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is
+to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 co."><a name="36939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36939] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod non est idem peccare habentem habitum, et peccare ex
+habitu. Uti enim habitu non est necessarium, sed subiacet voluntati
+habentis, unde et habitus definitur esse quo quis utitur cum
+voluerit. Et ideo sicut potest contingere quod aliquis habens
+habitum vitiosum, prorumpat in actum virtutis, eo quod ratio non
+totaliter corrumpitur per malum habitum, sed aliquid eius integrum
+manet, ex quo provenit quod peccator aliqua operatur de genere
+bonorum; ita etiam potest contingere quod aliquis habens habitum,
+interdum non ex habitu operetur, sed ex passione insurgente, vel
+etiam ex ignorantia. Sed quandocumque utitur habitu vitioso,
+necesse est quod ex certa malitia peccet. Quia unicuique habenti
+habitum, est per se diligibile id quod est ei conveniens secundum
+proprium habitum, quia fit ei quodammodo connaturale, secundum quod
+consuetudo et habitus vertitur in naturam. Hoc autem quod est
+alicui conveniens secundum habitum vitiosum, est id quod excludit
+bonum spirituale. Ex quo sequitur quod homo eligat malum
+spirituale, ut adipiscatur bonum quod est ei secundum habitum
+conveniens. Et hoc est ex certa malitia peccare. Unde manifestum
+est quod quicumque peccat ex habitu, peccet ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply,
+but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36940] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non excludunt bonum spirituale,
+quod est gratia Dei vel caritas. Unde non dicuntur mala
+simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et propter hoc nec habitus ipsorum
+possunt dici simpliciter mali, sed solum secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them
+as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36941] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod actus qui procedunt ex habitibus, sunt similes
+secundum speciem actibus ex quibus habitus generantur, differunt
+tamen ab eis sicut perfectum ab imperfecto. Et talis est
+differentia peccati quod committitur ex certa malitia, ad peccatum
+quod committitur ex aliqua passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able
+not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen
+that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man
+is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on
+account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36942] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ille qui peccat ex habitu, semper gaudet de hoc quod
+ex habitu operatur, quandiu habitu utitur. Sed quia potest habitu
+non uti, sed per rationem, quae non est totaliter corrupta, aliquid
+aliud meditari; potest contingere quod, non utens habitu, doleat de
+hoc quod per habitum commisit. Plerumque tamen tales poenitent de
+peccato, non quia eis peccatum secundum se displiceat; sed propter
+aliquod incommodum quod ex peccato incurrunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A3-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 3. Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an
+unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through
+certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q78_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36943] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod quicumque peccat ex certa malitia,
+peccet ex habitu. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod non est
+cuiuslibet iniusta facere qualiter iniustus facit, scilicet ex
+electione, sed solum habentis habitum. Sed peccare ex certa malitia
+est peccare ex electione mali, ut dictum est. Ergo peccare ex certa
+malitia non est nisi habentis habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little."
+But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain
+malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36944] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Origenes dicit, in I peri archon, quod <i>non ad subitum quis
+evacuatur aut deficit, sed paulatim per partes defluere necesse
+est</i>. Sed maximus defluxus esse videtur ut aliquis ex certa
+malitia peccet. Ergo non statim a principio, sed per multam
+consuetudinem, ex qua habitus generari potest, aliquis ad hoc
+devenit ut ex certa malitia peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But
+by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something
+supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through
+weakness, as stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q78_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore whenever anyone
+sins through certain malice, he sins through habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36945] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quandocumque aliquis ex certa malitia peccat, oportet quod ipsa
+voluntas de se inclinetur ad malum quod eligit. Sed ex natura
+potentiae non inclinatur homo ad malum, sed magis ad bonum. Ergo
+oportet, si eligit malum, quod hoc sit ex aliquo supervenienti,
+quod est passio vel habitus. Sed quando aliquis peccat ex passione,
+non peccat ex certa malitia, sed ex infirmitate, ut dictum est.
+Ergo quandocumque aliquis peccat ex certa malitia, oportet quod
+peccet ex habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil.
+But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.
+Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36946] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+sicut se habet habitus bonus ad electionem boni, ita habitus malus
+ad electionem mali. Sed quandoque aliquis non habens habitum
+virtutis, eligit id quod est bonum secundum virtutem. Ergo etiam
+quandoque aliquis non habens habitum vitiosum, potest eligere
+malum, quod est ex certa malitia peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational
+good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice,
+to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the
+reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the
+impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain
+malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may
+happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition,
+some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will
+tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt
+disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who
+is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord,
+may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not
+through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair,
+or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 co."><a name="36947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36947] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod voluntas aliter se habet ad bonum, et aliter ad
+malum. Ex natura enim suae potentiae inclinatur ad bonum rationis,
+sicut ad proprium obiectum, unde et omne peccatum dicitur esse
+contra naturam. Quod ergo in aliquod malum voluntas eligendo
+inclinetur, oportet quod aliunde contingat. Et quandoque quidem
+contingit ex defectu rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex ignorantia
+peccat, quandoque autem ex impulsu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum
+peccat ex passione. Sed neutrum horum est ex certa malitia peccare;
+sed tunc solum ex certa malitia aliquis peccat, quando ipsa
+voluntas ex seipsa movetur ad malum. Quod potest contingere
+dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, per hoc quod homo habet aliquam
+dispositionem corruptam inclinantem ad malum, ita quod secundum
+illam dispositionem fit homini quasi conveniens et simile aliquod
+malum, et in hoc, ratione convenientiae, tendit voluntas quasi in
+bonum, quia unumquodque secundum se tendit in id quod sibi est
+conveniens. Talis autem dispositio corrupta vel est aliquis habitus
+acquisitus ex consuetudine, quae vertitur in naturam, vel est
+aliqua aegritudinalis habitudo ex parte corporis, sicut aliquis
+habens quasdam naturales inclinationes ad aliqua peccata, propter
+corruptionem naturae in ipso. Alio modo contingit quod voluntas per
+se tendit in aliquod malum, per remotionem alicuius prohibentis.
+Puta si aliquis prohibeatur peccare non quia peccatum ei secundum
+se displiceat, sed propter spem vitae aeternae vel propter timorem
+Gehennae; remota spe per desperationem, vel timore per
+praesumptionem, sequitur quod ex certa malitia, quasi absque freno,
+peccet. Sic igitur patet quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia,
+semper praesupponit in homine aliquam inordinationem, quae tamen
+non semper est habitus. Unde non est necessarium quod quicumque
+peccat ex certa malitia, peccet ex habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p7"> It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which,
+however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins
+through habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36948] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod operari qualiter iniustus operatur, non solum
+est operari iniusta ex certa malitia, sed etiam delectabiliter, et
+sine gravi renisu rationis. Quod non est nisi eius qui habet
+habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with
+pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36949] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non statim ad hoc aliquis labitur quod ex certa
+malitia peccet, sed praesupponitur aliquid, quod tamen non semper
+est habitus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something
+is not always a habit, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36950] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illud propter quod voluntas inclinatur ad malum, non
+semper habitus est vel passio, sed quaedam alia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there
+is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good
+can be perfect without the evil of fault.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36951] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod non est similis ratio de electione boni, et de
+electione mali. Quia malum nunquam est sine bono naturae, sed bonum
+potest esse sine malo culpae perfecte.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A4-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 4. Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses
+from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins
+through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the
+Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the
+end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice,
+than for one who sins through passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36952] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, non
+peccet gravius quam ille qui peccat ex passione. Ignorantia enim
+excusat peccatum vel in toto vel in parte. Sed maior est ignorantia
+in eo qui peccat ex certa malitia, quam in eo qui peccat ex
+passione, nam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, patitur ignorantiam
+principii, quae est maxima, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.;
+habet enim malam existimationem de fine, qui est principium in
+operativis. Ergo magis excusatur a peccato qui peccat ex certa
+malitia, quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong
+into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which
+is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36953] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quanto aliquis habet maius impellens ad peccandum, tanto minus
+peccat, sicut patet de eo qui maiori impetu passionis deiicitur in
+peccatum. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, impellitur ab
+habitu, cuius est fortior impulsio quam passionis. Ergo ille qui
+peccat ex habitu, minus peccat quam ille qui peccat ex
+passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil.
+Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36954] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccare ex certa malitia est peccare ex electione mali. Sed ille
+qui peccat ex passione, etiam eligit malum. Ergo non minus peccat
+quam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.26" target="asv"> Job 34:26</a>: "He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment
+is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain
+malice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36955] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod peccatum quod ex industria committitur, ex hoc ipso
+graviorem poenam meretur, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, <i>quasi impios
+percussit eos in loco videntium, qui quasi de industria recesserunt
+ab eo</i>. Sed poena non augetur nisi propter gravitatem culpae.
+Ergo peccatum ex hoc aggravatur, quod est ex industria, seu certa
+malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because,
+as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous,
+according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of
+sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is
+committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated
+by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is
+diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion
+which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions;
+whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in
+his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick
+man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers
+intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is
+the
+principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion,
+whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now
+the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous
+than one committed through passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 co."><a name="36956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36956] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, est gravius
+peccato quod est ex passione, triplici ratione. Primo quidem quia,
+cum peccatum principaliter in voluntate consistat, quanto motus
+peccati est magis proprius voluntati, tanto peccatum est gravius,
+ceteris paribus. Cum autem ex certa malitia peccatur, motus peccati
+est magis proprius voluntati, quae ex seipsa in malum movetur, quam
+quando ex passione peccatur, quasi ex quodam extrinseco impulsu ad
+peccandum. Unde peccatum ex hoc ipso quod est ex malitia,
+aggravatur, et tanto magis, quanto fuerit vehementior malitia. Ex
+eo vero quod est ex passione, diminuitur, et tanto magis, quanto
+passio fuerit magis vehemens. Secundo, quia passio quae inclinat
+voluntatem ad peccandum, cito transit, et sic homo cito redit ad
+bonum propositum, poenitens de peccato. Sed habitus, quo homo ex
+malitia peccat, est qualitas permanens, et ideo qui ex malitia
+peccat, diuturnius peccat. Unde philosophus, in VII Ethic.,
+comparat intemperatum, qui peccat ex malitia, infirmo qui continue
+laborat; incontinentem autem, qui peccat ex passione, ei qui
+laborat interpolate. Tertio, quia ille qui peccat ex certa malitia,
+est male dispositus quantum ad ipsum finem, qui est principium in
+operabilibus. Et sic eius defectus est periculosior quam eius qui
+ex passione peccat, cuius propositum tendit in bonum finem, licet
+hoc propositum interrumpatur ad horam propter passionem. Semper
+autem defectus principii est pessimus. Unde manifestum est quod
+gravius est peccatum quod est ex malitia, quam quod est ex
+passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q76_A4" id="FS_Q78_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[4]</a>). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36957] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ignorantia electionis, de qua obiectio procedit,
+neque excusat neque diminuit peccatum, ut supra dictum est. Unde
+neque maior ignorantia talis facit esse minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined
+from within. Hence the comparison fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36958] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod impulsio quae est ex passione, est quasi ex exteriori
+respectu voluntatis, sed per habitum inclinatur voluntas quasi ab
+interiori. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while
+choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced
+through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through
+certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (
+<a href="#FS_Q78_A2" id="FS_Q78_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin
+"through" choosing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36959] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod aliud est peccare eligentem, et aliud peccare ex
+electione. Ille enim qui peccat ex passione, peccat quidem eligens,
+non tamen ex electione, quia electio non est in eo primum peccati
+principium, sed inducitur ex passione ad eligendum id quod extra
+passionem existens non eligeret. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa
+malitia, secundum se eligit malum, eo modo quo dictum est. Et ideo
+electio in ipso est principium peccati; et propter hoc dicitur ex
+electione peccare.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q79" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q79-p0.1">Q. 79. OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q79-p2"> We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part
+of man.
+</p><p id="FS_Q79-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q79-p4"><a href="#FS_Q79_A1"> (1) Whether God is a cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p5"><a href="#FS_Q79_A2"> (2) Whether the act of sin is from God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p6"><a href="#FS_Q79_A3"> (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p7"><a href="#FS_Q79_A4"> (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 pr."><a name="36960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36960]
+Iª-IIae q. 79 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+causis exterioribus peccati. Et primo, ex parte Dei; secundo, ex
+parte Diaboli; tertio, ex parte hominis. Circa primum quaeruntur
+quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit causa peccati. Secundo, utrum actus
+peccati sit a Deo. Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa excaecationis et
+obdurationis. Quarto, utrum haec ordinentur ad salutem eorum qui
+excaecantur vel obdurantur.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q79_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A1-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 1. Whether God is a cause of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.28" target="asv">Rom. 1:28</a>): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss
+comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good
+or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore
+God is to man a cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36961] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati. Dicit enim
+apostolus, Rom. I, de quibusdam, <i>tradidit eos Deus in reprobum
+sensum, ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt</i>. Et Glossa ibidem
+dicit quod <i>Deus operatur in cordibus hominum, inclinando
+voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum sive in
+malum</i>. Sed facere quae non conveniunt, et inclinari secundum
+voluntatem ad malum, est peccatum. Ergo Deus hominibus est causa
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.11" target="asv">Wis. 14:11</a>): "The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." But a temptation usually denotes
+a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the
+<a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36962] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Sap. XIV, dicitur, <i>creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt, et in
+tentationem animae hominum</i>. Sed tentatio solet dici provocatio
+ad peccandum. Cum ergo creaturae non sint factae nisi a Deo, ut in
+primo habitum est, videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati provocans
+homines ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause
+of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36963] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quidquid est causa causae, est causa effectus. Sed Deus est causa
+liberi arbitrii, quod est causa peccati. Ergo Deus est causa
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment;
+since of this evil it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">Is. 45:7</a>) that God creates evil, and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv">Amos 3:6</a>): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's
+goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36964] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne malum opponitur bono. Sed non repugnat divinae bonitati quod
+ipse sit causa mali poenae, de isto enim malo dicitur Isaiae XLV,
+quod <i>Deus est creans malum</i>; et Amos III, <i>si est malum in
+civitate quod Deus non fecerit?</i> Ergo etiam divinae bonitati non
+repugnat quod Deus sit causa culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36965] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+Sap. XI, dicitur de Deo, <i>nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti</i>.
+Odit autem Deus peccatum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>odio est Deo
+impius, et impietas eius</i>. Ergo Deus non est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's
+will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.3.18" target="asv">Ezech. 3:18</a>) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the wicked,
+'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] . . . I will require his blood at thy
+hand." Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the
+order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius
+states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from
+the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin
+indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He
+to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom
+and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is
+not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to
+steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 co."><a name="36966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36966] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod homo dupliciter est causa peccati vel sui vel
+alterius. Uno modo, directe, inclinando scilicet voluntatem suam
+vel alterius ad peccandum. Alio modo, indirecte, dum scilicet non
+retrahit aliquos a peccato, unde Ezech. III speculatori dicitur,
+<i>si non dixeris impio, morte morieris, sanguinem eius de manu tua
+requiram</i>. Deus autem non potest esse directe causa peccati vel
+sui vel alterius. Quia omne peccatum est per recessum ab ordine qui
+est in ipsum sicut in finem. Deus autem omnia inclinat et convertit
+in seipsum sicut in ultimum finem, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. de
+Div. Nom. Unde impossibile est quod sit sibi vel aliis causa
+discedendi ab ordine qui est in ipsum. Unde non potest directe esse
+causa peccati. Similiter etiam neque indirecte. Contingit enim quod
+Deus aliquibus non praebet auxilium ad vitandum peccata, quod si
+praeberet, non peccarent. Sed hoc totum facit secundum ordinem suae
+sapientiae et iustitiae, cum ipse sit sapientia et iustitia. Unde
+non imputatur ei quod alius peccat, sicut causae peccati, sicut
+gubernator non dicitur causa submersionis navis ex hoc quod non
+gubernat navem, nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem potens et
+debens gubernare. Et sic patet quod Deus nullo modo est causa
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it
+follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up
+to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose
+a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et
+Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be
+understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated
+above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36967] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, quantum ad verba apostoli, ex ipso textu patet
+solutio. Si enim Deus tradit aliquos in reprobum sensum, iam ergo
+reprobum sensum habent ad faciendum ea quae non conveniunt. Dicitur
+ergo tradere eos in reprobum sensum, inquantum non prohibet eos
+quin suum sensum reprobum sequantur, sicut dicimur exponere illos
+quos non tuemur. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, in libro de gratia et
+libero arbitrio, unde sumpta est Glossa, quod <i>Deus inclinat
+voluntates hominum in bonum et malum</i>; sic intelligendum est
+quod in bonum quidem directe inclinat voluntatem, in malum autem
+inquantum non prohibet, sicut dictum est. Et tamen hoc etiam
+contingit ex merito praecedentis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition
+"to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem"
+admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures
+that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly,
+wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for
+a purpose other than that for which they were made.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36968] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, cum dicitur, <i>creaturae Dei factae sunt in odium
+et in tentationem animae hominum</i>, haec praepositio in non
+ponitur causaliter, sed consecutive, non enim Deus fecit creaturas
+ad malum hominum, sed hoc consecutum est propter insipientiam
+hominum. Unde subditur, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui
+scilicet per suam insipientiam utuntur creaturis ad aliud quam ad
+quod factae sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first
+cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced
+to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though
+he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits
+against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36969] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod effectus causae mediae procedens ab ea secundum quod
+subditur ordini causae primae, reducitur etiam in causam primam.
+Sed si procedat a causa media secundum quod exit ordinem causae
+primae, non reducitur in causam primam, sicut si minister faciat
+aliquid contra mandatum domini, hoc non reducitur in dominum sicut
+in causam. Et similiter peccatum quod liberum arbitrium committit
+contra praeceptum Dei, non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed
+to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison
+between fault and punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36970] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod poena opponitur bono eius qui punitur, qui privatur
+quocumque bono. Sed culpa opponitur bono ordinis qui est in Deum,
+unde directe opponitur bonitati divinae. Et propter hoc non est
+similis ratio de culpa et poena.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A2-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 2. Whether the act of sin is from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not
+a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36971] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus peccati non sit a Deo. Dicit
+enim Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod <i>actus
+peccati non est res aliqua</i>. Omne autem quod est a Deo, est res
+aliqua. Ergo actus peccati non est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending
+evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36972] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+homo non dicitur esse causa peccati nisi quia homo est causa actus
+peccati, nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius
+dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed Deus non est causa peccati, ut
+dictum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause
+of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the
+cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above
+<a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36973] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+aliqui actus secundum suam speciem sunt mali et peccata, ut ex
+supradictis patet. Sed quidquid est causa alicuius, est causa eius
+quod convenit ei secundum suam speciem. Si ergo Deus esset causa
+actus peccati, sequeretur quod esset causa peccati. Sed hoc non est
+verum, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares
+(De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36974] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+actus peccati est quidam motus liberi arbitrii. Sed voluntas Dei
+est causa omnium motionum, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Ergo
+voluntas Dei est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of
+its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something
+existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the
+First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the
+cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect
+is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this
+defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg
+as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly
+God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 co."><a name="36975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36975] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod actus peccati et est ens, et est actus; et ex utroque
+habet quod sit a Deo. Omne enim ens, quocumque modo sit, oportet
+quod derivetur a primo ente; ut patet per Dionysium, V cap. de Div.
+Nom. Omnis autem actio causatur ab aliquo existente in actu, quia
+nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, omne autem ens actu
+reducitur in primum actum, scilicet Deum, sicut in causam, qui est
+per suam essentiam actus. Unde relinquitur quod Deus sit causa
+omnis actionis, inquantum est actio. Sed peccatum nominat ens et
+actionem cum quodam defectu. Defectus autem ille est ex causa
+creata, scilicet libero arbitrio, inquantum deficit ab ordine primi
+agentis, scilicet Dei. Unde defectus iste non reducitur in Deum
+sicut in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium, sicut defectus
+claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non
+autem in virtutem motivam, a qua tamen causatur quidquid est
+motionis in claudicatione. Et secundum hoc, Deus est causa actus
+peccati, non tamen est causa peccati, quia non est causa huius,
+quod actus sit cum defectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the
+act of sin is not a thing.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36976] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus nominat ibi rem id quod est res
+simpliciter, scilicet substantiam. Sic enim actus peccati non est
+res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to
+Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the
+cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause
+of the sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36977] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod in hominem sicut in causam reducitur non solum actus,
+sed etiam ipse defectus, quia scilicet non subditur ei cui debet
+subdi, licet hoc ipse non intendat principaliter. Et ideo homo est
+causa peccati. Sed Deus sic est causa actus, quod nullo modo est
+causa defectus concomitantis actum. Et ideo non est causa
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[1]</a>), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some
+object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species
+of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36978] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, actus et habitus non
+recipiunt speciem ex ipsa privatione, in qua consistit ratio mali;
+sed ex aliquo obiecto cui coniungitur talis privatio. Et sic ipse
+defectus, qui dicitur non esse a Deo, pertinet ad speciem actus
+consequenter, et non quasi differentia specifica.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A3-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 3. Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.
+3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
+Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36979] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa excaecationis et
+indurationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium
+quaest., quod <i>Deus non est causa eius quod homo sit
+deterior</i>. Sed per excaecationem et obdurationem fit homo
+deterior. Ergo Deus non est causa excaecationis et
+obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened
+heart, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 3:27</a>: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36980] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Fulgentius dicit quod <i>Deus non est ultor illius rei cuius est
+auctor</i>. Sed Deus est ultor cordis obdurati, secundum illud
+Eccli. III, <i>cor durum male habebit in novissimo</i>. Ergo Deus
+non est causa obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice
+of man, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.21" target="asv"> Wis. 2:21</a>: "For their own malice blinded them," and again, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:4</a>: "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is
+not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36981] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+idem effectus non attribuitur causis contrariis. Sed causa
+excaecationis dicitur esse malitia hominis, secundum illud Sap. II,
+<i>excaecavit enim eos malitia eorum</i>; et etiam Diabolus,
+secundum illud II ad Cor. IV, <i>Deus huius saeculi excaecavit
+mentes infidelium</i>; quae quidem causae videntur esse contrariae
+Deo. Deus ergo non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.10" target="asv">Is. 6:10</a>): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy," and
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.18" target="asv"> Rom. 9:18</a>: "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36982] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Isaiae VI, <i>excaeca cor populi huius, et aures
+eius aggrava</i>. Et Rom. IX dicitur, <i>cuius vult, miseretur; et
+quem vult, indurat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and
+turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart,
+just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not
+enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as
+regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.
+</p><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p7"> Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9</a>: "That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is the universal cause
+of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works
+freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all
+bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters
+are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in
+failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand,
+God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being
+withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this
+way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.
+</p><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p8"> These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom,
+and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect,
+viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that spiritual "blindness"
+corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 co."><a name="36983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36983] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod excaecatio et obduratio duo important. Quorum unum
+est motus animi humani inhaerentis malo, et aversi a divino lumine.
+Et quantum ad hoc Deus non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis,
+sicut non est causa peccati. Aliud autem est subtractio gratiae, ex
+qua sequitur quod mens divinitus non illuminetur ad recte videndum,
+et cor hominis non emolliatur ad recte vivendum. Et quantum ad hoc
+Deus est causa excaecationis et obdurationis. Est autem
+considerandum quod Deus est causa universalis illuminationis
+animarum, secundum illud Ioan. I, <i>erat lux vera quae illuminat
+omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>, sicut sol est
+universalis causa illuminationis corporum. Aliter tamen et aliter,
+nam sol agit illuminando per necessitatem naturae; Deus autem agit
+voluntarie, per ordinem suae sapientiae. Sol autem, licet quantum
+est de se omnia corpora illuminet, si quod tamen impedimentum
+inveniat in aliquo corpore, relinquit illud tenebrosum, sicut patet
+de domo cuius fenestrae sunt clausae. Sed tamen illius
+obscurationis nullo modo causa est sol, non enim suo iudicio agit
+ut lumen interius non immittat, sed causa eius est solum ille qui
+claudit fenestram. Deus autem proprio iudicio lumen gratiae non
+immittit illis in quibus obstaculum invenit. Unde causa
+subtractionis gratiae est non solum ille qui ponit obstaculum
+gratiae, sed etiam Deus, qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit. Et
+per hunc modum Deus est causa excaecationis, et aggravationis
+aurium, et obdurationis cordis. Quae quidem distinguuntur secundum
+effectus gratiae, quae et perficit intellectum dono sapientiae, et
+affectum emollit igne caritatis. Et quia ad cognitionem intellectus
+maxime deserviunt duo sensus, scilicet visus et auditus, quorum
+unus deservit inventioni, scilicet visus, alius disciplinae,
+scilicet auditus, ideo quantum ad visum, ponitur excaecatio;
+quantum ad auditum, aurium aggravatio; quantum ad affectum,
+obduratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they
+make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36984] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, cum excaecatio et induratio, ex parte
+subtractionis gratiae, sint quaedam poenae, ex hac parte eis homo
+non fit deterior, sed deterior factus per culpam, haec incurrit,
+sicut et ceteras poenas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36985] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de obduratione secundum quod
+est culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is
+said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36986] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod malitia est causa excaecationis meritoria, sicut
+culpa est causa poenae. Et hoc etiam modo Diabolus excaecare
+dicitur, inquantum inducit ad culpam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A4-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 4. Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.
+For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could
+draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause.
+Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q79_A3" id="FS_Q79_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36987] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod excaecatio et obduratio semper
+ordinentur ad salutem eius qui excaecatur et obduratur. Dicit enim
+Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod <i>Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo
+modo permitteret fieri aliquod malum, nisi posset ex quolibet malo
+elicere bonum</i>. Multo igitur magis ordinat ad bonum illud malum
+cuius ipse est causa. Sed excaecationis et obdurationis Deus est
+causa, ut dictum est. Ergo haec ordinantur ad salutem eius qui
+excaecatur vel induratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>) that "God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the
+destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness
+to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the
+invalid when he prescribes a bitter
+medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36988] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Sap. I dicitur quod <i>Deus non delectatur in perditione
+impiorum</i>. Videretur autem in eorum perditione delectari, si
+eorum excaecationem in bonum eorum non converteret, sicut medicus
+videretur delectari in afflictione infirmi, si medicinam amaram,
+quam infirmo propinat, ad eius sanitatem non ordinaret. Ergo Deus
+excaecationem convertit in bonum excaecatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34</a>). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not
+to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted,
+as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are
+blinded.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36989] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a>
+<i>Praeterea, Deus non est personarum acceptor</i>, ut dicitur Act.
+X. Sed quorundam excaecationem ordinat ad eorum salutem, sicut
+quorundam Iudaeorum, qui excaecati sunt ut Christo non crederent,
+et non credentes occiderent, et postmodum compuncti converterentur,
+sicut de quibusdam legitur Act. II; ut patet per Augustinum, in
+libro de quaest. Evang. Ergo Deus omnium excaecationem convertit in
+eorum salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.8" target="asv"> Rom. 3:8, </a> evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of
+their welfare.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36990] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+non sunt facienda mala ut veniant bona, ut dicitur Rom. III. Sed
+excaecatio est malum. Ergo Deus non excaecat aliquos propter eorum
+bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation---to
+another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall
+into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii).
+Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who
+are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed
+medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are
+blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine
+says
+(De Quaest. Evang. iii).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 co."><a name="36991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36991] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod excaecatio est quoddam praeambulum ad peccatum.
+Peccatum autem ad duo ordinatur, ad unum quidem per se, scilicet ad
+damnationem; ad aliud autem ex misericordi Dei providentia,
+scilicet ad sanationem, inquantum Deus permittit aliquos cadere in
+peccatum, ut peccatum suum agnoscentes, humilientur et
+convertantur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia.
+Unde et excaecatio ex sui natura ordinatur ad damnationem eius qui
+excaecatur, propter quod etiam ponitur reprobationis effectus, sed
+ex divina misericordia excaecatio ad tempus ordinatur medicinaliter
+ad salutem eorum qui excaecantur. Sed haec misericordia non omnibus
+impenditur excaecatis, <i>sed praedestinatis solum, quibus omnia
+cooperantur in bonum</i>, sicut dicitur Rom. VIII. Unde quantum ad
+quosdam, excaecatio ordinatur ad sanationem, quantum autem ad
+alios, ad damnationem, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de quaest.
+Evang.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the
+evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of
+the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36992] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod omnia mala quae Deus facit vel permittit fieri,
+ordinantur in aliquod bonum, non tamen semper in bonum eius in quo
+est malum, sed quandoque ad bonum alterius, vel etiam totius
+universi. Sicut culpam tyrannorum ordinavit in bonum martyrum; et
+poenam damnatorum ordinat in gloriam suae iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that
+ensues from the loss.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36993] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum quantum ad
+ipsam perditionem, sed ratione suae iustitiae, vel propter bonum
+quod inde provenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others
+is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God
+a respecter of persons, as explained in the
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q23_A5" id="FS_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[23], A[5]</a>, ad 3.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36994] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod hoc quod Deus aliquorum excaecationem ordinat in
+eorum salutem, misericordiae est, quod autem excaecatio aliorum
+ordinetur ad eorum damnationem, iustitiae est. Quod autem
+misericordiam quibusdam impendit et non omnibus, non facit
+personarum acceptionem in Deo, sicut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36995] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod mala culpae non sunt facienda ut veniant bona, sed
+mala poenae sunt inferenda propter bonum.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q80" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q80-p0.1">Q. 80. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q80-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q80-p3"><a href="#FS_Q80_A1"> (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p4"><a href="#FS_Q80_A2"> (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p5"><a href="#FS_Q80_A3"> (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p6"><a href="#FS_Q80_A4"> (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 pr."><a name="36996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36996]
+Iª-IIae q. 80 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
+peccati ex parte Diaboli. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo,
+utrum Diabolus sit directe causa peccati. Secundo, utrum Diabolus
+inducat ad peccandum interius persuadendo. Tertio, utrum possit
+necessitatem peccandi inducere. Quarto, utrum omnia peccata ex
+Diaboli suggestione proveniant.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q80_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A1-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 1. Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite.
+Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.3" target="asv"> Acts 5:3, </a> says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills
+men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the
+cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36997] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus sit homini directe causa
+peccandi. Peccatum enim directe in affectu consistit. Sed
+Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod <i>Diabolus suae societati
+malignos affectus inspirat</i>. Et Beda, super Act., dicit quod
+<i>Diabolus animam in affectum malitiae trahit</i>. Et Isidorus
+dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod <i>Diabolus corda hominum
+occultis cupiditatibus replet</i>. Ergo Diabolus directe est causa
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil."
