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| author | Henry S. Thompson <ht@inf.ed.ac.uk> |
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| date | Sat, 03 May 2025 22:47:32 +0100 |
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<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <head> <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> <style> h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm; orphans: 2; widows: 2; } @media print {div.div3 {page-break-before: always}} </style> </head> <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FS.v" class="div2"> <h2 id="FS.v-p0.1">TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[55]-70)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FS_Q55">Q. 55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q56">Q. 56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q57">Q. 57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q58">Q. 58. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q59">Q. 59. OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q60">Q. 60. HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q61">Q. 61. OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q62">Q. 62. OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q63">Q. 63. OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q64">Q. 64. OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q65">Q. 65. OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q66">Q. 66. OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q67">Q. 67. OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q68">Q. 68. OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q69">Q. 69. OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q70">Q. 70. OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q71">Q. 71. EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q72">Q. 72. OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q73">Q. 73. OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q74">Q. 74. OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q75">Q. 75. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FS_Q76">Q. 76. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q77">Q. 77. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q78">Q. 78. OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q79">Q. 79. OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q80">Q. 80. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q81">Q. 81. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q82">Q. 82. OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q83">Q. 83. OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q84">Q. 84. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q85">Q. 85. OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q86">Q. 86. OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q87">Q. 87. OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q88">Q. 88. OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FS_Q89">Q. 89. OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/></div> <div id="FS_Q55" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q55-p0.1">Q. 55. OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q55-p2"> We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A3" id="FS_Q55-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[3]</a>), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue. </p><p id="FS_Q55-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q55-p4"><a href="#FS_Q55_A1"> (1) Whether human virtue is a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p5"><a href="#FS_Q55_A2"> (2) Whether it is an operative habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p6"><a href="#FS_Q55_A3"> (3) Whether it is a good habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q55-p7"><a href="#FS_Q55_A4"> (4) Of the definition of virtue.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 pr."><a name="35787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35787] Iª-IIae q. 55 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de habitibus in speciali. Et quia habitus, ut dictum est, distinguuntur per bonum et malum, primo dicendum est de habitibus bonis, qui sunt virtutes et alia eis adiuncta, scilicet dona, beatitudines et fructus; secundo, de habitibus malis, scilicet de vitiis et peccatis. Circa virtutes autem quinque consideranda sunt, primo, de essentia virtutis; secundo, de subiecto eius; tertio, de divisione virtutum; quarto, de causa virtutis; quinto, de quibusdam proprietatibus virtutis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum virtus humana sit habitus. Secundo, utrum sit habitus operativus. Tertio, utrum sit habitus bonus. Quarto, de definitione virtutis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q55_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A1-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 1. Whether human virtue is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is "the limit of power" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35788] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sit habitus. Virtus enim est <i>ultimum potentiae</i>, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed ultimum uniuscuiusque reducitur ad genus illud cuius est ultimum, sicut punctum ad genus lineae. Ergo virtus reducitur ad genus potentiae, et non ad genus habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that "virtue is good use of free-will." But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35789] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in II de libero Arbit., quod <i>virtus est bonus usus liberi arbitrii</i>. Sed usus liberi arbitrii est actus. Ergo virtus non est habitus, sed actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35790] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, habitibus non meremur, sed actibus, alioquin homo mereretur continue, etiam dormiendo. Sed virtutibus meremur. Ergo virtutes non sunt habitus, sed actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "virtue is the order of love," and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that "the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use." Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="35791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35791] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod <i>virtus est ordo amoris</i>. Et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod <i>ordinatio quae virtus vocatur, est fruendis frui, et utendis uti</i>. Ordo autem, seu ordinatio, nominat vel actum, vel relationem. Ergo virtus non est habitus, sed actus vel relatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither therefore are human virtues habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="35792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35792] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, sicut inveniuntur virtutes humanae, ita et virtutes naturales. Sed virtutes naturales non sunt habitus, sed potentiae quaedam. Ergo etiam neque virtutes humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35793] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in libro Praedicament., scientiam et virtutem ponit esse habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A1-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act. </p><p id="FS_Q55_A1-p9"> Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q55_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a> ). Therefore human virtues are habits. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 co."><a name="35794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35794] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtus nominat quandam potentiae perfectionem. Uniuscuiusque autem perfectio praecipue consideratur in ordine ad suum finem. Finis autem potentiae actus est. Unde potentia dicitur esse perfecta, secundum quod determinatur ad suum actum. Sunt autem quaedam potentiae quae secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad suos actus; sicut potentiae naturales activae. Et ideo huiusmodi potentiae naturales secundum seipsas dicuntur virtutes. Potentiae autem rationales, quae sunt propriae hominis, non sunt determinatae ad unum, sed se habent indeterminate ad multa, determinantur autem ad actus per habitus, sicut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo virtutes humanae habitus sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When therefore we say that "virtue is the limit of power," virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say 'strength,' which is the original signification of the Latin 'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35795] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quandoque virtus dicitur id ad quod est virtus, scilicet vel obiectum virtutis, vel actus eius, sicut fides dicitur quandoque id quod creditur, quandoque vero ipsum credere, quandoque autem ipse habitus quo creditur. Unde quando dicitur quod virtus est ultimum potentiae, sumitur virtus pro obiecto virtutis. Id enim in quod ultimo potentia potest, est id ad quod dicitur virtus rei, sicut si aliquis potest ferre centum libras et non plus, virtus eius consideratur secundum centum libras, non autem secundum sexaginta. Obiectio autem procedebat ac si essentialiter virtus esset ultimum potentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35796] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bonus usus liberi arbitrii dicitur esse virtus, secundum eandem rationem, quia scilicet est id ad quod ordinatur virtus sicut ad proprium actum. Nihil est enim aliud actus virtutis quam bonus usus liberi arbitrii.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35797] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquo dicimur mereri dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ipso merito, eo modo quo dicimur currere cursu, et hoc modo meremur actibus. Alio modo dicimur mereri aliquo sicut principio merendi, sicut dicimur currere potentia motiva, et sic dicimur mereri virtutibus et habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is set in order by virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="35798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35798] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod virtus dicitur ordo vel ordinatio amoris, sicut id ad quod est virtus, per virtutem enim ordinatur amor in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A1-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we have said. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="35799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35799] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod potentiae naturales sunt de se determinatae ad unum, non autem potentiae rationales. Et ideo non est simile, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A2-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 2. Whether human virtue is an operative habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35800] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis humanae quod sit habitus operativus. Dicit enim Tullius, in IV de Tuscul. quaest., quod sicut est sanitas et pulchritudo corporis, ita est virtus animae. Sed sanitas et pulchritudo non sunt habitus operativi. Ergo neque etiam virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35801] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in rebus naturalibus invenitur virtus non solum ad agere, sed etiam ad esse, ut patet per philosophum, in I de caelo, quod quaedam habent virtutem ut sint semper, quaedam vero non ad hoc quod sint semper, sed aliquo tempore determinato. Sed sicut se habet virtus naturalis in rebus naturalibus, ita se habet virtus humana in rationalibus. Ergo etiam virtus humana non solum est ad agere, sed etiam ad esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3" target="asv">Eccl. 3</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.6" target="asv">6</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Eccl.14" target="asv">14</a>) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35802] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum. Optimum autem ad quod hominem oportet disponi per virtutem, est ipse Deus, ut probat Augustinus in libro II de moribus Eccles.; ad quem disponitur anima per assimilationem ad ipsum. Ergo videtur quod virtus dicatur qualitas quaedam animae in ordine ad Deum, tanquam assimilativa ad ipsum, non autem in ordine ad operationem. Non igitur est habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that "virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35803] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus uniuscuiusque rei est quae opus eius bonum reddit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q55_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word 'potentia' is rendered 'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act. </p><p id="FS_Q55_A2-p7"> Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 co."><a name="35804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35804] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtus, ex ipsa ratione nominis, importat quandam perfectionem potentiae, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum duplex sit potentia, scilicet potentia ad esse et potentia ad agere, utriusque potentiae perfectio virtus vocatur. Sed potentia ad esse se tenet ex parte materiae, quae est ens in potentia, potentia autem ad agere se tenet ex parte formae, quae est principium agendi, eo quod unumquodque agit inquantum est actu. In constitutione autem hominis, corpus se habet sicut materia, anima vero sicut forma. Et quantum quidem ad corpus, homo communicat cum aliis animalibus; et similiter quantum ad vires quae sunt animae et corpori communes; solae autem illae vires quae sunt propriae animae, scilicet rationales, sunt hominis tantum. Et ideo virtus humana, de qua loquimur, non potest pertinere ad corpus; sed pertinet tantum ad id quod est proprium animae. Unde virtus humana non importat ordinem ad esse, sed magis ad agere. Et ideo de ratione virtutis humanae est quod sit habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35805] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod modus actionis sequitur dispositionem agentis, unumquodque enim quale est, talia operatur. Et ideo, cum virtus sit principium aliqualis operationis, oportet quod in operante praeexistat secundum virtutem aliqua conformis dispositio. Facit autem virtus operationem ordinatam. Et ideo ipsa virtus est quaedam dispositio ordinata in anima, secundum scilicet quod potentiae animae ordinantur aliqualiter ad invicem, et ad id quod est extra. Et ideo virtus, inquantum est conveniens dispositio animae, assimilatur sanitati et pulchritudini, quae sunt debitae dispositiones corporis. Sed per hoc non excluditur quin virtus etiam sit operationis principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35806] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus quae est ad esse, non est propria hominis, sed solum virtus quae est ad opera rationis, quae sunt propria hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q55_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35807] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum Dei substantia sit eius actio, summa assimilatio hominis ad Deum est secundum aliquam operationem. Unde, sicut supra dictum est, felicitas sive beatitudo, per quam homo maxime Deo conformatur, quae est finis humanae vitae, in operatione consistit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A3-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 3. Whether human virtue is a good habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But there is a virtue even of sin; according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.56" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:56</a>: "The virtue [Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law." Therefore virtue is not always a good habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35808] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis quod sit habitus bonus. Peccatum enim in malo semper sumitur. Sed etiam peccati est aliqua virtus; secundum illud I ad Cor. XV, <i>virtus peccati lex</i>. Ergo virtus non semper est habitus bonus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5" target="asv">Is. 5</a>: "Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness." Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35809] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtus potentiae respondet. Sed potentia non solum se habet ad bonum, sed etiam ad malum; secundum illud Isaiae V, <i>vae, qui potentes estis ad bibendum vinum, et viri fortes ad miscendam ebrietatem</i>. Ergo etiam virtus se habet et ad bonum et ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "Virtue [Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity." But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35810] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, secundum apostolum, II ad Cor. XII, virtus in infirmitate perficitur. Sed infirmitas est quoddam malum. Ergo virtus non solum se habet ad bonum, sed etiam ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): "No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35811] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., <i>nemo autem dubitaverit quod virtus animam facit optimam</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q55_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 co."><a name="35812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35812] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus importat perfectionem potentiae, unde virtus cuiuslibet rei determinatur ad ultimum in quod res potest, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Ultimum autem in quod unaquaeque potentia potest, oportet quod sit bonum, nam omne malum defectum quendam importat; unde Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omne malum est infirmum. Et propter hoc oportet quod virtus cuiuslibet rei dicatur in ordine ad bonum. Unde virtus humana, quae est habitus operativus, est bonus habitus, et boni operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil things: so that the "virtue" of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35813] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut perfectum, ita et bonum dicitur metaphorice in malis, dicitur enim et perfectus fur sive latro, et bonus fur sive latro; ut patet per philosophum, in V Metaphys. Secundum hoc ergo, etiam virtus metaphorice in malis dicitur. Et sic virtus peccati dicitur lex, inquantum scilicet per legem occasionaliter est peccatum augmentatum, et quasi ad maximum suum posse pervenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35814] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod malum ebrietatis et nimiae potationis, consistit in defectu ordinis rationis. Contingit autem, cum defectu rationis, esse aliquam potentiam inferiorem perfectam ad id quod est sui generis, etiam cum repugnantia vel cum defectu rationis. Perfectio autem talis potentiae, cum sit cum defectu rationis, non posset dici virtus humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35815] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod tanto ratio perfectior esse ostenditur, quanto infirmitates corporis et inferiorum partium magis potest vincere seu tolerare. Et ideo virtus humana, quae rationi attribuitur, in infirmitate perfici dicitur, non quidem rationis, sed in infirmitate corporis et inferiorum partium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q55_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q55_A4-p0.1">Q. 55. A. 4. Whether virtue is suitably defined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35816] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio virtutis quae solet assignari, scilicet, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Virtus enim est bonitas hominis, ipsa enim est quae bonum facit habentem. Sed bonitas non videtur esse bona, sicut nec albedo est alba. Igitur inconvenienter dicitur quod virtus est bona qualitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35817] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nulla differentia est communior suo genere, cum sit generis divisiva. Sed bonum est communius quam qualitas, convertitur enim cum ente. Ergo bonum non debet poni in definitione virtutis, ut differentia qualitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35818] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., <i>ubi primo occurrit aliquid quod non sit nobis pecoribusque commune, illud ad mentem pertinet</i>. Sed quaedam virtutes sunt etiam irrationabilium partium; ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Non ergo omnis virtus est bona qualitas mentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35819] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, rectitudo videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, unde idem dicuntur recti, et iusti. Sed iustitia est species virtutis. Inconvenienter ergo ponitur rectum in definitione virtutis, cum dicitur, qua recte vivitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of virtue." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="35820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35820] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque superbit de aliquo, male utitur eo. Sed multi superbiunt de virtute, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, <i>quod superbia etiam bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant</i>. Falsum est ergo quod nemo virtute male utatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.11" target="asv"> Jn. 15:11</a>: "He shall do greater things than these," says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q55_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.11" target="asv">Ap. 11</a>]: "He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee." It is therefore unsuitable to say that "God works virtue in us, without us." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="35821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35821] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, homo per virtutem iustificatur. Sed Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan., <i>maiora horum faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te</i>. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod virtutem Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35822] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p9"> <b>I answer that,</b> This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as "a good quality": for "quality" is the genus of virtue, and the difference, "good." But the definition would be more suitable if for "quality" we substitute "habit," which is the proximate genus. </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p10"> Now virtue has no matter "out of which" it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter "about which" it is concerned, and matter "in which" it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality "of the mind." </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p11"> The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words "by which we live righteously": and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, "of which no one makes bad use." </p><p id="FS_Q55_A4-p12"> Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words "which God works in us without us." If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 co."><a name="35823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35823] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis. Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum. Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis. Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum, sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur. Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as gone, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35824] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente. Unde dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate. Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35825] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35826] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q58_A8" id="FS_Q55_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[58], A[8]</a>). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35827] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod iustitiae est propria rectitudo quae constituitur circa res exteriores quae in usum hominis veniunt, quae sunt propria materia iustitiae, ut infra patebit. Sed rectitudo quae importat ordinem ad finem debitum et ad legem divinam, quae est regula voluntatis humanae, ut supra dictum est, communis est omni virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="35828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35828] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod virtute potest aliquis male uti tanquam obiecto, puta cum male sentit de virtute, cum odit eam, vel superbit de ea, non autem tanquam principio usus, ita scilicet quod malus sit actus virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q55_A4-p18"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, "which God works in us without us." As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 55 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="35829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35829] Iª-IIae q. 55 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q56" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q56-p0.1">Q. 56. OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q56-p2"> We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q56-p3"><a href="#FS_Q56_A1"> (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p4"><a href="#FS_Q56_A2"> (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p5"><a href="#FS_Q56_A3"> (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p6"><a href="#FS_Q56_A4"> (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p7"><a href="#FS_Q56_A5"> (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q56-p8"><a href="#FS_Q56_A6"> (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 pr."><a name="35830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35830] Iª-IIae q. 56 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de subiecto virtutis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum virtus sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Secundo, utrum una virtus possit esse in pluribus potentiis. Tertio, utrum intellectus possit esse subiectum virtutis. Quarto, utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Quinto, utrum vires apprehensivae sensitivae. Sexto, utrum voluntas.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q56_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A1-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 1. Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtue is that by which we live righteously." But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power, but in the essence of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35831] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II de Lib. Arbit., quod virtus est qua recte vivitur. Vivere autem non est per potentiam animae, sed per eius essentiam. Ergo virtus non est in potentia animae, sed in eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise." But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35832] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit</i>. Sed sicut opus constituitur per potentiam, ita habens virtutem constituitur per essentiam animae. Ergo virtus non magis pertinet ad potentiam animae, quam ad eius essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35833] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, potentia est in secunda specie qualitatis. Virtus autem est quaedam qualitas, ut supra dictum est. Qualitatis autem non est qualitas. Ergo virtus non est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> "Virtue is the limit of power" (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35834] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed ultimum est in eo cuius est ultimum. Ergo virtus est in potentia animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q56_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 co."><a name="35835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35835] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtutem pertinere ad potentiam animae, ex tribus potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem, ex ipsa ratione virtutis, quae importat perfectionem potentiae, perfectio autem est in eo cuius est perfectio. Secundo, ex hoc quod est habitus operativus, ut supra dictum est, omnis autem operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam. Tertio, ex hoc quod disponit ad optimum, optimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem a potentia egredientem. Unde virtus humana est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35836] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vivere dupliciter sumitur. Quandoque enim dicitur vivere ipsum esse viventis, et sic pertinet ad essentiam animae, quae est viventi essendi principium. Alio modo vivere dicitur operatio viventis, et sic virtute recte vivitur, inquantum per eam aliquis recte operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35837] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum vel est finis, vel in ordine ad finem dicitur. Et ideo, cum bonum operantis consistat in operatione, hoc etiam ipsum quod virtus facit operantem bonum, refertur ad operationem, et per consequens ad potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35838] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod unum accidens dicitur esse in alio sicut in subiecto, non quia accidens per seipsum possit sustentare aliud accidens, sed quia unum accidens inhaeret substantiae mediante alio accidente, ut color corpori mediante superficie; unde superficies dicitur esse subiectum coloris. Et eo modo potentia animae dicitur esse subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A2-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 2. Whether one virtue can be in several powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35839] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod una virtus possit esse in duabus potentiis. Habitus enim cognoscuntur per actus. Sed unus actus progreditur diversimode a diversis potentiis, sicut ambulatio procedit a ratione ut a dirigente, a voluntate sicut a movente, et a potentia motiva sicut ab exequente. Ergo etiam unus habitus virtutis potest esse in pluribus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35840] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem tria requiruntur, scilicet scire, velle et immobiliter operari. Sed scire pertinet ad intellectum, velle ad voluntatem. Ergo virtus potest esse in pluribus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35841] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, prudentia est in ratione, cum sit recta ratio agibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Est etiam in voluntate, quia non potest esse cum voluntate perversa, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo una virtus potest esse in duabus potentiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35842] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, virtus est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Sed idem accidens non potest esse in pluribus subiectis. Ergo una virtus non potest esse in pluribus potentiis animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 co."><a name="35843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35843] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid esse in duobus, contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod ex aequo sit in utroque. Et sic impossibile est unam virtutem esse in duabus potentiis, quia diversitas potentiarum attenditur secundum generales conditiones obiectorum, diversitas autem habituum secundum speciales; unde ubicumque est diversitas potentiarum, est diversitas habituum, sed non convertitur. Alio modo potest esse aliquid in duobus vel pluribus, non ex aequo, sed ordine quodam. Et sic una virtus pertinere potest ad plures potentias; ita quod in una sit principaliter, et se extendat ad alias per modum diffusionis, vel per modum dispositionis; secundum quod una potentia movetur ab alia, et secundum quod una potentia accipit ab alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various degrees. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35844] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas rationes, et diverso ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To know" is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35845] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod scire praeexigitur ad virtutem moralem, inquantum virtus moralis operatur secundum rationem rectam. Sed essentialiter in appetendo virtus moralis consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further on <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q56_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[57], A[4]). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35846] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia realiter est in ratione sicut in subiecto, sed praesupponit rectitudinem voluntatis sicut principium, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A3-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 3. Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35847] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus non sit subiectum virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod omnis virtus est amor. Subiectum autem amoris non est intellectus, sed solum vis appetitiva. Ergo nulla virtus est in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q56_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35848] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtus ordinatur ad bonum, sicut ex supradictis patet. Bonum autem non est obiectum intellectus, sed appetitivae virtutis. Ergo subiectum virtutis non est intellectus, sed appetitiva virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, virtue is that "which makes its possessor good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35849] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, virtus est quae bonum facit habentem</i>, ut philosophus dicit. Sed habitus perficiens intellectum non facit bonum habentem, non enim propter scientiam vel artem dicitur homo bonus. Ergo intellectus non est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given, of virtue ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35850] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod mens maxime dicitur intellectus. Subiectum autem virtutis est mens; ut patet ex definitione virtutis supra inducta. Ergo intellectus est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q56_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly. </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p7"> And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that "which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise," these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2). </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p8"> Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1]; Q[17], AA[1],5; <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q82_A4" id="FS_Q56_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[82], A[4]</a>): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved by the will. </p><p id="FS_Q56_A3-p9"> Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 co."><a name="35851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35851] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtus est habitus quo quis bene operatur. Dupliciter autem habitus aliquis ordinatur ad bonum actum. Uno modo, inquantum per huiusmodi habitum acquiritur homini facultas ad bonum actum, sicut per habitum grammaticae habet homo facultatem recte loquendi. Non tamen grammatica facit ut homo semper recte loquatur, potest enim grammaticus barbarizare aut soloecismum facere. Et eadem ratio est in aliis scientiis et artibus. Alio modo, aliquis habitus non solum facit facultatem agendi, sed etiam facit quod aliquis recte facultate utatur, sicut iustitia non solum facit quod homo sit promptae voluntatis ad iusta operandum, sed etiam facit ut iuste operetur. Et quia bonum, sicut et ens, non dicitur simpliciter aliquid secundum id quod est in potentia, sed secundum id quod est in actu; ideo ab huiusmodi habitibus simpliciter dicitur homo bonum operari, et esse bonus, puta quia est iustus vel temperatus; et eadem ratio est de similibus. Et quia virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit, huiusmodi habitus simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, quia reddunt bonum opus in actu, et simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Primi vero habitus non simpliciter dicuntur virtutes, quia non reddunt bonum opus nisi in quadam facultate, nec simpliciter faciunt bonum habentem. Non enim dicitur simpliciter aliquis homo bonus, ex hoc quod est sciens vel artifex, sed dicitur bonus solum secundum quid, puta bonus grammaticus, aut bonus faber. Et propter hoc, plerumque scientia et ars contra virtutem dividitur, quandoque autem virtutes dicuntur, ut patet in VI Ethic. Subiectum igitur habitus qui secundum quid dicitur virtus, potest esse intellectus, non solum practicus, sed etiam intellectus speculativus, absque omni ordine ad voluntatem, sic enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum, et etiam artem, ponit esse intellectuales virtutes. Subiectum vero habitus qui simpliciter dicitur virtus, non potest esse nisi voluntas; vel aliqua potentia secundum quod est mota a voluntate. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas movet omnes alias potentias quae aliqualiter sunt rationales, ad suos actus, ut supra habitum est, et ideo quod homo actu bene agat, contingit ex hoc quod homo habet bonam voluntatem. Unde virtus quae facit bene agere in actu, non solum in facultate, oportet quod vel sit in ipsa voluntate; vel in aliqua potentia secundum quod est a voluntate mota. Contingit autem intellectum a voluntate moveri, sicut et alias potentias, considerat enim aliquis aliquid actu, eo quod vult. Et ideo intellectus, secundum quod habet ordinem ad voluntatem, potest esse subiectum virtutis simpliciter dictae. Et hoc modo intellectus speculativus, vel ratio, est subiectum fidei, movetur enim intellectus ad assentiendum his quae sunt fidei, ex imperio voluntatis; nullus enim credit nisi volens. Intellectus vero practicus est subiectum prudentiae. Cum enim prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, requiritur ad prudentiam quod homo se bene habeat ad principia huius rationis agendorum, quae sunt fines; ad quos bene se habet homo per rectitudinem voluntatis, sicut ad principia speculabilium per naturale lumen intellectus agentis. Et ideo sicut subiectum scientiae, quae est ratio recta speculabilium, est intellectus speculativus in ordine ad intellectum agentem; ita subiectum prudentiae est intellectus practicus in ordine ad voluntatem rectam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above (Q[25], AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4]; <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q20_A1" id="FS_Q56_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[20], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35852] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum Augustini intelligendum est de virtute simpliciter dicta non quod omnis talis virtus sit simpliciter amor; sed quia dependet aliqualiter ab amore, inquantum dependet a voluntate, cuius prima affectio est amor, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35853] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum uniuscuiusque est finis eius, et ideo, cum verum sit finis intellectus, cognoscere verum est bonus actus intellectus. Unde habitus perficiens intellectum ad verum cognoscendum, vel in speculativis vel in practicis, dicitur virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers virtue simply so called. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35854] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtute simpliciter dicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A4-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 4. Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we have said in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q56_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35855] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis non possint esse subiectum virtutis. Huiusmodi enim vires sunt communes nobis et brutis. Sed nunc loquimur de virtute secundum quod est propria homini, sic enim dicitur virtus humana. Non igitur humanae virtutis potest esse subiectum irascibilis et concupiscibilis, quae sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body: for the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q56_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I know that good does not dwell in my flesh." Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35856] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, appetitus sensitivus est vis utens organo corporali. Sed bonum virtutis non potest esse in corpore hominis, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>scio quod non habitat in carne mea bonum</i>. Ergo appetitus sensitivus non potest esse subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: "For instance, if my coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me." But just as the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now "virtue is that by which we live rightly," as we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q56_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35857] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus probat, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod virtus non est in corpore, sed in anima, eo quod per animam corpus regitur, unde quod aliquis corpore bene utatur, totum refertur ad animam; <i>sicut si mihi auriga obtemperans, equos quibus praeest, recte regit, hoc totum mihi debetur</i>. Sed sicut anima regit corpus, ita etiam ratio regit appetitum sensitivum. Ergo totum rationali parti debetur, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis recte regantur. Sed virtus est qua recte vivitur, ut supra dictum est. Virtus igitur non est in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed solum in parte rationali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "the principal act of moral virtue is choice" (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A2" id="FS_Q56_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[2]</a>). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="35858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35858] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, principalis actus virtutis moralis est electio, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Sed electio non est actus irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sed rationis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus moralis non est in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 10) says that "these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35859] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod fortitudo ponitur esse in irascibili, temperantia autem in concupiscibili. Unde philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>hae virtutes sunt irrationabilium partium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A4-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues. </p><p id="FS_Q56_A4-p8"> For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 co."><a name="35860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35860] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo secundum se, inquantum sunt partes appetitus sensitivi. Et hoc modo, non competit eis quod sint subiectum virtutis. Alio modo possunt considerari inquantum participant rationem, per hoc quod natae sunt rationi obedire. Et sic irascibilis vel concupiscibilis potest esse subiectum virtutis humanae, sic enim est principium humani actus, inquantum participat rationem. Et in his potentiis necesse est ponere virtutes. Quod enim in irascibili et concupiscibili sint aliquae virtutes, patet. Actus enim qui progreditur ab una potentia secundum quod est ab alia mota, non potest esse perfectus, nisi utraque potentia sit bene disposita ad actum, sicut actus artificis non potest esse congruus, nisi et artifex sit bene dispositus ad agendum, et etiam ipsum instrumentum. In his igitur circa quae operatur irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum quod sunt a ratione motae, necesse est ut aliquis habitus perficiens ad bene agendum sit non solum in ratione, sed etiam in irascibili et concupiscibili. Et quia bona dispositio potentiae moventis motae, attenditur secundum conformitatem ad potentiam moventem; ideo virtus quae est in irascibili et concupiscibili, nihil aliud est quam quaedam habitualis conformitas istarum potentiarum ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35861] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis secundum se consideratae, prout sunt partes appetitus sensitivi, communes sunt nobis et brutis. Sed secundum quod sunt rationales per participationem, ut obedientes rationi, sic sunt propriae hominis. Et hoc modo possunt esse subiectum virtutis humanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being moved by reason, we "yield our members to serve justice"; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the "fomes": whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of reason is begotten in them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35862] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut caro hominis ex se quidem non habet bonum virtutis, fit tamen instrumentum virtuosi actus, inquantum, movente ratione, membra nostra exhibemus ad serviendum iustitiae, ita etiam irascibilis et concupiscibilis ex se quidem non habent bonum virtutis sed magis infectionem fomitis; inquantum vero conformantur rationi, sic in eis adgeneratur bonum virtutis moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "soul rules the body with a despotic command" as the master rules his slave: wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the "reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command" such as that by which free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35863] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod alia ratione regitur corpus ab anima, et irascibilis et concupiscibilis a ratione. Corpus enim ad nutum obedit animae absque contradictione, in his in quibus natum est ab anima moveri, unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum. Et ideo totus motus corporis refertur ad animam. Et propter hoc in corpore non est virtus, sed solum in anima. Sed irascibilis et concupiscibilis non ad nutum obediunt rationi, sed habent proprios motus suos, quibus interdum rationi repugnant, unde in eodem libro philosophus dicit quod ratio regit irascibilem et concupiscibilem principatu politico, quo scilicet reguntur liberi, qui habent in aliquibus propriam voluntatem. Et propter hoc etiam oportet in irascibili et concupiscibili esse aliquas virtutes, quibus bene disponantur ad actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="35864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35864] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod in electione duo sunt, scilicet intentio finis, quae pertinet ad virtutem moralem; et praeacceptio eius quod est ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Quod autem habeat rectam intentionem finis circa passiones animae, hoc contingit ex bona dispositione irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Et ideo virtutes morales circa passiones, sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili, sed prudentia est in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A5-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 5. Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q56_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35865] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis interius, possit esse aliqua virtus. Appetitus enim sensitivus potest esse subiectum virtutis, inquantum obedit rationi. Sed vires sensitivae apprehensivae interius, rationi obediunt, ad imperium enim rationis operatur et imaginativa et cogitativa et memorativa. Ergo in his viribus potest esse virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35866] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas, in suo actu potest impediri, vel etiam adiuvari, per appetitum sensitivum; ita etiam intellectus vel ratio potest impediri, vel etiam iuvari, per vires praedictas. Sicut ergo in viribus sensitivis appetitivis potest esse virtus, ita etiam in apprehensivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35867] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, prudentia est quaedam virtus, cuius partem ponit Tullius memoriam, in sua rhetorica. Ergo etiam in vi memorativa potest esse aliqua virtus. Et eadem ratione, in aliis interioribus apprehensivis viribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35868] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod omnes virtutes vel sunt intellectuales, vel morales, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Morales autem virtutes omnes sunt in parte appetitiva, intellectuales autem in intellectu vel ratione, sicut patet in VI Ethic. Nulla ergo virtus est in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis interius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that "in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature." Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his Rhetoric that "it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Yet, in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A4" id="FS_Q56_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>, ad 3). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 co."><a name="35869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35869] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis interius, ponuntur aliqui habitus. Quod patet ex hoc praecipue quod philosophus dicit, in libro de memoria, <i>quod in memorando unum post aliud, operatur consuetudo, quae est quasi quaedam natura</i>, nihil autem est aliud habitus consuetudinalis quam habitudo acquisita per consuetudinem, quae est in modum naturae. Unde de virtute dicit Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod est <i>habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. In homine tamen id quod ex consuetudine acquiritur in memoria, et in aliis viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, non est habitus per se; sed aliquid annexum habitibus intellectivae partis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p7"> Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these are rather in the intellect or reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Sed tamen si qui sunt habitus in talibus viribus, virtutes dici non possunt. Virtus enim est habitus perfectus, quo non contingit nisi bonum operari, unde oportet quod virtus sit in illa potentia quae est consummativa boni operis. Cognitio autem veri non consummatur in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis; sed huiusmodi vires sunt quasi praeparatoriae ad cognitionem intellectivam. Et ideo in huiusmodi viribus non sunt virtutes, quibus cognoscitur verum; sed magis in intellectu vel ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35870] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod appetitus sensitivus se habet ad voluntatem, quae est appetitus rationis, sicut motus ab eo. Et ideo opus appetitivae virtutis consummatur in appetitu sensitivo. Et propter hoc, appetitus sensitivus est subiectum virtutis. Virtutes autem sensitivae apprehensivae magis se habent ut moventes respectu intellectus, eo quod phantasmata se habent ad animam intellectivam, sicut colores ad visum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Et ideo opus cognitionis in intellectu terminatur. Et propter hoc, virtutes cognoscitivae sunt in ipso intellectu vel ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p9"> And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35871] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35872] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod memoria non ponitur pars prudentiae, sicut species est pars generis, quasi ipsa memoria sit quaedam virtus per se, sed quia unum eorum quae requiruntur ad prudentiam, est bonitas memoriae; ut sic quodammodo se habeat per modum partis integralis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q56_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q56_A6-p0.1">Q. 56. A. 6. Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35873] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non sit subiectum alicuius virtutis. Ad id enim quod convenit potentiae ex ipsa ratione potentiae, non requiritur aliquis habitus. Sed de ipsa ratione voluntatis, cum sit in ratione, secundum philosophum in III de anima, est quod tendat in id quod est bonum secundum rationem, ad quod ordinatur omnis virtus, quia unumquodque naturaliter appetit proprium bonum, <i>virtus enim est habitus per modum naturae, consentaneus rationi</i>, ut Tullius dicit in sua rhetorica. Ergo voluntas non est subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35874] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis virtus aut est intellectualis, aut moralis, ut dicitur in I et II Ethic. Sed virtus intellectualis est, sicut in subiecto, in intellectu et ratione, non autem in voluntate, virtus autem moralis est, sicut in subiecto, in irascibili et concupiscibili, quae sunt rationales per participationem. Ergo nulla virtus est in voluntate sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the subject of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35875] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnes actus humani, ad quos virtutes ordinantur, sunt voluntarii. Si igitur respectu aliquorum humanorum actuum sit aliqua virtus in voluntate, pari ratione respectu omnium actuum humanorum erit virtus in voluntate. Aut ergo in nulla alia potentia erit aliqua virtus, aut ad eundem actum ordinabuntur duae virtutes, quod videtur inconveniens. Voluntas ergo non potest esse subiectum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35876] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod maior perfectio requiritur in movente quam in moto. Sed voluntas movet irascibilem et concupiscibilem. Multo ergo magis debet esse virtus in voluntate, quam in irascibili et concupiscibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q56_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose. </p><p id="FS_Q56_A6-p7"> Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q56_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 co."><a name="35877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35877] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum per habitum perficiatur potentia ad agendum, ibi indiget potentia habitu perficiente ad bene agendum, qui quidem habitus est virtus, ubi ad hoc non sufficit propria ratio potentiae. Omnis autem potentiae propria ratio attenditur in ordine ad obiectum. Unde cum, sicut dictum est, obiectum voluntati sit bonum rationis voluntati proportionatum, quantum ad hoc non indiget voluntas virtute perficiente. Sed si quod bonum immineat homini volendum, quod excedat proportionem volentis; sive quantum ad totam speciem humanam, sicut bonum divinum, quod transcendit limites humanae naturae, sive quantum ad individuum, sicut bonum proximi; ibi voluntas indiget virtute. Et ideo huiusmodi virtutes quae ordinant affectum hominis in Deum vel in proximum, sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto; ut caritas, iustitia et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A6" id="FS_Q56_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[6]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35878] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa habet locum de virtute quae ordinat ad bonum proprium ipsius volentis, sicut temperantia et fortitudo, quae sunt circa passiones humanas et alia huiusmodi, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q56_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35879] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est irascibilis et concupiscibilis; sed omnino, idest universaliter, appetitivum, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sub appetitivo autem comprehenditur voluntas. Et ideo, si qua virtus est in voluntate, erit moralis, nisi sit theologica, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q56_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 56 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35880] Iª-IIae q. 56 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod quaedam virtutes ordinantur ad bonum passionis moderatae, quod est proprium huius vel illius hominis, et in talibus non est necessarium quod sit aliqua virtus in voluntate, cum ad hoc sufficiat natura potentiae, ut dictum est. Sed hoc solum necessarium est in illis virtutibus quae ordinantur ad aliquod bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q57" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q57-p0.1">Q. 57. OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q57-p2"> We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry: </p><p id="FS_Q57-p3"><a href="#FS_Q57_A1"> (1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p4"><a href="#FS_Q57_A2"> (2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p5"><a href="#FS_Q57_A3"> (3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p6"><a href="#FS_Q57_A4"> (4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p7"><a href="#FS_Q57_A5"> (5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</a></p><p id="FS_Q57-p8"><a href="#FS_Q57_A6"> (6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 pr."><a name="35881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35881] Iª-IIae q. 57 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de distinctione virtutum. Et primo, quantum ad virtutes intellectuales; secundo, quantum ad morales; tertio, quantum ad theologicas. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum habitus intellectuales speculativi sint virtutes. Secundo, utrum sint tres, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Tertio, utrum habitus intellectualis qui est ars, sit virtus. Quarto, utrum prudentia sit virtus distincta ab arte. Quinto, utrum prudentia sit virtus necessaria homini. Sexto, utrum eubulia, synesis et gnome sint virtutes adiunctae prudentiae.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q57_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A1-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 1. Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A2" id="FS_Q57_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35882] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod habitus intellectuales speculativi non sint virtutes. Virtus enim est habitus operativus, ut supra dictum est. Sed habitus speculativi non sunt operativi, distinguitur enim speculativum a practico, idest operativo. Ergo habitus intellectuales speculativi non sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for "happiness is the reward of virtue" (Ethic. i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35883] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtus est eorum per quae fit homo felix sive beatus, eo quod felicitas est virtutis praemium, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed habitus intellectuales non considerant actus humanos, aut alia bona humana, per quae homo beatitudinem adipiscitur, sed magis res naturales et divinas. Ergo huiusmodi habitus virtutes dici non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35884] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, scientia est habitus speculativus. Sed scientia et virtus distinguuntur sicut diversa genera non subalternatim posita; ut patet per philosophum, in IV Topic. Ergo habitus speculativi non sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35885] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, soli habitus speculativi considerant necessaria quae impossibile est aliter se habere. Sed philosophus ponit, in VI Ethic., quasdam virtutes intellectuales in parte animae quae considerat necessaria quae non possunt aliter se habere. Ergo habitus intellectuales speculativi sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), a habit, as we have already observed ( <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses. </p><p id="FS_Q57_A1-p7"> Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the "contemplative life has greater merit than the active life." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 co."><a name="35886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35886] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum omnis virtus dicatur in ordine ad bonum, sicut supra dictum est, duplici ratione aliquis habitus dicitur virtus, ut supra dictum est, uno modo, quia facit facultatem bene operandi; alio modo, quia cum facultate, facit etiam usum bonum. Et hoc, sicut supra dictum est, pertinet solum ad illos habitus qui respiciunt partem appetitivam, eo quod vis appetitiva animae est quae facit uti omnibus potentiis et habitibus. Cum igitur habitus intellectuales speculativi non perficiant partem appetitivam, nec aliquo modo ipsam respiciant, sed solam intellectivam; possunt quidem dici virtutes inquantum faciunt facultatem bonae operationis, quae est consideratio veri (hoc enim est bonum opus intellectus), non tamen dicuntur virtutes secundo modo, quasi facientes bene uti potentia seu habitu. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis habet habitum scientiae speculativae, non inclinatur ad utendum, sed fit potens speculari verum in his quorum habet scientiam, sed quod utatur scientia habita, hoc est movente voluntate. Et ideo virtus quae perficit voluntatem, ut caritas vel iustitia, facit etiam bene uti huiusmodi speculativis habitibus. Et secundum hoc etiam, in actibus horum habituum potest esse meritum, si ex caritate fiant, sicut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., quod <i>contemplativa est maioris meriti quam activa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35887] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est opus, scilicet exterius, et interius. Practicum ergo, vel operativum, quod dividitur contra speculativum, sumitur ab opere exteriori, ad quod non habet ordinem habitus speculativus. Sed tamen habet ordinem ad interius opus intellectus, quod est speculari verum. Et secundum hoc est habitus operativus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word "whereby" indicates the efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A7" id="FS_Q57_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35888] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus est aliquorum dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut obiectorum. Et sic huiusmodi virtutes speculativae non sunt eorum per quae homo fit beatus; nisi forte secundum quod ly per dicit causam efficientem vel obiectum completae beatitudinis, quod est Deus, quod est summum speculabile. Alio modo dicitur virtus esse aliquorum sicut actuum. Et hoc modo virtutes intellectuales sunt eorum per quae homo fit beatus. Tum quia actus harum virtutum possunt esse meritorii, sicut dictum est. Tum etiam quia sunt quaedam inchoatio perfectae beatitudinis, quae in contemplatione veri consistit, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35889] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia dividitur contra virtutem secundo modo dictam, quae pertinet ad vim appetitivam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A2-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 2. Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35890] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur tres virtutes intellectuales speculativae, scilicet sapientia, scientia et intellectus. Species enim non debet condividi generi. Sed sapientia est quaedam scientia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo sapientia non debet condividi scientiae, in numero virtutum intellectualium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already explained ( <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q57_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35891] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in distinctione potentiarum, habituum et actuum, quae attenditur secundum obiecta, attenditur principaliter distinctio quae est secundum rationem formalem obiectorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Non ergo diversi habitus debent distingui secundum materiale obiectum; sed secundum rationem formalem illius obiecti. Sed principium demonstrationis est ratio sciendi conclusiones. Non ergo intellectus principiorum debet poni habitus alius, aut alia virtus, a scientia conclusionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35892] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtus intellectualis dicitur quae est in ipso rationali per essentiam. Sed ratio, etiam speculativa, sicut ratiocinatur syllogizando demonstrative; ita etiam ratiocinatur syllogizando dialectice. Ergo sicut scientia, quae causatur ex syllogismo demonstrativo, ponitur virtus intellectualis speculativa; ita etiam et opinio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35893] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, VI Ethic., ponit has solum tres virtutes intellectuales speculativas, scilicet sapientiam, scientiam et intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated <a href="#FS_Q57_A1" id="FS_Q57_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration---as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a "principle," and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called "understanding," which is the habit of principles. </p><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p7"> On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason's inquiry, and is as a "term." This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since "things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is "wisdom," which considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is "science" which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 co."><a name="35894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35894] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, virtus intellectualis speculativa est per quam intellectus speculativus perficitur ad considerandum verum, hoc enim est bonum opus eius. Verum autem est dupliciter considerabile, uno modo, sicut per se notum; alio modo, sicut per aliud notum. Quod autem est per se notum, se habet ut principium; et percipitur statim ab intellectu. Et ideo habitus perficiens intellectum ad huiusmodi veri considerationem, vocatur intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum. Verum autem quod est per aliud notum, non statim percipitur ab intellectu, sed per inquisitionem rationis, et se habet in ratione termini. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter, uno modo, ut sit ultimum in aliquo genere; alio modo, ut sit ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae. <i>Et quia ea quae sunt posterius nota quoad nos, sunt priora et magis nota secundum naturam</i>, ut dicitur in I Physic.; ideo id quod est ultimum respectu totius cognitionis humanae, est id quod est primum et maxime cognoscibile secundum naturam. Et circa huiusmodi est sapientia, quae considerat altissimas causas, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Unde convenienter iudicat et ordinat de omnibus, quia iudicium perfectum et universale haberi non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas. Ad id vero quod est ultimum in hoc vel in illo genere cognoscibilium, perficit intellectum scientia. Et ideo secundum diversa genera scibilium, sunt diversi habitus scientiarum, cum tamen sapientia non sit nisi una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35895] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet id quod est commune omnibus scientiis, ut scilicet ex principiis conclusiones demonstret. Sed quia habet aliquid proprium supra alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat; et non solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima principia, ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding. </p><p id="FS_Q57_A2-p10"> Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35896] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale, sicut ad eandem potentiam visivam pertinet videre colorem, et lumen, quod est ratio videndi colorem et simul cum ipso videtur. Principia vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, quae considerat etiam conclusiones, sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum. Unde, si quis recte consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q57_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they are not intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35897] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus virtutis determinate se habet ad bonum, nullo autem modo ad malum. Bonum autem intellectus est verum, malum autem eius est falsum. Unde soli illi habitus virtutes intellectuales dicuntur, quibus semper dicitur verum, et nunquam falsum. Opinio vero et suspicio possunt esse veri et falsi. Et ideo non sunt intellectuales virtutes, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A3-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 3. Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no one makes bad use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35898] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ars non sit virtus intellectualis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod virtute nullus male utitur. Sed arte aliquis male utitur, potest enim aliquis artifex, secundum scientiam artis suae, male operari. Ergo ars non est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore art is not a virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35899] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtutis non est virtus. Artis autem est aliqua virtus, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo ars non est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35900] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, artes liberales sunt excellentiores quam artes mechanicae. Sed sicut artes mechanicae sunt practicae, ita artes liberales sunt speculativae. Ergo si ars esset virtus intellectualis, deberet virtutibus speculativis annumerari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35901] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit artem esse virtutem; nec tamen connumerat eam virtutibus speculativis, quarum subiectum ponit scientificam partem animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Art is nothing else but "the right reason about certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends, not on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 co."><a name="35902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35902] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ars nihil aliud est quam ratio recta aliquorum operum faciendorum. Quorum tamen bonum non consistit in eo quod appetitus humanus aliquo modo se habet, sed in eo quod ipsum opus quod fit, in se bonum est. Non enim pertinet ad laudem artificis, inquantum artifex est, qua voluntate opus faciat; sed quale sit opus quod facit. Sic igitur ars, proprie loquendo, habitus operativus est. Et tamen in aliquo convenit cum habitibus speculativis, quia etiam ad ipsos habitus speculativos pertinet qualiter se habeat res quam considerant, non autem qualiter se habeat appetitus humanus ad illas. Dummodo enim verum geometra demonstret, non refert qualiter se habeat secundum appetitivam partem, utrum sit laetus vel iratus, sicut nec in artifice refert, ut dictum est. Et ideo eo modo ars habet rationem virtutis, sicut et habitus speculativi, inquantum scilicet nec ars, nec habitus speculativus, faciunt bonum opus quantum ad usum, quod est proprium virtutis perficientis appetitum; sed solum quantum ad facultatem bene agendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although there cannot be a good use without the art. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35903] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum aliquis habens artem operatur malum artificium, hoc non est opus artis, immo est contra artem, sicut etiam cum aliquis sciens verum mentitur, hoc quod dicit non est secundum scientiam, sed contra scientiam. Unde sicut scientia se habet semper ad bonum, ut dictum est, ita et ars, et secundum hoc dicitur virtus. In hoc tamen deficit a perfecta ratione virtutis, quia non facit ipsum bonum usum, sed ad hoc aliquid aliud requiritur, quamvis bonus usus sine arte esse non possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35904] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, quia ad hoc ut homo bene utatur arte quam habet, requiritur bona voluntas, quae perficitur per virtutem moralem; ideo philosophus dicit quod artis est virtus, scilicet moralis, inquantum ad bonum usum eius aliqua virtus moralis requiritur. Manifestum est enim quod artifex per iustitiam, quae facit voluntatem rectam, inclinatur ut opus fidele faciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35905] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in ipsis speculabilibus est aliquid per modum cuiusdam operis, puta constructio syllogismi aut orationis congruae aut opus numerandi vel mensurandi. Et ideo quicumque ad huiusmodi opera rationis habitus speculativi ordinantur, dicuntur per quandam similitudinem artes, sed liberales; ad differentiam illarum artium quae ordinantur ad opera per corpus exercita, quae sunt quodammodo serviles, inquantum corpus serviliter subditur animae, et homo secundum animam est liber. Illae vero scientiae quae ad nullum huiusmodi opus ordinantur, simpliciter scientiae dicuntur, non autem artes. Nec oportet, si liberales artes sunt nobiliores, quod magis eis conveniat ratio artis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A4-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 4. Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35906] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit alia virtus ab arte. Ars enim est ratio recta aliquorum operum. Sed diversa genera operum non faciunt ut aliquid amittat rationem artis, sunt enim diversae artes circa opera valde diversa. Cum igitur etiam prudentia sit quaedam ratio recta operum, videtur quod etiam ipsa debeat dici ars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be called an art. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35907] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus speculativi, utrumque enim eorum est circa contingens aliter se habere, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed quidam habitus speculativi dicuntur artes. Ergo multo magis prudentia debet dici ars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35908] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad prudentiam pertinet bene consiliari, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed etiam in quibusdam artibus consiliari contingit, ut dicitur in III Ethic., sicut in arte militari, et gubernativa, et medicinali. Ergo prudentia ab arte non distinguitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35909] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus distinguit prudentiam ab arte, in VI Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q57_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above <a href="#FS_Q57_A1" id="FS_Q57_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[56], A[3]) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof. </p><p id="FS_Q57_A4-p7"> The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason of things to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing into outward matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to see," "to will," and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man's appetite, but the good of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 co."