+But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36998] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Hieronymus dicit quod <i>sicut Deus est perfector boni, ita
+Diabolus est perfector mali</i>. Sed Deus est directe causa bonorum
+nostrorum. Ergo Diabolus est directe causa peccatorum
+nostrorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle
+of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man
+to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly
+the cause of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36999] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus probat, in quodam cap. Ethicae Eudemicae, quod oportet
+esse quoddam principium extrinsecum humani consilii. Consilium
+autem humanum non solum est de bonis, sed etiam de malis. Ergo
+sicut Deus movet ad consilium bonum, et per hoc directe est causa
+boni; ita Diabolus movet hominem ad consilium malum, et per hoc
+sequitur quod Diabolus directe sit causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now
+man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's
+own will alone.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37000] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus probat, in I et III de Lib. Arb., <i>quod nulla
+alia re fit mens hominis serva libidinis, nisi propria
+voluntate</i>. Sed homo non fit servus libidinis nisi per peccatum.
+Ergo causa peccati non potest esse Diabolus, sed sola propria
+voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an
+action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action
+is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move
+the will to act.
+</p><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p7"> Now the will, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite:
+secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown
+above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[79], A[1]</a>). Therefore it follows that
+in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin.
+</p><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p8"> As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed
+to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly,
+he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will
+its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible
+things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may
+incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three
+ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end,
+as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q80_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[10], AA[1]</a>,2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that
+proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin,
+neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 co."><a name="37001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37001] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum actus quidam est. Unde hoc modo potest esse
+aliquid directe causa peccati, per quem modum aliquis directe est
+causa alicuius actus. Quod quidem non contingit nisi per hoc quod
+proprium principium illius actus movet ad agendum. Proprium autem
+principium actus peccati est voluntas, quia omne peccatum est
+voluntarium. Unde nihil potest directe esse causa peccati, nisi
+quod potest movere voluntatem ad agendum. Voluntas autem, sicut
+supra dictum est, a duobus moveri potest, uno modo, ab obiecto,
+sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum; alio
+modo, ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum. Hoc
+autem non est nisi vel ipsa voluntas, vel Deus, ut supra ostensum
+est. Deus autem non potest esse causa peccati, ut dictum est.
+Relinquitur ergo quod ex hac parte sola voluntas hominis sit
+directe causa peccati eius. Ex parte autem obiecti, potest
+intelligi quod aliquid moveat voluntatem tripliciter. Uno modo,
+ipsum obiectum propositum, sicut dicimus quod cibus excitat
+desiderium hominis ad comedendum. Alio modo, ille qui proponit vel
+offert huiusmodi obiectum. Tertio modo, ille qui persuadet obiectum
+propositum habere rationem boni, quia et hic aliqualiter proponit
+proprium obiectum voluntati, quod est rationis bonum verum vel
+apparens. Primo igitur modo, res sensibiles exterius apparentes
+movent voluntatem hominis ad peccandum, secundo autem et tertio
+modo, vel Diabolus, vel etiam homo, potest incitare ad peccandum,
+vel offerendo aliquid appetibile sensui, vel persuadendo rationi.
+Sed nullo istorum trium modorum potest aliquid esse directa causa
+peccati, quia voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ab aliquo obiecto
+nisi ab ultimo fine, ut supra dictum est; unde non est sufficiens
+causa peccati neque res exterius oblata, neque ille qui eam
+proponit, neque ille qui persuadet. Unde sequitur quod Diabolus non
+sit causa peccati directe et sufficienter; sed solum per modum
+persuadentis, vel proponentis appetibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man
+to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37002] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod omnes illae auctoritates, et si quae similes
+inveniantur, sunt referendae ad hoc quod Diabolus suggerendo, vel
+aliqua appetibilia proponendo, inducit in affectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause
+of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly,
+whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37003] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod similitudo illa est attendenda quantum ad hoc, quod
+Diabolus quodammodo est causa peccatorum nostrorum, sicut Deus est
+aliquo modo causa bonorum nostrorum. Non tamen attenditur quantum
+ad modum causandi, nam Deus causat bona interius movendo
+voluntatem, quod Diabolo convenire non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel,
+is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37004] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus
+humani, sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana,
+hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a Diabolo per modum
+persuadentis, vel appetibilia proponentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A2-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 2. Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul
+are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal
+soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37005] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non possit inducere ad
+peccandum interius instigando. Interiores enim motus animae sunt
+quaedam opera vitae. Sed nullum opus vitae potest esse nisi a
+principio intrinseco; nec etiam opus animae vegetabilis, quod est
+infimum inter opera vitae. Ergo Diabolus secundum interiores motus
+non potest hominem instigare ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God
+alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FS_Q80_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[4]</a>. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived
+by the external senses.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37006] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnes interiores motus, secundum ordinem naturae, a sensibus
+exterioribus oriuntur. Sed praeter ordinem naturae aliquid operari
+est solius Dei, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo Diabolus non potest in
+interioribus motibus hominis aliquid operari, nisi secundum ea quae
+exterioribus sensibus apparent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with
+either of these, because, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary
+species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless,
+the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>;
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37007] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+interiores actus animae sunt intelligere et imaginari. Sed quantum
+ad neutrum horum potest Diabolus aliquid operari. Quia, ut in primo
+habitum est, Diabolus non imprimit in intellectum humanum. In
+phantasiam etiam videtur quod imprimere non possit, quia formae
+imaginatae, tanquam magis spirituales, sunt digniores quam formae
+quae sunt in materia sensibili; quas tamen Diabolus imprimere non
+potest, ut patet ex his quae in primo habita sunt. Ergo Diabolus
+non potest secundum interiores motus inducere hominem ad
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37008] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quia secundum hoc nunquam tentaret hominem nisi visibiliter
+apparendo. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will.
+As regards the will, we have already stated
+<a href="#FS_Q80_A1" id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a>
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the
+knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he
+darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently
+the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can
+induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the
+sensitive appetite to some passion or other.
+</p><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p7"> The reason of this is, that as stated in the
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FS_Q80_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[3]</a>, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all
+those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power.
+Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno
+et Vigil.) [*De Insomn.
+iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend
+with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible
+species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were
+being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons,
+whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play.
+</p><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p8"> In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and
+the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive
+appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained,
+before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn.
+iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing
+of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is
+held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 co."><a name="37009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37009] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod interior pars animae est intellectiva et sensitiva.
+Intellectiva autem continet intellectum et voluntatem. Et de
+voluntate quidem iam dictum est quomodo ad eam Diabolus se habet.
+Intellectus autem per se quidem movetur ab aliquo illuminante ipsum
+ad cognitionem veritatis, quod Diabolus circa hominem non intendit,
+sed magis obtenebrare rationem ipsius ad consentiendum peccato.
+Quae quidem obtenebratio provenit ex phantasia et appetitu
+sensitivo. Unde tota interior operatio Diaboli esse videtur circa
+phantasiam et appetitum sensitivum. Quorum utrumque commovendo,
+potest inducere ad peccatum, potest enim operari ad hoc quod
+imaginationi aliquae formae imaginariae praesententur; potest etiam
+facere quod appetitus sensitivus concitetur ad aliquam passionem.
+Dictum est enim in primo libro quod natura corporalis spirituali
+naturaliter obedit ad motum localem. Unde et Diabolus omnia illa
+causare potest quae ex motu locali corporum inferiorum provenire
+possunt, nisi virtute divina reprimatur. Quod autem aliquae formae
+repraesententur imaginationi, consequitur quandoque ad motum
+localem. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de somno et vigilia, quod
+<i>cum animal dormierit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium
+sensitivum, simul descendunt motus</i>, sive impressiones relictae
+ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in sensibilibus speciebus
+conservantur, et movent principium apprehensivum, ita quod apparent
+ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus
+immutaretur. Unde talis motus localis spirituum vel humorum potest
+procurari a Daemonibus, sive dormiant sive vigilent homines, et sic
+sequitur quod homo aliqua imaginetur. Similiter etiam appetitus
+sensitivus concitatur ad aliquas passiones secundum quendam
+determinatum motum cordis et spirituum. Unde ad hoc etiam Diabolus
+potest cooperari. Et ex hoc quod passiones aliquae concitantur in
+appetitu sensitivo, sequitur quod et motum sive intentionem
+sensibilem praedicto modo reductam ad principium apprehensivum,
+magis homo percipiat, quia, ut philosophus in eodem libro dicit,
+<i>amantes modica similitudine in apprehensionem rei amatae
+moventur</i>. Contingit etiam ex hoc quod passio est concitata, ut
+id quod proponitur imaginationi, iudicetur prosequendum, quia ei
+qui a passione detinetur, videtur esse bonum id ad quod per
+passionem inclinatur. Et per hunc modum Diabolus interius inducit
+ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as
+external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37010] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod opera vitae semper etsi sint ab aliquo principio
+intrinseco, tamen ad ea potest cooperari aliquod exterius agens,
+sicut etiam ad opera animae vegetabilis operatur calor exterior, ut
+facilius digeratur cibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according
+to local movement, as explained above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37011] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod huiusmodi apparitio formarum imaginabilium non est
+omnino praeter ordinem naturae. Nec est per solum imperium, sed per
+motum localem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37012] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet
+responsio ad tertium, quia formae illae sunt a sensibus acceptae
+primordialiter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A3-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 3. Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said
+of the devil (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv">Job 41:24</a>) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the
+earth.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37013] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus possit necessitatem inferre
+ad peccandum. Potestas enim maior potest necessitatem inferre
+minori. Sed de Diabolo dicitur Iob XLI, <i>non est potestas super
+terram quae ei valeat comparari</i>. Ergo potest homini terreno
+necessitatem inferre ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented
+to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima
+iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q80_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which,
+to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends
+with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37014] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ratio hominis non potest moveri nisi secundum ea quae exterius
+sensibus proponuntur et imaginationi repraesentantur, quia omnis
+nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu, <i>et non est intelligere sine
+phantasmate</i>, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Sed Diabolus potest
+movere imaginationem hominis, ut dictum est, et etiam exteriores
+sensus, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
+quod <i>serpit hoc malum</i>, scilicet quod est a Diabolo, <i>per
+omnes aditus sensuales; dat se figuris, accommodat coloribus,
+adhaeret sonis, infundit saporibus</i>. Ergo potest rationem
+hominis ex necessitate inclinare ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the
+devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above
+<a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q80_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37015] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum Augustinum, <i>nonnullum peccatum est, cum caro
+concupiscit adversus spiritum</i>. Sed concupiscentiam carnis
+Diabolus potest causare, sicut et ceteras passiones, eo modo quo
+supra dictum est. Ergo ex necessitate potest inducere ad
+peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish
+thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin
+of necessity.
+</p><p id="FS_Q80_A3-p6"> Further, it is likewise written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.7" target="asv">Jam. 4:7</a>): "Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly,
+if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor
+would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37016] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur I Petr. ult., <i>adversarius vester Diabolus
+tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret, cui resistite
+fortes in fide</i>. Frustra autem talis admonitio daretur, si homo
+ei ex necessitate succumberet. Non ergo potest homini necessitatem
+inducere ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin;
+but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves
+him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the
+sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being
+thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered,
+then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A7" id="FS_Q80_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[7]</a>). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 co."><a name="37017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37017] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod Diabolus propria virtute, nisi refraenetur a Deo,
+potest aliquem inducere ex necessitate ad faciendum aliquem actum
+qui de suo genere peccatum est, non autem potest inducere
+necessitatem peccandi. Quod patet ex hoc quod homo motivo ad
+peccandum non resistit nisi per rationem, cuius usum totaliter
+impedire potest movendo imaginationem et appetitum sensitivum,
+sicut in arreptitiis patet. Sed tunc, ratione sic ligata, quidquid
+homo agat, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed si ratio non sit
+totaliter ligata, ex ea parte qua est libera, potest resistere
+peccato, sicut supra dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod Diabolus
+nullo modo potest necessitatem inducere homini ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A6" id="FS_Q80_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[6]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37018] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet potestas maior homine, potest
+movere voluntatem hominis, sed solus Deus, ut supra habitum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use
+of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37019] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illud quod est apprehensum per sensum vel
+imaginationem, non ex necessitate movet voluntatem, si homo habeat
+usum rationis. Nec semper huiusmodi apprehensio ligat rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise
+of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37020] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum, quando ratio
+ei actualiter resistit, non est peccatum, sed materia exercendae
+virtutis. Quod autem ratio ei non resistat, non est in potestate
+Diaboli. Et ideo non potest inducere necessitatem peccati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A4-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 4. Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd
+of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37021] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata hominum sint ex
+suggestione Diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
+quod <i>multitudo Daemonum causa est omnium malorum et sibi et
+aliis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.34" target="asv"> Jn. 8:34</a>: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is
+the slave" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:19</a>). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37022] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quicumque peccat mortaliter, efficitur servus Diaboli; secundum
+illud Ioan. VIII, <i>qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Sed ei
+aliquis in servitutem addicitur, a quo superatus est</i>, ut
+dicitur II Petr. II. Ergo quicumque facit peccatum, superatus est a
+Diabolo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore,
+if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which
+is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37023] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Gregorius dicit quod peccatum Diaboli est irreparabile, quia
+cecidit nullo suggerente. Si igitur aliqui homines peccarent per
+liberum arbitrium, nullo suggerente, eorum peccatum esset
+irremediabile, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo omnia peccata humana a
+Diabolo suggeruntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement
+of the free-will."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37024] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, <i>non
+omnes cogitationes nostrae malae a Diabolo excitantur, sed
+aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of
+whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man
+who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though
+each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from
+the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which
+desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 co."><a name="37025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37025] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod occasionaliter quidem et indirecte Diabolus est causa
+omnium peccatorum nostrorum, inquantum induxit primum hominem ad
+peccandum, ex cuius peccato intantum vitiata est humana natura, ut
+omnes simus ad peccandum proclives, sicut diceretur esse causa
+combustionis lignorum qui ligna siccaret, ex quo sequeretur quod
+facile incenderentur. Directe autem non est causa omnium peccatorum
+humanorum, ita quod singula peccata persuadeat. Quod Origenes
+probat ex hoc, quia etiam si Diabolus non esset, homines haberent
+appetitum cibi et venereorum et similium, qui posset esse
+inordinatus nisi ratione ordinaretur, quod subiacet libero
+arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37026] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod multitudo Daemonum est causa omnium malorum
+nostrorum secundum primam originem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it
+is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37027] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non solum fit servus alicuius qui ab eo superatur,
+sed etiam qui se ei voluntarie subiicit. Et hoc modo fit servus
+Diaboli qui motu proprio peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already
+prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37028] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod peccatum Diaboli fuit irremediabile, quia nec aliquo
+suggerente peccavit, nec habuit aliquam pronitatem ad peccandum ex
+praecedenti suggestione causatam. Quod de nullo hominis peccato
+dici potest.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q81" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q81-p0.1">Q. 81. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q81-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin,
+by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original
+sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject.
+</p><p id="FS_Q81-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q81-p4"><a href="#FS_Q81_A1"> (1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p5"><a href="#FS_Q81_A2"> (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way
+of origin?
+</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p6"><a href="#FS_Q81_A3"> (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p7"><a href="#FS_Q81_A4"> (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p8"><a href="#FS_Q81_A5"> (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 pr."><a name="37029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37029]
+Iª-IIae q. 81 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
+peccati ex parte hominis. Cum autem homo sit causa peccati alteri
+homini exterius suggerendo, sicut et Diabolus, habet quendam
+specialem modum causandi peccatum in alterum per originem. Unde de
+peccato originali dicendum est. Circa quod tria consideranda
+occurrunt, primo, de eius traductione; secundo, de eius essentia;
+tertio, de eius subiecto. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo,
+utrum primum peccatum hominis derivetur per originem in posteros.
+Secundo, utrum omnia alia peccata primi parentis, vel etiam aliorum
+parentum, per originem in posteros deriventur. Tertio, utrum
+peccatum originale derivetur ad omnes qui ex Adam per viam seminis
+generantur. Quarto, utrum derivaretur ad illos qui miraculose ex
+aliqua parte humani corporis formarentur. Quinto, utrum si femina
+peccasset, viro non peccante, traduceretur originale peccatum.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q81_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A1-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 1. Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of origin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore
+no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37030] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum peccatum primi parentis non
+traducatur ad alios per originem. Dicitur enim Ezech. XVIII,
+<i>filius non portabit iniquitatem patris</i>. Portaret autem, si
+ab eo iniquitatem traheret. Ergo nullus trahit ab aliquo parentum
+per originem aliquod peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not
+pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin,
+as was shown in the
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A2" id="FS_Q81_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[118], A[2]</a>. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37031] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+accidens non traducitur per originem, nisi traducto subiecto, eo
+quod accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum. Sed anima
+rationalis, quae est subiectum culpae, non traducitur per originem,
+ut in primo ostensum est. Ergo neque aliqua culpa per originem
+traduci potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because
+it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37032] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne illud quod traducitur per originem humanam, causatur ex
+semine. Sed semen non potest causare peccatum, eo quod caret
+rationali parte animae, quae sola potest esse causa peccati. Ergo
+nullum peccatum potest trahi per originem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united
+to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can
+the semen infect the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37033] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+quod est perfectius in natura, virtuosius est ad agendum. Sed caro
+perfecta non potest inficere animam sibi unitam, alioquin anima non
+posset emundari a culpa originali dum est carni unita. Ergo multo
+minus semen potest inficere animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who
+are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their
+origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="37034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37034] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>propter naturam turpes
+nullus increpat, sed eos qui propter desidiam et negligentiam</i>.
+Dicuntur autem natura turpes qui habent turpitudinem ex sua
+origine. Ergo nihil quod est per originem, est increpabile, neque
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion,
+since it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.24" target="asv">Wis. 2:24</a>): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin
+entered into the world.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37035] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in
+hunc mundum intravit</i>. Quod non potest intelligi per modum
+imitationis, propter hoc quod dicitur Sap. II, <i>invidia Diaboli
+mors intravit in orbem terrarum</i>. Restat ergo quod per originem
+a primo homine peccatum in mundo intravit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants,
+by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed
+from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For
+instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono
+Persev. xi, xii.]
+</p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p9"> In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various
+writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained
+that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls.
+Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be
+transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted
+from parent to child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some
+seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and
+since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is
+passed
+on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt.
+</p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p10"> But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from
+parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in
+the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin
+seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the
+rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to
+be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man
+born blind; one rather takes pity on him."
+</p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p11"> Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch
+as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members
+of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that
+"by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so
+many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will
+of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would
+not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging
+to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is
+voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate
+from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first
+parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called
+"actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except
+inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin
+of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the
+"sin of nature," according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.3" target="asv"> Eph. 2:3</a>: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 co."><a name="37036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37036] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam est tenendum quod primum
+peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros. Propter
+quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad Baptismum, tanquam ab
+aliqua infectione culpae abluendi. Contrarium autem est haeresis
+Pelagianae, ut patet per Augustinum in plurimis suis libris. Ad
+investigandum autem qualiter peccatum primi parentis originaliter
+possit transire in posteros, diversi diversis viis processerunt.
+Quidam enim, considerantes quod peccati subiectum est anima
+rationalis, posuerunt quod cum semine rationalis anima traducatur,
+ut sic ex infecta anima animae infectae derivari videantur. Alii
+vero, hoc repudiantes tanquam erroneum, conati sunt ostendere
+quomodo culpa animae parentis traducitur in prolem, etiam si anima
+non traducatur, per hoc quod corporis defectus traducuntur a
+parente in prolem, sicut si leprosus generat leprosum, et
+podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis, licet
+talis corruptio non dicatur lepra vel podagra. Cum autem corpus sit
+proportionatum animae, et defectus animae redundent in corpus, et e
+converso; simili modo dicunt quod culpabilis defectus animae per
+traductionem seminis in prolem derivatur, quamvis semen actualiter
+non sit culpae subiectum. Sed omnes huiusmodi viae insufficientes
+sunt. Quia dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente transeant
+in prolem per originem; et etiam aliqui defectus animae ex
+consequenti, propter corporis indispositionem, sicut interdum ex
+fatuis fatui generantur, tamen hoc ipsum quod est ex origine
+aliquem defectum habere, videtur excludere rationem culpae, de
+cuius ratione est quod sit voluntaria. Unde etiam posito quod anima
+rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc ipso quod infectio animae prolis
+non esset in eius voluntate, amitteret rationem culpae obligantis
+ad poenam, quia, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., <i>nullus
+improperabit caeco nato, sed magis miserebitur</i>. Et ideo alia
+via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex
+Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, inquantum conveniunt in
+natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus
+omnes qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et
+tota communitas quasi unus homo. Porphyrius etiam dicit quod
+<i>participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo</i>. Sic
+igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati, sunt tanquam multa membra
+unius corporis. Actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus,
+non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae,
+quae primo movet membra. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non
+imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se
+ut divisa a corpore, sed imputatur ei inquantum est aliquid hominis
+quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur
+inordinatio quae est in isto homine, ex Adam generato, non est
+voluntaria voluntate ipsius sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet
+motione generationis omnes qui ex eius origine derivantur, sicut
+voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum. Unde peccatum quod sic
+a primo parente in posteros derivatur, dicitur originale, sicut
+peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur
+actuale. Et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod
+committitur, non est peccatum illius membri nisi inquantum illud
+membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur peccatum
+humanum; ita peccatum originale non est peccatum huius personae,
+nisi inquantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente. Unde
+et vocatur peccatum naturae; secundum illud Ephes. II, <i>eramus
+natura filii irae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share
+in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even
+as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37037] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod filius dicitur non portare peccatum patris, quia
+non punitur pro peccato patris, nisi sit particeps culpae. Et sic
+est in proposito, derivatur enim per originem culpa a patre in
+filium, sicut et peccatum actuale per imitationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless
+the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits
+the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated
+with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature
+from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37038] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, etsi anima non traducatur, quia virtus seminis non
+potest causare animam rationalem; movet tamen ad ipsam dispositive.
+Unde per virtutem seminis traducitur humana natura a parente in
+prolem, et simul cum natura naturae infectio, ex hoc enim fit iste
+qui nascitur consors culpae primi parentis, quod naturam ab eo
+sortitur per quandam generativam motionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37039] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, etsi culpa non sit actu in semine, est tamen ibi
+virtute humana natura, quam concomitatur talis culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the
+soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37040] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod semen est principium generationis, quae est proprius
+actus naturae, eius propagationi deserviens. Et ideo magis
+inficitur anima per semen quam per carnem iam perfectam, quae iam
+determinata est ad personam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him
+as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on
+account of a crime committed by one of his forbears.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="37041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37041] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod illud quod est per originem, non est increpabile, si
+consideretur iste qui nascitur secundum se. Sed si consideretur
+prout refertur ad aliquod principium, sic potest esse ei
+increpabile, sicut aliquis qui nascitur patitur ignominiam generis
+ex culpa alicuius progenitorum causatam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A2-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 2. Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants.
+For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate
+parents, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation."
+Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those
+who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37042] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam alia peccata vel ipsius primi
+parentis, vel proximorum parentum, traducantur in posteros. Poena
+enim nunquam debetur nisi culpae. Sed aliqui puniuntur iudicio
+divino pro peccato proximorum parentum; secundum illud Exod. XX,
+<i>ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios, in
+tertiam et quartam generationem</i>. Iudicio etiam humano, in
+crimine laesae maiestatis, filii exheredantur pro peccato parentum.
+Ergo etiam culpa proximorum parentum transit ad posteros.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another:
+thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has
+from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37043] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+magis potest transferre in alterum id quod habet aliquis a seipso,
+quam id quod habet ex alio, sicut ignis magis potest calefacere
+quam aqua calefacta, sed homo transfert in prolem per originem
+peccatum quod habet ab Adam. Ergo multo magis peccatum quod ipse
+commisit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our
+nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it
+be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.11" target="asv"> Apoc. 22:11</a>: "He that is filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer
+ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37044] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ideo contrahimus a primo parente peccatum originale, quia in eo
+fuimus sicut in principio naturae, quam ipse corrupit. Sed
+similiter fuimus in proximis parentibus sicut in quibusdam
+principiis naturae, quae etsi sit corrupta, potest adhuc magis
+corrumpi per peccatum, secundum illud Apoc. ult., <i>qui in
+sordibus est, sordescat adhuc</i>. Ergo filii contrahunt peccata
+proximorum parentum per originem, sicut et primi parentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much
+less therefore are their sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37045] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+bonum est magis diffusivum sui quam malum. Sed merita proximorum
+parentum non traducuntur ad posteros. Ergo multo minus peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q81_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully
+we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first
+parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently
+those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and
+matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the
+knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the
+species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son
+having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural
+disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those
+that are purely personal, as stated above.
+</p><p id="FS_Q81_A2-p7"> Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong
+to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In
+this way original justice, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q100_A1" id="FS_Q81_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[100], A[1]</a>, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first
+sin. Wherefore as that
+original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual
+sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that
+person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 co."><a name="37046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37046] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod Augustinus hanc quaestionem movet in Enchiridio, et
+insolutam relinquit. Sed si quis diligenter attendit, impossibile
+est quod aliqua peccata proximorum parentum, vel etiam primi
+parentis praeter primum, per originem traducantur. Cuius ratio est
+quia homo generat sibi idem in specie, non autem secundum
+individuum. Et ideo ea quae directe pertinent ad individuum, sicut
+personales actus et quae ad eos pertinent, non traducuntur a
+parentibus in filios, non enim grammaticus traducit in filium
+scientiam grammaticae, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quae
+pertinent ad naturam speciei, traducuntur a parentibus in filios,
+nisi sit defectus naturae, sicut oculatus generat oculatum, nisi
+natura deficiat. Et si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia
+individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad dispositionem
+naturae, sicut velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia
+huiusmodi, nullo autem modo ea quae sunt pure personalia, ut dictum
+est. Sicut autem ad personam pertinet aliquid secundum seipsam, et
+aliquid ex dono gratiae; ita etiam ad naturam potest aliquid
+pertinere secundum seipsam, scilicet quod causatur ex principiis
+eius, et aliquid ex dono gratiae. Et hoc modo iustitia originalis,
+sicut in primo dictum est, erat quoddam donum gratiae toti humanae
+naturae divinitus collatum in primo parente. Quod quidem primus
+homo amisit per primum peccatum. Unde sicut illa originalis
+iustitia traducta fuisset in posteros simul cum natura, ita etiam
+inordinatio opposita. Sed alia peccata actualia vel primi parentis
+vel aliorum, non corrumpunt naturam quantum ad id quod naturae est;
+sed solum quantum ad id quod personae est, idest secundum
+pronitatem ad actum. Unde alia peccata non traducuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment
+on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul
+is God's immediate property, as stated in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.4" target="asv"> Ezech. 18:4.</a> Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as
+the
+child, as to its body, is part of its father.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37047] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod poena spirituali, sicut Augustinus dicit in
+epistola ad avitum, nunquam puniuntur filii pro parentibus, nisi
+communicent in culpa, vel per originem vel per imitationem, quia
+omnes animae immediate sunt Dei, ut dicitur Ezech. XVIII. Sed poena
+corporali interdum, iudicio divino vel humano, puniuntur filii pro
+parentibus, inquantum filius est aliquid patris secundum
+corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer
+ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37048] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illud quod habet aliquis ex se, magis potest
+traducere, dummodo sit traducibile. Sed peccata actualia proximorum
+parentum non sunt traducibilia, quia sunt pure personalia, ut
+dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption
+pertaining only to the person.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37049] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod primum peccatum corrumpit naturam humanam corruptione
+ad naturam pertinente, alia vero peccata corrumpunt eam corruptione
+pertinente ad solam personam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A3-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 3. Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment
+consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still
+living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.14" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:14</a>: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have
+slept." Therefore they do not contract original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37050] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum primi parentis non transeat
+per originem in omnes homines. Mors enim est poena consequens
+originale peccatum. Sed non omnes qui procedunt seminaliter ex
+Adam, morientur, illi enim qui vivi reperientur in adventu domini,
+nunquam morientur, ut videtur per quod dicitur I Thessal. IV,
+<i>nos qui vivimus, non praeveniemus in adventu domini eos qui
+dormierunt</i>. Ergo illi non contrahunt originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he
+does not transmit it to his children.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37051] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus dat alteri quod ipse non habet. Sed homo baptizatus non
+habet peccatum originale. Ergo non traducit ipsum in prolem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv">Rom. 5:15, </a> seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37052] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+donum Christi est maius quam peccatum Adae, ut apostolus dicit,
+Rom. V. Sed donum Christi non transit in omnes homines. Ergo nec
+peccatum Adae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37053] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>mors in omnes pertransiit, in
+quo omnes peccaverunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract
+original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf. Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through
+Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his
+posterity, just as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved
+by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved
+by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 co."><a name="37054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37054] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam firmiter est tenendum quod
+omnes homines, praeter solum Christum, ex Adam derivati, peccatum
+originale ex eo contrahunt, alioquin non omnes indigerent
+redemptione quae est per Christum; quod est erroneum. Ratio autem
+sumi potest ex hoc quod supra dictum est, quod sic ex peccato primi
+parentis traducitur culpa originalis in posteros, sicut a voluntate
+animae per motionem membrorum traducitur peccatum actuale ad membra
+corporis. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum actuale traduci potest
+ad omnia membra quae nata sunt moveri a voluntate. Unde et culpa
+originalis traducitur ad omnes illos qui moventur ab Adam motione
+generationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die,
+and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP (
+<a href="XP_iii.html#XP_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q81_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">XP, Q[78], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others
+in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the
+objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death
+will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37055] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod probabilius et communius tenetur quod omnes illi
+qui in adventu domini reperientur, morientur, et post modicum
+resurgent, ut in tertio plenius dicetur. Si tamen hoc verum sit
+quod alii dicunt, quod illi nunquam morientur, sicut Hieronymus
+narrat diversorum opiniones in quadam epistola ad Minerium, de
+resurrectione carnis; dicendum est ad argumentum, quod illi etsi
+non moriantur, est tamen in eis reatus mortis, sed poena aufertur a
+Deo, qui etiam peccatorum actualium poenas condonare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless
+original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes," which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the
+body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized
+transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism,
+but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37056] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum originale per Baptismum aufertur reatu,
+inquantum anima recuperat gratiam quantum ad mentem. Remanet tamen
+peccatum originale actu quantum ad fomitem, qui est inordinatio
+inferiorum partium animae et ipsius corporis, secundum quod homo
+generat, et non secundum mentem. Et ideo baptizati traducunt
+peccatum originale, non enim generant inquantum sunt renovati per
+Baptismum, sed inquantum retinent adhuc aliquid de vetustate primi
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that
+are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but
+also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37057] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut peccatum Adae traducitur in omnes qui ab Adam
+corporaliter generantur, ita gratia Christi traducitur in omnes qui
+ab eo spiritualiter generantur per fidem et Baptismum, et non solum
+ad removendam culpam primi parentis, sed etiam ad removendum
+peccata actualia, et ad introducendum in gloriam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A4-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 4. Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv"> Gn. 4:1 </a>says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life,
+before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner,
+his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would
+contract original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37058] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si aliquis formaretur ex carne humana
+miraculose, contraheret originale peccatum. Dicit enim quaedam
+Glossa Gen. IV, quod <i>in lumbis Adae fuit tota posteritas
+corrupta, quia non est separata prius in loco vitae, sed postea in
+loco exilii</i>. Sed si aliquis homo sic formaretur sicut dictum
+est, caro eius separaretur in loco exilii. Ergo contraheret
+originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted.
+Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37059] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale causatur in nobis inquantum anima inficitur ex
+carne. Sed caro tota hominis est infecta. Ergo ex quacumque parte
+carnis homo formaretur, anima eius inficeretur infectione
+originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who
+might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37060] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale a primo parente pervenit in omnes, inquantum
+omnes in eo peccante fuerunt. Sed illi qui ex carne humana
+formarentur, in Adam fuissent. Ergo peccatum originale
+contraherent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original
+sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37061] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quia non fuissent in Adam secundum seminalem rationem; quod
+solum causat traductionem peccati originalis, ut Augustinus dicit,
+X super Gen. ad Litt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation,
+even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power
+of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation
+originally derived from Adam, i.e. who
+are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But
+if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam.
+Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by
+the man's will, but by some external power.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 co."><a name="37062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37062] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum originale a primo
+parente traducitur in posteros, inquantum moventur ab ipso per
+generationem, sicut membra moventur ab anima ad peccatum actuale.
+Non autem est motio ad generationem nisi per virtutem activam in
+generatione. Unde illi soli peccatum originale contrahunt, qui ab
+Adam descendunt per virtutem activam in generatione originaliter ab
+Adam derivatam, quod est secundum seminalem rationem ab eo
+descendere, nam ratio seminalis nihil aliud est quam vis activa in
+generatione. Si autem aliquis formaretur virtute divina ex carne
+humana, manifestum est quod vis activa non derivaretur ab Adam.
+Unde non contraheret peccatum originale, sicut nec actus manus
+pertineret ad peccatum humanum, si manus non moveretur a voluntate
+hominis, sed ab aliquo extrinseco movente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account
+of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37063] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Adam non fuit in loco exilii nisi post peccatum.
+Unde non propter locum exilii, sed propter peccatum, traducitur
+originalis culpa ad eos ad quos activa eius generatio pervenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37064] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod caro non inficit animam nisi inquantum est principium
+activum in generatione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is
+St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica
+<a href="TP_ii.html#TP_Q31_A6" id="FS_Q81_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">TP, Q[31], A[6]</a>, Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37065] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ille qui formaretur ex carne humana, fuisset in Adam
+secundum corpulentam substantiam; sed non secundum seminalem
+rationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non contraheret originale
+peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A5-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 5. Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract
+original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted
+original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37066] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si Adam non peccasset, Eva peccante,
+filii originale peccatum contraherent. Peccatum enim originale a
+parentibus contrahimus, inquantum in eis fuimus, secundum illud
+apostoli, Rom. V, <i>in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>. Sed sicut homo
+praeexistit in patre suo, ita in matre. Ergo ex peccato matris homo
+peccatum originale contraheret, sicut et ex peccato patris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is
+"the mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and
+liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments
+of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would
+contract original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37067] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+si Eva peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii passibiles et mortales
+nascerentur, mater enim dat materiam in generatione, ut dicit
+philosophus, in II de Generat. Animal.; mors autem, et omnis
+passibilitas, provenit ex necessitate materiae. Sed passibilitas et
+necessitas moriendi sunt poena peccati originalis. Ergo, si Eva
+peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii contraherent originale
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born
+without original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin
+were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve
+had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37068] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Damascenus dicit, in libro III, quod spiritus sanctus praevenit in
+virginem, de qua Christus erat absque peccato originali nasciturus,
+purgans eam. Sed illa purgatio non fuisset necessaria, si infectio
+originalis peccati non traheretur ex matre. Ergo infectio
+originalis peccati ex matre trahitur. Et sic, Eva peccante, eius
+filii peccatum originale contraherent, etiam si Adam non
+peccasset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should
+have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first.
+Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37069] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in
+hunc mundum intravit</i>. Magis autem fuisset dicendum quod per
+duos intrasset, cum ambo peccaverint; vel potius per mulierem, quae
+primo peccavit; si femina peccatum originale in prolem
+transmitteret. Non ergo peccatum originale derivatur in filios a
+matre, sed a patre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore
+it has been said
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A4" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that
+in the opinion of philosophers, the active
+principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not
+from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract
+original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 co."><a name="37070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37070] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod huius dubitationis solutio ex praemissis apparet.
+Dictum est enim supra quod peccatum originale a primo parente
+traducitur inquantum ipse movet ad generationem natorum, unde
+dictum est quod, si materialiter tantum aliquis ex carne humana
+generaretur, originale peccatum non contraheret. Manifestum est
+autem secundum doctrinam philosophorum, quod principium activum in
+generatione est a patre, materiam autem mater ministrat. Unde
+peccatum originale non contrahitur a matre, sed a patre. Et
+secundum hoc, si, Adam non peccante, Eva peccasset, filii originale
+peccatum non contraherent. E converso autem esset, si Adam
+peccasset, et Eva non peccasset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle.
+Consequently the comparison fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37071] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod in patre praeexistit filius sicut in principio
+activo, sed in matre sicut in principio materiali et passivo. Unde
+non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject
+to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the
+mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q81_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], AA[1]</a>, 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the
+original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to
+the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing
+Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that
+the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer
+and subject to the necessity of dying.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37072] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod quibusdam videtur quod, Eva peccante, si Adam non
+peccasset, filii essent immunes a culpa, paterentur tamen
+necessitatem moriendi, et alias passibilitates provenientes ex
+necessitate materiae, quam mater ministrat, non sub ratione poenae,
+sed sicut quosdam naturales defectus. Sed hoc non videtur
+conveniens. Immortalitas enim et impassibilitas primi status non
+erat ex conditione materiae, ut in primo dictum est; sed ex
+originali iustitiae, per quam corpus subdebatur animae, quandiu
+anima esset subiecta Deo. Defectus autem originalis iustitiae est
+peccatum originale. Si igitur, Adam non peccante, peccatum
+originale non transfunderetur in posteros propter peccatum Evae;
+manifestum est quod in filiis non esset defectus originalis
+iustitiae. Unde non esset in eis passibilitas vel necessitas
+moriendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because
+it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy
+to receive God unless it be pure, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.92.5" target="asv"> Ps. 92:5</a>: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37073] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illa purgatio praeveniens in beata virgine, non
+requirebatur ad auferendum transfusionem originalis peccati, sed
+quia oportebat ut mater Dei maxima puritate niteret. Non enim est
+aliquid digne receptaculum Dei, nisi sit mundum; secundum illud
+Psalmi XCII, <i>domum tuam, domine, decet sanctitudo</i>.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q82" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q82-p0.1">Q. 82. OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q82-p2"> We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q82-p3"><a href="#FS_Q82_A1"> (1) Whether original sin is a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p4"><a href="#FS_Q82_A2"> (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p5"><a href="#FS_Q82_A3"> (3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p6"><a href="#FS_Q82_A4"> (4) Whether original sin is equally in all?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 pr."><a name="37074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37074]
+Iª-IIae q. 82 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+peccato originali quantum ad suam essentiam. Et circa hoc
+quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum originale peccatum sit habitus.
+Secundo, utrum sit unum tantum in uno homine. Tertio, utrum sit
+concupiscentia. Quarto, utrum sit aequaliter in omnibus.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q82_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A1-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 1. Whether original sin is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De
+Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin
+is not a habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37075] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod originale peccatum non sit habitus.
+Originale enim peccatum est carentia originalis iustitiae, ut
+Anselmus dicit, in libro de concepto virginali, et sic originale
+peccatum est quaedam privatio. Sed privatio opponitur habitui. Ergo
+originale peccatum non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual
+sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original
+habit has the nature of a fault.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37076] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+actuale peccatum habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale,
+inquantum habet plus de ratione voluntarii. Sed habitus actualis
+peccati non habet rationem culpae, alioquin sequeretur quod homo
+dormiens culpabiliter, peccaret. Ergo nullus habitus originalis
+habet rationem culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is
+not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37077] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+in malis actus semper praecedit habitum, nullus enim habitus malus
+est infusus, sed acquisitus. Sed originale peccatum non praecedit
+aliquis actus. Ergo originale peccatum non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little
+children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore
+original sin is a habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37078] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Baptismo puerorum, quod
+secundum peccatum originale parvuli sunt concupiscibiles, etsi non
+sint actu concupiscentes. Sed habilitas dicitur secundum aliquem
+habitum. Ergo peccatum originale est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>;
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[50], A[1]</a>), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits.
+In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature
+is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of
+sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction
+of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body,
+by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the
+"languor of nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, serm. iii].
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 co."><a name="37079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37079] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est habitus. Unus
+quidem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum, sicut scientiae et
+virtutes habitus dicuntur. Et hoc modo peccatum originale non est
+habitus. Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicuius naturae ex
+multis compositae, secundum quam bene se habet vel male ad aliquid,
+et praecipue cum talis dispositio versa fuerit quasi in naturam, ut
+patet de aegritudine et sanitate. Et hoc modo peccatum originale
+est habitus. Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex
+dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis
+iustitiae, sicut etiam aegritudo corporalis est quaedam inordinata
+dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur aequalitas in qua
+consistit ratio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale languor naturae
+dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly
+something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original
+justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but
+a corrupt habit.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37080] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut aegritudo corporalis habet aliquid de
+privatione, inquantum tollitur aequalitas sanitatis; et aliquid
+habet positive, scilicet ipsos humores inordinate dispositos, ita
+etiam peccatum originale habet privationem originalis iustitiae, et
+cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae. Unde non est
+privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of
+nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q82_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and
+for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin
+cannot.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37081] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod actuale peccatum est inordinatio quaedam actus,
+originale vero, cum sit peccatum naturae, est quaedam inordinata
+dispositio ipsius naturae, quae habet rationem culpae inquantum
+derivatur ex primo parente, ut dictum est. Huiusmodi autem
+dispositio naturae inordinata habet rationem habitus, sed
+inordinata dispositio actus non habet rationem habitus. Et propter
+hoc, peccatum originale potest esse habitus, non autem peccatum
+actuale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless
+a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal
+of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements
+results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that
+original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act):
+but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37082] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu quo potentia
+inclinatur in actum, talis autem habitus non est peccatum
+originale. Quamvis etiam ex peccato originali sequatur aliqua
+inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte,
+scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis iustitiae,
+quae prohibebat inordinatos motus, sicut etiam ex aegritudine
+corporali indirecte sequitur inclinatio ad motus corporales
+inordinatos. Nec debet dici quod peccatum originale sit habitus
+infusus; aut acquisitus per actum nisi primi parentis, non autem
+huius personae; sed per vitiatam originem innatus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A2-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 2. Whether there are several original sins in one man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.1.7" target="asv">Ps. 1:7</a>): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived
+is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37083] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod in uno homine sint multa originalia
+peccata. Dicitur enim in Psalmo l, <i>ecce enim in iniquitatibus
+conceptus sum, et in peccatis concepit me mater mea</i>. Sed
+peccatum in quo homo concipitur, est originale. Ergo plura peccata
+originalia sunt in uno homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of
+nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original
+sin is not one habit; but several.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37084] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+unus et idem habitus non inclinat ad contraria, habitus enim
+inclinat per modum naturae, quae tendit in unum. Sed peccatum
+originale, etiam in uno homine, inclinat ad diversa peccata et
+contraria. Ergo peccatum originale non est unus habitus, sed
+plures.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin,
+as shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q74" id="FS_Q82_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74])</a>. Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37085] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale inficit omnes animae partes. Sed diversae partes
+animae sunt diversa subiecta peccati, ut ex praemissis patet. Cum
+igitur unum peccatum non possit esse in diversis subiectis, videtur
+quod peccatum originale non sit unum, sed multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular
+is that the "sin of the world" is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37086] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit
+peccatum mundi</i>. Quod singulariter dicitur, quia peccatum mundi,
+quod est peccatum originale, est unum; ut Glossa ibidem
+exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original
+sin. For it has been stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one
+in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken
+from the very essence of
+original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is
+derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g.
+from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in
+number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original
+justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can
+be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 co."><a name="37087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37087] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in uno homine est unum peccatum originale. Cuius
+ratio dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, ex parte causae peccati
+originalis. Dictum est enim supra quod solum primum peccatum primi
+parentis in posteros traducitur. Unde peccatum originale in uno
+homine est unum numero; et in omnibus hominibus est unum
+proportione, in respectu scilicet ad primum principium. Alio modo
+potest accipi ratio eius ex ipsa essentia originalis peccati. In
+omni enim inordinata dispositione unitas speciei consideratur ex
+parte causae; unitas autem secundum numerum, ex parte subiecti.
+Sicut patet in aegritudine corporali, sunt enim diversae
+aegritudines specie quae ex diversis causis procedunt, puta ex
+superabundantia calidi vel frigidi, vel ex laesione pulmonis vel
+hepatis; una autem aegritudo secundum speciem, in uno homine non
+est nisi una numero. Causa autem huius corruptae dispositionis quae
+dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio
+originalis iustitiae, per quam sublata est subiectio humanae mentis
+ad Deum. Et ideo peccatum originale est unum specie. Et in uno
+homine non potest esse nisi unum numero, in diversis autem
+hominibus est unum specie et proportione, diversum autem
+numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of
+the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually
+pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities
+in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so
+forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37088] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod pluraliter dicitur in peccatis, secundum illum
+morem divinae Scripturae quo frequenter ponitur pluralis numerus
+pro singulari, sicut Matth. II, <i>defuncti sunt qui quaerebant
+animam pueri</i>. Vel quia in peccato originali virtualiter
+praeexistunt omnia peccata actualia, sicut in quodam principio,
+unde est multiplex virtute. Vel quia in peccato primi parentis quod
+per originem traducitur, fuerunt plures deformitates, scilicet
+superbiae, inobedientiae, gulae, et alia huiusmodi. Vel quia multae
+partes animae inficiuntur per peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason
+why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed
+body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed,
+the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37089] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod unus habitus non potest inclinare per se et directe,
+idest per propriam formam, ad contraria. Sed indirecte et per
+accidens, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, nihil prohibet,
+sicut, soluta harmonia corporis mixti, elementa tendunt in loca
+contraria. Et similiter, soluta harmonia originalis iustitiae,
+diversae animae potentiae in diversa feruntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice
+held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one
+man, although the various parts of the body are affected.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37090] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod peccatum originale inficit diversas partes animae,
+secundum quod sunt partes unius totius, sicut et iustitia
+originalis continebat omnes animae partes in unum. Et ideo est unum
+tantum peccatum originale. Sicut etiam est una febris in uno
+homine, quamvis diversae partes corporis graventur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A3-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 3. Whether original sin is concupiscence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide
+Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which
+is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37091] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit
+concupiscentia. Omne enim peccatum est contra naturam, ut dicit
+Damascenus, in II libro. Sed concupiscentia est secundum naturam,
+est enim proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis, quae est potentia
+naturalis. Ergo concupiscentia non est peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us, according to the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37092] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+per peccatum originale sunt in nobis passiones peccatorum; ut patet
+per apostolum, Rom. VII. Sed multae aliae sunt passiones praeter
+concupiscentiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccatum originale non
+magis est concupiscentia quam aliqua alia passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is
+the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than
+concupiscence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37093] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+per peccatum originale deordinantur omnes animae partes, ut dictum
+est. Sed intellectus est suprema inter animae partes; ut patet per
+philosophum, in X Ethic. Ergo peccatum originale magis est
+ignorantia quam concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37094] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., <i>concupiscentia est
+reatus originalis peccati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated
+<a href="#FS_Q82_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered
+in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be
+considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original
+justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function
+it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God,
+all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made
+subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material
+element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning
+inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin
+is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 co."><a name="37095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37095] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod unumquodque habet speciem a sua forma. Dictum est
+autem supra quod species peccati originalis sumitur ex sua causa.
+Unde oportet quod id quod est formale in originali peccato,
+accipiatur ex parte causae peccati originalis. Oppositorum autem
+oppositae sunt causae. Est igitur attendenda causa originalis
+peccati ex causa originalis iustitiae, quae ei opponitur. Tota
+autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae ex hoc est, quod voluntas
+hominis erat Deo subiecta. Quae quidem subiectio primo et
+principaliter erat per voluntatem, cuius est movere omnes alias
+partes in finem, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex aversione voluntatis
+a Deo, consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae viribus.
+Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas
+subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali, omnis autem alia
+inordinatio virium animae se habet in peccato originali sicut
+quiddam materiale. Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae
+praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum
+commutabile, quae quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici
+concupiscentia. Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est
+concupiscentia; formaliter vero, defectus originalis iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man,
+as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man,
+contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37096] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, quia in homine concupiscibilis naturaliter
+regitur ratione, intantum concupiscere est homini naturale,
+inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem, concupiscentia autem quae
+transcendit limites rationis, est homini contra naturam. Et talis
+est concupiscentia originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence
+is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others,
+in a fashion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37097] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis
+ad passiones concupiscibilis reducuntur, sicut ad principaliores.
+Inter quas concupiscentia vehementius movet, et magis sentitur, ut
+supra habitum est. Et ideo concupiscentiae attribuitur, tanquam
+principaliori, et in qua quodammodo omnes aliae passiones
+includuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found
+to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[77], AA[1]</a>,2;
+<a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[80], A[2]</a>). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects
+of original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37098] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut in bonis intellectus et ratio principalitatem
+habent, ita e converso in malis inferior pars animae principalior
+invenitur, quae obnubilat et trahit rationem, ut supra dictum est.
+Et propter hoc peccatum originale magis dicitur esse concupiscentia
+quam ignorantia, licet etiam ignorantia inter defectus materiales
+peccati originalis contineatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A4-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 4. Whether original sin is equally in all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37099] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit aequaliter
+in omnibus. Est enim peccatum originale concupiscentia inordinata,
+ut dictum est. Sed non omnes aequaliter sunt proni ad
+concupiscendum. Ergo peccatum originale non est aequaliter in
+omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body.
+But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37100] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale est quaedam inordinata dispositio animae, sicut
+aegritudo est quaedam inordinata dispositio corporis. Sed aegritudo
+recipit magis et minus. Ergo peccatum originale recipit magis et
+minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation
+may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37101] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nupt. et Concupisc., quod <i>libido
+transmittit originale peccatum in prolem</i>. Sed contingit esse
+maiorem libidinem unius in actu generationis, quam alterius. Ergo
+peccatum originale potest esse maius in uno quam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q82_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37102] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quia peccatum originale est peccatum naturae, ut dictum est.
+Sed natura aequaliter est in omnibus. Ergo et peccatum
+originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation
+to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin
+has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely,
+such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q73_A2" id="FS_Q82_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[73], A[2]</a>). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our
+corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently
+it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 co."><a name="37103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37103] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in originali peccato sunt duo, quorum unum est
+defectus originalis iustitiae; aliud autem est relatio huius
+defectus ad peccatum primi parentis, a quo per vitiatam originem
+deducitur. Quantum autem ad primum, peccatum originale non recipit
+magis et minus, quia totum donum originalis iustitiae est sublatum;
+privationes autem totaliter aliquid privantes, ut mors et tenebrae,
+non recipiunt magis et minus, sicut supra dictum est. Similiter
+etiam nec quantum ad secundum, aequaliter enim omnes relationem
+habent ad primum principium vitiatae originis, ex quo peccatum
+originale recipit rationem culpae; relationes enim non recipiunt
+magis et minus. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum originale non
+potest esse magis in uno quam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each
+power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some
+of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently
+if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to
+original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all,
+left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37104] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, soluto vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo
+quodam ordine omnes vires animae continebantur, unaquaeque vis
+animae tendit in suum proprium motum; et tanto vehementius, quanto
+fuerit fortior. Contingit autem vires aliquas animae esse fortiores
+in uno quam in alio, propter diversas corporis complexiones. Quod
+ergo unus homo sit pronior ad concupiscendum quam alter, non est
+ratione peccati originalis, cum in omnibus aequaliter solvatur
+vinculum originalis iustitiae, et aequaliter in omnibus partes
+inferiores animae sibi relinquantur, sed accidit hoc ex diversa
+dispositione potentiarum, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused
+by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the
+cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37105] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod aegritudo corporalis non habet in omnibus aequalem
+causam, etiam si sit eiusdem speciei, puta, si sit febris ex
+cholera putrefacta, potest esse maior vel minor putrefactio, et
+propinquior vel remotior a principio vitae. Sed causa originalis
+peccati in omnibus est aequalis. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust
+in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive
+appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37106] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod libido quae transmittit peccatum originale in prolem,
+non est libido actualis, quia dato quod virtute divina concederetur
+alicui quod nullam inordinatam libidinem in actu generationis
+sentiret, adhuc transmitteret in prolem originale peccatum. Sed
+libido illa est intelligenda habitualiter, secundum quod appetitus
+sensitivus non continetur sub ratione vinculo originalis iustitiae.
+Et talis libido in omnibus est aequalis.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q83" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q83-p0.1">Q. 83. OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q83-p2"> We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q83-p3"><a href="#FS_Q83_A1"> (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p4"><a href="#FS_Q83_A2"> (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p5"><a href="#FS_Q83_A3"> (3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p6"><a href="#FS_Q83_A4"> (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the
+sense of touch?
+</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 pr."><a name="37107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37107]
+Iª-IIae q. 83 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+subiecto originalis peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
+Primo, utrum subiectum originalis peccati per prius sit caro vel
+anima. Secundo, si anima, utrum per essentiam aut per potentias
+suas. Tertio, utrum voluntas per prius sit subiectum peccati
+originalis quam aliae potentiae. Quarto, utrum aliquae potentiae
+animae sint specialiter infectae, scilicet generativa, vis
+concupiscibilis et sensus tactus.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q83_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A1-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 1. Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind
+arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the
+flesh.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37108] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale magis sit in carne
+quam in anima. Repugnantia enim carnis ad mentem ex corruptione
+originalis peccati procedit. Sed radix huius repugnantiae in carne
+consistit, dicit enim apostolus ad Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem
+in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Ergo originale
+peccatum in carne principaliter consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now
+the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather
+than in the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37109] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+unumquodque potius est in causa quam in effectu, sicut calor magis
+est in igne calefaciente quam in aqua calefacta. Sed anima
+inficitur infectione originalis peccati per semen carnale. Ergo
+peccatum originale magis est in carne quam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our
+souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37110] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale ex primo parente contrahimus, prout in eo fuimus
+secundum rationem seminalem. Sic autem non fuit ibi anima, sed sola
+caro. Ergo originale peccatum non est in anima, sed in carne.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin,
+it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the
+author of the soul's creation and fusion.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37111] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+anima rationalis creata a Deo corpori infunditur. Si igitur anima
+per peccatum originale inficeretur, consequens esset quod ex sua
+creatione vel infusione inquinaretur. Et sic Deus esset causa
+peccati, qui est auctor creationis et infusionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational
+soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection
+of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is
+not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the
+flesh.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="37112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37112] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus sapiens liquorem pretiosum vasi infunderet ex quo sciret
+ipsum liquorem infici. Sed anima rationalis est pretiosior omni
+liquore. Si ergo anima ex corporis unione infici posset infectione
+originalis culpae, Deus, qui ipsa sapientia est, nunquam animam
+tali corpori infunderet. Infundit autem. Non ergo inquinatur ex
+carne. Sic igitur peccatum originale non est in anima, sed in
+carne.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of
+virtue: for the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be
+the subject of original sin, but only the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37113] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod idem est subiectum virtutis et vitii sive peccati, quod
+contrariatur virtuti. Sed caro non potest esse subiectum virtutis,
+dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, <i>scio quod non habitat in me,
+hoc est in carne mea, bonum</i>. Ergo caro non potest esse
+subiectum originalis peccati, sed solum anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject.
+Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power
+of the semen that original sin together with human
+nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul.
+</p><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p9"> The reason for this is that, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in
+the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed,
+that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that
+guilt, either as its
+subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues
+to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved
+by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal
+members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt.
+</p><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p10"> Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever
+accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh,
+has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the
+flesh.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 co."><a name="37114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37114] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliquid potest esse in aliquo dupliciter, uno modo,
+sicut in causa, vel principali vel instrumentali; alio modo, sicut
+in subiecto. Peccatum ergo originale omnium hominum fuit quidem in
+ipso Adam sicut in prima causa principali; secundum illud apostoli,
+Rom. V, <i>in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>. In semine autem corporali
+est peccatum originale sicut in causa instrumentali, eo quod per
+virtutem activam seminis traducitur peccatum originale in prolem,
+simul cum natura humana. Sed sicut in subiecto, peccatum originale
+nullo modo potest esse in carne, sed solum in anima. Cuius ratio
+est quia, sicut supra dictum est, hoc modo ex voluntate primi
+parentis peccatum originale traducitur in posteros per quandam
+generativam motionem, sicut a voluntate alicuius hominis derivatur
+peccatum actuale ad alias partes eius. In qua quidem derivatione
+hoc potest attendi, quod quidquid provenit ex motione voluntatis
+peccati ad quamcumque partem hominis quae quocumque modo potest
+esse particeps peccati, vel per modum subiecti vel per modum
+instrumenti, habet rationem culpae, sicut ex voluntate gulae
+provenit concupiscentia cibi ad concupiscibilem, et sumptio cibi ad
+manus et os, quae inquantum moventur a voluntate ad peccatum, sunt
+instrumenta peccati. Quod vero ulterius derivatur ad vim nutritivam
+et ad interiora membra, quae non sunt nata moveri a voluntate, non
+habet rationem culpae. Sic igitur, cum anima possit esse subiectum
+culpae, caro autem de se non habeat quod sit subiectum culpae;
+quidquid provenit de corruptione primi peccati ad animam, habet
+rationem culpae; quod autem provenit ad carnem, non habet rationem
+culpae, sed poenae. Sic igitur anima est subiectum peccati
+originalis, non autem caro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed,
+who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh."
+Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37115] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Retract.,
+apostolus loquitur ibi de homine iam redempto, qui liberatus est a
+culpa, sed subiacet poenae, ratione cuius peccatum dicitur habitare
+in carne. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod caro sit subiectum culpae,
+sed solum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental
+cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in
+him it had the nature of actual sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37116] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum originale causatur ex semine sicut ex causa
+instrumentali. Non autem oportet quod aliquid sit principalius in
+causa instrumentali quam in effectu, sed solum in causa principali.
+Et hoc modo peccatum originale potiori modo fuit in Adam, in quo
+fuit secundum rationem actualis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but
+as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce
+the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37117] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod anima huius hominis non fuit secundum seminalem
+rationem in Adam peccante sicut in principio effectivo, sed sicut
+in principio dispositivo, eo quod semen corporale, quod ex Adam
+traducitur, sua virtute non efficit animam rationalem, sed ad eam
+disponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation.
+And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being
+created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused.
+And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained
+through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37118] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a
+Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationem.
+Et ideo, cum creatio importet respectum animae ad solum Deum, non
+potest dici quod anima ex sua creatione inquinetur. Sed infusio
+importat respectum et ad Deum infundentem, et ad carnem cui
+infunditur anima. Et ideo, habito respectu ad Deum infundentem, non
+potest dici quod anima per infusionem maculetur; sed solum habito
+respectu ad corpus cui infunditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order
+of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the
+more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A4" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[4]</a>;
+<a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A3" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[118], A[3]</a>.
+And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation,
+by means of grace.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="37119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37119] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod bonum commune praefertur bono singulari. Unde Deus,
+secundum suam sapientiam, non praetermittit universalem ordinem
+rerum, qui est ut tali corpori talis anima infundatur, ut vitetur
+singularis infectio huius animae, praesertim cum natura animae hoc
+habeat, ut esse non incipiat nisi in corpore, ut in primo habitum
+est. Melius est autem ei sic esse secundum naturam, quam nullo modo
+esse, praesertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A2-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 2. Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt
+to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not
+as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only
+according to the powers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37120] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit per prius
+in essentia animae quam in potentiis. Anima enim nata est esse
+subiectum peccati, quantum ad id quod potest a voluntate moveri.
+Sed anima non movetur a voluntate secundum suam essentiam, sed
+solum secundum potentias. Ergo peccatum originale non est in anima
+secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the
+subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37121] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale opponitur originali iustitiae. Sed originalis
+iustitia erat in aliqua potentia animae, quae est subiectum
+virtutis. Ergo et peccatum originale est magis in potentia animae
+quam in eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence.
+But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37122] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut a carne peccatum originale derivatur ad animam, ita ab
+essentia animae derivatur ad potentias. Sed peccatum originale
+magis est in anima quam in carne. Ergo etiam magis est in potentiis
+animae quam in essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q83_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37123] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale dicitur esse concupiscentia, ut dictum est. Sed
+concupiscentia est in potentiis animae. Ergo et peccatum
+originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body,
+in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q76_A6" id="FS_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37124] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod peccatum originale dicitur esse peccatum naturale, ut
+supra dictum est. Anima autem est forma et natura corporis secundum
+essentiam suam, et non secundum potentias, ut in primo habitum est.
+Ergo anima est subiectum originalis peccati principaliter secundum
+suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the
+motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows
+that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our
+origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the
+primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of
+the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q76_A6" id="FS_Q83_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 co."><a name="37125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37125] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod illud animae est principaliter subiectum alicuius
+peccati, ad quod primo pertinet causa motiva illius peccati, sicut
+si causa motiva ad peccandum sit delectatio sensus, quae pertinet
+ad vim concupiscibilem sicut obiectum proprium eius, sequitur quod
+vis concupiscibilis sit proprium subiectum illius peccati.
+Manifestum est autem quod peccatum originale causatur per originem.
+Unde illud animae quod primo attingitur ab origine hominis, est
+primum subiectum originalis peccati. Attingit autem origo animam ut
+terminum generationis, secundum quod est forma corporis; quod
+quidem convenit ei secundum essentiam propriam, ut in primo habitum
+est. Unde anima secundum essentiam est primum subiectum originalis
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will
+of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37126] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod, sicut motio voluntatis alicuius propriae
+pervenit ad potentias animae, non autem ad animae essentiam; ita
+motio voluntatis primi generantis, per viam generationis, pervenit
+primo ad animae essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which
+the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the
+principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37127] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod etiam originalis iustitia pertinebat primordialiter
+ad essentiam animae, erat enim donum divinitus datum humanae
+naturae, quam per prius respicit essentia animae quam potentiae.
+Potentiae enim magis videntur pertinere ad personam, inquantum sunt
+principia personalium actuum. Unde sunt propria subiecta peccatorum
+actualium, quae sunt peccata personalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes
+first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper
+accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison
+fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37128] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod corpus comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam,
+quae etsi sit posterior ordine generationis, est tamen prior ordine
+perfectionis et naturae. Essentia autem animae comparatur ad
+potentias sicut subiecta ad accidentia propria, quae sunt
+posteriora subiecto et ordine generationis et etiam perfectionis.
+Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q83_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37129] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod concupiscentia se habet materialiter et ex
+consequenti in peccato originali, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A3-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 3. Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power
+by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to
+the generative power more than to the others.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37130] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non per prius
+inficiat voluntatem quam alias potentias. Omne enim peccatum
+principaliter pertinet ad potentiam per cuius actum causatur. Sed
+peccatum originale causatur per actum generativae potentiae. Ergo
+inter ceteras potentias animae, videtur magis pertinere ad
+generativam potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh
+than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin
+is in them more than in the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37131] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale per semen carnale traducitur. Sed aliae vires
+animae propinquiores sunt carni quam voluntas, sicut patet de
+omnibus sensitivis, quae utuntur organo corporali. Ergo in eis
+magis est peccatum originale quam in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin
+infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37132] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono
+intellecto. Si ergo peccatum originale inficit omnes potentias
+animae, videtur quod per prius inficiat intellectum, tanquam
+priorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg.
+iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37133] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod iustitia originalis per prius respicit voluntatem, est
+enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu
+virginali. Ergo et peccatum originale, quod ei opponitur, per prius
+respicit voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect
+it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q83_A2" id="FS_Q83_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must
+therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as
+stated
+above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 co."><a name="37134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37134] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in infectione peccati originalis duo est considerare.
+Primo quidem, inhaerentiam eius ad subiectum, et secundum hoc primo
+respicit essentiam animae, ut dictum est. Deinde oportet
+considerare inclinationem eius ad actum, et hoc modo respicit
+potentias animae. Oportet ergo quod illam per prius respiciat, quae
+primam inclinationem habet ad peccandum. Haec autem est voluntas,
+ut ex supradictis patet. Unde peccatum originale per prius respicit
+voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power.
+Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37135] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale non causatur in homine per
+potentiam generativam prolis, sed per actum potentiae generativae
+parentis. Unde non oportet quod sua potentia generativa sit primum
+subiectum originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former
+follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive
+powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul,
+the infection of original sin reaches it first.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37136] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum originale habet duplicem processum, unum
+quidem a carne ad animam; alium vero ab essentia animae ad
+potentias. Primus quidem processus est secundum ordinem
+generationis, secundus autem secundum ordinem perfectionis. Et ideo
+quamvis aliae potentiae, scilicet sensitivae, propinquiores sint
+carni; quia tamen voluntas est propinquior essentiae animae,
+tanquam superior potentia, primo pervenit ad ipsam infectio
+originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect,
+in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37137] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod intellectus quodam modo praecedit voluntatem,
+inquantum proponit ei suum obiectum. Alio vero modo voluntas
+praecedit intellectum, secundum ordinem motionis ad actum, quae
+quidem motio pertinet ad peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A4-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 4. Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to
+pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the
+will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37138] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedictae potentiae non sint magis
+infectae quam aliae. Infectio enim originalis peccati magis videtur
+pertinere ad illam animae partem quae prius potest esse subiectum
+peccati. Haec autem est rationalis pars, et praecipue voluntas.
+Ergo ipsa est magis infecta per peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot
+obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37139] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nulla vis animae inficitur per culpam, nisi inquantum potest
+obedire rationi. Generativa autem non potest obedire, ut dicitur in
+I Ethic. Ergo generativa non est maxime infecta per originale
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number
+of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected
+than touch.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37140] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+visus inter alios sensus est spiritualior et propinquior rationi,
+inquantum plures differentias rerum ostendit, ut dicitur in I
+Metaphys. Sed infectio culpae primo est in ratione. Ergo visus
+magis est infectus quam tactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the
+members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes,
+wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection
+of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the
+concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37141] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod infectio
+originalis culpae maxime apparet in motu genitalium membrorum, qui
+rationi non subditur. Sed illa membra deserviunt generativae
+virtuti in commixtione sexuum, in qua est delectatio secundum
+tactum, quae maxime concupiscentiam movet. Ergo infectio originalis
+peccati maxime pertinet ad ista tria, scilicet potentiam
+generativam, vim concupiscibilem et sensum tactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject
+to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption
+of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves
+the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most
+powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original
+sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 co."><a name="37142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37142] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod illa corruptio praecipue infectio nominari solet,
+quae nata est in aliud transferri, unde et morbi contagiosi, sicut
+lepra et scabies et huiusmodi, infectiones dicuntur. Corruptio
+autem originalis peccati traducitur per actum generationis, sicut
+supra dictum est. Unde potentiae quae ad huiusmodi actum
+concurrunt, maxime dicuntur esse infectae. Huiusmodi autem actus
+deservit generativae, inquantum ad generationem ordinatur, habet
+autem in se delectationem tactus, quae est maximum obiectum
+concupiscibilis. Et ideo, cum omnes partes animae dicantur esse
+corruptae per peccatum originale, specialiter tres praedictae
+dicuntur esse corruptae et infectae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q83_A3" id="FS_Q83_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37143] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale ex ea parte qua inclinat in
+peccata actualia, praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem, ut dictum est.
+Sed ex ea parte qua traducitur in prolem, pertinet propinque ad
+potentias praedictas, ad voluntatem autem remote.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original
+sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power.
+Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37144] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod infectio actualis culpae non pertinet nisi ad
+potentias quae moventur a voluntate peccantis. Sed infectio
+originalis culpae non derivatur a voluntate eius qui ipsam
+contrahit, sed per originem naturae, cui deservit potentia
+generativa. Et ideo in ea est infectio originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species
+is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to
+the touch rather than to the sight.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37145] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod visus non pertinet ad actum generationis nisi
+secundum dispositionem remotam, prout scilicet per visum apparet
+species concupiscibilis. Sed delectatio perficitur in tactu. Et
+ideo talis infectio magis attribuitur tactui quam visui.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q84" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q84-p0.1">Q. 84. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q84-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points
+of inquiry:
+</p><p id="FS_Q84-p3"><a href="#FS_Q84_A1"> (1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p4"><a href="#FS_Q84_A2"> (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p5"><a href="#FS_Q84_A3"> (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p6"><a href="#FS_Q84_A4"> (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 pr."><a name="37146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37146]
+Iª-IIae q. 84 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa
+peccati secundum quod unum peccatum est causa alterius. Et circa
+hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cupiditas sit radix omnium
+peccatorum. Secundo, utrum superbia sit initium omnis peccati.
+Tertio, utrum praeter superbiam et avaritiam, debeant dici
+capitalia vitia aliqua specialia peccata. Quarto, quot et quae sint
+capitalia vitia.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q84_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A1-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 1. Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is
+opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root
+of all sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37147] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod cupiditas non sit radix omnium
+peccatorum. Cupiditas enim, quae est immoderatus appetitus
+divitiarum, opponitur virtuti liberalitatis. Sed liberalitas non
+est radix omnium virtutum. Ergo cupiditas non est radix omnium
+peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness,
+are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all
+sins, but proceeds from some deeper root.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37148] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, procedit ex appetitu finis. Sed
+divitiae, quarum appetitus est cupiditas, non appetuntur nisi ut
+utiles ad aliquem finem, sicut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo cupiditas
+non est radix omnis peccati, sed procedit ex alia priori
+radice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires
+money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37149] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+frequenter invenitur quod avaritia, quae cupiditas nominatur,
+oritur ex aliis peccatis, puta cum quis appetit pecuniam propter
+ambitionem, vel ut satisfaciat gulae. Non ergo est radix omnium
+peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>): "The desire of money is the root of all evil."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37150] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ult., <i>radix omnium malorum
+est cupiditas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and
+thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising
+all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A2" id="FS_Q84_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[2]</a>). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods
+inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which
+draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things.
+</p><p id="FS_Q84_A1-p7"> Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the
+root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they "will become rich, fall into temptation,
+and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is evident that he is speaking
+of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as
+denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the
+whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for
+any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv"> Eccles. 10:19</a>: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 co."><a name="37151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37151] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod secundum quosdam cupiditas multipliciter dicitur. Uno
+modo, prout est appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et sic est
+speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum quod significat inordinatum
+appetitum cuiuscumque boni temporalis. Et sic est genus omnis
+peccati, nam in omni peccato est inordinata conversio ad
+commutabile bonum, ut dictum est. Tertio modo sumitur prout
+significat quandam inclinationem naturae corruptae ad bona
+corruptibilia inordinate appetenda. Et sic dicunt cupiditatem esse
+radicem omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae
+ex terra trahit alimentum, sic enim ex amore rerum temporalium omne
+peccatum procedit. Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, non tamen
+videntur esse secundum intentionem apostoli, qui dixit cupiditatem
+esse radicem omnium peccatorum. Manifeste enim ibi loquitur contra
+eos qui, <i>cum velint divites fieri, incidunt in tentationes et in
+laqueum Diaboli, eo quod radix omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>,
+unde manifestum est quod loquitur de cupiditate secundum quod est
+appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et secundum hoc, dicendum est
+quod cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, dicitur radix
+omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae alimentum
+praestat toti arbori. Videmus enim quod per divitias homo acquirit
+facultatem perpetrandi quodcumque peccatum, et adimplendi
+desiderium cuiuscumque peccati, eo quod ad habenda quaecumque
+temporalia bona, potest homo per pecuniam iuvari; secundum quod
+dicitur Eccle. X, <i>pecuniae obediunt omnia</i>. Et secundum hoc,
+patet quod cupiditas divitiarum est radix omnium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire
+of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire
+for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37152] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non ab eodem oritur virtus et peccatum. Oritur
+enim peccatum ex appetitu commutabilis boni, et ideo appetitus
+illius boni quod iuvat ad consequenda omnia temporalia bona, radix
+peccatorum dicitur. Virtus autem oritur ex appetitu incommutabilis
+boni, et ideo caritas, quae est amor Dei, ponitur radix virtutum;
+secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et
+fundati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last
+end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than
+a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by
+means of money.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37153] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod appetitus pecuniarum dicitur esse radix peccatorum,
+non quia divitiae propter se quaerantur, tanquam ultimus finis, sed
+quia multum quaeruntur ut utiles ad omnem temporalem finem. Et quia
+universale bonum est appetibilius quam aliquod particulare bonum,
+ideo magis movent appetitum quam quaedam bona singularia, quae
+simul cum multis aliis per pecuniam haberi possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature
+of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what
+happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So
+when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no
+other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37154] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus non quaeritur quid semper
+fiat, sed quid in pluribus accidit, eo quod natura corruptibilium
+rerum impediri potest, ut non semper eodem modo operetur; ita etiam
+in moralibus consideratur quod ut in pluribus est, non autem quod
+est semper, eo quod voluntas non ex necessitate operatur. Non
+igitur dicitur avaritia radix omnis mali, quin interdum aliquod
+aliud malum sit radix eius, sed quia ex ipsa frequentius alia mala
+oriuntur, ratione praedicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A2-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 2. Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning
+of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37155] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit initium omnis
+peccati. Radix enim est quoddam principium arboris, et ita videtur
+idem esse radix peccati et initium peccati. Sed cupiditas est radix
+omnis peccati, ut dictum est. Ergo ipsa etiam est initium omnis
+peccati, non autem superbia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore
+another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37156] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Eccli. X dicitur, <i>initium superbiae hominis apostatare a
+Deo</i>. Sed apostasia a Deo est quoddam peccatum. Ergo aliquod
+peccatum est initium superbiae, et ipsa non est initium omnis
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which,
+according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning
+of every sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37157] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+illud videtur esse initium omnis peccati, quod facit omnia peccata.
+Sed hoc est inordinatus amor sui, qui facit civitatem Babylonis, ut
+Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo amor sui est initium
+omnis peccati, non autem superbia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37158] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Eccli. X, <i>initium omnis peccati
+superbia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin.
+Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it
+is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense
+they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness,
+because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered,
+for which reason covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment
+man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of evil consists in turning
+away from God.
+</p><p id="FS_Q84_A2-p7"> Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel,
+as is clear from what follows (verse 17): "God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the point of
+nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the
+beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention,
+and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18],
+A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he
+may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is
+said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which
+by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that,
+from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 co."><a name="37159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37159] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod quidam dicunt superbiam dici tripliciter. Uno modo,
+secundum quod superbia significat inordinatum appetitum propriae
+excellentiae. Et sic est speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum
+quod importat quendam actualem contemptum Dei, quantum ad hunc
+effectum qui est non subdi eius praecepto. Et sic dicunt quod est
+generale peccatum. Tertio modo, secundum quod importat quandam
+inclinationem ad huiusmodi contemptum, ex corruptione naturae. Et
+sic dicunt quod est initium omnis peccati. Et differt a cupiditate,
+quia cupiditas respicit peccatum ex parte conversionis ad bonum
+commutabile, ex quo peccatum quodammodo nutritur et fovetur, et
+propter hoc cupiditas dicitur radix, sed superbia respicit peccatum
+ex parte aversionis a Deo, cuius praecepto homo subdi recusat; et
+ideo vocatur initium, quia ex parte aversionis incipit ratio mali.
+Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, tamen non sunt secundum
+intentionem sapientis, qui dixit, initium omnis peccati est
+superbia. Manifeste enim loquitur de superbia secundum quod est
+inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae, ut patet per hoc quod
+subdit, <i>sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus</i>. Et de hac
+materia fere loquitur in toto capitulo. Et ideo dicendum est quod
+superbia, etiam secundum quod est speciale peccatum, est initium
+omnis peccati. Considerandum est enim quod in actibus voluntariis,
+cuiusmodi sunt peccata, duplex ordo invenitur, scilicet
+intentionis, et executionis. In primo quidem ordine, habet rationem
+principii finis, ut supra multoties dictum est. Finis autem in
+omnibus bonis temporalibus acquirendis, est ut homo per illa
+quandam perfectionem et excellentiam habeat. Et ideo ex hac parte
+superbia, quae est appetitus excellentiae, ponitur initium omnis
+peccati. Sed ex parte executionis, est primum id quod praebet
+opportunitatem adimplendi omnia desideria peccati, quod habet
+rationem radicis, scilicet divitiae. Et ideo ex hac parte avaritia
+ponitur esse radix omnium malorum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37160] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc
+patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the
+fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things.
+Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of
+every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that
+apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic
+of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted
+up, in respect of the other species of pride.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37161] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae ex
+parte aversionis, ex hoc enim quod homo non vult subdi Deo,
+sequitur quod inordinate velit propriam excellentiam in rebus
+temporalibus. Et sic apostasia a Deo non sumitur ibi quasi speciale
+peccatum, sed magis ut quaedam conditio generalis omnis peccati,
+quae est aversio ab incommutabili bono. Vel potest dici quod
+apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae, quia est prima
+superbiae species. Ad superbiam enim pertinet cuicumque superiori
+nolle subiici, et praecipue nolle subdi Deo; ex quo contingit quod
+homo supra seipsum indebite extollatur, quantum ad alias superbiae
+species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently
+it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37162] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in hoc homo se amat, quod sui excellentiam vult, idem
+enim est se amare quod sibi velle bonum. Unde ad idem pertinet quod
+ponatur initium omnis peccati superbia, vel amor proprius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A3-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 3. Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to
+be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore
+covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37163] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter superbiam et avaritiam, non
+sint quaedam alia peccata specialia quae dicantur capitalia. <i>Ita
+enim se videtur habere caput ad animalia, sicut radix ad
+plantas</i>, ut dicitur in II de anima, nam radices sunt ori
+similes. Si igitur cupiditas dicitur radix omnium malorum, videtur
+quod ipsa sola debeat dici vitium capitale, et nullum aliud
+peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from
+the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called
+capital.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37164] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+caput habet quendam ordinem ad alia membra, inquantum a capite
+diffunditur quodammodo sensus et motus. Sed peccatum dicitur per
+privationem ordinis. Ergo peccatum non habet rationem capitis. Et
+ita non debent poni aliqua capitalia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished
+thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37165] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+capitalia crimina dicuntur quae capite plectuntur. Sed tali poena
+puniuntur quaedam peccata in singulis generibus. Ergo vitia
+capitalia non sunt aliqua determinata secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37166] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., enumerat quaedam specialia vitia,
+quae dicit esse capitalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which
+is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even
+men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head"
+taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which
+capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in
+which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital
+vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A6" id="FS_Q84_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[6]</a>). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director
+and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander
+in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 co."><a name="37167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37167] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod capitale a capite dicitur. Caput autem proprie quidem
+est quoddam membrum animalis, quod est principium et directivum
+totius animalis. Unde metaphorice omne principium caput vocatur, et
+etiam homines qui alios dirigunt et gubernant, capita aliorum
+dicuntur. Dicitur ergo vitium capitale uno modo a capite proprie
+dicto, et secundum hoc, peccatum capitale dicitur peccatum quod
+capitis poena punitur. Sed sic nunc non intendimus de capitalibus
+peccatis, sed secundum quod alio modo dicitur peccatum capitale a
+capite prout metaphorice significat principium vel directivum
+aliorum. Et sic dicitur vitium capitale ex quo alia vitia oriuntur,
+et praecipue secundum originem causae finalis, quae est formalis
+origo, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo vitium capitale non solum est
+principium aliorum, sed etiam est directivum et quodammodo ductivum
+aliorum, semper enim ars vel habitus ad quem pertinet finis,
+principatur et imperat circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde Gregorius,
+XXXI Moral., huiusmodi vitia capitalia ducibus exercituum
+comparat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some
+property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have
+the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but
+also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37168] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod capitale dicitur denominative a capite, quod
+quidem est per quandam derivationem vel participationem capitis,
+sicut habens aliquam proprietatem capitis, non sicut simpliciter
+caput. Et ideo capitalia vitia dicuntur non solum illa quae habent
+rationem primae originis, sicut avaritia, quae dicitur radix, et
+superbia, quae dicitur initium, sed etiam illa quae habent rationem
+originis propinquae respectu plurium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine
+(De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it
+regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37169] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum caret ordine ex parte aversionis, ex hac
+enim parte habet rationem mali; <i>malum autem</i>, secundum
+Augustinum, in libro de natura boni, <i>est privatio modi, speciei
+et ordinis</i>. Sed ex parte conversionis, respicit quoddam bonum.
+Et ideo ex hac parte potest habere ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37170] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de capitali peccato secundum quod
+dicitur a reatu poenae. Sic autem hic non loquimur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A4-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 4. Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony,
+lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[2]</a>). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37171] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum septem esse vitia
+capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia,
+avaritia, gula, luxuria. Peccata enim virtutibus opponuntur.
+Virtutes autem principales sunt quatuor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
+et vitia principalia, sive capitalia, non sunt nisi quatuor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q77" id="FS_Q84_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[77])</a>. But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins,
+whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and
+sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37172] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+passiones animae sunt quaedam causae peccati, ut supra dictum est.
+Sed passiones animae principales sunt quatuor. De quarum duabus
+nulla fit mentio inter praedicta peccata, scilicet de spe et
+timore. Enumerantur autem aliqua vitia ad quae pertinet delectatio
+et tristitia, nam delectatio pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam,
+tristitia vero ad acediam et invidiam. Ergo inconvenienter
+enumerantur principalia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37173] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+ira non est principalis passio. Non ergo debuit poni inter
+principalia vitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q84_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37174] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut cupiditas, sive avaritia, est radix peccati, ita superbia est
+peccati initium, ut supra dictum est. Sed avaritia ponitur unum de
+septem vitiis capitalibus. Ergo superbia inter vitia capitalia
+enumeranda esset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance,
+or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently
+enumerated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="37175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37175] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+quaedam peccata committuntur quae ex nullo horum causari possunt,
+sicut cum aliquis errat ex ignorantia; vel cum aliquis ex aliqua
+bona intentione committit aliquod peccatum, puta cum aliquis
+furatur ut det eleemosynam. Ergo insufficienter capitalia vitia
+enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p7">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37176] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in
+contrarium est auctoritas Gregorii sic enumerantis, XXXI
+Moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q84_A3" id="FS_Q84_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take
+place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for
+one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come
+under the consideration of art, because man's
+particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another:
+and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration
+of art.
+</p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p9"> Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite;
+and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite
+in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason,
+moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one
+seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil.
+</p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p10"> Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of
+appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately
+by "vainglory." Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g.
+meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual
+intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness"
+is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.
+</p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p11"> Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now
+in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown,
+which is desired by "pride" or "vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in riches that give promise
+thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x,
+6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue.
+</p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p12"> On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect
+of one's own good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily
+labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to "envy," which
+is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination
+with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 co."><a name="37177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37177] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitia capitalia dicuntur ex quibus
+alia oriuntur, praecipue secundum rationem causae finalis.
+Huiusmodi autem origo potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo,
+secundum conditionem peccantis, qui sic dispositus est ut maxime
+afficiatur ad unum finem, ex quo ut plurimum in alia peccata
+procedat. Sed iste modus originis sub arte cadere non potest, eo
+quod infinitae sunt particulares hominum dispositiones. Alio modo,
+secundum naturalem habitudinem ipsorum finium ad invicem. Et
+secundum hoc, ut in pluribus unum vitium ex alio oritur. Unde iste
+modus originis sub arte cadere potest. Secundum hoc ergo, illa
+vitia capitalia dicuntur, quorum fines habent quasdam primarias
+rationes movendi appetitum, et secundum harum rationum
+distinctionem, distinguuntur capitalia vitia. Movet autem aliquid
+appetitum dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et per se, et hoc modo
+bonum movet appetitum ad prosequendum, malum autem, secundum eandem
+rationem, ad fugiendum. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per aliud,
+sicut aliquis aliquod malum prosequitur propter aliquod bonum
+adiunctum, vel aliquod bonum fugit propter aliquod malum adiunctum.
+Bonum autem hominis est triplex. Est enim primo quoddam bonum
+animae, quod scilicet ex sola apprehensione rationem
+appetibilitatis habet, scilicet excellentia laudis vel honoris, et
+hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur inanis gloria. Aliud est bonum
+corporis, et hoc vel pertinet ad conservationem individui, sicut
+cibus et potus, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur gula; aut ad
+conservationem speciei, sicut coitus, et ad hoc ordinatur luxuria.
+Tertium bonum est exterius, scilicet divitiae, et ad hoc ordinatur
+avaritia. Et eadem quatuor vitia inordinate fugiunt mala contraria.
+Vel aliter, bonum praecipue movet appetitum ex hoc quod participat
+aliquid de proprietate felicitatis, quam naturaliter omnes
+appetunt. De cuius ratione est quidem primo quaedam perfectio, nam
+felicitas est perfectum bonum, ad quod pertinet excellentia vel
+claritas, quam appetit superbia vel inanis gloria. Secundo de
+ratione eius est sufficientia, quam appetit avaritia in divitiis
+eam promittentibus. Tertio est de conditione eius delectatio, sine
+qua felicitas esse non potest, ut dicitur in I et X Ethic., et hanc
+appetunt gula et luxuria. Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter
+aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc
+est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de
+bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de
+bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad
+invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum
+propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad
+vindictam, et sic est ira. Et ad eadem etiam vitia pertinet
+prosecutio mali oppositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason,
+or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need
+for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37178] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod non est eadem ratio originis in virtutibus et
+vitiis, nam virtutes causantur per ordinem appetitus ad rationem,
+vel etiam ad bonum incommutabile, quod est Deus; vitia autem
+oriuntur ex appetitu boni commutabilis. Unde non oportet quod
+principalia vitia opponantur principalibus virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible
+part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among
+the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A4" id="FS_Q84_A4-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[4]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37179] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod timor et spes sunt passiones irascibilis. Omnes autem
+passiones irascibilis oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, quae
+etiam omnes ordinantur quodammodo ad delectationem et tristitiam.
+Et ideo delectatio et tristitia principaliter connumerantur in
+peccatis capitalibus, tanquam principalissimae passiones, ut supra
+habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special
+kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e.
+of the right to vengeance.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37180] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ira, licet non sit principalis passio, quia tamen
+habet specialem rationem appetitivi motus, prout aliquis impugnat
+bonum alterius sub ratione honesti, idest iusti vindicativi; ideo
+distinguitur ab aliis capitalibus vitiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q84_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>: and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal
+vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27).
+But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above
+(
+<a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.2" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37181] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse initium omnis peccati secundum
+rationem finis, ut dictum est. Et secundum eandem rationem
+accipitur principalitas vitiorum capitalium. Et ideo superbia,
+quasi universale vitium, non connumeratur, sed magis ponitur velut
+regina quaedam omnium vitiorum, sicut Gregorius dicit. Avaritia
+autem dicitur radix secundum aliam rationem, sicut supra dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p17">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from
+arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth,
+to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the
+ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should
+not be done that good may come of it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="37182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37182] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod ista vitia dicuntur capitalia, quia ex eis ut
+frequentius alia oriuntur. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua peccata
+interdum ex aliis causis oriri. Potest tamen dici quod omnia
+peccata quae ex ignorantia proveniunt, possunt reduci ad acediam,
+ad quam pertinet negligentia qua aliquis recusat bona spiritualia
+acquirere propter laborem, ignorantia enim quae potest esse causa
+peccati, ex negligentia provenit, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem
+aliquis committat aliquod peccatum ex bona intentione, videtur ad
+ignorantiam pertinere, inquantum scilicet ignorat quod non sunt
+facienda mala ut veniant bona.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q85" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q85-p0.1">Q. 85. OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q85-p2"> We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the
+debt of punishment.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q85-p4"><a href="#FS_Q85_A1"> (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p5"><a href="#FS_Q85_A2"> (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p6"><a href="#FS_Q85_A3"> (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p7"><a href="#FS_Q85_A4"> (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p8"><a href="#FS_Q85_A5"> (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p9"><a href="#FS_Q85_A6"> (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 pr."><a name="37183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37183]
+Iª-IIae q. 85 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+effectibus peccati. Et primo quidem, de corruptione boni naturae;
+secundo, de macula animae; tertio, de reatu poenae. Circa primum
+quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum naturae diminuatur per peccatum.
+Secundo, utrum totaliter tolli possit. Tertio, de quatuor
+vulneribus quae Beda ponit, quibus natura humana vulnerata est
+propter peccatum. Quarto, utrum privatio modi, speciei et ordinis,
+sit effectus peccati. Quinto, utrum mors et alii defectus
+corporales sint effectus peccati. Sexto, utrum sint aliquo modo
+homini naturales.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q85_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A1-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 1. Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good
+remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of
+human nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37184] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non diminuat bonum naturae.
+Peccatum enim hominis non est gravius quam peccatum Daemonis. Sed
+bona naturalia in Daemonibus manent integra post peccatum, ut
+Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum etiam bonum
+naturae humanae non diminuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when
+its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary
+act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37185] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+transmutato posteriori, non transmutatur prius, manet enim
+substantia eadem, transmutatis accidentibus. Sed natura praeexistit
+actioni voluntariae. Ergo, facta deordinatione circa actionem
+voluntariam per peccatum, non transmutatur propter hoc natura, ita
+quod bonum naturae diminuatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although
+it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin,
+diminish the good of his nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37186] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum est actus quidam, diminutio autem passio. Nullum autem
+agens, ex hoc ipso quod agit, patitur, potest autem contingere quod
+in unum agat, et ab alio patiatur. Ergo ille qui peccat, per
+peccatum non diminuit bonum suae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected
+to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a
+subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37187] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullum accidens agit in suum subiectum, quia quod patitur, est
+potentia ens; quod autem subiicitur accidenti, iam est actu ens
+secundum accidens illud. Sed peccatum est in bono naturae sicut
+accidens in subiecto. Ergo peccatum non diminuit bonum naturae,
+diminuere enim quoddam agere est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.30" target="asv">Lk. 10:30</a>), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the
+Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37188] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. X, <i>homo descendens a Ierusalem in
+Iericho, idest in defectum peccati, expoliatur gratuitis et
+vulneratur in naturalibus</i>, ut Beda exponit. Ergo peccatum
+diminuit bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties
+that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue,
+as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[1]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[63], A[1]</a>), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of
+human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A1-p8"> Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was
+entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue,
+is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[1]</a>). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the
+other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there
+results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 co."><a name="37189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37189] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici. Primo,
+ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus natura constituitur, et
+proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae et alia
+huiusmodi. Secundo, quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad
+virtutem, ut supra habitum est, ipsa inclinatio ad virtutem est
+quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae donum
+originalis iustitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti
+humanae naturae. Primum igitur bonum naturae nec tollitur nec
+diminuitur per peccatum. Tertium vero bonum naturae totaliter est
+ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturae,
+scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, diminuitur per
+peccatum. Per actus enim humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes
+actus, ut supra habitum est. Oportet autem quod ex hoc quod aliquid
+inclinatur ad unum contrariorum, diminuatur inclinatio eius ad
+aliud. Unde cum peccatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod
+homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae quod est inclinatio ad
+virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone
+may see who reads the context.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37190] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de bono primo naturae, quod
+est esse, vivere et intelligere; ut patet eius verba intuenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not
+changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed
+to its term.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37191] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod natura, etsi sit prior quam voluntaria actio, tamen
+habet inclinationem ad quandam voluntariam actionem. Unde ipsa
+natura secundum se non variatur propter variationem voluntariae
+actionis, sed ipsa inclinatio variatur ex illa parte qua ordinatur
+ad terminum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something
+is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits (
+<a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q85_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37192] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod actio voluntaria procedit ex diversis potentiis,
+quarum una est activa et alia passiva. Et ex hoc contingit quod per
+actiones voluntarias causatur aliquid, vel aufertur ab homine sic
+agente, ut supra dictum est, cum de generatione habituum
+ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness
+makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as
+sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness
+of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the
+fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive
+appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[77], AA[1]</a>, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object
+acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37193] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod accidens non agit effective in subiectum; agit tamen
+formaliter in ipsum, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod albedo facit
+album. Et sic nihil prohibet quod peccatum diminuat bonum naturae,
+eo tamen modo quo est ipsa diminutio boni naturae, inquantum
+pertinet ad inordinationem actus. Sed quantum ad inordinationem
+agentis, oportet dicere quod talis inordinatio causatur per hoc
+quod in actibus animae aliquid est activum et aliquid passivum,
+sicut sensibile movet appetitum sensitivum, et appetitus sensitivus
+inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc
+causatur inordinatio, non quidem ita quod accidens agat in proprium
+subiectum; sed secundum quod obiectum agit in potentiam, et una
+potentia agit in aliam, et deordinat ipsam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A2-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 2. Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since
+human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore
+the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37194] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod totum bonum humanae naturae possit per
+peccatum auferri. Bonum enim naturae humanae finitum est, cum et
+ipsa natura humana sit finita. Sed quodlibet finitum totaliter
+consumitur, facta continua ablatione. Cum ergo bonum naturae
+continue per peccatum diminui possit, videtur quod possit quandoque
+totaliter consumi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and
+all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away
+by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37195] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+eorum quae sunt unius naturae, similis est ratio de toto et de
+partibus, sicut patet in aere et in aqua et carne, et omnibus
+corporibus similium partium. Sed bonum naturae est totaliter
+uniforme. Cum igitur pars eius possit auferri per peccatum, totum
+etiam per peccatum auferri posse videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in
+some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can
+take away the good of nature entirely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37196] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+bonum naturae quod per peccatum minuitur, est habilitas ad
+virtutem. Sed in quibusdam propter peccatum habilitas praedicta
+totaliter tollitur, ut patet in damnatis, qui reparari ad virtutem
+non possunt, sicut nec caecus ad visum. Ergo peccatum potest
+totaliter tollere bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good
+of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does
+not destroy it entirely.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37197] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non est nisi in
+bono. Sed malum culpae non potest esse in bono virtutis vel
+gratiae, quia est ei contrarium. Ergo oportet quod sit in bono
+naturae. Non ergo totaliter tollit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the
+very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act
+virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be
+capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible
+for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p7"> Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made
+use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher
+says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at
+last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If,
+however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely,
+as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely,
+provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question
+at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it
+be a more grievous sin.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p8"> We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle
+term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its
+term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, secondly, on the
+part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated
+above
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were
+diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed.
+Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident
+that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely,
+inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this
+inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light,
+from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds,
+although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 co."><a name="37198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37198] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum naturae quod per peccatum
+diminuitur, est naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem. Quae quidem
+convenit homini ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est, ex hoc enim habet
+quod secundum rationem operetur, quod est agere secundum virtutem.
+Per peccatum autem non potest totaliter ab homine tolli quod sit
+rationalis, quia iam non esset capax peccati. Unde non est
+possibile quod praedictum naturae bonum totaliter tollatur. Cum
+autem inveniatur huiusmodi bonum continue diminui per peccatum,
+quidam ad huius manifestationem usi sunt quodam exemplo, in quo
+invenitur aliquod finitum in infinitum diminui, nunquam tamen
+totaliter consumi. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Physic., quod si
+ab aliqua magnitudine finita continue auferatur aliquid secundum
+eandem quantitatem, totaliter tandem consumetur, puta si a
+quacumque quantitate finita semper subtraxero mensuram palmi. Si
+vero fiat subtractio semper secundum eandem proportionem, et non
+secundum eandem quantitatem, poterit in infinitum subtrahi, puta,
+si quantitas dividatur in duas partes, et a dimidio subtrahatur
+dimidium, ita in infinitum poterit procedi; ita tamen quod semper
+quod posterius subtrahitur, erit minus eo quod prius subtrahebatur.
+Sed hoc in proposito non habet locum, non enim sequens peccatum
+minus diminuit bonum naturae quam praecedens, sed forte magis, si
+sit gravius. Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod praedicta inclinatio
+intelligitur ut media inter duo, fundatur enim sicut in radice in
+natura rationali, et tendit in bonum virtutis sicut in terminum et
+finem. Dupliciter igitur potest intelligi eius diminutio, uno modo,
+ex parte radicis; alio modo, ex parte termini. Primo quidem modo
+non diminuitur per peccatum, eo quod peccatum non diminuit ipsam
+naturam, ut supra dictum est. Sed diminuitur secundo modo,
+inquantum scilicet ponitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum. Si
+autem primo modo diminueretur, oporteret quod quandoque totaliter
+consumeretur, natura rationali totaliter consumpta. Sed quia
+diminuitur ex parte impedimenti quod apponitur ne pertingat ad
+terminum, manifestum est quod diminui quidem potest in infinitum,
+quia in infinitum possunt impedimenta apponi, secundum quod homo
+potest in infinitum addere peccatum peccato, non tamen potest
+totaliter consumi, quia semper manet radix talis inclinationis.
+Sicut patet in diaphano corpore, quod quidem habet inclinationem ad
+susceptionem lucis ex hoc ipso quod est diaphanum, diminuitur autem
+haec inclinatio vel habilitas ex parte nebularum supervenientium,
+cum tamen semper maneat in radice naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this
+neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37199] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quando fit diminutio per
+subtractionem. Hic autem fit diminutio per appositionem
+impedimenti, quod neque tollit neque diminuit radicem
+inclinationis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term,
+in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37200] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod inclinatio naturalis est quidem tota uniformis, sed
+tamen habet respectum et ad principium et ad terminum, secundum
+quam diversitatem quodammodo diminuitur et quodammodo non
+diminuitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not
+reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains
+in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced
+to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ
+requisite for sight.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37201] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod etiam in damnatis manet naturalis inclinatio ad
+virtutem, alioquin non esset in eis remorsus conscientiae. Sed quod
+non reducatur in actum, contingit quia deest gratia, secundum
+divinam iustitiam. Sicut etiam in caeco remanet aptitudo ad
+videndum in ipsa radice naturae, inquantum est animal naturaliter
+habens visum, sed non reducitur in actum, quia deest causa quae
+reducere possit formando organum quod requiritur ad videndum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A3-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 3. Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent
+upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as
+appears from what has been said above (
+<a href="#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[77], AA[3]</a>,5;
+<a href="#FS_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.3" shape="rect"> Q[78], A[1]</a>). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of
+sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37202] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur vulnera
+naturae esse, ex peccato consequentia, infirmitas, ignorantia,
+malitia et concupiscentia. Non enim idem est effectus et causa
+eiusdem. Sed ista ponuntur causae peccatorum, ut ex supradictis
+patet. Ergo non debent poni effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37203] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+malitia nominat quoddam peccatum. Non ergo debet poni inter
+effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should
+not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37204] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+concupiscentia est quiddam naturale, cum sit actus virtutis
+concupiscibilis. Sed illud quod est naturale, non debet poni vulnus
+naturae. Ergo concupiscentia non debet poni vulnus naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it has been stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be
+condivided with weakness.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37205] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+dictum est quod idem est peccare ex infirmitate, et ex passione.
+Sed concupiscentia passio quaedam est. Ergo non debet contra
+infirmitatem dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p6">
+<b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner,
+viz. ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which four do not coincide with the four in question.
+Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="37206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37206] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus, in libro de natura et gratia, ponit duo poenalia animae
+peccanti, scilicet ignorantiam et difficultatem, ex quibus oritur
+error et cruciatus, quae quidem quatuor non concordant istis
+quatuor. Ergo videtur quod alterum eorum insufficienter
+ponatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p7">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37207] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> In
+contrarium est auctoritas Bedae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected
+by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already
+stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q85_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed
+to virtue; which destitution is
+called a wounding of nature.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p9"> Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q85_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[2]</a>), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible,
+the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance;
+in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in
+so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible
+is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p10"> Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since
+the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above (
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in
+practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult
+and concupiscence more impetuous.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 co."><a name="37208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37208] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat
+inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei
+subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum
+primi parentis, sicut iam dictum est. Et ideo omnes vires animae
+remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter
+ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae
+dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae quae possunt esse
+subiecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio, in qua est
+prudentia; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est
+fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo
+ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae;
+inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus
+malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad
+arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia
+destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus
+concupiscentiae. Sic igitur ita quatuor sunt vulnera inflicta toti
+humanae naturae ex peccato primi parentis. Sed quia inclinatio ad
+bonum virtutis in unoquoque diminuitur per peccatum actuale, ut ex
+dictis patet, et ista sunt quatuor vulnera ex aliis peccatis
+consequentia, inquantum scilicet per peccatum et ratio hebetatur,
+praecipue in agendis; et voluntas induratur ad bonum; et maior
+difficultas bene agendi accrescit; et concupiscentia magis
+exardescit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once,
+is more easily inclined to sin again.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37209] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est effectus unius
+peccati, esse causam peccati alterius. Ex hoc enim quod anima
+deordinatur per peccatum praecedens, facilius inclinatur ad
+peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.8.21" target="asv"> Gn. 8:21</a>: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil
+from his youth.'].
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37210] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod malitia non sumitur hic pro peccato, sed pro quadam
+pronitate voluntatis ad malum; secundum quod dicitur Gen. VIII,
+<i>proni sunt sensus hominis ad malum ab adolescentia sua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the
+bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37211] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, concupiscentia intantum est
+naturalis homini, inquantum subditur rationi. Quod autem excedat
+limites rationis, hoc est homini contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p14">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs
+the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="37212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37212] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod infirmitas communiter potest dici omnis passio,
+inquantum debilitat robur animae et impedit rationem. Sed Beda
+accepit infirmitatem stricte, secundum quod opponitur fortitudini,
+quae pertinet ad irascibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p15">
+<b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers,
+viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the
+good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects
+of his concupiscence.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="37213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37213] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
+dicendum quod difficultas quae ponitur in libro Augustini, includit
+ista tria quae pertinent ad appetitivas potentias, scilicet
+malitiam, infirmitatem et concupiscentiam, ex his enim tribus
+contingit quod aliquis non facile tendit in bonum. Error autem et
+dolor sunt vulnera consequentia, ex hoc enim aliquis dolet, quod
+infirmatur circa ea quae concupiscit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A4-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 4. Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii)
+that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no
+good at all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37214] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non
+sit effectus peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de natura
+boni, quod <i>ubi haec tria magna sunt, magnum bonum est; ubi
+parva, parvum; ubi nulla, nullum</i>. Sed peccatum non annullat
+bonum naturae. Ergo non privat modum, speciem et ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the "privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De
+Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37215] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+nihil est causa sui ipsius. Sed ipsum peccatum est privatio modi,
+speciei et ordinis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni.
+Ergo privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non est effectus
+peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding
+privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species
+and order is not the effect of each sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37216] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+diversa peccata diversos habent effectus. Sed modus, species et
+ordo, cum sint quaedam diversa, diversas privationes habere
+videntur. Ergo per diversa peccata privantur. Non ergo est effectus
+cuiuslibet peccati privatio modi, speciei et ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.3" target="asv"> Ps. 6:3, </a> "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37217] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod peccatum est in anima sicut infirmitas in corpore;
+secundum illud Psalmi VI, <i>miserere mei, domine, quoniam infirmus
+sum</i>. Sed infirmitas privat modum, speciem et ordinem ipsius
+corporis. Ergo peccatum privat modum, speciem et ordinem
+animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the
+<a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q85_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>, mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being
+and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether substantial
+or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms
+of things are like numbers," so that
+a form has a certain "mode" corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of "order" to
+something else.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A4-p7"> Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there
+is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed
+nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and
+this is diminished by sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a> ,2), but is not entirely destroyed.
+Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin.
+Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of
+which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes
+mode, species and order.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 co."><a name="37218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37218] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, modus, species et ordo
+consequuntur unumquodque bonum creatum inquantum huiusmodi, et
+etiam unumquodque ens. Omne enim esse et bonum consideratur per
+aliquam formam, secundum quam sumitur species. Forma autem
+uniuscuiusque rei, qualiscumque sit, sive substantialis sive
+accidentalis, est secundum aliquam mensuram, unde et in VIII
+Metaphys. dicitur quod formae rerum sunt sicut numeri. Et ex hoc
+habet modum quendam, qui mensuram respicit. Ex forma vero sua
+unumquodque ordinatur ad aliud. Sic igitur secundum diversos gradus
+bonorum, sunt diversi gradus modi, speciei et ordinis. Est ergo
+quoddam bonum pertinens ad ipsam substantiam naturae, quod habet
+suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et illud nec privatur nec
+diminuitur per peccatum. Est etiam quoddam bonum naturalis
+inclinationis, et hoc etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem,
+et hoc diminuitur per peccatum, ut dictum est, sed non totaliter
+tollitur. Est etiam quoddam bonum virtutis et gratiae, quod etiam
+habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc totaliter tollitur per
+peccatum mortale. Est etiam quoddam bonum quod est ipse actus
+ordinatus, quod etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et
+huius privatio est essentialiter ipsum peccatum. Et sic patet
+qualiter peccatum et est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis; et
+privat vel diminuit modum, speciem et ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1&amp;2:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37219] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet
+responsio ad duo prima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37220] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod modus, species et ordo se consequuntur, sicut ex
+dictis patet. Unde simul privantur et diminuuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A5-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 5. Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now
+these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these
+defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q82_A4" id="FS_Q85_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37221] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et alii corporales defectus non
+sint effectus peccati. Si enim causa fuerit aequalis, et effectus
+erit aequalis. Sed huiusmodi defectus non sunt aequales in omnibus,
+sed in quibusdam huiusmodi defectus magis abundant, cum tamen
+peccatum originale sit in omnibus aequale, sicut dictum est, cuius
+videntur huiusmodi defectus maxime esse effectus. Ergo mors et
+huiusmodi defectus non sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism
+or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37222] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed remoto omni peccato per
+Baptismum vel poenitentiam, non removentur huiusmodi defectus. Ergo
+non sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of
+the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects
+are not the result of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37223] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum actuale habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale. Sed
+peccatum actuale non transmutat naturam corporis ad aliquem
+defectum. Ergo multo minus peccatum originale. Non ergo mors et
+alii defectus corporales sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>), "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37224] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in
+hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing
+is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the
+effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner,
+it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one
+thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by
+displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause
+of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken
+away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder
+whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the
+soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A3" id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[82], A[3]), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A5-p7"> Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently,
+death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the
+sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 co."><a name="37225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37225] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliquid est causa alterius dupliciter, uno quidem
+modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem est causa
+alterius quod secundum virtutem suae naturae vel formae producit
+effectum, unde sequitur quod effectus sit per se intentus a causa.
+Unde cum mors et huiusmodi defectus sint praeter intentionem
+peccantis, manifestum est quod peccatum non est per se causa
+istorum defectuum. Per accidens autem aliquid est causa alterius,
+si sit causa removendo prohibens, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic.
+quod <i>divellens columnam, per accidens movet lapidem columnae
+superpositum</i>. Et hoc modo peccatum primi parentis est causa
+mortis et omnium huiusmodi defectuum in natura humana, inquantum
+per peccatum primi parentis sublata est originalis iustitia, per
+quam non solum inferiores animae vires continebantur sub ratione
+absque omni deordinatione, sed totum corpus continebatur sub anima
+absque omni defectu, ut in primo habitum est. Et ideo, subtracta
+hac originali iustitia per peccatum primi parentis, sicut vulnerata
+est humana natura quantum ad animam per deordinationem potentiarum,
+ut supra dictum est; ita etiam est corruptibilis effecta per
+deordinationem ipsius corporis. Subtractio autem originalis
+iustitiae habet rationem poenae, sicut etiam subtractio gratiae.
+Unde etiam mors, et omnes defectus corporales consequentes, sunt
+quaedam poenae originalis peccati. Et quamvis huiusmodi defectus
+non sint intenti a peccante, sunt tamen ordinati secundum iustitiam
+Dei punientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished,
+the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing
+a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will
+be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the
+greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly,
+when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments,
+some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37226] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod aequalitas causae per se, causat aequalem
+effectum, augmentata enim vel diminuta causa per se, augetur vel
+diminuitur effectus. Sed aequalitas causae removentis prohibens,
+non ostendit aequalitatem effectuum. Si quis enim aequali impulsu
+divellat duas columnas, non sequitur quod lapides superpositi
+aequaliter moveantur, sed ille velocius movebitur qui gravior erit
+secundum proprietatem suae naturae, cui relinquitur remoto
+prohibente. Sic igitur, remota originali iustitia, natura corporis
+humani relicta est sibi, et secundum hoc, secundum diversitatem
+naturalis complexionis, quorundam corpora pluribus defectibus
+subiacent, quorundam vero paucioribus, quamvis existente originali
+peccato aequali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.11" target="asv">Rom. 8:11</a>): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according
+to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's
+sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility
+of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time,
+subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37227] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod culpa originalis et actualis removetur ab eodem a quo
+etiam removentur et huiusmodi defectus, secundum illud apostoli,
+Rom. VIII, <i>vivificabit mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem
+spiritum eius in vobis</i>, sed utrumque fit secundum ordinem
+divinae sapientiae, congruo tempore. Oportet enim quod ad
+immortalitatem et impassibilitatem gloriae, quae in Christo
+inchoata est, et per Christum nobis acquisita, perveniamus
+conformati prius passionibus eius. Unde oportet quod ad tempus
+passibilitas in nostris corporibus remaneat, ad impassibilitatem
+gloriae promerendam conformiter Christo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of
+the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault,
+it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects
+of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those
+defects, as original sin does.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37228] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in peccato actuali duo possumus considerare, scilicet
+ipsam substantiam actus, et rationem culpae. Ex parte quidem
+substantiae actus, potest peccatum actuale aliquem defectum
+corporalem causare, sicut ex superfluo cibo aliqui infirmantur et
+moriuntur. Sed ex parte culpae, privat gratiam quae datur homini ad
+rectificandum animae actus, non autem ad cohibendum defectus
+corporales, sicut originalis iustitia cohibebat. Et ideo peccatum
+actuale non causat huiusmodi defectus, sicut originale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A6-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 6. Whether death and other defects are natural to man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically"
+(Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally
+corruptible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37229] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini
+naturales. <i>Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile differunt
+genere</i>, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed homo est eiusdem generis
+cum aliis animalibus, quae sunt naturaliter corruptibilia. Ergo
+homo est naturaliter corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But
+such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37230] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+omne quod est compositum ex contrariis, est naturaliter
+corruptibile, quasi habens in se causam corruptionis suae. Sed
+corpus humanum est huiusmodi. Ergo est naturaliter
+corruptibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore
+the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and
+such like defects are natural to man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37231] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+calidum naturaliter consumit humidum. Vita autem hominis
+conservatur per calidum et humidum. Cum igitur operationes vitae
+expleantur per actum caloris naturalis, ut dicitur in II de anima,
+videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now "God made not death" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>). Therefore death is not natural to man.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p6"> (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable
+to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q85_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore they are not natural to man.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p7"> (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated
+above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A6" id="FS_Q85_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[6]</a>. Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1"><a name="37232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37232] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed
+contra, quidquid est homini naturale, Deus in homine fecit. Sed
+Deus mortem non fecit, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo mors non est homini
+naturalis.</p><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2"><a name="37233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37233] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+id quod est secundum naturam, non potest dici poena nec malum, quia
+unicuique rei est conveniens id quod est ei naturale. Sed mors et
+huiusmodi defectus sunt poena peccati originalis, ut supra dictum
+est. Ergo non sunt homini naturales.</p><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3"><a name="37234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37234] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+materia proportionatur formae, et quaelibet res suo fini. Finis
+autem hominis est beatitudo perpetua, ut supra dictum est. Forma
+etiam humani corporis est anima rationalis, quae est
+incorruptibilis, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo corpus humanum est
+naturaliter incorruptibile.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p8">
+<b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular
+nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every
+corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation
+of the thing to which it belongs.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p9"> On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly
+body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature."
+This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things
+are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the
+inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is
+allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form
+intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational
+soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial
+operation of its own, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q85_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that very
+form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In
+this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature
+of his form.
+</p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p10"> The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore
+in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility
+is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect
+of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold
+condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition
+of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to
+be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and
+inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he
+would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the
+purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament,
+in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact
+that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an
+incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature,
+and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q85_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 co."><a name="37235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37235] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod de unaquaque re corruptibili dupliciter loqui
+possumus, uno modo, secundum naturam universalem; alio modo,
+secundum naturam particularem. Natura quidem particularis est
+propria virtus activa et conservativa uniuscuiusque rei. Et
+secundum hanc, omnis corruptio et defectus est contra naturam, ut
+dicitur in II de caelo, quia huiusmodi virtus intendit esse et
+conservationem eius cuius est. Natura vero universalis est virtus
+activa in aliquo universali principio naturae, puta in aliquo
+caelestium corporum; vel alicuius superioris substantiae, secundum
+quod etiam Deus a quibusdam dicitur natura naturans. Quae quidem
+virtus intendit bonum et conservationem universi, ad quod exigitur
+alternatio generationis et corruptionis in rebus. Et secundum hoc,
+corruptiones et defectus rerum sunt naturales, non quidem secundum
+inclinationem formae, quae est principium essendi et perfectionis;
+sed secundum inclinationem materiae, quae proportionaliter
+attribuitur tali formae secundum distributionem universalis
+agentis. Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse quantum
+potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi
+perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa non est
+subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae formae; quinimmo
+habet propriam operationem immaterialem, ut in primo habitum est.
+Unde ex parte suae formae, naturalior est homini incorruptio quam
+aliis rebus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et ipsa habet materiam ex
+contrariis compositam, ex inclinatione materiae sequitur
+corruptibilitas in toto. Et secundum hoc, homo est naturaliter
+corruptibilis secundum naturam materiae sibi relictae, sed non
+secundum naturam formae. Primae autem tres rationes procedunt ex
+parte materiae, aliae vero tres procedunt ex parte formae. Unde ad
+earum solutionem, considerandum est quod forma hominis, quae est
+anima rationalis, secundum suam incorruptibilitatem proportionata
+est suo fini, qui est beatitudo perpetua. Sed corpus humanum, quod
+est corruptibile secundum suam naturam consideratum, quodammodo
+proportionatum est suae formae, et quodammodo non. Duplex enim
+conditio potest attendi in aliqua materia, una scilicet quam agens
+eligit; alia quae non est ab agente electa, sed est secundum
+conditionem naturalem materiae. Sicut faber ad faciendum cultellum
+eligit materiam duram et ductilem, quae subtiliari possit ut sit
+apta incisioni, et secundum hanc conditionem ferrum est materia
+proportionata cultello, sed hoc quod ferrum sit frangibile et
+rubiginem contrahens, consequitur ex naturali dispositione ferri,
+nec hoc eligit artifex in ferro, sed magis repudiaret si posset.
+Unde haec dispositio materiae non est proportionata intentioni
+artificis, nec intentioni artis. Similiter corpus humanum est
+materia electa a natura quantum ad hoc, quod est temperatae
+complexionis, ut possit esse convenientissimum organum tactus et
+aliarum virtutum sensitivarum et motivarum. Sed quod sit
+corruptibile, hoc est ex conditione materiae, nec est electum a
+natura, quin potius natura eligeret materiam incorruptibilem, si
+posset. Sed Deus, cui subiacet omnis natura, in ipsa institutione
+hominis supplevit defectum naturae, et dono iustitiae originalis
+dedit corpori incorruptibilitatem quandam, ut in primo dictum est.
+Et secundum hoc dicitur quod Deus mortem non fecit, et quod mors
+est poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1--3:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 ad arg."><a name="37236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37236] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 ad arg.</span></a> Unde patet
+responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q86" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q86-p0.1">Q. 86. OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q86-p2"> We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q86-p3"><a href="#FS_Q86_A1"> (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q86-p4"><a href="#FS_Q86_A2"> (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 pr."><a name="37237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37237]
+Iª-IIae q. 86 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+macula peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum macula
+animae sit effectus peccati. Secundo, utrum remaneat in anima post
+actum peccati.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q86_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q86_A1-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 1. Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature:
+hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the
+human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a
+stain from them by sinning.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37238] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non causet aliquam maculam in
+anima. Natura enim superior non potest inquinari ex contactu
+naturae inferioris, unde radius solaris non inquinatur per tactum
+corporum fetidorum, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra quinque
+haereses. Sed anima humana est multo superioris naturae quam res
+commutabiles, ad quas peccando convertitur. Ergo ex eis maculam non
+contrahit peccando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q86_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering
+anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37239] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum est principaliter in voluntate, ut supra dictum est.
+Voluntas autem est in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed
+ratio, sive intellectus, non maculatur ex consideratione
+quarumcumque rerum, sed magis perficitur. Ergo nec voluntas ex
+peccato maculatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive,
+it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither
+disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance,
+in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin
+of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation.
+Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain
+caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37240] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si peccatum maculam causat, aut macula illa est aliquid positive,
+aut est privatio pura. Si sit aliquid positive, non potest esse
+nisi dispositio vel habitus, nihil enim aliud videtur ex actu
+causari. Dispositio autem et habitus non est, contingit enim,
+remota dispositione vel habitu, adhuc remanere maculam; ut patet in
+eo qui peccavit mortaliter prodigalitate, et postea transmutatur,
+mortaliter peccando, in habitum vitii oppositi. Non ergo macula
+ponit aliquid positive in anima. Similiter etiam nec est privatio
+pura. Quia omnia peccata conveniunt ex parte aversionis et
+privationis gratiae. Sequeretur ergo quod omnium peccatorum esset
+macula una. Ergo macula non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Solomon (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.47.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 47:22</a>): "Thou hast stained thy glory": and it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each case it is question of
+the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37241] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur, Eccli. XLVII, Salomoni, <i>dedisti maculam in
+gloria tua</i>. Et Ephes. V, <i>ut exhiberet sibi gloriosam
+Ecclesiam non habentem maculam aut rugam</i>. Et utrobique loquitur
+de macula peccati. Ergo macula est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body,
+e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's
+soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions;
+the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby
+man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there
+is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the
+Divine law, as shown above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q86_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 co."><a name="37242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37242] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod macula proprie dicitur in corporalibus, quando
+aliquod corpus nitidum perdit suum nitorem ex contactu alterius
+corporis, sicut vestis et aurum et argentum, aut aliud huiusmodi.
+In rebus autem spiritualibus ad similitudinem huius oportet maculam
+dici. Habet autem anima hominis duplicem nitorem, unum quidem ex
+refulgentia luminis naturalis rationis, per quam dirigitur in suis
+actibus; alium vero ex refulgentia divini luminis, scilicet
+sapientiae et gratiae, per quam etiam homo perficitur ad bene et
+decenter agendum. Est autem quasi quidam animae tactus, quando
+inhaeret aliquibus rebus per amorem. Cum autem peccat, adhaeret
+rebus aliquibus contra lumen rationis et divinae legis, ut ex
+supradictis patet. Unde ipsum detrimentum nitoris ex tali contactu
+proveniens, macula animae metaphorice vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul,
+by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37243] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod anima non inquinatur ex rebus inferioribus
+virtute earum, quasi agentibus eis in animam, sed magis e converso
+anima sua actione se inquinat, inordinate eis inhaerendo, contra
+lumen rationis et divinae legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the
+intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in
+a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained,
+when it cleaves inordinately, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They .
+. . became abominable as those things were which they loved."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37244] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod actio intellectus perficitur secundum quod res
+intelligibiles sunt in intellectu per modum ipsius intellectus, et
+ideo intellectus ex eis non inficitur, sed magis perficitur. Sed
+actus voluntatis consistit in motu ad ipsas res, ita quod amor
+conglutinat animam rei amatae. Et ex hoc anima maculatur, quando in
+ordinate inhaeret; secundum illud Osee IX, <i>facti sunt
+abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's
+brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which
+is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed
+bodies.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37245] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod macula non est aliquid positive in anima, nec
+significat privationem solam, sed significat privationem quandam
+nitoris animae in ordine ad suam causam, quae est peccatum. Et ideo
+diversa peccata diversas maculas inducunt. Et est simile de umbra,
+quae est privatio luminis ex obiecto alicuius corporis, et secundum
+diversitatem corporum obiectorum diversificantur umbrae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the
+soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the
+stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37246] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod macula non maneat in anima post actum
+peccati. Nihil enim manet in anima post actum, nisi habitus vel
+dispositio. Sed macula non est habitus vel dispositio, ut supra
+habitum est. Ergo macula non manet in anima post actum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain
+when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37247] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+hoc modo se habet macula ad peccatum, sicut umbra ad corpus, ut
+supra dictum est. Sed transeunte corpore, non manet umbra. Ergo,
+transeunte actu peccati, non manet macula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is
+no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37248] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+omnis effectus dependet ex sua causa. Causa autem maculae est actus
+peccati. Ergo, remoto actu peccati, non remanet macula in
+anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.22.17" target="asv">Jos. 22:17</a>): "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us']
+to this day?"
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37249] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Iosue XXII, <i>an parum vobis est quod peccastis
+in Beelphegor, et usque in praesentem diem macula huius sceleris in
+vobis permanet?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above
+(A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the
+Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved
+by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed.
+For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once
+return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous
+movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as
+the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 co."><a name="37250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37250] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod macula peccati remanet in anima, etiam transeunte
+actu peccati. Cuius ratio est quia macula, sicut dictum est,
+importat quendam defectum nitoris propter recessum a lumine
+rationis vel divinae legis. Et ideo quandiu homo manet extra
+huiusmodi lumen, manet in eo macula peccati, sed postquam redit ad
+lumen divinum et ad lumen rationis, quod fit per gratiam, tunc
+macula cessat. Licet autem cesset actus peccati, quo homo discessit
+a lumine rationis vel legis divinae, non tamen statim homo ad illud
+redit in quo fuerat, sed requiritur aliquis motus voluntatis
+contrarius primo motui. Sicut si aliquis sit distans alicui per
+aliquem motum, non statim cessante motu fit ei propinquus, sed
+oportet quod appropinquet rediens per motum contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something
+private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37251] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod post actum peccati nihil positive remanet in
+anima nisi dispositio vel habitus, remanet tamen aliquid privative,
+scilicet privatio coniunctionis ad divinum lumen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating
+body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and
+so there is no comparison.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37252] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, transeunte obstaculo corporis, remanet corpus
+diaphanum in aequali propinquitate et habitudine ad corpus
+illuminans, et ideo statim umbra transit. Sed remoto actu peccati,
+non remanet anima in eadem habitudine ad Deum. Unde non est similis
+ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting.
+Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain
+removed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37253] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod actus peccati facit distantiam a Deo, quam quidem
+distantiam sequitur defectus nitoris, hoc modo sicut motus localis
+facit localem distantiam. Unde sicut, cessante motu, non tollitur
+distantia localis; ita nec, cessante actu peccati, tollitur
+macula.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q87" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q87-p0.1">Q. 87. OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q87-p2"> We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ
+in respect of the punishment due to them.
+</p><p id="FS_Q87-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q87-p4"><a href="#FS_Q87_A1"> (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p5"><a href="#FS_Q87_A2"> (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p6"><a href="#FS_Q87_A3"> (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p7"><a href="#FS_Q87_A4"> (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p8"><a href="#FS_Q87_A5"> (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p9"><a href="#FS_Q87_A6"> (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p10"><a href="#FS_Q87_A7"> (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p11"><a href="#FS_Q87_A8"> (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 pr."><a name="37254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37254]
+Iª-IIae q. 87 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de reatu
+poenae. Et primo, de ipso reatu; secundo, de mortali et veniali
+peccato, quae distinguuntur secundum reatum. Circa primum
+quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum reatus poenae sit effectus peccati.
+Secundo, utrum peccatum possit esse poena alterius peccati. Tertio,
+utrum aliquod peccatum faciat reum aeterna poena. Quarto, utrum
+faciat reum poena infinita secundum quantitatem. Quinto, utrum omne
+peccatum faciat reum aeterna et infinita poena. Sexto, utrum reatus
+poenae possit remanere post peccatum. Septimo, utrum omnis poena
+inferatur pro aliquo peccato. Octavo, utrum unus sit reus poenae
+pro peccato alterius.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q87_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A1-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 1. Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does
+not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention
+of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37255] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non sit effectus
+peccati. Quod enim per accidens se habet ad aliquid, non videtur
+esse proprius effectus eius. Sed reatus poenae per accidens se
+habet ad peccatum, cum sit praeter intentionem peccantis. Ergo
+reatus poenae non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an
+effect of sin, which is evil.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37256] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+malum non est causa boni. Sed poena bona est, cum sit iusta, et a
+Deo. Ergo non est effectus peccati, quod est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur
+a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37257] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, in I Confess., quod <i>omnis inordinatus animus
+sibi ipsi est poena</i>. Sed poena non causat reatum alterius
+poenae, quia sic iretur in infinitum. Ergo peccatum non causat
+reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.9" target="asv">Rom. 2:9</a>): "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a
+punishment which is signified by the words "tribulation and anguish."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37258] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Rom. II, <i>tribulatio et angustia in animam omnem
+operantis malum</i>. Sed operari malum est peccare. Ergo peccatum
+inducit poenam, quae nomine tribulationis et angustiae
+designatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A1-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment
+therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which
+reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man
+is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things
+contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up
+against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident
+that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which
+repression is punishment.
+</p><p id="FS_Q87_A1-p7"> Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is
+subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order
+of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household;
+thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is
+disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold
+punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 co."><a name="37259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37259] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod ex rebus naturalibus ad res humanas derivatur ut id
+quod contra aliquid insurgit, ab eo detrimentum patiatur. Videmus
+enim in rebus naturalibus quod unum contrarium vehementius agit,
+altero contrario superveniente, propter quod aquae calefactae magis
+congelantur, ut dicitur in I Meteor. Unde in hominibus hoc ex
+naturali inclinatione invenitur, ut unusquisque deprimat eum qui
+contra ipsum insurgit. Manifestum est autem quod quaecumque
+continentur sub aliquo ordine, sunt quodammodo unum in ordine ad
+principium ordinis. Unde quidquid contra ordinem aliquem insurgit,
+consequens est ut ab ipso ordine, vel principe ordinis, deprimatur.
+Cum autem peccatum sit actus inordinatus, manifestum est quod
+quicumque peccat, contra aliquem ordinem agit. Et ideo ab ipso
+ordine consequens est quod deprimatur. Quae quidem depressio poena
+est. Unde secundum tres ordines quibus subditur humana voluntas,
+triplici poena potest homo puniri. Primo quidem enim subditur
+humana natura ordini propriae rationis; secundo, ordini exterioris
+hominis gubernantis vel spiritualiter vel temporaliter, politice
+seu oeconomice; tertio, subditur universali ordini divini
+regiminis. Quilibet autem horum ordinum per peccatum pervertitur,
+dum ille qui peccat, agit et contra rationem, et contra legem
+humanam, et contra legem divinam. Unde triplicem poenam incurrit,
+unam quidem a seipso, quae est conscientiae remorsus, aliam vero ab
+homine, tertiam vero a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental
+to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37260] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod poena consequitur peccatum inquantum malum est,
+ratione suae inordinationis. Unde sicut malum est per accidens in
+actu peccantis, praeter intentionem ipsius, ita et reatus
+poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin,
+not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div.
+Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered
+to be directly the effect of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37261] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod poena quidem iusta esse potest et a Deo et ab homine
+inflicta, unde ipsa poena non est effectus peccati directe, sed
+solum dispositive. Sed peccatum facit hominem esse reum poenae,
+quod est malum, dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod
+<i>puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum</i>. Unde reatus
+poenae directe ponitur effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a
+further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37262] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod poena illa inordinati animi debetur peccato ex hoc
+quod ordinem rationis pervertit. Fit autem reus alterius poenae,
+per hoc quod pervertit ordinem legis divinae vel humanae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A2-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 2. Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of
+virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in
+the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37263] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse poena
+peccati. Poenae enim sunt inductae ut per eas homines reducantur ad
+bonum virtutis, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Sed per
+peccatum non reducitur homo in bonum virtutis, sed in oppositum.
+Ergo peccatum non est poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice.
+Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37264] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+poenae iustae sunt a Deo, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro
+octoginta trium quaest. Peccatum autem non est a Deo, et est
+iniustum. Non ergo peccatum potest esse poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above
+(
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q87_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74], AA[1]</a> ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37265] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem. Sed peccatum est
+a voluntate, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo peccatum non potest esse
+poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37266] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod quaedam peccata sunt
+poenae peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as
+such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will,
+for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will,
+as stated in the
+<a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Consequently it is evident that sin
+regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 co."><a name="37267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37267] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod de peccato dupliciter loqui possumus, per se, et per
+accidens. Per se quidem nullo modo peccatum potest esse poena
+peccati. Peccatum enim per se consideratur secundum quod egreditur
+a voluntate, sic enim habet rationem culpae. De ratione autem
+poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, ut in primo habitum est.
+Unde manifestum est quod nullo modo, per se loquendo, peccatum
+potest esse poena peccati. Per accidens autem peccatum potest esse
+poena peccati, tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte causae quae est
+remotio prohibentis. Sunt enim causae inclinantes ad peccatum
+passiones, tentatio Diaboli, et alia huiusmodi; quae quidem causae
+impediuntur per auxilium divinae gratiae, quae subtrahitur per
+peccatum. Unde cum ipsa subtractio gratiae sit quaedam poena, et a
+Deo, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod per accidens etiam peccatum
+quod ex hoc sequitur, poena dicatur. Et hoc modo loquitur
+apostolus, Rom. I, dicens, <i>propter quod tradidit eos Deus in
+desideria cordis eorum</i>, quae sunt animae passiones, quia
+scilicet deserti homines ab auxilio divinae gratiae, vincuntur a
+passionibus. Et hoc modo semper peccatum dicitur esse poena
+praecedentis peccati. Alio modo ex parte substantiae actus, quae
+afflictionem inducit, sive sit actus interior, ut patet in ira et
+invidia; sive actus exterior, ut patet cum aliqui gravi labore
+opprimuntur et damno, ut expleant actum peccati, secundum illud
+Sap. V, <i>lassati sumus in via iniquitatis</i>. Tertio modo, ex
+parte effectus, ut scilicet aliquod peccatum dicatur poena respectu
+effectus consequentis. Et his duobus ultimis modis, unum peccatum
+non solum est poena praecedentis peccati, sed etiam sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7"> On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another,
+by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded
+by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment,
+and is from God, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q79_A3" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[3]</a>), the result is that the sin which ensues
+from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.24" target="asv">Rom. 1:24</a>) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when
+men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the
+punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it
+be an
+interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable
+trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.7" target="asv"> Wis. 5:7</a>: "We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment
+by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with
+regard to itself.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37268] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod hoc etiam quod aliqui puniuntur a Deo, dum
+permittit eos in aliqua peccata profluere, ad bonum virtutis
+ordinatur. Quandoque quidem etiam ipsorum qui peccant, cum scilicet
+post peccatum humiliores et cautiores resurgunt. Semper autem est
+ad emendationem aliorum, qui videntes aliquos ruere de peccato in
+peccatum, magis reformidant peccare. In aliis autem duobus modis,
+manifestum est quod poena ordinatur ad emendationem quia hoc ipsum
+quod homo laborem et detrimentum patitur in peccando, natum est
+retrahere homines a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed
+it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always
+for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the
+other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's
+amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37269] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato secundum se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37270] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A3-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 3. Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice
+is equality: wherefore it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.8" target="asv">Is. 27:8</a>): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not
+incur a debt of eternal punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37271] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum peccatum inducat reatum
+aeternae poenae. Poena enim iusta adaequatur culpae, iustitia enim
+aequalitas est. Unde dicitur Isaiae XXVII, <i>in mensura contra
+mensuram, cum abiecta fuerit, iudicabit eam</i>. Sed peccatum est
+temporale. Ergo non inducit reatum poenae aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed
+to an end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment
+should be infinite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37272] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+poenae medicinae quaedam sunt, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla
+medicina debet esse infinita, quia ordinatur ad finem; <i>quod
+autem ordinatur ad finem, non est infinitum</i>, ut philosophus
+dicit, in I Polit. Ergo nulla poena debet esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction
+of men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37273] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+nullus semper facit aliquid, nisi propter se in ipso delectetur.
+<i>Sed Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum</i>, ut dicitur
+Sap. I. Ergo non puniet homines poena sempiterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished.
+Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37274] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+nihil quod est per accidens, est infinitum. Sed poena est per
+accidens, non est enim secundum naturam eius qui punitur. Ergo non
+potest in infinitum durare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>): "These shall go into everlasting punishment"; and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.3.29" target="asv">Mk. 3:29</a>): "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37275] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, <i>ibunt hi in supplicium
+aeternum</i>. Et Marc. III dicitur, <i>qui autem blasphemaverit in
+spiritum sanctum, non habebit remissionem in aeternum, sed erit
+reus aeterni delicti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A1" id="FS_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore
+so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order
+is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the
+principle be saved, defects can be
+repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except
+by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight,
+these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently
+if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to
+be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this
+order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity,
+considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 co."><a name="37276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37276] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum ex hoc inducit
+reatum poenae, quod pervertit aliquem ordinem. Manente autem causa,
+manet effectus. Unde quandiu perversitas ordinis remanet, necesse
+est quod remaneat reatus poenae. Pervertit autem aliquis ordinem
+quandoque quidem reparabiliter, quandoque autem irreparabiliter.
+Semper enim defectus quo subtrahitur principium, irreparabilis est,
+si autem salvetur principium, eius virtute defectus reparari
+possunt. Sicut si corrumpatur principium visivum, non potest fieri
+visionis reparatio, nisi sola virtute divina, si vero, salvo
+principio visivo, aliqua impedimenta adveniant visioni, reparari
+possunt per naturam vel per artem. Cuiuslibet autem ordinis est
+aliquod principium, per quod aliquis fit particeps illius ordinis.
+Et ideo si per peccatum corrumpatur principium ordinis quo voluntas
+hominis subditur Deo, erit inordinatio, quantum est de se,
+irreparabilis, etsi reparari possit virtute divina. Principium
+autem huius ordinis est ultimus finis, cui homo inhaeret per
+caritatem. Et ideo quaecumque peccata avertunt a Deo, caritatem
+auferentia, quantum est de se, inducunt reatum aeternae poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however,
+as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that
+adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes
+by imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is
+not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the
+living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to
+Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity.
+A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also
+because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial.
+iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37277] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod poena peccato proportionatur secundum
+acerbitatem, tam in iudicio divino quam in humano, sicut Augustinus
+dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, in nullo iudicio requiritur ut poena
+adaequetur culpae secundum durationem. Non enim quia adulterium vel
+homicidium in momento committitur, propter hoc momentanea poena
+punitur, sed quandoque quidem perpetuo carcere vel exilio,
+quandoque etiam morte. In qua non consideratur occisionis mora, sed
+potius quod in perpetuum auferatur a societate viventium, et sic
+repraesentat suo modo aeternitatem poenae inflictae divinitus.
+Iustum autem est, secundum Gregorium, quod qui in suo aeterno
+peccavit contra Deum, in aeterno Dei puniatur. Dicitur autem
+aliquis in suo aeterno peccasse, non solum secundum continuationem
+actus in tota hominis vita durantis, sed quia ex hoc ipso quod
+finem in peccato constituit, voluntatem habet in aeternum peccandi.
+Unde dicit Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., quod <i>iniqui voluissent sine
+fine vivere, ut sine fine potuissent in iniquitatibus
+permanere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished,
+but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others,
+that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.19.25" target="asv">Prov. 19:25</a>: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments
+inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments,
+according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.59.6" target="asv"> Ps. 59:6</a>: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37278] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod poena etiam quae secundum leges humanas infligitur,
+non semper est medicinalis ei qui punitur, sed solum aliis, sicut
+cum latro suspenditur, non ut ipse emendetur, sed propter alios, ut
+saltem metu poenae peccare desistant; secundum illud Prov. XIX,
+<i>pestilente flagellato, stultus sapientior erit</i>. Sic igitur
+et aeternae poenae reproborum a Deo inflictae, sunt medicinales his
+qui consideratione poenarum abstinent a peccatis; secundum illud
+Psalmi LIX, <i>dedisti metuentibus te significationem, ut fugiant a
+facie arcus, ut liberentur dilecti tui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37279] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in poenis propter ipsas; sed
+delectatur in ordine suae iustitiae, quae haec requirit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order,
+and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="37280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37280] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod poena, etsi per accidens ordinetur ad naturam, per se
+tamen ordinatur ad privationem ordinis et ad Dei iustitiam. Et
+ideo, durante inordinatione, semper durat poena.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A4-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 4. Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now God's anger or fury
+signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as
+to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance,
+sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37281] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccato debeatur poena infinita
+secundum quantitatem. Dicitur enim Ierem. X, <i>corripe me, domine,
+veruntamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum
+redigas me</i>. Ira autem vel furor Dei metaphorice significat
+vindictam divinae iustitiae, redigi autem in nihilum est poena
+infinita, sicut et ex nihilo aliquid facere est virtutis infinitae.
+Ergo secundum vindictam divinam, peccatum punitur poena infinita
+secundum quantitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against God,
+is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a
+more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is infinite.
+Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37282] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quantitati culpae respondet quantitas poenae; secundum illud
+Deuteron. XXV, <i>pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus</i>.
+Sed peccatum quod contra Deum committitur, est infinitum, tanto
+enim gravius est peccatum, quanto maior est persona contra quam
+peccatur, sicut gravius peccatum est percutere principem quam
+percutere hominem privatum; Dei autem magnitudo est infinita. Ergo
+poena infinita debetur pro peccato quod contra Deum
+committitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore
+it is infinite in quantity also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37283] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+dupliciter est aliquid infinitum, duratione scilicet, et
+quantitate. Sed duratione est poena infinita. Ergo et
+quantitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37284] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quia secundum hoc omnium mortalium peccatorum poenae essent
+aequales, non enim est infinitum infinito maius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good,
+which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good.
+In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards
+it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin
+consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also is infinite, because
+it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment
+is the "pain of sense," which is also finite.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 co."><a name="37285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37285] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod poena proportionatur peccato. In peccato autem duo
+sunt. Quorum unum est aversio ab incommutabili bono, quod est
+infinitum, unde ex hac parte peccatum est infinitum. Aliud quod est
+in peccato, est inordinata conversio ad commutabile bonum. Et ex
+hac parte peccatum est finitum, tum quia ipsum bonum commutabile
+est finitum; tum quia ipsa conversio est finita, non enim possunt
+esse actus creaturae infiniti. Ex parte igitur aversionis,
+respondet peccato poena damni, quae etiam est infinita, est enim
+amissio infiniti boni, scilicet Dei. Ex parte autem inordinatae
+conversionis, respondet ei poena sensus, quae etiam est finita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible
+with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37286] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod omnino redigi in nihilum eum qui peccat, non
+convenit divinae iustitiae, quia repugnat perpetuitati poenae, quae
+est secundum divinam iustitiam, ut dictum est. Sed in nihilum
+redigi dicitur qui spiritualibus bonis privatur; secundum illud I
+Cor. XIII, <i>si non habuero caritatem, nihil sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37287] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato ex parte aversionis,
+sic enim homo contra Deum peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for
+as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And
+a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But
+it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it
+does not incur punishment of infinite quantity.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37288] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod duratio poenae respondet durationi culpae, non quidem
+ex parte actus, sed ex parte maculae, qua durante manet reatus
+poenae. Sed acerbitas poenae respondet gravitati culpae. Culpa
+autem quae est irreparabilis, de se habet quod perpetuo duret, et
+ideo debetur ei poena aeterna. Non autem ex parte conversionis
+habet infinitatem, et ideo non debetur ei ex hac parte poena
+infinita secundum quantitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A5-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 5. Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A4" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently,
+differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur
+a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A4" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37289] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod omne peccatum inducat reatum poenae
+aeternae. Poena enim, ut dictum est, proportionatur culpae. Sed
+poena aeterna differt a temporali in infinitum. Nullum autem
+peccatum differre videtur ab altero in infinitum, cum omne peccatum
+sit humanus actus, qui infinitus esse non potest. Cum ergo alicui
+peccato debeatur poena aeterna, sicut dictum est, videtur quod
+nulli peccato debeatur poena temporalis tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment
+is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children
+who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words
+(
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.3" target="asv">Jn. 3:3</a>): " Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of
+God." Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37290] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum originale est minimum peccatorum, unde et Augustinus
+dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>mitissima poena est eorum qui pro solo
+peccato originali puniuntur</i>. Sed peccato originali debetur
+poena perpetua, nunquam enim videbunt regnum Dei pueri qui sine
+Baptismo decesserunt cum originali peccato; ut patet per id quod
+dominus dicit, Ioan. III, <i>nisi quis renatus fuerit denuo, non
+potest videre regnum Dei</i>. Ergo multo magis omnium aliorum
+peccatorum poena erit aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its
+punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because
+in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment
+is not due for any sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37291] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccato non debetur maior poena ex hoc quod alteri peccato
+adiungitur, cum utrumque peccatum suam habeat poenam taxatam
+secundum divinam iustitiam. Sed peccato veniali debetur poena
+aeterna, si cum mortali peccato inveniatur in aliquo damnato, quia
+in Inferno nulla potest esse remissio. Ergo peccato veniali
+simpliciter debetur poena aeterna. Nulli ergo peccato debetur poena
+temporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished
+eternally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37292] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog., quod quaedam leviores
+culpae post hanc vitam remittuntur. Non ergo omnia peccata aeterna
+poena puniuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice,
+through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is
+disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable
+to the end, in so far as one is too much or
+too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some
+temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not
+incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 co."><a name="37293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37293] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum causat reatum
+poenae aeternae, inquantum irreparabiliter repugnat ordini divinae
+iustitiae, per hoc scilicet quod contrariatur ipsi principio
+ordinis, quod est ultimus finis. Manifestum est autem quod in
+quibusdam peccatis est quidem aliqua inordinatio, non tamen per
+contrarietatem ad ultimum finem, sed solum circa ea quae sunt ad
+finem, inquantum plus vel minus debite eis intenditur, salvato
+tamen ordine ad ultimum finem, puta cum homo, etsi nimis ad aliquam
+rem temporalem afficiatur, non tamen pro ea vellet Deum offendere,
+aliquid contra praeceptum eius faciendo. Unde huiusmodi peccatis
+non debetur aeterna poena, sed temporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance
+of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist
+in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs
+infinitely from the things that are referred to it.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37294] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccata non differunt in infinitum ex parte
+conversionis ad bonum commutabile, in qua consistit substantia
+actus, differunt autem in infinitum ex parte aversionis. Nam
+quaedam peccata committuntur per aversionem ab ultimo fine, quaedam
+vero per inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem
+ultimus ab his quae sunt ad finem, in infinitum differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject,
+viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37295] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccato originali non debetur poena aeterna ratione
+suae gravitatis, sed ratione conditionis subiecti, scilicet hominis
+qui sine gratia invenitur, per quam solam fit remissio poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p9"> The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the
+quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37296] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter
+dicendum est ad tertium, de veniali peccato. Aeternitas enim poenae
+non respondet quantitati culpae, sed irremissibilitati ipsius, ut
+dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A6-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 6. Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But
+sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37297] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non remaneat post
+peccatum. Remota enim causa, removetur effectus. Sed peccatum est
+causa reatus poenae. Ergo, remoto peccato, cessat reatus
+poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when
+sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37298] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum removetur per hoc quod homo ad virtutem redit. Sed
+virtuoso non debetur poena, sed magis praemium. Ergo, remoto
+peccato, non remanet reatus poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease.
+Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37299] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+poenae sunt medicinae, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed postquam aliquis
+iam est ab infirmitate curatus, non adhibetur sibi medicina. Ergo,
+remoto peccato, non remanet debitum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.12.13" target="asv">2 Kings xii. 13,14</a>): "David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin;
+thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child
+that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment
+remains, when the sin has been removed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37300] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur II Reg. XII, quod <i>David dixit ad Nathan,
+peccavi domino. Dixitque Nathan ad David, dominus quoque transtulit
+peccatum tuum, non morieris. Veruntamen quia blasphemare fecisti
+inimicos nomen domini, filius qui natus est tibi, morte
+morietur</i>. Punitur ergo aliquis a Deo etiam postquam ei peccatum
+dimittitur. Et sic reatus poenae remanet, peccato remoto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins,
+when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as
+he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which
+restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he
+who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something
+contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in
+injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still
+remains the debt of punishment.
+</p><p id="FS_Q87_A6-p7"> But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul,
+without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness,
+in which the stain consists, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q86_A1" id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the
+order of Divine justice,
+that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the
+punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory,
+it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory
+punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular
+purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained
+when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A6" id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[6], A[6]</a>). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed
+of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 co."><a name="37301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37301] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod in peccato duo possunt considerari, scilicet actus
+culpae, et macula sequens. Planum est autem quod, cessante actu
+peccati, remanet reatus, in omnibus peccatis actualibus. Actus enim
+peccati facit hominem reum poenae, inquantum transgreditur ordinem
+divinae iustitiae; ad quem non redit nisi per quandam
+recompensationem poenae, quae ad aequalitatem iustitiae reducit; ut
+scilicet qui plus voluntati suae indulsit quam debuit, contra
+mandatum Dei agens, secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, aliquid
+contra illud quod vellet, spontaneus vel invitus patiatur. Quod
+etiam in iniuriis hominibus factis observatur, ut per
+recompensationem poenae reintegretur aequalitas iustitiae. Unde
+patet quod, cessante actu peccati vel iniuriae illatae, adhuc
+remanet debitum poenae. Sed si loquamur de ablatione peccati
+quantum ad maculam, sic manifestum est quod macula peccati ab anima
+auferri non potest, nisi per hoc quod anima Deo coniungitur, per
+cuius distantiam detrimentum proprii nitoris incurrebat, quod est
+macula, ut supra dictum est. Coniungitur autem homo Deo per
+voluntatem. Unde macula peccati ab homine tolli non potest nisi
+voluntas hominis ordinem divinae iustitiae acceptet, ut scilicet
+vel ipse poenam sibi spontaneus assumat in recompensationem culpae
+praeteritae, vel etiam a Deo illatam patienter sustineat, utroque
+enim modo poena rationem satisfactionis habet. Poena autem
+satisfactoria diminuit aliquid de ratione poenae. Est enim de
+ratione poenae quod sit contra voluntatem. Poena autem
+satisfactoria, etsi secundum absolutam considerationem sit contra
+voluntatem, tamen tunc, et pro hoc, est voluntaria. Unde
+simpliciter est voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria, sicut
+patet ex his quae supra de voluntario et involuntario dicta sunt.
+Dicendum est ergo quod, remota macula culpae, potest quidem
+remanere reatus non poenae simpliciter, sed satisfactoriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q86_A2" id="FS_Q87_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[2]</a>), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain
+in the same way, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37302] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod sicut, cessante actu peccati, remanet macula, ut
+supra dictum est; ita etiam potest remanere reatus. Cessante vero
+macula, non remanet reatus secundum eandem rationem, ut dictum
+est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands
+that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37303] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod virtuoso non debetur poena simpliciter, potest tamen
+sibi deberi poena ut satisfactoria, quia hoc ipsum ad virtutem
+pertinet, ut satisfaciat pro his in quibus offendit vel Deum vel
+hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that
+the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder
+may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality
+of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were
+scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37304] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, remota macula, sanatum est vulnus peccati quantum ad
+voluntatem. Requiritur autem adhuc poena ad sanationem aliarum
+virium animae, quae per peccatum praecedens deordinatae fuerunt, ut
+scilicet per contraria curentur. Requiritur etiam ad restituendum
+aequalitatem iustitiae; et ad amovendum scandalum aliorum, ut
+aedificentur in poena qui sunt scandalizati in culpa; ut patet ex
+exemplo de David inducto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A7-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 7. Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.3" target="asv">Jn. 9:3</a>,
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.2" target="asv">2</a>) about the man born blind: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In like manner
+we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical
+possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover
+before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore
+not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="37305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37305] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis poena sit propter aliquam
+culpam. Dicitur enim Ioan. IX, de caeco nato, <i>neque hic
+peccavit, neque parentes eius, ut nasceretur caecus</i>. Et
+similiter videmus quod multi pueri, etiam baptizati, graves poenas
+patiuntur, ut puta febres, Daemonum oppressiones, et multa
+huiusmodi, cum tamen in eis non sit peccatum, postquam sunt
+baptizati. Et antequam sint baptizati, non est in eis plus de
+peccato quam in aliis pueris, qui haec non patiuntur. Non ergo
+omnis poena est pro peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of
+these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.5" target="asv">Ps. 72:5</a>): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.7" target="asv">Job 21:7</a>): "[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in
+brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hab.1.13" target="asv">Hab. 1:13</a>): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man
+oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for
+a sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="37306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37306] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod peccatores prosperentur, et quod
+aliqui innocentes puniantur. Utrumque autem in rebus humanis
+frequenter invenimus, dicitur enim de iniquis in Psalmo LXXII,
+<i>in labore hominum non sunt, et cum hominibus non
+flagellabuntur</i>; et Iob XXI, <i>impii vivunt, sublevati sunt,
+confortatique divitiis</i>; et Habacuc I, dicitur, <i>quare
+respicis contemptores et taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se?</i>
+Non ergo omnis poena infligitur pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written of Christ (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.22" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:22</a>) that "He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.21" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:21</a>) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="37307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37307] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+de Christo dicitur I Pet. II, quod <i>peccatum non fecit, nec
+inventus est dolus in ore eius</i>. Et tamen ibidem dicitur quod
+<i>passus est pro nobis</i>. Ergo non semper poena a Deo
+dispensatur pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.7" target="asv">Job 4:7, </a> seqq.): "Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity
+. . . perishing by the blast of God"; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is inflicted for
+a sin."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 s. c."><a name="37308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37308] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Iob IV, <i>quis unquam innocens periit? Aut quando
+recti deleti sunt? Quin potius vidi eos qui operantur iniquitatem,
+flante Deo, periisse</i>. Et Augustinus dicit, in I Retract., quod
+<i>omnis poena iusta est, et pro peccato aliquo impenditur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A7-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As already stated
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A6" id="FS_Q87_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, punishment can be considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary.
+And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who
+has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another
+upon themselves. If, however, we
+speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished.
+Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes
+it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original sin
+is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result
+from
+this defect in human nature.
+</p><p id="FS_Q87_A7-p7"> Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species
+of evil, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods,
+it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers
+loss of money for the sake of bodily health,
+or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man,
+not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because
+a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments
+properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact
+that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment
+of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue;
+so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 co."><a name="37309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37309] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, poena potest dupliciter
+considerari, simpliciter, et inquantum est satisfactoria. Poena
+quidem satisfactoria est quodammodo voluntaria. Et quia contingit
+eos qui differunt in reatu poenae, esse unum secundum voluntatem
+unione amoris, inde est quod interdum aliquis qui non peccavit,
+poenam voluntarius pro alio portat, sicut etiam in rebus humanis
+videmus quod aliquis in se transfert alterius debitum. Si vero
+loquamur de poena simpliciter, secundum quod habet rationem poenae,
+sic semper habet ordinem ad culpam propriam, sed quandoque quidem
+ad culpam actualem, puta quando aliquis vel a Deo vel ab homine pro
+peccato commisso punitur; quandoque vero ad culpam originalem. Et
+hoc quidem vel principaliter, vel consequenter. Principaliter
+quidem poena originalis peccati est quod natura humana sibi
+relinquitur, destituta auxilio originalis iustitiae, sed ad hoc
+consequuntur omnes poenalitates quae ex defectu naturae in
+hominibus contingunt. Sciendum tamen est quod quandoque aliquid
+videtur esse poenale, quod tamen non habet simpliciter rationem
+poenae. Poena enim est species mali, ut in primo dictum est. Malum
+autem est privatio boni. Cum autem sint plura hominis bona,
+scilicet animae, corporis, et exteriorum rerum; contingit interdum
+quod homo patiatur detrimentum in minori bono, ut augeatur in
+maiori, sicut cum patitur detrimentum pecuniae propter sanitatem
+corporis, vel in utroque horum propter salutem animae et propter
+gloriam Dei. Et tunc tale detrimentum non est simpliciter malum
+hominis, sed secundum quid. Unde non dicit simpliciter rationem
+poenae, sed medicinae, nam et medici austeras potiones propinant
+infirmis, ut conferant sanitatem. Et quia huiusmodi non proprie
+habent rationem poenae, non reducuntur ad culpam sicut ad causam,
+nisi pro tanto, quia hoc ipsum quod oportet humanae naturae
+medicinas poenales exhibere, est ex corruptione naturae, quae est
+poena originalis peccati. In statu enim innocentiae non oportuisset
+aliquem ad profectum virtutis inducere per poenalia exercitia. Unde
+hoc ipsum quod est poenale in talibus reducitur ad originalem
+culpam sicut ad causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of
+original sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above
+(
+<a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad
+1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others
+who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="37310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37310] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi defectus eorum qui nascuntur, vel
+etiam puerorum, sunt effectus et poenae originalis peccati, ut
+dictum est. Et manent etiam post Baptismum, propter causam superius
+dictam. Et quod non sint aequaliter in omnibus, contingit propter
+naturae diversitatem, quae sibi relinquitur, ut supra dictum est.
+Ordinantur tamen huiusmodi defectus, secundum divinam providentiam,
+ad salutem hominum, vel eorum qui patiuntur, vel aliorum, qui
+poenis admonentur; et etiam ad gloriam Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief
+goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal
+goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude
+of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive
+temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath
+held them fast."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="37311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37311] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod bona temporalia et corporalia sunt quidem aliqua bona
+hominis, sed parva, bona vero spiritualia sunt magna hominis bona.
+Pertinet igitur ad divinam iustitiam ut virtuosis det spiritualia
+bona; et de temporalibus bonis vel malis tantum det eis, quantum
+sufficit ad virtutem, ut enim Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div.
+Nom., <i>divinae iustitiae est non emollire optimorum fortitudinem
+materialium donationibus</i>. Aliis vero hoc ipsum quod temporalia
+dantur, in malum spiritualium cedit. Unde in Psalmo LXXII
+concluditur, <i>ideo tenuit eos superbia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="37312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37312] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod Christus poenam sustinuit satisfactoriam non pro
+suis, sed pro nostris peccatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A8-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 8. Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation
+of them that hate Me"; and (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.35" target="asv">Mat. 23:35</a>): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="37313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37313] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis puniatur pro peccato alterius.
+Dicitur enim Exodi XX, <i>ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans
+iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem,
+his qui oderunt me</i>. Et Matth. XXIII dicitur, <i>ut veniat super
+vos omnis sanguis iustus qui effusus est super terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for
+their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="37314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37314] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+iustitia humana derivatur a iustitia divina. Sed secundum iustitiam
+humanam aliquando filii puniuntur pro parentibus, sicut patet in
+crimine laesae maiestatis. Ergo etiam secundum divinam iustitiam,
+unus punitur pro peccato alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his
+father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those
+whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their
+parents.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="37315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37315] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si dicatur filius non puniri pro peccato patris, sed pro peccato
+proprio, inquantum imitatur malitiam paternam, non magis hoc
+diceretur de filiis quam de extraneis, qui simili poena puniuntur
+his quorum peccata imitantur. Non ergo videtur quod filii pro
+peccatis propriis puniantur, sed pro peccatis parentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 s. c."><a name="37316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37316] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, <i>filius non portabit iniquitatem
+patris</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A8-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment,
+in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A7" id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for
+his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this
+way it
+does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A7" id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a> that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the
+soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either
+by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property
+so to speak; in such a
+way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in
+regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character
+of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely
+medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he
+bears it patiently.
+</p><p id="FS_Q87_A8-p7"> With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet
+higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine
+says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin, because, as
+regards the soul, the son is not the father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying
+(Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine."
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 co."><a name="37317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37317] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, si loquamur de poena satisfactoria, quae voluntarie
+assumitur, contingit quod unus portet poenam alterius inquantum
+sunt quodammodo unum, sicut iam dictum est. Si autem loquamur de
+poena pro peccato inflicta, inquantum habet rationem poenae, sic
+solum unusquisque pro peccato suo punitur, quia actus peccati
+aliquid personale est. Si autem loquamur de poena quae habet
+rationem medicinae, sic contingit quod unus punitur pro peccato
+alterius. Dictum est enim quod detrimenta corporalium rerum, vel
+etiam ipsius corporis, sunt quaedam poenales medicinae ordinatae ad
+salutem animae. Unde nihil prohibet talibus poenis aliquem puniri
+pro peccato alterius, vel a Deo vel ab homine, utpote filios pro
+patribus, et subditos pro dominis, inquantum sunt quaedam res
+eorum. Ita tamen quod, si filius vel subditus est particeps culpae,
+huiusmodi poenalis defectus habet rationem poenae quantum ad
+utrumque, scilicet eum qui punitur, et eum pro quo punitur. Si vero
+non sit particeps culpae, habet rationem poenae quantum ad eum pro
+quo punitur, quantum vero ad eum qui punitur, rationem medicinae
+tantum, nisi per accidens, inquantum peccato alterius consentit;
+ordinatur enim ei ad bonum animae, si patienter sustineat. Poenae
+vero spirituales non sunt medicinales tantum, quia bonum animae non
+ordinatur ad aliud melius bonum. Unde in bonis animae nullus
+patitur detrimentum sine culpa propria. Et propter hoc etiam
+talibus poenis, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad avitum, unus non
+punitur pro alio, quia quantum ad animam, filius non est res
+patris. Unde et huius causam dominus assignans, dicit, Ezech.
+XVIII, <i>omnes animae meae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the
+property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must
+be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and
+in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure
+of your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone
+to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents'
+example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their
+parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live
+long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate
+them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="37318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37318] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod utrumque dictum videtur esse referendum ad
+poenas temporales vel corporales, inquantum filii sunt res quaedam
+parentum, et successores praedecessorum. Vel si referatur ad poenas
+spirituales, hoc dicitur propter imitationem culpae, unde in Exodo
+additur, <i>his qui oderunt me</i>; et in Matthaeo dicitur, <i>et
+vos implete mensuram patrum vestrorum</i>. Dicit autem puniri
+peccata patrum in filiis, quia filii, in peccatis parentum nutriti,
+proniores sunt ad peccandum, tum propter consuetudinem; tum etiam
+propter exemplum, patrum quasi auctoritatem sequentes. Sunt etiam
+maiori poena digni, si, poenas patrum videntes, correcti non sunt.
+Ideo autem addidit, in tertiam et quartam generationem, quia tantum
+consueverunt homines vivere, ut tertiam et quartam generationem
+videant; et sic mutuo videre possunt et filii peccata patrum ad
+imitandum, et patres poenas filiorum ad dolendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or
+medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="37319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37319] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod poenae illae sunt corporales et temporales quas
+iustitia humana uni pro peccato alterius infligit. Et sunt remedia
+quaedam, vel medicinae, contra culpas sequentes, ut vel ipsi qui
+puniuntur, vel alii, cohibeantur a similibus culpis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment
+of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and
+because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought
+up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is
+not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="37320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37320] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod magis dicuntur puniri pro peccatis aliorum propinqui
+quam extranei, tum quia poena propinquorum quodammodo redundat in
+illos qui peccaverunt, ut dictum est, inquantum filius est quaedam
+res patris. Tum etiam quia et domestica exempla, et domesticae
+poenae, magis movent. Unde quando aliquis nutritus est in peccatis
+parentum, vehementius ea sequitur; et si ex eorum poenis non est
+deterritus, obstinatior videtur; unde et maiori poena dignus.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q88" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q88-p0.1">Q. 88. OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q88-p2"> In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First,
+we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q88-p4"><a href="#FS_Q88_A1"> (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p5"><a href="#FS_Q88_A2"> (2) Whether they differ generically?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p6"><a href="#FS_Q88_A3"> (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p7"><a href="#FS_Q88_A4"> (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p8"><a href="#FS_Q88_A5"> (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p9"><a href="#FS_Q88_A6"> (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 pr."><a name="37321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37321]
+Iª-IIae q. 88 pr.</span></a> Deinde, quia peccatum veniale et
+mortale distinguuntur secundum reatum, considerandum est de eis. Et
+primo, considerandum est de veniali per comparationem ad mortale;
+secundo, de veniali secundum se. Circa primum quaeruntur sex.
+Primo, utrum veniale peccatum convenienter dividatur contra
+mortale. Secundo, utrum distinguantur genere. Tertio, utrum veniale
+peccatum sit dispositio ad mortale. Quarto, utrum veniale peccatum
+possit fieri mortale. Quinto, utrum circumstantia aggravans possit
+de veniali peccato facere mortale. Sexto, utrum peccatum mortale
+possit fieri veniale.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q88_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A1-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 1. Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin
+is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal.
+Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37322] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod veniale peccatum non convenienter
+dividatur contra mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXII libro contra
+Faustum, <i>peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra
+legem aeternam</i>. Sed esse contra legem aeternam, dat peccato
+quod sit mortale. Ergo omne peccatum est mortale. Non ergo peccatum
+veniale dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment,
+because sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that
+whoever sins, sins mortally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37323] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+apostolus dicit, I Cor. X, <i>sive manducatis, sive bibitis, sive
+aliquid aliud facitis, omnia in gloriam Dei facite</i>. Sed contra
+hoc praeceptum facit quicumque peccat, non enim peccatum fit
+propter gloriam Dei. Cum ergo facere contra praeceptum sit peccatum
+mortale, videtur quod quicumque peccat, mortaliter peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr.
+Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good
+which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore
+whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness,"
+as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow,
+to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37324] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+quicumque amore alicui rei inhaeret, inhaeret ei vel sicut fruens,
+vel sicut utens; ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doctr. Christ.
+Sed nullus peccans inhaeret bono commutabili quasi utens, non enim
+refert ipsum ad bonum quod nos beatos facit, quod proprie est uti,
+ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Ergo quicumque peccat, fruitur bono
+commutabili. <i>Sed frui rebus utendis est humana perversitas</i>,
+ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Cum ergo
+perversitas peccatum mortale nominet, videtur quod quicumque
+peccat, mortaliter peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable
+good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly
+condivided with mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37325] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+quicumque accedit ad unum terminum, ex hoc ipso recedit ab alio.
+Sed quicumque peccat, accedit ad bonum commutabile. Ergo recedit a
+bono incommutabili. Ergo peccat mortaliter. Non ergo convenienter
+peccatum veniale contra mortale dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But
+a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37326] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus dicit, in Homil. XLI super Ioan., <i>quod
+crimen est quod damnationem meretur, veniale autem est quod non
+meretur damnationem</i>. Sed crimen nominat peccatum mortale. Ergo
+veniale peccatum convenienter dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically:
+thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and
+fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of
+the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus.
+But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p8"> For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>, ad 3;
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[72], A[5]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A9" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.3" shape="rect"> Q[74], A[9]</a>, ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect
+consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.4" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is
+the order to the last end, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.5" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>;
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.6" shape="rect"> Q[87], A[3]</a>): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated
+above (
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.7" shape="rect">Q[87], A[3]</a>), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be
+repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end
+cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such
+sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end,
+the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal
+[veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above (
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A6" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.8" shape="rect">Q[87], A[6]</a>).
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p9"> Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic
+principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial
+sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 co."><a name="37327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37327] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod aliqua, secundum quod proprie accipiuntur, non
+videntur esse opposita, quae si metaphorice accipiantur, opponi
+inveniuntur, sicut ridere non opponitur ei quod est arescere; sed
+secundum quod ridere metaphorice de prato dicitur propter eius
+floritionem et virorem, opponitur ei quod est arescere. Similiter
+si mortale proprie accipiatur, prout refertur ad mortem corporalem,
+non videtur oppositionem habere cum veniali, nec ad idem genus
+pertinere. Sed si mortale accipiatur metaphorice, secundum quod
+dicitur in peccatis, mortale opponitur ei quod est veniale. Cum
+enim peccatum sit quaedam infirmitas animae, ut supra habitum est,
+peccatum aliquod mortale dicitur ad similitudinem morbi, qui
+dicitur mortalis ex eo quod inducit defectum irreparabilem per
+destitutionem alicuius principii, ut dictum est. Principium autem
+spiritualis vitae, quae est secundum virtutem, est ordo ad ultimum
+finem, ut supra dictum est. Qui quidem si destitutus fuerit,
+reparari non potest per aliquod principium intrinsecum, sed solum
+per virtutem divinam, ut supra dictum est, quia inordinationes
+eorum quae sunt ad finem, reparantur ex fine, sicut error qui
+accidit circa conclusiones, per veritatem principiorum. Defectus
+ergo ordinis ultimi finis non potest per aliquid aliud reparari
+quod sit principalius; sicut nec error qui est circa principia. Et
+ideo huiusmodi peccata dicuntur mortalia, quasi irreparabilia.
+Peccata autem quae habent inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad
+finem, conservato ordine ad ultimum finem, reparabilia sunt. Et
+haec dicuntur venialia, tunc enim peccatum veniam habet, quando
+reatus poenae tollitur, qui cessat cessante peccato, ut dictum est.
+Secundum hoc ergo, mortale et veniale opponuntur sicut reparabile
+et irreparabile. Et hoc dico per principium interius, non autem per
+comparationem ad virtutem divinam, quae omnem morbum et corporalem
+et spiritualem potest reparare. Et propter hoc veniale peccatum
+convenienter dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the
+generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and
+of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other
+hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in
+relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion
+of being. For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the
+law prescribes to be done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37328] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod divisio peccati venialis et mortalis non est
+divisio generis in species, quae aequaliter participent rationem
+generis, sed analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secundum prius et
+posterius. Et ideo perfecta ratio peccati, quam Augustinus ponit,
+convenit peccato mortali. Peccatum autem veniale dicitur peccatum
+secundum rationem imperfectam, et in ordine ad peccatum mortale,
+sicut accidens dicitur ens in ordine ad substantiam, secundum
+imperfectam rationem entis. Non enim est contra legem, quia
+venialiter peccans non facit quod lex prohibet, nec praetermittit
+id ad quod lex per praeceptum obligat; sed facit praeter legem,
+quia non observat modum rationis quem lex intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually
+refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal
+sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has
+to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human
+act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore
+it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37329] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illud praeceptum apostoli est affirmativum, unde non
+obligat ad semper. Et sic non facit contra hoc praeceptum quicumque
+non actu refert in gloriam Dei omne quod facit. Sufficit ergo quod
+aliquis habitualiter referat se et omnia sua in Deum, ad hoc quod
+non semper mortaliter peccet, cum aliquem actum non refert in
+gloriam Dei actualiter. Veniale autem peccatum non excludit
+habitualem ordinationem actus humani in gloriam Dei, sed solum
+actualem, quia non excludit caritatem, quae habitualiter ordinat in
+Deum. Unde non sequitur quod ille qui peccat venialiter, peccet
+mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using
+it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37330] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ille qui peccat venialiter, inhaeret bono temporali
+non ut fruens, quia non constituit in eo finem; sed ut utens,
+referens in Deum non actu, sed habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because
+what is referred to the end has not the character of finality.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37331] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod bonum commutabile non accipitur ut terminus
+contrapositus incommutabili bono, nisi quando constituitur in eo
+finis. Quod enim est ad finem, non habet rationem termini.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A2-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 2. Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically
+venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above
+(
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q88_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good,
+either less than God, which may be a venial
+sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37332] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale et mortale non
+differant genere, ita scilicet quod aliquod sit peccatum mortale ex
+genere, et aliquod veniale ex genere. Bonum enim et malum ex genere
+in actibus humanis accipitur per comparationem ad materiam sive ad
+obiectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum quodlibet obiectum vel
+materiam, contingit peccare mortaliter et venialiter, quodlibet
+enim bonum commutabile potest homo diligere vel infra Deum, quod
+est peccare venialiter, vel supra Deum quod est peccare mortaliter.
+Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non differunt genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability
+belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed
+through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice
+differs from sin committed
+through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8],
+ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37333] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut dictum est supra, peccatum mortale dicitur quod est
+irreparabile, peccatum autem veniale quod est reparabile. Sed esse
+irreparabile convenit peccato quod fit ex malitia, quod secundum
+quosdam irremissibile dicitur, esse autem reparabile convenit
+peccato quod fit per infirmitatem vel ignorantiam, quod dicitur
+remissibile. Ergo peccatum mortale et veniale differunt sicut
+peccatum quod est ex malitia commissum, vel ex infirmitate et
+ignorantia. Sed secundum hoc non differunt peccata genere, sed
+causa, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non
+differunt genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A3" id="FS_Q88_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[3]</a>, ad 3; A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur
+in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37334] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+supra dictum est quod subiti motus tam sensualitatis quam rationis,
+sunt peccata venialia. Sed subiti motus inveniuntur in quolibet
+peccati genere. Ergo non sunt aliqua peccata venialia ex
+genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic
+mortal sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37335] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod Augustinus, in sermone de Purgatorio, enumerat quaedam
+genera peccatorum venialium, et quaedam genera peccatorum
+mortalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been
+pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly,
+a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially,
+as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through
+weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the last end,
+wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p7"> For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense,
+can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the
+genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary
+to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently
+it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against
+the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus.
+Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary
+to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason
+of their genus.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from
+some disposition of the agent, as stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q88_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the
+agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own
+genus; for example, if a man
+direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically
+mortal because venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle
+of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 co."><a name="37336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37336] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum veniale a venia dicitur. Potest igitur
+aliquod peccatum dici veniale uno modo, quia est veniam consecutum,
+et sic dicit Ambrosius quod <i>omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit
+veniale</i>. Et hoc dicitur veniale ex eventu. Alio modo dicitur
+veniale, quia non habet in se unde veniam non consequatur vel
+totaliter vel in parte. In parte quidem, sicut cum habet in se
+aliquid diminuens culpam, ut cum fit ex infirmitate vel ignorantia.
+Et hoc dicitur veniale ex causa. In toto autem, ex eo quod non
+tollit ordinem ad ultimum finem, unde non meretur poenam aeternam,
+sed temporalem. Et de hoc veniali ad praesens intendimus. De primis
+enim duobus constat quod non habent genus aliquod determinatum. Sed
+veniale tertio modo dictum, potest habere genus determinatum, ita
+quod aliquod peccatum dicatur veniale ex genere, et aliquod mortale
+ex genere, secundum quod genus vel species actus determinantur ex
+obiecto. Cum enim voluntas fertur in aliquid quod secundum se
+repugnat caritati, per quam homo ordinatur in ultimum finem,
+peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale. Unde est mortale ex
+genere, sive sit contra dilectionem Dei, sicut blasphemia,
+periurium, et huiusmodi; sive contra dilectionem proximi, sicut
+homicidium, adulterium, et similia. Unde huiusmodi sunt peccata
+mortalia ex suo genere. Quandoque vero voluntas peccantis fertur in
+id quod in se continet quandam inordinationem, non tamen
+contrariatur dilectioni Dei et proximi, sicut verbum otiosum, risus
+superfluus, et alia huiusmodi. Et talia sunt peccata venialia ex
+suo genere. Sed quia actus morales recipiunt rationem boni et mali
+non solum ex obiecto, sed etiam ex aliqua dispositione agentis, ut
+supra habitum est; contingit quandoque quod id quod est peccatum
+veniale ex genere ratione sui obiecti, fit mortale ex parte
+agentis, vel quia in eo constituit finem ultimum, vel quia ordinat
+ipsum ad aliquid quod est peccatum mortale ex genere, puta cum
+aliquis ordinat verbum otiosum ad adulterium committendum.
+Similiter etiam ex parte agentis contingit quod aliquod peccatum
+quod ex suo genere est mortale, fit veniale, propter hoc scilicet
+quod actus est imperfectus, idest non deliberatus ratione, quae est
+principium proprium mali actus, sicut supra dictum est de subitis
+motibus infidelitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of
+God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves
+contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37337] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod aliquis eligit id quod repugnat
+divinae caritati, convincitur praeferre illud caritati divinae, et
+per consequens plus amare ipsum quam Deum. Et ideo aliqua peccata
+ex genere, quae de se repugnant caritati, habent quod aliquid
+diligatur supra Deum. Et sic sunt ex genere suo mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37338] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato veniali ex causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37339] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato quod est veniale
+propter imperfectionem actus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A3-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 3. Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial
+and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37340] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale non sit dispositio ad
+mortale. Unum enim oppositum non disponit ad aliud. Sed peccatum
+veniale et mortale ex opposito dividuntur, ut dictum est. Ergo
+peccatum veniale non est dispositio ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like
+dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37341] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+actus disponit ad aliquid simile in specie sibi, unde in II Ethic.
+dicitur quod <i>ex similibus actibus generantur similes
+dispositiones et habitus</i>. Sed peccatum mortale et veniale
+differunt genere seu specie, ut dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale
+non disponit ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is
+a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies
+in wait for good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37342] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+si peccatum dicatur veniale quia disponit ad mortale, oportebit
+quod quaecumque disponunt ad mortale peccatum, sint peccata
+venialia. Sed omnia bona opera disponunt ad peccatum mortale, dicit
+enim Augustinus, in regula, quod superbia bonis operibus
+insidiatur, ut pereant. Ergo etiam bona opera erunt peccata
+venialia, quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:1</a>): "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things.
+Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37343] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Eccli. XIX, <i>qui spernit minima, paulatim
+defluit</i>. Sed ille qui peccat venialiter, videtur minima
+spernere. Ergo paulatim disponitur ad hoc quod totaliter defluat
+per peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition.
+For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which
+moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly
+an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it
+disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to
+a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of
+consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened
+by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end
+for one
+who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially,
+he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this
+way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns
+aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is
+disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 co."><a name="37344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37344] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod disponens est quodammodo causa. Unde secundum
+duplicem modum causae, est duplex dispositionis modus. Est enim
+causa quaedam movens directe ad effectum, sicut calidum calefacit.
+Est etiam causa indirecte movens, removendo prohibens, sicut
+removens columnam dicitur removere lapidem superpositum. Et
+secundum hoc, actus peccati dupliciter ad aliquid disponit. Uno
+quidem modo, directe, et sic disponit ad actum similem secundum
+speciem. Et hoc modo, primo et per se peccatum veniale ex genere
+non disponit ad mortale ex genere, cum differant specie. Sed per
+hunc modum peccatum veniale potest disponere, per quandam
+consequentiam, ad peccatum quod est mortale ex parte agentis.
+Augmentata enim dispositione vel habitu per actus peccatorum
+venialium, intantum potest libido peccandi crescere, quod ille qui
+peccat, finem suum constituet in peccato veniali, nam unicuique
+habenti habitum, inquantum huiusmodi, finis est operatio secundum
+habitum. Et sic, multoties peccando venialiter, disponetur ad
+peccatum mortale. Alio modo actus humanus disponit ad aliquid
+removendo prohibens. Et hoc modo peccatum veniale ex genere potest
+disponere ad peccatum mortale ex genere. Qui enim peccat venialiter
+ex genere, praetermittit aliquem ordinem, et ex hoc quod consuescit
+voluntatem suam in minoribus debito ordini non subiicere,
+disponitur ad hoc quod etiam voluntatem suam non subiiciat ordini
+ultimi finis, eligendo id quod est peccatum mortale ex genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated
+above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial
+form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37345] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccatum veniale et mortale non dividuntur ex
+opposito, sicut duae species unius generis, ut dictum est, sed
+sicut accidens contra substantiam dividitur. Unde sicut accidens
+potest esse dispositio ad formam substantialem, ita et veniale
+peccatum ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit
+in different ways, as stated (
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37346] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod peccatum veniale non est simile mortali in specie,
+est tamen simile ei in genere, inquantum utrumque importat defectum
+debiti ordinis, licet aliter et aliter, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally;
+whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37347] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod opus bonum non est per se dispositio ad mortale
+peccatum, potest tamen esse materia vel occasio peccati mortalis
+per accidens. Sed peccatum veniale per se disponit ad mortale, ut
+dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A4-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 4. Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.36" target="asv"> Jn. 3:36</a>: "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill
+if we make little of them." Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial
+sin can become mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37348] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit fieri mortale.
+Dicit enim Augustinus, exponens illud Ioan. III, <i>qui incredulus
+est filio, non videbit vitam</i>, peccata minima (idest venialia),
+si negligantur, occidunt. Sed ex hoc dicitur peccatum mortale, quod
+spiritualiter occidit animam. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri
+mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin,
+as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A8" id="FS_Q88_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[8]</a>, ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37349] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+motus sensualitatis ante consensum rationis est peccatum veniale,
+post consensum vero est peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
+peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37350] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum veniale et mortale differunt sicut morbus curabilis et
+incurabilis, ut dictum est. Sed morbus curabilis potest fieri
+incurabilis. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37351] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+dispositio potest fieri habitus. Sed peccatum veniale est
+dispositio ad mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo veniale peccatum potest
+fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a">
+<b>On the contrary,</b>
+Those which differ infinitely, are not be transformed one to another.  But a mortal sin
+differs infinitely from a venial sin, as is apparent from the above <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a" shape="rect">(Q[87] A[5])</a>.
+Therefore venial [sin] cannot become mortal. [HST translation, missing
+from original]</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37352] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
+ea quae differunt in infinitum, non transmutantur in invicem. Sed
+peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in infinitum, ut ex
+praedictis patet. Ergo veniale non potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be
+at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act
+of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however,
+the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p7"> Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may
+fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p8"> Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning
+that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur
+a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal
+sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated
+above (
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[87], AA[3]</a>,5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing
+God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards
+the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate
+to one another.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p9"> If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 co."><a name="37353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37353] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod peccatum veniale fieri mortale, potest tripliciter
+intelligi. Uno modo sic quod idem actus numero, primo sit peccatum
+veniale, et postea mortale. Et hoc esse non potest. Quia peccatum
+principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, sicut et quilibet actus
+moralis. Unde non dicitur unus actus moraliter, si voluntas
+mutetur, quamvis etiam actio secundum naturam sit continua. Si
+autem voluntas non mutetur, non potest esse quod de veniali fiat
+mortale. Alio modo potest intelligi ut id quod est veniale ex
+genere, fiat mortale. Et hoc quidem possibile est, inquantum
+constituitur in eo finis, vel inquantum refertur ad mortale
+peccatum sicut ad finem, ut dictum est. Tertio modo potest
+intelligi ita quod multa venialia peccata constituant unum peccatum
+mortale. Quod si sic intelligatur quod ex multis peccatis
+venialibus integraliter constituatur unum peccatum mortale, falsum
+est. Non enim omnia peccata venialia de mundo, possunt habere
+tantum de reatu, quantum unum peccatum mortale. Quod patet ex parte
+durationis, quia peccatum mortale habet reatum poenae aeternae,
+peccatum autem veniale reatum poenae temporalis, ut dictum est.
+Patet etiam ex parte poenae damni, quia peccatum mortale meretur
+carentiam visionis divinae, cui nulla alia poena comparari potest
+ut Chrysostomus dicit. Patet etiam ex parte poenae sensus, quantum
+ad vermem conscientiae, licet forte quantum ad poenam ignis, non
+sint improportionales poenae. Si vero intelligatur quod multa
+peccata venialia faciunt unum mortale dispositive, sic verum est,
+sicut supra ostensum est, secundum duos modos dispositionis, quo
+peccatum veniale disponit ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37354] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in illo sensu, quod multa
+peccata venialia dispositive causant mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement
+of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37355] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod ille idem motus sensualitatis qui praecessit
+consensum rationis nunquam fiet peccatum mortale, sed ipse actus
+rationis consentientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo
+change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison
+fails.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37356] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod morbus corporalis non est actus, sed dispositio
+quaedam permanens, unde eadem manens, potest mutari. Sed peccatum
+veniale est actus transiens, qui resumi non potest. Et quantum ad
+hoc, non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected,
+becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which
+disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37357] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod dispositio quae fit habitus, est sicut imperfectum in
+eadem specie, sicut imperfecta scientia, dum perficitur, fit
+habitus. Sed veniale peccatum est dispositio alterius generis,
+sicut accidens ad formam substantialem, in quam nunquam
+mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A5-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 5. Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis,
+serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and
+drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes
+a venial sin to be mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37358] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia possit de veniali
+peccato facere mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de
+Purgatorio, quod <i>si diu teneatur iracundia, et ebrietas si
+assidua sit, transeunt in numerum peccatorum mortalium</i>. Sed ira
+et ebrietas non sunt ex suo genere peccata mortalia, sed venialia,
+alioquin semper essent mortalia. Ergo circumstantia facit peccatum
+veniale esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See
+<a href="#FS_Q74_A6" id="FS_Q88_A5-p3.1" shape="rect"> Q[74], A[6]</a>], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance
+makes a venial sin to be mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37359] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Magister dicit, XXIV dist. II libri Sent., quod delectatio, si sit
+morosa, est peccatum mortale; si autem non sit morosa, est peccatum
+veniale. Sed morositas est quaedam circumstantia. Ergo
+circumstantia facit de peccato veniali mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes
+a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37360] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+plus differunt malum et bonum quam veniale peccatum et mortale,
+quorum utrumque est in genere mali. Sed circumstantia facit de actu
+bono malum, sicut patet cum quis dat eleemosynam propter inanem
+gloriam. Ergo multo magis potest facere de peccato veniali
+mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because
+the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by
+reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what
+has been said (
+<a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>, ad 1;
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.2" shape="rect"> Q[87],
+A[5]
+</a>, ad 1).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37361] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod, cum circumstantia sit accidens, quantitas eius non potest
+excedere quantitatem ipsius actus, quam habet ex suo genere, semper
+enim subiectum praeeminet accidenti. Si igitur actus ex suo genere
+sit peccatum veniale, non poterit per circumstantiam fieri peccatum
+mortale, cum peccatum mortale in infinitum quodammodo excedat
+quantitatem venialis, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4;
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A10" id="FS_Q88_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[10]</a> ,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance
+may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes
+the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man
+has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another
+man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly
+this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p7"> It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another
+species. For it has been stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity
+of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial
+sin to be mortal, so long as it
+remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference
+of the moral act.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 co."><a name="37362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37362] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de circumstantiis
+ageretur, circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, est accidens actus
+moralis, contingit tamen circumstantiam accipi ut differentiam
+specificam actus moralis, et tunc amittit rationem circumstantiae,
+et constituit speciem moralis actus. Hoc autem contingit in
+peccatis quando circumstantia addit deformitatem alterius generis
+sicut cum aliquis accedit ad non suam, est actus deformis
+deformitate opposita castitati; sed si accedat ad non suam quae est
+alterius uxor, additur deformitas opposita iustitiae, contra quam
+est ut aliquis usurpet rem alienam; et secundum hoc huiusmodi
+circumstantia constituit novam speciem peccati, quae dicitur
+adulterium. Impossibile est autem quod circumstantia de peccato
+veniali faciat mortale, nisi afferat deformitatem alterius generis.
+Dictum est enim quod peccatum veniale habet deformitatem per hoc
+quod importat deordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, peccatum
+autem mortale habet deformitatem per hoc quod importat
+deordinationem respectu ultimi finis. Unde manifestum est quod
+circumstantia non potest de veniali peccato facere mortale, manens
+circumstantia, sed solum tunc quando transfert in aliam speciem, et
+fit quodammodo differentia specifica moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something
+accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance
+something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p9"> We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's
+neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will
+be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is
+a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through
+the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for
+instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the
+anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to
+great scandal or something of the kind.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p10"> With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and
+through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing
+many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a
+man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk,
+for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk
+frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than
+to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37363] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod diuturnitas non est circumstantia trahens in
+aliam speciem, similiter nec frequentia vel assiduitas, nisi forte
+per accidens ex aliquo supervenienti. Non enim aliquid acquirit
+novam speciem ex hoc quod multiplicatur vel protelatur, nisi forte
+in actu protelato vel multiplicato superveniat aliquid quod variet
+speciem, puta inobedientia vel contemptus, vel aliquid huiusmodi.
+Dicendum est ergo quod, cum ira sit motus animi ad nocendum
+proximo, si sit tale nocumentum in quod tendit motus irae, quod ex
+genere suo sit peccatum mortale, sicut homicidium vel furtum, talis
+ira ex genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod sit peccatum
+veniale, habet ex imperfectione actus, inquantum est motus subitus
+sensualitatis. Si vero sit diuturna, redit ad naturam sui generis
+per consensum rationis. Si vero nocumentum in quod tendit motus
+irae, esset veniale ex genere suo, puta cum aliquis in hoc
+irascitur contra aliquem, quod vult ei dicere aliquod verbum leve
+et iocosum, quod modicum ipsum contristet; non erit ira peccatum
+mortale, quantumcumque sit diuturna; nisi forte per accidens, puta
+si ex hoc grave scandalum oriatur, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi.
+De ebrietate vero dicendum est quod secundum suam rationem habet
+quod sit peccatum mortale, quod enim homo absque necessitate reddat
+se impotentem ad utendum ratione, per quam homo in Deum ordinatur
+et multa peccata occurrentia vitat, ex sola voluptate vini,
+expresse contrariatur virtuti. Sed quod sit peccatum veniale,
+contingit propter ignorantiam quandam vel infirmitatem, puta cum
+homo nescit virtutem vini, aut propriam debilitatem, unde non putat
+se inebriari, tunc enim non imputatur ei ebrietas ad peccatum, sed
+solum superabundantia potus. Sed quando frequenter inebriatur, non
+potest per hanc ignorantiam excusari quin videatur voluntas eius
+eligere magis pati ebrietatem, quam abstinere a vino superfluo.
+Unde redit peccatum ad suam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the
+delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad
+1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37364] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod delectatio morosa non dicitur esse peccatum mortale,
+nisi in his quae ex suo genere sunt peccata mortalia; in quibus si
+delectatio non morosa sit, peccatum veniale est ex imperfectione
+actus, sicut et de ira dictum est. Dicitur enim ira diuturna, et
+delectatio morosa, propter approbationem rationis deliberantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above (
+<a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a> , ad 4).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37365] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod circumstantia non facit de bono actu malum, nisi
+constituens speciem peccati, ut supra etiam habitum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A6-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 6. Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from
+venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A5" id="FS_Q88_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37366] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum mortale possit fieri veniale.
+Aequaliter enim distat peccatum veniale a mortali, et e contrario.
+Sed peccatum veniale fit mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam
+peccatum mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while
+he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal,
+loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary
+to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love
+of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his
+will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37367] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum veniale et mortale ponuntur differre secundum hoc, quod
+peccans mortaliter diligit creaturam plus quam Deum, peccans autem
+venialiter diligit creaturam infra Deum. Contingit autem quod
+aliquis committens id quod est ex genere suo peccatum mortale,
+diligat creaturam infra Deum, puta si aliquis, nesciens
+fornicationem simplicem esse peccatum mortale et contrariam divino
+amori, fornicetur, ita tamen quod propter divinum amorem paratus
+esset fornicationem praetermittere, si sciret fornicando se contra
+divinum amorem agere. Ergo peccabit venialiter. Et sic peccatum
+mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is
+evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much
+more therefore can a mortal sin become venial.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37368] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+sicut dictum est, plus differt bonum a malo quam veniale a mortali.
+Sed actus qui est de se malus, potest fieri bonus, sicut homicidium
+potest fieri actus iustitiae, sicut patet in iudice qui occidit
+latronem. Ergo multo magis peccatum mortale potest fieri
+veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal
+punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37369] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod aeternum nunquam potest fieri temporale. Sed peccatum
+mortale meretur poenam aeternam, peccatum autem veniale poenam
+temporalem. Ergo peccatum mortale nunquam potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can
+become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity
+pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand,
+the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become
+venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit
+fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.
+</p><p id="FS_Q88_A6-p7"> Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then
+it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident
+from what we have said above
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate
+reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the
+species of the act is destroyed.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 co."><a name="37370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37370] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod veniale et mortale differunt sicut perfectum et
+imperfectum in genere peccati, ut dictum est. Imperfectum autem per
+aliquam additionem potest ad perfectionem venire. Unde et veniale,
+per hoc quod additur ei deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati
+mortalis, efficitur mortale, sicut cum quis dicit verbum otiosum ut
+fornicetur. Sed id quod est perfectum, non potest fieri imperfectum
+per additionem. Et ideo peccatum mortale non fit veniale per hoc
+quod additur ei aliqua deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati
+venialis, non enim diminuitur peccatum eius qui fornicatur ut dicat
+verbum otiosum, sed magis aggravatur propter deformitatem
+adiunctam. Potest tamen id quod est ex genere mortale, esse veniale
+propter imperfectionem actus, quia non perfecte pertingit ad
+rationem actus moralis, cum non sit deliberatus sed subitus, ut ex
+dictis patet. Et hoc fit per subtractionem quandam, scilicet
+deliberatae rationis. Et quia a ratione deliberata habet speciem
+moralis actus, inde est quod per talem subtractionem solvitur
+species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not
+vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37371] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod veniale differt a mortali sicut imperfectum a
+perfecto, ut puer a viro. Fit autem ex puero vir, sed non
+convertitur. Unde ratio non cogit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication
+in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance
+itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things
+whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37372] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod, si sit talis ignorantia quae peccatum omnino
+excuset, sicut est furiosi vel amentis, tunc ex tali ignorantia
+fornicationem committens nec mortaliter nec venialiter peccat. Si
+vero sit ignorantia non invincibilis, tunc ignorantia ipsa est
+peccatum, et continet in se defectum divini amoris, inquantum
+negligit homo addiscere ea per quae potest se in divino amore
+conservare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end."
+Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5),
+the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37373] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium,
+<i>ea quae sunt secundum se mala, nullo fine bene fieri
+possunt</i>. Homicidium autem est occisio innocentis, et hoc nullo
+modo bene fieri potest. Sed iudex qui occidit latronem, vel miles
+qui occidit hostem reipublicae, non appellantur homicidae, ut
+Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio.</p></div></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q89" class="div3">
+<h3 id="FS_Q89-p0.1">Q. 89. OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+<div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
+<p id="FS_Q89-p2"> We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q89-p3"><a href="#FS_Q89_A1"> (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p4"><a href="#FS_Q89_A2"> (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>);
+</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p5"><a href="#FS_Q89_A3"> (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p6"><a href="#FS_Q89_A4"> (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p7"><a href="#FS_Q89_A5"> (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p8"><a href="#FS_Q89_A6"> (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?</a></p>
+</div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 pr."><a name="37374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37374]
+Iª-IIae q. 89 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
+peccato veniali secundum se. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo,
+utrum peccatum veniale causet maculam in anima. Secundo, de
+distinctione peccati venialis, prout figuratur per lignum, faenum
+et stipulam, I Cor. III. Tertio, utrum homo in statu innocentiae
+potuerit peccare venialiter. Quarto, utrum Angelus bonus vel malus
+possit peccare venialiter. Quinto, utrum primi motus infidelium
+sint peccata venialia. Sexto, utrum peccatum veniale possit esse in
+aliquo simul cum solo peccato originali.</p></div></div></div>
+<div id="FS_Q89_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A1-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 1. Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that
+if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse.
+But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37375] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale causet maculam in
+anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Poenit., quod peccata
+venialia, si multiplicentur, decorem nostrum ita exterminant, ut a
+caelestis sponsi amplexibus nos separent. Sed nihil aliud est
+macula quam detrimentum decoris. Ergo peccata venialia causant
+maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections.
+But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the
+soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37376] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum mortale causat maculam in anima propter inordinationem
+actus et affectus ipsius peccantis. Sed in peccato veniali est
+quaedam deordinatio actus et affectus. Ergo peccatum veniale causat
+maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q86_A1" id="FS_Q89_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings
+a stain on the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37377] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+macula animae causatur ex contactu rei temporalis per amorem, ut
+supra dictum est. Sed in peccato veniali anima inordinato amore
+contingit rem temporalem. Ergo peccatum veniale inducit maculam in
+anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> it is written, (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some
+grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37378] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Ephes. V, <i>ut exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam
+Ecclesiam non habentem maculam</i>; Glossa, <i>idest aliquod
+peccatum criminale</i>. Ergo proprium peccati mortalis esse videtur
+quod maculam in anima causet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p6"> I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be
+seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the
+body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting
+from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to
+speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but
+not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we
+shall show further on (
+<a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q24_A10" id="FS_Q89_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[24], A[10]</a>; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained,
+wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual
+rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however,
+we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness
+that results from acts of virtue.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 co."><a name="37379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37379] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, macula importat detrimentum
+nitoris ex aliquo contactu, sicut in corporalibus patet, ex quibus
+per similitudinem nomen maculae ad animam transfertur. Sicut autem
+in corpore est duplex nitor, unus quidem ex intrinseca dispositione
+membrorum et coloris, alius autem ex exteriori claritate
+superveniente; ita etiam in anima est duplex nitor, unus quidem
+habitualis, quasi intrinsecus, alius autem actualis, quasi exterior
+fulgor. Peccatum autem veniale impedit quidem nitorem actualem, non
+tamen habitualem, quia non excludit neque diminuit habitum
+caritatis et aliarum virtutum, ut infra patebit, sed solum impedit
+earum actum. Macula autem importat aliquid manens in re maculata,
+unde magis videtur pertinere ad detrimentum habitualis nitoris quam
+actualis. Unde, proprie loquendo, peccatum veniale non causat
+maculam in anima. Et si alicubi dicatur maculam inducere, hoc est
+secundum quid, inquantum impedit nitorem qui est ex actibus
+virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would
+not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37380] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in eo casu in quo multa
+peccata venialia dispositive inducunt ad mortale. Aliter enim non
+separarent ab amplexu caelestis sponsi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37381] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod inordinatio actus in peccato mortali corrumpit
+habitum virtutis, non autem in peccato veniali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which
+accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man
+does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37382] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod in peccato mortali anima per amorem contingit rem
+temporalem quasi finem, et per hoc totaliter impeditur influxus
+splendoris gratiae, qui provenit in eos qui Deo adhaerent ut ultimo
+fini per caritatem. Sed in peccato veniali non adhaeret homo
+creaturae tanquam fini ultimo. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are
+said (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions
+are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37383] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccata venialia per
+lignum, faenum et stipulam designentur. Lignum enim, faenum et
+stipula dicuntur superaedificari spirituali fundamento. Sed peccata
+venialia sunt praeter spirituale aedificium, sicut etiam quaelibet
+falsae opiniones sunt praeter scientiam. Ergo peccata venialia non
+convenienter designantur per lignum, faenum et stipulam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to
+which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37384] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, sic salvus erit
+quasi per ignem. Sed quandoque ille qui committit peccata venialia,
+non erit salvus etiam per ignem, puta cum peccata venialia
+inveniuntur in eo qui decedit cum peccato mortali. Ergo
+inconvenienter per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata venialia
+designantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those
+who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for
+it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably
+designated by these three.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37385] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+secundum apostolum, alii sunt qui aedificant aurum, argentum,
+lapides pretiosos, idest amorem Dei et proximi et bona opera; et
+alii qui aedificant lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sed peccata
+venialia committunt etiam illi qui diligunt Deum et proximum, et
+bona opera faciunt, dicitur enim I Ioan. I, <i>si dixerimus quia
+peccatum non habemus, nosipsos seducimus</i>. Ergo non convenienter
+designantur peccata venialia per ista tria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p5">
+<b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under
+these three.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37386] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
+multo plures differentiae et gradus sunt peccatorum venialium quam
+tres. Ergo inconvenienter sub his tribus comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment,
+but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[87], A[5]</a>). Therefore these three signify venial sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37387] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod apostolus dicit de eo qui superaedificat lignum, faenum et
+stipulam, quod salvus erit quasi per ignem, et sic patietur poenam,
+sed non aeternam. Reatus autem poenae temporalis proprie pertinet
+ad peccatum veniale, ut dictum est. Ergo per illa tria
+significantur peccata venialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p7">
+<b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and
+precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine
+disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the
+Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble
+cannot be understood to denote mortal sins.
+</p><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p8"> Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed
+with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or
+of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of
+these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be
+reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are
+designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble."
+</p><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p9"> We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things,
+are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the
+house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice
+remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life,
+and yet he is saved for ever.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 co."><a name="37388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37388] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt fundamentum esse fidem informem,
+super quam aliqui aedificant bona opera, quae significantur per
+aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos; quidam vero peccata etiam
+mortalia, quae significantur, secundum eos, per lignum, faenum et
+stipulam. Sed hanc expositionem improbat Augustinus, in libro de
+fide et operibus, quia, ut apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, qui opera
+carnis facit, regnum Dei non consequetur, quod est salvum fieri;
+apostolus autem dicit quod ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et
+stipulam, salvus erit quasi per ignem. Unde non potest intelligi
+quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata mortalia designentur.
+Quidam vero dicunt quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam
+significantur opera bona, quae superaedificantur quidem spirituali
+aedificio, sed tamen commiscent se eis peccata venialia sicut, cum
+aliquis habet curam rei familiaris, quod bonum est, commiscet se
+superfluus amor vel uxoris vel filiorum vel possessionum, sub Deo
+tamen, ita scilicet quod pro his homo nihil vellet facere contra
+Deum. Sed hoc iterum non videtur convenienter dici. Manifestum est
+enim quod omnia opera bona referuntur ad caritatem Dei et proximi,
+unde pertinent ad aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos. Non ergo ad
+lignum, faenum et stipulam. Et ideo dicendum est quod ipsa peccata
+venialia quae admiscent se procurantibus terrena, significantur per
+lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sicut enim huiusmodi congregantur in
+domo, et non pertinent ad substantiam aedificii, et possunt comburi
+aedificio remanente; ita etiam peccata venialia multiplicantur in
+homine, manente spirituali aedificio; et pro istis patitur ignem
+vel temporalis tribulationis in hac vita, vel Purgatorii post hanc
+vitam; et tamen salutem consequitur aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because
+they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.136.1" target="asv">Ps. 136:1</a>): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37389] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non dicuntur superaedificari
+spirituali fundamento quasi directe supra ipsum posita, sed quia
+ponuntur iuxta ipsum; sicut accipitur ibi, super flumina Babylonis,
+idest iuxta. Quia peccata venialia non destruunt spirituale
+aedificium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon"
+the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according
+to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble,
+but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and
+consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37390] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non dicitur de quocumque aedificante lignum, faenum
+et stipulam, quod salvus sit quasi per ignem, sed solum de eo qui
+aedificat supra fundamentum. Quod quidem non est fides informis, ut
+quidam aestimabant, sed fides formata caritate, secundum illud
+Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Ille ergo qui
+decedit cum peccato mortali et venialibus, habet quidem lignum,
+faenum et stipulam, sed non superaedificata supra fundamentum
+spirituale. Et ideo non erit salvus sic quasi per ignem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p12">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial
+sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these
+do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable
+to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove
+them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37391] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illi qui sunt abstracti a cura temporalium rerum,
+etsi aliquando venialiter peccent, tamen levia peccata venialia
+committunt, et frequentissime per fervorem caritatis purgantur.
+Unde tales non superaedificant venialia, quia in eis modicum
+manent. Sed peccata venialia ipsorum qui circa terrena occupantur,
+diutius manent, quia non ita frequenter recurrere possunt ad
+huiusmodi peccata delenda per caritatis fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p13">
+<b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end."
+Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble,"
+which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly,
+according as man is more or less attached to them.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37392] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
+dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo, omnia tribus
+includuntur, scilicet principio, medio et fine. Et secundum hoc,
+omnes gradus venialium peccatorum ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad
+lignum, quod diutius manet in igne; ad stipulam, quae citissime
+expeditur; ad faenum, quod medio modo se habet. Secundum enim quod
+peccata venialia sunt maioris vel minoris adhaerentiae vel
+gravitatis, citius vel tardius per ignem purgantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A3-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 3. Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14, </a> "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken
+as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial
+sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37393] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae potuerit
+peccare venialiter. Quia super illud I ad Tim. II, <i>Adam non est
+seductus</i>, dicit Glossa, <i>inexpertus divinae severitatis, in
+eo falli potuit, ut crederet veniale esse commissum</i>. Sed hoc
+non credidisset, nisi venialiter peccare potuisset. Ergo venialiter
+peccare potuit, non peccando mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first
+of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded
+man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like
+manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of
+making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to
+have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.3" target="asv">Gn. 3:3</a>): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed
+a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37394] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., <i>non est arbitrandum
+quod esset hominem deiecturus tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima
+hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda</i>. Elatio autem deiectionem
+praecedens, quae facta est per peccatum mortale, non potuit esse
+nisi peccatum veniale. Similiter etiam in eodem Augustinus dicit
+quod <i>virum sollicitavit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum
+mulierem videret, sumpto vetito pomo, non esse mortuam</i>. Videtur
+etiam in Eva fuisse aliquis infidelitatis motus, in hoc quod de
+verbis domini dubitavit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, ne forte
+moriamur, ut habetur Gen. III. Haec autem videntur esse venialia
+peccata. Ergo homo potuit venialiter peccare, antequam mortaliter
+peccaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally
+notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37395] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+peccatum mortale magis opponitur integritati primi status quam
+peccatum veniale. Sed homo potuit peccare mortaliter, non obstante
+integritate primi status. Ergo etiam potuit peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ.
+Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not
+change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37396] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod cuilibet peccato debetur aliqua poena. Sed nihil poenale
+esse potuit in statu innocentiae, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ.
+Dei. Ergo non potuit peccare aliquo peccato quo non eiiceretur ab
+illo integritatis statu. Sed peccatum veniale non mutat statum
+hominis. Ergo non potuit peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q89_A3-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood
+as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he
+had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another
+species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow
+or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into
+mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin
+venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the
+original state by sinning mortally.
+</p><p id="FS_Q89_A3-p7"> The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden
+movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order
+of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers
+not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the
+sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the
+fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good,
+as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order
+of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the
+end,
+which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10],
+AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q95_A1" id="FS_Q89_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a>, there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained
+subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all
+the
+highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of
+innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.
+</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 co."><a name="37397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37397] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod communiter ponitur quod homo in statu innocentiae non
+potuit venialiter peccare. Hoc autem non est sic intelligendum,
+quasi id quod nobis est veniale, si ipse committeret, esset sibi
+mortale, propter altitudinem sui status. Dignitas enim personae est
+quaedam circumstantia aggravans peccatum, non tamen transfert in
+aliam speciem, nisi forte superveniente deformitate inobedientiae
+vel voti, vel alicuius huiusmodi, quod in proposito dici non
+potest. Unde id quod est de se veniale, non potuit transferri in
+mortale, propter dignitatem primi status. Sic ergo intelligendum
+est quod non potuit peccare venialiter, quia non potuit esse ut
+committeret aliquid quod esset de se veniale, antequam integritatem
+primi status amitteret peccando mortaliter. Cuius ratio est quia
+peccatum veniale in nobis contingit vel propter imperfectionem
+actus, sicut subiti motus in genere peccatorum mortalium, vel
+propter inordinationem existentem circa ea quae sunt ad finem,
+servato debito ordine ad finem. Utrumque autem horum contingit
+propter quendam defectum ordinis, ex eo quod inferius non
+continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat
+subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non
+est omnino subdita rationi. Quod vero insurgat subitus motus in
+ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus
+rationis non subditur deliberationi quae est ex altiori bono, ut
+supra dictum est. Quod vero humanus animus inordinetur circa ea
+quae sunt ad finem, servato debito ordine ad finem, provenit ex hoc
+quod ea quae sunt ad finem non ordinantur infallibiliter sub fine,
+qui tenet summum locum, quasi principium in appetibilibus, ut supra
+dictum est. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in primo habitum est,
+erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur
+sub superiori, quandiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut
+etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Et ideo oportebat quod
+inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum
+hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale. Ex quo
+patet quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit peccare venialiter,
+antequam peccaret mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily
+forgiven.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37398] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod veniale non sumitur ibi secundum quod nunc de
+veniali loquimur, sed dicitur veniale quod est facile
+remissibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into
+the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by
+doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be
+held in check by the precept.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37399] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod illa elatio quae praecessit in animo hominis, fuit
+primum hominis peccatum mortale, dicitur autem praecessisse
+deiectionem eius in exteriorem actum peccati. Huiusmodi autem
+elationem subsecuta est et experiendi cupiditas in viro, et
+dubitatio in muliere; quae ex hoc solo in quandam elationem
+prorupit, quod praecepti mentionem a serpente audivit, quasi nollet
+sub praecepto contineri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p10">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin
+cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is
+that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37400] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod peccatum mortale intantum opponitur integritati primi
+status, quod corrumpit ipsum, quod peccatum veniale facere non
+potest. Et quia non potest simul esse quaecumque inordinatio cum
+integritate primi status, consequens est quod primus homo non
+potuerit peccare venialiter, antequam peccaret mortaliter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A4-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 4. Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul
+which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels."
+But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37401] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus bonus vel malus possit peccare
+venialiter. Homo enim cum Angelis convenit in superiori animae
+parte, quae mens vocatur; secundum illud Gregorii, in Homil.,
+<i>homo intelligit cum Angelis</i>. Sed homo secundum superiorem
+partem animae potest peccare venialiter. Ergo et Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally.
+Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37402] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+quicumque potest quod est plus, potest etiam quod est minus. Sed
+Angelus potuit diligere bonum creatum plus quam Deum, quod fecit
+peccando mortaliter. Ergo etiam potuit bonum creatum diligere infra
+Deum inordinate, venialiter peccando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like
+frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above
+<a href="#FS_Q89_A3" id="FS_Q89_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37403] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Angeli mali videntur aliqua facere quae sunt ex genere suo venialia
+peccata, provocando homines ad risum, et ad alias huiusmodi
+levitates. Sed circumstantia personae non facit de veniali mortale,
+ut dictum est, nisi speciali prohibitione superveniente, quod non
+est in proposito. Ergo Angelus potest peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive
+state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37404] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod maior est perfectio Angeli quam perfectio hominis in primo
+statu. Sed homo in primo statu non potuit peccare venialiter. Ergo
+multo minus Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> An angel's intellect, as stated above in the
+<a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>;
+<a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A8" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>, is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do.
+Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles.
+Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72],
+A[5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means,
+except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in
+respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin.
+Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts
+are
+acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination
+to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does
+not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them (
+<a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q63_A4" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[63], A[4]</a>; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 co."><a name="37405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37405] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod intellectus Angeli, sicut in primo dictum est, non
+est discursivus, ut scilicet procedat a principiis in conclusiones,
+seorsum utrumque intelligens, sicut in nobis contingit. Unde
+oportet quod quandocumque considerat conclusiones, consideret eas
+prout sunt in principiis. In appetibilibus autem, sicut multoties
+dictum est, fines sunt sicut principia; ea vero quae sunt ad finem,
+sunt sicut conclusiones. Unde mens Angeli non fertur in ea quae
+sunt ad finem, nisi secundum quod constant sub ordine finis.
+Propter hoc ex natura sua habent quod non possit in eis esse
+deordinatio circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi simul sit deordinatio
+circa finem ipsum, quod est per peccatum mortale. Sed Angeli boni
+non moventur in ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi in ordine ad finem
+debitum, qui est Deus. Et propter hoc omnes eorum actus sunt actus
+caritatis. Et sic in eis non potest esse peccatum veniale. Angeli
+vero mali in nihil moventur nisi in ordine ad finem peccati
+superbiae ipsorum. Et ideo in omnibus peccant mortaliter,
+quaecumque propria voluntate agunt. Secus autem est de appetitu
+naturalis boni qui est in eis, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37406] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod homo convenit quidem cum Angelis in mente, sive
+in intellectu; sed differt in modo intelligendi, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end,
+or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37407] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod Angelus non potuit minus diligere creaturam quam
+Deum, nisi simul referens eam in Deum, sicut in ultimum finem, vel
+aliquem finem inordinatum, ratione iam dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal
+sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37408] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod omnia illa quae videntur esse venialia, Daemones
+procurant ut homines ad sui familiaritatem attrahant, et sic
+deducant eos in peccatum mortale. Unde in omnibus talibus
+mortaliter peccant, propter intentionem finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A5-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 5. Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.1" target="asv">Rom. 8:1</a>) that "there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking
+there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the
+flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus.
+Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37409] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod primi motus sensualitatis in
+infidelibus sint peccata mortalia. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom.
+VIII, quod <i>nihil est damnationis his qui sunt in Christo Iesu,
+qui non secundum carnem ambulant</i>, et loquitur ibi de
+concupiscentia sensualitatis, ut ex praemissis apparet. Haec ergo
+causa est quare concupiscere non sit damnabile his qui non secundum
+carnem ambulant, consentiendo scilicet concupiscentiae, quia sunt
+in Christo Iesu. Sed infideles non sunt in Christo Iesu. Ergo in
+infidelibus est damnabile. Primi igitur motus infidelium sunt
+peccata mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow
+the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore,
+since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence
+in unbelievers are mortal sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37410] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+Anselmus dicit, in libro de gratia et Lib. Arb., <i>qui non sunt in
+Christo, sentientes carnem, sequuntur damnationem, etiam si non
+secundum carnem ambulant</i>. Sed damnatio non debetur nisi peccato
+mortali. Ergo, cum homo sentiat carnem secundum primum motum
+concupiscentiae, videtur quod primus motus concupiscentiae in
+infidelibus sit peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this
+liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence
+in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37411] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+Anselmus dicit, in eodem libro, <i>sic factus est homo, ut
+concupiscentiam sentire non deberet</i>. Hoc autem debitum videtur
+homini remissum per gratiam baptismalem, quam infideles non habent.
+Ergo quandocumque infidelis concupiscit, etiam si non consentiat,
+peccat mortaliter, contra debitum faciens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34 </a>that "God is not a respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to
+another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to
+unbelievers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37412] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quod dicitur Act. X, <i>non est personarum acceptor Deus</i>.
+Quod ergo uni non imputat ad damnationem, nec alteri. Sed primos
+motus fidelibus non imputat ad damnationem. Ergo etiam nec
+infidelibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This
+is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q79_A4" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements
+of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins.
+Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary,
+increases it, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q73_A10" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[73], A[10]</a>). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever
+are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in
+my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.29" target="asv"> Heb. 10:29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean,
+by which he was sanctified?"
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 co."><a name="37413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37413] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod irrationabiliter dicitur quod primi motus infidelium
+sint peccata mortalia, si eis non consentiatur. Et hoc patet
+dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia ipsa sensualitas non potest esse
+subiectum peccati mortalis, ut supra habitum est. Est autem eadem
+natura sensualitatis in infidelibus et fidelibus. Unde non potest
+esse quod solus motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sit peccatum
+mortale. Alio modo, ex statu ipsius peccantis. Nunquam enim
+dignitas personae diminuit peccatum, sed magis auget, ut ex supra
+dictis patet. Unde nec peccatum est minus in fideli quam in
+infideli, sed multo maius. Nam et infidelium peccata magis merentur
+veniam, propter ignorantiam, secundum illud I ad Tim. I,
+<i>misericordiam Dei consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in
+incredulitate mea</i>; et peccata fidelium aggravantur propter
+gratiae sacramenta, secundum illud Heb. X, <i>quanto magis putatis
+deteriora mereri supplicia, qui sanguinem testamenti, in quo
+sanctificatus est, pollutum duxerit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ,
+although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them
+a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37414] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de damnatione debita peccato
+originali, quae aufertur per gratiam Iesu Christi, quamvis maneat
+concupiscentiae fomes. Unde hoc quod fideles concupiscunt, non est
+in eis signum damnationis originalis peccati, sicut est in
+infidelibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p8"> In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37415] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Et hoc etiam
+modo intelligendum est dictum Anselmi. Unde patet solutio ad
+secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability
+pertains, not to actual but to original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37416] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod illud debitum non concupiscendi erat per originalem
+iustitiam. Unde id quod opponitur tali debito, non pertinet ad
+peccatum actuale, sed ad peccatum originale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A6-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 6. Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p2">
+<b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is
+a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (
+<a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q89_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[3]</a>). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes
+unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37417] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum
+sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit esse in aliquo
+cum solo originali. Dispositio enim praecedit habitum. Sed veniale
+est dispositio ad mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo veniale in
+infideli, cui non remittitur originale, invenitur ante mortale. Et
+sic quandoque infideles habent peccata venialia cum originali, sine
+mortalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p3">
+<b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an
+unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit
+a venial sin without committing a mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37418] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
+minus habet de connexione et convenientia veniale cum mortali, quam
+mortale peccatum cum mortali. Sed infidelis subiectus originali
+peccato, potest committere unum peccatum mortale et non aliud. Ergo
+etiam potest committere peccatum veniale, et non mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p4">
+<b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes
+to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals.
+Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin
+can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37419] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
+determinari potest tempus in quo puer primo potest esse actor
+peccati actualis. Ad quod tempus cum pervenerit, potest ad minus
+per aliquod breve spatium stare, quin peccet mortaliter, quia hoc
+etiam in maximis sceleratis contingit. In illo autem spatio,
+quantumcumque brevi, potest peccare venialiter. Ergo peccatum
+veniale potest esse in aliquo cum originali peccato, absque
+mortali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p5">
+<b>On the contrary,</b> Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on (
+<a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q69_A6" id="FS_Q89_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[69], A[6]</a>): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished
+for venial sin with no other than original sin.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37420] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra
+est quia pro peccato originali puniuntur homines in Limbo puerorum,
+ubi non est poena sensus, ut infra dicetur. In Inferno autem
+detruduntur homines propter solum peccatum mortale. Ergo non erit
+locus in quo possit puniri ille qui habet peccatum veniale cum
+originali solo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p6">
+<b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because
+before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin,
+wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins
+to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal
+sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself
+to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself
+to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing
+that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until
+afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 co."><a name="37421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37421] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo
+dicendum quod impossibile est quod peccatum veniale sit in aliquo
+cum originali peccato, absque mortali. Cuius ratio est quia
+antequam ad annos discretionis perveniat, defectus aetatis,
+prohibens usum rationis, excusat eum a peccato mortali, unde multo
+magis excusat eum a peccato veniali, si committat aliquid quod sit
+ex genere suo tale. Cum vero usum rationis habere inceperit, non
+omnino excusatur a culpa venialis et mortalis peccati. Sed primum
+quod tunc homini cogitandum occurrit, est deliberare de seipso. Et
+si quidem seipsum ordinaverit ad debitum finem, per gratiam
+consequetur remissionem originalis peccati. Si vero non ordinet
+seipsum ad debitum finem, secundum quod in illa aetate est capax
+discretionis, peccabit mortaliter, non faciens quod in se est. Et
+ex tunc non erit in eo peccatum veniale sine mortali, nisi postquam
+totum fuerit sibi per gratiam remissum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p7">
+<b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes
+to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37422] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum
+ergo dicendum quod veniale non est dispositio ex necessitate
+praecedens mortale, sed contingenter, sicut labor disponit
+quandoque ad febrem, non autem sicut calor disponit ad formam
+ignis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p8">
+<b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on
+account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37423] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
+dicendum quod non impeditur peccatum veniale esse simul cum solo
+originali propter distantiam eius vel convenientiam; sed propter
+defectum usus rationis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9">
+<b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from
+the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has
+discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing
+in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's
+affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (
+<a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you."
+</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37424] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
+dicendum quod ab aliis peccatis mortalibus potest puer incipiens
+habere usum rationis, per aliquod tempus abstinere, sed a peccato
+omissionis praedictae non liberatur, nisi quam cito potest, se
+convertat ad Deum. Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem
+habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad
+finem, finis enim est prior in intentione. Et ideo hoc est tempus
+pro quo obligatur ex Dei praecepto affirmativo, quo dominus dicit,
+<i>convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos</i>, Zachariae
+I.</p></div></div></div></div>
+`
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>

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