><a name="35910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35910] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ubi invenitur diversa ratio virtutis, ibi oportet virtutes distingui. Dictum est autem supra quod aliquis habitus habet rationem virtutis ex hoc solum quod facit facultatem boni operis, aliquis autem ex hoc quod facit non solum facultatem boni operis, sed etiam usum. Ars autem facit solum facultatem boni operis, quia non respicit appetitum. Prudentia autem non solum facit boni operis facultatem, sed etiam usum, respicit enim appetitum, tanquam praesupponens rectitudinem appetitus. Cuius differentiae ratio est, quia ars est recta ratio factibilium; prudentia vero est recta ratio agibilium. Differt autem facere et agere quia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., factio est actus transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare, et huiusmodi; agere autem est actus permanens in ipso agente, sicut videre, velle, et huiusmodi. Sic igitur hoc modo se habet prudentia ad huiusmodi actus humanos, qui sunt usus potentiarum et habituum, sicut se habet ars ad exteriores factiones, quia utraque est perfecta ratio respectu illorum ad quae comparatur. Perfectio autem et rectitudo rationis in speculativis, dependet ex principiis, ex quibus ratio syllogizat, sicut dictum est quod scientia dependet ab intellectu, qui est habitus principiorum, et praesupponit ipsum. In humanis autem actibus se habent fines sicut principia in speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Et ideo ad prudentiam, quae est recta ratio agibilium, requiritur quod homo sit bene dispositus circa fines, quod quidem est per appetitum rectum. Et ideo ad prudentiam requiritur moralis virtus, per quam fit appetitus rectus. Bonum autem artificialium non est bonum appetitus humani, sed bonum ipsorum operum artificialium, et ideo ars non praesupponit appetitum rectum. Et inde est quod magis laudatur artifex qui volens peccat, quam qui peccat nolens; magis autem contra prudentiam est quod aliquis peccet volens, quam nolens, quia rectitudo voluntatis est de ratione prudentiae, non autem de ratione artis. Sic igitur patet quod prudentia est virtus distincta ab arte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35911] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod diversa genera artificialium omnia sunt extra hominem, et ideo non diversificatur ratio virtutis. Sed prudentia est recta ratio ipsorum actuum humanorum, unde diversificatur ratio virtutis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35912] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia magis convenit cum arte quam habitus speculativi, quantum ad subiectum et materiam, utrumque enim est in opinativa parte animae, et circa contingens aliter se habere. Sed ars magis convenit cum habitibus speculativis in ratione virtutis, quam cum prudentia, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35913] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa de his quae pertinent ad totam vitam hominis, et ad ultimum finem vitae humanae. Sed in artibus aliquibus est consilium de his quae pertinent ad fines proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter, sed illi solum qui bene consiliantur de his quae conferunt ad totam vitam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A5-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 5. Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become virtuous. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35914] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod prudentia non sit virtus necessaria ad bene vivendum. Sicut enim se habet ars ad factibilia, quorum est ratio recta; ita se habet prudentia ad agibilia, secundum quae vita hominis consideratur, est enim eorum recta ratio prudentia, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed ars non est necessaria in rebus factibilibus nisi ad hoc quod fiant, non autem postquam sunt factae. Ergo nec prudentia est necessaria homini ad bene vivendum, postquam est virtuosus, sed forte solum quantum ad hoc quod virtuosus fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the counsels of prudent men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35915] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, prudentia est per quam recte consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed homo potest ex bono consilio agere non solum proprio, sed etiam alieno. Ergo non est necessarium ad bene vivendum quod ipse homo habeat prudentiam; sed sufficit quod prudentum consilia sequatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35916] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtus intellectualis est secundum quam contingit semper dicere verum, et nunquam falsum. Sed hoc non videtur contingere secundum prudentiam, non enim est humanum quod in consiliando de agendis nunquam erretur; cum humana agibilia sint contingentia aliter se habere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX, <i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae</i>. Ergo videtur quod prudentia non debeat poni intellectualis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q57_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>) of Divine Wisdom: "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35917] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Sap. VIII, connumeratur aliis virtutibus necessariis ad vitam humanam, cum dicitur de divina sapientia, <i>sobrietatem et prudentiam docet, iustitiam et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 co."><a name="35918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35918] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod prudentia est virtus maxime necessaria ad vitam humanam. Bene enim vivere consistit in bene operari. Ad hoc autem quod aliquis bene operetur, non solum requiritur quid faciat, sed etiam quomodo faciat; ut scilicet secundum electionem rectam operetur, non solum ex impetu aut passione. Cum autem electio sit eorum quae sunt ad finem, rectitudo electionis duo requirit, scilicet debitum finem; et id quod convenienter ordinatur ad debitum finem. Ad debitum autem finem homo convenienter disponitur per virtutem quae perficit partem animae appetitivam, cuius obiectum est bonum et finis. Ad id autem quod convenienter in finem debitum ordinatur, oportet quod homo directe disponatur per habitum rationis, quia consiliari et eligere, quae sunt eorum quae sunt ad finem, sunt actus rationis. Et ideo necesse est in ratione esse aliquam virtutem intellectualem, per quam perficiatur ratio ad hoc quod convenienter se habeat ad ea quae sunt ad finem. Et haec virtus est prudentia. Unde prudentia est virtus necessaria ad bene vivendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q57_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35919] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum artis consideratur non in ipso artifice, sed magis in ipso artificiato, cum ars sit ratio recta factibilium, factio enim, in exteriorem materiam transiens, non est perfectio facientis, sed facti, sicut motus est actus mobilis; ars autem circa factibilia est. Sed prudentiae bonum attenditur in ipso agente, cuius perfectio est ipsum agere, est enim prudentia recta ratio agibilium, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad artem non requiritur quod artifex bene operetur, sed quod bonum opus faciat. Requireretur autem magis quod ipsum artificiatum bene operaretur, sicut quod cultellus bene incideret, vel serra bene secaret; si proprie horum esset agere, et non magis agi, quia non habent dominium sui actus. Et ideo ars non est necessaria ad bene vivendum ipsi artificis; sed solum ad faciendum artificiatum bonum, et ad conservandum ipsum. Prudentia autem est necessaria homini ad bene vivendum, non solum ad hoc quod fiat bonus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35920] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum homo bonum operatur non secundum propriam rationem, sed motus ex consilio alterius; nondum est omnino perfecta operatio ipsius, quantum ad rationem dirigentem, et quantum ad appetitum moventem. Unde si bonum operetur, non tamen simpliciter bene; quod est bene vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35921] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod verum intellectus practici aliter accipitur quam verum intellectus speculativi, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Nam verum intellectus speculativi accipitur per conformitatem intellectus ad rem. Et quia intellectus non potest infallibiliter conformari rebus in contingentibus, sed solum in necessariis; ideo nullus habitus speculativus contingentium est intellectualis virtus, sed solum est circa necessaria. Verum autem intellectus practici accipitur per conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Quae quidem conformitas in necessariis locum non habet, quae voluntate humana non fiunt, sed solum in contingentibus quae possunt a nobis fieri, sive sint agibilia interiora, sive factibilia exteriora. Et ideo circa sola contingentia ponitur virtus intellectus practici, circa factibilia quidem, ars; circa agibilia vero prudentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q57_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q57_A6-p0.1">Q. 57. A. 6. Whether "eubulia, synesis, and gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence? [*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}" are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For "{euboulia}" is "a habit whereby we take good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it "belongs to prudence to take good counsel," as stated (Ethic. vi, 9). Therefore "{euboulia}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="35922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35922] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter adiungantur prudentiae eubulia, synesis et gnome. Eubulia enim est habitus quo bene consiliamur, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed bene consiliari pertinet ad prudentiam, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo eubulia non est virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed magis est ipsa prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is judgment. Now "{synesis}" enables us to judge well. Therefore "{synesis}" is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="35923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35923] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad superiorem pertinet de inferioribus iudicare. Illa ergo virtus videtur suprema, cuius est actus iudicium. Sed synesis est bene iudicativa. Ergo synesis non est virtus adiuncta prudentiae, sed magis ipsa est principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no need, besides "{synesis}" of the virtue of "{gnome}." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="35924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35924] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut diversa sunt ea de quibus est iudicandum, ita etiam diversa sunt ea de quibus est consiliandum. Sed circa omnia consiliabilia ponitur una virtus, scilicet eubulia. Ergo ad bene iudicandum de agendis, non oportet ponere, praeter synesim, aliam virtutem, scilicet gnomen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="35925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35925] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Tullius ponit, in sua rhetorica, tres alias partes prudentiae, scilicet memoriam praeteritorum, intelligentiam praesentium, et providentiam futurorum. Macrobius etiam ponit, super somnium Scipionis, quasdam alias partes prudentiae, scilicet cautionem, docilitatem, et alia huiusmodi. Non videntur igitur solae huiusmodi virtutes prudentiae adiungi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 s. c."><a name="35926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35926] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est auctoritas philosophi, in VI Ethic., qui has tres virtutes ponit prudentiae adiunctas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. "{eustochia}," which perfects counsel; and "{synesis}" and "{gnome}," which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 co."><a name="35927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35927] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in omnibus potentiis ordinatis illa est principalior, quae ad principaliorem actum ordinatur. Circa agibilia autem humana tres actus rationis inveniuntur, quorum primus est consiliari, secundus iudicare, tertius est praecipere. Primi autem duo respondent actibus intellectus speculativi qui sunt inquirere et iudicare, nam consilium inquisitio quaedam est. Sed tertius actus proprius est practici intellectus, inquantum est operativus, non enim ratio habet praecipere ea quae per hominem fieri non possunt. Manifestum est autem quod in his quae per hominem fiunt, principalis actus est praecipere, ad quem alii ordinantur. Et ideo virtuti quae est bene praeceptiva, scilicet prudentiae, tanquam principaliori, adiunguntur tanquam secundariae, eubulia, quae est bene consiliativa, et synesis et gnome, quae sunt partes iudicativae; de quarum distinctione dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. "{euboulia}." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="35928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35928] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia est bene consiliativa, non quasi bene consiliari sit immediate actus eius, sed quia hunc actum perficit mediante virtute sibi subiecta, quae est eubulia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="35929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35929] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod iudicium in agendis ad aliquid ulterius ordinatur, contingit enim aliquem bene iudicare de aliquo agendo, et tamen non recte exequi. Sed ultimum complementum est, quando ratio iam bene praecipit de agendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects. "{Synesis}" and "{gnome}" differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for "{synesis}" judges of actions according to the common law; while "{gnome}" bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on ( <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q51_A4" id="FS_Q57_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[51], A[4]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="35930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35930] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod iudicium de unaquaque re fit per propria principia eius. Inquisitio autem nondum est per propria principia, quia his habitis, non esset opus inquisitione, sed iam res esset inventa. Et ideo una sola virtus ordinatur ad bene consiliandum, duae autem virtutes ad bene iudicandum, quia distinctio non est in communibus principiis, sed in propriis. Unde et in speculativis una est dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus, scientiae autem demonstrativae, quae sunt iudicativae, sunt diversae de diversis. Distinguuntur autem synesis et gnome secundum diversas regulas quibus iudicatur, nam synesis est iudicativa de agendis secundum communem legem; gnome autem secundum ipsam rationem naturalem, in his in quibus deficit lex communis; sicut plenius infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q57_A6-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 57 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="35931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35931] Iª-IIae q. 57 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod memoria, intelligentia et providentia, similiter etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes diversae a prudentia, sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam sicut partes integrales, inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem prudentiae. Sunt etiam et quaedam partes subiectivae, seu species prudentiae, sicut oeconomica, regnativa, et huiusmodi. Sed praedicta tria sunt quasi partes potentiales prudentiae, quia ordinantur sicut secundarium ad principale. Et de his infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q58" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q58-p0.1">Q. 58. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q58-p2"> We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others. </p><p id="FS_Q58-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q58-p4"><a href="#FS_Q58_A1"> (1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p5"><a href="#FS_Q58_A2"> (2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p6"><a href="#FS_Q58_A3"> (3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p7"><a href="#FS_Q58_A4"> (4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q58-p8"><a href="#FS_Q58_A5"> (5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 pr."><a name="35932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35932] Iª-IIae q. 58 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de virtutibus moralibus. Et primo, de distinctione earum a virtutibus intellectualibus; secundo, de distinctione earum ab invicem, secundum propriam materiam; tertio, de distinctione principalium, vel cardinalium, ab aliis. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum omnis virtus sit virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum virtus moralis distinguatur ab intellectuali. Tertio, utrum sufficienter dividatur virtus per intellectualem et moralem. Quarto, utrum moralis virtus possit esse sine intellectuali. Quinto, utrum e converso, intellectualis virtus possit esse sine morali.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q58_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A1-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 1. Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin "mos," i.e. custom. Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35933] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus sit moralis. Virtus enim moralis dicitur a more, idest consuetudine. Sed omnium virtutum actus consuescere possumus. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on ( <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[64], AA[1]</a>,2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35934] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est habitus electivus in medietate rationis consistens</i>. Sed omnis virtus videtur esse habitus electivus, quia actus cuiuslibet virtutis possumus ex electione facere. Omnis etiam virtus aliqualiter in medio rationis consistit, ut infra patebit. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35935] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in sua rhetorica, quod <i>virtus est habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. Sed cum omnis virtus humana ordinetur ad bonum hominis, oportet quod sit consentanea rationi, cum bonum hominis sit secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit. Ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q58_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[2]</a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35936] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., <i>dicentes de moribus, non dicimus quoniam sapiens vel intelligens; sed quoniam mitis vel sobrius</i>. Sic igitur sapientia et intellectus non sunt morales. Quae tamen sunt virtutes, sicut supra dictum est. Non ergo omnis virtus est moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q58_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.1" target="asv">Acts 15:1</a>): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.1.2" target="asv">2 Macc. 1:2</a>) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the word is used in the same sense in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.7" target="asv">Ps. 67:7</a>, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short "e". </p><p id="FS_Q58_A1-p7"> Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1] </a>). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 co."><a name="35937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35937] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ad huius evidentiam, considerare oportet quid sit mos, sic enim scire poterimus quid sit moralis virtus. Mos autem duo significat. Quandoque enim significat consuetudinem, sicut dicitur Act. XV, <i>nisi circumcidamini secundum morem Moysi, non poteritis salvi fieri</i>. Quandoque vero significat inclinationem quandam naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum, unde etiam et brutorum animalium dicuntur aliqui mores; unde dicitur II Machab. XI, quod <i>leonum more irruentes in hostes, prostraverunt eos</i>. Et sic accipitur mos in Psalmo LXVII, ubi dicitur, <i>qui habitare facit unius moris in domo</i>. Et hae quidem duae significationes in nullo distinguuntur, apud Latinos, quantum ad vocem. In Graeco autem distinguuntur, nam ethos, quod apud nos morem significat, quandoque habet primam longam, et scribitur per eta, Graecam litteram; quandoque habet primam correptam, et scribitur per epsilon. Dicitur autem virtus moralis a more, secundum quod mos significat quandam inclinationem naturalem, vel quasi naturalem, ad aliquid agendum. Et huic significationi moris propinqua est alia significatio, qua significat consuetudinem, nam consuetudo quodammodo vertitur in naturam, et facit inclinationem similem naturali. Manifestum est autem quod inclinatio ad actum proprie convenit appetitivae virtuti, cuius est movere omnes potentias ad agendum, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo non omnis virtus dicitur moralis, sed solum illa quae est in vi appetitiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes "mos" in the sense of "custom." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35938] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de more, secundum quod significat consuetudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q13_A1" id="FS_Q58_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35939] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis actus virtutis potest ex electione agi, sed electionem rectam agit sola virtus quae est in appetitiva parte animae, dictum est enim supra quod eligere est actus appetitivae partis. Unde habitus electivus, qui scilicet est electionis principium, est solum ille qui perficit vim appetitivam, quamvis etiam aliorum habituum actus sub electione cadere possint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the appetitive faculty. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35940] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod natura est principium motus, sicut dicitur in II Physic. Movere autem ad agendum proprium est appetitivae partis. Et ideo assimilari naturae in consentiendo rationi, est proprium virtutum quae sunt in vi appetitiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A2-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 2. Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35941] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis ab intellectuali non distinguatur. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Civ. Dei, quod <i>virtus est ars recte vivendi</i>. Sed ars est virtus intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis ab intellectuali non differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35942] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, plerique in definitione virtutum moralium ponunt scientiam, sicut quidam definiunt quod perseverantia est scientia vel habitus eorum quibus est immanendum vel non immanendum; et sanctitas est scientia faciens fideles et servantes quae ad Deum iusta. Scientia autem est virtus intellectualis. Ergo virtus moralis non debet distingui ab intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35943] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., quod <i>virtus est recta et perfecta ratio</i>. Sed hoc pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut patet in VI Ethic. ergo virtus moralis non est distincta ab intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="35944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35944] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, nihil distinguitur ab eo quod in eius definitione ponitur. Sed virtus intellectualis ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est habitus electivus existens in medietate determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit</i>. Huiusmodi autem recta ratio determinans medium virtutis moralis, pertinet ad virtutem intellectualem, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo virtus moralis non distinguitur ab intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that "there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35945] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in I Ethic., <i>determinatur virtus secundum differentiam hanc, dicimus enim harum has quidem intellectuales, has vero morales</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 co."><a name="35946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35946] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod omnium humanorum operum principium primum ratio est, et quaecumque alia principia humanorum operum inveniantur, quodammodo rationi obediunt; diversimode tamen. Nam quaedam rationi obediunt omnino ad nutum, absque omni contradictione, sicut corporis membra, si fuerint in sua natura consistentia; statim enim ad imperium rationis, manus aut pes movetur ad opus. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod anima regit corpus despotico principatu, idest sicut dominus servum, qui ius contradicendi non habet. Posuerunt igitur quidam quod omnia principia activa quae sunt in homine, hoc modo se habent ad rationem. Quod quidem si verum esset, sufficeret quod ratio esset perfecta, ad bene agendum. Unde, cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum, sequeretur quod in sola ratione esset, et sic nulla virtus esset nisi intellectualis. Et haec fuit opinio Socratis, qui dixit omnes virtutes esse prudentias, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Unde ponebat quod homo, scientia in eo existente, peccare non poterat; sed quicumque peccabat, peccabat propter ignorantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8"> Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a> (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc autem procedit ex suppositione falsi. Pars enim appetitiva obedit rationi non omnino ad nutum, sed cum aliqua contradictione, unde philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod ratio imperat appetitivae principatu politico, quo scilicet aliquis praeest liberis, qui habent ius in aliquo contradicendi. Unde Augustinus dicit, super Psalm., quod <i>interdum praecedit intellectus, et sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus</i>, intantum quod quandoque passionibus vel habitibus appetitivae partis hoc agitur, ut usus rationis in particulari impediatur. Et secundum hoc, aliqualiter verum est quod Socrates dixit, quod scientia praesente, non peccatur, si tamen hoc extendatur usque ad usum rationis in particulari eligibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p9"> Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic igitur ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis moralis. Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali. Unde sicut appetitus est principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, ita habitus moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, inquantum rationi conformatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by prudence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35947] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus communiter accipit artem, pro qualibet recta ratione. Et sic sub arte includitur etiam prudentia, quae ita est recta ratio agibilium, sicut ars est recta ratio factibilium. Et secundum hoc, quod dicit quod virtus est ars recte vivendi, essentialiter convenit prudentiae, participative autem aliis virtutibus, prout secundum prudentiam diriguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we have said about art (ad 1). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35948] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod tales definitiones, a quibuscumque inveniantur datae, processerunt ex opinione Socratica, et sunt exponendae eo modo quo de arte praedictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same applies to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35949] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="35950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35950] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod recta ratio, quae est secundum prudentiam, ponitur in definitione virtutis moralis, non tanquam pars essentiae eius, sed sicut quiddam participatum in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, inquantum prudentia dirigit omnes virtutes morales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A3-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 3. Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on ( <a href="#FS_Q61_A1" id="FS_Q58_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[1]</a>). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35951] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus humana non sufficienter dividatur per virtutem moralem et intellectualem. Prudentia enim videtur esse aliquid medium inter virtutem moralem et intellectualem, connumeratur enim virtutibus intellectualibus in VI Ethic.; et etiam ab omnibus communiter connumeratur inter quatuor virtutes cardinales, quae sunt morales, ut infra patebit. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectualem et moralem, sicut per immediata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35952] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, continentia et perseverantia, et etiam patientia, non computantur inter virtutes intellectuales. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non tenent medium in passionibus, sed abundant in eis passiones. Non ergo sufficienter dividitur virtus per intellectuales et morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q58_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[57], AA[2]</a> ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35953] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, fides, spes et caritas quaedam virtutes sunt. Non tamen sunt virtutes intellectuales, hae enim solum sunt quinque, scilicet scientia, sapientia, intellectus, prudentia et ars, ut dictum est. Nec etiam sunt virtutes morales, quia non sunt circa passiones, circa quas maxime est moralis virtus. Ergo virtus non sufficienter dividitur per intellectuales et morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35954] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., <i>duplicem esse virtutem, hanc quidem intellectualem, illam autem moralem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 co."><a name="35955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35955] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem ad bene operandum. Principium autem humanorum actuum in homine non est nisi duplex, scilicet intellectus sive ratio, et appetitus, haec enim sunt duo moventia in homine, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde omnis virtus humana oportet quod sit perfectiva alicuius istorum principiorum. Si quidem igitur sit perfectiva intellectus speculativi vel practici ad bonum hominis actum, erit virtus intellectualis, si autem sit perfectiva appetitivae partis, erit virtus moralis. Unde relinquitur quod omnis virtus humana vel est intellectualis vel moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q58_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[4]</a>). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35956] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia, secundum essentiam suam, est intellectualis virtus. Sed secundum materiam, convenit cum virtutibus moralibus, est enim recta ratio agibilium, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, virtutibus moralibus connumeratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35957] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod continentia et perseverantia non sunt perfectiones appetitivae virtutis sensitivae. Quod ex hoc patet, quod in continente et perseverante superabundant inordinatae passiones, quod non esset, si appetitus sensitivus esset perfectus aliquo habitu conformante ipsum rationi. Est autem continentia, seu perseverantia, perfectio rationalis partis, quae se tenet contra passiones ne deducatur. Deficit tamen a ratione virtutis, quia virtus intellectiva quae facit rationem se bene habere circa moralia, praesupponit appetitum rectum finis, ut recte se habeat circa principia, idest fines, ex quibus ratiocinatur; quod continenti et perseveranti deest. Neque etiam potest esse perfecta operatio quae a duabus potentiis procedit, nisi utraque potentia perficiatur per debitum habitum, sicut non sequitur perfecta actio alicuius agentis per instrumentum, si instrumentum non sit bene dispositum, quantumcumque principale agens sit perfectum. Unde si appetitus sensitivus, quem movet rationalis pars, non sit perfectus; quantumcumque rationalis pars sit perfecta, actio consequens non erit perfecta. Unde nec principium actionis erit virtus. Et propter hoc, continentia a delectationibus, et perseverantia a tristitiis, non sunt virtutes, sed aliquid minus virtute, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35958] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod fides, spes et caritas sunt supra virtutes humanas, sunt enim virtutes hominis prout est factus particeps divinae gratiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A4-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 4. Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is "a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="35959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35959] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse sine intellectuali. <i>Virtus enim moralis</i>, ut dicit Tullius, <i>est habitus in modum naturae, rationi consentaneus</i>. Sed natura etsi consentiat alicui superiori rationi moventi, non tamen oportet quod illa ratio naturae coniungatur in eodem, sicut patet in rebus naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Ergo potest esse in homine virtus moralis in modum naturae, inclinans ad consentiendum rationi, quamvis illius hominis ratio non sit perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="35960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35960] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, per virtutem intellectualem homo consequitur rationis usum perfectum. Sed quandoque contingit quod aliqui in quibus non multum viget usus rationis, sunt virtuosi et Deo accepti. Ergo videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse sine virtute intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="35961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35961] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtus moralis facit inclinationem ad bene operandum. Sed quidam habent naturalem inclinationem ad bene operandum, etiam absque rationis iudicio. Ergo virtutes morales possunt esse sine intellectuali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that "the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues." But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q57_A5" id="FS_Q58_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[5]</a>). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 s. c."><a name="35962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35962] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in XXII Moral., quod <i>ceterae virtutes, nisi ea quae appetunt, prudenter agant, virtutes esse nequaquam possunt</i>. Sed prudentia est virtus intellectualis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non possunt esse sine intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q57_A5" id="FS_Q58_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[57], AA[5]</a>,6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 co."><a name="35963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35963] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtus moralis potest quidem esse sine quibusdam intellectualibus virtutibus, sicut sine sapientia, scientia et arte, non autem potest esse sine intellectu et prudentia. Sine prudentia quidem esse non potest moralis virtus, quia moralis virtus est habitus electivus, idest faciens bonam electionem. Ad hoc autem quod electio sit bona, duo requiruntur. Primo, ut sit debita intentio finis, et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, quae vim appetitivam inclinat ad bonum conveniens rationi, quod est finis debitus. Secundo, ut homo recte accipiat ea quae sunt ad finem, et hoc non potest esse nisi per rationem recte consiliantem, iudicantem et praecipientem; quod pertinet ad prudentiam et ad virtutes sibi annexas, ut supra dictum est. Unde virtus moralis sine prudentia esse non potest. Et per consequens nec sine intellectu. Per intellectum enim cognoscuntur principia naturaliter nota, tam in speculativis quam in operativis. Unde sicut recta ratio in speculativis, inquantum procedit ex principiis naturaliter cognitis, praesupponit intellectum principiorum; ita etiam prudentia, quae est recta ratio agibilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="35964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35964] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod inclinatio naturae in rebus carentibus ratione, est absque electione, et ideo talis inclinatio non requirit ex necessitate rationem. Sed inclinatio virtutis moralis est cum electione, et ideo ad suam perfectionem indiget quod sit ratio perfecta per virtutem intellectualem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q58_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.16" target="asv"> Mat. 10:16</a>: "Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents, and simple as doves." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="35965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35965] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod in virtuoso non oportet quod vigeat usus rationis quantum ad omnia, sed solum quantum ad ea quae sunt agenda secundum virtutem. Et sic usus rationis viget in omnibus virtuosis. Unde etiam qui videntur simplices, eo quod carent mundana astutia, possunt esse prudentes; secundum illud Matth. X, <i>estote prudentes sicut serpentes, et simplices sicut columbae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it "according to right reason," in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be "joined with right reason," as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="35966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35966] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod naturalis inclinatio ad bonum virtutis, est quaedam inchoatio virtutis, non autem est virtus perfecta. Huiusmodi enim inclinatio, quanto est fortior, tanto potest esse periculosior, nisi recta ratio adiungatur, per quam fiat recta electio eorum quae conveniunt ad debitum finem, sicut equus currens, si sit caecus, tanto fortius impingit et laeditur, quanto fortius currit. Et ideo, etsi virtus moralis non sit ratio recta, ut Socrates dicebat; non tamen solum est secundum rationem rectam, inquantum inclinat ad id quod est secundum rationem rectam, ut Platonici posuerunt; sed etiam oportet quod sit cum ratione recta, ut Aristoteles dicit, in VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q58_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q58_A5-p0.1">Q. 58. A. 5. Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="35967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35967] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus intellectualis possit esse sine virtute morali. Perfectio enim prioris non dependet a perfectione posterioris. Sed ratio est prior appetitu sensitivo, et movens ipsum. Ergo virtus intellectualis quae est perfectio rationis, non dependet a virtute morali, quae est perfectio appetitivae partis. Potest ergo esse sine ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin to the moral virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="35968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35968] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, moralia sunt materia prudentiae, sicut factibilia sunt materia artis. Sed ars potest esse sine propria materia, sicut faber sine ferro. Ergo et prudentia potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, quae tamen inter omnes intellectuales virtutes, maxime moralibus coniuncta videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, prudence is "a virtue whereby we are of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="35969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35969] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, prudentia est virtus bene consiliativa, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Sed multi bene consiliantur, quibus tamen virtutes morales desunt. Ergo prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence "to sin willingly" (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 s. c."><a name="35970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35970] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, velle malum facere opponitur directe virtuti morali; non autem opponitur alicui quod sine virtute morali esse potest. Opponitur autem prudentiae quod volens peccet, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Non ergo prudentia potest esse sine virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 co."><a name="35971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35971] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali esse possunt, sed prudentia sine virtute morali esse non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium; non autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones. Recta autem ratio praeexigit principia ex quibus ratio procedit. Oportet autem rationem circa particularia procedere non solum ex principiis universalibus, sed etiam ex principiis particularibus. Circa principia quidem universalia agibilium, homo recte se habet per naturalem intellectum principiorum, per quem homo cognoscit quod nullum malum est agendum; vel etiam per aliquam scientiam practicam. Sed hoc non sufficit ad recte ratiocinandum circa particularia. Contingit enim quandoque quod huiusmodi universale principium cognitum per intellectum vel scientiam, corrumpitur in particulari per aliquam passionem, sicut concupiscenti, quando concupiscentia vincit, videtur hoc esse bonum quod concupiscit, licet sit contra universale iudicium rationis. Et ideo, sicut homo disponitur ad recte se habendum circa principia universalia, per intellectum naturalem vel per habitum scientiae; ita ad hoc quod recte se habeat circa principia particularia agibilium, quae sunt fines, oportet quod perficiatur per aliquos habitus secundum quos fiat quodammodo homini connaturale recte iudicare de fine. Et hoc fit per virtutem moralem, virtuosus enim recte iudicat de fine virtutis, <i>quia qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei</i>, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et ideo ad rectam rationem agibilium, quae est prudentia, requiritur quod homo habeat virtutem moralem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="35972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35972] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio, secundum quod est apprehensiva finis, praecedit appetitum finis, sed appetitus finis praecedit rationem ratiocinantem ad eligendum ea quae sunt ad finem, quod pertinet ad prudentiam. Sicut etiam in speculativis, intellectus principiorum est principium rationis syllogizantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="35973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35973] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod principia artificialium non diiudicantur a nobis bene vel male secundum dispositionem appetitus nostri, sicut fines, qui sunt moralium principia, sed solum per considerationem rationis. Et ideo ars non requirit virtutem perficientem appetitum, sicut requirit prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q58_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 58 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="35974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35974] Iª-IIae q. 58 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia non solum est bene consiliativa, sed etiam bene iudicativa et bene praeceptiva. Quod esse non potest, nisi removeatur impedimentum passionum corrumpentium iudicium et praeceptum prudentiae; et hoc per virtutem moralem.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q59" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q59-p0.1">Q. 59. OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q59-p2"> We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry: </p><p id="FS_Q59-p3"><a href="#FS_Q59_A1"> (1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p4"><a href="#FS_Q59_A2"> (2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p5"><a href="#FS_Q59_A3"> (3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p6"><a href="#FS_Q59_A4"> (4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q59-p7"><a href="#FS_Q59_A5"> (5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 pr."><a name="35975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35975] Iª-IIae q. 59 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de distinctione moralium virtutum ad invicem. Et quia virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones, distinguuntur secundum diversitatem passionum, oportet primo considerare comparationem virtutis ad passionem; secundo, distinctionem moralium virtutum secundum passiones. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum virtus moralis sit passio. Secundo, utrum virtus moralis possit esse cum passione. Tertio, utrum possit esse cum tristitia. Quarto, utrum omnis virtus moralis sit circa passionem. Quinto, utrum aliqua virtus moralis possit esse sine passione.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q59_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A1-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 1. Whether moral virtue is a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="35976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35976] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis sit passio. Medium enim est eiusdem generis cum extremis. Sed virtus moralis est medium inter passiones. Ergo virtus moralis est passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="35977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35977] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtus et vitium, cum sint contraria, sunt in eodem genere. Sed quaedam passiones vitia esse dicuntur, ut invidia et ira. Ergo etiam quaedam passiones sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A8" id="FS_Q59_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="35978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35978] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, misericordia quaedam passio est, est enim tristitia de alienis malis, ut supra dictum est. <i>Hanc autem Cicero, locutor egregius, non dubitavit appellare virtutem</i>; ut Augustinus dicit, in IX de Civ. Dei. Ergo passio potest esse virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 s. c."><a name="35979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35979] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in II Ethic., quod <i>passiones neque virtutes sunt neque malitiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q59_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 co."><a name="35980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35980] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtus moralis non potest esse passio. Et hoc patet triplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia passio est motus quidam appetitus sensitivi, ut supra dictum est. Virtus autem moralis non est motus aliquis, sed magis principium appetitivi motus, habitus quidam existens. Secundo quia passiones ex seipsis non habent rationem boni vel mali. Bonum enim vel malum hominis est secundum rationem, unde passiones, secundum se consideratae, se habent et ad bonum et ad malum, secundum quod possunt convenire rationi vel non convenire. Nihil autem tale potest esse virtus, cum virtus solum ad bonum se habeat, ut supra dictum est. Tertio quia, dato quod aliqua passio se habeat solum ad bonum, vel solum ad malum, secundum aliquem modum; tamen motus passionis, inquantum passio est, principium habet in ipso appetitu, et terminum in ratione, in cuius conformitatem appetitus tendit. Motus autem virtutis est e converso, principium habens in ratione et terminum in appetitu, secundum quod a ratione movetur. Unde in definitione virtutis moralis dicitur, in II Ethic., <i>quod est habitus electivus in medietate consistens determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="35981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35981] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus, secundum suam essentiam, non est medium inter passiones, sed secundum suum effectum, quia scilicet inter passiones medium constituit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="35982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35982] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, si vitium dicatur habitus secundum quem quis male operatur, manifestum est quod nulla passio est vitium. Si vero dicatur vitium peccatum, quod est actus vitiosus, sic nihil prohibet passionem esse vitium, et e contrario concurrere ad actum virtutis; secundum quod passio vel contrariatur rationi, vel sequitur actum rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as "that movement of the soul is obedient to reason"; viz. "when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="35983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35983] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod misericordia dicitur esse virtus, idest virtutis actus, secundum quod <i>motus ille animi rationi servit, quando scilicet ita praebetur misericordia, ut iustitia conservetur, sive cum indigenti tribuitur, sive cum ignoscitur poenitenti</i>, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Si tamen misericordia dicatur aliquis habitus quo homo perficitur ad rationabiliter miserendum, nihil prohibet misericordiam sic dictam esse virtutem. Et eadem est ratio de similibus passionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A2-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 2. Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that "a gentle man is one who is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way." The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral virtues are without passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="35984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35984] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis cum passione esse non possit. Dicit enim philosophus, in IV Topic., quod <i>mitis est qui non patitur, patiens autem qui patitur et non deducitur</i>. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus virtutibus moralibus. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est sine passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore "virtue is a kind of health of the soul," as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul's passions are "the soul's diseases," as he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="35985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35985] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtus est quaedam recta habitudo animae, sicut sanitas corporis, ut dicitur in VII Physic., unde virtus quaedam sanitas animae esse videtur, ut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tuscul. quaest. Passiones autem animae dicuntur morbi quidam animae, ut in eodem libro Tullius dicit. Sanitas autem non compatitur secum morbum. Ergo neque virtus compatitur animae passionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that "when they," i.e. the soul's passions, "interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth." Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="35986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35986] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtus moralis requirit perfectum usum rationis etiam in particularibus. Sed hoc impeditur per passiones, dicit enim philosophus, in VI Ethic., quod <i>delectationes corrumpunt existimationem prudentiae</i>; et Sallustius dicit, in Catilinario, quod non facile verum perspicit animus, ubi illa officiunt, scilicet animi passiones. Virtus ergo moralis non potest esse cum passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): "If the will is perverse, these movements," viz. the passions, "are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy." But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 s. c."><a name="35987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35987] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>si perversa est voluntas, perversos habebit hos motus</i>, scilicet passionum, si autem recta est, <i>non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt</i>. Sed nullum laudabile excluditur per virtutem moralem. Virtus ergo moralis non excludit passiones, sed potest esse cum ipsis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean. </p><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p7"> This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto." </p><p id="FS_Q59_A2-p8"> Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to manner and time." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 co."><a name="35988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35988] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc fuit discordia inter Stoicos et Peripateticos, sicut Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei. Stoici enim posuerunt quod passiones animae non possunt esse in sapiente, sive virtuoso, Peripatetici vero, quorum sectam Aristoteles instituit, ut Augustinus dicit in IX de Civ. Dei, posuerunt quod passiones simul cum virtute morali esse possunt, sed ad medium reductae. Haec autem diversitas, sicut Augustinus ibidem dicit, magis erat secundum verba, quam secundum eorum sententias. Quia enim Stoici non distinguebant inter appetitum intellectivum, qui est voluntas, et inter appetitum sensitivum, qui per irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur; non distinguebant in hoc passiones animae ab aliis affectionibus humanis, quod passiones animae sint motus appetitus sensitivi, aliae vero affectiones, quae non sunt passiones animae, sunt motus appetitus intellectivi, qui dicitur voluntas, sicut Peripatetici distinxerunt, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod passiones esse dicebant quascumque affectiones rationi repugnantes. Quae si ex deliberatione oriantur, in sapiente, seu in virtuoso, esse non possunt. Si autem subito oriantur, hoc in virtuoso potest accidere, <i>eo quod animi visa quae appellant phantasias, non est in potestate nostra utrum aliquando incidant animo; et cum veniunt ex terribilibus rebus, necesse est ut sapientis animum moveant, ita ut paulisper vel pavescat metu, vel tristitia contrahatur, tanquam his passionibus praevenientibus rationis officium; nec tamen approbant ista, eisque consentiunt</i>; ut Augustinus narrat in IX de Civ. Dei, ab Agellio dictum. Sic igitur, si passiones dicantur inordinatae affectiones, non possunt esse in virtuoso, ita quod post deliberationem eis consentiatur; ut Stoici posuerunt. Si vero passiones dicantur quicumque motus appetitus sensitivi, sic possunt esse in virtuoso, secundum quod sunt a ratione ordinati. Unde Aristoteles dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>non bene quidam determinant virtutes impassibilitates quasdam et quietes, quoniam simpliciter dicunt</i>, sed deberent dicere quod sunt quietes a passionibus quae sunt ut non oportet, et quando non oportet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of inordinate passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="35989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35989] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus exemplum illud inducit, sicut et multa alia in libris logicalibus, non secundum opinionem propriam, sed secundum opinionem aliorum. Haec autem fuit opinio Stoicorum, quod virtutes essent sine passionibus animae. Quam opinionem philosophus excludit in II Ethic., dicens virtutes non esse impassibilitates. Potest tamen dici quod, cum dicitur quod mitis non patitur, intelligendum est secundum passionem inordinatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's command. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="35990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35990] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa, et omnes similes quas Tullius ad hoc inducit in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., procedit de passionibus secundum quod significant inordinatas affectiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="35991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35991] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod passio praeveniens iudicium rationis, si in animo praevaleat ut ei consentiatur, impedit consilium et iudicium rationis. Si vero sequatur, quasi ex ratione imperata, adiuvat ad exequendum imperium rationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A3-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 3. Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv"> Wis. 8:7</a>: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="35992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35992] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus cum tristitia esse non possit. Virtutes enim sunt sapientiae effectus, secundum illud Sap. VIII, sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, scilicet divina sapientia, prudentiam et virtutem. Sed sapientiae convictus non habet amaritudinem, ut postea subditur. Ergo nec virtutes cum tristitia esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="35993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35993] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, tristitia est impedimentum operationis; ut patet per philosophum, in VII et X Ethic. Sed impedimentum bonae operationis repugnat virtuti. Ergo tristitia repugnat virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="35994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35994] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, tristitia est quaedam animi aegritudo; ut Tullius eam vocat, in III de Tuscul. quaest. Sed aegritudo animae contrariatur virtuti, quae est bona animae habitudo. Ergo tristitia contrariatur virtuti, nec potest simul esse cum ea.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.38" target="asv">Mat. 26:38</a>): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 s. c."><a name="35995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35995] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Christus fuit perfectus virtute. Sed in eo fuit tristitia, dicit enim, ut habetur Matth. XXVI, <i>tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem</i>. Ergo tristitia potest esse cum virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e. "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons. </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p7"> First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason. </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p8"> Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow. </p><p id="FS_Q59_A3-p9"> Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 co."><a name="35996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35996] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod sicut dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, <i>Stoici voluerunt, pro tribus perturbationibus, in animo sapientis esse tres eupathias, idest tres bonas passiones, pro cupiditate scilicet voluntatem; pro laetitia, gaudium; pro metu, cautionem</i>. Pro tristitia vero, negaverunt posse aliquid esse in animo sapientis, duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia tristitia est de malo quod iam accidit. Nullum autem malum aestimant posse accidere sapienti, crediderunt enim quod, sicut solum hominis bonum est virtus, bona autem corporalia nulla bona hominis sunt; ita solum inhonestum est hominis malum, quod in virtuoso esse non potest. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Cum enim homo sit ex anima et corpore compositus, id quod confert ad vitam corporis conservandam, aliquod bonum hominis est, non tamen maximum, quia eo potest homo male uti. Unde et malum huic bono contrarium in sapiente esse potest, et tristitiam moderatam inducere. Praeterea, etsi virtuosus sine gravi peccato esse possit, nullus tamen invenitur qui absque levibus peccatis vitam ducat, secundum illud I Ioan. I, <i>si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus</i>. Tertio, quia virtuosus, etsi peccatum non habeat, forte quandoque habuit. Et de hoc laudabiliter dolet; secundum illud II ad Cor. VII, <i>quae secundum Deum est tristitia, poenitentiam in salutem stabilem operatur</i>. Quarto, quia potest etiam dolere laudabiliter de peccato alterius. Unde eo modo quo virtus moralis compatitur alias passiones ratione moderatas, compatitur etiam tristitiam. Secundo, movebantur ex hoc, quod tristitia est de praesenti malo, timor autem de malo futuro, sicut delectatio de bono praesenti, desiderium vero de bono futuro. Potest autem hoc ad virtutem pertinere, quod aliquis bono habito fruatur, vel non habitum habere desideret, vel quod etiam malum futurum caveat. Sed quod malo praesenti animus hominis substernatur, quod fit per tristitiam, omnino videtur contrarium rationi, unde cum virtute esse non potest. Sed hoc irrationabiliter dicitur. Est enim aliquod malum quod potest esse virtuoso praesens, ut dictum est. Quod quidem malum ratio detestatur. Unde appetitus sensitivus in hoc sequitur detestationem rationis, quod de huiusmodi malo tristatur, moderate tamen, secundum rationis iudicium. Hoc autem pertinet ad virtutem, ut appetitus sensitivus rationi conformetur, ut dictum est. Unde ad virtutem pertinet quod tristetur moderate in quibus tristandum est, sicut etiam philosophus dicit in II Ethic. Et hoc etiam utile est ad fugiendum mala. Sicut enim bona propter delectationem promptius quaeruntur, ita mala propter tristitiam fortius fugiuntur. Sic igitur dicendum est quod tristitia de his quae conveniunt virtuti, non potest simul esse cum virtute, quia virtus in propriis delectatur. Sed de his quae quocumque modo repugnant virtuti, virtus moderate tristatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="35997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35997] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex illa auctoritate habetur quod de sapientia sapiens non tristetur. Tristatur tamen de his quae sunt impeditiva sapientiae. Et ideo in beatis, in quibus nullum impedimentum sapientiae esse potest, tristitia locum non habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="35998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35998] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod tristitia impedit operationem de qua tristamur, sed adiuvat ad ea promptius exequenda per quae tristitia fugitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="35999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[35999] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod tristitia immoderata est animae aegritudo, tristitia autem moderata ad bonam habitudinem animae pertinet, secundum statum praesentis vitae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A4-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 4. Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that "moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow." But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[31], A[1]</a>; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q59_A4-p2.3" shape="rect"> Q[35], AA[1]</a>, 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36000] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnis virtus moralis sit circa passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod <i>circa voluptates et tristitias est moralis virtus</i>. Sed delectatio et tristitia sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36001] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, rationale per participationem est subiectum moralium virtutum, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed huiusmodi pars animae est in qua sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36002] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in omni virtute morali est invenire aliquam passionem. Aut ergo omnes sunt circa passiones, aut nulla. Sed aliquae sunt circa passiones, ut fortitudo et temperantia, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo omnes virtutes morales sunt circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36003] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod iustitia, quae est virtus moralis, non est circa passiones, ut dicitur in V Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q22_A3" id="FS_Q59_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 co."><a name="36004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36004] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtus moralis perficit appetitivam partem animae ordinando ipsam in bonum rationis. Est autem rationis bonum id quod est secundum rationem moderatum seu ordinatum. Unde circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem. Ratio autem ordinat non solum passiones appetitus sensitivi; sed etiam ordinat operationes appetitus intellectivi, qui est voluntas, quae non est subiectum passionis, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo non omnis virtus moralis est circa passiones; sed quaedam circa passiones, quaedam circa operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the words quoted, adds, "if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows," viz. as about something that results from virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36005] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias sicut circa propriam materiam, sed sicut circa aliquid consequens proprium actum. Omnis enim virtuosus delectatur in actu virtutis, et tristatur in contrario. Unde philosophus post praemissa verba subdit quod, <i>si virtutes sunt circa actus et passiones; omni autem passioni et omni actui sequitur delectatio et tristitia; propter hoc virtus erit circa delectationes et tristitias</i>, scilicet sicut circa aliquid consequens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36006] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod rationale per participationem non solum est appetitus sensitivus, qui est subiectum passionum; sed etiam voluntas, in qua non sunt passiones, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36007] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in quibusdam virtutibus sunt passiones sicut propria materia, in quibusdam autem non. Unde non est eadem ratio de omnibus, ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q59_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q59_A5-p0.1">Q. 59. A. 5. Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36008] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse absque passione. Quanto enim virtus moralis est perfectior, tanto magis superat passiones. Ergo in suo perfectissimo esse, est omnino absque passionibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q59_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) they are called "passions of sins." Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36009] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, tunc unumquodque est perfectum, quando est remotum a suo contrario, et ab his quae ad contrarium inclinant. Sed passiones inclinant ad peccatum, quod virtuti contrariatur, unde Rom. VII, nominantur passiones peccatorum. Ergo perfecta virtus est omnino absque passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36010] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, secundum virtutem Deo conformamur; ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de moribus Eccles. Sed Deus omnia operatur sine passione. Ergo virtus perfectissima est absque omni passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36011] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed gaudium est passio. Ergo iustitia non potest esse sine passione. Et multo minus aliae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q59_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements. </p><p id="FS_Q59_A5-p7"> Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A7" id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[7]</a>; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q24_A3" id="FS_Q59_A5-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[24], A[3]</a>). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 co."><a name="36012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36012] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt; sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt. Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo. Unde sicut virtus membra corporis ordinat ad actus exteriores debitos, ita appetitum sensitivum ad motus proprios ordinatos. Virtutes vero morales quae non sunt circa passiones, sed circa operationes, possunt esse sine passionibus (et huiusmodi virtus est iustitia), quia per eas applicatur voluntas ad proprium actum, qui non est passio. Sed tamen ad actum iustitiae sequitur gaudium, ad minus in voluntate, quod non est passio. Et si hoc gaudium multiplicetur per iustitiae perfectionem, fiet gaudii redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum; secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et sic per redundantiam huiusmodi, quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto magis passionem causat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36013] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus passiones inordinatas superat, moderatas autem producit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36014] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sunt moderatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q59_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 59 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36015] Iª-IIae q. 59 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem suae naturae. In Deo autem et Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, sicut est in homine. Et ideo bona operatio Dei et Angeli est omnino sine passione, sicut et sine corpore, bona autem operatio hominis est cum passione, sicut et cum corporis ministerio.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q60" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q60-p0.1">Q. 60. HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q60-p2"> We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q60-p3"><a href="#FS_Q60_A1"> (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p4"><a href="#FS_Q60_A2"> (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p5"><a href="#FS_Q60_A3"> (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p6"><a href="#FS_Q60_A4"> (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</a></p><p id="FS_Q60-p7"><a href="#FS_Q60_A5"> (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 pr."><a name="36016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36016] Iª-IIae q. 60 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de distinctione virtutum moralium ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum sit tantum una virtus moralis. Secundo, utrum distinguantur virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, ab his quae sunt circa passiones. Tertio, utrum circa operationes sit una tantum moralis virtus. Quarto, utrum circa diversas passiones sint diversae morales virtutes. Quinto, utrum virtutes morales distinguantur secundum diversa obiecta passionum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q60_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A1-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 1. Whether there is only one moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36017] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus. Sicut enim in actibus moralibus directio pertinet ad rationem, quae est subiectum intellectualium virtutum; ita inclinatio pertinet ad vim appetitivam, quae est subiectum moralium virtutum. Sed una est intellectualis virtus dirigens in omnibus moralibus actibus, scilicet prudentia. Ergo etiam una tantum est moralis virtus inclinans in omnibus moralibus actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36018] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, habitus non distinguuntur secundum materialia obiecta, sed secundum formales rationes obiectorum. Formalis autem ratio boni ad quod ordinatur virtus moralis, est unum, scilicet modus rationis. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q60_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36019] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, moralia recipiunt speciem a fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed finis omnium virtutum moralium communis est unus, scilicet felicitas; proprii autem et propinqui sunt infiniti. Non sunt autem infinitae virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[80], A[2]</a>; <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36020] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod unus habitus non potest esse in diversis potentiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed subiectum virtutum moralium est pars appetitiva animae, quae per diversas potentias distinguitur, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo non potest esse una tantum virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q58_A1" id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], AA[1]</a>,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q60_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter. </p><p id="FS_Q60_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 co."><a name="36021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36021] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente. Est autem considerandum quod materia patientis se habet ad agens dupliciter. Quandoque enim recipit formam agentis secundum eandem rationem, prout est in agente, sicut est in omnibus agentibus univocis. Et sic necesse est quod, si agens est unum specie, quod materia recipiat formam unius speciei, sicut ab igne non generatur univoce nisi aliquid existens in specie ignis. Aliquando vero materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eandem rationem, prout est in agente, sicut patet in generantibus non univocis, ut animal generatur a sole. Et tunc formae receptae in materia ab eodem agente, non sunt unius speciei sed diversificantur secundum diversam proportionem materiae ad recipiendum influxum agentis, sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum secundum diversam proportionem materiae. Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Unde appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem. Et ita sequitur quod virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36022] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia. Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36023] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod illud formale est unum genere, propter unitatem agentis. Sed diversificatur specie, propter diversas habitudines recipientium, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36024] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A2-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 2. Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A1" id="FS_Q60_A2-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[1]</a>). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36025] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur ab invicem per hoc quod quaedam sunt circa operationes, quaedam circa passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias optimorum operativa. Sed voluptates et tristitiae sunt passiones quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Ergo eadem virtus quae est circa passiones, est etiam circa operationes, utpote operativa existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36026] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, passiones sunt principia exteriorum operationum. Si ergo aliquae virtutes rectificant passiones, oportet quod etiam per consequens rectificent operationes. Eaedem ergo virtutes morales sunt circa passiones et operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36027] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad omnem operationem exteriorem movetur appetitus sensitivus bene vel male. Sed motus appetitus sensitivi sunt passiones. Ergo eaedem virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, sunt circa passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36028] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa passiones quasdam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q59_A4" id="FS_Q60_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[4]</a>, ad 1). </p><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p7"> Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like. </p><p id="FS_Q60_A2-p8"> It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 co."><a name="36029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36029] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod operatio et passio dupliciter potest comparari ad virtutem. Uno modo, sicut effectus. Et hoc modo, omnis moralis virtus habet aliquas operationes bonas, quarum est productiva; et delectationem aliquam vel tristitiam, quae sunt passiones, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo potest comparari operatio ad virtutem moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa passiones. Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo afficiatur ad eas, inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum secundum seipsas, sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad alterum. Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis huiusmodi. Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris operationis, est corruptio iustitiae, inquantum autem corrumpitur commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius virtutis. Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia, in immoderantia vero irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A2-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, for the reason given above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36030] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam prima ratio procedit de operatione, secundum quod est effectus virtutis. Aliae vero duae rationes procedunt ex hoc, quod ad idem concurrunt operatio et passio. Sed in quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in quibusdam circa passionem, ratione praedicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A3-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 3. Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36031] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum virtus moralis circa operationes. Rectitudo enim omnium operationum exteriorum videtur ad iustitiam pertinere. Sed iustitia est una virtus. Ergo una sola virtus est circa operationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36032] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, operationes maxime differentes esse videntur quae ordinantur ad bonum unius, et quae ordinantur ad bonum multitudinis. Sed ista diversitas non diversificat virtutes morales, dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod iustitia legalis, quae ordinat actus hominum ad commune bonum, non est aliud a virtute quae ordinat actus hominis ad unum tantum, nisi secundum rationem. Ergo diversitas operationum non causat diversitatem virtutum moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36033] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si sunt diversae virtutes morales circa diversas operationes, oporteret quod secundum diversitatem operationum, esset diversitas virtutum moralium. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, nam ad iustitiam pertinet in diversis generibus commutationum rectitudinem statuere, et etiam in distributionibus, ut patet in V Ethic. Non ergo diversae virtutes sunt diversarum operationum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36034] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod religio est alia virtus a pietate, quarum tamen utraque est circa operationes quasdam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is established, as we have stated <a href="#FS_Q60_A2" id="FS_Q60_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: e.g. "Religion" whereby we pay our debt to God; "Piety," whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; "Gratitude," whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 co."><a name="36035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36035] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod omnes virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, conveniunt in quadam generali ratione iustitiae, quae attenditur secundum debitum ad alterum, distinguuntur autem secundum diversas speciales rationes. Cuius ratio est quia in operationibus exterioribus ordo rationis instituitur sicut dictum est, non secundum proportionem ad affectionem hominis, sed secundum ipsam convenientiam rei in seipsa; secundum quam convenientiam accipitur ratio debiti, ex quo constituitur ratio iustitiae, ad iustitiam enim pertinere videtur ut quis debitum reddat. Unde omnes huiusmodi virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, habent aliquo modo rationem iustitiae. Sed debitum non est unius rationis in omnibus, aliter enim debetur aliquid aequali, aliter superiori, aliter minori; et aliter ex pacto, vel ex promisso, vel ex beneficio suscepto. Et secundum has diversas rationes debiti, sumuntur diversae virtutes, puta religio est per quam redditur debitum Deo; pietas est per quam redditur debitum parentibus vel patriae; gratia est per quam redditur debitum benefactoribus; et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36036] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitia proprie dicta est una specialis virtus, quae attendit perfectam rationem debiti, quod secundum aequivalentiam potest restitui. Dicitur tamen et ampliato nomine iustitia, secundum quamcumque debiti redditionem. Et sic non est una specialis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36037] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod iustitia quae intendit bonum commune, est alia virtus a iustitia quae ordinatur ad bonum privatum alicuius, unde et ius commune distinguitur a iure privato; et Tullius ponit unam specialem virtutem, pietatem, quae ordinat ad bonum patriae. Sed iustitia ordinans hominem ad bonum commune, est generalis per imperium, quia omnes actus virtutum ordinat ad finem suum, scilicet ad bonum commune. Virtus autem secundum quod a tali iustitia imperatur, etiam iustitiae nomen accipit. Et sic virtus a iustitia legali non differt nisi ratione, sicut sola ratione differt virtus operans secundum seipsam, et virtus operans ad imperium alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ( <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q61_A1" id="FS_Q60_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[61], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36038] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in omnibus operationibus ad iustitiam specialem pertinentibus, est eadem ratio debiti. Et ideo est eadem virtus iustitiae, praecipue quantum ad commutationes. Forte enim distributiva est alterius speciei a commutativa, sed de hoc infra quaeretur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A4-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 4. Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[25], AA[1]</a>,2,4; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q60_A4-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[27], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is but one moral virtue about all the passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36039] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circa diversas passiones non sint diversae virtutes morales. Eorum enim quae conveniunt in principio et fine, unus est habitus, sicut patet maxime in scientiis. Sed omnium passionum unum est principium, scilicet amor; et omnes ad eundem finem terminantur, scilicet ad delectationem vel tristitiam; ut supra habitum est. Ergo circa omnes passiones est una tantum moralis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36040] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si circa diversas passiones essent diversae virtutes morales, sequeretur quod tot essent virtutes morales quot passiones. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, quia circa oppositas passiones est una et eadem virtus moralis, sicut fortitudo circa timores et audacias, temperantia circa delectationes et tristitias. Non ergo oportet quod circa diversas passiones sint diversae virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q60_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about different passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36041] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, amor, concupiscentia et delectatio sunt passiones specie differentes, ut supra habitum est. Sed circa omnes has est una virtus, scilicet temperantia. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt diversae circa diversas passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36042] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod fortitudo est circa timores et audacias; temperantia circa concupiscentias; mansuetudo circa iras; ut dicitur in III et IV Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A1" id="FS_Q60_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[1]</a>). </p><p id="FS_Q60_A4-p7"> On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 co."><a name="36043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36043] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod non potest dici quod circa omnes passiones sit una sola virtus moralis, sunt enim quaedam passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes; aliae namque pertinent ad irascibilem, aliae ad concupiscibilem, ut supra dictum est. Nec tamen oportet quod omnis diversitas passionum sufficiat ad virtutes morales diversificandas. Primo quidem, quia quaedam passiones sunt quae sibi opponuntur secundum contrarietatem, sicut gaudium et tristitia, timor et audacia, et alia huiusmodi. Et circa huiusmodi passiones sic oppositas, oportet esse unam et eandem virtutem. Cum enim virtus moralis in quadam medietate consistat, medium in contrariis passionibus secundum eandem rationem instituitur, sicut et in naturalibus idem est medium inter contraria, ut inter album et nigrum. Secundo, quia diversae passiones inveniuntur secundum eundem modum rationi repugnantes, puta secundum impulsum ad id quod est contra rationem; vel secundum retractionem ab eo quod est secundum rationem. Et ideo diversae passiones concupiscibilis non pertinent ad diversas virtutes morales, quia earum motus secundum quendam ordinem se invicem consequuntur, utpote ad idem ordinati, scilicet ad consequendum bonum, vel ad fugiendum malum; sicut ex amore procedit concupiscentia, et ex concupiscentia pervenitur ad delectationem. Et eadem ratio est de oppositis, quia ex odio sequitur fuga vel abominatio, quae perducit ad tristitiam. Sed passiones irascibilis non sunt unius ordinis, sed ad diversa ordinantur, nam audacia et timor ordinantur ad aliquod magnum periculum; spes et desperatio ad aliquod bonum arduum; ira autem ad superandum aliquod contrarium quod nocumentum intulit. Et ideo circa has passiones diversae virtutes ordinantur, utpote temperantia circa passiones concupiscibilis; fortitudo circa timores et audacias; magnanimitas circa spem et desperationem; mansuetudo circa iras.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36044] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes passiones conveniunt in uno principio et fine communi, non autem in uno proprio principio seu fine. Unde hoc non sufficit ad unitatem virtutis moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a second nature, consents to reason's dictates. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36045] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in naturalibus idem est principium quo receditur ab uno principio, et acceditur ad aliud; et in rationalibus est eadem ratio contrariorum, ita etiam virtus moralis, quae in modum naturae rationi consentit, est eadem contrariarum passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36046] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illae tres passiones ad idem obiectum ordinantur secundum quendam ordinem, ut dictum est. Et ideo ad eandem virtutem moralem pertinent.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q60_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q60_A5-p0.1">Q. 60. A. 5. Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according to the objects of those passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36047] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur secundum obiecta passionum. Sicut enim sunt obiecta passionum, ita sunt obiecta operationum. Sed virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, non distinguuntur secundum obiecta operationum, ad eandem enim virtutem iustitiae pertinet emere vel vendere domum, et equum. Ergo etiam nec virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones, diversificantur per obiecta passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36048] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, passiones sunt quidam actus vel motus appetitus sensitivi. Sed maior diversitas requiritur ad diversitatem habituum, quam ad diversitatem actuum. Diversa igitur obiecta quae non diversificant speciem passionis, non diversificabunt speciem virtutis moralis. Ita scilicet quod de omnibus delectabilibus erit una virtus moralis, et similiter est de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less pleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36049] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Sed diversa delectabilia non differunt nisi secundum magis et minus. Ergo omnia delectabilia pertinent ad unam speciem virtutis. Et eadem ratione, omnia terribilia, et similiter de aliis. Non ergo virtus moralis distinguitur secundum obiecta passionum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be different virtues about fears of evils. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36050] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut virtus est operativa boni, ita est impeditiva mali. Sed circa concupiscentias bonorum sunt diversae virtutes, sicut temperantia circa concupiscentias delectationum tactus, et eutrapelia circa delectationes ludi. Ergo etiam circa timores malorum debent esse diversae virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and "eutrapelia" about pleasures in games. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36051] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod castitas est circa delectabilia venereorum; abstinentia vero est circa delectabilia ciborum; et eutrapelia circa delectabilia ludorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q60_A4" id="FS_Q60_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure. </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p8"> And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q60_A4" id="FS_Q60_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues---for instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to man's good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues. </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p9"> Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of "temperance." As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, "like art, is about difficult things" (Ethic. ii, 3). </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p10"> On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is "liberality": but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is "magnificence" [*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called "philotimia" [*{philotimia}], i.e. "love of honor": while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have "magnanimity." Wherefore liberality and "philotimia" seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible. </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p11"> As regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls "friendship" [*{philia}], and may be rendered "affability." Secondly, one man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls "truthfulness" [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher "eutrapelia" [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. iv, 8). </p><p id="FS_Q60_A5-p12"> It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, "philotimia," gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and "eutrapelia," all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add "justice," which is about operations, there will be eleven in all. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 co."><a name="36052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36052] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod perfectio virtutis ex ratione dependet, perfectio autem passionis, ex ipso appetitu sensitivo. Unde oportet quod virtutes diversificentur secundum ordinem ad rationem, passiones autem, secundum ordinem ad appetitum. Obiecta igitur passionum, secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum. Non est autem idem motus rationis, et appetitus sensitivi. Unde nihil prohibet aliquam differentiam obiectorum causare diversitatem passionum, quae non causat diversitatem virtutum, sicut quando una virtus est circa multas passiones, ut dictum est, et aliquam etiam differentiam obiectorum causare diversitatem virtutum, quae non causat diversitatem passionum, cum circa unam passionem, puta delectationem, diversae virtutes ordinentur. Et quia diversae passiones ad diversas potentias pertinentes, semper pertinent ad diversas virtutes, ut dictum est; ideo diversitas obiectorum quae respicit diversitatem potentiarum, semper diversificat species virtutum; puta quod aliquid sit bonum absolute, et aliquid bonum cum aliqua arduitate. Et quia ordine quodam ratio inferiores hominis partes regit, et etiam se ad exteriora extendit; ideo etiam secundum quod unum obiectum passionis apprehenditur sensu vel imaginatione, aut etiam ratione; et secundum etiam quod pertinet ad animam, corpus, vel exteriores res; diversam habitudinem habet ad rationem; et per consequens natum est diversificare virtutes. Bonum igitur hominis, quod est obiectum amoris, concupiscentiae et delectationis, potest accipi vel ad sensum corporis pertinens; vel ad interiorem animae apprehensionem. Et hoc, sive ordinetur ad bonum hominis in seipso, vel quantum ad corpus vel quantum ad animam; sive ordinetur ad bonum hominis in ordine ad alios. Et omnis talis diversitas, propter diversum ordinem ad rationem, diversificat virtutem. Sic igitur si consideretur aliquod bonum, si quidem sit per sensum tactus apprehensum, et ad consistentiam humanae vitae pertinens in individuo vel in specie, sicut sunt delectabilia ciborum et venereorum; erit pertinens ad virtutem temperantiae. Delectationes autem aliorum sensuum, cum non sint vehementes, non praestant aliquam difficultatem rationi, et ideo circa eas non ponitur aliqua virtus, quae est circa difficile, sicut et ars, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Bonum autem non sensu, sed interiori virtute apprehensum, ad ipsum hominem pertinens secundum seipsum, est sicut pecunia et honor; quorum pecunia ordinabilis est de se ad bonum corporis; honor autem consistit in apprehensione animae. Et haec quidem bona considerari possunt vel absolute, secundum quod pertinent ad concupiscibilem; vel cum arduitate quadam, secundum quod pertinent ad irascibilem. Quae quidem distinctio non habet locum in bonis quae delectant tactum, quia huiusmodi sunt quaedam infima, et competunt homini secundum quod convenit cum brutis. Circa bonum igitur pecuniae absolute sumptum, secundum quod est obiectum concupiscentiae vel delectationis aut amoris, est liberalitas. Circa bonum autem huiusmodi cum arduitate sumptum, secundum quod est obiectum spei, est magnificentia. Circa bonum vero quod est honor, si quidem sit absolute sumptum, secundum quod est obiectum amoris, sic est quaedam virtus quae vocatur philotimia, idest amor honoris. Si vero cum arduitate consideretur, secundum quod est obiectum spei, sic est magnanimitas. Unde liberalitas et philotimia videntur esse in concupiscibili, magnificentia vero et magnanimitas in irascibili. Bonum vero hominis in ordine ad alium, non videtur arduitatem habere, sed accipitur ut absolute sumptum, prout est obiectum passionum concupiscibilis. Quod quidem bonum potest esse alicui delectabile secundum quod praebet se alteri vel in his quae serio fiunt, idest in actionibus per rationem ordinatis ad debitum finem; vel in his quae fiunt ludo, idest in actionibus ordinatis ad delectationem tantum, quae non eodem modo se habent ad rationem sicut prima. In seriis autem se exhibet aliquis alteri dupliciter. Uno modo, ut delectabilem decentibus verbis et factis, et hoc pertinet ad quandam virtutem quam Aristoteles nominat amicitiam; et potest dici affabilitas. Alio modo praebet se aliquis alteri ut manifestum, per dicta et facta, et hoc pertinet ad aliam virtutem, quam nominat veritatem. Manifestatio enim propinquius accedit ad rationem quam delectatio; et seria quam iocosa. Unde et circa delectationes ludorum est alia virtus, quam philosophus eutrapeliam nominat. Sic igitur patet quod, secundum Aristotelem, sunt decem virtutes morales circa passiones, scilicet fortitudo, temperantia, liberalitas, magnificentia, magnanimitas, philotimia, mansuetudo, amicitia, veritas et eutrapelia. Et distinguuntur secundum diversas materias vel secundum diversas passiones; vel secundum diversa obiecta. Si igitur addatur iustitia, quae est circa operationes, erunt omnes undecim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36053] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia obiecta eiusdem operationis secundum speciem, eandem habitudinem habent ad rationem; non autem omnia obiecta eiusdem passionis secundum speciem, quia operationes non repugnant rationi, sicut passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36054] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod alia ratione diversificantur passiones, et alia virtutes, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36055] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod magis et minus non diversificant speciem, nisi propter diversam habitudinem ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q60_A5-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 60 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36056] Iª-IIae q. 60 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod bonum fortius est ad movendum quam malum quia malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde malum non facit difficultatem rationi quae requirat virtutem, nisi sit excellens, quod videtur esse unum in uno genere passionis. Unde circa iras non ponitur nisi una virtus, scilicet mansuetudo, et similiter circa audacias una sola, scilicet fortitudo. Sed bonum ingerit difficultatem, quae requirit virtutem, etiam si non sit excellens in genere talis passionis. Et ideo circa concupiscentias ponuntur diversae virtutes morales, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q61" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q61-p0.1">Q. 61. OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q61-p2"> We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q61-p3"><a href="#FS_Q61_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p4"><a href="#FS_Q61_A2"> (2) Of their number;</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p5"><a href="#FS_Q61_A3"> (3) Which are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p6"><a href="#FS_Q61_A4"> (4) Whether they differ from one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q61-p7"><a href="#FS_Q61_A5"> (5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 pr."><a name="36057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36057] Iª-IIae q. 61 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de virtutibus cardinalibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum virtutes morales debeant dici cardinales, vel principales. Secundo, de numero earum. Tertio, quae sint. Quarto, utrum differant ab invicem. Quinto, utrum dividantur convenienter in virtutes politicas, et purgatorias, et purgati animi, et exemplares.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q61_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A1-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For "the opposite members of a division are by nature simultaneous" (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus "virtue." Therefore none of them should be called principal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36058] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non debeant dici cardinales, seu principales. Quae enim ex opposito dividuntur, sunt simul natura, ut dicitur in praedicamentis, et sic unum non est altero principalius. Sed omnes virtutes ex opposito dividunt genus virtutis. Ergo nullae earum debent dici principales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36059] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, finis principalior est his quae sunt ad finem. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt circa finem, virtutes autem morales circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Ergo virtutes morales non debent dici principales, seu cardinales; sed magis theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[58] , A[3]</a>). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36060] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, principalius est quod est per essentiam, quam quod est per participationem. Sed virtutes intellectuales pertinent ad rationale per essentiam, virtutes autem morales ad rationale per participationem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt principales, sed magis virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose in explaining the words, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv">Lk. 6:20</a>) says: "We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude." But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36061] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, exponens illud, <i>beati pauperes spiritu, scimus virtutes esse quatuor cardinales, scilicet temperantiam, iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem</i>. Hae autem sunt virtutes morales. Ergo virtutes morales sunt cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q57_A4" id="FS_Q61_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[57], A[4]</a>). Consequently, those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 co."><a name="36062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36062] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum simpliciter de virtute loquimur, intelligimur loqui de virtute humana. Virtus autem humana, ut supra dictum est, secundum perfectam rationem virtutis dicitur, quae requirit rectitudinem appetitus, huiusmodi enim virtus non solum facit facultatem bene agendi, sed ipsum etiam usum boni operis causat. Sed secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis dicitur virtus quae non requirit rectitudinem appetitus, quia solum facit facultatem bene agendi, non autem causat boni operis usum. Constat autem quod perfectum est principalius imperfecto. Et ideo virtutes quae continent rectitudinem appetitus, dicuntur principales. Huiusmodi autem sunt virtutes morales; et inter intellectuales, sola prudentia, quae etiam quodammodo moralis est, secundum materiam, ut ex supradictis patet, unde convenienter inter virtutes morales ponuntur illae quae dicuntur principales, seu cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36063] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quando genus univocum dividitur in suas species, tunc partes divisionis ex aequo se habent secundum rationem generis; licet secundum naturam rei, una species sit principalior et perfectior alia, sicut homo aliis animalibus. Sed quando est divisio alicuius analogi, quod dicitur de pluribus secundum prius et posterius; tunc nihil prohibet unum esse principalius altero, etiam secundum communem rationem; sicut substantia principalius dicitur ens quam accidens. Et talis est divisio virtutum in diversa genera virtutum, eo quod bonum rationis non secundum eundem ordinem invenitur in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues are above man, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q61_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or godlike virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36064] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sunt supra hominem, ut supra dictum est. Unde non proprie dicuntur virtutes humanae, sed superhumanae, vel divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36065] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliae virtutes intellectuales a prudentia, etsi sint principaliores quam morales quantum ad subiectum; non tamen sunt principaliores quantum ad rationem virtutis, quae respicit bonum, quod est obiectum appetitus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A2-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 2. Whether there are four cardinal virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above ( <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q61_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36066] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint quatuor virtutes cardinales. Prudentia enim est directiva aliarum virtutum moralium, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed id quod est directivum aliorum, principalius est. Ergo prudentia sola est virtus principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36067] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes principales sunt aliquo modo morales. Sed ad operationes morales ordinamur per rationem practicam, et appetitum rectum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo solae duae virtutes cardinales sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36068] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter alias etiam virtutes una est principalior altera. Sed ad hoc quod virtus dicatur principalis, non requiritur quod sit principalis respectu omnium, sed respectu quarundam. Ergo videtur quod sint multo plures principales virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36069] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., <i>in quatuor virtutibus tota boni operis structura consurgit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues. </p><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p7"> For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called "Prudence." Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have "Justice"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a curb, which we call "Temperance." Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is "Fortitude." </p><p id="FS_Q61_A2-p8"> In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by "Prudence"; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of "Justice," the concupiscible faculty, subject of "Temperance," and the irascible faculty, subject of "Fortitude." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 co."><a name="36070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36070] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod numerus aliquorum accipi potest aut secundum principia formalia aut secundum subiecta, et utroque modo inveniuntur quatuor cardinales virtutes. Principium enim formale virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, est rationis bonum. Quod quidem dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod in ipsa consideratione rationis consistit. Et sic erit una virtus principalis, quae dicitur prudentia. Alio modo, secundum quod circa aliquid ponitur rationis ordo. Et hoc vel circa operationes, et sic est iustitia, vel circa passiones, et sic necesse est esse duas virtutes. Ordinem enim rationis necesse est ponere circa passiones, considerata repugnantia ipsarum ad rationem. Quae quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod passio impellit ad aliquid contrarium rationi, et sic necesse est quod passio reprimatur, et ab hoc denominatur temperantia. Alio modo, secundum quod passio retrahit ab eo quod ratio dictat, sicut timor periculorum vel laborum, et sic necesse est quod homo firmetur in eo quod est rationis, ne recedat; et ab hoc denominatur fortitudo. Similiter secundum subiecta, idem numerus invenitur. Quadruplex enim invenitur subiectum huius virtutis de qua nunc loquimur, scilicet rationale per essentiam, quod prudentia perficit; et rationale per participationem, quod dividitur in tria; idest in voluntatem, quae est subiectum iustitiae; et in concupiscibilem, quae est subiectum temperantiae; et in irascibilem, quae est subiectum fortitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36071] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prudentia est simpliciter principalior omnibus. Sed aliae ponuntur principales unaquaeque in suo genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36072] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod rationale per participationem dividitur in tria, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36073] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod omnes aliae virtutes, quarum una est principalior alia, reducuntur ad praedictas quatuor, et quantum ad subiectum, et quantum ad rationes formales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A3-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 3. Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal in any genus. Now "magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a principal virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36074] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliae virtutes debeant dici magis principales quam istae. Id enim quod est maximum in unoquoque genere, videtur esse principalius. Sed magnanimitas operatur magnum in omnibus virtutibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnanimitas maxime debet dici principalis virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that "he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind." Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36075] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud per quod aliae virtutes firmantur, videtur esse maxime principalis virtus. Sed humilitas est huiusmodi, dicit enim Gregorius quod <i>qui ceteras virtutes sine humilitate congregat, quasi paleas in ventum portat</i>. Ergo humilitas videtur esse maxime principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> James 1:4</a>: "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36076] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud videtur esse principale, quod est perfectissimum. Sed hoc pertinet ad patientiam; secundum illud Iacobi I, <i>patientia opus perfectum habet</i>. Ergo patientia debet poni principalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36077] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ad has quatuor omnes alias reducit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q61_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand. </p><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p7"> Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the objections fail. </p><p id="FS_Q61_A3-p8"> Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 co."><a name="36078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36078] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod sicut supra dictum est, huiusmodi quatuor virtutes cardinales accipiuntur secundum quatuor formales rationes virtutis de qua loquimur. Quae quidem in aliquibus actibus vel passionibus principaliter inveniuntur. Sicut bonum consistens in consideratione rationis, principaliter invenitur in ipso rationis imperio; non autem in consilio, neque in iudicio, ut supra dictum est. Similiter autem bonum rationis prout ponitur in operationibus secundum rationem recti et debiti, principaliter invenitur in commutationibus vel distributionibus quae sunt ad alterum cum aequalitate. Bonum autem refraenandi passiones principaliter invenitur in passionibus quas maxime difficile est reprimere, scilicet in delectationibus tactus. Bonum autem firmitatis ad standum in bono rationis contra impetum passionum, praecipue invenitur in periculis mortis, contra quae difficillimum est stare. Sic igitur praedictas quatuor virtutes dupliciter considerare possumus. Uno modo, secundum communes rationes formales. Et secundum hoc, dicuntur principales, quasi generales ad omnes virtutes, utputa quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum in consideratione rationis, dicatur prudentia; et quod omnis virtus quae facit bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo. Et sic multi loquuntur de istis virtutibus, tam sacri doctores quam etiam philosophi. Et sic aliae virtutes sub ipsis continentur unde cessant omnes obiectiones. Alio vero modo possunt accipi, secundum quod istae virtutes denominantur ab eo quod est praecipuum in unaquaque materia. Et sic sunt speciales virtutes, contra alias divisae. Dicuntur tamen principales respectu aliarum, propter principalitatem materiae, puta quod prudentia dicatur quae praeceptiva est; iustitia, quae est circa actiones debitas inter aequales; temperantia, quae reprimit concupiscentias delectationum tactus; fortitudo, quae firmat contra pericula mortis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A3-p9"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> Thus again do the objections fail: because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36079] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Et sic etiam cessant obiectiones, quia aliae virtutes possunt habere aliquas alias principalitates, sed istae dicuntur principales ratione materiae, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A4-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 4. Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): "There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance." But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36080] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod quatuor praedictae virtutes non sint diversae virtutes, et ab invicem distinctae. Dicit enim Gregorius, in XXII Moral., <i>prudentia vera non est, quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est; nec perfecta temperantia, quae fortis, iusta et prudens non est; nec fortitudo integra, quae prudens, temperans et iusta non est; nec vera iustitia, quae prudens, fortis et temperans non est</i>. Hoc autem non contingeret, si praedictae quatuor virtutes essent ab invicem distinctae, diversae enim species eiusdem generis non denominant se invicem. Ergo praedictae virtutes non sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): "Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is not weakened and bent by any enticement." And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it "safeguards the manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that these virtues are not distinct from one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36081] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eorum quae ab invicem sunt distincta, quod est unius, non attribuitur alteri. Sed illud quod est temperantiae, attribuitur fortitudini, dicit enim Ambrosius, in I libro de Offic., <i>iure ea fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, nullis illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur</i>. De temperantia etiam dicit quod modum vel ordinem servat <i>omnium quae vel agenda vel dicenda arbitramur</i>. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi virtutes non sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36082] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod ad virtutem haec requiruntur, <i>primum quidem, si sciens; deinde, si eligens, et eligens propter hoc; tertium autem, si firme et immobiliter habeat et operetur</i>. Sed horum primum videtur ad prudentiam pertinere, quae est recta ratio agibilium; secundum, scilicet eligere, ad temperantiam, ut aliquis non ex passione, sed ex electione agat, passionibus refraenatis; tertium, ut aliquis propter debitum finem operetur, rectitudinem quandam continet, quae videtur ad iustitiam pertinere aliud, scilicet firmitas et immobilitas, pertinet ad fortitudinem. Ergo quaelibet harum virtutum est generalis ad omnes virtutes. Ergo non distinguuntur ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36083] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de moribus Eccles., quod <i>quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ipsius amoris vario affectu</i>, et subiungit de praedictis quatuor virtutibus. Praedictae ergo quatuor virtutes sunt ab invicem distinctae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q61_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and moral virtue. </p><p id="FS_Q61_A4-p7"> Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q61_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 co."><a name="36084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36084] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, praedictae quatuor virtutes dupliciter a diversis accipiuntur. Quidam enim accipiunt eas, prout significant quasdam generales conditiones humani animi, quae inveniuntur in omnibus virtutibus, ita scilicet quod prudentia nihil sit aliud quam quaedam rectitudo discretionis in quibuscumque actibus vel materiis; iustitia vero sit quaedam rectitudo animi, per quam homo operatur quod debet in quacumque materia; temperantia vero sit quaedam dispositio animi quae modum quibuscumque passionibus vel operationibus imponit, ne ultra debitum efferantur; fortitudo vero sit quaedam dispositio animae per quam firmetur in eo quod est secundum rationem, contra quoscumque impetus passionum vel operationum labores. Haec autem quatuor sic distincta, non important diversitatem habituum virtuosorum quantum ad iustitiam, temperantiam et fortitudinem. Cuilibet enim virtuti morali, ex hoc quod est habitus, convenit quaedam firmitas, ut a contrario non moveatur, quod dictum est ad fortitudinem pertinere. Ex hoc vero quod est virtus, habet quod ordinetur ad bonum, in quo importatur ratio recti vel debiti, quod dicebatur ad iustitiam pertinere. In hoc vero quod est virtus moralis rationem participans, habet quod modum rationis in omnibus servet, et ultra se non extendat, quod dicebatur pertinere ad temperantiam. Solum autem hoc quod est discretionem habere, quod attribuebatur prudentiae, videtur distingui ab aliis tribus, inquantum hoc est ipsius rationis per essentiam; alia vero tria important quandam participationem rationis, per modum applicationis cuiusdam ad passiones vel operationes. Sic igitur, secundum praedicta, prudentia quidem esset virtus distincta ab aliis tribus, sed aliae tres non essent virtutes distinctae ab invicem; manifestum est enim quod una et eadem virtus et est habitus, et est virtus, et est moralis. Alii vero, et melius, accipiunt has quatuor virtutes secundum quod determinantur ad materias speciales; unaquaeque quidem illarum ad unam materiam, in qua principaliter laudatur illa generalis conditio a qua nomen virtutis accipitur, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, manifestum est quod praedictae virtutes sunt diversi habitus, secundum diversitatem obiectorum distincti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered by toil." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36085] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur de praedictis quatuor virtutibus secundum primam acceptionem. Vel potest dici quod istae quatuor virtutes denominantur ab invicem per redundantiam quandam. Id enim quod est prudentiae, redundat in alias virtutes, inquantum a prudentia diriguntur. Unaquaeque vero aliarum redundat in alias ea ratione, quod qui potest quod est difficilius, potest et id quod minus est difficile. Unde qui potest refraenare concupiscentias delectabilium secundum tactum, ne modum excedant, quod est difficillimum; ex hoc ipso redditur habilior ut refraenet audaciam in periculis mortis, ne ultra modum procedat, quod est longe facilius; et secundum hoc, fortitudo dicitur temperata. Temperantia etiam dicitur fortis, ex redundantia fortitudinis in temperantiam, inquantum scilicet ille qui per fortitudinem habet animum firmum contra pericula mortis, quod est difficillimum, est habilior ut retineat animi firmitatem contra impetus delectationum; quia, ut dicit Tullius in I de Offic., <i>non est consentaneum ut qui metu non frangitur, cupiditate frangatur; nec qui invictum se a labore praestiterit, vinci a voluptate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36086] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad secundum. Sic enim temperantia in omnibus modum servat, et fortitudo contra illecebras voluptatum animum servat inflexum, vel inquantum istae virtutes denominant quasdam generales conditiones virtutum; vel per redundantiam praedictam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36087] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illae quatuor generales virtutum conditiones quas ponit philosophus, non sunt propriae praedictis virtutibus. Sed possunt eis appropriari, secundum modum iam dictum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q61_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q61_A5-p0.1">Q. 61. A. 5. Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36088] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter huiusmodi quatuor virtutes dividantur in virtutes exemplares, purgati animi, purgatorias, et politicas. Ut enim Macrobius dicit, in I super somnium Scipionis, <i>virtutes exemplares sunt quae in ipsa divina mente consistunt</i>. Sed philosophus, in X Ethic., dicit quod <i>ridiculum est Deo iustitiam, fortitudinem, temperantiam et prudentiam attribuere</i>. Ergo virtutes huiusmodi non possunt esse exemplares.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q59_A5" id="FS_Q61_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[59], A[5]</a>) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36089] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes purgati animi dicuntur quae sunt absque passionibus, dicit enim ibidem Macrobius quod <i>temperantiae purgati animi est terrenas cupiditates non reprimere, sed penitus oblivisci; fortitudinis autem passiones ignorare, non vincere</i>. Dictum est autem supra quod huiusmodi virtutes sine passionibus esse non possunt. Ergo huiusmodi virtutes purgati animi esse non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36090] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes purgatorias dicit esse eorum <i>qui quadam humanorum fuga solis se inserunt divinis</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse vitiosum, dicit enim Tullius, in I de Offic., <i>quod qui despicere se dicunt ea quae plerique mirantur imperia et magistratus, his non modo non laudi, verum etiam vitio dandum puto</i>. Ergo non sunt aliquae virtutes purgatoriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36091] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes politicas esse dicit <i>quibus boni viri reipublicae consulunt, urbesque tuentur</i>. Sed ad bonum commune sola iustitia legalis ordinatur; ut philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. Ergo aliae virtutes non debent dici politicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal."] </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36092] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Macrobius ibidem dicit, <i>Plotinus, inter philosophiae professores cum Platone princeps, quatuor sunt, inquit, quaternarum genera virtutum. Ex his primae politicae vocantur; secundae, purgatoriae; tertiae autem, iam purgati animi; quartae, exemplares</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1). </p><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p8"> Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now. </p><p id="FS_Q61_A5-p9"> But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us---for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q61_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 co."><a name="36093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36093] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., <i>oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene vivimus</i>. Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, et sic dicuntur virtutes exemplares. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae intentionis ad seipsum, sicut in nobis temperantia dicitur per hoc quod concupiscibilis conformatur rationi; fortitudo autem Dei est eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit. Et quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quem modum hactenus de his virtutibus locuti sumus. Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est illud Matth. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est</i>, necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias inter politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt virtutes divinae. Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum diversitatem motus et termini. Ita scilicet quod quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam. Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando. Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36094] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus secundum quod sunt circa res humanas, puta iustitia circa emptiones et venditiones, fortitudo circa timores, temperantia circa concupiscentias. Sic enim ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36095] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet virtutes hominum in hoc mundo conversantium. Sed virtutes eorum qui plenam beatitudinem assequuntur, sunt absque passionibus. Unde Plotinus dicit quod passiones politicae virtutes molliunt, idest ad medium reducunt; secundae, scilicet purgatoriae, auferunt; tertiae, quae sunt purgati animi, obliviscuntur; in quartis, scilicet exemplaribus, nefas est nominari. Quamvis dici possit quod loquitur hic de passionibus secundum quod significant aliquos inordinatos motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hollowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36096] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, vitiosum est, alias est virtuosum. Unde parum supra Tullius praemittit, <i>his forsitan concedendum est rempublicam non capessentibus, qui excellenti ingenio doctrinae se dederunt; et his qui aut valetudinis imbecillitate, aut aliqua graviori causa impediti, a republica recesserunt; cum eius administrandae potestatem aliis laudemque concederent</i>. Quod consonat ei quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, <i>otium sanctum quaerit caritas veritatis; negotium iustum suscipit necessitas caritatis. Quam sarcinam si nullus imponit, percipiendae atque intuendae vacandum est veritati, si autem imponitur, suscipienda est, propter caritatis necessitatem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q61_A5-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or even towards one individual. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 61 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36097] Iª-IIae q. 61 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod sola iustitia legalis directe respicit bonum commune, sed per imperium omnes alias virtutes ad bonum commune trahit, ut in V Ethic. dicit philosophus. Est enim considerandum quod ad politicas virtutes, secundum quod hic dicuntur, pertinet non solum bene operari ad commune, sed etiam bene operari ad partes communis, scilicet ad domum, vel aliquam singularem personam.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q62" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q62-p0.1">Q. 62. OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q62-p2"> We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q62-p3"><a href="#FS_Q62_A1"> (1) Whether there are any theological virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p4"><a href="#FS_Q62_A2"> (2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p5"><a href="#FS_Q62_A3"> (3) How many, and which are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q62-p6"><a href="#FS_Q62_A4"> (4) Of their order.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 pr."><a name="36098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36098] Iª-IIae q. 62 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de virtutibus theologicis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Secundo, utrum virtutes theologicae distinguantur ab intellectualibus et moralibus. Tertio, quot, et quae sint. Quarto, de ordine earum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q62_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A1-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 1. Whether there are any theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36099] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sint aliquae virtutes theologicae. Ut enim dicitur in VII Physic., <i>virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum naturam</i>. Sed id quod est divinum, est supra naturam hominis. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q61_A5" id="FS_Q62_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[5]</a>), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36100] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quasi virtutes divinae. Sed virtutes divinae sunt exemplares, ut dictum est, quae quidem non sunt in nobis, sed in Deo. Ergo virtutes theologicae non sunt virtutes hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36101] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quibus ordinamur in Deum, qui est primum principium et ultimus finis rerum. Sed homo ex ipsa natura rationis et voluntatis, habet ordinem ad primum principium et ultimum finem. Non ergo requiruntur aliqui habitus virtutum theologicarum, quibus ratio et voluntas ordinetur in Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.2.8" target="asv">Ecclus. 2:8, </a> seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36102] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod praecepta legis sunt de actibus virtutum. Sed de actibus fidei, spei et caritatis dantur praecepta in lege divina, dicitur enim Eccli. II, qui timetis Deum, credite illi; item, sperate in illum; item, diligite illum. Ergo fides, spes et caritas sunt virtutes in Deum ordinantes. Sunt ergo theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A7" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[7]</a>). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q62_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[5], A[5]</a>). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made "partakers of the Divine nature." And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called "theological virtues": first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 co."><a name="36103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36103] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod per virtutem perficitur homo ad actus quibus in beatitudinem ordinatur, ut ex supradictis patet. Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas, ut supra dictum est. Una quidem proportionata humanae naturae, ad quam scilicet homo pervenire potest per principia suae naturae. Alia autem est beatitudo naturam hominis excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest, secundum quandam divinitatis participationem; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, quod per Christum facti sumus consortes divinae naturae. Et quia huiusmodi beatitudo proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficiunt ad ordinandum hominem in beatitudinem praedictam. Unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deo nobis infunduntur; tum quia sola divina revelatione, in sacra Scriptura, huiusmodi virtutes traduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36104] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua natura potest attribui alicui rei dupliciter. Uno modo, essentialiter, et sic huiusmodi virtutes theologicae excedunt hominis naturam. Alio modo, participative, sicut lignum ignitum participat naturam ignis, et sic quodammodo fit homo particeps divinae naturae, ut dictum est. Et sic istae virtutes conveniunt homini secundum naturam participatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36105] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod istae virtutes non dicuntur divinae, sicut quibus Deus sit virtuosus, sed sicut quibus nos efficimur virtuosi a Deo, et in ordine ad Deum. Unde non sunt exemplares, sed exemplatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36106] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ad Deum naturaliter ratio et voluntas ordinatur prout est naturae principium et finis, secundum tamen proportionem naturae. Sed ad ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, ratio et voluntas secundum suam naturam non ordinantur sufficienter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A2-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 2. Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36107] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes theologicae non distinguantur a moralibus et intellectualibus. Virtutes enim theologicae, si sunt in anima humana, oportet quod perficiant ipsam vel secundum partem intellectivam vel secundum partem appetitivam. Sed virtutes quae perficiunt partem intellectivam, dicuntur intellectuales, virtutes autem quae perficiunt partem appetitivam, sunt morales. Ergo virtutes theologicae non distinguuntur a virtutibus moralibus et intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36108] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes theologicae dicuntur quae ordinant nos ad Deum. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes est aliqua quae ordinat nos ad Deum, scilicet sapientia, quae est de divinis, utpote causam altissimam considerans. Ergo virtutes theologicae ab intellectualibus virtutibus non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the "order of love." Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36109] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro de moribus Eccles., manifestat in quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus quod sunt ordo amoris. Sed amor est caritas, quae ponitur virtus theologica. Ergo virtutes morales non distinguuntur a theologicis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q62_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>). Therefore they are distinct from one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36110] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, id quod est supra naturam hominis, distinguitur ab eo quod est secundum naturam hominis. Sed virtutes theologicae sunt super naturam hominis, cui secundum naturam conveniunt virtutes intellectuales et morales, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo distinguuntur ab invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q62_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>, ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 co."><a name="36111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36111] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus specie distinguuntur secundum formalem differentiam obiectorum. Obiectum autem theologicarum virtutum est ipse Deus, qui est ultimus rerum finis, prout nostrae rationis cognitionem excedit. Obiectum autem virtutum intellectualium et moralium est aliquid quod humana ratione comprehendi potest. Unde virtutes theologicae specie distinguuntur a moralibus et intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36112] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales et morales perficiunt intellectum et appetitum hominis secundum proportionem naturae humanae, sed theologicae supernaturaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36113] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod sapientia quae a philosopho ponitur intellectualis virtus, considerat divina secundum quod sunt investigabilia ratione humana. Sed theologica virtus est circa ea secundum quod rationem humanam excedunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q[65], AA[2],5; <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q23_A7" id="FS_Q62_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[23], A[7]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36114] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, licet caritas sit amor, non tamen omnis amor est caritas. Cum ergo dicitur quod omnis virtus est ordo amoris, potest intelligi vel de amore communiter dicto; vel de amore caritatis. Si de amore communiter dicto, sic dicitur quaelibet virtus esse ordo amoris, inquantum ad quamlibet cardinalium virtutum requiritur ordinata affectio, omnis autem affectionis radix et principium est amor, ut supra dictum est. Si autem intelligatur de amore caritatis, non datur per hoc intelligi quod quaelibet alia virtus essentialiter sit caritas, sed quod omnes aliae virtutes aliqualiter a caritate dependeant, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A3-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 3. Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one theological virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36115] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur tres virtutes theologicae, fides, spes et caritas. Virtutes enim theologicae se habent in ordine ad beatitudinem divinam, sicut inclinatio naturae ad finem connaturalem. Sed inter virtutes ordinatas ad finem connaturalem, ponitur una sola virtus naturalis, scilicet intellectus principiorum. Ergo debet poni una sola virtus theologica.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36116] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, theologicae virtutes sunt perfectiores virtutibus intellectualibus et moralibus. Sed inter intellectuales virtutes fides non ponitur, sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit cognitio imperfecta. Similiter etiam inter virtutes morales non ponitur spes, sed est aliquid minus virtute, cum sit passio. Ergo multo minus debent poni virtutes theologicae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God. Now man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36117] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes theologicae ordinant animam hominis ad Deum. Sed ad Deum non potest anima hominis ordinari nisi per intellectivam partem, in qua est intellectus et voluntas. Ergo non debent esse nisi duae virtutes theologicae, una quae perficiat intellectum, alia quae perficiat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36118] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q62_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q62_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason. </p><p id="FS_Q62_A3-p7"> But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as something attainable---and this pertains to hope---and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end---and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 co."><a name="36119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36119] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes theologicae hoc modo ordinant hominem ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per naturalem inclinationem ordinatur homo in finem sibi connaturalem. Hoc autem contingit secundum duo. Primo quidem, secundum rationem vel intellectum, inquantum continet prima principia universalia cognita nobis per naturale lumen intellectus, ex quibus procedit ratio tam in speculandis quam in agendis. Secundo, per rectitudinem voluntatis naturaliter tendentis in bonum rationis. Sed haec duo deficiunt ab ordine beatitudinis supernaturalis; secundum illud I ad Cor. II, <i>oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se</i>. Unde oportuit quod quantum ad utrumque, aliquid homini supernaturaliter adderetur, ad ordinandum ipsum in finem supernaturalem. Et primo quidem, quantum ad intellectum, adduntur homini quaedam principia supernaturalia, quae divino lumine capiuntur, et haec sunt credibilia, de quibus est fides. Secundo vero, voluntas ordinatur in illum finem et quantum ad motum intentionis, in ipsum tendentem sicut in id quod est possibile consequi, quod pertinet ad spem, et quantum ad unionem quandam spiritualem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem, quod fit per caritatem. Appetitus enim uniuscuiusque rei naturaliter movetur et tendit in finem sibi connaturalem, et iste motus provenit ex quadam conformitate rei ad suum finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36120] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus indiget speciebus intelligibilibus, per quas intelligat, et ideo oportet quod in eo ponatur aliquis habitus naturalis superadditus potentiae. Sed ipsa natura voluntatis sufficit ad naturalem ordinem in finem, sive quantum ad intentionem finis, sive quantum ad conformitatem ad ipsum. Sed in ordine ad ea quae supra naturam sunt, ad nihil horum sufficit natura potentiae. Et ideo oportet fieri superadditionem habitus supernaturalis quantum ad utrumque.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:25</a>: "The weakness of God is stronger than men." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36121] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod fides et spes imperfectionem quandam important, quia fides est de his quae non videntur, et spes de his quae non habentur. Unde habere fidem et spem de his quae subduntur humanae potestati, deficit a ratione virtutis. Sed habere fidem et spem de his quae sunt supra facultatem naturae humanae, excedit omnem virtutem homini proportionatam; secundum illud I ad Cor. I, <i>quod infirmum est Dei, fortius est hominibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36122] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ad appetitum duo pertinent, scilicet motus in finem; et conformatio ad finem per amorem. Et sic oportet quod in appetitu humano duae virtutes theologicae ponantur, scilicet spes et caritas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q62_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q62_A4-p0.1">Q. 62. A. 4. Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Being rooted and founded in charity." Therefore charity precedes the others. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36123] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit hic ordo theologicarum virtutum, quod fides sit prior spe, et spes prior caritate. Radix enim est prior eo quod est ex radice. Sed caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Ergo caritas est prior aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): "A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping." Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36124] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., <i>non potest aliquis diligere quod esse non crediderit. Porro si credit et diligit, bene agendo efficit ut etiam speret</i>. Ergo videtur quod fides praecedat caritatem, et caritas spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a passion, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q62_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36125] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, amor est principium omnis affectionis, ut supra dictum est. Sed spes nominat quandam affectionem; est enim quaedam passio, ut supra dictum est. Ergo caritas, quae est amor, est prior spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle enumerates them thus ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q62_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36126] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est ordo quo apostolus ista enumerat, dicens, <i>nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q62_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts. </p><p id="FS_Q62_A4-p7"> But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on ( <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q23_A8" id="FS_Q62_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[23], A[8]</a>). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 co."><a name="36127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36127] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est ordo, scilicet generationis, et perfectionis. Ordine quidem generationis, quo materia est prior forma, et imperfectum perfecto, in uno et eodem; fides praecedit spem, et spes caritatem, secundum actus (nam habitus simul infunduntur). Non enim potest in aliquid motus appetitivus tendere vel sperando vel amando, nisi quod est apprehensum sensu aut intellectu. Per fidem autem apprehendit intellectus ea quae sperat et amat. Unde oportet quod, ordine generationis, fides praecedat spem et caritatem. Similiter autem ex hoc homo aliquid amat, quod apprehendit illud ut bonum suum. Per hoc autem quod homo ab aliquo sperat se bonum consequi posse, reputat ipsum in quo spem habet, quoddam bonum suum. Unde ex hoc ipso quod homo sperat de aliquo, procedit ad amandum ipsum. Et sic, ordine generationis, secundum actus, spes praecedit caritatem. Ordine vero perfectionis, caritas praecedit fidem et spem, eo quod tam fides quam spes per caritatem formatur, et perfectionem virtutis acquirit. Sic enim caritas est mater omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum forma, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36128] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not already possessed, but which he hopes to possess. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36129] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de spe qua quis sperat ex meritis iam habitis se ad beatitudinem perventurum, quod est spei formatae, quae sequitur caritatem. Potest autem aliquis sperare antequam habeat caritatem, non ex meritis quae iam habet, sed quae sperat se habiturum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q62_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q40_A7" id="FS_Q62_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[7]</a>), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 62 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36130] Iª-IIae q. 62 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de passionibus ageretur, spes respicit duo. Unum quidem sicut principale obiectum, scilicet bonum quod speratur. Et respectu huius, semper amor praecedit spem, nunquam enim speratur aliquod bonum nisi desideratum et amatum. Respicit etiam spes illum a quo se sperat posse consequi bonum. Et respectu huius, primo quidem spes praecedit amorem; quamvis postea ex ipso amore spes augeatur. Per hoc enim quod aliquis reputat per aliquem se posse consequi aliquod bonum, incipit amare ipsum, et ex hoc ipso quod ipsum amat, postea fortius de eo sperat.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q63" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q63-p0.1">Q. 63. OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q63-p2"> We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q63-p3"><a href="#FS_Q63_A1"> (1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p4"><a href="#FS_Q63_A2"> (2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p5"><a href="#FS_Q63_A3"> (3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</a></p><p id="FS_Q63-p6"><a href="#FS_Q63_A4"> (4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 pr."><a name="36131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36131] Iª-IIae q. 63 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum virtus sit in nobis a natura. Secundo, utrum aliqua virtus causetur in nobis ex assuetudine operum. Tertio, utrum aliquae virtutes morales sint in nobis per infusionem. Quarto, utrum virtus quam acquirimus ex assuetudine operum, sit eiusdem speciei cum virtute infusa.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q63_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A1-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 1. Whether virtue is in us by nature? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): "Virtues are natural to us and are equally in all of us." And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: "If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it is virtuous." Moreover, a gloss on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.23" target="asv"> Mat. 4:23, </a> "Jesus went about," etc., says: "He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36132] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus sit in nobis a natura. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, <i>naturales sunt virtutes, et aequaliter insunt omnibus</i>. Et Antonius dicit, in sermone ad monachos, <i>si naturam voluntas mutaverit, perversitas est; conditio servetur, et virtus est</i>. Et Matth. IV, super illud, <i>circuibat Iesus</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>docet naturales iustitias, scilicet castitatem, iustitiam, humilitatem, quas naturaliter habet homo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q63_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>, ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36133] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum virtutis est secundum rationem esse, ut ex dictis patet. Sed id quod est secundum rationem, est homini naturale, cum ratio sit hominis natura. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.31.18" target="asv">Job 31:18</a>): "From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother's womb." Therefore virtue is in man by nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36134] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud dicitur esse nobis naturale, quod nobis a nativitate inest. Sed virtutes quibusdam a nativitate insunt, dicitur enim Iob XXXI, <i>ab infantia crevit mecum miseratio, et de utero egressa est mecum</i>. Ergo virtus inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36135] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, id quod inest homini a natura, est omnibus hominibus commune, et non tollitur per peccatum, quia etiam in Daemonibus bona naturalia manent, ut Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed virtus non inest omnibus hominibus; et abiicitur per peccatum. Ergo non inest homini a natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who upheld the theory of "latent forms" [*Anaxagoras; Cf. <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q45_A8" id="FS_Q63_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[45], A[8]</a>; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent. </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p7"> In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth. </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p8"> To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul. </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p9"> In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances. </p><p id="FS_Q63_A1-p10"> It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 co."><a name="36136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36136] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod circa formas corporales, aliqui dixerunt quod sunt totaliter ab intrinseco, sicut ponentes latitationem formarum. Aliqui vero, quod totaliter sint ab extrinseco, sicut ponentes formas corporales esse ab aliqua causa separata. Aliqui vero, quod partim sint ab intrinseco, inquantum scilicet praeexistunt in materia in potentia; et partim ab extrinseco, inquantum scilicet reducuntur ad actum per agens. Ita etiam circa scientias et virtutes, aliqui quidem posuerunt eas totaliter esse ab intrinseco, ita scilicet quod omnes virtutes et scientiae naturaliter praeexistunt in anima; sed per disciplinam et exercitium impedimenta scientiae et virtutis tolluntur, quae adveniunt animae ex corporis gravitate; sicut cum ferrum clarificatur per limationem. Et haec fuit opinio Platonicorum. Alii vero dixerunt quod sunt totaliter ab extrinseco, idest ex influentia intelligentiae agentis, ut ponit Avicenna. Alii vero dixerunt quod secundum aptitudinem scientiae et virtutes sunt in nobis a natura, non autem secundum perfectionem, ut philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Et hoc verius est. Ad cuius manifestationem, oportet considerare quod aliquid dicitur alicui homini naturale dupliciter, uno modo, ex natura speciei; alio modo, ex natura individui. Et quia unumquodque habet speciem secundum suam formam, individuatur vero secundum materiam; forma vero hominis est anima rationalis, materia vero corpus, id quod convenit homini secundum animam rationalem, est ei naturale secundum rationem speciei; id vero quod est ei naturale secundum determinatam corporis complexionem, est ei naturale secundum naturam individui. Quod enim est naturale homini ex parte corporis secundum speciem, quodammodo refertur ad animam, inquantum scilicet tale corpus est tali animae proportionatum. Utroque autem modo virtus est homini naturalis secundum quandam inchoationem. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, inquantum in ratione homini insunt naturaliter quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia intellectualium virtutum et moralium; et inquantum in voluntate inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni quod est secundum rationem. Secundum vero naturam individui, inquantum ex corporis dispositione aliqui sunt dispositi vel melius vel peius ad quasdam virtutes, prout scilicet vires quaedam sensitivae actus sunt quarundam partium corporis, ex quarum dispositione adiuvantur vel impediuntur huiusmodi vires in suis actibus, et per consequens vires rationales, quibus huiusmodi sensitivae vires deserviunt. Et secundum hoc, unus homo habet naturalem aptitudinem ad scientiam, alius ad fortitudinem, alius ad temperantiam. Et his modis tam virtutes intellectuales quam morales, secundum quandam aptitudinis inchoationem, sunt in nobis a natura. Non autem consummatio earum. Quia natura determinatur ad unum, consummatio autem huiusmodi virtutum non est secundum unum modum actionis, sed diversimode, secundum diversas materias in quibus virtutes operantur, et secundum diversas circumstantias. Sic ergo patet quod virtutes in nobis sunt a natura secundum aptitudinem et inchoationem, non autem secundum perfectionem, praeter virtutes theologicas, quae sunt totaliter ab extrinseco.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A1-p11"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36137] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam primae duae rationes procedunt secundum quod seminalia virtutum insunt nobis a natura, inquantum rationales sumus. Tertia vero ratio procedit secundum quod ex naturali dispositione corporis, quam habet ex nativitate, unus habet aptitudinem ad miserendum, alius ad temperate vivendum, alius ad aliam virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A2-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 2. Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv"> Rom. 14:23, </a> "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36138] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes in nobis causari non possint ex assuetudine operum. Quia super illud Rom. XIV, <i>omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, dicit Glossa Augustini, <i>omnis infidelium vita peccatum est; et nihil est bonum sine summo bono. Ubi deest cognitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in optimis moribus</i>. Sed fides non potest acquiri ex operibus, sed causatur in nobis a Deo; secundum illud Ephes. II, <i>gratia estis salvati per fidem</i>. Ergo nulla virtus potest in nobis acquiri ex assuetudine operum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.21" target="asv"> Wis. 8:21</a>: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36139] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum, cum contrarietur virtuti, non compatitur secum virtutem. Sed homo non potest vitare peccatum nisi per gratiam Dei; secundum illud Sap. VIII, <i>didici quod non possum esse aliter continens, nisi Deus det</i>. Ergo nec virtutes aliquae possunt in nobis causari ex assuetudine operum; sed solum dono Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36140] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, actus qui sunt in virtutem, deficiunt a perfectione virtutis. Sed effectus non potest esse perfectior causa. Ergo virtus non potest causari ex actibus praecedentibus virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36141] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum est virtuosius quam malum. Sed ex malis actibus causantur habitus vitiorum. Ergo multo magis ex bonis actibus possunt causari habitus virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> We have spoken above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[51], AA[2]</a>,3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4), man's virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in "mode, species, and order," as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in "number, weight, and measure," as expressed in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv"> Wis. 11:21, </a> man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 co."><a name="36142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36142] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod de generatione habituum ex actibus, supra in generali dictum est. Nunc autem specialiter quantum ad virtutem, considerandum est quod sicut supra dictum est, virtus hominis perficit ipsum ad bonum. Cum autem ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et ordine, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de natura boni; sive in numero, pondere et mensura, ut dicitur Sap. XI, oportet quod bonum hominis secundum aliquam regulam consideretur. Quae quidem est duplex, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio humana, et lex divina. Et quia lex divina est superior regula, ideo ad plura se extendit, ita quod quidquid regulatur ratione humana, regulatur etiam lege divina, sed non convertitur. Virtus igitur hominis ordinata ad bonum quod modificatur secundum regulam rationis humanae, potest ex actibus humanis causari, inquantum huiusmodi actus procedunt a ratione, sub cuius potestate et regula tale bonum consistit. Virtus vero ordinans hominem ad bonum secundum quod modificatur per legem divinam, et non per rationem humanam, non potest causari per actus humanos, quorum principium est ratio, sed causatur solum in nobis per operationem divinam. Et ideo, huiusmodi virtutem definiens, Augustinus posuit in definitione virtutis, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7"> It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, "which God works in us without us" (Super <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36143] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et de huiusmodi etiam virtutibus prima ratio procedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A3" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later ( <a href="FS_vii.html#FS_Q109_A4" id="FS_Q63_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[109], A[4]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36144] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus divinitus infusa, maxime si in sua perfectione consideretur, non compatitur secum aliquod peccatum mortale. Sed virtus humanitus acquisita potest secum compati aliquem actum peccati, etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae voluntati subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per unum actum peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis acquisitae; habitui enim non contrariatur directe actus, sed habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia homo non possit peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet mortaliter; non tamen impeditur quin possit habitum virtutis acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et praecipue ab his quae sunt valde rationi contraria. Sunt etiam quaedam peccata mortalia quae homo sine gratia nullo modo potest vitare, quae scilicet directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis, quae ex dono gratiae sunt in nobis. Hoc tamen infra manifestius fiet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q63_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results through the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36145] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, virtutum acquisitarum praeexistunt in nobis quaedam semina sive principia, secundum naturam. Quae quidem principia sunt nobiliora virtutibus eorum virtute acquisitis, sicut intellectus principiorum speculabilium est nobilior scientia conclusionum; et naturalis rectitudo rationis est nobilior rectificatione appetitus quae fit per participationem rationis, quae quidem rectificatio pertinet ad virtutem moralem. Sic igitur actus humani, inquantum procedunt ex altioribus principiis, possunt causare virtutes acquisitas humanas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A3-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 3. Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), "it is God's rule to bring about extremes through the mean." Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q63_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36146] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter virtutes theologicas, non sint aliae virtutes nobis infusae a Deo. Ea enim quae possunt fieri a causis secundis, non fiunt immediate a Deo, nisi forte aliquando miraculose, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, lex divinitatis est ultima per media adducere. Sed virtutes intellectuales et morales possunt in nobis causari per nostros actus, ut dictum est. Non ergo convenienter causantur in nobis per infusionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36147] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in operibus Dei multo minus est aliquid superfluum quam in operibus naturae. Sed ad ordinandum nos in bonum supernaturale, sufficiunt virtutes theologicae. Ergo non sunt aliae virtutes supernaturales, quas oporteat in nobis causari a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1" target="asv">Heb. 1</a> [*Cf. Jerome on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.1.15" target="asv"> Gal. 1: 15,16</a>]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36148] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, natura non facit per duo, quod potest facere per unum, et multo minus Deus. Sed Deus inseruit animae nostrae semina virtutum, ut dicit Glossa Heb. I. Ergo non oportet quod alias virtutes in nobis per infusionem causet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.7" target="asv">Wis. 8:7</a>): "She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36149] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. VIII, <i>sobrietatem et iustitiam docet, prudentiam et virtutem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q63_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 co."><a name="36150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36150] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod oportet effectus esse suis causis et principiis proportionatos. Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus, ut supra dictum est. Loco quorum naturalium principiorum, conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad finem supernaturalem, sicut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod his etiam virtutibus theologicis proportionaliter respondeant alii habitus divinitus causati in nobis, qui sic se habeant ad virtutes theologicas sicut se habent virtutes morales et intellectuales ad principia naturalia virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36151] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquae quidem virtutes morales et intellectuales possunt causari in nobis ex nostris actibus, tamen illae non sunt proportionatae virtutibus theologicis. Et ideo oportet alias, eis proportionatas, immediate a Deo causari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36152] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes theologicae sufficienter nos ordinant in finem supernaturalem, secundum quandam inchoationem, quantum scilicet ad ipsum Deum immediate. Sed oportet quod per alias virtutes infusas perficiatur anima circa alias res, in ordine tamen ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36153] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus illorum principiorum naturaliter inditorum, non se extendit ultra proportionem naturae. Et ideo in ordine ad finem supernaturalem, indiget homo perfici per alia principia superaddita.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q63_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q63_A4-p0.1">Q. 63. A. 4. Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said <a href="#FS_Q63_A3" id="FS_Q63_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36154] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes infusae non sint alterius speciei a virtutibus acquisitis. Virtus enim acquisita et virtus infusa, secundum praedicta, non videntur differre nisi secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem. Sed habitus et actus humani non recipiunt speciem ab ultimo fine, sed a proximo. Non ergo virtutes morales vel intellectuales infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36155] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, habitus per actus cognoscuntur. Sed idem est actus temperantiae infusae, et acquisitae, scilicet moderari concupiscentias tactus. Ergo non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36156] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtus acquisita et infusa differunt secundum illud quod est immediate a Deo factum, et a creatura. Sed idem est specie homo quem Deus formavit, et quem generat natura; et oculus quem caeco nato dedit, et quem virtus formativa causat. Ergo videtur quod est eadem specie virtus acquisita, et infusa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, "which God works in us without us," as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q63_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[4]</a>). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36157] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quaelibet differentia in definitione posita, mutata diversificat speciem. Sed in definitione virtutis infusae ponitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo virtus acquisita, cui hoc non convenit, non est eiusdem speciei cum infusa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q63_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q56_A2" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[56], A[2]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to "chastise his body, and bring it into subjection" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p6.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.27" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:27</a>), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues. </p><p id="FS_Q63_A4-p7"> The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being "fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q63_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.19" target="asv">Eph. 2:19</a>), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 co."><a name="36158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36158] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod dupliciter habitus distinguuntur specie. Uno modo, sicut praedictum est, secundum speciales et formales rationes obiectorum. Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum consideratum in materia propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est bonum delectabilium in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte concupiscentiarum. Manifestum est autem quod alterius rationis est modus qui imponitur in huiusmodi concupiscentiis secundum regulam rationis humanae, et secundum regulam divinam. Puta in sumptione ciborum, ratione humana modus statuitur ut non noceat valetudini corporis, nec impediat rationis actum, secundum autem regulam legis divinae, requiritur quod homo castiget corpus suum, et in servitutem redigat, per abstinentiam cibi et potus, et aliorum huiusmodi. Unde manifestum est quod temperantia infusa et acquisita differunt specie, et eadem ratio est de aliis virtutibus. Alio modo habitus distinguuntur specie secundum ea ad quae ordinantur, non enim est eadem specie sanitas hominis et equi, propter diversas naturas ad quas ordinantur. Et eodem modo dicit philosophus, in III Polit., quod diversae sunt virtutes civium, secundum quod bene se habent ad diversas politias. Et per hunc etiam modum differunt specie virtutes morales infusae, per quas homines bene se habent in ordine ad hoc quod sint cives sanctorum et domestici Dei; et aliae virtutes acquisitae, secundum quas homo se bene habet in ordine ad res humanas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36159] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem; sed etiam secundum ordinem ad propria obiecta, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36160] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod alia ratione modificat concupiscentias delectabilium tactus temperantia acquisita, et temperantia infusa, ut dictum est. Unde non habent eundem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q63_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 63 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36161] Iª-IIae q. 63 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod oculum caeci nati Deus fecit ad eundem actum ad quem formantur alii oculi secundum naturam, et ideo fuit eiusdem speciei. Et eadem ratio esset, si Deus vellet miraculose causare in homine virtutes quales acquiruntur ex actibus. Sed ita non est in proposito, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q64" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q64-p0.1">Q. 64. OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q64-p2"> We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: </p><p id="FS_Q64-p3"><a href="#FS_Q64_A1"> (1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p4"><a href="#FS_Q64_A2"> (2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p5"><a href="#FS_Q64_A3"> (3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</a></p><p id="FS_Q64-p6"><a href="#FS_Q64_A4"> (4) Whether the theological virtues do?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 pr."><a name="36162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36162] Iª-IIae q. 64 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de proprietatibus virtutum. Et primo quidem, de medio virtutum; secundo, de connexione virtutum; tertio, de aequalitate earum; quarto, de ipsarum duratione. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum virtutes morales sint in medio. Secundo, utrum medium virtutis moralis sit medium rei, vel rationis. Tertio, utrum intellectuales virtutes consistant in medio. Quarto, utrum virtutes theologicae.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q64_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A1-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 1. Whether moral virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that "virtue is the limit of power." Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36163] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis non consistat in medio. Ultimum enim repugnat rationi medii. Sed de ratione virtutis est ultimum, dicitur enim in I de caelo, quod virtus est ultimum potentiae. Ergo virtus moralis non consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36164] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud quod est maximum, non est medium. Sed quaedam virtutes morales tendunt in aliquod maximum, sicut magnanimitas est circa maximos honores, et magnificentia circa maximos sumptus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo non omnis virtus moralis est in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36165] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si de ratione virtutis moralis sit in medio esse, oportet quod virtus moralis non perficiatur, sed magis corrumpatur, per hoc quod tendit ad extremum. Sed quaedam virtutes morales perficiuntur per hoc quod tendunt ad extremum, sicut virginitas, quae abstinet ab omni delectabili venereo, et sic tenet extremum, et est perfectissima castitas. Et dare omnia pauperibus est perfectissima misericordia vel liberalitas. Ergo videtur quod non sit de ratione virtutis moralis esse in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36166] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis est habitus electivus in medietate existens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As already explained ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q64_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 co."><a name="36167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36167] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtus de sui ratione ordinat hominem ad bonum. Moralis autem virtus proprie est perfectiva appetitivae partis animae circa aliquam determinatam materiam. Mensura autem et regula appetitivi motus circa appetibilia, est ipsa ratio. Bonum autem cuiuslibet mensurati et regulati consistit in hoc quod conformetur suae regulae, sicut bonum in artificiatis est ut consequantur regulam artis. Malum autem per consequens in huiusmodi est per hoc quod aliquid discordat a sua regula vel mensura. Quod quidem contingit vel per hoc quod superexcedit mensuram, vel per hoc quod deficit ab ea, sicut manifeste apparet in omnibus regulatis et mensuratis. Et ideo patet quod bonum virtutis moralis consistit in adaequatione ad mensuram rationis. Manifestum est autem quod inter excessum et defectum medium est aequalitas sive conformitas. Unde manifeste apparet quod virtus moralis in medio consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state," in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: "but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent,'" viz. as to its conformity with reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36168] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus moralis bonitatem habet ex regula rationis, pro materia autem habet passiones vel operationes. Si ergo comparetur virtus moralis ad rationem, sic, secundum id quod rationis est, habet rationem extremi unius, quod est conformitas, excessus vero et defectus habet rationem alterius extremi, quod est difformitas. Si vero consideretur virtus moralis secundum suam materiam, sic habet rationem medii, inquantum passionem reducit ad regulam rationis. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod virtus secundum substantiam medietas est, inquantum regula virtutis ponitur circa propriam materiam, secundum optimum autem et bene, est extremitas, scilicet secundum conformitatem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. "where" it is right, "when" it is right, and for an "end" that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum "when" it is not right, or "where" it is not right, or for an undue "end"; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto "where" one ought, and "when" one aught. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36169] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod medium et extrema considerantur in actionibus et passionibus secundum diversas circumstantias, unde nihil prohibet in aliqua virtute esse extremum secundum unam circumstantiam, quod tamen est medium secundum alias circumstantias, per conformitatem ad rationem. Et sic est in magnificentia et magnanimitate. Nam si consideretur quantitas absoluta eius in quod tendit magnificus et magnanimus, dicetur extremum et maximum, sed si consideretur hoc ipsum per comparationem ad alias circumstantias, sic habet rationem medii; quia in hoc tendunt huiusmodi virtutes secundum regulam rationis, idest ubi oportet, et quando oportet, et propter quod oportet. Excessus autem, si in hoc maximum tendatur quando non oportet, vel ubi non oportet, vel propter quod non oportet; defectus autem est, si non tendatur in hoc maximum ubi oportet, et quando oportet. Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod <i>magnanimus est quidem magnitudine extremus; eo autem quod ut oportet, medius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36170] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod eadem ratio est de virginitate et paupertate, quae est de magnanimitate. Abstinet enim virginitas ab omnibus venereis, et paupertas ab omnibus divitiis, propter quod oportet, et secundum quod oportet; idest secundum mandatum Dei, et propter vitam aeternam. Si autem hoc fiat secundum quod non oportet, idest secundum aliquam superstitionem illicitam, vel etiam propter inanem gloriam; erit superfluum. Si autem non fiat quando oportet, vel secundum quod oportet, est vitium per defectum, ut patet in transgredientibus votum virginitatis vel paupertatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A2-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 2. Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36171] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod medium virtutis moralis non sit medium rationis, sed medium rei. Bonum enim virtutis moralis consistit in hoc quod est in medio. Bonum autem, ut dicitur in VI Metaphys., est in rebus ipsis. Ergo medium virtutis moralis est medium rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36172] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ratio est vis apprehensiva. Sed virtus moralis non consistit in medio apprehensionum; sed magis in medio operationum et passionum. Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis, sed medium rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36173] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, medium quod accipitur secundum proportionem arithmeticam vel geometricam, est medium rei. Sed tale est medium iustitiae, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis, sed rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36174] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus moralis in medio consistit quoad nos, determinata ratione</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason. </p><p id="FS_Q64_A2-p7"> But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q60_A2" id="FS_Q64_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[2]</a>): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the passions. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 co."><a name="36175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36175] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod medium rationis dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod medium in ipso actu rationis existit, quasi ipse actus rationis ad medium reducatur. Et sic, quia virtus moralis non perficit actum rationis, sed actum virtutis appetitivae; medium virtutis moralis non est medium rationis. Alio modo potest dici medium rationis id quod a ratione ponitur in aliqua materia. Et sic omne medium virtutis moralis est medium rationis, quia, sicut dictum est, virtus moralis dicitur consistere in medio, per conformitatem ad rationem rectam. Sed quandoque contingit quod medium rationis est etiam medium rei, et tunc oportet quod virtutis moralis medium sit medium rei; sicut est in iustitia. Quandoque autem medium rationis non est medium rei, sed accipitur per comparationem ad nos, et sic est medium in omnibus aliis virtutibus moralibus. Cuius ratio est quia iustitia est circa operationes, quae consistunt in rebus exterioribus, in quibus rectum institui debet simpliciter et secundum se, ut supra dictum est, et ideo medium rationis in iustitia est idem cum medio rei, inquantum scilicet iustitia dat unicuique quod debet, et non plus nec minus. Aliae vero virtutes morales consistunt circa passiones interiores, in quibus non potest rectum constitui eodem modo, propter hoc quod homines diversimode se habent ad passiones, et ideo oportet quod rectitudo rationis in passionibus instituatur per respectum ad nos, qui afficimur secundum passiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36176] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Nam, primae duae rationes procedunt de medio rationis quod scilicet invenitur in ipso actu rationis. Tertia vero ratio procedit de medio iustitiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A3-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 3. Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36177] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non consistant in medio. Virtutes enim morales consistunt in medio, inquantum conformantur regulae rationis. Sed virtutes intellectuales sunt in ipsa ratione; et sic non videntur habere superiorem regulam. Ergo virtutes intellectuales non consistunt in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that "virtue observes the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it." If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36178] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium virtutis moralis determinatur a virtute intellectuali, dicitur enim in II Ethic., quod <i>virtus consistit in medietate determinata ratione, prout sapiens determinabit</i>. Si igitur virtus intellectualis iterum consistat in medio, oportet quod determinetur sibi medium per aliquam aliam virtutem. Et sic procedetur in infinitum in virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36179] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, medium proprie est inter contraria; ut patet per philosophum, in X Metaphys. Sed in intellectu non videtur esse aliqua contrarietas, cum etiam ipsa contraria, secundum quod sunt in intellectu, non sint contraria, sed simul intelligantur, ut album et nigrum, sanum et aegrum. Ergo in intellectualibus virtutibus non est medium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36180] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod ars est virtus intellectualis, ut dicitur in VI Ethic.; et tamen artis est aliquod medium, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Ergo etiam virtus intellectualis consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with a right appetite. </p><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p7"> Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is. </p><p id="FS_Q64_A3-p8"> The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence---of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 co."><a name="36181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36181] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod bonum alicuius rei consistit in medio, secundum quod conformatur regulae vel mensurae quam contingit transcendere et ab ea deficere, sicut dictum est. Virtus autem intellectualis ordinatur ad bonum, sicut et moralis, ut supra dictum est. Unde secundum quod bonum virtutis intellectualis se habet ad mensuram, sic se habet ad rationem medii. Bonum autem virtutis intellectualis est verum, speculativae quidem virtutis, verum absolute, ut in VI Ethic. dicitur; practicae autem virtutis, verum secundum conformitatem ad appetitum rectum. Verum autem intellectus nostri absolute consideratum, est sicut mensuratum a re, res enim est mensura intellectus nostri, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.; ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, veritas est in opinione et in oratione. Sic igitur bonum virtutis intellectualis speculativae consistit in quodam medio, per conformitatem ad ipsam rem, secundum quod dicit esse quod est, vel non esse quod non est; in quo ratio veri consistit. Excessus autem est secundum affirmationem falsam, per quam dicitur esse quod non est, defectus autem accipitur secundum negationem falsam, per quam dicitur non esse quod est. Verum autem virtutis intellectualis practicae, comparatum quidem ad rem, habet rationem mensurati. Et sic eodem modo accipitur medium per conformitatem ad rem, in virtutibus intellectualibus practicis, sicut in speculativis. Sed respectu appetitus, habet rationem regulae et mensurae. Unde idem medium, quod est virtutis moralis, etiam est ipsius prudentiae, scilicet rectitudo rationis, sed prudentiae quidem est istud medium ut regulantis et mensurantis; virtutis autem moralis, ut mensuratae et regulatae. Similiter excessus et defectus accipitur diversimode utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36182] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod etiam virtus intellectualis habet suam mensuram, ut dictum est, et per conformitatem ad ipsam, accipitur in ipsa medium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue, but things themselves. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36183] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non est necesse in infinitum procedere in virtutibus, quia mensura et regula intellectualis virtutis non est aliquod aliud genus virtutis, sed ipsa res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other: nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end of Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something positive in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36184] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsae res contrariae non habent contrarietatem in anima, quia unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et tamen in intellectu est contrarietas affirmationis et negationis, quae sunt contraria, ut dicitur in fine peri hermeneias. Quamvis enim esse et non esse non sint contraria, sed contradictorie opposita, si considerentur ipsa significata prout sunt in rebus, quia alterum est ens, et alterum est pure non ens, tamen si referantur ad actum animae, utrumque ponit aliquid. Unde esse et non esse sunt contradictoria, sed opinio qua opinamur quod bonum est bonum, est contraria opinioni qua opinamur quod bonum non est bonum. Et inter huiusmodi contraria medium est virtus intellectualis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q64_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q64_A4-p0.1">Q. 64. A. 4. Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36185] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus theologica consistat in medio. Bonum enim aliarum virtutum consistit in medio. Sed virtus theologica excedit in bonitate alias virtutes. Ergo virtus theologica multo magis est in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q64_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36186] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium virtutis accipitur, moralis quidem secundum quod appetitus regulatur per rationem; intellectualis vero secundum quod intellectus noster mensuratur a re. Sed virtus theologica et perficit intellectum, et appetitum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam virtus theologica consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue observes the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36187] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, spes quae est virtus theologica, medium est inter desperationem et praesumptionem. Similiter etiam fides incedit media inter contrarias haereses, ut Boetius dicit, in libro de duabus naturis, quod enim confitemur in Christo unam personam et duas naturas, medium est inter haeresim Nestorii, qui dicit duas personas et duas naturas; et haeresim Eutychis, qui dicit unam personam et unam naturam. Ergo virtus theologica consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q64_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.43.33" target="asv">Ecclus. 43:33</a>): "Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise." Therefore theological virtue does not observe the mean. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36188] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, in omnibus in quibus consistit virtus in medio, contingit peccare per excessum, sicut et per defectum. Sed circa Deum, qui est obiectum virtutis theologicae, non contingit peccare per excessum, dicitur enim Eccli. XLIII, <i>benedicentes Deum, exaltate illum quantum potestis, maior enim est omni laude</i>. Ergo virtus theologica non consistit in medio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q64_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q64_A1" id="FS_Q64_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit. </p><p id="FS_Q64_A4-p7"> The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 co."><a name="36189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36189] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, medium virtutis accipitur per conformitatem ad suam regulam vel mensuram, secundum quod contingit ipsam transcendere vel ab ea deficere. Virtutis autem theologicae duplex potest accipi mensura. Una quidem secundum ipsam rationem virtutis. Et sic mensura et regula virtutis theologicae est ipse Deus, fides enim nostra regulatur secundum veritatem divinam, caritas autem secundum bonitatem eius, spes autem secundum magnitudinem omnipotentiae et pietatis eius. Et ista est mensura excellens omnem humanam facultatem, unde nunquam potest homo tantum diligere Deum quantum diligi debet, nec tantum credere aut sperare in ipsum, quantum debet. Unde multo minus potest ibi esse excessus. Et sic bonum talis virtutis non consistit in medio, sed tanto est melius, quanto magis acceditur ad summum. Alia vero regula vel mensura virtutis theologicae est ex parte nostra, quia etsi non possumus ferri in Deum quantum debemus, debemus tamen ferri in ipsum credendo, sperando et amando, secundum mensuram nostrae conditionis. Unde per accidens potest in virtute theologica considerari medium et extrema, ex parte nostra.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36190] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod bonum virtutum intellectualium et moralium consistit in medio per conformitatem ad regulam vel mensuram quam transcendere contingit. Quod non est in virtutibus theologicis, per se loquendo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36191] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes morales et intellectuales perficiunt intellectum et appetitum nostrum in ordine ad mensuram et regulam creatam, virtutes autem theologicae in ordine ad mensuram et regulam increatam. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q64_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 64 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36192] Iª-IIae q. 64 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod spes est media inter praesumptionem et desperationem, ex parte nostra, inquantum scilicet aliquis praesumere dicitur ex eo quod sperat a Deo bonum quod excedit suam conditionem; vel non sperat quod secundum suam conditionem sperare posset. Non autem potest esse superabundantia spei ex parte Dei, cuius bonitas est infinita. Similiter etiam fides est media inter contrarias haereses, non per comparationem ad obiectum, quod est Deus, cui non potest aliquis nimis credere, sed inquantum ipsa opinio humana est media inter contrarias opiniones, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q65" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q65-p0.1">Q. 65. OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q65-p2"> We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q65-p3"><a href="#FS_Q65_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p4"><a href="#FS_Q65_A2"> (2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p5"><a href="#FS_Q65_A3"> (3) Whether charity can be without them?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p6"><a href="#FS_Q65_A4"> (4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q65-p7"><a href="#FS_Q65_A5"> (5) Whether charity can be without them?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 pr."><a name="36193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36193] Iª-IIae q. 65 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de connexione virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum virtutes morales sint ad invicem connexae. Secundo, utrum virtutes morales possint esse sine caritate. Tertio, utrum caritas possit esse sine eis. Quarto, utrum fides et spes possint esse sine caritate. Quinto, utrum caritas possit esse sine eis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q65_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A1-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36194] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non sint ex necessitate connexae. Virtutes enim morales quandoque causantur ex exercitio actuum, ut probatur in II Ethic. Sed homo potest exercitari in actibus alicuius virtutis sine hoc quod exercitetur in actibus alterius virtutis. Ergo una virtus moralis potest haberi sine altera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that "a poor man cannot be magnificent," and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that "he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36195] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magnificentia et magnanimitas sunt quaedam virtutes morales. Sed aliquis potest habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habeat magnificentiam et magnanimitatem, dicit enim philosophus, in IV Ethic., quod inops non potest esse magnificus, qui tamen potest habere quasdam alias virtutes; et quod <i>ille qui parvis est dignus, et his se dignificat, temperatus est, magnanimus autem non est</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non sunt connexae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36196] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt partem appetitivam animae, ita virtutes intellectuales perficiunt partem intellectivam. Sed virtutes intellectuales non sunt connexae, potest enim aliquis habere unam scientiam, sine hoc quod habeat aliam. Ergo etiam neque virtutes morales sunt connexae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36197] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si virtutes morales sint connexae, hoc non est nisi quia connectuntur in prudentia. Sed hoc non sufficit ad connexionem virtutum moralium. Videtur enim quod aliquis possit esse prudens circa agibilia quae pertinent ad unam virtutem, sine hoc quod sit prudens in his quae pertinent ad aliam, sicut etiam aliquis potest habere artem circa quaedam factibilia, sine hoc quod habeat artem circa alia. Prudentia autem est recta ratio agibilium. Ergo non est necessarium virtutes morales esse connexas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20</a>: "The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several": and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another": and Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect": and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): "If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36198] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, <i>connexae sibi sunt, concatenataeque virtutes, ut qui unam habet, plures habere videatur</i>. Augustinus etiam dicit, in VI de Trin., quod <i>virtutes quae sunt in animo humano, nullo modo separantur ab invicem</i>. Et Gregorius dicit, XXII Moral., quod <i>una virtus sine aliis aut omnino nulla est, aut imperfecta</i>. Et Tullius dicit, in II de Tuscul. quaest., <i>si unam virtutem confessus es te non habere, nullam necesse est te habiturum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity. </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p8"> But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q61_A3" id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[61], AA[3]</a>,4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that "a virtue cannot be perfect" as a virtue, "if isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude": and he continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. <a href="#FS_Q61_A4" id="FS_Q65_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[61], A[4]</a>, OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4). </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p9"> Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q65_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is "right reason about things to be done," and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 co."><a name="36199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36199] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtus moralis potest accipi vel perfecta vel imperfecta. Imperfecta quidem moralis virtus, ut temperantia vel fortitudo, nihil aliud est quam aliqua inclinatio in nobis existens ad opus aliquod de genere bonorum faciendum, sive talis inclinatio sit in nobis a natura, sive ex assuetudine. Et hoc modo accipiendo virtutes morales, non sunt connexae, videmus enim aliquem ex naturali complexione, vel ex aliqua consuetudine, esse promptum ad opera liberalitatis, qui tamen non est promptus ad opera castitatis. Perfecta autem virtus moralis est habitus inclinans in bonum opus bene agendum. Et sic accipiendo virtutes morales, dicendum est eas connexas esse; ut fere ab omnibus ponitur. Cuius ratio duplex assignatur, secundum quod diversimode aliqui virtutes cardinales distinguunt. Ut enim dictum est, quidam distinguunt eas secundum quasdam generales conditiones virtutum, utpote quod discretio pertineat ad prudentiam, rectitudo ad iustitiam, moderantia ad temperantiam, firmitas animi ad fortitudinem, in quacumque materia ista considerentur. Et secundum hoc, manifeste apparet ratio connexionis, non enim firmitas habet laudem virtutis, si sit sine moderatione, vel rectitudine, aut discretione; et eadem ratio est de aliis. Et hanc rationem connexionis assignat Gregorius, XXII Moral., dicens quod <i>virtutes, si sint disiunctae, non possunt esse perfectae</i>, secundum rationem virtutis, <i>quia nec prudentia vera est quae iusta, temperans et fortis non est</i>; et idem subdit de aliis virtutibus. Et similem rationem assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin. Alii vero distinguunt praedictas virtutes secundum materias. Et secundum hoc assignatur ratio connexionis ab Aristotele, in VI Ethic. Quia sicut supra dictum est, nulla virtus moralis potest sine prudentia haberi, eo quod proprium virtutis moralis est facere electionem rectam, cum sit habitus electivus; ad rectam autem electionem non solum sufficit inclinatio in debitum finem, quod est directe per habitum virtutis moralis; sed etiam quod aliquis directe eligat ea quae sunt ad finem, quod fit per prudentiam, quae est consiliativa et iudicativa et praeceptiva eorum quae sunt ad finem. Similiter etiam prudentia non potest haberi nisi habeantur virtutes morales, cum prudentia sit recta ratio agibilium, quae, sicut ex principiis, procedit ex finibus agibilium, ad quos aliquis recte se habet per virtutes morales. Unde sicut scientia speculativa non potest haberi sine intellectu principiorum, ita nec prudentia sine virtutibus moralibus. Ex quo manifeste sequitur virtutes morales esse connexas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence be lacking. </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p11"> But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues---provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36200] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem secundum communem statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in omni vita hominum occurrunt agenda. Unde oportet quod homo simul exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium. Et si quidem circa omnes exercitetur bene operando, acquiret habitus omnium virtutum moralium. Si autem exercitetur bene operando circa unam materiam, non autem circa aliam, puta bene se habendo circa iras, non autem circa concupiscentias; acquiret quidem habitum aliquem ad refrenandum iras, qui tamen non habebit rationem virtutis, propter defectum prudentiae, quae circa concupiscentias corrumpitur. Sicut etiam naturales inclinationes non habent perfectam rationem virtutis, si prudentia desit. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt quae perficiunt hominem secundum aliquem eminentem statum, sicut magnificentia, et magnanimitas. Et quia exercitium circa materias harum virtutum non occurrit unicuique communiter, potest aliquis habere alias virtutes morales, sine hoc quod habitus harum virtutum habeat actu, loquendo de virtutibus acquisitis. Sed tamen, acquisitis aliis virtutibus, habet istas virtutes in potentia propinqua. Cum enim aliquis per exercitium adeptus est liberalitatem circa mediocres donationes et sumptus, si superveniat ei abundantia pecuniarum, modico exercitio acquiret magnificentiae habitum, sicut geometer modico studio acquirit scientiam alicuius conclusionis quam nunquam consideravit. Illud autem habere dicimur, quod in promptu est ut habeamus; secundum illud philosophi, in II Physic., <i>quod parum deest, quasi nihil deesse videtur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36201] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence. </p><p id="FS_Q65_A1-p14"> Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q58_A5" id="FS_Q65_A1-p14.2" shape="rect"> Q[58], A[5]</a>, ad 1). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36202] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod virtutes intellectuales sunt circa diversas materias ad invicem non ordinatas, sicut patet in diversis scientiis et artibus. Et ideo non invenitur in eis connexio quae invenitur in virtutibus moralibus existentibus circa passiones et operationes, quae manifeste habent ordinem ad invicem. Nam omnes passiones, a quibusdam primis procedentes, scilicet amore et odio, ad quasdam alias terminantur, scilicet delectationem et tristitiam. Et similiter omnes operationes quae sunt virtutis moralis materia, habent ordinem ad invicem, et etiam ad passiones. Et ideo tota materia moralium virtutum sub una ratione prudentiae cadit. Habent tamen omnia intelligibilia ordinem ad prima principia. Et secundum hoc, omnes virtutes intellectuales dependent ab intellectu principiorum; sicut prudentia a virtutibus moralibus, ut dictum est. Principia autem universalia, quorum est intellectus principiorum, non dependent a conclusionibus, de quibus sunt reliquae intellectuales virtutes; sicut morales dependent a prudentia, eo quod appetitus movet quodammodo rationem, et ratio appetitum, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, "A whole is greater than its part," he cannot acquire the science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things "done" are related to one another, but not things "made," as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36203] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod ea ad quae inclinant virtutes morales, se habent ad prudentiam sicut principia, non autem factibilia se habent ad artem sicut principia, sed solum sicut materia. Manifestum est autem quod, etsi ratio possit esse recta in una parte materiae, et non in alia; nullo tamen modo potest dici ratio recta, si sit defectus cuiuscumque principii. Sicut si quis erraret circa hoc principium, omne totum est maius sua parte, non posset habere scientiam geometricam, quia oporteret multum recedere a veritate in sequentibus. Et praeterea, agibilia sunt ordinata ad invicem; non autem factibilia, ut dictum est. Et ideo defectus prudentiae circa unam partem agibilium, induceret defectum etiam circa alia agibilia. Quod in factibilibus non contingit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A2-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 2. Whether moral virtues can be without charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that "every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad." But "charity can be in none except the good," as stated in the same book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36204] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales possint esse sine caritate. Dicitur enim in libro sententiarum prosperi, quod <i>omnis virtus praeter caritatem, potest esse communis bonis et malis</i>. Sed caritas non potest esse nisi in bonis, ut dicitur ibidem. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt haberi sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36205] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes morales possunt acquiri ex actibus humanis, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed caritas non habetur nisi ex infusione; secundum illud Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>. Ergo aliae virtutes possunt haberi sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36206] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes morales connectuntur ad invicem, inquantum dependent a prudentia. Sed caritas non dependet a prudentia; immo prudentiam excedit, secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non connectuntur caritati, sed sine ea esse possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.14" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:14</a>): "He that loveth not, abideth in death." Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is "by them" that "we lead a good life," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36207] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>qui non diligit, manet in morte</i>. Sed per virtutes perficitur vita spiritualis, ipsae enim sunt quibus recte vivitur, ut Augustinus dicit, in II de Lib. Arbit. Ergo non possunt esse sine dilectione caritatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q65_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[58], AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, that "contradictories cannot both be true at the same time." It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence. </p><p id="FS_Q65_A2-p7"> It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the words, "All that is not of faith is sin" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>), says: "He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 co."><a name="36208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36208] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales prout sunt operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic acquisitae sine caritate esse possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis; et non possunt humanis actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a Deo. Et huiusmodi virtutes morales sine caritate esse non possunt. Dictum est enim supra quod aliae virtutes morales non possunt esse sine prudentia; prudentia autem non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, inquantum virtutes morales faciunt bene se habere ad quosdam fines, ex quibus procedit ratio prudentiae. Ad rectam autem rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habeat circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes morales, sicut ratio recta in speculativis maxime indiget primo principio indemonstrabili, quod est contradictoria non simul esse vera. Unde manifestum fit quod nec prudentia infusa potest esse sine caritate; nec aliae virtutes morales consequenter, quae sine prudentia esse non possunt. Patet igitur ex dictis quod solae virtutes infusae sunt perfectae, et simpliciter dicendae virtutes, quia bene ordinant hominem ad finem ultimum simpliciter. Aliae vero virtutes, scilicet acquisitae, sunt secundum quid virtutes, non autem simpliciter, ordinant enim hominem bene respectu finis ultimi in aliquo genere, non autem respectu finis ultimi simpliciter. Unde Rom. XIV super illud, <i>omne quod non est ex fide, peccatum est</i>, dicit Glossa Augustini, <i>ubi deest agnitio veritatis, falsa est virtus etiam in bonis moribus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, "it makes its possessor good," and consequently cannot be in the wicked. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36209] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes ibi accipiuntur secundum imperfectam rationem virtutis. Alioquin, si virtus moralis secundum perfectam rationem virtutis accipiatur, bonum facit habentem; et per consequens in malis esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36210] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de virtutibus moralibus acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36211] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi caritas excedat scientiam et prudentiam, tamen prudentia dependet a caritate, ut dictum est. Et per consequens, omnes virtutes morales infusae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A3-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 3. Whether charity can be without moral virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4, </a> seqq.: "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36212] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas sine aliis virtutibus moralibus haberi possit. Ad id enim ad quod sufficit unum, indebitum est quod plura ordinentur. Sed sola caritas sufficit ad omnia opera virtutis implenda, ut patet per id quod dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, <i>caritas patiens est, benigna est,</i> et cetera. Ergo videtur quod, habita caritate, aliae virtutes superfluerent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake: hence "pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit" (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36213] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt virtutis, et ei secundum se placent, unde et signum habitus est delectatio quae fit in opere, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed multi habent caritatem, absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen difficultatem in operibus virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad caritatem. Ergo multi habent caritatem, qui non habent alias virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.10" target="asv"> Lk. 17:10</a>) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36214] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, caritas in omnibus sanctis invenitur. Sed quidam sunt sancti qui tamen aliquibus virtutibus carent, dicit enim Beda quod sancti magis humiliantur de virtutibus quas non habent, quam de virtutibus quas habent, glorientur. Ergo non est necessarium quod qui habet caritatem, omnes virtutes morales habeat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>): "He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law." Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36215] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod per caritatem tota lex impletur, dicitur enim Rom. XIII, <i>qui diligit proximum, legem implevit</i>. Sed tota lex impleri non potest nisi per omnes virtutes morales, quia lex praecipit de omnibus actibus virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ergo qui habet caritatem, habet omnes virtutes morales. Augustinus etiam dicit, in quadam epistola, quod caritas includit in se omnes virtutes cardinales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work. </p><p id="FS_Q65_A3-p7"> It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 co."><a name="36216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36216] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod cum caritate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes morales. Cuius ratio est quia Deus non minus perfecte operatur in operibus gratiae, quam in operibus naturae. Sic autem videmus in operibus naturae, quod non invenitur principium aliquorum operum in aliqua re, quin inveniantur in ea quae sunt necessaria ad huiusmodi opera perficienda, sicut in animalibus inveniuntur organa quibus perfici possunt opera ad quae peragenda anima habet potestatem. Manifestum est autem quod caritas, inquantum ordinat hominem ad finem ultimum, est principium omnium bonorum operum quae in finem ultimum ordinari possunt. Unde oportet quod cum caritate simul infundantur omnes virtutes morales, quibus homo perficit singula genera bonorum operum. Et sic patet quod virtutes morales infusae non solum habent connexionem propter prudentiam; sed etiam propter caritatem. Et quod qui amittit caritatem per peccatum mortale, amittit omnes virtutes morales infusas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36217] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad hoc quod actus inferioris potentiae sit perfectus, requiritur quod non solum adsit perfectio in superiori potentia, sed etiam in inferiori, si enim principale agens debito modo se haberet, non sequeretur actio perfecta, si instrumentum non esset bene dispositum. Unde oportet ad hoc quod homo bene operetur in his quae sunt ad finem, quod non solum habeat virtutem qua bene se habeat circa finem, sed etiam virtutes quibus bene se habeat circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nam virtus quae est circa finem, se habet ut principalis et motiva respectu earum quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo cum caritate necesse est etiam habere alias virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36218] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod quandoque contingit quod aliquis habens habitum, patitur difficultatem in operando, et per consequens non sentit delectationem et complacentiam in actu, propter aliquod impedimentum extrinsecus superveniens, sicut ille qui habet habitum scientiae, patitur difficultatem in intelligendo, propter somnolentiam vel aliquam infirmitatem. Et similiter habitus moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum difficultatem in operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex praecedentibus actibus relictas. Quae quidem difficultas non ita accidit in virtutibus moralibus acquisitis, quia per exercitium actuum, quo acquiruntur, tolluntur etiam contrariae dispositiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36219] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod aliqui sancti dicuntur aliquas virtutes non habere, inquantum patiuntur difficultatem in actibus earum, ratione iam dicta; quamvis habitus omnium virtutum habeant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A4-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 4. Whether faith and hope can be without charity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36220] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides et spes nunquam sint sine caritate. Cum enim sint virtutes theologicae, digniores esse videntur virtutibus moralibus, etiam infusis. Sed virtutes morales infusae non possunt esse sine caritate. Ergo neque fides et spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man believes unwillingly" as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q65_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith cannot be without charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36221] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nullus credit nisi volens, sed caritas est in voluntate ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Sicut perfectio eius, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fides non potest esse sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that "there can be no hope without love." But love is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36222] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>spes sine amore esse non potest</i>. Amor autem est caritas, de hoc enim amore ibi loquitur. Ergo spes non potest esse sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope, charity." Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36223] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Matth. I, dicitur in Glossa quod <i>fides generat spem, spes vero caritatem</i>. Sed generans est prius generato, et potest esse sine eo. Ergo fides potest esse sine spe; et spes sine caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q65_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. </p><p id="FS_Q65_A4-p7"> Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 co."><a name="36224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36224] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod fides et spes, sicut et virtutes morales, dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo, secundum inchoationem quandam; alio modo, secundum perfectum esse virtutis. Cum enim virtus ordinetur ad bonum opus agendum, virtus quidem perfecta dicitur ex hoc quod potest in opus perfecte bonum, quod quidem est dum non solum bonum est quod fit, sed etiam bene fit. Alioquin, si bonum sit quod fit, non autem bene fiat, non erit perfecte bonum, unde nec habitus qui est talis operis principium, habebit perfecte rationem virtutis. Sicut si aliquis operetur iusta, bonum quidem facit, sed non erit opus perfectae virtutis, nisi hoc bene faciat, idest secundum electionem rectam, quod est per prudentiam, et ideo iustitia sine prudentia non potest esse virtus perfecta. Sic igitur fides et spes sine caritate possunt quidem aliqualiter esse, perfectae autem virtutis rationem sine caritate non habent. Cum enim fidei opus sit credere Deo; credere autem sit alicui propria voluntate assentire, si non debito modo velit, non erit fidei opus perfectum. Quod autem debito modo velit, hoc est per caritatem, quae perficit voluntatem, omnis enim rectus motus voluntatis ex recto amore procedit, ut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sic igitur fides est quidem sine caritate, sed non perfecta virtus, sicut temperantia vel fortitudo sine prudentia. Et similiter dicendum est de spe. Nam actus spei est expectare futuram beatitudinem a Deo. Qui quidem actus perfectus est, si fiat ex meritis quae quis habet, quod non potest esse sine caritate. Si autem hoc expectet ex meritis quae nondum habet, sed proponit in futurum acquirere, erit actus imperfectus, et hoc potest esse sine caritate. Et ideo fides et spes possunt esse sine caritate, sed sine caritate, proprie loquendo, virtutes non sunt; nam ad rationem virtutis pertinet ut non solum secundum ipsam aliquod bonum operemur, sed etiam bene, ut dicitur in II Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36225] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales dependent a prudentia, prudentia autem infusa nec rationem prudentiae habere potest absque caritate, utpote deficiente debita habitudine ad primum principium, quod est ultimus finis. Fides autem et spes, secundum proprias rationes, nec a prudentia nec a caritate dependent. Et ideo sine caritate esse possunt; licet non sint virtutes sine caritate, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36226] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de fide quae habet perfectam rationem virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36227] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de spe, secundum quod aliquis expectat futuram beatitudinem per merita quae iam habet, quod non est sine caritate.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q65_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q65_A5-p0.1">Q. 65. A. 5. Whether charity can be without faith and hope?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36228] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas possit esse sine fide et spe. Caritas enim est amor Dei. Sed Deus potest a nobis amari naturaliter, etiam non praesupposita fide, vel spe futurae beatitudinis. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36229] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Sed radix aliquando est sine ramis. Ergo caritas potest esse aliquando sine fide et spe et aliis virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on ( <a href="TP_ii.html#TP_Q7_A3" id="FS_Q65_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">TP, Q[7], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36230] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in Christo fuit perfecta caritas. Ipse tamen non habuit fidem et spem, quia fuit perfectus comprehensor, ut infra dicetur. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>): "Without faith it is impossible to please God"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.17" target="asv"> Prov. 8:17</a>: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q65_A5-p5.3" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36231] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, <i>sine fide impossibile est placere Deo</i>; quod maxime pertinet ad caritatem, ut patet; secundum illud Proverb. VIII, <i>ego diligentes me diligo</i>. Spes etiam est quae introducit ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo caritas non potest haberi sine fide et spe.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him," and from <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q65_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:9, </a> where it is written: "God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 co."><a name="36232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36232] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam amicitiam quandam ad ipsum; quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Et quod hoc ad caritatem pertineat, patet per id quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>. Et I ad Cor. I dicitur, <i>fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius</i>. Haec autem societas hominis ad Deum, quae est quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur quidem hic in praesenti per gratiam, perficietur autem in futuro per gloriam, quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel desperaret se posse habere aliquam societatem vel familiarem conversationem cum ipso; ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad Deum, quae est caritas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat huiusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret se ad hanc societatem pertinere. Et sic caritas sine fide et spe nullo modo esse potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36233] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis obiectum, ad quod ordinamur per fidem et spem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q65_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>), and so charity is impossible without them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36234] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas est radix fidei et spei, inquantum dat eis perfectionem virtutis. Sed fides et spes, secundum rationem propriam, praesupponuntur ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Et sic caritas sine eis esse non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q65_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A3" id="FS_Q65_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">, Q[4], A[3]</a>]: so that in Him was perfect charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 65 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36235] Iª-IIae q. 65 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Christo defuit fides et spes, propter id quod est imperfectionis in eis. Sed loco fidei, habuit apertam visionem; et loco spei, plenam comprehensionem. Et sic fuit perfecta caritas in eo.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q66" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q66-p0.1">Q. 66. OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q66-p2"> We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q66-p3"><a href="#FS_Q66_A1"> (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p4"><a href="#FS_Q66_A2"> (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p5"><a href="#FS_Q66_A3"> (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p6"><a href="#FS_Q66_A4"> (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p7"><a href="#FS_Q66_A5"> (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q66-p8"><a href="#FS_Q66_A6"> (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 pr."><a name="36236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36236] Iª-IIae q. 66 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de aequalitate virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum virtus possit esse maior vel minor. Secundo, utrum omnes virtutes simul in eodem existentes, sint aequales. Tertio, de comparatione virtutum moralium ad intellectuales. Quarto, de comparatione virtutum moralium ad invicem. Quinto, de comparatione virtutum intellectualium ad invicem. Sexto, de comparatione virtutum theologicarum ad invicem.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q66_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A1-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 1. Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.16" target="asv">Apoc. 21:16</a>) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36237] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior vel minor. Dicitur enim in Apoc. XXI, quod latera civitatis Ierusalem sunt aequalia. Per haec autem significantur virtutes, ut Glossa dicit ibidem. Ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. Non ergo potest esse virtus maior virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is "the limit of power," as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose." Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36238] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne illud cuius ratio consistit in maximo, non potest esse maius vel minus. Sed ratio virtutis consistit in maximo, est enim virtus ultimum potentiae, ut philosophus dicit in I de caelo; et Augustinus etiam dicit, in II de Lib. Arb., quod <i>virtutes sunt maxima bona, quibus nullus potest male uti</i>. Ergo videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior neque minor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36239] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quantitas effectus pensatur secundum virtutem agentis. Sed virtutes perfectae, quae sunt virtutes infusae, sunt a Deo, cuius virtus est uniformis et infinita. Ergo videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and increase: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20</a>): "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven": and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv">Prov. 15:5</a>): "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus]." Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36240] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ubicumque potest esse augmentum et superabundantia, potest esse inaequalitas. Sed in virtutibus invenitur superabundantia et augmentum, dicitur enim Matth. V, <i>nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum</i>; et Proverb. XV dicitur, <i>in abundanti iustitia virtus maxima est</i>. Ergo videtur quod virtus possit esse maior vel minor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q66_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[61], A[2] </a>) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. </p><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p7"> The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was said above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q52_A1" id="FS_Q66_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[52], A[1]</a> ), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum. </p><p id="FS_Q66_A1-p8"> If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of the giving of Christ," as stated in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.9" target="asv"> Eph. 4:9.</a> And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 co."><a name="36241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36241] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod cum quaeritur utrum virtus una possit esse maior alia, dupliciter intelligi potest quaestio. Uno modo, in virtutibus specie differentibus. Et sic manifestum est quod una virtus est alia maior. Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu, et in effectibus, tanto aliquid est potius, quanto est causae propinquius. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod causa et radix humani boni est ratio. Et ideo prudentia, quae perficit rationem, praefertur in bonitate aliis virtutibus moralibus, perficientibus vim appetitivam inquantum participat rationem. Et in his etiam tanto est una altera melior, quanto magis ad rationem accedit. Unde et iustitia, quae est in voluntate, praefertur aliis virtutibus moralibus, et fortitudo, quae est in irascibili, praefertur temperantiae, quae est in concupiscibili, quae minus participat rationem, ut patet in VII Ethic. Alio modo potest intelligi quaestio in virtute eiusdem speciei. Et sic, secundum ea quae dicta sunt supra, cum de intensionibus habituum ageretur, virtus potest dupliciter dici maior et minor, uno modo, secundum seipsam; alio modo, ex parte participantis subiecti. Si igitur secundum seipsam consideretur, magnitudo vel parvitas eius attenditur secundum ea ad quae se extendit. Quicumque autem habet aliquam virtutem, puta temperantiam, habet ipsam quantum ad omnia ad quae se temperantia extendit. Quod de scientia et arte non contingit, non enim quicumque est grammaticus, scit omnia quae ad grammaticam pertinent. Et secundum hoc bene dixerunt Stoici, ut Simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, quod virtus non recipit magis et minus, sicut scientia vel ars; eo quod ratio virtutis consistit in maximo. Si vero consideretur virtus ex parte subiecti participantis, sic contingit virtutem esse maiorem vel minorem, sive secundum diversa tempora, in eodem; sive in diversis hominibus. Quia ad attingendum medium virtutis, quod est secundum rationem rectam, unus est melius dispositus quam alius, vel propter maiorem assuetudinem, vel propter meliorem dispositionem naturae, vel propter perspicacius iudicium rationis, aut etiam propter maius gratiae donum, quod unicuique donatur secundum mensuram donationis Christi, ut dicitur ad Ephes. IV. Et in hoc deficiebant Stoici, aestimantes nullum esse virtuosum dicendum, nisi qui summe fuerit dispositus ad virtutem. Non enim exigitur ad rationem virtutis, quod attingat rectae rationis medium in indivisibili, sicut Stoici putabant, sed sufficit prope medium esse, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Idem etiam indivisibile signum unus propinquius et promptius attingit quam alius, sicut etiam patet in sagittatoribus trahentibus ad certum signum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on <a href="#FS_Q66_A2" id="FS_Q66_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36242] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aequalitas illa non est secundum quantitatem absolutam, sed est secundum proportionem intelligenda, quia omnes virtutes proportionaliter crescunt in homine, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36243] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod illud ultimum quod pertinet ad virtutem, potest habere rationem magis vel minus boni secundum praedictos modos, cum non sit ultimum indivisibile, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv"> Eph. 4:7</a>: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36244] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non operatur secundum necessitatem naturae, sed secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, secundum quam diversam mensuram virtutis hominibus largitur, secundum illud ad Ephes. IV, <i>unicuique vestrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A2-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 2. Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:7</a>): "Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that." Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36245] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnes virtutes in uno et eodem sint aequaliter intensae. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. VII, <i>unusquisque habet proprium donum a Deo, alius quidem sic, alius autem sic</i>. Non esset autem unum donum magis proprium alicui quam aliud, si omnes virtutes dono Dei infusas quilibet aequaliter haberet. Ergo videtur quod non omnes virtutes sint aequales in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4" target="asv">Rom. 4</a>), Moses for his meekness ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Num.7.3" target="asv">Num. 7:3</a>), Job for his patience ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Tob.2.12" target="asv">Tob. 2:12</a>). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: "There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High," [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36246] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si omnes virtutes essent aeque intensae in uno et eodem, sequeretur quod quicumque excederet aliquem in una virtute, excederet ipsum in omnibus aliis virtutibus. Sed hoc patet esse falsum, quia diversi sancti de diversis virtutibus praecipue laudantur; sicut Abraham de fide, Moyses de mansuetudine, Iob de patientia. Unde et de quolibet confessore cantatur in Ecclesia, <i>non est inventus similis illi, qui conservaret legem excelsi</i>; eo quod quilibet habuit praerogativam alicuius virtutis. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36247] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto habitus est intensior, tanto homo secundum ipsum delectabilius et promptius operatur. Sed experimento patet quod unus homo delectabilius et promptius operatur actum unius virtutis quam actum alterius. Non ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that "those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance," and so on. Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36248] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI de Trin., quod <i>quicumque sunt aequales in fortitudine, aequales sunt in prudentia et temperantia</i>; et sic de aliis. Hoc autem non esset, nisi omnes virtutes unius hominis essent aequales. Ergo omnes virtutes unius hominis sunt aequales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another. </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p7"> Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: "If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all in the same way." </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p8"> The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters ( <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[65] , AA[1]</a>,2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q66_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue. </p><p id="FS_Q66_A2-p9"> But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 co."><a name="36249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36249] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quantitas virtutum, sicut ex dictis patet, potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum rationem speciei. Et sic non est dubium quod una virtus unius hominis sit maior quam alia, sicut caritas fide et spe. Alio modo potest attendi secundum participationem subiecti, prout scilicet intenditur vel remittitur in subiecto. Et secundum hoc, omnes virtutes unius hominis sunt aequales quadam aequalitate proportionis, inquantum aequaliter crescunt in homine, sicut digiti manus sunt inaequales secundum quantitatem, sed sunt aequales secundum proportionem, cum proportionaliter augeantur. Huiusmodi autem aequalitatis oportet eodem modo rationem accipere, sicut et connexionis, aequalitas enim est quaedam connexio virtutum secundum quantitatem. Dictum est autem supra quod ratio connexionis virtutum dupliciter assignari potest. Uno modo, secundum intellectum eorum qui intelligunt per has quatuor virtutes, quatuor conditiones generales virtutum, quarum una simul invenitur cum aliis in qualibet materia. Et sic virtus in qualibet materia non potest aequalis dici, nisi habeat omnes istas conditiones aequales. Et hanc rationem aequalitatis virtutum assignat Augustinus, in VI de Trin., dicens, <i>si dixeris aequales esse istos fortitudine, sed illum praestare prudentia; sequitur quod huius fortitudo minus prudens sit. Ac per hoc, nec fortitudine aequales sunt, quando est illius fortitudo prudentior. Atque ita de ceteris virtutibus invenies, si omnes eadem consideratione percurras</i>. Alio modo assignata est ratio connexionis virtutum secundum eos qui intelligunt huiusmodi virtutes habere materias determinatas. Et secundum hoc, ratio connexionis virtutum moralium accipitur ex parte prudentiae, et ex parte caritatis quantum ad virtutes infusas, non autem ex parte inclinationis, quae est ex parte subiecti, ut supra dictum est. Sic igitur et ratio aequalitatis virtutum potest accipi ex parte prudentiae, quantum ad id quod est formale in omnibus virtutibus moralibus, existente enim ratione aequaliter perfecta in uno et eodem, oportet quod proportionaliter secundum rationem rectam medium constituatur in qualibet materia virtutum. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in virtutibus moralibus, scilicet inclinationem ipsam ad actum virtutis; potest esse unus homo magis promptus ad actum unius virtutis quam ad actum alterius, vel ex natura, vel ex consuetudine, vel etiam ex gratiae dono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36250] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli potest intelligi de donis gratiae gratis datae, quae non sunt communia omnibus, nec omnia aequalia in uno et eodem. Vel potest dici quod refertur ad mensuram gratiae gratum facientis; secundum quam unus abundat in omnibus virtutibus plus quam alius, propter maiorem abundantiam prudentiae, vel etiam caritatis, in qua connectuntur omnes virtutes infusae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36251] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod unus sanctus laudatur praecipue de una virtute, et alius de alia, propter excellentiorem promptitudinem ad actum unius virtutis, quam ad actum alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A2-p12"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36252] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A3-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 3. Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral virtues are "more lasting even than the sciences" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36253] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales praeemineant intellectualibus. Quod enim magis est necessarium, et permanentius, est melius. Sed virtutes morales sunt permanentiores etiam disciplinis, quae sunt virtutes intellectuales, et sunt etiam magis necessariae ad vitam humanam. Ergo sunt praeferendae virtutibus intellectualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue is defined as "that which makes its possessor good." Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36254] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de ratione virtutis est quod bonum faciat habentem. Sed secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus, non autem secundum virtutes intellectuales, nisi forte secundum solam prudentiam. Ergo virtus moralis est melior quam intellectualis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, "moral virtue gives right intention of the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means." Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36255] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, finis est nobilior his quae sunt ad finem. Sed sicut dicitur in VI Ethic., <i>virtus moralis facit rectam intentionem finis; prudentia autem facit rectam electionem eorum quae sunt ad finem</i>. Ergo virtus moralis est nobilior prudentia, quae est virtus intellectualis circa moralia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36256] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, virtus moralis est in rationali per participationem; virtus autem intellectualis in rationali per essentiam, sicut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed rationale per essentiam est nobilius quam rationale per participationem. Ergo virtus intellectualis est nobilior virtute morali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches," and yet not better relatively, i.e. "for one who is in want" [*Aristotle, Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as explained above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q54_A2" id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[54], A[2]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q66_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[60], A[1]</a>). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite. </p><p id="FS_Q66_A3-p7"> But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A1" id="FS_Q66_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 co."><a name="36257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36257] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest dici maius vel minus, dupliciter, uno modo, simpliciter; alio modo, secundum quid. Nihil enim prohibet aliquid esse melius simpliciter, ut philosophari quam ditari, quod tamen non est melius secundum quid, idest necessitatem patienti. Simpliciter autem consideratur unumquodque, quando consideratur secundum propriam rationem suae speciei. Habet autem virtus speciem ex obiecto, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, illa virtus nobilior est quae habet nobilius obiectum. Manifestum est autem quod obiectum rationis est nobilius quam obiectum appetitus, ratio enim apprehendit aliquid in universali; sed appetitus tendit in res, quae habent esse particulare. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, virtutes intellectuales, quae perficiunt rationem, sunt nobiliores quam morales, quae perficiunt appetitum. Sed si consideretur virtus in ordine ad actum, sic virtus moralis, quae perficit appetitum, cuius est movere alias potentias ad actum, ut supra dictum est, nobilior est. Et quia virtus dicitur ex eo quod est principium alicuius actus, cum sit perfectio potentiae, sequitur etiam quod ratio virtutis magis competat virtutibus moralibus quam virtutibus intellectualibus, quamvis virtutes intellectuales sint nobiliores habitus simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A6" id="FS_Q66_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[6]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36258] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes morales sunt magis permanentes quam intellectuales, propter exercitium earum in his quae pertinent ad vitam communem. Sed manifestum est quod obiecta disciplinarum, quae sunt necessaria et semper eodem modo se habentia, sunt permanentiora quam obiecta virtutum moralium, quae sunt quaedam particularia agibilia. Quod autem virtutes morales sunt magis necessariae ad vitam humanam, non ostendit eas esse nobiliores simpliciter, sed quoad hoc. Quinimmo virtutes intellectuales speculativae, ex hoc ipso quod non ordinantur ad aliud sicut utile ordinatur ad finem, sunt digniores. Hoc enim contingit quia secundum eas quodammodo inchoatur in nobis beatitudo, quae consistit in cognitione veritatis, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q66_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36259] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod secundum virtutes morales dicitur homo bonus simpliciter, et non secundum intellectuales, ea ratione, quia appetitus movet alias potentias ad suum actum, ut supra dictum est. Unde per hoc etiam non probatur nisi quod virtus moralis sit melior secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36260] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia non solum dirigit virtutes morales in eligendo ea quae sunt ad finem, sed etiam in praestituendo finem. Est autem finis uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis attingere medium in propria materia, quod quidem medium determinatur secundum rectam rationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in II et VI Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A4-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 4. Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36261] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia non sit praecipua inter virtutes morales. Maius enim est dare alicui de proprio, quam reddere alicui quod ei debetur. Sed primum pertinet ad liberalitatem; secundum autem ad iustitiam. Ergo videtur quod liberalitas sit maior virtus quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.4" target="asv"> Jam. 1:4, </a> "Patience hath a perfect work." Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36262] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud videtur esse maximum in unoquoque, quod est perfectissimum in ipso. Sed sicut dicitur Iac. I, <i>patientia opus perfectum habet</i>. Ergo videtur quod patientia sit maior quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue," as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. Therefore it is greater than justice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36263] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, magnanimitas operatur magnum, in omnibus virtutibus</i>, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Ergo magnificat etiam ipsam iustitiam. Est igitur maior quam iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "justice is the most excellent of the virtues." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36264] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in V Ethic., quod <i>iustitia est praeclarissima virtutum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q66_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q66_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence "justice is the most excellent of virtues" (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that "those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former," i.e. fortitude, "is useful in war, and the latter," i.e. justice, "both in war and in peace." After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence also. </p><p id="FS_Q66_A4-p7"> A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 co."><a name="36265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36265] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtus aliqua secundum suam speciem potest dici maior vel minor, vel simpliciter, vel secundum quid. Simpliciter quidem virtus dicitur maior, secundum quod in ea maius bonum rationis relucet, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc, iustitia inter omnes virtutes morales praecellit, tanquam propinquior rationi. Quod patet et ex subiecto, et ex obiecto. Ex subiecto quidem, quia est in voluntate sicut in subiecto, voluntas autem est appetitus rationalis, ut ex dictis patet. Secundum autem obiectum sive materiam, quia est circa operationes, quibus homo ordinatur non solum in seipso, sed etiam ad alterum. Unde iustitia est praeclarissima virtutum, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Inter alias autem virtutes morales, quae sunt circa passiones, tanto in unaquaque magis relucet rationis bonum, quanto circa maiora motus appetitivus subditur rationi. Maximum autem in his quae ad hominem pertinent, est vita, a qua omnia alia dependent. Et ideo fortitudo, quae appetitivum motum subdit rationi in his quae ad mortem et vitam pertinent, primum locum tenet inter virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones, tamen ordinatur infra iustitiam. Unde philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod <i>necesse est maximas esse virtutes, quae sunt aliis honoratissimae, siquidem est virtus potentia benefactiva. Propter hoc, fortes et iustos maxime honorant, haec quidem enim in bello, scilicet fortitudo; haec autem, scilicet iustitia, et in bello et in pace utilis est</i>. Post fortitudinem autem ordinatur temperantia, quae subiicit rationi appetitum circa ea quae immediate ordinantur ad vitam, vel in eodem secundum numerum, vel in eodem secundum speciem, scilicet in cibis et venereis. Et sic istae tres virtutes, simul cum prudentia, dicuntur esse principales etiam dignitate. Secundum quid autem dicitur aliqua virtus esse maior, secundum quod adminiculum vel ornamentum praebet principali virtuti. Sicut substantia est simpliciter dignior accidente; aliquod tamen accidens est secundum quid dignius substantia, inquantum perficit substantiam in aliquo esse accidentali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36266] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus liberalitatis oportet quod fundetur super actum iustitiae, <i>non enim esset liberalis datio, si non de proprio daret</i>, ut in II Polit. dicitur. Unde liberalitas sine iustitia esse non posset, quae secernit suum a non suo. Iustitia autem potest esse sine liberalitate. Unde iustitia simpliciter est maior liberalitate, tanquam communior, et fundamentum ipsius, liberalitas autem est secundum quid maior, cum sit quidam ornatus iustitiae, et complementum eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36267] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod patientia dicitur habere opus perfectum in tolerantia malorum, in quibus non solum excludit iniustam vindictam, quam etiam excludit iustitia; neque solum odium quod facit caritas; neque solum iram, quod facit mansuetudo; sed etiam excludit tristitiam inordinatam, quae est radix omnium praedictorum. Et ideo in hoc est perfectior et maior, quod in hac materia extirpat radicem. Non autem est simpliciter perfectior omnibus aliis virtutibus. Quia fortitudo non solum sustinet molestias absque perturbatione, quod est patientiae, sed etiam ingerit se eis, cum opus fuerit. Unde quicumque est fortis, est patiens, sed non convertitur, est enim patientia quaedam fortitudinis pars.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36268] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod magnanimitas non potest esse nisi aliis virtutibus praeexistentibus, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Unde comparatur ad alias sicut ornatus earum. Et sic secundum quid est maior omnibus aliis, non tamen simpliciter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A5-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 5. Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36269] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sapientia non sit maxima inter virtutes intellectuales. Imperans enim maius est eo cui imperatur. Sed prudentia videtur imperare sapientiae, dicitur enim I Ethic., quod <i>quales disciplinarum debitum est esse in civitatibus, et quales unumquemque addiscere, et usquequo, haec praeordinat</i>, scilicet politica, quae ad prudentiam pertinet, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Cum igitur inter disciplinas etiam sapientia contineatur, videtur quod prudentia sit maior quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36270] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de ratione virtutis est quod ordinet hominem ad felicitatem, est enim virtus dispositio perfecti ad optimum, ut dicitur in VII Physic. Sed prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, per quae homo ad felicitatem perducitur, sapientia autem non considerat humanos actus, quibus ad beatitudinem pervenitur. Ergo prudentia est maior virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.26.26" target="asv"> Job 26:26</a>: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36271] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto cognitio est perfectior, tanto videtur esse maior. Sed perfectiorem cognitionem habere possumus de rebus humanis, de quibus est scientia, quam de rebus divinis, de quibus est sapientia, ut distinguit Augustinus in XII de Trin., quia divina incomprehensibilia sunt, secundum illud Iob XXXVI, <i>ecce Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram</i>. Ergo scientia est maior virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36272] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, cognitio principiorum est dignior quam cognitio conclusionum. Sed sapientia concludit ex principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus; sicut et aliae scientiae. Ergo intellectus est maior virtus quam sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36273] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod sapientia est sicut caput inter virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q66_A3" id="FS_Q66_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 co."><a name="36274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36274] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Obiectum autem sapientiae praecellit inter obiecta omnium virtutum intellectualium, considerat enim causam altissimam, quae Deus est, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Et quia per causam iudicatur de effectu, et per causam superiorem de causis inferioribus; inde est quod sapientia habet iudicium de omnibus aliis virtutibus intellectualibus; et eius est ordinare omnes; et ipsa est quasi architectonica respectu omnium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15 </a>). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36275] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum prudentia sit circa res humanas, sapientia vero circa causam altissimam; impossibile est quod prudentia sit maior virtus quam sapientia, <i>nisi</i>, ut dicitur in VI Ethic., <i>maximum eorum quae sunt in mundo, esset homo</i>. Unde dicendum est, sicut in eodem libro dicitur, quod prudentia non imperat ipsi sapientiae, sed potius e converso, quia <i>spiritualis iudicat omnia, et ipse a nemine iudicatur</i>, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Non enim prudentia habet se intromittere de altissimis, quae considerat sapientia, sed imperat de his quae ordinantur ad sapientiam, scilicet quomodo homines debeant ad sapientiam pervenire. Unde in hoc est prudentia, seu politica, ministra sapientiae, introducit enim ad eam, praeparans ei viam, sicut ostiarius ad regem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36276] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod prudentia considerat ea quibus pervenitur ad felicitatem, sed sapientia considerat ipsum obiectum felicitatis, quod est altissimum intelligibile. Et si quidem esset perfecta consideratio sapientiae respectu sui obiecti, esset perfecta felicitas in actu sapientiae. Sed quia actus sapientiae in hac vita est imperfectus respectu principalis obiecti, quod est Deus; ideo actus sapientiae est quaedam inchoatio seu participatio futurae felicitatis. Et sic propinquius se habet ad felicitatem quam prudentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), "one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain." Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that "it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that "it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things." Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this "belongs to God alone" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36277] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de anima, <i>una notitia praefertur alteri aut ex eo quod est nobiliorum, aut propter certitudinem</i>. Si igitur subiecta sint aequalia in bonitate et nobilitate, illa quae est certior, erit maior virtus. Sed illa quae est minus certa de altioribus et maioribus, praefertur ei quae est magis certa de inferioribus rebus. Unde philosophus dicit, in II de caelo, quod magnum est de rebus caelestibus aliquid posse cognoscere etiam debili et topica ratione. Et in I de partibus Animal., dicit quod <i>amabile est magis parvum aliquid cognoscere de rebus nobilioribus quam multa cognoscere de rebus ignobilioribus</i>. Sapientia igitur ad quam pertinet Dei cognitio, homini, maxime in statu huius vitae, non potest perfecte advenire, ut sit quasi eius possessio; sed hoc solius Dei est, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed tamen illa modica cognitio quae per sapientiam de Deo haberi potest, omni alii cognitioni praefertur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36278] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod veritas et cognitio principiorum indemonstrabilium dependet ex ratione terminorum, cognito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim cognoscitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Cognoscere autem rationem entis et non entis, et totius et partis, et aliorum quae consequuntur ad ens, ex quibus sicut ex terminis constituuntur principia indemonstrabilia, pertinet ad sapientiam, quia ens commune est proprius effectus causae altissimae, scilicet Dei. Et ideo sapientia non solum utitur principiis indemonstrabilibus, quorum est intellectus, concludendo ex eis, sicut aliae scientiae; sed etiam iudicando de eis, et disputando contra negantes. Unde sequitur quod sapientia sit maior virtus quam intellectus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q66_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q66_A6-p0.1">Q. 66. A. 6. Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A3" id="FS_Q66_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36279] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit maxima inter virtutes theologicas. Cum enim fides sit in intellectu, spes autem et caritas in vi appetitiva, ut supra dictum est; videtur quod fides comparetur ad spem et caritatem, sicut virtus intellectualis ad moralem. Sed virtus intellectualis est maior morali, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo fides est maior spe et caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36280] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, videtur esse maius eo. Sed spes, ut videtur, se habet ex additione ad caritatem, praesupponit enim spes amorem, ut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid.; addit autem quendam motum protensionis in rem amatam. Ergo spes est maior caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.3" target="asv"> Mat. 1:3 </a>says that "faith begets hope, and hope charity." Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36281] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, causa est potior effectu. Sed fides et spes sunt causa caritatis, dicitur enim Matth. I, in Glossa, quod <i>fides generat spem, et spes caritatem</i>. Ergo fides et spes sunt maiores caritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>): "Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36282] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>nunc autem manent fides, spes, caritas, tria haec; maior autem horum est caritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q66_A3" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 co."><a name="36283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36283] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, magnitudo virtutis secundum suam speciem, consideratur ex obiecto. Cum autem tres virtutes theologicae respiciant Deum sicut proprium obiectum, non potest una earum dici maior altera ex hoc quod sit circa maius obiectum; sed ex eo quod una se habet propinquius ad obiectum quam alia. Et hoc modo caritas est maior aliis. Nam aliae important in sui ratione quandam distantiam ab obiecto, est enim fides de non visis, spes autem de non habitis. Sed amor caritatis est de eo quod iam habetur, est enim amatum quodammodo in amante, et etiam amans per affectum trahitur ad unionem amati; propter quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q66_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.19" target="asv"> Eph. 3:19</a>: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36284] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non hoc modo se habent fides et spes ad caritatem, sicut prudentia ad virtutem moralem. Et hoc propter duo. Primo quidem, quia virtutes theologicae habent obiectum quod est supra animam humanam, sed prudentia et virtutes morales sunt circa ea quae sunt infra hominem. In his autem quae sunt supra hominem, nobilior est dilectio quam cognitio. Perficitur enim cognitio, secundum quod cognita sunt in cognoscente, dilectio vero, secundum quod diligens trahitur ad rem dilectam. Id autem quod est supra hominem, nobilius est in seipso quam sit in homine, quia unumquodque est in altero per modum eius in quo est. E converso autem est in his quae sunt infra hominem. Secundo, quia prudentia moderatur motus appetitivos ad morales virtutes pertinentes, sed fides non moderatur motum appetitivum tendentem in Deum, qui pertinet ad virtutes theologicas; sed solum ostendit obiectum. Motus autem appetitivus in obiectum, excedit cognitionem humanam; secundum illud ad Ephes. III, <i>supereminentem scientiae caritatem Christi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A4" id="FS_Q66_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[4]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36285] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod spes praesupponit amorem eius quod quis adipisci se sperat, qui est amor concupiscentiae, quo quidem amore magis se amat qui concupiscit bonum, quam aliquid aliud. Caritas autem importat amorem amicitiae, ad quam pervenitur spe, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q66_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 66 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36286] Iª-IIae q. 66 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod causa perficiens est potior effectu, non autem causa disponens. Sic enim calor ignis esset potior quam anima, ad quam disponit materiam, quod patet esse falsum. Sic autem fides generat spem, et spes caritatem, secundum scilicet quod una disponit ad alteram.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q67" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q67-p0.1">Q. 67. OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q67-p2"> We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q67-p3"><a href="#FS_Q67_A1"> (1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p4"><a href="#FS_Q67_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p5"><a href="#FS_Q67_A3"> (3) Whether faith remains?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p6"><a href="#FS_Q67_A4"> (4) Whether hope remains?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p7"><a href="#FS_Q67_A5"> (5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?</a></p><p id="FS_Q67-p8"><a href="#FS_Q67_A6"> (6) Whether charity remains?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 pr."><a name="36287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36287] Iª-IIae q. 67 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de duratione virtutum post hanc vitam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum virtutes morales maneant post hanc vitam. Secundo, utrum virtutes intellectuales. Tertio, utrum fides. Quarto, utrum remaneat spes. Quinto, utrum aliquid fidei maneat, vel spei. Sexto, utrum maneat caritas.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q67_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A1-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 1. Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv"> Mat. 22:30.</a> But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods" (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36288] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non maneant post hanc vitam. Homines enim in statu futurae gloriae erunt similes Angelis, ut dicitur Matth. XXII. Sed ridiculum est in Angelis ponere virtutes morales, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo neque in hominibus, post hanc vitam, erunt virtutes morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says (Moral. iv, 18): "The works of the active life pass away from the body." Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36289] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes morales perficiunt hominem in vita activa. Sed vita activa non manet post hanc vitam, dicit enim Gregorius, in VI Moral., <i>activae vitae opera cum corpore transeunt</i>. Ergo virtutes morales non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36290] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, temperantia et fortitudo, quae sunt virtutes morales, sunt irrationalium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Sed irrationales partes animae corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore, eo quod sunt actus organorum corporalium. Ergo videtur quod virtutes morales non maneant post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>) that "justice is perpetual and immortal." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36291] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. I, quod <i>iustitia perpetua est et immortalis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), "in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others." Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the future life, but after a different manner. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 co."><a name="36292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36292] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., Tullius posuit post hanc vitam quatuor virtutes cardinales non esse; sed in alia vita homines esse beatos sola cognitione naturae, in qua nihil est melius aut amabilius, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem, ea natura quae creavit omnes naturas. Ipse autem postea determinat huiusmodi quatuor virtutes in futura vita existere, tamen alio modo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p7"> In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in huiusmodi virtutibus aliquid est formale; et aliquid quasi materiale. Materiale quidem est in his virtutibus inclinatio quaedam partis appetitivae ad passiones vel operationes secundum modum aliquem. Sed quia iste modus determinatur a ratione, ideo formale in omnibus virtutibus est ipse ordo rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p8"> Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that "prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection." As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its act in that life, viz. "to be subject to God": because even in this life subjection to a superior is part of justice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi virtutes morales in futura vita non manent, quantum ad id quod est materiale in eis. Non enim habebunt in futura vita locum concupiscentiae et delectationes ciborum et venereorum; neque etiam timores et audaciae circa pericula mortis; neque etiam distributiones et communicationes rerum quae veniunt in usum praesentis vitae. Sed quantum ad id quod est formale, remanebunt in beatis perfectissimae post hanc vitam, inquantum ratio uniuscuiusque rectissima erit circa ea quae ad ipsum pertinent secundum statum illum; et vis appetitiva omnino movebitur secundum ordinem rationis, in his quae ad statum illum pertinent. Unde Augustinus ibidem dicit quod <i>prudentia ibi erit sine ullo periculo erroris; fortitudo, sine molestia tolerandorum malorum; temperantia, sine repugnatione libidinum. Ut prudentiae sit nullum bonum Deo praeponere vel aequare; fortitudinis, ei firmissime cohaerere; temperantiae, nullo defectu noxio delectari</i>. De iustitia vero manifestius est quem actum ibi habebit, scilicet esse subditum Deo, quia etiam in hac vita ad iustitiam pertinet esse subditum superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards "commutations and distributions"; of fortitude, as to "matters of terror and danger"; of temperance, in respect of "lewd desires." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36293] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur ibi de huiusmodi virtutibus moralibus, quantum ad id quod materiale est in eis, sicut de iustitia, quantum ad commutationes et depositiones; de fortitudine, quantum ad terribilia et pericula; de temperantia, quantum ad concupiscentias pravas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of the virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36294] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter dicendum est ad secundum. Ea enim quae sunt activae vitae, materialiter se habent ad virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q77_A8" id="FS_Q67_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[77], A[8]</a>. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice it is specially said that it is "perpetual and immortal"; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its act will not change, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36295] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod status post hanc vitam est duplex, unus quidem ante resurrectionem, quando animae erunt a corporibus separatae; alius autem post resurrectionem, quando animae iterato corporibus suis unientur. In illo ergo resurrectionis statu, erunt vires irrationales in organis corporis, sicut et nunc sunt. Unde et poterit in irascibili esse fortitudo, et in concupiscibili temperantia, inquantum utraque vis perfecte erit disposita ad obediendum rationi. Sed in statu ante resurrectionem, partes irrationales non erunt actu in anima, sed solum radicaliter in essentia ipsius, ut in primo dictum est. Unde nec huiusmodi virtutes erunt in actu nisi in radice, scilicet in ratione et voluntate, in quibus sunt seminalia quaedam harum virtutum, ut dictum est. Sed iustitia, quae est in voluntate, etiam actu remanebit. Unde specialiter de ea dictum est quod est perpetua et immortalis, tum ratione subiecti, quia voluntas incorruptibilis est; tum etiam propter similitudinem actus, ut prius dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A2-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 2. Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8,9</a>) that "knowledge shall be destroyed," and he states the reason to be because "we know in part." Now just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36296] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes intellectuales non maneant post hanc vitam. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII, quod scientia destruetur, et ratio est quia ex parte cognoscimus. Sed sicut cognitio scientiae est ex parte, idest imperfecta; ita etiam cognitio aliarum virtutum intellectualium, quandiu haec vita durat. Ergo omnes virtutes intellectuales post hanc vitam cessabunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36297] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in praedicamentis, quod scientia, cum sit habitus, est qualitas difficile mobilis, non enim de facili amittitur, nisi ex aliqua forti transmutatione vel aegritudine. Sed nulla est tanta transmutatio corporis humani sicut per mortem. Ergo scientia et aliae virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36298] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes intellectuales perficiunt intellectum ad bene operandum proprium actum. Sed actus intellectus non videtur esse post hanc vitam, eo quod nihil intelligit anima sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in III de anima; phantasmata autem post hanc vitam non manent, cum non sint nisi in organis corporeis. Ergo virtutes intellectuales non manent post hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv"> Lk. 16:25</a>: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36299] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod firmior est cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quam particularium et contingentium. Sed in homine remanet post hanc vitam cognitio particularium contingentium, puta eorum quae quis fecit vel passus est; secundum illud Luc. XVI, <i>recordare quia recepisti bona in vita tua, et Lazarus similiter mala</i>. Ergo multo magis remanet cognitio universalium et necessariorum, quae pertinent ad scientiam et ad alias virtutes intellectuales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A6" id="FS_Q67_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[6]</a> some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands; and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted. </p><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p7"> But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually." It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima iii) because it preserves the intelligible species. </p><p id="FS_Q67_A2-p8"> And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A7" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[84], A[7]</a>; <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[85], A[1]</a>, ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p8.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 co."><a name="36300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36300] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, quidam posuerunt quod species intelligibiles non permanent in intellectu possibili nisi quandiu actu intelligit, nec est aliqua conservatio specierum, cessante consideratione actuali, nisi in viribus sensitivis, quae sunt actus corporalium organorum, scilicet in imaginativa et memorativa. Huiusmodi autem vires corrumpuntur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo secundum hoc, scientia nullo modo post hanc vitam remanebit, corpore corrupto; neque aliqua alia intellectualis virtus. Sed haec opinio est contra sententiam Aristotelis, qui in III de anima dicit quod <i>intellectus possibilis est in actu, cum fit singula, sicut sciens; cum tamen sit in potentia ad considerandum in actu</i>. Est etiam contra rationem, quia species intelligibiles recipiuntur in intellectu possibili immobiliter, secundum modum recipientis. Unde et intellectus possibilis dicitur locus specierum, quasi species intelligibiles conservans. Sed phantasmata, ad quae respiciendo homo intelligit in hac vita, applicando ad ipsa species intelligibiles, ut in primo dictum est, corrupto corpore corrumpuntur. Unde quantum ad ipsa phantasmata, quae sunt quasi materialia in virtutibus intellectualibus, virtutes intellectuales destruuntur, destructo corpore, sed quantum ad species intelligibiles, quae sunt in intellectu possibili, virtutes intellectuales manent. Species autem se habent in virtutibus intellectualibus sicut formales. Unde intellectuales virtutes manent post hanc vitam, quantum ad id quod est formale in eis, non autem quantum ad id quod est materiale, sicut et de moralibus dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the phantasms. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36301] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verbum apostoli est intelligendum quantum ad id quod est materiale in scientia, et quantum ad modum intelligendi, quia scilicet neque phantasmata remanebunt, destructo corpore; neque erit usus scientiae per conversionem ad phantasmata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36302] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod per aegritudinem corrumpitur habitus scientiae quantum ad id quod est materiale in eo, scilicet quantum ad phantasmata, non autem quantum ad species intelligibiles, quae sunt in intellectu possibili.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q89_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[89], A[1]</a> the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q67_A2-p11.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36303] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod anima separata post mortem habet alium modum intelligendi quam per conversionem ad phantasmata, ut in primo dictum est. Et sic scientia manet, non tamen secundum eundem modum operandi, sicut et de virtutibus moralibus dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A3-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 3. Whether faith remains after this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after this life, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q67_A2" id="FS_Q67_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore faith remains also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36304] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod fides maneat post hanc vitam. Nobilior enim est fides quam scientia. Sed scientia manet post hanc vitam, ut dictum est. Ergo et fides.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:11</a>): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other virtue remains. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36305] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, I ad Cor. III, dicitur, <i>fundamentum aliud nemo potest ponere, praeter id quod positum est, quod est Christus Iesus</i>, idest fides Christi Iesu. Sed sublato fundamento, non remanet id quod superaedificatur. Ergo, si fides non remanet post hanc vitam, nulla alia virtus remaneret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be "evening" and "morning" knowledge [*Cf. <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A6" id="FS_Q67_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[6]</a>]; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowledge of glory. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36306] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cognitio fidei et cognitio gloriae differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum. Sed cognitio imperfecta potest esse simul cum cognitione perfecta, sicut in Angelo simul potest esse cognitio vespertina cum cognitione matutina; et aliquis homo potest simul habere de eadem conclusione scientiam per syllogismum demonstrativum, et opinionem per syllogismum dialecticum. Ergo etiam fides simul esse potest, post hanc vitam, cum cognitione gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.5.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 5:6,7</a>): "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight." But those who are in glory are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36307] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. V, <i>quandiu sumus in corpore, peregrinamur a domino, per fidem enim ambulamus, et non per speciem</i>. Sed illi qui sunt in gloria, non peregrinantur a domino, sed sunt ei praesentes. Ergo fides non manet post hanc vitam in gloria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect of contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 co."><a name="36308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36308] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod oppositio est per se et propria causa quod unum excludatur ab alio, inquantum scilicet in omnibus oppositis includitur oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Invenitur autem in quibusdam oppositio secundum contrarias formas, sicut in coloribus album et nigrum. In quibusdam autem, secundum perfectum et imperfectum, unde in alterationibus magis et minus accipiuntur ut contraria, ut cum de minus calido fit magis calidum, ut dicitur in V Physic. Et quia perfectum et imperfectum opponuntur, impossibile est quod simul, secundum idem, sit perfectio et imperfectio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p7"> Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Est autem considerandum quod imperfectio quidem quandoque est de ratione rei, et pertinet ad speciem ipsius, sicut defectus rationis pertinet ad rationem speciei equi vel bovis. Et quia unum et idem numero manens non potest transferri de una specie in aliam, inde est quod, tali imperfectione sublata, tollitur species rei, sicut iam non esset bos vel equus, si esset rationalis. Quandoque vero imperfectio non pertinet ad rationem speciei, sed accidit individuo secundum aliquid aliud, sicut alicui homini quandoque accidit defectus rationis, inquantum impeditur in eo rationis usus, propter somnum vel ebrietatem vel aliquid huiusmodi. Patet autem quod, tali imperfectione remota, nihilominus substantia rei manet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8"> Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith being defined as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Where is faith? Believing without seeing." But it is an imperfect knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Manifestum est autem quod imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Ponitur enim in eius definitione, <i>fides enim est substantia sperandarum rerum, argumentum non apparentium</i>, ut dicitur ad Heb. XI. Et Augustinus dicit, <i>quid est fides? Credere quod non vides</i>. Quod autem cognitio sit sine apparitione vel visione, hoc ad imperfectionem cognitionis pertinet. Et sic imperfectio cognitionis est de ratione fidei. Unde manifestum est quod fides non potest esse perfecta cognitio, eadem numero manens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p9"> But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the "morning" and "evening" knowledge of the angels: for the "morning" knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in the Word, while the "evening" knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sed ulterius considerandum est utrum simul possit esse cum cognitione perfecta, nihil enim prohibet aliquam cognitionem imperfectam simul esse aliquando cum cognitione perfecta. Est igitur considerandum quod cognitio potest esse imperfecta tripliciter, uno modo, ex parte obiecti cognoscibilis; alio modo, ex parte medii; tertio modo, ex parte subiecti. Ex parte quidem obiecti cognoscibilis, differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum cognitio matutina et vespertina in Angelis, nam cognitio matutina est de rebus secundum quod habent esse in verbo; cognitio autem vespertina est de eis secundum quod habent esse in propria natura, quod est imperfectum respectu primi esse. Ex parte vero medii, differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum cognitio quae est de aliqua conclusione per medium demonstrativum, et per medium probabile. Ex parte vero subiecti differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum opinio, fides et scientia. Nam de ratione opinionis est quod accipiatur unum cum formidine alterius oppositi, unde non habet firmam inhaesionem. De ratione vero scientiae est quod habeat firmam inhaesionem cum visione intellectiva, habet enim certitudinem procedentem ex intellectu principiorum. Fides autem medio modo se habet, excedit enim opinionem, in hoc quod habet firmam inhaesionem; deficit vero a scientia, in hoc quod non habet visionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p10"> Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that which makes them happy, as stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A8" id="FS_Q67_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in one and the same subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Manifestum est autem quod perfectum et imperfectum non possunt simul esse secundum idem, sed ea quae differunt secundum perfectum et imperfectum, secundum aliquid idem possunt simul esse in aliquo alio eodem. Sic igitur cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex parte obiecti, nullo modo possunt esse de eodem obiecto. Possunt tamen convenire in eodem medio, et in eodem subiecto, nihil enim prohibet quod unus homo simul et semel per unum et idem medium habeat cognitionem de duobus, quorum unum est perfectum et aliud imperfectum, sicut de sanitate et aegritudine, et bono et malo. Similiter etiam impossibile est quod cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex parte medii, conveniant in uno medio. Sed nihil prohibet quin conveniant in uno obiecto, et in uno subiecto, potest enim unus homo cognoscere eandem conclusionem per medium probabile, et demonstrativum. Et est similiter impossibile quod cognitio perfecta et imperfecta ex parte subiecti, sint simul in eodem subiecto. Fides autem in sui ratione habet imperfectionem quae est ex parte subiecti, ut scilicet credens non videat id quod credit, beatitudo autem de sui ratione habet perfectionem ex parte subiecti, ut scilicet beatus videat id quo beatificatur, ut supra dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod impossibile est quod fides maneat simul cum beatitudine in eodem subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith is incompatible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36309] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod fides est nobilior quam scientia, ex parte obiecti, quia eius obiectum est veritas prima. Sed scientia habet perfectiorem modum cognoscendi, qui non repugnat perfectioni beatitudinis, scilicet visioni, sicut repugnat ei modus fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36310] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod fides est fundamentum quantum ad id quod habet de cognitione. Et ideo quando perficietur cognitio, erit perfectius fundamentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A3-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36311] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium patet solutio ex his quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A4-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 4. Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more then does hope remain. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36312] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes maneat post mortem in statu gloriae. Spes enim nobiliori modo perficit appetitum humanum quam virtutes morales. Sed virtutes morales manent post hanc vitam, ut patet per Augustinum, in XIV de Trin. Ergo multo magis spes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever---in the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36313] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, spei opponitur timor. Sed timor manet post hanc vitam, et in beatis quidem timor filialis, qui manet in saeculum; et in damnatis timor poenarum. Ergo spes, pari ratione, potest permanere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst," and <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>: "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36314] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut spes est futuri boni, ita et desiderium. Sed in beatis est desiderium futuri boni, et quantum ad gloriam corporis, quam animae beatorum desiderant, ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt.; et etiam quantum ad gloriam animae, secundum illud Eccli. XXIV, <i>qui edunt me, adhuc esurient, et qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient</i>; et I Petr. I, dicitur, <i>in quem desiderant Angeli prospicere</i>. Ergo videtur quod possit esse spes post hanc vitam in beatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36315] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, <i>quod videt quis, quid sperat?</i> Sed beati vident id quod est obiectum spei, scilicet Deum. Ergo non sperant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is "the act of that which is in potentiality as such" (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 co."><a name="36316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36316] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, id quod de ratione sui importat imperfectionem subiecti, non potest simul stare cum subiecto opposita perfectione perfecto. Sicut patet quod motus in ratione sui importat imperfectionem subiecti, est enim actus existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, unde quando illa potentia reducitur ad actum, iam cessat motus; non enim adhuc albatur, postquam iam aliquid factum est album. Spes autem importat motum quendam in id quod non habetur; ut patet ex his quae supra de passione spei diximus. Et ideo quando habebitur id quod speratur, scilicet divina fruitio, iam spes esse non poterit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is in our actual possession. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36317] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spes est nobilior virtutibus moralibus quantum ad obiectum, quod est Deus. Sed actus virtutum moralium non repugnant perfectioni beatitudinis, sicut actus spei; nisi forte ratione materiae, secundum quam non manent. Non enim virtus moralis perficit appetitum solum in id quod nondum habetur; sed etiam circa id quod praesentialiter habetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on ( <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q19_A2" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[19], A[2]</a>). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.1.33" target="asv"> Prov. 1:33</a>: "He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils." Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1] ), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42], A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36318] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod timor est duplex, servilis et filialis, ut infra dicetur. Servilis quidem est timor poenae, qui non poterit esse in gloria, nulla possibilitate ad poenam remanente. Timor vero filialis habet duos actus, scilicet revereri Deum, et quantum ad hunc actum manet; et timere separationem ab ipso, et quantum ad hunc actum non manet. Separari enim a Deo habet rationem mali, nullum autem malum ibi timebitur, secundum illud Proverb. I, <i>abundantia perfruetur, malorum timore sublato</i>. Timor autem opponitur spei oppositione boni et mali, ut supra dictum est, et ideo timor qui remanet in gloria, non opponitur spei. In damnatis autem magis potest esse timor poenae, quam in beatis spes gloriae. Quia in damnatis erit successio poenarum, et sic remanet ibi ratio futuri, quod est obiectum timoris, sed gloria sanctorum est absque successione, secundum quandam aeternitatis participationem, in qua non est praeteritum et futurum, sed solum praesens. Et tamen nec etiam in damnatis est proprie timor. Nam sicut supra dictum est, timor nunquam est sine aliqua spe evasionis, quae omnino in damnatis non erit. Unde nec timor; nisi communiter loquendo, secundum quod quaelibet expectatio mali futuri dicitur timor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q40_A1" id="FS_Q67_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[40], A[1]</a>): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36319] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod quantum ad gloriam animae, non potest esse in beatis desiderium, secundum quod respicit futurum, ratione iam dicta. Dicitur autem ibi esse esuries et sitis, per remotionem fastidii, et eadem ratione dicitur esse desiderium in Angelis. Respectu autem gloriae corporis, in animabus sanctorum potest quidem esse desiderium, non tamen spes, proprie loquendo, neque secundum quod spes est virtus theologica, sic enim eius obiectum est Deus, non autem aliquod bonum creatum; neque secundum quod communiter sumitur. Quia obiectum spei est arduum, ut supra dictum est, bonum autem cuius iam inevitabilem causam habemus, non comparatur ad nos in ratione ardui. Unde non proprie dicitur aliquis qui habet argentum, sperare se habiturum aliquid quod statim in potestate eius est ut emat. Et similiter illi qui habent gloriam animae, non proprie dicuntur sperare gloriam corporis; sed solum desiderare.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A5-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 5. Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that "if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you remove living, there remains being." Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36320] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid fidei vel spei remaneat in gloria. Remoto enim eo quod est proprium, remanet id quod est commune, sicut dicitur in libro de causis, quod, <i>remoto rationali, remanet vivum; et remoto vivo, remanet ens</i>. Sed in fide est aliquid quod habet commune cum beatitudine, scilicet ipsa cognitio, aliquid autem quod est sibi proprium, scilicet aenigma; est enim fides cognitio aenigmatica. Ergo, remoto aenigmate fidei, adhuc remanet ipsa cognitio fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv"> Eph. 1:17,18</a>: "The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light of glory, of which it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>): "In Thy light we shall see light." Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36321] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, fides est quoddam spirituale lumen animae, secundum illud Ephes. I, <i>illuminatos oculos cordis vestri in agnitionem Dei</i>; sed hoc lumen est imperfectum respectu luminis gloriae, de quo dicitur in Psalmo XXXV, <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>. Lumen autem imperfectum remanet, superveniente lumine perfecto, non enim candela extinguitur, claritate solis superveniente. Ergo videtur quod ipsum lumen fidei maneat cum lumine gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36322] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, substantia habitus non tollitur per hoc quod subtrahitur materia, potest enim homo habitum liberalitatis retinere, etiam amissa pecunia; sed actum habere non potest. Obiectum autem fidei est veritas prima non visa. Ergo, hoc remoto per hoc quod videtur veritas prima, adhuc potest remanere ipse habitus fidei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, it seems that it is withdrawn entirely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36323] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod fides est quidam habitus simplex. Simplex autem vel totum tollitur, vel totum manet. Cum igitur fides non totaliter maneat, sed evacuetur, ut dictum est; videtur quod totaliter tollatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement. </p><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p7"> But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect. </p><p id="FS_Q67_A5-p8"> It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the same, but only generically. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 co."><a name="36324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36324] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod spes totaliter tollitur, fides autem partim tollitur, scilicet quantum ad aenigma, et partim manet, scilicet quantum ad substantiam cognitionis. Quod quidem si sic intelligatur quod maneat non idem numero, sed idem genere, verissime dictum est, fides enim cum visione patriae convenit in genere, quod est cognitio. Spes autem non convenit cum beatitudine in genere, comparatur enim spes ad beatitudinis fruitionem, sicut motus ad quietem in termino. Si autem intelligatur quod eadem numero cognitio quae est fidei, maneat in patria; hoc est omnino impossibile. Non enim, remota differentia alicuius speciei, remanet substantia generis eadem numero, sicut, remota differentia constitutiva albedinis, non remanet eadem substantia coloris numero, ut sic idem numero color sit quandoque albedo, quandoque vero nigredo. Non enim comparatur genus ad differentiam sicut materia ad formam, ut remaneat substantia generis eadem numero, differentia remota; sicut remanet eadem numero substantia materiae, remota forma. Genus enim et differentia non sunt partes speciei, alioquin non praedicarentur de specie. Sed sicut species significat totum, idest compositum ex materia et forma in rebus materialibus, ita differentia significat totum, et similiter genus, sed genus denominat totum ab eo quod est sicut materia; differentia vero ab eo quod est sicut forma; species vero ab utroque. Sicut in homine sensitiva natura materialiter se habet ad intellectivam, animal autem dicitur quod habet naturam sensitivam; rationale quod habet intellectivam; homo vero quod habet utrumque. Et sic idem totum significatur per haec tria, sed non ab eodem. Unde patet quod, cum differentia non sit nisi designativa generis, remota differentia, non potest substantia generis eadem remanere, non enim remanet eadem animalitas, si sit alia anima constituens animal. Unde non potest esse quod eadem numero cognitio, quae prius fuit aenigmatica, postea fiat visio aperta. Et sic patet quod nihil idem numero vel specie quod est in fide, remanet in patria; sed solum idem genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If "rational" be withdrawn, the remaining "living" thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36325] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, remoto rationali, non remanet vivum idem numero, sed idem genere, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36326] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod imperfectio luminis candelae non opponitur perfectioni solaris luminis, quia non respiciunt idem subiectum. Sed imperfectio fidei et perfectio gloriae opponuntur ad invicem, et respiciunt idem subiectum. Unde non possunt esse simul, sicut nec claritas aeris cum obscuritate eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36327] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui amittit pecuniam, non amittit possibilitatem habendi pecuniam, et ideo convenienter remanet habitus liberalitatis. Sed in statu gloriae non solum actu tollitur obiectum fidei, quod est non visum; sed etiam secundum possibilitatem, propter beatitudinis stabilitatem. Et ideo frustra talis habitus remaneret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q67_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q67_A6-p0.1">Q. 67. A. 6. Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10, </a> "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part," i.e. that which is imperfect, "shall be done away." Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36328] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non maneat post hanc vitam in gloria. Quia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII, <i>cum venerit quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est</i>, idest quod est imperfectum. Sed caritas viae est imperfecta. Ergo evacuabitur, adveniente perfectione gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36329] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, habitus et actus distinguuntur secundum obiecta. Sed obiectum amoris est bonum apprehensum. Cum ergo alia sit apprehensio praesentis vitae, et alia apprehensio futurae vitae; videtur quod non maneat eadem caritas utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36330] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, eorum quae sunt unius rationis, imperfectum potest venire ad aequalitatem perfectionis, per continuum augmentum. Sed caritas viae nunquam potest pervenire ad aequalitatem caritatis patriae, quantumcumque augeatur. Ergo videtur quod caritas viae non remaneat in patria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q67_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>): "Charity never falleth away." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36331] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. XIII, <i>caritas nunquam excidit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q67_A3" id="FS_Q67_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 co."><a name="36332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36332] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, quando imperfectio alicuius rei non est de ratione speciei ipsius, nihil prohibet idem numero quod prius fuit imperfectum, postea perfectum esse, sicut homo per augmentum perficitur, et albedo per intensionem. Caritas autem est amor; de cuius ratione non est aliqua imperfectio, potest enim esse et habiti et non habiti, et visi et non visi. Unde caritas non evacuatur per gloriae perfectionem, sed eadem numero manet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, charity itself is not done away. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36333] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod imperfectio caritatis per accidens se habet ad ipsam, quia non est de ratione amoris imperfectio. Remoto autem eo quod est per accidens, nihilominus remanet substantia rei. Unde, evacuata imperfectione caritatis, non evacuatur ipsa caritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36334] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas non habet pro obiecto ipsam cognitionem, sic enim non esset eadem in via et in patria. Sed habet pro obiecto ipsam rem cognitam, quae est eadem, scilicet ipsum Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q67_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 67 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36335] Iª-IIae q. 67 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas viae per augmentum non potest pervenire ad aequalitatem caritatis patriae, propter differentiam quae est ex parte causae, visio enim est quaedam causa amoris, ut dicitur in IX Ethic. Deus autem quanto perfectius cognoscitur, tanto perfectius amatur.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q68" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q68-p0.1">Q. 68. OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q68-p2"> We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q68-p3"><a href="#FS_Q68_A1"> (1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p4"><a href="#FS_Q68_A2"> (2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p5"><a href="#FS_Q68_A3"> (3) Whether the Gifts are habits?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p6"><a href="#FS_Q68_A4"> (4) Which, and how many are they?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p7"><a href="#FS_Q68_A5"> (5) Whether the Gifts are connected?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p8"><a href="#FS_Q68_A6"> (6) Whether they remain in heaven?</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p9"><a href="#FS_Q68_A7"> (7) Of their comparison with one another;</a></p><p id="FS_Q68-p10"><a href="#FS_Q68_A8"> (8) Of their comparison with the virtues.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 pr."><a name="36336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36336] Iª-IIae q. 68 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de donis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum dona differant a virtutibus. Secundo, de necessitate donorum. Tertio, utrum dona sint habitus. Quarto, quae, et quot sint. Quinto, utrum dona sint connexa. Sexto, utrum maneant in patria. Septimo, de comparatione eorum ad invicem. Octavo, de comparatione eorum ad virtutes.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q68_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A1-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 1. Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.1.2" target="asv"> Job 1:2, </a> "There were born to him seven sons," says (Moral. i, 12): "Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us": and he quotes the words of <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc. where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36337] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non distinguantur a virtutibus. Dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., exponens illud Iob, <i>nati sunt ei septem filii, septem nobis nascuntur filii, cum per conceptionem bonae cogitationis, sancti spiritus septem in nobis virtutes oriuntur</i>. Et inducit illud quod habetur Isaiae XI, requiescet super eum spiritus intellectus etc., ubi enumerantur septem spiritus sancti dona. Ergo septem dona spiritus sancti sunt virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.45" target="asv"> Mat. 12:45, </a> "Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits," etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): "The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost," i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36338] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Quaestionib. Evang., exponens illud quod habetur Matth. XII, <i>tunc vadit, et assumit septem alios spiritus etc., septem vitia sunt contraria septem virtutibus spiritus sancti</i>, idest septem donis. Sunt autem septem vitia contraria virtutibus communiter dictis. Ergo dona non distinguuntur a virtutibus communiter dictis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; for each gift is "a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life," etc. [*Cf. <a href="#FS_Q55_A4" id="FS_Q68_A1-p4.1" shape="rect"> Q[55], A[4]</a>]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is "an unreturnable giving," according to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36339] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quorum est definitio eadem, ipsa quoque sunt eadem. Sed definitio virtutis convenit donis, unumquodque enim donum est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, et cetera. Similiter definitio doni convenit virtutibus infusis, est enim donum datio irreddibilis, secundum philosophum. Ergo virtutes et dona non distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q57_A2" id="FS_Q68_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[57], A[2]</a>), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36340] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, plura eorum quae enumerantur inter dona, sunt virtutes. Nam sicut supra dictum est, sapientia et intellectus et scientia sunt virtutes intellectuales; consilium autem ad prudentiam pertinet; pietas autem species est iustitiae; fortitudo autem quaedam virtus est moralis. Ergo videtur quod virtutes non distinguantur a donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36341] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius, I Moral., distinguit septem dona, quae dicit significari per septem filios Iob, a tribus virtutibus theologicis, quas dicit significari per tres filias Iob. Et in II Moral., distinguit eadem septem dona a quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus, quae dicit significari per quatuor angulos domus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated ( <a href="#FS_Q63_A3" id="FS_Q68_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[3] </a>) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned virtues. </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p8"> Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections. If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason. </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p9"> Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.7" target="asv">Cant 8:7</a>): "Many waters cannot quench charity." </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p10"> Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3, </a> said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in humility and meekness, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.29" target="asv"> Mat. 11:29</a>: "Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart," and in charity, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.15.12" target="asv"> Jn. 15:12</a>: "Love one another, as I have loved you." Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion. </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p11"> Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we find there that the term employed is "spirit" rather than "gift." For thus it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>): "The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him," etc.: from which words we are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A4" id="FS_Q68_A1-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[4]</a>,6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8). </p><p id="FS_Q68_A1-p12"> Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.50.5" target="asv"> Is. 50:5</a>: "The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back." Even the Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts of virtue. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 co."><a name="36342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36342] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de dono et virtute secundum nominis rationem, sic nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem. Nam ratio virtutis sumitur secundum quod perficit hominem ad bene agendum, ut supra dictum est, ratio autem doni sumitur secundum comparationem ad causam a qua est. Nihil autem prohibet illud quod est ab alio ut donum, esse perfectivum alicuius ad bene operandum, praesertim cum supra dixerimus quod virtutes quaedam nobis sunt infusae a Deo. Unde secundum hoc, donum a virtute distingui non potest. Et ideo quidam posuerunt quod dona non essent a virtutibus distinguenda. Sed eis remanet non minor difficultas, ut scilicet rationem assignent quare quaedam virtutes dicantur dona, et non omnes; et quare aliqua computantur inter dona, quae non computantur inter virtutes, ut patet de timore. Unde alii dixerunt dona a virtutibus esse distinguenda; sed non assignaverunt convenientem distinctionis causam, quae scilicet ita communis esset virtutibus, quod nullo modo donis, aut e converso. Considerantes enim aliqui quod, inter septem dona, quatuor pertinent ad rationem, scilicet sapientia scientia, intellectus et consilium; et tria ad vim appetitivam, scilicet fortitudo, pietas et timor; posuerunt quod dona perficiebant liberum arbitrium secundum quod est facultas rationis, virtutes vero secundum quod est facultas voluntatis, quia invenerunt duas solas virtutes in ratione vel intellectu, scilicet fidem et prudentiam, alias vero in vi appetitiva vel affectiva. Oporteret autem, si haec distinctio esset conveniens, quod omnes virtutes essent in vi appetitiva, et omnia dona in ratione. Quidam vero, considerantes quod Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod <i>donum spiritus sancti, quod in mente sibi subiecta format temperantiam, prudentiam, iustitiam et fortitudinem; eandem mentem munit contra singula tentamenta per septem dona</i>, dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur ad bene operandum, dona vero ad resistendum tentationibus. Sed nec ista distinctio sufficit. Quia etiam virtutes tentationibus resistunt, inducentibus ad peccata, quae contrariantur virtutibus, unumquodque enim resistit naturaliter suo contrario. Quod praecipue patet de caritate, de qua dicitur Cantic. VIII, <i>aquae multae non potuerunt extinguere caritatem</i>. Alii vero, considerantes quod ista dona traduntur in Scriptura secundum quod fuerunt in Christo, ut patet Isaiae XI; dixerunt quod virtutes ordinantur simpliciter ad bene operandum; sed dona ordinantur ad hoc ut per ea conformemur Christo, praecipue quantum ad ea quae passus est, quia in passione eius praecipue huiusmodi dona resplenduerunt. Sed hoc etiam non videtur esse sufficiens. Quia ipse dominus praecipue nos inducit ad sui conformitatem secundum humilitatem et mansuetudinem, Matth. XI, <i>discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde</i>; et secundum caritatem, ut Ioan. XV, <i>diligatis invicem, sicut dilexi vos</i>. Et hae etiam virtutes praecipue in passione Christi refulserunt. Et ideo ad distinguendum dona a virtutibus, debemus sequi modum loquendi Scripturae, in qua nobis traduntur non quidem sub nomine donorum, sed magis sub nomine spirituum, sic enim dicitur Isaiae XI, <i>requiescet super eum spiritus sapientiae et intellectus,</i> et cetera. Ex quibus verbis manifeste datur intelligi quod ista septem enumerantur ibi, secundum quod sunt in nobis ab inspiratione divina. Inspiratio autem significat quandam motionem ab exteriori. Est enim considerandum quod in homine est duplex principium movens, unum quidem interius, quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius, quod est Deus, ut supra dictum est; et etiam philosophus hoc dicit, in cap. de bona fortuna. Manifestum est autem quod omne quod movetur, necesse est proportionatum esse motori, et haec est perfectio mobilis inquantum est mobile, dispositio qua disponitur ad hoc quod bene moveatur a suo motore. Quanto igitur movens est altior, tanto necesse est quod mobile perfectiori dispositione ei proportionetur, sicut videmus quod perfectius oportet esse discipulum dispositum, ad hoc quod altiorem doctrinam capiat a docente. Manifestum est autem quod virtutes humanae perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo natus est moveri per rationem in his quae interius vel exterius agit. Oportet igitur inesse homini altiores perfectiones, secundum quas sit dispositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istae perfectiones vocantur dona, non solum quia infunduntur a Deo; sed quia secundum ea homo disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab inspiratione divina, sicut dicitur Isaiae l, <i>dominus aperuit mihi aurem; ego autem non contradico, retrorsum non abii</i>. Et philosophus etiam dicit, in cap. de bona fortuna, quod his qui moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum, quia moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana. Et hoc est quod quidam dicunt, quod dona perficiunt hominem ad altiores actus quam sint actus virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike kai theia}]," in respect of which some men are called "divine." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36343] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi dona nominantur quandoque virtutes, secundum communem rationem virtutis. Habent tamen aliquid supereminens rationi communi virtutis, inquantum sunt quaedam divinae virtutes, perficientes hominem inquantum est a Deo motus. Unde et philosophus, in VII Ethic., supra virtutem communem ponit quandam virtutem heroicam vel divinam, secundum quam dicuntur aliqui divini viri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light flows from God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36344] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod vitia, inquantum sunt contra bonum rationis, contrariantur virtutibus, inquantum autem sunt contra divinum instinctum, contrariantur donis. Idem enim contrariatur Deo et rationi, cuius lumen a Deo derivatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the promptings of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36345] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod definitio illa datur de virtute secundum communem modum virtutis. Unde si volumus definitionem restringere ad virtutes prout distinguuntur a donis, dicemus quod hoc quod dicitur, qua recte vivitur, intelligendum est de rectitudine vitae quae accipitur secundum regulam rationis. Similiter autem donum, prout distinguitur a virtute infusa, potest dici id quod datur a Deo in ordine ad motionem ipsius; quod scilicet facit hominem bene sequentem suos instinctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A1-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36346] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod sapientia dicitur intellectualis virtus, secundum quod procedit ex iudicio rationis, dicitur autem donum, secundum quod operatur ex instinctu divino. Et similiter dicendum est de aliis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A2-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 2. Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36347] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint necessaria homini ad salutem. Dona enim ordinantur ad quandam perfectionem ultra communem perfectionem virtutis. Non autem est homini necessarium ad salutem ut huiusmodi perfectionem consequatur, quae est ultra communem statum virtutis, quia huiusmodi perfectio non cadit sub praecepto, sed sub consilio. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36348] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad salutem hominis sufficit quod homo se bene habeat et circa divina et circa humana. Sed per virtutes theologicas homo se habet bene circa divina; per virtutes autem morales, circa humana. Ergo dona non sunt homini necessaria ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36349] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod <i>spiritus sanctus dat sapientiam contra stultitiam, intellectum contra hebetudinem, consilium contra praecipitationem, fortitudinem contra timorem, scientiam contra ignorantiam, pietatem contra duritiam, timorem contra superbiam</i>. Sed sufficiens remedium potest adhiberi ad omnia ista tollenda per virtutes. Ergo dona non sunt necessaria homini ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of wisdom it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv">Wis. 7:28</a>): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.28" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:28</a>): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary for salvation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36350] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, inter dona summum videtur esse sapientia, infimum autem timor. Utrumque autem horum necessarium est ad salutem, quia de sapientia dicitur, Sap. VII, <i>neminem diligit Deus nisi eum qui cum sapientia inhabitat</i>; et de timore dicitur, Eccli. I, <i>qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari</i>. Ergo etiam alia dona media sunt necessaria ad salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is, in consequence, need for a gift. </p><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p7"> Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q68_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[1]</a>). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from him. </p><p id="FS_Q68_A2-p8"> Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man's connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be out of God's superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man's reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.17" target="asv">17</a>: "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also": and <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.142.10" target="asv"> Ps. 142:10</a>: "Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land," because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 co."><a name="36351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36351] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam hominis perfectiones, quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur instinctum divinum. Unde in his in quibus non sufficit instinctus rationis, sed est necessarius spiritus sancti instinctus, per consequens est necessarium donum. Ratio autem hominis est perfecta dupliciter a Deo, primo quidem, naturali perfectione, scilicet secundum lumen naturale rationis; alio modo, quadam supernaturali perfectione, per virtutes theologicas, ut dictum est supra. Et quamvis haec secunda perfectio sit maior quam prima, tamen prima perfectiori modo habetur ab homine quam secunda, nam prima habetur ab homine quasi plena possessio, secunda autem habetur quasi imperfecta; imperfecte enim diligimus et cognoscimus Deum. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque quod perfecte habet naturam vel formam aliquam aut virtutem, potest per se secundum illam operari, non tamen exclusa operatione Dei, qui in omni natura et voluntate interius operatur. Sed id quod imperfecte habet naturam aliquam vel formam aut virtutem, non potest per se operari, nisi ab altero moveatur. Sicut sol, quia est perfecte lucidus, per seipsum potest illuminare, luna autem, in qua est imperfecte natura lucis, non illuminat nisi illuminata. Medicus etiam, qui perfecte novit artem medicinae, potest per se operari, sed discipulus eius, qui nondum est plene instructus, non potest per se operari, nisi ab eo instruatur. Sic igitur quantum ad ea quae subsunt humanae rationi, in ordine scilicet ad finem connaturalem homini; homo potest operari, per iudicium rationis. Si tamen etiam in hoc homo adiuvetur a Deo per specialem instinctum, hoc erit superabundantis bonitatis, unde secundum philosophos, non quicumque habebat virtutes morales acquisitas, habebat virtutes heroicas vel divinas. Sed in ordine ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet secundum quod est aliqualiter et imperfecte formata per virtutes theologicas; non sufficit ipsa motio rationis, nisi desuper adsit instinctus et motio spiritus sancti; secundum illud Rom. VIII, <i>qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt; et si filii, et haeredes</i>, et in Psalmo CXLII, dicitur, <i>spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam</i>; quia scilicet in haereditatem illius terrae beatorum nullus potest pervenire, nisi moveatur et deducatur a spiritu sancto. Et ideo ad illum finem consequendum, necessarium est homini habere donum spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36352] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dona excedunt communem perfectionem virtutum, non quantum ad genus operum, eo modo quo consilia excedunt praecepta, sed quantum ad modum operandi, secundum quod movetur homo ab altiori principio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36353] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod per virtutes theologicas et morales non ita perficitur homo in ordine ad ultimum finem, quin semper indigeat moveri quodam superiori instinctu spiritus sancti, ratione iam dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36354] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod rationi humanae non sunt omnia cognita, neque omnia possibilia, sive accipiatur ut perfecta perfectione naturali, sive accipiatur ut perfecta theologicis virtutibus. Unde non potest quantum ad omnia repellere stultitiam, et alia huiusmodi, de quibus ibi fit mentio. Sed Deus cuius scientiae et potestati omnia subsunt, sua motione ab omni stultitia et ignorantia et hebetudine et duritia et ceteris huiusmodi, nos tutos reddit. Et ideo dona spiritus sancti, quae faciunt nos bene sequentes instinctum ipsius, dicuntur contra huiusmodi defectus dari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A3-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 3. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv"> Is. 11:2,3</a>: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator." Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36355] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non sint habitus. Habitus enim est qualitas in homine manens, est enim qualitas difficile mobilis, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed proprium Christi est quod dona spiritus sancti in eo requiescant; ut dicitur Isaiae XI. Et Ioan. I, dicitur, <i>super quem videris spiritum descendentem, et manentem super eum, hic est qui baptizat</i>, quod exponens Gregorius, in II Moral., dicit, <i>in cunctis fidelibus spiritus sanctus venit; sed in solo mediatore semper singulariter permanet</i>. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36356] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem secundum quod agitur a spiritu Dei, sicut dictum est. Sed inquantum homo agitur a spiritu Dei, se habet quodammodo ut instrumentum respectu eius. Non autem convenit ut instrumentum perficiatur per habitum, sed principale agens. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36357] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut dona spiritus sancti sunt ex inspiratione divina, ita et donum prophetiae. Sed prophetia non est habitus, non enim semper spiritus prophetiae adest prophetis, ut Gregorius dicit, in I homilia Ezechielis. Ergo neque etiam dona spiritus sancti sunt habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36358] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dominus dicit discipulis, de spiritu sancto loquens, Ioan. XIV, <i>apud vos manebit, et in vobis erit</i>. Spiritus autem sanctus non est in hominibus absque donis eius. Ergo dona eius manent in hominibus. Ergo non solum sunt actus vel passiones, sed etiam habitus permanentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q68_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 co."><a name="36359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36359] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quaedam perfectiones hominis, quibus disponitur ad hoc quod homo bene sequatur instinctum spiritus sancti. Manifestum est autem ex supradictis quod virtutes morales perficiunt vim appetitivam secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, inquantum scilicet nata est moveri per imperium rationis. Hoc igitur modo dona spiritus sancti se habent ad hominem in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum, sicut virtutes morales se habent ad vim appetitivam in comparatione ad rationem. Virtutes autem morales habitus quidam sunt, quibus vires appetitivae disponuntur ad prompte obediendum rationi. Unde et dona spiritus sancti sunt quidam habitus, quibus homo perficitur ad prompte obediendum spiritui sancto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that "by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts." Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q68_A2" id="FS_Q68_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36360] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius ibidem solvit, dicens quod <i>in illis donis sine quibus ad vitam perveniri non potest, spiritus sanctus in electis omnibus semper manet, sed in aliis non semper manet</i>. Septem autem dona sunt necessaria ad salutem, ut dictum est. Unde quantum ad ea, spiritus sanctus semper manet in sanctis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36361] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de instrumento cuius non est agere, sed solum agi. Tale autem instrumentum non est homo; sed sic agitur a spiritu sancto, quod etiam agit, inquantum est liberi arbitrii. Unde indiget habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36362] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod prophetia est de donis quae sunt ad manifestationem spiritus, non autem ad necessitatem salutis. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A4-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 4. Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36363] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter septem dona spiritus sancti enumerentur. In illa enim enumeratione ponuntur quatuor pertinentia ad virtutes intellectuales, scilicet sapientia, intellectus, scientia et consilium, quod pertinet ad prudentiam, nihil autem ibi ponitur quod pertineat ad artem, quae est quinta virtus intellectualis. Similiter etiam ponitur aliquid pertinens ad iustitiam, scilicet pietas, et aliquid pertinens ad fortitudinem, scilicet donum fortitudinis, nihil autem ponitur ibi pertinens ad temperantiam. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36364] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, pietas est pars iustitiae. Sed circa fortitudinem non ponitur aliqua pars eius, sed ipsa fortitudo. Ergo non debuit poni pietas, sed ipsa iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36365] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes theologicae maxime ordinant nos ad Deum. Cum ergo dona perficiant hominem secundum quod movetur a Deo, videtur quod debuissent poni aliqua dona pertinentia ad theologicas virtutes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36366] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut Deus timetur, ita etiam amatur, et in ipsum aliquis sperat, et de eo delectatur. Amor autem, spes et delectatio sunt passiones condivisae timori. Ergo, sicut timor ponitur donum, ita et alia tria debent poni dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="36367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36367] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, intellectui adiungitur sapientia quae regit ipsum; fortitudini autem consilium, pietati vero scientia. Ergo et timori debuit addi aliquod donum directivum. Inconvenienter ergo septem dona spiritus sancti enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Holy Writ ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.2" target="asv">Is. 11:2,3</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36368] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Scripturae, Isaiae XI.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A4-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite. </p><p id="FS_Q68_A4-p9"> Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by "understanding"; the practical reason, by "counsel." In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by "wisdom"; the practical reason by "knowledge." The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's relations to another, is perfected by "piety"; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by "fortitude" against the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by "fear," according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.27" target="asv"> Prov. 15:27</a>: "By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil," and <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.120" target="asv"> Ps. 118:120</a>: "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments." Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 co."><a name="36369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36369] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, dona sunt quidam habitus perficientes hominem ad hoc quod prompte sequatur instinctum spiritus sancti, sicut virtutes morales perficiunt vires appetitivas ad obediendum rationi. Sicut autem vires appetitivae natae sunt moveri per imperium rationis, ita omnes vires humanae natae sunt moveri per instinctum Dei, sicut a quadam superiori potentia. Et ideo in omnibus viribus hominis quae possunt esse principia humanorum actuum, sicut sunt virtutes, ita etiam sunt dona, scilicet in ratione, et in vi appetitiva. Ratio autem est speculativa et practica, et in utraque consideratur apprehensio veritatis, quae pertinet ad inventionem; et iudicium de veritate. Ad apprehensionem igitur veritatis, perficitur speculativa ratio per intellectum; practica vero per consilium. Ad recte autem iudicandum, speculativa quidem per sapientiam, practica vero per scientiam perficitur. Appetitiva autem virtus, in his quidem quae sunt ad alterum, perficitur per pietatem. In his autem quae sunt ad seipsum, perficitur per fortitudinem contra terrorem periculorum, contra concupiscentiam vero inordinatam delectabilium, per timorem, secundum illud Proverb. XV, <i>per timorem domini declinat omnis a malo</i>; et in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>confige timore tuo carnes meas, a iudiciis enim tuis timui</i>. Et sic patet quod haec dona extendunt se ad omnia ad quae se extendunt virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made (Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36370] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dona spiritus sancti perficiunt hominem in his quae pertinent ad bene vivendum, ad quae non ordinatur ars, sed ad exteriora factibilia; est enim ars ratio recta non agibilium, sed factibilium, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Potest tamen dici quod, quantum ad infusionem donorum, ars pertinet ad spiritum sanctum, qui est principaliter movens; non autem ad homines, qui sunt quaedam organa eius dum ab eo moventur. Temperantiae autem respondet quodammodo donum timoris. Sicut enim ad virtutem temperantiae pertinet, secundum eius propriam rationem, ut aliquis recedat a delectationibus pravis propter bonum rationis; ita ad donum timoris pertinet quod aliquis recedat a delectationibus pravis propter Dei timorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36371] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod nomen iustitiae imponitur a rectitudine rationis, et ideo nomen virtutis est convenientius quam nomen doni. Sed nomen pietatis importat reverentiam quam habemus ad patrem et ad patriam. Et quia pater omnium Deus est, etiam cultus Dei pietas nominatur; ut Augustinus dicit, X de Civ. Dei. Et ideo convenienter donum quo aliquis propter reverentiam Dei bonum operatur ad omnes, pietas nominatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36372] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod animus hominis non movetur a spiritu sancto, nisi ei secundum aliquem modum uniatur, sicut instrumentum non movetur ab artifice nisi per contactum, aut per aliquam aliam unionem. Prima autem unio hominis est per fidem, spem et caritatem. Unde istae virtutes praesupponuntur ad dona, sicut radices quaedam donorum. Unde omnia dona pertinent ad has tres virtutes, sicut quaedam derivationes praedictarum virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36373] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod amor et spes et delectatio habent bonum pro obiecto. Summum autem bonum Deus est, unde nomina harum passionum transferuntur ad virtutes theologicas, quibus anima coniungitur Deo. Timoris autem obiectum est malum, quod Deo nullo modo competit, unde non importat coniunctionem ad Deum, sed magis recessum ab aliquibus rebus propter reverentiam Dei. Et ideo non est nomen virtutis theologicae, sed doni, quod eminentius retrahit a malis quam virtus moralis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A4-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="36374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36374] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod per sapientiam dirigitur et hominis intellectus, et hominis affectus. Et ideo ponuntur duo correspondentia sapientiae tanquam directivo, ex parte quidem intellectus, donum intellectus; ex parte autem affectus, donum timoris. Ratio enim timendi Deum praecipue sumitur ex consideratione excellentiae divinae, quam considerat sapientia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A5-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 5. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>): "To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit." Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36375] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona non sint connexa. Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XII, <i>alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum</i>. Sed sapientia et scientia inter dona spiritus sancti computantur. Ergo dona spiritus sancti dantur diversis, et non connectuntur sibi invicem in eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that "many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith." But some of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the same man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36376] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Trin., quod <i>scientia non pollent fideles plurimi, quamvis polleant ipsa fide</i>. Sed fidem concomitatur aliquod de donis, ad minus donum timoris. Ergo videtur quod dona non sint ex necessitate connexa in uno et eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom "is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action": from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36377] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Gregorius, in I Moral., dicit quod <i>minor est sapientia, si intellectu careat; et valde inutilis est intellectus, si ex sapientia non subsistat. Vile est consilium, cui opus fortitudinis deest; et valde fortitudo destruitur, nisi per consilium fulciatur. Nulla est scientia, si utilitatem pietatis non habet; et valde inutilis est pietas, si scientiae discretione caret. Timor quoque ipse, si non has virtutes habuerit, ad nullum opus bonae actionis surgit</i>. Ex quibus videtur quod unum donum possit sine alio haberi. Non ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: "It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's sons, that by turns they fed one another." Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36378] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod ibidem Gregorius praemittit, dicens, <i>illud in hoc filiorum convivio perscrutandum videtur, quod semetipsos invicem pascunt</i>. Per filios autem Iob, de quibus loquitur, designantur dona spiritus sancti. Ergo dona spiritus sancti sunt connexa, per hoc quod se invicem reficiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5</a>: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us," even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 co."><a name="36379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36379] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas de facili ex praemissis potest haberi. Dictum est enim supra quod sicut vires appetitivae disponuntur per virtutes morales in comparatione ad regimen rationis, ita omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum moventem. Spiritus autem sanctus habitat in nobis per caritatem, secundum illud Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>, sicut et ratio nostra perficitur per prudentiam. Unde sicut virtutes morales connectuntur sibi invicem in prudentia, ita dona spiritus sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate, ita scilicet quod qui caritatem habet, omnia dona spiritus sancti habet; quorum nullum sine caritate haberi potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36380] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sapientia et scientia uno modo possunt considerari secundum quod sunt gratiae gratis datae, prout scilicet aliquis abundat intantum in cognitione rerum divinarum et humanarum, ut possit et fideles instruere et adversarios confutare. Et sic loquitur ibi apostolus de sapientia et scientia, unde signanter fit mentio de sermone sapientiae et scientiae. Alio modo possunt accipi prout sunt dona spiritus sancti. Et sic sapientia et scientia nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam perfectiones humanae mentis, secundum quas disponitur ad sequendum instinctus spiritus sancti in cognitione divinorum vel humanorum. Et sic patet quod huiusmodi dona sunt in omnibus habentibus caritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: "For it is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36381] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de scientia exponens praedictam auctoritatem apostoli, unde loquitur de scientia praedicto modo accepta, secundum quod est gratia gratis data. Quod patet ex hoc quod subdit, <i>aliud enim est scire tantummodo quid homo credere debeat propter adipiscendam vitam beatam, quae non nisi aeterna est; aliud autem scire quemadmodum hoc ipsum et piis opituletur, et contra impios defendatur; quam proprio appellare vocabulo scientiam videtur apostolus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q68_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed that "each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend its support to another." We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36382] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut uno modo connexio virtutum cardinalium probatur per hoc quod una earum perficitur quodammodo per aliam, ut supra dictum est; ita Gregorius eodem modo vult probare connexionem donorum, per hoc quod unum sine alio non potest esse perfectum. Unde praemittit dicens, <i>valde singula quaelibet destituitur, si non una alii virtus virtuti suffragetur</i>. Non ergo datur intelligi quod unum donum possit esse sine alio, sed quod intellectus, si esset sine sapientia, non esset donum; sicut temperantia, si esset sine iustitia, non esset virtus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A6-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 6. Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His sevenfold gift the "Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations." Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.11.9" target="asv"> Is. 11:9</a>: "They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain." Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in heaven. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36383] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dona spiritus sancti non maneant in patria. Dicit enim Gregorius, in II Moral., quod <i>spiritus sanctus contra singula tentamenta septem donis erudit mentem</i>. Sed in patria non erunt aliqua tentamenta; secundum illud Isaiae XI, <i>non nocebunt et non occident in universo monte sancto meo</i>. Ergo dona spiritus sancti non erunt in patria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q68_A3" id="FS_Q68_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that "understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy," all of which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36384] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dona spiritus sancti sunt habitus quidam, ut supra dictum est. Frustra autem essent habitus, ubi actus esse non possunt. Actus autem quorundam donorum in patria esse non possunt, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod <i>intellectus facit audita penetrare, et consilium prohibet esse praecipitem, et fortitudo facit non metuere adversa, et pietas replet cordis viscera operibus misericordiae</i>; haec autem non competunt statui patriae. Ergo huiusmodi dona non erunt in statu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36385] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, donorum quaedam perficiunt hominem in vita contemplativa, ut sapientia et intellectus; quaedam in vita activa, ut pietas et fortitudo. Sed activa vita cum hac vita terminatur; ut Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral. Ergo in statu gloriae non erunt omnia dona spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): "The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36386] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>civitas Dei illa, Ierusalem caelestis, non meatu alicuius fluvii terrestris abluitur; sed ex vitae fonte procedens spiritus sanctus, cuius nos brevi satiamur haustu, in illis caelestibus spiritibus redundantius videtur affluere, pleno septem virtutum spiritualium fervens meatu</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be "all in all" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28</a>), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues ( <a href="#FS_Q67_A1" id="FS_Q68_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[67], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 co."><a name="36387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36387] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod de donis dupliciter possumus loqui. Uno modo, quantum ad essentiam donorum, et sic perfectissime erunt in patria, sicut patet per auctoritatem Ambrosii inductam. Cuius ratio est quia dona spiritus sancti perficiunt mentem humanam ad sequendam motionem spiritus sancti, quod praecipue erit in patria, quando Deus erit omnia in omnibus, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XV, et quando homo erit totaliter subditus Deo. Alio modo possunt considerari quantum ad materiam circa quam operantur, et sic in praesenti habent operationem circa aliquam materiam circa quam non habebunt operationem in statu gloriae. Et secundum hoc, non manebunt in patria, sicut supra de virtutibus cardinalibus dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36388] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur ibi de donis secundum quod competunt statui praesenti, sic enim donis protegimur contra tentamenta malorum. Sed in statu gloriae, cessantibus malis, per dona spiritus sancti perficiemur in bono.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in the future state. For he says that "wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things"; of which two, hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says "that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness," of which, hearing passes away, since "they shall teach no more every man . . . his brother" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3,4</a>); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it "prevents us from being impetuous," which is necessary in the present life; and also that "it makes the mind full of reason," which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude he says that it "fears not adversity," which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it "sets before us the viands of confidence," which remains also in the future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that "she overcomes the void of ignorance," which refers to the present state. When, however, he adds "in the womb of the mind," this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that "it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy." These words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by "the inmost heart," belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that "it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things," which refers to the present state, and that "it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future," which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to the future state, as regards being "strengthened" for things we hope are here, and obtain there. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36389] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Gregorius quasi in singulis donis ponit aliquid quod transit cum statu praesenti, et aliquid quod permanet etiam in futuro. Dicit enim quod sapientia mentem de aeternorum spe et certitudine reficit, quorum duorum spes transit, sed certitudo remanet. Et de intellectu dicit quod in eo quod audita penetrat, reficiendo cor, tenebras eius illustrat, quorum auditus transit, quia non docebit vir fratrem suum, ut dicitur Ierem. XXXI; sed illustratio mentis manebit. De consilio autem dicit quod prohibet esse praecipitem, quod est necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod ratione animum replet, quod est necessarium etiam in futuro. De fortitudine vero dicit quod adversa non metuit, quod est necessarium in praesenti, et iterum quod confidentiae cibos apponit, quod permanet etiam in futuro. De scientia vero unum tantum ponit, scilicet quod ignorantiae ieiunium superat, quod pertinet ad statum praesentem. Sed quod addit, in ventre mentis, potest figuraliter intelligi repletio cognitionis, quae pertinet etiam ad statum futurum. De pietate vero dicit quod cordis viscera misericordiae operibus replet. Quod quidem secundum verba, pertinet tantum ad statum praesentem. Sed ipse intimus affectus proximorum, per viscera designatus, pertinet etiam ad futurum statum; in quo pietas non exhibebit misericordiae opera, sed congratulationis affectum. De timore vero dicit quod premit mentem, ne de praesentibus superbiat, quod pertinet ad statum praesentem; et quod de futuris cibo spei confortat, quod etiam pertinet ad statum praesentem, quantum ad spem; sed potest etiam ad statum futurum pertinere, quantum ad confortationem de rebus hic speratis, et ibi obtentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36390] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de donis quantum ad materiam. Opera enim activae vitae non erunt materia donorum, sed omnia habebunt actus suos circa ea quae pertinent ad vitam contemplativam, quae est vita beata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A7-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 7. Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?" and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.6" target="asv">Malachi 1:6</a>): "If . . . I be a master, where is My fear?" Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36391] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod dignitas donorum non attenditur secundum enumerationem qua enumerantur Isaiae XI. Illud enim videtur esse potissimum in donis, quod maxime Deus ab homine requirit. Sed maxime requirit Deus ab homine timorem, dicitur enim Deut. X, <i>et nunc, Israel, quid dominus Deus tuus petit a te, nisi ut timeas dominum Deum tuum?</i> Et Malach. I, dicitur, <i>si ego dominus, ubi timor meus?</i> Ergo videtur quod timor, qui enumeratur ultimo, non sit infimum donorum, sed maximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.8" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:8</a>): "Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable to all things." Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36392] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, pietas videtur esse quoddam bonum universale, dicit enim apostolus, I ad Tim. IV, quod <i>pietas ad omnia utilis est</i>. Sed bonum universale praefertur particularibus bonis. Ergo pietas, quae penultimo enumeratur, videtur esse potissimum donorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36393] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, scientia perficit iudicium hominis; consilium autem ad inquisitionem pertinet. Sed iudicium praeeminet inquisitioni. Ergo scientia est potius donum quam consilium, cum tamen post enumeretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="36394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36394] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, fortitudo pertinet ad vim appetitivam; scientia autem ad rationem. Sed ratio est eminentior quam vis appetitiva. Ergo et scientia est eminentius donum quam fortitudo, quae tamen primo enumeratur. Non ergo dignitas donorum attenditur secundum ordinem enumerationis eorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: "It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.3" target="asv"> Mat. 5:3</a>]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36395] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, <i>videtur mihi septiformis operatio spiritus sancti, de qua Isaias loquitur, his gradibus sententiisque congruere</i> (de quibus fit mentio Matth. V); sed interest ordinis. Nam ibi (scilicet in Isaia) <i>enumeratio ab excellentioribus coepit, hic vero, ab inferioribus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q68_A4" id="FS_Q68_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their matter. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 co."><a name="36396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36396] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod dignitas donorum dupliciter potest attendi, uno modo, simpliciter, scilicet per comparationem ad proprios actus prout procedunt a suis principiis; alio modo, secundum quid, scilicet per comparationem ad materiam. Simpliciter autem loquendo de dignitate donorum, eadem est ratio comparationis in ipsis et in virtutibus, quia dona ad omnes actus potentiarum animae perficiunt hominem, ad quos perficiunt virtutes, ut supra dictum est. Unde sicut virtutes intellectuales praeferuntur virtutibus moralibus; et in ipsis virtutibus intellectualibus contemplativae praeferuntur activis, ut sapientia intellectui, et scientia prudentiae et arti; ita tamen quod sapientia praefertur intellectui, et intellectus scientiae, sicut prudentia et synesis eubuliae, ita etiam in donis sapientia et intellectus, scientia et consilium, praeferuntur pietati et fortitudini et timori; in quibus etiam pietas praefertur fortitudini, et fortitudo timori, sicut iustitia fortitudini, et fortitudo temperantiae. Sed quantum ad materiam, fortitudo et consilium praeferuntur scientiae et pietati, quia scilicet fortitudo et consilium in arduis locum habent; pietas autem, et etiam scientia, in communibus. Sic igitur donorum dignitas ordini enumerationis respondet, partim quidem simpliciter, secundum quod sapientia et intellectus omnibus praeferuntur, partim autem secundum ordinem materiae, secundum quod consilium et fortitudo praeferuntur scientiae et pietati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.10" target="asv">Ps. 110:10</a>; <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.16" target="asv"> Ecclus. 1:16</a>), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on account of fear ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A7-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.16" target="asv">Prov. 16:16</a>), before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36397] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod timor maxime requiritur quasi primordium quoddam perfectionis donorum, quia initium sapientiae timor domini, non propter hoc quod sit ceteris dignius. Prius enim est, secundum ordinem generationis, ut aliquis recedat a malo, quod fit per timorem, ut dicitur Proverb. XVI; quam quod operetur bonum, quod fit per alia dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which he had said it "is profitable to little." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36398] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod pietas non comparatur in verbis apostoli, omnibus donis Dei, sed soli corporali exercitationi, de qua praemittit quod ad modicum utilis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36399] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod scientia etsi praeferatur consilio ratione iudicii, tamen consilium praefertur ratione materiae, nam consilium non habet locum nisi in arduis, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; sed iudicium scientiae in omnibus locum habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A7-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="36400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36400] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod dona directiva, quae pertinent ad rationem, donis exequentibus digniora sunt, si considerentur per comparationem ad actus prout egrediuntur a potentiis, ratio enim appetitivae praeeminet, ut regulans regulato. Sed ratione materiae, adiungitur consilium fortitudini, sicut directivum exequenti, et similiter scientia pietati, quia scilicet consilium et fortitudo in arduis locum habent, scientia autem et pietas etiam in communibus. Et ideo consilium simul cum fortitudine, ratione materiae, numeratur ante scientiam et pietatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q68_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q68_A8-p0.1">Q. 68. A. 8. Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity: "No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing." But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36401] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes sint praeferendae donis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in XV de Trin., de caritate loquens, <i>nullum est isto Dei dono excellentius. Solum est quod dividit inter filios regni aeterni, et filios perditionis aeternae, dantur et alia per spiritum sanctum munera, sed sine caritate nihil prosunt</i>. Sed caritas est virtus. Ergo virtus est potior donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues" [viz. the gifts], so "as against folly to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36402] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea quae sunt priora naturaliter, videntur esse potiora. Sed virtutes sunt priores donis spiritus sancti, dicit enim Gregorius, in II Moral., quod <i>donum spiritus sancti in subiecta mente ante alia iustitiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem et temperantiam format, et sic eandem mentem septem mox virtutibus</i> (idest donis) <i>temperat, ut contra stultitiam, sapientiam; contra hebetudinem, intellectum; contra praecipitationem, consilium; contra timorem, fortitudinem; contra ignorantiam, scientiam; contra duritiam, pietatem; contra superbiam, det timorem</i>. Ergo virtutes sunt potiores donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that "the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose." But it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): "We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair." Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36403] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtutibus nullus male uti potest, ut Augustinus dicit. Donis autem potest aliquis male uti, dicit enim Gregorius, in I Moral., quod <i>hostiam nostrae precis immolamus ne sapientia elevet; ne intellectus, dum subtiliter currit, oberret; ne consilium, dum se multiplicat, confundat; ne fortitudo, dum fiduciam praebet, praecipitet; ne scientia, dum novit et non diligit, inflet; ne pietas, dum se extra rectitudinem inclinat, intorqueat; ne timor, dum plus iusto trepidat, in desperationis foveam mergat</i>. Ergo virtutes sunt digniores donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36404] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dona dantur in adiutorium virtutum contra defectus, ut patet in auctoritate inducta; et sic videtur quod perficiant quod virtutes perficere non possunt. Sunt ergo dona potiora virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[58], A[3]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q68_A8-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[62], A[1]</a>), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion. </p><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p7"> Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i, 12) that "the seven sons," i.e. the seven gifts, "never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in faith, hope, and charity." </p><p id="FS_Q68_A8-p8"> But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect than the virtues. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 co."><a name="36405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36405] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, virtutes in tria genera distinguuntur, sunt enim quaedam virtutes theologicae, quaedam intellectuales, quaedam morales. Virtutes quidem theologicae sunt quibus mens humana Deo coniungitur; virtutes autem intellectuales sunt quibus ratio ipsa perficitur; virtutes autem morales sunt quibus vires appetitivae perficiuntur ad obediendum rationi. Dona autem spiritus sancti sunt quibus omnes vires animae disponuntur ad hoc quod subdantur motioni divinae. Sic ergo eadem videtur esse comparatio donorum ad virtutes theologicas, per quas homo unitur spiritui sancto moventi; sicut virtutum moralium ad virtutes intellectuales, per quas perficitur ratio, quae est virtutum moralium motiva. Unde sicut virtutes intellectuales praeferuntur virtutibus moralibus, et regulant eas; ita virtutes theologicae praeferuntur donis spiritus sancti, et regulant ea. Unde Gregorius dicit, in I Moral., quod <i>neque ad denarii perfectionem septem filii</i> (idest septem dona) <i>perveniunt, nisi in fide, spe et caritate fuerit omne quod agunt</i>. Sed si comparemus dona ad alias virtutes intellectuales vel morales, dona praeferuntur virtutibus. Quia dona perficiunt vires animae in comparatione ad spiritum sanctum moventem, virtutes autem perficiunt vel ipsam rationem, vel alias vires in ordine ad rationem. Manifestum est autem quod ad altiorem motorem oportet maiori perfectione mobile esse dispositum. Unde perfectiora sunt dona virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36406] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas est virtus theologica; de qua concedimus quod sit potior donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36407] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid est prius altero dupliciter. Uno modo, ordine perfectionis et dignitatis, sicut dilectio Dei est prior dilectione proximi. Et hoc modo dona sunt priora virtutibus intellectualibus et moralibus, posteriora vero virtutibus theologicis. Alio modo, ordine generationis seu dispositionis, sicut dilectio proximi praecedit dilectionem Dei, quantum ad actum. Et sic virtutes morales et intellectuales praecedunt dona, quia per hoc quod homo bene se habet circa rationem propriam, disponitur ad hoc quod se bene habeat in ordine ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which "dealeth not perversely" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q68_A8-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:4</a>). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 68 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36408] Iª-IIae q. 68 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod sapientia et intellectus et alia huiusmodi sunt dona spiritus sancti, secundum quod caritate informantur; quae non agit perperam, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Et ideo sapientia et intellectu et aliis huiusmodi nullus male utitur, secundum quod sunt dona spiritus sancti. Sed ad hoc quod a caritatis perfectione non recedant, unum ab altero adiuvatur. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicere intendit.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q69" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q69-p0.1">Q. 69. OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q69-p2"> We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q69-p3"><a href="#FS_Q69_A1"> (1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p4"><a href="#FS_Q69_A2"> (2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p5"><a href="#FS_Q69_A3"> (3) Of the number of the beatitudes;</a></p><p id="FS_Q69-p6"><a href="#FS_Q69_A4"> (4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 pr."><a name="36409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36409] Iª-IIae q. 69 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de beatitudinibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum beatitudines a donis et virtutibus distinguantur. Secundo, de praemiis beatitudinum, utrum pertineant ad hanc vitam. Tertio, de numero beatitudinum. Quarto, de convenientia praemiorum quae eis attribuuntur.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q69_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A1-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 1. Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Luke 6:20, </a> seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36410] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudines a virtutibus et donis non distinguantur. Augustinus enim, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, attribuit beatitudines in Matthaeo enumeratas, donis spiritus sancti, Ambrosius autem, super Lucam, attribuit beatitudines ibi enumeratas quatuor virtutibus cardinalibus. Ergo beatitudines non distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A3" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q21_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.2" shape="rect"> Q[21], A[1]</a>). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from what has been said ( <a href="#FS_Q68_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p3.3" shape="rect">Q[68], AA[1]</a>,3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36411] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, humanae voluntatis non est nisi duplex regula, scilicet ratio, et lex aeterna, ut supra habitum est. Sed virtutes perficiunt hominem in ordine ad rationem; dona autem in ordine ad legem aeternam spiritus sancti, ut ex dictis patet. Ergo non potest esse aliquid aliud pertinens ad rectitudinem voluntatis humanae, praeter virtutes et dona. Non ergo beatitudines ab eis distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36412] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in enumeratione beatitudinum ponitur mititas, et iustitia, et misericordia; quae dicuntur esse quaedam virtutes. Ergo beatitudines non distinguuntur a virtutibus et donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36413] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod quaedam enumerantur inter beatitudines, quae nec sunt virtutes nec dona; sicut paupertas, et luctus, et pax. Differunt ergo beatitudines et a virtutibus et a donis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q2_A7" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[7]</a>; <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[3], A[1]</a>), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that "children are said to be happy because they are full of hope"; and the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>): "We are saved by hope." Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 co."><a name="36414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36414] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, beatitudo est ultimus finis humanae vitae. Dicitur autem aliquis iam finem habere, propter spem finis obtinendi, unde et philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod <i>pueri dicuntur beati propter spem</i>; et apostolus dicit, Rom. VIII, <i>spe salvi facti sumus</i>. Spes autem de fine consequendo insurgit ex hoc quod aliquis convenienter movetur ad finem, et appropinquat ad ipsum, quod quidem fit per aliquam actionem. Ad finem autem beatitudinis movetur aliquis et appropinquat per operationes virtutum; et praecipue per operationes donorum, si loquamur de beatitudine aeterna, ad quam ratio non sufficit, sed in eam inducit spiritus sanctus, ad cuius obedientiam et sequelam per dona perficimur. Et ideo beatitudines distinguuntur quidem a virtutibus et donis, non sicut habitus ab eis distincti, sed sicut actus distinguuntur ab habitibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q68_A8" id="FS_Q69_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[68], A[8]</a>). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36415] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus et Ambrosius attribuunt beatitudines donis et virtutibus, sicut actus attribuuntur habitibus. Dona autem sunt eminentiora virtutibus cardinalibus, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo Ambrosius, exponens beatitudines turbis propositas, attribuit eas virtutibus cardinalibus; Augustinus autem, exponens beatitudines discipulis propositas in monte, tanquam perfectioribus, attribuit eas donis spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36416] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod non sunt alii habitus rectificantes humanam vitam, praeter virtutes et dona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q68_A2" id="FS_Q69_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[68], A[2]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36417] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod mititas accipitur pro actu mansuetudinis, et similiter dicendum est de iustitia et de misericordia. Et quamvis haec videantur esse virtutes, attribuuntur tamen donis, quia etiam dona perficiunt hominem circa omnia circa quae perficiunt virtutes, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A2-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 2. Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because they hope for a reward, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q69_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36418] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia quae attribuuntur beatitudinibus, non pertineant ad hanc vitam. Dicuntur enim aliqui beati propter spem praemiorum, ut dictum est. Sed obiectum spei beatitudo est futura. Ergo praemia ista pertinent ad vitam futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes, <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.25" target="asv"> Lk. 6:25, </a> where we read: "Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep." Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.13" target="asv"> Job 21:13</a>: "They spend their days in wealth." Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes refer to this life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36419] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Luc. VI, ponuntur quaedam poenae per oppositum ad beatitudines, cum dicitur, <i>vae vobis qui saturati estis, quia esurietis. Vae vobis qui ridetis nunc, quia lugebitis et flebitis</i>. Sed istae poenae non intelliguntur in hac vita, quia frequenter homines in hac vita non puniuntur, secundum illud Iob XXI, <i>ducunt in bonis dies suos</i>. Ergo nec praemia beatitudinum pertinent ad hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.16.15" target="asv"> Ps. 16:15</a>: "I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall appear." Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>: "We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Therefore these rewards refer to the future life. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36420] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, regnum caelorum, quod ponitur praemium paupertatis, est beatitudo caelestis; ut Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei. Plena etiam saturitas non nisi in futura vita habetur; secundum illud Psalmi XVI, <i>satiabor cum apparuerit gloria tua</i>. Visio etiam Dei, et manifestatio filiationis divinae, ad vitam futuram pertinent; secundum illud I Ioan. III, <i>nunc filii Dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus. Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est</i>. Ergo praemia illa pertinent ad vitam futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after this life." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36421] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte, <i>ista quidem in hac vita compleri possunt, sicut completa esse in apostolis credimus. Nam illa omnimoda, et in angelicam formam mutatio, quae post hanc vitam promittitur, nullis verbis exponi potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life. </p><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p7"> In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit. </p><p id="FS_Q69_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 co."><a name="36422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36422] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod circa ista praemia expositores sacrae Scripturae diversimode sunt locuti. Quidam enim omnia ista praemia ad futuram beatitudinem pertinere dicunt, sicut Ambrosius, super Lucam. Augustinus vero dicit ea ad praesentem vitam pertinere. Chrysostomus autem, in suis homiliis, quaedam eorum dicit pertinere ad futuram vitam, quaedam autem ad praesentem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod spes futurae beatitudinis potest esse in nobis propter duo, primo quidem, propter aliquam praeparationem vel dispositionem ad futuram beatitudinem, quod est per modum meriti; alio modo, per quandam inchoationem imperfectam futurae beatitudinis in viris sanctis, etiam in hac vita. Aliter enim habetur spes fructificationis arboris cum virescit frondibus, et aliter cum iam primordia fructuum incipiunt apparere. Sic igitur ea quae in beatitudinibus tanguntur tanquam merita, sunt quaedam praeparationes vel dispositiones ad beatitudinem, vel perfectam vel inchoatam. Ea vero quae ponuntur tanquam praemia, possunt esse vel ipsa beatitudo perfecta, et sic pertinent ad futuram vitam, vel aliqua inchoatio beatitudinis, sicut est in viris perfectis, et sic praemia pertinent ad praesentem vitam. Cum enim aliquis incipit proficere in actibus virtutum et donorum, potest sperari de eo quod perveniet et ad perfectionem viae, et ad perfectionem patriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that end, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.27.7" target="asv"> Ps. 27:7</a>: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36423] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spes est de futura beatitudine sicut de ultimo fine, potest etiam esse et de auxilio gratiae, sicut de eo quod ducit ad finem, secundum illud Psalmi XXVII, <i>in Deo speravit cor meum, et adiutus sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence Augustine says (Confess. i): "Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord---that the disordered mind should be its own punishment." The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that "their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another that"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: "If wickedness makes a man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice." In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.29" target="asv"> Mat. 19:29, </a> and <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: "Ye shall receive a hundred times as much" even "in this time." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36424] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod mali, etsi interdum in hac vita temporales poenas non patiantur, patiuntur tamen spirituales. Unde Augustinus dicit, in I Confess., <i>iussisti, domine, et sic est, ut poena sibi sit inordinatus animus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., de malis, quod <i>contendit ipsorum anima, et hoc quidem huc trahit, illud autem illuc</i>; et postea concludit, <i>si autem sic miserum est malum esse, fugiendum est malitiam intense</i>. Et similiter e converso boni, etsi in hac vita quandoque non habeant corporalia praemia, nunquam tamen deficiunt a spiritualibus, etiam in hac vita; secundum illud Matth. XIX, et Marc. X, <i>centuplum accipietis etiam in hoc saeculo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this life. Because the "kingdom of heaven," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as "the spirit" begins to reign in men. The "possession" of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by "the land." They are "comforted" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the "Paraclete," i.e. the Comforter. They "have their fill," even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.34" target="asv">Jn. 4:34</a>): "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me." Again, in this life, men "obtain" God's "Mercy." Again, the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, "see God." Likewise, in this life, those who are the "peacemakers" of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called "the children of God." Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36425] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa praemia perfecte quidem consummabuntur in vita futura, sed interim etiam in hac vita quodammodo inchoantur. Nam regnum caelorum, ut Augustinus dicit, potest intelligi perfectae sapientiae initium, secundum quod incipit in eis spiritus regnare. Possessio etiam terrae significat affectum bonum animae requiescentis per desiderium in stabilitate haereditatis perpetuae, per terram significatae. Consolantur autem in hac vita, spiritum sanctum, qui Paracletus, idest consolator, dicitur, participando. Saturantur etiam in hac vita illo cibo de quo dominus dicit, <i>meus cibus est ut faciam voluntatem patris mei</i>. In hac etiam vita consequuntur homines misericordiam Dei. In hac etiam vita, purgato oculo per donum intellectus, Deus quodammodo videri potest. Similiter etiam in hac vita qui motus suos pacificant, ad similitudinem Dei accedentes, filii Dei nominantur. Tamen haec perfectius erunt in patria.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A3-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 3. Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36426] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter enumerentur beatitudines. Attribuuntur enim beatitudines donis, ut dictum est. Donorum autem quaedam pertinent ad vitam contemplativam, scilicet sapientia et intellectus, nulla autem beatitudo ponitur in actu contemplationis, sed omnes in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently indicated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36427] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad vitam activam non solum pertinent dona exequentia; sed etiam quaedam dona dirigentia, ut scientia et consilium. Nihil autem ponitur inter beatitudines quod directe ad actum scientiae vel consilii pertinere videatur. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines tanguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36428] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter dona exequentia in vita activa, timor ponitur ad paupertatem pertinere; pietas autem videtur pertinere ad beatitudinem misericordiae. Nihil autem ponitur directe ad fortitudinem pertinens. Ergo insufficienter enumerantur beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.17" target="asv">Job 5:17</a>): "Blessed is the man whom God correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly"; and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.13" target="asv">Prov. 3:13</a>): "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom." Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="36429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36429] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in sacra Scriptura tanguntur multae aliae beatitudines, sicut Iob V, dicitur, <i>beatus homo qui corripitur a domino</i>; et in Psalmo I, <i>beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum</i>; et Proverb. III, <i>beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam</i>. Ergo insufficienter beatitudines enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are indicated. </p></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1"><a name="36430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36430] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, videtur quod superflue enumerentur. Sunt enim septem dona spiritus sancti. Beatitudines autem tanguntur octo.</p><p title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2"><a name="36431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36431] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Luc. VI, ponuntur quatuor tantum beatitudines. Superflue ergo enumerantur septem, vel octo, in Matthaeo.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Matthew 5</a> are too many. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 co."><a name="36432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36432] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudines istae convenientissime enumerantur. Ad cuius evidentiam, est considerandum quod triplicem beatitudinem aliqui posuerunt, quidam enim posuerunt beatitudinem in vita voluptuosa; quidam in vita activa; quidam vero in vita contemplativa. Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad beatitudinem futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic beati. Nam beatitudo voluptuosa, quia falsa est et rationi contraria, impedimentum est beatitudinis futurae. Beatitudo vero activae vitae dispositiva est ad beatitudinem futuram. Beatitudo autem contemplativa, si sit perfecta, est essentialiter ipsa futura beatitudo, si autem sit imperfecta, est quaedam inchoatio eius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof. </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p9"> And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn---by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: "Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: "Blessed are the meek." From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation---and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow [*Cf. <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q35_A3" id="FS_Q69_A3-p9.1" shape="rect"> Q[35], A[3]</a>]; hence the third beatitude is: "Blessed are they that mourn." </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p10"> Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice." With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: hence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.14.12" target="asv">Lk. 14:12,13</a>): "When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc . . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the merciful." </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p11"> Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of heart." But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.32.17" target="asv"> Is. 32:17</a>: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Et ideo dominus primo quidem posuit quasdam beatitudines quasi removentes impedimentum voluptuosae beatitudinis. Consistit enim voluptuosa vita in duobus. Primo quidem, in affluentia exteriorum bonorum, sive sint divitiae, sive sint honores. A quibus quidem retrahitur homo per virtutem sic ut moderate eis utatur, per donum autem excellentiori modo, ut scilicet homo totaliter ea contemnat. Unde prima beatitudo ponitur, beati pauperes spiritu, quod potest referri vel ad contemptum divitiarum; vel ad contemptum honorum, quod fit per humilitatem. Secundo vero voluptuosa vita consistit in sequendo proprias passiones, sive irascibilis sive concupiscibilis. A sequela autem passionum irascibilis, retrahit virtus ne homo in eis superfluat, secundum regulam rationis, donum autem excellentiori modo, ut scilicet homo, secundum voluntatem divinam, totaliter ab eis tranquillus reddatur. Unde secunda beatitudo ponitur, beati mites. A sequela vero passionum concupiscibilis, retrahit virtus, moderate huiusmodi passionibus utendo, donum vero, eas, si necesse fuerit, totaliter abiiciendo; quinimmo, si necessarium fuerit, voluntarium luctum assumendo. Unde tertia beatitudo ponitur, beati qui lugent. Activa vero vita in his consistit praecipue quae proximis exhibemus, vel sub ratione debiti, vel sub ratione spontanei beneficii. Et ad primum quidem nos virtus disponit, ut ea quae debemus proximis, non recusemus exhibere, quod pertinet ad iustitiam. Donum autem ad hoc ipsum abundantiori quodam affectu nos inducit, ut scilicet ferventi desiderio opera iustitiae impleamus, sicut ferventi desiderio esuriens et sitiens cupit cibum vel potum. Unde quarta beatitudo ponitur, beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam. Circa spontanea vero dona nos perficit virtus ut illis donemus quibus ratio dictat esse donandum, puta amicis aut aliis nobis coniunctis, quod pertinet ad virtutem liberalitatis. Sed donum, propter Dei reverentiam, solam necessitatem considerat in his quibus gratuita beneficia praestat, unde dicitur Luc. XIV, <i>cum facis prandium aut coenam, noli vocare amicos neque fratres tuos etc., sed voca pauperes et debiles</i> etc., quod proprie est misereri. Et ideo quinta beatitudo ponitur, beati misericordes. Ea vero quae ad contemplativam vitam pertinent, vel sunt ipsa beatitudo finalis, vel aliqua inchoatio eius, et ideo non ponuntur in beatitudinibus tanquam merita, sed tanquam praemia. Ponuntur autem tanquam merita effectus activae vitae, quibus homo disponitur ad contemplativam vitam. Effectus autem activae vitae, quantum ad virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in seipso, est munditia cordis, ut scilicet mens hominis passionibus non inquinetur. Unde sexta beatitudo ponitur, beati mundo corde. Quantum vero ad virtutes et dona quibus homo perficitur in comparatione ad proximum, effectus activae vitae est pax; secundum illud Isaiae XXXII, <i>opus iustitiae pax</i>. Et ideo septima beatitudo ponitur, beati pacifici.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God," corresponds to the gift of wisdom. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36433] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus donorum pertinentium ad vitam activam, exprimuntur in ipsis meritis, sed actus donorum pertinentium ad vitam contemplativam, exprimuntur in praemiis, ratione iam dicta. Videre enim Deum respondet dono intellectus; et conformari Deo quadam filiatione adoptiva, pertinet ad donum sapientiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and mercy in respect of counsel. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36434] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod in his quae pertinent ad activam vitam, cognitio non quaeritur propter seipsam, sed propter operationem, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in II Ethic. Et ideo, quia beatitudo aliquid ultimum importat, non computantur inter beatitudines actus donorum dirigentium in vita activa, quos scilicet eliciunt, sicut consiliari est actus consilii, et iudicare est actus scientiae, sed magis attribuuntur eis actus operativi in quibus dirigunt, sicut scientiae lugere, et consilio misereri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.22" target="asv"> Lk. 6:22 </a>: "It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation," fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world. </p><p id="FS_Q69_A3-p15"> Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv"> Eccles. 1:18</a>: "He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]." The principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.4.24" target="asv">Dan. 4:24</a>: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor." It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36435] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in attributione beatitudinum ad dona, possunt duo considerari. Quorum unum est conformitas materiae. Et secundum hoc, omnes primae quinque beatitudines possunt attribui scientiae et consilio, tanquam dirigentibus. Sed inter dona exequentia distribuuntur, ita scilicet quod esuries et sitis iustitiae, et etiam misericordia, pertineant ad pietatem, quae perficit hominem in his quae sunt ad alterum; mititas autem ad fortitudinem, dicit enim Ambrosius, super Lucam, quod <i>fortitudinis est iram vincere, indignationem cohibere</i>, est enim fortitudo circa passiones irascibilis; paupertas vero et luctus ad donum timoris, quo homo se retrahit a cupiditatibus et delectationibus mundi. Alio modo possumus in his beatitudinibus considerare motiva ipsarum, et sic, quantum ad aliqua eorum, oportet aliter attribuere. Praecipue enim ad mansuetudinem movet reverentia ad Deum; quae pertinet ad pietatem. Ad lugendum autem movet praecipue scientia, per quam homo cognoscit defectus suos et rerum mundanarum; secundum illud Eccle. I, <i>qui addit scientiam, addit et dolorem</i>. Ad esuriendum autem iustitiae opera, praecipue movet animi fortitudo. Ad miserendum vero praecipue movet consilium Dei; secundum illud Dan. IV, <i>consilium meum regi placeat, peccata tua eleemosynis redime, et iniquitates tuas misericordiis pauperum</i>. Et hunc modum attributionis sequitur Augustinus, in libro de Serm. Dom. in monte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read, "Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that can be adduced. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36436] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod necesse est beatitudines omnes quae in sacra Scriptura ponuntur, ad has reduci vel quantum ad merita, vel quantum ad praemia, quia necesse est quod omnes pertineant aliquo modo vel ad vitam activam, vel ad vitam contemplativam. Unde quod dicitur, beatus vir qui corripitur a domino, pertinet ad beatitudinem luctus. Quod vero dicitur, beatus vir qui non abiit in consilio impiorum, pertinet ad munditiam cordis. Quod vero dicitur, beatus vir qui invenit sapientiam, pertinet ad praemium septimae beatitudinis. Et idem patet de omnibus aliis quae possunt induci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="36437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36437] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod octava beatitudo est quaedam confirmatio et manifestatio omnium praecedentium. Ex hoc enim quod aliquis est confirmatus in paupertate spiritus et mititate et aliis sequentibus, provenit quod ab his bonis propter nullam persecutionem recedit. Unde octava beatitudo quodammodo ad septem praecedentes pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.17" target="asv">Lk. 6:17</a>). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: "Blessed are ye poor." The second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger." The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now." The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you." And as Ambrose says on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q69_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.20" target="asv"> Lk. 6:20, </a> "poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="36438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36438] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod Lucas narrat sermonem domini factum esse ad turbas. Unde beatitudines numerantur ab eo secundum capacitatem turbarum, quae solam voluptuosam et temporalem et terrenam beatitudinem noverunt. Unde dominus per quatuor beatitudines quatuor excludit quae ad praedictam beatitudinem pertinere videntur. Quorum primum est abundantia bonorum exteriorum, quod excludit per hoc quod dicit, beati pauperes. Secundum est quod sit bene homini quantum ad corpus, in cibis et potibus et aliis huiusmodi, et hoc excludit per secundum quod ponit, beati qui esuritis. Tertium est quod sit homini bene quantum ad cordis iucunditatem, et hoc excludit tertio, dicens, beati qui nunc fletis. Quartum est exterior hominum favor, et hoc excludit quarto, dicens, beati eritis cum vos oderint homines. Et sicut Ambrosius dicit, <i>paupertas pertinet ad temperantiam, quae illecebrosa non quaerit; esuries ad iustitiam, quia qui esurit, compatitur, et, compatiendo, largitur; fletus ad prudentiam, cuius est flere occidua; pati odium hominum, ad fortitudinem</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q69_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q69_A4-p0.1">Q. 69. A. 4. Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36439] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praemia beatitudinum inconvenienter enumerentur. In regno enim caelorum, quod est vita aeterna, bona omnia continentur. Posito ergo regno caelorum, non oportuit alia praemia ponere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same ground it should have been assigned to all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36440] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, regnum caelorum ponitur pro praemio et in prima beatitudine et in octava. Ergo, eadem ratione, debuit poni in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36441] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in beatitudinibus proceditur ascendendo, sicut Augustinus dicit. In praemiis autem videtur procedi descendendo, nam possessio terrae est minus quam regnum caelorum. Ergo inconvenienter huiusmodi praemia assignantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36442] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est auctoritas ipsius domini, praemia huiusmodi proponentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness indicated above <a href="#FS_Q69_A3" id="FS_Q69_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn. </p><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p7"> Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery. </p><p id="FS_Q69_A4-p8"> The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 co."><a name="36443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36443] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod praemia ista convenientissime assignantur, considerata conditione beatitudinum secundum tres beatitudines supra assignatas. Tres enim primae beatitudines accipiuntur per retractionem ab his in quibus voluptuosa beatitudo consistit, quam homo desiderat quaerens id quod naturaliter desideratur, non ubi quaerere debet, scilicet in Deo, sed in rebus temporalibus et caducis. Et ideo praemia trium primarum beatitudinum accipiuntur secundum ea quae in beatitudine terrena aliqui quaerunt. Quaerunt enim homines in rebus exterioribus, scilicet divitiis et honoribus, excellentiam quandam et abundantiam, quorum utrumque importat regnum caelorum, per quod homo consequitur excellentiam et abundantiam bonorum in Deo. Et ideo regnum caelorum dominus pauperibus spiritu repromisit. Quaerunt autem homines feroces et immites per litigia et bella securitatem sibi acquirere, inimicos suos destruendo. Unde dominus repromisit mitibus securam et quietam possessionem terrae viventium, per quam significatur soliditas aeternorum bonorum. Quaerunt autem homines in concupiscentiis et delectationibus mundi, habere consolationem contra praesentis vitae labores. Et ideo dominus consolationem lugentibus repromittit. Aliae vero duae beatitudines pertinent ad opera activae beatitudinis, quae sunt opera virtutum ordinantium hominem ad proximum, a quibus operibus aliqui retrahuntur propter inordinatum amorem proprii boni. Et ideo dominus attribuit illa praemia his beatitudinibus, propter quae homines ab eis discedunt. Discedunt enim aliqui ab operibus iustitiae, non reddentes debitum, sed potius aliena rapientes ut bonis temporalibus repleantur. Et ideo dominus esurientibus iustitiam, saturitatem repromisit. Discedunt etiam aliqui ab operibus misericordiae, ne se immisceant miseriis alienis. Et ideo dominus misericordibus repromittit misericordiam, per quam ab omni miseria liberentur. Aliae vero duae ultimae beatitudines pertinent ad contemplativam felicitatem seu beatitudinem, et ideo secundum convenientiam dispositionum quae ponuntur in merito, praemia redduntur. Nam munditia oculi disponit ad clare videndum, unde mundis corde divina visio repromittitur. Constituere vero pacem vel in seipso vel inter alios, manifestat hominem esse Dei imitatorem, qui est Deus unitatis et pacis. Et ideo pro praemio redditur ei gloria divinae filiationis, quae est in perfecta coniunctione ad Deum per sapientiam consummatam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the merits to which those rewards are assigned. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36444] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, omnia praemia ista unum sunt in re, scilicet beatitudo aeterna; quam intellectus humanus non capit. Et ideo oportuit quod per diversa bona nobis nota, describeretur, observata convenientia ad merita quibus praemia attribuuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the body. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36445] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut octava beatitudo est firmitas quaedam omnium beatitudinum, ita debentur sibi omnium beatitudinum praemia. Et ideo redit ad caput, ut intelligantur sibi consequenter omnia praemia attribui. Vel, secundum Ambrosium, pauperibus spiritu repromittitur regnum caelorum, quantum ad gloriam animae, sed passis persecutionem in corpore, quantum ad gloriam corporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q69_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 69 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36446] Iª-IIae q. 69 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam praemia secundum additionem se habent ad invicem. Nam plus est possidere terram regni caelorum, quam simpliciter habere, multa enim habemus quae non firmiter et pacifice possidemus. Plus est etiam consolari in regno, quam habere et possidere, multa enim cum dolore possidemus. Plus est etiam saturari quam simpliciter consolari, nam saturitas abundantiam consolationis importat. Misericordia vero excedit saturitatem, ut plus scilicet homo accipiat quam meruerit, vel desiderare potuerit. Adhuc autem maius est Deum videre, sicut maior est qui in curia regis non solum prandet, sed etiam faciem regis videt. Summam autem dignitatem in domo regia filius regis habet.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q70" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q70-p0.1">Q. 70. OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q70-p2"> We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q70-p3"><a href="#FS_Q70_A1"> (1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p4"><a href="#FS_Q70_A2"> (2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p5"><a href="#FS_Q70_A3"> (3) Of their number?</a></p><p id="FS_Q70-p6"><a href="#FS_Q70_A4"> (4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 pr."><a name="36447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36447] Iª-IIae q. 70 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de fructibus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum fructus spiritus sancti sint actus. Secundo, utrum differant a beatitudinibus. Tertio, de eorum numero. Quarto, de oppositione eorum ad opera carnis.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q70_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 1. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p0.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.5" target="asv">Gal. 5</a>) are acts? </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.3.15" target="asv">Wis. 3:15</a>): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#John.4.36" target="asv">Jn. 4:36</a>): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36448] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus spiritus sancti quos apostolus nominat ad Galat. V, non sint actus. Id enim cuius est alius fructus, non debet dici fructus, sic enim in infinitum iretur. Sed actuum nostrorum est aliquis fructus, dicitur enim Sap. III, <i>bonorum laborum gloriosus est fructus</i>; et Ioan. IV, <i>qui metit, mercedem accipit, et fructum congregat in vitam aeternam</i>. Ergo ipsi actus nostri non dicuntur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36449] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., <i>fruimur cognitis in quibus voluntas propter ipsa delectata conquiescit</i>. Sed voluntas nostra non debet conquiescere in actibus nostris propter se. Ergo actus nostri fructus dici non debent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A1" id="FS_Q70_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[1]</a>). Therefore the fruits are not actions. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36450] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter fructus spiritus sancti enumerantur ab apostolo aliquae virtutes scilicet caritas, mansuetudo, fides et castitas. Virtutes autem non sunt actus, sed habitus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo fructus non sunt actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv">Mat. 12:33</a>): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36451] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. XII, <i>ex fructu arbor cognoscitur</i>; idest, ex operibus suis homo, ut ibi exponitur a sanctis. Ergo ipsi actus humani dicuntur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 co."><a name="36452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36452] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod nomen fructus a corporalibus ad spiritualia est translatum. Dicitur autem in corporalibus fructus, quod ex planta producitur cum ad perfectionem pervenerit, et quandam in se suavitatem habet. Qui quidem fructus ad duo comparari potest, scilicet ad arborem producentem ipsum; et ad hominem qui fructum ex arbore adipiscitur. Secundum hoc igitur, nomen fructus in rebus spiritualibus dupliciter accipere possumus, uno modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis, quasi arboris, id quod ab eo producitur; alio modo, ut dicatur fructus hominis id quod homo adipiscitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p7"> Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Non autem omne id quod adipiscitur homo, habet rationem fructus, sed id quod est ultimum, delectationem habens. Habet enim homo et agrum et arborem, quae fructus non dicuntur; sed solum id quod est ultimum, quod scilicet ex agro et arbore homo intendit habere. Et secundum hoc, fructus hominis dicitur ultimus hominis finis, quo debet frui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8"> If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine seed, for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.9" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:9</a>): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin"> Si autem dicatur fructus hominis id quod ex homine producitur, sic ipsi actus humani fructus dicuntur, operatio enim est actus secundus operantis, et delectationem habet, si sit conveniens operanti. Si igitur operatio hominis procedat ab homine secundum facultatem suae rationis, sic dicitur esse fructus rationis. Si vero procedat ab homine secundum altiorem virtutem, quae est virtus spiritus sancti; sic dicitur esse operatio hominis fructus spiritus sancti, quasi cuiusdam divini seminis, dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>omnis qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit, quoniam semen ipsius in eo manet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:23</a>): "My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36453] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum fructus habeat quodammodo rationem ultimi et finis, nihil prohibet alicuius fructus esse alium fructum, sicut finis ad finem ordinatur. Opera igitur nostra inquantum sunt effectus quidam spiritus sancti in nobis operantis, habent rationem fructus, sed inquantum ordinantur ad finem vitae aeternae, sic magis habent rationem florum. Unde dicitur Eccli. XXIV, <i>flores mei fructus honoris et honestatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36454] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur voluntas in aliquo propter se delectari, potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod ly propter dicit causam finalem, et sic propter se non delectatur aliquis nisi in ultimo fine. Alio modo, secundum quod designat causam formalem, et sic propter se aliquis potest delectari in omni eo quod delectabile est secundum suam formam. Sicut patet quod infirmus delectatur in sanitate propter se, sicut in fine; in medicina autem suavi, non sicut in fine, sed sicut in habente saporem delectabilem; in medicina autem austera, nullo modo propter se, sed solum propter aliud. Sic igitur dicendum est quod in Deo delectari debet homo propter se, sicut propter ultimum finem, in actibus autem virtuosis, non sicut propter finem, sed propter honestatem quam continent, delectabilem virtuosis. Unde Ambrosius dicit quod opera virtutum dicuntur fructus, <i>quia suos possessores sancta et sincera delectatione reficiunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): "Faith is to believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor." It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36455] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod nomina virtutum sumuntur quandoque pro actibus earum, sicut Augustinus dicit quod <i>fides est credere quod non vides; et caritas est motus animi ad diligendum Deum et proximum</i>. Et hoc modo sumuntur nomina virtutum in enumeratione fructuum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A2-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 2. Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy Ghost. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36456] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus a beatitudinibus non differant. Beatitudines enim attribuuntur donis, ut supra dictum est. Sed dona perficiunt hominem secundum quod movetur a spiritu sancto. Ergo beatitudines ipsae sunt fructus spiritus sancti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36457] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut se habet fructus vitae aeternae ad beatitudinem futuram, quae est rei; ita se habent fructus praesentis vitae ad beatitudines praesentis vitae, quae sunt spei. Sed fructus vitae aeternae est ipsa beatitudo futura. Ergo fructus vitae praesentis sunt ipsae beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>; <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q4_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[4], A[1]</a>). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36458] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, de ratione fructus est quod sit quiddam ultimum et delectabile. Sed hoc pertinet ad rationem beatitudinis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo eadem ratio est fructus et beatitudinis. Ergo non debent ab invicem distingui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36459] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quorum species sunt diversae, ipsa quoque sunt diversa. Sed in diversas partes dividuntur et fructus et beatitudines; ut patet per numerationem utrorumque. Ergo fructus differunt a beatitudinibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the virtues, as already stated ( <a href="#FS_Q69_A1" id="FS_Q70_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[69], A[1]</a>, ad 1). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 co."><a name="36460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36460] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod plus requiritur ad rationem beatitudinis, quam ad rationem fructus. Nam ad rationem fructus sufficit quod sit aliquid habens rationem ultimi et delectabilis, sed ad rationem beatitudinis, ulterius requiritur quod sit aliquid perfectum et excellens. Unde omnes beatitudines possunt dici fructus, sed non convertitur. Sunt enim fructus quaecumque virtuosa opera, in quibus homo delectatur. Sed beatitudines dicuntur solum perfecta opera, quae etiam, ratione suae perfectionis, magis attribuuntur donis quam virtutibus, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36461] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa probat quod beatitudines sint fructus, non autem quod omnes fructus beatitudines sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36462] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod fructus vitae aeternae est simpliciter ultimus et perfectus, et ideo in nullo distinguitur a beatitudine futura. Fructus autem praesentis vitae non sunt simpliciter ultimi et perfecti, et ideo non omnes fructus sunt beatitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36463] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquid amplius est de ratione beatitudinis quam de ratione fructus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A3-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 3. Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22,23</a>). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.22" target="asv"> Rom. 6:22</a>: "You have your fruit unto sanctification." Moreover it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away." Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36464] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod apostolus inconvenienter enumeret, ad Galat. V, duodecim fructus. Alibi enim dicit esse tantum unum fructum praesentis vitae; secundum illud Rom. VI, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificatione et Isaiae XXVII dicitur, <i>hic est omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum</i>. Non ergo ponendi sunt duodecim fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.23" target="asv">Mat. 13:23</a>) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold, sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold." Therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36465] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, fructus est qui ex spirituali semine exoritur, ut dictum est. Sed dominus, Matth. XIII, ponit triplicem terrae bonae fructum ex spirituali semine provenientem, scilicet centesimum, et sexagesimum, et trigesimum. Ergo non sunt ponendi duodecim fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36466] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, fructus habet in sui ratione quod sit ultimum et delectabile. Sed ratio ista non invenitur in omnibus fructibus ab apostolo enumeratis, patientia enim et longanimitas videntur in rebus contristantibus esse; fides autem non habet rationem ultimi, sed magis rationem primi fundamenti. Superflue igitur huiusmodi fructus enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated <a href="#FS_Q70_A2" id="FS_Q70_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36467] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, videtur quod insufficienter et diminute enumerentur. Dictum est enim quod omnes beatitudines fructus dici possunt, sed non omnes hic enumerantur. Nihil etiam hic ponitur ad actum sapientiae pertinens, et multarum aliarum virtutum. Ergo videtur quod insufficienter enumerentur fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve fruits of which it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.2" target="asv">Apoc. 22:2</a>): "On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits." Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it. </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p7"> Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q27_A4" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[4]</a>). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us." The necessary result of the love of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in God Whom it loves, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.3" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is "joy." Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.165" target="asv">Ps. 118:165</a>): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block," because, to wit, external things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, "peace" is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience"; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed; which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of evil" (Ethic. v, 3). </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p8"> Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs "goodness." Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs "benignity," for the benign are those in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that is his, to God. </p><p id="FS_Q70_A3-p9"> Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe the "mode" in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and "chastity": whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from them. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 co."><a name="36468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36468] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod numerus duodecim fructuum ab apostolo enumeratorum, conveniens est, et possunt significari per duodecim fructus de quibus dicitur Apoc. ult., <i>ex utraque parte fluminis lignum vitae, afferens fructus duodecim</i>. Quia vero fructus dicitur quod ex aliquo principio procedit sicut ex semine vel radice, attendenda est distinctio horum fructuum secundum diversum processum spiritus sancti in nobis. Qui quidem processus attenditur secundum hoc, ut primo mens hominis in seipsa ordinetur; secundo vero, ordinetur ad ea quae sunt iuxta; tertio vero, ad ea quae sunt infra. Tunc autem bene mens hominis disponitur in seipsa, quando mens hominis bene se habet et in bonis et in malis. Prima autem dispositio mentis humanae ad bonum, est per amorem, qui est prima affectio et omnium affectionum radix, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo inter fructus spiritus primo ponitur caritas; in qua specialiter spiritus sanctus datur, sicut in propria similitudine, cum et ipse sit amor. Unde dicitur Rom. V, <i>caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>. Ad amorem autem caritatis ex necessitate sequitur gaudium. Omnis enim amans gaudet ex coniunctione amati. Caritas autem semper habet praesentem Deum, quem amat; secundum illud I Ioan. IV, <i>qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo</i>. Unde sequela caritatis est gaudium. Perfectio autem gaudii est pax, quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, quantum ad quietem ab exterioribus conturbantibus, non enim potest perfecte gaudere de bono amato, qui in eius fruitione ab aliis perturbatur; et iterum, qui perfecte cor habet in uno pacatum, a nullo alio molestari potest, cum alia quasi nihil reputet; unde dicitur in Psalmo CXVIII, <i>pax multa diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum</i>, quia scilicet ab exterioribus non perturbantur, quin Deo fruantur. Secundo, quantum ad sedationem desiderii fluctuantis, non enim perfecte gaudet de aliquo, cui non sufficit id de quo gaudet. Haec autem duo importat pax, scilicet ut neque ab exterioribus perturbemur; et ut desideria nostra conquiescant in uno. Unde post caritatem et gaudium, tertio ponitur pax. In malis autem bene se habet mens quantum ad duo. Primo quidem, ut non perturbetur mens per imminentiam malorum, quod pertinet ad patientiam. Secundo, ut non perturbetur in dilatione bonorum, quod pertinet ad longanimitatem, nam carere bono habet rationem mali, ut dicitur in V Ethic. Ad id autem quod est iuxta hominem, scilicet proximum, bene disponitur mens hominis, primo quidem, quantum ad voluntatem bene faciendi. Et ad hoc pertinet bonitas. Secundo, quantum ad beneficentiae executionem. Et ad hoc pertinet benignitas, dicuntur enim benigni quos bonus ignis amoris fervere facit ad benefaciendum proximis. Tertio, quantum ad hoc quod aequanimiter tolerentur mala ab eis illata. Et ad hoc pertinet mansuetudo, quae cohibet iras. Quarto, quantum ad hoc quod non solum per iram proximis non noceamus, sed etiam neque per fraudem vel per dolum. Et ad hoc pertinet fides, si pro fidelitate sumatur. Sed si sumatur pro fide qua creditur in Deum, sic per hanc ordinatur homo ad id quod est supra se, ut scilicet homo intellectum suum Deo subiiciat, et per consequens omnia quae ipsius sunt. Sed ad id quod infra est, bene disponitur homo, primo quidem, quantum ad exteriores actiones, per modestiam, quae in omnibus dictis et factis modum observat. Quantum ad interiores concupiscentias, per continentiam et castitatem, sive haec duo distinguantur per hoc, quod castitas refrenat hominem ad illicitis, continentia vero etiam a licitis; sive per hoc quod continens patitur concupiscentias sed non deducitur, castus autem neque patitur neque deducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36469] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sanctificatio fit per omnes virtutes per quas etiam peccata tolluntur. Unde fructus ibi singulariter nominatur propter unitatem generis, quod in multas species dividitur, secundum quas dicuntur multi fructus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and its end. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36470] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod fructus centesimus, sexagesimus et trigesimus non diversificantur secundum diversas species virtuosorum actuum, sed secundum diversos perfectionis gradus etiam unius virtutis. Sicut continentia coniugalis dicitur significari per fructum trigesimum; continentia vidualis per sexagesimum; virginalis autem per centesimum. Et aliis etiam modis sancti distinguunt tres evangelicos fructus secundum tres gradus virtutis. Et ponuntur tres gradus, quia cuiuslibet rei perfectio attenditur secundum principium, medium et finem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith, which is certainly about the unseen." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36471] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum quod est in tristitiis non perturbari, rationem delectabilis habet. Et fides etiam si accipiatur prout est fundamentum, habet quandam rationem ultimi et delectabilis, secundum quod continet certitudinem, unde Glossa exponit, <i>fides, idest de invisibilibus certitudo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> "the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after." Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36472] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, super epistolam ad Galat., <i>apostolus non hoc ita suscepit, ut doceret quod sunt</i> (vel opera carnis, vel fructus spiritus); sed <i>ut ostenderet in quo genere illa vitanda, illa vero sectanda sint</i>. Unde potuissent vel plures, vel etiam pauciores fructus enumerari. Et tamen omnes donorum et virtutum actus possunt secundum quandam convenientiam ad haec reduci, secundum quod omnes virtutes et dona necesse est quod ordinent mentem aliquo praedictorum modorum. Unde et actus sapientiae, et quorumcumque donorum ordinantium ad bonum, reducuntur ad caritatem, gaudium et pacem. Ideo tamen potius haec quam alia enumeravit, quia hic enumerata magis important vel fruitionem bonorum, vel sedationem malorum; quod videtur ad rationem fructus pertinere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q70_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q70_A4-p0.1">Q. 70. A. 4. Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19, </a> seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36473] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod fructus non contrarientur operibus carnis quae apostolus enumerat. Contraria enim sunt in eodem genere. Sed opera carnis non dicuntur fructus. Ergo fructus spiritus eis non contrariantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36474] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum uni est contrarium. Sed plura enumerat apostolus opera carnis quam fructus spiritus. Ergo fructus spiritus et opera carnis non contrariantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the flesh. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36475] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter fructus spiritus primo ponuntur caritas, gaudium, pax, quibus non correspondent ea quae primo enumerantur inter opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia. Ergo fructus spiritus non contrariantur operibus carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv">Gal. 5:17</a>) that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36476] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit ibidem, quod <i>caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, et spiritus adversus carnem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q70_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit. </p><p id="FS_Q70_A4-p7"> Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q70_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv"> Gal. 5:22,23, </a> contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus "to fornication, which is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 co."><a name="36477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36477] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod opera carnis et fructus spiritus possunt accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum communem rationem. Et hoc modo in communi fructus spiritus sancti contrariantur operibus carnis. Spiritus enim sanctus movet humanam mentem ad id quod est secundum rationem, vel potius ad id quod est supra rationem, appetitus autem carnis, qui est appetitus sensitivus, trahit ad bona sensibilia, quae sunt infra hominem. Unde sicut motus sursum et motus deorsum contrariantur in naturalibus, ita in operibus humanis contrariantur opera carnis fructibus spiritus. Alio modo possunt considerari secundum proprias rationes singulorum fructuum enumeratorum, et operum carnis. Et sic non oportet quod singula singulis contraponantur, quia, sicut dictum est, apostolus non intendit enumerare omnia opera spiritualia, nec omnia opera carnalia. Sed tamen, secundum quandam adaptationem, Augustinus, super epistolam ad Galat., contraponit singulis operibus carnis singulos fructus. <i>Sicut fornicationi, quae est amor explendae libidinis a legitimo connubio solutus, opponitur caritas, per quam anima coniungitur Deo in qua etiam est vera castitas. Immunditiae autem sunt omnes perturbationes de illa fornicatione conceptae, quibus gaudium tranquillitatis opponitur. Idolorum autem servitus, propter quam bellum est gestum adversus Evangelium Dei, opponitur paci. Contra veneficia autem, et inimicitias et contentiones et aemulationes, animositates et dissensiones, opponuntur longanimitas, ad sustinendum mala hominum inter quos vivimus; et ad curandum, benignitas; et ad ignoscendum, bonitas. Haeresibus autem opponitur fides, invidiae, mansuetudo; ebrietatibus et comessationibus, continentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called fruits, but not so works of vice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36478] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod procedit ab arbore contra naturam arboris, non dicitur esse fructus eius, sed magis corruptio quaedam. Et quia virtutum opera sunt connaturalia rationi, opera vero vitiorum sunt contra rationem; ideo opera virtutum fructus dicuntur, non autem opera vitiorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36479] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod <i>bonum contingit uno modo, malum vero omnifariam</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., unde et uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur. Et propter hoc, non est mirum si plura ponuntur opera carnis quam fructus spiritus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q70_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 70 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36480] Iª-IIae q. 70 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium patet solutio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q71" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q71-p0.1">Q. 71. EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q71-p2">OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)</p><p id="FS_Q71-p3"> We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect of sin. </p><p id="FS_Q71-p4"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q71-p5"><a href="#FS_Q71_A1"> (1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p6"><a href="#FS_Q71_A2"> (2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p7"><a href="#FS_Q71_A3"> (3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p8"><a href="#FS_Q71_A4"> (4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p9"><a href="#FS_Q71_A5"> (5) Whether every sin includes action?</a></p><p id="FS_Q71-p10"><a href="#FS_Q71_A6"> (6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law." </a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 pr."><a name="36481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36481] Iª-IIae q. 71 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de vitiis et peccatis. Circa quae sex consideranda occurrunt, primo quidem, de ipsis vitiis et peccatis secundum se; secundo, de distinctione eorum; tertio, de comparatione eorum ad invicem; quarto, de subiecto peccati; quinto, de causa eius; sexto, de effectu ipsius. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum vitium contrarietur virtuti. Secundo, utrum vitium sit contra naturam. Tertio, quid sit peius, utrum vitium vel actus vitiosus. Quarto, utrum actus vitiosus possit esse simul cum virtute. Quinto, utrum in omni peccato sit aliquis actus. Sexto, de definitione peccati quam Augustinus ponit, XXII contra Faustum, <i>peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam</i>.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q71_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A1-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 1. Whether vice is contrary to virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36482] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non contrarietur virtuti. Uni enim unum est contrarium, ut probatur in X Metaphys. Sed virtuti contrariantur peccatum et malitia. Non ergo contrariatur ei vitium, quia vitium dicitur etiam si sit indebita dispositio membrorum corporalium, vel quarumcumque rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36483] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, virtus nominat quandam perfectionem potentiae. Sed vitium nihil nominat ad potentiam pertinens. Ergo vitium non contrariatur virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is the soul's health." Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36484] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod <i>virtus est quaedam sanitas animae</i>. Sanitati autem opponitur aegritudo vel morbus, magis quam vitium. Ergo virtuti non contrariatur vitium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil." But "virtue is a quality which makes its subject good," as was shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q55_A3" id="FS_Q71_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[55], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36485] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod <i>vitium est qualitas secundum quam malus est animus</i>. Virtus autem est qualitas quae facit bonum habentem, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo vitium contrariatur virtuti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its nature." That which virtue implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q56_A3" id="FS_Q71_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). </p><p id="FS_Q71_A1-p7"> Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is "vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 co."><a name="36486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36486] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod circa virtutem duo possumus considerare, scilicet ipsam essentiam virtutis; et id ad quod est virtus. In essentia quidem virtutis aliquid considerari potest directe; et aliquid ex consequenti. Directe quidem virtus importat dispositionem quandam alicuius convenienter se habentis secundum modum suae naturae, unde philosophus dicit, in VII Physic. quod <i>virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam</i>. Ex consequenti autem sequitur quod virtus sit bonitas quaedam, in hoc enim consistit uniuscuiusque rei bonitas, quod convenienter se habeat secundum modum suae naturae. Id autem ad quod virtus ordinatur, est actus bonus, ut ex supradictis patet. Secundum hoc igitur tria inveniuntur opponi virtuti. Quorum unum est peccatum, quod opponitur sibi ex parte eius ad quod virtus ordinatur, nam peccatum proprie nominat actum inordinatum, sicut actus virtutis est actus ordinatus et debitus. Secundum autem quod ad rationem virtutis consequitur quod sit bonitas quaedam, opponitur virtuti malitia. Sed secundum id quod directe est de ratione virtutis, opponitur virtuti vitium, vitium enim uniuscuiusque rei esse videtur quod non sit disposita secundum quod convenit suae naturae. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>quod perfectioni naturae deesse perspexeris, id voca vitium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36487] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa tria non contrariantur virtuti secundum idem, sed peccatum quidem contrariatur secundum quod virtus est operativa boni; malitia autem secundum quod est bonitas quaedam; vitium autem proprie secundum quod est virtus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36488] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus non solum importat perfectionem potentiae quae est principium agendi, sed etiam importat debitam dispositionem eius cuius est virtus, et hoc ideo quia unumquodque operatur secundum quod actu est. Requiritur ergo quod aliquid sit in se bene dispositum, quod debet esse boni operativum. Et secundum hoc virtuti vitium opponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he calls it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease is attended with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well compacted together." And although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in the soul," as he says, "these two things are indistinguishable, except in thought." For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i.e. man by his works, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.33" target="asv"> Mat. 12:33.</a> But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36489] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., morbi et aegrotationes partes sunt vitiositatis, in corporibus enim morbum appellant totius corporis corruptionem, puta febrem vel aliquid huiusmodi; aegrotationem vero, morbum cum imbecillitate; vitium autem, cum partes corporis inter se dissident. Et quamvis in corpore quandoque sit morbus sine aegrotatione, puta cum aliquis est interius male dispositus, non tamen exterius praepeditur a solitis operationibus; in animo tamen, ut ipse dicit, haec duo non possunt nisi cogitatione secerni. Necesse est enim quod quandocumque aliquis interius est male dispositus, habens inordinatum affectum, quod ex hoc imbecillis reddatur ad debitas operationes exercendas, quia unaquaeque arbor ex suo fructu cognoscitur, idest homo ex opere, ut dicitur Matth. XII. <i>Sed vitium animi</i>, ut Tullius ibidem dicit, <i>est habitus aut affectio animi in tota vita inconstans, et a seipsa dissentiens</i>. Quod quidem invenitur etiam absque morbo vel aegrotatione, ut puta cum aliquis ex infirmitate vel ex passione peccat. Unde in plus se habet vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus, sicut etiam virtus in plus se habet quam sanitas, nam sanitas etiam quaedam virtus ponitur in VII Physic. Et ideo virtuti convenientius opponitur vitium quam aegrotatio vel morbus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A2-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 2. Whether vice is contrary to nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36490] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium non sit contra naturam. Vitium enim contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Sed virtutes non sunt in nobis a natura, sed causantur in nobis per infusionem aut ab assuetudine, ut dictum est. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36491] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea quae sunt contra naturam, non possunt assuefieri, sicut lapis nunquam assuescit ferri sursum, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed aliqui assuefiunt ad vitia. Ergo vitia non sunt contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number of men; for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv">Mat. 7:13</a>): "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat." Therefore vice is not contrary to nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36492] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nihil quod est contra naturam, invenitur in habentibus illam naturam ut in pluribus. Sed vitia inveniuntur in hominibus ut in pluribus, quia, sicut dicitur Matth. VII, <i>lata est via quae ducit ad perditionem, et multi vadunt per eam</i>. Ergo vitium non est contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36493] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum comparatur ad vitium sicut actus ad habitum, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed peccatum definitur esse dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei; ut patet per Augustinum, XXII contra Faustum. Lex autem Dei est supra naturam. Magis ergo dicendum est quod vitium sit contra legem, quam sit contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36494] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>omne vitium, eo ipso quod vitium est, contra naturam est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated," which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14). </p><p id="FS_Q71_A2-p8"> But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 co."><a name="36495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36495] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitium virtuti contrariatur. Virtus autem uniuscuiusque rei consistit in hoc quod sit bene disposita secundum convenientiam suae naturae, ut supra dictum est. Unde oportet quod in qualibet re vitium dicatur ex hoc quod est disposita contra id quod convenit naturae. Unde et de hoc unaquaeque res vituperatur, <i>a vitio autem nomen vituperationis tractum creditur</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb. Sed considerandum est quod natura uniuscuiusque rei potissime est forma secundum quam res speciem sortitur. Homo autem in specie constituitur per animam rationalem. Et ideo id quod est contra ordinem rationis, proprie est contra naturam hominis inquantum est homo; quod autem est secundum rationem, est secundum naturam hominis inquantum est homo. <i>Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, et malum hominis est praeter rationem esse</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Unde virtus humana, quae hominem facit bonum, et opus ipsius bonum reddit, intantum est secundum naturam hominis, inquantum convenit rationi, vitium autem intantum est contra naturam hominis, inquantum est contra ordinem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36496] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutes, etsi non causentur a natura secundum suum esse perfectum, tamen inclinant ad id quod est secundum naturam, idest secundum ordinem rationis, dicit enim Tullius, in sua rhetorica, quod <i>virtus est habitus in modum naturae rationi consentaneus</i>. Et hoc modo virtus dicitur esse secundum naturam, et per contrarium intelligitur quod vitium sit contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36497] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod philosophus ibi loquitur de his quae sunt contra naturam, secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est esse a natura, non autem secundum quod esse contra naturam opponitur ei quod est esse secundum naturam, eo modo quo virtutes dicuntur esse secundum naturam, inquantum inclinant ad id quod naturae convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36498] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in homine est duplex natura, scilicet rationalis et sensitiva. Et quia per operationem sensus homo pervenit ad actus rationis, ideo plures sequuntur inclinationes naturae sensitivae quam ordinem rationis, plures enim sunt qui assequuntur principium rei, quam qui ad consummationem perveniunt. Ex hoc autem vitia et peccata in hominibus proveniunt, quod sequuntur inclinationem naturae sensitivae contra ordinem rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the Divine art whereby it was made." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36499] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod quidquid est contra rationem artificiati, est etiam contra naturam artis, qua artificiatum producitur. Lex autem aeterna comparatur ad ordinem rationis humanae sicut ars ad artificiatum. Unde eiusdem rationis est quod vitium et peccatum sit contra ordinem rationis humanae, et quod sit contra legem aeternam. Unde Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., quod <i>a Deo habent omnes naturae quod naturae sunt, et intantum sunt vitiosae, inquantum ab eius, qua factae sunt, arte discedunt</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A3-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 3. Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36500] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitium, idest habitus malus sit peius quam peccatum, idest actus malus. Sicut enim bonum quod est diuturnius, est melius; ita malum quod est diuturnius, est peius. Sed habitus vitiosus est diuturnior quam actus vitiosi, qui statim transeunt. Ergo habitus vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36501] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, plura mala sunt magis fugienda quam unum malum. Sed habitus malus virtualiter est causa multorum malorum actuum. Ergo habitus vitiosus est peior quam actus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36502] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, causa est potior quam effectus. Sed habitus perficit actum tam in bonitate quam in malitia. Ergo habitus est potior actu et in bonitate et in malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36503] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, pro actu vitioso aliquis iuste punitur, non autem pro habitu vitioso, si non procedat ad actum. Ergo actus vitiosus est peior quam habitus vitiosus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since "the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 co."><a name="36504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36504] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod habitus medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum. Manifestum est autem quod actus in bono et in malo praeeminet potentiae, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., melius est enim bene agere quam posse bene agere; et similiter vituperabilius est male agere quam posse male agere. Unde etiam sequitur quod habitus in bonitate et in malitia medium gradum obtineat inter potentiam et actum, ut scilicet, sicut habitus bonus vel malus praeeminet in bonitate vel malitia potentiae, ita etiam subdatur actui. Quod etiam ex hoc apparet, quod habitus non dicitur bonus vel malus nisi ex hoc quod inclinat ad actum bonum vel malum. Unde propter bonitatem vel malitiam actus, dicitur habitus bonus vel malus. Et sic potior est actus in bonitate vel malitia quam habitus, quia propter quod unumquodque tale, et illud magis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36505] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse simpliciter altero potius, quod tamen secundum quid ab eo deficit. Simpliciter enim potius iudicatur quod praeeminet quantum ad id quod per se consideratur in utroque, secundum quid autem quod praeeminet secundum id quod per accidens se habet ad utrumque. Ostensum est autem ex ipsa ratione actus et habitus, quod actus est potior in bonitate et malitia quam habitus. Quod autem habitus sit diuturnior quam actus, accidit ex eo quod utrumque invenitur in tali natura quae non potest semper agere, et cuius actio est in motu transeunte. Unde simpliciter actus est potior tam in bonitate quam in malitia, sed habitus est potior secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36506] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod habitus non est simpliciter plures actus, sed secundum quid, idest virtute. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi quod habitus sit simpliciter potior in bonitate vel malitia quam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36507] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod habitus est causa actus in genere causae efficientis, sed actus est causa habitus in genere causae finalis, secundum quam consideratur ratio boni et mali. Et ideo in bonitate et malitia actus praeeminet habitui.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A4-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 4. Whether sin is compatible with virtue?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36508] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus vitiosus, sive peccatum, non possit simul esse cum virtute. Contraria enim non possunt esse simul in eodem. Sed peccatum quodammodo contrariatur virtuti, ut dictum est. Ergo peccatum non potest simul esse cum virtute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, therefore, can sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36509] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum est peius quam vitium, idest actus malus quam habitus malus. Sed vitium non potest simul esse in eodem cum virtute. Ergo neque peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36510] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut peccatum accidit in rebus voluntariis, ita et in rebus naturalibus, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed nunquam in rebus naturalibus accidit peccatum nisi per aliquam corruptionem virtutis naturalis, sicut monstra accidunt corrupto aliquo principio in semine, ut dicitur in II Physic. Ergo etiam in rebus voluntariis non accidit peccatum nisi corrupta aliqua virtute animae. Et sic peccatum et virtus non possunt esse in eodem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes." Now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A3" id="FS_Q71_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[3]</a>): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36511] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod per contraria virtus generatur et corrumpitur. Sed unus actus virtuosus non causat virtutem, ut supra habitum est. Ergo neque unus actus peccati tollit virtutem. Possunt ergo simul in eodem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by one act as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q63_A2" id="FS_Q71_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[63], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as virtues." And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin. </p><p id="FS_Q71_A4-p7"> Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 co."><a name="36512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36512] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum comparatur ad virtutem sicut actus malus ad habitum bonum. Aliter autem se habet habitus in anima, et forma in re naturali. Forma enim naturalis ex necessitate producit operationem sibi convenientem, unde non potest esse simul cum forma naturali actus formae contrariae; sicut non potest esse cum calore actus infrigidationis, neque simul cum levitate motus descensionis, nisi forte ex violentia exterioris moventis. Sed habitus in anima non ex necessitate producit suam operationem, sed homo utitur eo cum voluerit. Unde simul habitu in homine existente, potest non uti habitu, aut agere contrarium actum. Et sic potest habens virtutem procedere ad actum peccati. Actus autem peccati, si comparetur ad ipsam virtutem prout est habitus quidam, non potest ipsam corrumpere, si sit unus tantum, sicut enim non generatur habitus per unum actum, ita nec per unum actum corrumpitur, ut supra dictum est. Sed si comparetur actus peccati ad causam virtutum, sic possibile est quod per unum actum peccati aliquae virtutes corrumpantur. Quodlibet enim peccatum mortale contrariatur caritati, quae est radix omnium virtutum infusarum, inquantum sunt virtutes, et ideo per unum actum peccati mortalis, exclusa caritate, excluduntur per consequens omnes virtutes infusae, quantum ad hoc quod sunt virtutes. Et hoc dico propter fidem et spem, quarum habitus remanent informes post peccatum mortale, et sic non sunt virtutes. Sed peccatum veniale, quod non contrariatur caritati nec excludit ipsam, per consequens etiam non excludit alias virtutes. Virtutes vero acquisitae non tolluntur per unum actum cuiuscumque peccati. Sic igitur peccatum mortale non potest simul esse cum virtutibus infusis, potest tamen simul esse cum virtutibus acquisitis. Peccatum vero veniale potest simul esse et cum virtutibus infusis, et cum acquisitis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36513] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum non contrariatur virtuti secundum se, sed secundum suum actum. Et ideo peccatum non potest simul esse cum actu virtutis, potest tamen simul esse cum habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36514] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod vitium directe contrariatur virtuti, sicut et peccatum actui virtuoso. Et ideo vitium excludit virtutem, sicut peccatum excludit actum virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36515] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod virtutes naturales agunt ex necessitate, et ideo, integra existente virtute, nunquam peccatum potest in actu inveniri. Sed virtutes animae non producunt actus ex necessitate, unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A5-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 5. Whether every sin includes an action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36516] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in quolibet peccato sit aliquis actus. Sicut enim meritum comparatur ad virtutem, ita peccatum ad vitium comparatur. Sed meritum non potest esse absque aliquo actu. Ergo nec peccatum potest esse absque aliquo actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies an act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36517] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>omne peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non sit voluntarium, non est peccatum</i>. Sed non potest esse aliquid voluntarium nisi per actum voluntatis. Ergo omne peccatum habet aliquem actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36518] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si peccatum esset absque aliquo actu, sequeretur quod ex hoc ipso quod aliquis cessat ab actu debito, peccaret. Sed continue aliquis cessat ab actu debito, ille scilicet qui nunquam actum debitum operatur. Ergo sequeretur quod continue peccaret, quod est falsum. Non ergo est aliquod peccatum absque actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q71_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv">James 4:17</a>): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36519] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Iac. IV, <i>scienti bonum facere et non facienti, peccatum est illi</i>. Sed non facere non importat aliquem actum. Ergo peccatum potest esse absque actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not to go to church," when he is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin. </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p7"> Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills "not to go to church": while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church. </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p8"> If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission. </p><p id="FS_Q71_A5-p9"> Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 co."><a name="36520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36520] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quaestio ista principaliter movetur propter peccatum omissionis, de quo aliqui diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim dicunt quod in omni peccato omissionis est aliquis actus vel interior vel exterior. Interior quidem, sicut cum aliquis vult non ire ad Ecclesiam quando ire tenetur. Exterior autem, sicut cum aliquis illa hora qua ad Ecclesiam ire tenetur, vel etiam ante, occupat se talibus quibus ab eundo ad Ecclesiam impeditur. Et hoc quodammodo videtur in primum redire, qui enim vult aliquid cum quo aliud simul esse non potest, ex consequenti vult illo carere; nisi forte non perpendat quod per hoc quod vult facere, impeditur ab eo quod facere tenetur; in quo casu posset per negligentiam culpabilis iudicari. Alii vero dicunt quod in peccato omissionis non requiritur aliquis actus, ipsum enim non facere quod quis facere tenetur, peccatum est. Utraque autem opinio secundum aliquid veritatem habet. Si enim intelligatur in peccato omissionis illud solum quod per se pertinet ad rationem peccati, sic quandoque omissionis peccatum est cum actu interiori, ut cum aliquis vult non ire ad Ecclesiam, quandoque vero absque omni actu vel interiori vel exteriori, sicut cum aliquis hora qua tenetur ire ad Ecclesiam, nihil cogitat de eundo vel non eundo ad Ecclesiam. Si vero in peccato omissionis intelligantur etiam causae vel occasiones omittendi, sic necesse est in peccato omissionis aliquem actum esse. Non enim est peccatum omissionis nisi cum aliquis praetermittit quod potest facere et non facere. Quod autem aliquis declinet ad non faciendum illud quod potest facere et non facere, non est nisi ex aliqua causa vel occasione coniuncta vel praecedente. Et si quidem causa illa non sit in potestate hominis, omissio non habet rationem peccati, sicut cum aliquis propter infirmitatem praetermittit ad Ecclesiam ire. Si vero causa vel occasio omittendi subiaceat voluntati, omissio habet rationem peccati, et tunc semper oportet quod ista causa, inquantum est voluntaria, habeat aliquem actum, ad minus interiorem voluntatis. Qui quidem actus quandoque directe fertur in ipsam omissionem, puta cum aliquis vult non ire ad Ecclesiam, vitans laborem. Et tunc talis actus per se pertinet ad omissionem, voluntas enim cuiuscumque peccati per se pertinet ad peccatum illud, eo quod voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Quandoque autem actus voluntatis directe fertur in aliud, per quod homo impeditur ab actu debito, sive illud in quod fertur voluntas, sit coniunctum omissioni, puta cum aliquis vult ludere quando ad Ecclesiam debet ire; sive etiam sit praecedens, puta cum aliquis vult diu vigilare de sero, ex quo sequitur quod non vadat hora matutinali ad Ecclesiam. Et tunc actus iste interior vel exterior per accidens se habet ad omissionem, quia omissio sequitur praeter intentionem; hoc autem dicimus per accidens esse, quod est praeter intentionem, ut patet in II Physic. Unde manifestum est quod tunc peccatum omissionis habet quidem aliquem actum coniunctum vel praecedentem, qui tamen per accidens se habet ad peccatum omissionis. Iudicium autem de rebus dandum est secundum illud quod est per se, et non secundum illud quod est per accidens. Unde verius dici potest quod aliquod peccatum possit esse absque omni actu. Alioquin etiam ad essentiam aliorum peccatorum actualium pertinerent actus et occasiones circumstantes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> More things are required for good than for evil, since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36521] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod plura requiruntur ad bonum quam ad malum, eo quod <i>bonum contingit ex tota integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus</i>, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Et ideo peccatum potest contingere sive aliquis faciat quod non debet, sive non faciendo quod debet, sed meritum non potest esse nisi aliquis faciat voluntarie quod debet. Et ideo meritum non potest esse sine actu, sed peccatum potest esse sine actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in his power to will, and not to will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36522] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium non solum quia cadit super ipsum actus voluntatis, sed quia in potestate nostra est ut fiat vel non fiat, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Unde etiam ipsum non velle potest dici voluntarium, inquantum in potestate hominis est velle et non velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A5-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36523] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum omissionis contrariatur praecepto affirmativo, quod obligat semper, sed non ad semper. Et ideo solum pro tempore illo aliquis cessando ab actu peccat, pro quo praeceptum affirmativum obligat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q71_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q71_A6-p0.1">Q. 71. A. 6. Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: "Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law." Because "Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q71_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore this definition does not include every sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36524] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter definiatur peccatum, cum dicitur, peccatum est <i>dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam</i>. Dictum enim, vel factum, vel concupitum, importat aliquem actum. Sed non omne peccatum importat aliquem actum, ut dictum est. Ergo haec definitio non includit omne peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids." Now will is comprised under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36525] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de duabus animabus, <i>peccatum est voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod iustitia vetat</i>. Sed voluntas sub concupiscentia comprehenditur, secundum quod concupiscentia largo modo sumitur, pro omni appetitu. Ergo suffecisset dicere, peccatum est concupitum contra legem aeternam; nec oportuit addere, dictum vel factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the end as explained above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A2" id="FS_Q71_A6-p4.3" shape="rect"> Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use." Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36526] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum proprie consistere videtur in aversione a fine, nam bonum et malum principaliter considerantur secundum finem, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde et Augustinus, in I de Lib. Arb., per comparationem ad finem definit peccatum, dicens quod <i>peccare nihil est aliud quam, neglectis rebus aeternis, temporalia sectari</i>, et in libro octoginta trium quaest., dicit quod <i>omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis et frui utendis</i>. Sed in praemissa definitione nulla fit mentio de aversione a debito fine. Ergo insufficienter definitur peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="36527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36527] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ex hoc dicitur aliquid esse prohibitum, quia legi contrariatur. Sed non omnia peccata sunt mala quia prohibita, sed quaedam sunt prohibita quia mala. Non ergo in communi definitione peccati debuit poni quod sit contra legem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5"><a name="36528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36528] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum significat malum hominis actum, ut ex dictis patet. Sed malum hominis est contra rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo potius debuit dici quod peccatum sit contra rationem, quam quod peccatum sit contra legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36529] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> In contrarium sufficit auctoritas Augustini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q71_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal law." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 co."><a name="36530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36530] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, peccatum nihil aliud est quam actus humanus malus. Quod autem aliquis actus sit humanus, habet ex hoc quod est voluntarius, sicut ex supradictis patet, sive sit voluntarius quasi a voluntate elicitus, ut ipsum velle et eligere; sive quasi a voluntate imperatus, ut exteriores actus vel locutionis vel operationis. Habet autem actus humanus quod sit malus, ex eo quod caret debita commensuratione. Omnis autem commensuratio cuiuscumque rei attenditur per comparationem ad aliquam regulam, a qua si divertat, incommensurata erit. Regula autem voluntatis humanae est duplex, una propinqua et homogenea, scilicet ipsa humana ratio; alia vero est prima regula, scilicet lex aeterna, quae est quasi ratio Dei. Et ideo Augustinus in definitione peccati posuit duo, unum quod pertinet ad substantiam actus humani, quod est quasi materiale in peccato, cum dixit, dictum vel factum vel concupitum; aliud autem quod pertinet ad rationem mali, quod est quasi formale in peccato, cum dixit, contra legem aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so "word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is not said, what is done and what is not done. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36531] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod affirmatio et negatio reducuntur ad idem genus, sicut in divinis genitum et ingenitum ad relationem, ut Augustinus dicit, in V de Trin. Et ideo pro eodem est accipiendum dictum et non dictum, factum et non factum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external action. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36532] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod prima causa peccati est in voluntate, quae imperat omnes actus voluntarios, in quibus solum invenitur peccatum, et ideo Augustinus quandoque per solam voluntatem definit peccatum. Sed quia etiam ipsi exteriores actus pertinent ad substantiam peccati, cum sint secundum se mali, ut dictum est, necesse fuit quod in definitione peccati poneretur etiam aliquid pertinens ad exteriores actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end and all other forms of inordinateness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36533] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod lex aeterna primo et principaliter ordinat hominem ad finem, consequenter autem facit hominem bene se habere circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Et ideo in hoc quod dicit contra legem aeternam, tangit aversionem a fine, et omnes alias inordinationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely because it is inordinate. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="36534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36534] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod non omne peccatum ideo est malum quia est prohibitum, intelligitur de prohibitione facta per ius positivum. Si autem referatur ad ius naturale, quod continetur primo quidem in lege aeterna, secundario vero in naturali iudicatorio rationis humanae, tunc omne peccatum est malum quia prohibitum, ex hoc enim ipso quod est inordinatum, iuri naturali repugnat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q71_A6-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being "contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 71 a. 6 ad 5"><a name="36535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36535] Iª-IIae q. 71 a. 6 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod a theologis consideratur peccatum praecipue secundum quod est offensa contra Deum, a philosopho autem morali, secundum quod contrariatur rationi. Et ideo Augustinus convenientius definit peccatum ex hoc quod est contra legem aeternam, quam ex hoc quod est contra rationem, praecipue cum per legem aeternam regulemur in multis quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut in his quae sunt fidei.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q72" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q72-p0.1">Q. 72. OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q72-p2"> We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q72-p3"><a href="#FS_Q72_A1"> (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p4"><a href="#FS_Q72_A2"> (2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p5"><a href="#FS_Q72_A3"> (3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p6"><a href="#FS_Q72_A4"> (4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p7"><a href="#FS_Q72_A5"> (5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p8"><a href="#FS_Q72_A6"> (6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p9"><a href="#FS_Q72_A7"> (7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p10"><a href="#FS_Q72_A8"> (8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?</a></p><p id="FS_Q72-p11"><a href="#FS_Q72_A9"> (9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 pr."><a name="36536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36536] Iª-IIae q. 72 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de distinctione peccatorum vel vitiorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur novem. Primo, utrum peccata distinguantur specie secundum obiecta. Secundo, de distinctione peccatorum spiritualium et carnalium. Tertio, utrum secundum causas. Quarto, utrum secundum eos in quos peccatur. Quinto, utrum secundum diversitatem reatus. Sexto, utrum secundum omissionem et commissionem. Septimo, utrum secundum diversum processum peccati. Octavo, utrum secundum abundantiam et defectum. Nono, utrum secundum diversas circumstantias.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q72_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A1-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 1. Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q72_A1-p2.3" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36537] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata non differant specie secundum obiecta. Actus enim humani praecipue dicuntur boni vel mali per comparationem ad finem, ut supra ostensum est. Cum igitur peccatum nihil aliud sit quam actus hominis malus, sicut dictum est, videtur quod secundum fines peccata debeant distingui specie, magis quam secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36538] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, malum, cum sit privatio, distinguitur specie secundum diversas species oppositorum. Sed peccatum est quoddam malum in genere humanorum actuum. Ergo peccata magis distinguuntur specie secundum opposita, quam secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36539] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si peccata specie differrent secundum obiecta, impossibile esset idem peccatum specie circa diversa obiecta inveniri. Sed inveniuntur aliqua huiusmodi peccata, nam superbia est et in rebus spiritualibus et in corporalibus, ut Gregorius dicit, in libro XXXIV Moral.; avaritia etiam est circa diversa genera rerum. Ergo peccata non distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law." Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q72_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a> ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36540] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei. Sed dicta vel facta vel concupita distinguuntur specie secundum diversa obiecta, quia actus per obiecta distinguuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo etiam peccata secundum obiecta specie distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects, as was proved above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q72_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 co."><a name="36541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36541] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem peccati duo concurrunt, scilicet actus voluntarius; et inordinatio eius, quae est per recessum a lege Dei. Horum autem duorum unum per se comparatur ad peccantem, qui intendit talem actum voluntarium exercere in tali materia, aliud autem, scilicet inordinatio actus, per accidens se habet ad intentionem peccantis; nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque, consequitur speciem secundum illud quod est per se, non autem secundum id quod est per accidens, quia ea quae sunt per accidens, sunt extra rationem speciei. Et ideo peccata specie distinguuntur ex parte actuum voluntariorum, magis quam ex parte inordinationis in peccato existentis. Actus autem voluntarii distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut in superioribus ostensum est. Unde sequitur quod peccata proprie distinguantur specie secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36542] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod finis principaliter habet rationem boni, et ideo comparatur ad actum voluntatis, qui est primordialis in omni peccato, sicut obiectum. Unde in idem redit quod peccata differant secundum obiecta, vel secundum fines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q72_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36543] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito ordine privatus. Et ideo peccata magis distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta actuum, quam secundum opposita. Quamvis etiam si distinguantur secundum oppositas virtutes, in idem rediret, virtutes enim distinguuntur specie secundum obiecta, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things adapted to human use. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36544] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod nihil prohibet in diversis rebus specie vel genere differentibus, invenire unam formalem rationem obiecti, a qua peccatum speciem recipit. Et hoc modo superbia circa diversas res excellentiam quaerit, avaritia vero abundantiam eorum quae usui humano accommodantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A2-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 2. Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.19" target="asv">Gal. 5:19</a>): "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36545] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter distinguantur peccata spiritualia a carnalibus. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Galat. V, <i>manifesta sunt opera carnis, quae sunt fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia, luxuria, idolorum servitus, veneficia,</i> etc., ex quo videtur quod omnia peccatorum genera sunt opera carnis. Sed peccata carnalia dicuntur opera carnis. Ergo non sunt distinguenda peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.13" target="asv"> Rom. 8:13</a>: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live." Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36546] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque peccat, secundum carnem ambulat, secundum illud Rom. VIII, <i>si secundum carnem vixeritis, moriemini; si autem spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis</i>. Sed vivere vel ambulare secundum carnem, videtur pertinere ad rationem peccati carnalis. Ergo omnia peccata sunt carnalia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda peccata carnalia a spiritualibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv"> Eph. 4:23</a>: "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on ( <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q72_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[74], A[7]</a>). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36547] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, superior pars animae, quae est mens vel ratio, spiritus nominatur, secundum illud Ephes. IV, <i>renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae</i>, ubi spiritus pro ratione ponitur, ut ibi Glossa dicit. Sed omne peccatum quod secundum carnem committitur, a ratione derivatur per consensum, quia superioris rationis est consentire in actum peccati, ut infra dicetur. Ergo eadem peccata sunt carnalia et spiritualia. Non ergo sunt distinguenda ad invicem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against his own body. But, according to the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.6.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 6:18</a>), "every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body." Therefore fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.3" target="asv">Eph. 5:3</a>) reckons covetousness with the carnal sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36548] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si aliqua peccata specialiter sunt carnalia, hoc potissime intelligendum videtur de illis peccatis quibus aliquis in corpus suum peccat. Sed sicut apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. VI, <i>omne peccatum quodcumque fecerit homo, extra corpus est, qui autem fornicatur, in corpus suum peccat</i>. Ergo sola fornicatio esset peccatum carnale, cum tamen apostolus, ad Ephes. V, etiam avaritiam carnalibus peccatis annumeret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36549] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., dicit quod <i>septem capitalium vitiorum quinque sunt spiritualia, et duo carnalia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure. </p><p id="FS_Q72_A2-p8"> Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.1" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:1</a>): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 co."><a name="36550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36550] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccata recipiunt speciem ex obiectis. Omne autem peccatum consistit in appetitu alicuius commutabilis boni quod inordinate appetitur, et per consequens in eo iam habito inordinate aliquis delectatur. Ut autem ex superioribus patet, duplex est delectatio. Una quidem animalis, quae consummatur in sola apprehensione alicuius rei ad votum habitae, et haec etiam potest dici delectatio spiritualis, sicut cum aliquis delectatur in laude humana, vel in aliquo huiusmodi. Alia vero delectatio est corporalis, sive naturalis, quae in ipso tactu corporali perficitur, quae potest etiam dici delectatio carnalis. Sic igitur illa peccata quae perficiuntur in delectatione spirituali, vocantur peccata spiritualia, illa vero quae perficiuntur in delectatione carnali, vocantur peccata carnalia; sicut gula, quae perficitur in delectatione ciborum, et luxuria, quae perficitur in delectatione venereorum. Unde et apostolus dicit II ad Cor. VII. <i>Emundemus nos ab omni inquinamento, carnis et spiritus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36551] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, illa vitia dicuntur opera carnis, <i>non quia in voluptate carnis perficiantur, sed caro sumitur ibi pro homine, qui dum secundum se vivit, secundum carnem vivere dicitur</i>; ut etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Et huius ratio est ex hoc, quod omnis rationis humanae defectus ex sensu carnali aliquo modo initium habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36552] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc etiam patet responsio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36553] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in peccatis etiam carnalibus est aliquis actus spiritualis, scilicet actus rationis, sed finis horum peccatorum, a quo denominantur, est delectatio carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36554] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, <i>specialiter in fornicationis peccato servit anima corpori, intantum ut nihil aliud in ipso momento cogitare homini liceat</i>. Delectatio autem gulae, etsi sit carnalis, non ita absorbet rationem. Vel potest dici quod in hoc peccato etiam quaedam iniuria fit corpori, dum inordinate maculatur. Et ideo per hoc solum peccatum dicitur specialiter homo in corpus peccare. Avaritia vero quae in carnalibus peccatis connumeratur, pro adulterio ponitur, quod est iniusta usurpatio uxoris alienae. Vel potest dici quod res in qua delectatur avarus, corporale quoddam est, et quantum ad hoc, connumeratur peccatis carnalibus. Sed ipsa delectatio non pertinet ad carnem, sed ad spiritum, et ideo secundum Gregorium, est spirituale peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A3-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 3. Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ specifically in reference to their causes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36555] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata distinguantur specie secundum causas. Ab eodem enim habet res speciem, a quo habet esse. Sed peccata habent esse ex suis causis. Ergo ab eis etiam speciem sortiuntur. Differunt ergo specie secundum diversitatem causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference to their other causes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36556] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, inter alias causas minus videtur pertinere ad speciem causa materialis. Sed obiectum in peccato est sicut causa materialis. Cum ergo secundum obiecta peccata specie distinguantur, videtur quod peccata multo magis secundum alias causas distinguantur specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine, commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor." For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>) that "all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the pride of life." Now a thing is said to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36557] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit quod <i>omne peccatum est ex timore male humiliante, vel ex amore male inflammante</i>. Dicitur etiam I Ioan. II, quod <i>omne quod est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia vitae</i>, dicitur autem aliquid esse in mundo, propter peccatum, secundum quod mundi nomine amatores mundi significantur, ut Augustinus dicit, super Ioan. Gregorius etiam, XXXI Moral., distinguit omnia peccata secundum septem vitia capitalia. Omnes autem huiusmodi divisiones respiciunt causas peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod peccata differant specie secundum diversitatem causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>) that "the desire of money is the root of all evils." Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36558] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia secundum hoc omnia peccata essent unius speciei, cum ex una causa causentur, dicitur enim Eccli. X, quod <i>initium omnis peccati est superbia</i>; et I ad Tim. ult., quod <i>radix omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>. Manifestum est autem esse diversas species peccatorum. Non ergo peccata distinguuntur specie secundum diversitates causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and the "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form, both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q72_A3-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6) that human acts take their species from the end. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 co."><a name="36559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36559] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum quatuor sint causarum genera, diversimode diversis attribuuntur. Causa enim formalis et materialis respiciunt proprie substantiam rei, et ideo substantiae secundum formam et materiam specie et genere distinguuntur. Agens autem et finis respiciunt directe motum et operationem, et ideo motus et operationes secundum huiusmodi causas specie distinguuntur; diversimode tamen. Nam principia activa naturalia sunt determinata semper ad eosdem actus, et ideo diversae species in actibus naturalibus attenduntur non solum secundum obiecta, quae sunt fines vel termini, sed etiam secundum principia activa; sicut calefacere et infrigidare distinguuntur specie secundum calidum et frigidum. Sed principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cuiusmodi sunt actus peccatorum, non se habent ex necessitate ad unum, et ideo ex uno principio activo vel motivo possunt diversae species peccatorum procedere; sicut ex timore male humiliante potest procedere quod homo furetur, et quod occidat, et quod deserat gregem sibi commissum; et haec eadem possunt procedere ex amore. Unde manifestum est quod peccata non differant specie secundum diversas causas activas vel motivas; sed solum secundum diversitatem causae finalis. Finis autem est obiectum voluntatis, ostensum est enim supra quod actus humani habent speciem ex fine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36560] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principia activa in actibus voluntariis, cum non sint determinata ad unum, non sufficiunt ad producendum humanos actus, nisi determinetur voluntas ad unum per intentionem finis; ut patet per philosophum, in IX Metaphys. Et ideo a fine perficitur et esse et species peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the character of end. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36561] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod obiecta, secundum quod comparantur ad actus exteriores, habent rationem materiae circa quam, sed secundum quod comparantur ad actum interiorem voluntatis, habent rationem finium; et ex hoc habent quod dent speciem actui. Quamvis etiam secundum quod sunt materia circa quam, habeant rationem terminorum; a quibus motus specificantur, ut dicitur in V Physic. et in X Ethic. Sed tamen etiam termini motus dant speciem motibus, inquantum habent rationem finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36562] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illae divisiones peccatorum non dantur ad distinguendas species peccatorum; sed ad manifestandas diversas causas eorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A4-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 4. Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q66_A6" id="FS_Q72_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[66], A[6]</a>). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36563] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccatum distinguatur per peccatum quod est in Deum, in proximum, et in seipsum. Illud enim quod est commune omni peccato, non debet poni quasi pars in divisione peccati. Sed commune est omni peccato quod sit contra Deum, ponitur enim in definitione peccati quod sit contra legem Dei, ut supra dictum est. Non ergo peccatum in Deum debet poni quasi pars in divisione peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36564] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis divisio debet fieri per opposita. Sed ista tria genera peccatorum non sunt opposita, quicumque enim peccat in proximum, peccat etiam in seipsum et in Deum. Non ergo peccatum convenienter dividitur secundum haec tria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36565] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea quae sunt extrinsecus, non conferunt speciem. Sed Deus et proximus sunt extra nos. Ergo per haec non distinguuntur peccata secundum speciem. Inconvenienter igitur secundum haec tria peccatum dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36566] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Isidorus, in libro de summo bono, distinguens peccata, dicit quod <i>homo dicitur peccare in se, in Deum, et in proximum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from what has been said ( <a href="#FS_Q62_A1" id="FS_Q72_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[62], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his neighbor. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 co."><a name="36567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36567] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum est actus inordinatus. Triplex autem ordo in homine debet esse. Unus quidem secundum comparationem ad regulam rationis, prout scilicet omnes actiones et passiones nostrae debent secundum regulam rationis commensurari. Alius autem ordo est per comparationem ad regulam divinae legis, per quam homo in omnibus dirigi debet. Et si quidem homo naturaliter esset animal solitarium, hic duplex ordo sufficeret, sed quia homo est naturaliter animal politicum et sociale, ut probatur in I Polit., ideo necesse est quod sit tertius ordo, quo homo ordinetur ad alios homines, quibus convivere debet. Horum autem ordinum secundus continet primum, et excedit ipsum. Quaecumque enim continentur sub ordine rationis, continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei, sed quaedam continentur sub ordine ipsius Dei, quae excedunt rationem humanam, sicut ea quae sunt fidei, et quae debentur soli Deo. Unde qui in talibus peccat, dicitur in Deum peccare, sicut haereticus et sacrilegus et blasphemus. Similiter etiam secundus ordo includit tertium, et excedit ipsum. Quia in omnibus in quibus ordinamur ad proximum, oportet nos dirigi secundum regulam rationis, sed in quibusdam dirigimur secundum rationem quantum ad nos tantum, non autem quantum ad proximum. Et quando in his peccatur, dicitur homo peccare in seipsum, sicut patet de guloso, luxurioso et prodigo. Quando vero peccat homo in his quibus ad proximum ordinatur, dicitur peccare in proximum, sicut patet de fure et homicida. Sunt autem diversa quibus homo ordinatur ad Deum, et ad proximum, et ad seipsum. Unde haec distinctio peccatorum est secundum obiecta, secundum quae diversificantur species peccatorum. Unde haec distinctio peccatorum proprie est secundum diversas peccatorum species. Nam et virtutes, quibus peccata opponuntur, secundum hanc differentiam specie distinguuntur, manifestum est enim ex dictis quod virtutibus theologicis homo ordinatur ad Deum, temperantia vero et fortitudine ad seipsum, iustitia autem ad proximum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36568] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccare in Deum, secundum quod ordo qui est ad Deum, includit omnem humanum ordinem, commune est omni peccato. Sed quantum ad id quod ordo Dei excedit alios duos ordines, sic peccatum in Deum est speciale genus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers three and four. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36569] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod quando aliqua quorum unum includit alterum, ab invicem distinguuntur, intelligitur fieri distinctio non secundum illud quod unum continetur in altero, sed secundum illud quod unum excedit alterum. Sicut patet in divisione numerorum et figurarum, non enim triangulus dividitur contra quadratum secundum quod continetur in eo, sed secundum quod exceditur ab eo; et similiter est de ternario et quaternario.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36570] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus et proximus, quamvis sint exteriora respectu ipsius peccantis, non tamen sunt extranea respectu actus peccati; sed comparantur ad ipsum sicut propria obiecta ipsius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A5-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 5. Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36571] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod divisio peccatorum quae est secundum reatum, diversificet speciem, puta cum dividitur secundum veniale et mortale. Ea enim quae in infinitum differunt, non possunt esse unius speciei, nec etiam unius generis. Sed veniale et mortale peccatum differunt in infinitum, veniali enim debetur poena temporalis, mortali poena aeterna; mensura autem poenae respondet quantitati culpae, secundum illud Deut. XXV, <i>pro mensura delicti erit et plagarum modus</i>. Ergo veniale et mortale non sunt unius generis, nedum quod sint unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36572] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quaedam peccata sunt mortalia ex genere, sicut homicidium et adulterium, quaedam vero ex suo genere sunt peccata venialia, sicut verbum otiosum et risus superfluus. Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale specie differunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36573] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut se habet actus virtuosus ad praemium, ita se habet peccatum ad poenam. Sed praemium est finis virtuosi actus. Ergo et poena est finis peccati. Sed peccata distinguuntur specie secundum fines, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam distinguuntur specie secundum reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36574] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ea quae constituunt speciem, sunt priora, sicut differentiae specificae. Sed poena sequitur culpam, sicut effectus eius. Ergo peccata non differunt specie secundum reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man. </p><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p7"> We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the agent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it. </p><p id="FS_Q72_A5-p8"> Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 co."><a name="36575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36575] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod eorum quae specie differunt, duplex differentia invenitur. Una quidem quae constituit diversitatem specierum, et talis differentia nunquam invenitur nisi in speciebus diversis; sicut rationale et irrationale, animatum et inanimatum. Alia autem differentia est consequens diversitatem speciei, et talis differentia, etsi in aliquibus consequatur diversitatem speciei, in aliis tamen potest inveniri in eadem specie; sicut album et nigrum consequuntur diversitatem speciei corvi et cygni, tamen invenitur huiusmodi differentia in eadem hominis specie. Dicendum est ergo quod differentia venialis et mortalis peccati, vel quaecumque alia differentia sumitur penes reatum, non potest esse differentia constituens diversitatem speciei. Nunquam enim id quod est per accidens, constituit speciem. Id autem quod est praeter intentionem agentis, est per accidens, ut patet in II Physic. Manifestum est autem quod poena est praeter intentionem peccantis. Unde per accidens se habet ad peccatum, ex parte ipsius peccantis. Ordinatur tamen ad peccatum ab exteriori, scilicet ex iustitia iudicantis, qui secundum diversas conditiones peccatorum diversas poenas infligit. Unde differentia quae est ex reatu poenae, potest consequi diversam speciem peccatorum; non autem constituit diversitatem speciei. Differentia autem peccati venialis et mortalis consequitur diversitatem inordinationis, quae complet rationem peccati. Duplex enim est inordinatio, una per subtractionem principii ordinis; alia qua, salvato principio ordinis, fit inordinatio circa ea quae sunt post principium. Sicut in corpore animalis quandoque quidem inordinatio complexionis procedit usque ad destructionem principii vitalis, et haec est mors, quandoque vero, salvo principio vitae, fit inordinatio quaedam in humoribus, et tunc est aegritudo. Principium autem totius ordinis in moralibus est finis ultimus, qui ita se habet in operativis, sicut principium indemonstrabile in speculativis, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Unde quando anima deordinatur per peccatum usque ad aversionem ab ultimo fine, scilicet Deo, cui unimur per caritatem, tunc est peccatum mortale, quando vero fit deordinatio citra aversionem a Deo, tunc est peccatum veniale. Sicut enim in corporalibus deordinatio mortis, quae est per remotionem principii vitae, est irreparabilis secundum naturam; inordinatio autem aegritudinis reparari potest, propter id quod salvatur principium vitae; similiter est in his quae pertinent ad animam. Nam in speculativis qui errat circa principia, impersuasibilis est, qui autem errat salvatis principiis, per ipsa principia revocari potest. Et similiter in operativis qui peccando avertitur ab ultimo fine, quantum est ex natura peccati, habet lapsum irreparabilem, et ideo dicitur peccare mortaliter, aeternaliter puniendus. Qui vero peccat citra aversionem a Deo, ex ipsa ratione peccati reparabiliter deordinatur, quia salvatur principium, et ideo dicitur peccare venialiter, quia scilicet non ita peccat ut mereatur interminabilem poenam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they "turn away from," not as regards what they "turn to," viz. the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species "adultery" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36576] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in infinitum ex parte aversionis, non autem ex parte conversionis, per quam respicit obiectum, unde peccatum speciem habet. Unde nihil prohibet in eadem specie inveniri aliquod peccatum mortale et veniale, sicut primus motus in genere adulterii est peccatum veniale; et verbum otiosum, quod plerumque est veniale, potest etiam esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36577] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc quod invenitur aliquod peccatum mortale ex genere, et aliquod peccatum veniale ex genere, sequitur quod talis differentia consequatur diversitatem peccatorum secundum speciem, non autem quod causet eam. Talis autem differentia potest inveniri etiam in his quae sunt eiusdem speciei, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36578] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod praemium est de intentione merentis vel virtuose agentis, sed poena non est de intentione peccantis, sed magis est contra voluntatem ipsius. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A6-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 6. Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For "offense" and "sin" are condivided with one another ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.1" target="asv">Eph. 2:1</a>), where it is written: "When you were dead in your offenses and sins," which words a gloss explains, saying: "'Offenses,' by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by doing what was forbidden." Whence it is evident that "offenses" here denotes sins of omission; while "sin" denotes sins of commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36579] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum commissionis et omissionis specie differant. Delictum enim contra peccatum dividitur, Ephes. II, ubi dicitur, <i>cum essetis mortui delictis et peccatis vestris</i>. Et exponit ibi Glossa, <i>delictis, idest dimittendo quae iubentur; et peccatis, scilicet agendo prohibita</i>, ex quo patet quod per delictum intelligitur peccatum omissionis, per peccatum, peccatum commissionis. Differunt igitur specie, cum ex opposito dividantur, tanquam diversae species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q72_A6-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36580] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccato per se convenit quod sit contra legem Dei, ponitur enim in eius definitione, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed in lege Dei alia sunt praecepta affirmativa, contra quae est peccatum omissionis; et alia praecepta negativa, contra quae est peccatum commissionis. Ergo peccatum omissionis et peccatum commissionis differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36581] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omissio et commissio differunt sicut affirmatio et negatio. Sed affirmatio et negatio non possunt esse unius speciei, quia negatio non habet speciem; non entis enim non sunt neque species neque differentiae, ut philosophus dicit. Ergo omissio et commissio non possunt esse unius speciei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36582] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, in eadem specie peccati invenitur omissio et commissio, avarus enim et aliena rapit, quod est peccatum commissionis; et sua non dat quibus dare debet, quod est peccatum omissionis. Ergo omissio et commissio non differunt specie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 co."><a name="36583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36583] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in peccatis invenitur duplex differentia, una materialis, et alia formalis. Materialis quidem attenditur secundum naturalem speciem actuum peccati, formalis autem secundum ordinem ad unum finem proprium, quod est obiectum proprium. Unde inveniuntur aliqui actus materialiter specie differentes, qui tamen formaliter sunt in eadem specie peccati, quia ad idem ordinantur, sicut ad eandem speciem homicidii pertinet iugulatio, lapidatio et perforatio, quamvis actus sint specie differentes secundum speciem naturae. Sic ergo si loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et commissionis materialiter, differunt specie, large tamen loquendo de specie, secundum quod negatio vel privatio speciem habere potest. Si autem loquamur de specie peccati omissionis et commissionis formaliter, sic non differunt specie, quia ad idem ordinantur, et ex eodem motivo procedunt. Avarus enim ad congregandum pecuniam et rapit, et non dat ea quae dare debet; et similiter gulosus ad satisfaciendum gulae, et superflua comedit, et ieiunia debita praetermittit; et idem est videre in ceteris. Semper enim in rebus negatio fundatur super aliqua affirmatione, quae est quodammodo causa eius, unde etiam in rebus naturalibus eiusdem rationis est quod ignis calefaciat, et quod non infrigidet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to material species, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36584] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa divisio quae est per commissionem et omissionem, non est secundum diversas species formales, sed materiales tantum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36585] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod necesse fuit in lege Dei proponi diversa praecepta affirmativa et negativa, ut gradatim homines introducerentur ad virtutem, prius quidem abstinendo a malo, ad quod inducimur per praecepta negativa; et postmodum faciendo bonum, ad quod inducimur per praecepta affirmativa. Et sic praecepta affirmativa et negativa non pertinent ad diversas virtutes, sed ad diversos gradus virtutis. Et per consequens non oportet quod contrarientur diversis peccatis secundum speciem. Peccatum etiam non habet speciem ex parte aversionis, quia secundum hoc est negatio vel privatio, sed ex parte conversionis, secundum quod est actus quidam. Unde secundum diversa praecepta legis non diversificantur peccata secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36586] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de materiali diversitate speciei. Sciendum est tamen quod negatio, etsi proprie non sit in specie, constituitur tamen in specie per reductionem ad aliquam affirmationem quam sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A7-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 7. Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three stages of sin, of which the first is "when the carnal sense offers a bait," which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached "when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought"; and the third stage, "when consent is given to the deed." Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36587] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter dividatur peccatum in peccatum cordis, oris, et operis. Augustinus enim, in XII de Trin., ponit tres gradus peccati, quorum primus est, cum carnalis sensus illecebram quandam ingerit, quod est peccatum cogitationis, secundus gradus est, quando sola cogitationis delectatione aliquis contentus est; tertius gradus est, quando faciendum decernitur per consensum. Sed tria haec pertinent ad peccatum cordis. Ergo inconvenienter peccatum cordis ponitur quasi unum genus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is "a fault hidden in the heart"; the second, "when it is done openly"; the third, "when it is formed into a habit"; and the fourth, "when man goes so far as to presume on God's mercy or to give himself up to despair": where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36588] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Gregorius, in IV Moral., ponit quatuor gradus peccati, quorum primus est culpa latens in corde; secundus, cum exterius publicatur; tertius est, cum consuetudine roboratur; quartus est, cum usque ad praesumptionem divinae misericordiae, vel ad desperationem, homo procedit. Ubi non distinguitur peccatum operis a peccato oris; et adduntur duo alii peccatorum gradus. Ergo inconveniens fuit prima divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36589] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, non potest esse peccatum in ore vel in opere, nisi fiat prius in corde. Ergo ista peccata specie non differunt. Non ergo debent contra se invicem dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome in commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>: "The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36590] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Hieronymus dicit, super Ezech., <i>tria sunt generalia delicta quibus humanum subiacet genus, aut enim cogitatione, aut sermone, aut opere peccamus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 co."><a name="36591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36591] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua inveniuntur differre specie dupliciter. Uno modo, ex eo quod utrumque habet speciem completam, sicut equus et bos differunt specie. Alio modo, secundum diversos gradus in aliqua generatione vel motu accipiuntur diversae species, sicut aedificatio est completa generatio domus, collocatio autem fundamenti et erectio parietis sunt species incompletae, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic.; et idem etiam potest dici in generationibus animalium. Sic igitur peccatum dividitur per haec tria, scilicet peccatum oris, cordis et operis, non sicut per diversas species completas, nam consummatio peccati est in opere, unde peccatum operis habet speciem completam. Sed prima inchoatio eius est quasi fundatio in corde; secundus autem gradus eius est in ore, secundum quod homo prorumpit facile ad manifestandum conceptum cordis; tertius autem gradus iam est in consummatione operis. Et sic haec tria differunt secundum diversos gradus peccati. Patet tamen quod haec tria pertinent ad unam perfectam peccati speciem, cum ab eodem motivo procedant, iracundus enim, ex hoc quod appetit vindictam, primo quidem perturbatur in corde; secundo, in verba contumeliosa prorumpit; tertio vero, procedit usque ad facta iniuriosa. Et idem patet in luxuria, et in quolibet alio peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36592] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne peccatum cordis convenit in ratione occulti, et secundum hoc ponitur unus gradus. Qui tamen per tres gradus distinguitur, scilicet cogitationis, delectationis et consensus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome (in commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q72_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.43.23" target="asv"> Ezech. 43:23</a>) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36593] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum oris et operis conveniunt in manifestatione, et propter hoc a Gregorio sub uno computantur. Hieronymus autem distinguit ea, quia in peccato oris est manifestatio tantum, et principaliter intenta, in peccato vero operis est principaliter expletio interioris conceptus cordis, sed manifestatio est ex consequenti. Consuetudo vero et desperatio sunt gradus consequentes post speciem perfectam peccati, sicut adolescentia et iuventus post perfectam hominis generationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36594] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum cordis et oris non distinguuntur a peccato operis, quando simul cum eo coniunguntur, sed prout quodlibet horum per se invenitur. Sicut etiam pars motus non distinguitur a toto motu, quando motus est continuus, sed solum quando motus sistit in medio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A8-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 8. Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less. Now "more" and "less" do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36595] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superabundantia et defectus non diversificent species peccatorum. Superabundantia enim et defectus differunt secundum magis et minus. Sed magis et minus non diversificant speciem. Ergo superabundantia et defectus non diversificant speciem peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude of reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36596] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut peccatum in agibilibus est ex hoc quod receditur a rectitudine rationis, ita falsitas in speculativis est ex hoc quod receditur a veritate rei. Sed non diversificatur species falsitatis ex hoc quod aliquis dicit plus vel minus esse quam sit in re. Ergo etiam non diversificatur species peccati ex hoc quod recedit a rectitudine rationis in plus vel in minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one species cannot be made out of two," as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful---illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36597] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, ex duabus speciebus non constituitur una species</i>, ut Porphyrius dicit. Sed superabundantia et defectus uniuntur in uno peccato, sunt enim simul quidam illiberales et prodigi, quorum duorum illiberalitas est peccatum secundum defectum, prodigalitas autem secundum superabundantiam. Ergo superabundantia et defectus non diversificant speciem peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries differ specifically, for "contrariety is a difference of form," as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36598] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, contraria differunt secundum speciem, nam contrarietas est differentia secundum formam, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed vitia quae differunt secundum superabundantiam et defectum, sunt contraria, sicut illiberalitas prodigalitati. Ergo differunt secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's intention, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 co."><a name="36599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36599] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum in peccato sint duo, scilicet ipse actus, et inordinatio eius, prout receditur ab ordine rationis et legis divinae; species peccati attenditur non ex parte inordinationis, quae est praeter intentionem peccantis, ut supra dictum est; sed magis ex parte ipsius actus, secundum quod terminatur ad obiectum, in quod fertur intentio peccantis. Et ideo ubicumque occurrit diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est diversa species peccati. Manifestum est autem quod non est idem motivum ad peccandum in peccatis quae sunt secundum superabundantiam, et in peccatis quae sunt secundum defectum; quinimmo sunt contraria motiva; sicut motivum in peccato intemperantiae est amor delectationum corporalium, motivum autem in peccato insensibilitatis est odium earum. Unde huiusmodi peccata non solum differunt specie, sed etiam sunt sibi invicem contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although "more" and "less" do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof." In this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36600] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod magis et minus, etsi non sint causa diversitatis speciei, consequuntur tamen quandoque species differentes, prout proveniunt ex diversis formis, sicut si dicatur quod ignis est levior aere. Unde philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod qui posuerunt non esse diversas species amicitiarum propter hoc quod dicuntur secundum magis et minus, non sufficienti crediderunt signo. Et hoc modo superexcedere rationem, vel deficere ab ea, pertinet ad diversa peccata secundum speciem, inquantum consequuntur diversa motiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the "boaster," who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the "cheat," who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36601] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod intentio peccantis non est ut recedat a ratione, et ideo non efficitur eiusdem rationis peccatum superabundantiae et defectus propter recessum ab eadem rationis rectitudine. Sed quandoque ille qui dicit falsum, intendit veritatem occultare, unde quantum ad hoc, non refert utrum dicat vel plus vel minus. Si tamen recedere a veritate sit praeter intentionem, tunc manifestum est quod ex diversis causis aliquis movetur ad dicendum plus vel minus, et secundum hoc diversa est ratio falsitatis. Sicut patet de iactatore, qui superexcedit dicendo falsum, quaerens gloriam; et de deceptore, qui diminuit, evadens debiti solutionem. Unde et quaedam falsae opiniones sunt sibi invicem contrariae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q119_A1" id="FS_Q72_A8-p9.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[119], A[1]</a>, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36602] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod prodigus et illiberalis potest esse aliquis secundum diversa, ut scilicet sit aliquis illiberalis in accipiendo quae non debet, et prodigus in dando quae non debet. Nihil autem prohibet contraria inesse eidem secundum diversa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q72_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q72_A9-p0.1">Q. 72. A. 9. Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "evil results from each single defect." Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36603] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod vitia et peccata diversificentur specie secundum diversas circumstantias. Quia, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>malum contingit ex singularibus defectibus</i>. Singulares autem defectus sunt corruptiones singularum circumstantiarum. Ergo ex singulis circumstantiis corruptis singulae species peccatorum consequuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q72_A9-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36604] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccata sunt quidam actus humani. Sed actus humani interdum accipiunt speciem a circumstantiis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccata differunt specie secundum quod diversae circumstantiae corrumpuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse: </p><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p5"> 'Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.' Now these pertain to various circumstances, for "hastily" means sooner than is right; "too much," more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to the various circumstances. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36605] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, diversae species gulae assignantur secundum particulas quae in hoc versiculo continentur, <i>praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, studiose</i>. Haec autem pertinent ad diversas circumstantias, nam praepropere est antequam oportet, nimis plus quam oportet, et idem patet in aliis. Ergo species peccati diversificantur secundum diversas circumstantias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that "every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not"; and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36606] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III et IV Ethic., quod singula vitia peccant agendo et plus quam oportet, et quando non oportet, et similiter secundum omnes alias circumstantias. Non ergo secundum hoc diversificantur peccatorum species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q72_A8" id="FS_Q72_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the circumstances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species. </p><p id="FS_Q72_A9-p8"> Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances entails different species of sins. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 co."><a name="36607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36607] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi occurrit aliud motivum ad peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species, quia motivum ad peccandum est finis et obiectum. Contingit autem quandoque quod in corruptionibus diversarum circumstantiarum est idem motivum, sicut illiberalis ab eodem movetur quod accipiat quando non oportet, et ubi non oportet, et plus quam oportet, et similiter de aliis circumstantiis; hoc enim facit propter inordinatum appetitum pecuniae congregandae. Et in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones non diversificant species peccatorum, sed pertinent ad unam et eandem peccati speciem. Quandoque vero contingit quod corruptiones diversarum circumstantiarum proveniunt a diversis motivis. Puta quod aliquis praepropere comedat, potest provenire ex hoc quod homo non potest ferre dilationem cibi, propter facilem consumptionem humiditatis; quod vero appetat immoderatum cibum, potest contingere propter virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum multum cibum; quod autem aliquis appetat cibos deliciosos, contingit propter appetitum delectationis quae est in cibo. Unde in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones inducunt diversas peccati species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q72_A9-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, but from turning to the object of the act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36608] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum, inquantum huiusmodi, privatio est, et ideo diversificatur specie secundum ea quae privantur, sicut et ceterae privationes. Sed peccatum non sortitur speciem ex parte privationis vel aversionis, ut supra dictum est; sed ex conversione ad obiectum actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36609] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod circumstantia nunquam transfert actum in aliam speciem, nisi quando est aliud motivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q72_A9-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 72 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36610] Iª-IIae q. 72 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in diversis speciebus gulae diversa sunt motiva, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q73" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q73-p0.1">Q. 73. OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q73-p2"> We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q73-p3"><a href="#FS_Q73_A1"> (1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p4"><a href="#FS_Q73_A2"> (2) Whether all are equal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p5"><a href="#FS_Q73_A3"> (3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p6"><a href="#FS_Q73_A4"> (4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p7"><a href="#FS_Q73_A5"> (5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p8"><a href="#FS_Q73_A6"> (6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p9"><a href="#FS_Q73_A7"> (7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p10"><a href="#FS_Q73_A8"> (8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p11"><a href="#FS_Q73_A9"> (9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?</a></p><p id="FS_Q73-p12"><a href="#FS_Q73_A10"> (10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 pr."><a name="36611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36611] Iª-IIae q. 73 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de comparatione peccatorum ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. Primo, utrum omnia peccata et vitia sint connexa. Secundo, utrum omnia sint paria. Tertio, utrum gravitas peccatorum attendatur secundum obiecta. Quarto, utrum secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus peccata opponuntur. Quinto, utrum peccata carnalia sint graviora quam spiritualia. Sexto, utrum secundum causas peccatorum attendatur gravitas peccatorum. Septimo, utrum secundum circumstantias. Octavo, utrum secundum quantitatem nocumenti. Nono, utrum secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Decimo, utrum propter magnitudinem personae peccantis aggravetur peccatum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q73_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A1-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 1. Whether all sins are connected with one another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.10" target="asv">James 2:10</a>): "Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all." Now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), "sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments." Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36612] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint connexa. Dicitur enim Iac. II, <i>quicumque totam legem servaverit, offendat autem in uno, factus est omnium reus</i>. Sed idem est esse reum omnium mandatorum legis, quod habere omnia peccata, quia, sicut Ambrosius dicit, <i>peccatum est transgressio legis divinae, et caelestium inobedientia mandatorum</i>. Ergo quicumque peccat uno peccato, subiicitur omnibus peccatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36613] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quodlibet peccatum excludit virtutem sibi oppositam. Sed qui caret una virtute, caret omnibus, ut patet ex supradictis. Ergo qui peccat uno peccato, privatur omnibus virtutibus. Sed qui caret virtute, habet vitium sibi oppositum. Ergo qui habet unum peccatum, habet omnia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[65], AA[1]</a>,2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has one, has them all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36614] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, virtutes omnes sunt connexae quae conveniunt in uno principio, ut supra habitum est. Sed sicut virtutes conveniunt in uno principio, ita et peccata, quia sicut amor Dei, qui facit civitatem Dei, est principium et radix omnium virtutum, ita amor sui, qui facit civitatem Babylonis, est radix omnium peccatorum; ut patet per Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo etiam omnia vitia et peccata sunt connexa, ita ut qui unum habet, habeat omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36615] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quaedam vitia sunt sibi invicem contraria, ut patet per philosophum, in II Ethic. Sed impossibile est contraria simul inesse eidem. Ergo impossibile est omnia peccata et vitia esse sibi invicem connexa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[1]</a>). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 co."><a name="36616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36616] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliter se habet intentio agentis secundum virtutem ad sequendum rationem, et aliter intentio peccantis ad divertendum a ratione. Cuiuslibet enim agentis secundum virtutem intentio est ut rationis regulam sequatur, et ideo omnium virtutum intentio in idem tendit. Et propter hoc omnes virtutes habent connexionem ad invicem in ratione recta agibilium, quae est prudentia, sicut supra dictum est. Sed intentio peccantis non est ad hoc quod recedat ab eo quod est secundum rationem, sed potius ut tendat in aliquod bonum appetibile, a quo speciem sortitur. Huiusmodi autem bona in quae tendit intentio peccantis a ratione recedens, sunt diversa, nullam connexionem habentia ad invicem, immo etiam interdum sunt contraria. Cum igitur vitia et peccata speciem habeant secundum illud ad quod convertuntur, manifestum est quod, secundum illud quod perficit speciem peccatorum, nullam connexionem habent peccata ad invicem. Non enim peccatum committitur in accedendo a multitudine ad unitatem, sicut accidit in virtutibus quae sunt connexae, sed potius in recedendo ab unitate ad multitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[72] , A[1]</a>), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36617] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Iacobus loquitur de peccato non ex parte conversionis, secundum quod peccata distinguuntur, sicut dictum est, sed loquitur de eis ex parte aversionis, inquantum scilicet homo peccando recedit a legis mandato. Omnia autem legis mandata sunt ab uno et eodem, ut ipse ibidem dicit, et ideo idem Deus contemnitur in omni peccato. Et ex hac parte dicit quod qui offendit in uno, factus est omnium reus, quia scilicet uno peccato peccando, incurrit poenae reatum ex hoc quod contemnit Deum, ex cuius contemptu provenit omnium peccatorum reatus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A4" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[4]</a>), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction of which entails the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue is possible, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q58_A4" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[58], A[4]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q65_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.3" shape="rect"> Q[65], A[1]</a>). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. Nevertheless it does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins---first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q73_A1-p8.4" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36618] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, non per quemlibet actum peccati tollitur virtus opposita, nam peccatum veniale virtutem non tollit; peccatum autem mortale tollit virtutem infusam, inquantum avertit a Deo; sed unus actus peccati etiam mortalis, non tollit habitum virtutis acquisitae. Sed si multiplicentur actus intantum quod generetur contrarius habitus, excluditur habitus virtutis acquisitae. Qua exclusa, excluditur prudentia, quia cum homo agit contra quamcumque virtutem, agit contra prudentiam. Sine prudentia autem nulla virtus moralis esse potest, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo per consequens excluduntur omnes virtutes morales, quantum ad perfectum et formale esse virtutis, quod habent secundum quod participant prudentiam, remanent tamen inclinationes ad actus virtutum, non habentes rationem virtutis. Sed non sequitur quod propter hoc homo incurrat omnia vitia vel peccata. Primo quidem, quia uni virtuti plura vitia opponuntur, ita quod virtus potest privari per unum eorum, etsi alterum non adsit. Secundo, quia peccatum directe opponitur virtuti quantum ad inclinationem virtutis ad actum, ut supra dictum est, unde, remanentibus aliquibus inclinationibus virtuosis, non potest dici quod homo habeat vitia vel peccata opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36619] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod amor Dei est congregativus, inquantum affectum hominis a multis ducit in unum, et ideo virtutes, quae ex amore Dei causantur, connexionem habent. Sed amor sui disgregat affectum hominis in diversa, prout scilicet homo se amat appetendo sibi bona temporalia, quae sunt varia et diversa, et ideo vitia et peccata, quae causantur ex amore sui, non sunt connexa.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A2-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 2. Whether all sins are equal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36620] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata sint paria. Hoc enim est peccare, facere quod non licet. Sed facere quod non licet, uno et eodem modo in omnibus reprehenditur. Ergo peccare uno et eodem modo reprehenditur. Non ergo unum peccatum est alio gravius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36621] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne peccatum consistit in hoc quod homo transgreditur regulam rationis, quae ita se habet ad actus humanos, sicut regula linearis in corporalibus rebus. Ergo peccare simile est ei quod est lineas transilire. Sed lineas transilire est aequaliter et uno modo, etiam si aliquis longius recedat vel propinquius stet, quia privationes non recipiunt magis et minus. Ergo omnia peccata sunt aequalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36622] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccata virtutibus opponuntur. Sed omnes virtutes aequales sunt, ut Tullius dicit, in paradoxis. Ergo omnia peccata sunt paria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said to Pilate ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.11" target="asv">Jn. 19:11</a>): "He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin," and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36623] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dominus dicit ad Pilatum, Ioan. XIX, <i>qui tradidit me tibi, maius peccatum habet</i>. Et tamen constat quod Pilatus aliquod peccatum habuit. Ergo unum peccatum est maius alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in "being" corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite habit; it consists in "becoming" corrupted rather than in "being" corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 co."><a name="36624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36624] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod opinio Stoicorum fuit, quam Tullius prosequitur in paradoxis, quod omnia peccata sunt paria. Et ex hoc etiam derivatus est quorundam haereticorum error, qui, ponentes omnia peccata esse paria, dicunt etiam omnes poenas Inferni esse pares. Et quantum ex verbis Tullii perspici potest, Stoici movebantur ex hoc quod considerabant peccatum ex parte privationis tantum, prout scilicet est recessus a ratione, unde simpliciter aestimantes quod nulla privatio susciperet magis et minus, posuerunt omnia peccata esse paria. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, inveniet duplex privationum genus. Est enim quaedam simplex et pura privatio, quae consistit quasi in corruptum esse, sicut mors est privatio vitae, et tenebra est privatio luminis. Et tales privationes non recipiunt magis et minus, quia nihil residuum est de habitu opposito. Unde non minus est mortuus aliquis primo die mortis, et tertio vel quarto, quam post annum, quando iam cadaver fuerit resolutum. Et similiter non est magis tenebrosa domus, si lucerna sit operta pluribus velaminibus, quam si sit operta uno solo velamine totum lumen intercludente. Est autem alia privatio non simplex, sed aliquid retinens de habitu opposito; quae quidem privatio magis consistit in corrumpi, quam in corruptum esse, sicut aegritudo, quae privat debitam commensurationem humorum, ita tamen quod aliquid eius remanet, alioquin non remaneret animal vivum; et simile est de turpitudine, et aliis huiusmodi. Huiusmodi autem privationes recipiunt magis et minus ex parte eius quod remanet de habitu contrario, multum enim refert ad aegritudinem vel turpitudinem, utrum plus vel minus a debita commensuratione humorum vel membrorum recedatur. Et similiter dicendum est de vitiis et peccatis, sic enim in eis privatur debita commensuratio rationis, ut non totaliter ordo rationis tollatur; alioquin malum, si sit integrum, destruit seipsum, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.; non enim posset remanere substantia actus, vel affectio agentis, nisi aliquid remaneret de ordine rationis. Et ideo multum interest ad gravitatem peccati, utrum plus vel minus recedatur a rectitudine rationis. Et secundum hoc dicendum est quod non omnia peccata sunt paria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36625] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccata committere non licet, propter aliquam deordinationem quam habent. Unde illa quae maiorem deordinationem continent, sunt magis illicita; et per consequens graviora peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36626] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato, ac si esset privatio pura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q66_A1" id="FS_Q73_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[66], AA[1]</a>,2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36627] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod virtutes sunt aequales proportionaliter in uno et eodem, tamen una virtus praecedit aliam dignitate secundum suam speciem; et unus etiam homo est alio virtuosior in eadem specie virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Et tamen si virtutes essent pares, non sequeretur vitia esse paria, quia virtutes habent connexionem, non autem vitia seu peccata.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A3-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 3. Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36628] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatorum gravitas non varietur secundum obiecta. Gravitas enim peccati pertinet ad modum vel qualitatem ipsius peccati. Sed obiectum est materia ipsius peccati. Ergo secundum diversa obiecta, peccatorum gravitas non variatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36629] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, gravitas peccati est intensio malitiae ipsius. Peccatum autem non habet rationem malitiae ex parte conversionis ad proprium obiectum, quod est quoddam bonum appetibile; sed magis ex parte aversionis. Ergo gravitas peccatorum non variatur secundum diversa obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36630] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccata quae habent diversa obiecta, sunt diversorum generum. Sed ea quae sunt diversorum generum, non sunt comparabilia, ut probatur in VII Physic. Ergo unum peccatum non est gravius altero secundum diversitatem obiectorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[1]</a>). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies according to their objects. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36631] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, peccata recipiunt speciem ex obiectis, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed aliquorum peccatorum unum est gravius altero secundum suam speciem, sicut homicidium furto. Ergo gravitas peccatorum differt secundum obiecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[5]</a>), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A3" id="FS_Q73_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 co."><a name="36632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36632] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supradictis patet, gravitas peccatorum differt eo modo quo una aegritudo est alia gravior, sicut enim bonum sanitatis consistit in quadam commensuratione humorum per convenientiam ad naturam animalis, ita bonum virtutis consistit in quadam commensuratione humani actus secundum convenientiam ad regulam rationis. Manifestum est autem quod tanto est gravior aegritudo, quanto tollitur debita humorum commensuratio per commensurationem prioris principii, sicut aegritudo quae provenit in corpore humano ex corde, quod est principium vitae, vel ex aliquo quod appropinquat cordi, periculosior est. Unde oportet etiam quod peccatum sit tanto gravius, quanto deordinatio contingit circa aliquod principium quod est prius in ordine rationis. Ratio autem ordinat omnia in agibilibus ex fine. Et ideo quanto peccatum contingit in actibus humanis ex altiori fine, tanto peccatum est gravius. Obiecta autem actuum sunt fines eorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo secundum diversitatem obiectorum attenditur diversitas gravitatis in peccatis. Sicut patet quod res exteriores ordinantur ad hominem sicut ad finem; homo autem ordinatur ulterius in Deum sicut in finem. Unde peccatum quod est circa ipsam substantiam hominis, sicut homicidium est gravius peccato quod est circa res exteriores, sicut furtum; et adhuc est gravius peccatum quod immediate contra Deum committitur, sicut infidelitas, blasphemia et huiusmodi. Et in ordine quorumlibet horum peccatorum unum peccatum est gravius altero, secundum quod est circa aliquid principalius vel minus principale. Et quia peccata habent speciem ex obiectis, differentia gravitatis quae attenditur penes obiecta, est prima et principalis, quasi consequens speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A3" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[3]</a>, ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A6" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[72], A[6]</a>; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q73_A3-p7.3" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36633] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur actus, habet tamen rationem finis, secundum quod intentio agentis fertur in ipsum, ut supra dictum est. Forma autem actus moralis dependet ex fine, ut ex superioribus patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which man turns. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36634] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ipsa indebita conversione ad aliquod bonum commutabile, sequitur aversio ab incommutabili bono, in qua perficitur ratio mali. Et ideo oportet quod secundum diversitatem eorum quae pertinent ad conversionem, sequatur diversa gravitas malitiae in peccatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36635] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia obiecta humanorum actuum habent ordinem ad invicem, et ideo omnes actus humani quodammodo conveniunt in uno genere, secundum quod ordinantur ad ultimum finem. Et ideo nihil prohibet omnia peccata esse comparabilia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A4-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 4. Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.5" target="asv"> Prov. 15:5, </a> "In abundant justice there is the greatest strength." Now, as Our Lord says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv">Mat. 5:20, </a> seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36636] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non differat secundum dignitatem virtutum quibus peccata opponuntur, ut scilicet maiori virtuti gravius peccatum opponatur. Quia ut dicitur Prov. XV, <i>in abundanti iustitia virtus maxima est</i>. Sed sicut dicit dominus, Matth. V, abundans iustitia cohibet iram; quae est minus peccatum quam homicidium, quod cohibet minor iustitia. Ergo maximae virtuti opponitur minimum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "virtue is about the difficult and the good": whence it seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36637] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in II Ethic. dicitur quod virtus est circa difficile et bonum, ex quo videtur quod maior virtus sit circa magis difficile. Sed minus est peccatum si homo deficiat in magis difficili, quam si deficiat in minus difficili. Ergo maiori virtuti minus peccatum opponitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.13" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:13</a>). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36638] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, caritas est maior virtus quam fides et spes, ut dicitur I ad Cor. XIII. Odium autem, quod opponitur caritati, est minus peccatum quam infidelitas vel desperatio, quae opponuntur fidei et spei. Ergo maiori virtuti opponitur minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the "worst is opposed to the best." Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36639] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod <i>pessimum optimo contrarium est</i>. Optimum autem in moralibus est maxima virtus; pessimum autem, gravissimum peccatum. Ergo maximae virtuti opponitur gravissimum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object: because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q60_A5" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[5]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q73_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[72], A[1]</a>). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 co."><a name="36640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36640] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod virtuti opponitur aliquod peccatum, uno quidem modo principaliter et directe, quod scilicet est circa idem obiectum, nam contraria circa idem sunt. Et hoc modo oportet quod maiori virtuti opponatur gravius peccatum. Sicut enim ex parte obiecti attenditur maior gravitas peccati, ita etiam maior dignitas virtutis, utrumque enim ex obiecto speciem sortitur, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde oportet quod maximae virtuti directe contrarietur maximum peccatum, quasi maxime ab eo distans in eodem genere. Alio modo potest considerari oppositio virtutis ad peccatum, secundum quandam extensionem virtutis cohibentis peccatum, quanto enim fuerit virtus maior, tanto magis elongat hominem a peccato sibi contrario, ita quod non solum ipsum peccatum, sed etiam inducentia ad peccatum cohibet. Et sic manifestum est quod quanto aliqua virtus fuerit maior, tanto etiam minora peccata cohibet, sicut etiam sanitas, quanto fuerit maior, tanto etiam minores distemperantias excludit. Et per hunc modum maiori virtuti minus peccatum opponitur ex parte effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36641] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de oppositione quae attenditur secundum cohibitionem peccati, sic enim abundans iustitia etiam minora peccata cohibet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the difficulty. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36642] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod maiori virtuti, quae est circa bonum magis difficile, contrariatur directe peccatum quod est circa malum magis difficile. Utrobique enim invenitur quaedam eminentia, ex hoc quod ostenditur voluntas proclivior in bonum vel in malum, ex hoc quod difficultate non vincitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36643] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas non est quicumque amor, sed amor Dei. Unde non opponitur ei quodcumque odium directe, sed odium Dei, quod est gravissimum peccatorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A5-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 5. Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.30" target="asv">Prov. 6:30</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.32" target="asv">32</a>): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36644] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccata carnalia non sint minoris culpae quam peccata spiritualia. Adulterium enim gravius peccatum est quam furtum, dicitur enim Prov. VI, <i>non grandis est culpae cum quis furatus fuerit. Qui autem adulter est, propter cordis inopiam perdet animam suam</i>. Sed furtum pertinet ad avaritiam, quae est peccatum spirituale; adulterium autem ad luxuriam, quae est peccatum carnale. Ergo peccata carnalia sunt maioris culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36645] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Levit., quod Diabolus maxime gaudet de peccato luxuriae et idololatriae. Sed de maiori culpa magis gaudet. Ergo, cum luxuria sit peccatum carnale, videtur quod peccata carnalia sint maximae culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36646] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus probat, in VII Ethic., quod <i>incontinens concupiscentiae est turpior quam incontinens irae</i>. Sed ira est peccatum spirituale, secundum Gregorium, XXXI Moral.; concupiscentia autem pertinet ad peccata carnalia. Ergo peccatum carnale est gravius quam peccatum spirituale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36647] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, quod peccata carnalia sunt minoris culpae, et maioris infamiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason, implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we shall state further on <a href="#FS_Q73_A6" id="FS_Q73_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 co."><a name="36648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36648] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccata spiritualia sunt maioris culpae quam peccata carnalia. Quod non est sic intelligendum quasi quodlibet peccatum spirituale sit maioris culpae quolibet peccato carnali, sed quia, considerata hac sola differentia spiritualitatis et carnalitatis, graviora sunt quam cetera peccata, ceteris paribus. Cuius ratio triplex potest assignari. Prima quidem ex parte subiecti. Nam peccata spiritualia pertinent ad spiritum, cuius est converti ad Deum et ab eo averti, peccata vero carnalia consummantur in delectatione carnalis appetitus, ad quem principaliter pertinet ad bonum corporale converti. Et ideo peccatum carnale, inquantum huiusmodi, plus habet de conversione, propter quod etiam est maioris adhaesionis, sed peccatum spirituale habet plus de aversione, ex qua procedit ratio culpae. Et ideo peccatum spirituale, inquantum huiusmodi, est maioris culpae. Secunda ratio potest sumi ex parte eius in quem peccatur. Nam peccatum carnale, inquantum huiusmodi, est in corpus proprium; quod est minus diligendum, secundum ordinem caritatis, quam Deus et proximus, in quos peccatur per peccata spiritualia. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt maioris culpae. Tertia ratio potest sumi ex parte motivi. Quia quanto est gravius impulsivum ad peccandum, tanto homo minus peccat, ut infra dicetur. Peccata autem carnalia habent vehementius impulsivum, idest ipsam concupiscentiam carnis nobis innatam. Et ideo peccata spiritualia, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt maioris culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.5" target="asv"> Eph. 5:5.</a> "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his chattels. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36649] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod adulterium non solum pertinet ad peccatum luxuriae, sed etiam pertinet ad peccatum iniustitiae. Et quantum ad hoc, potest ad avaritiam reduci; ut Glossa dicit, ad Ephes., super illud, <i>omnis fornicator, aut immundus, aut avarus</i>. Et tunc gravius est adulterium quam furtum, quanto homini carior est uxor quam res possessa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36650] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Diabolus dicitur maxime gaudere de peccato luxuriae, quia est maximae adhaerentiae, et difficile ab eo homo potest eripi, insatiabilis est enim delectabilis appetitus ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that they are more shameful. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36651] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus dicit, turpiorem esse incontinentem concupiscentiae quam incontinentem irae, quia minus participat de ratione. Et secundum hoc etiam dicit, in III Ethic., quod peccata intemperantiae sunt maxime exprobrabilia, quia sunt circa illas delectationes quae sunt communes nobis et brutis, unde quodammodo per ista peccata homo brutalis redditur. Et inde est quod, sicut Gregorius dicit, sunt maioris infamiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A6-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 6. Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36652] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccatorum non attendatur secundum causam peccati. Quanto enim peccati causa fuerit maior, tanto vehementius movet ad peccandum, et ita difficilius potest ei resisti. Sed peccatum diminuitur ex hoc quod ei difficilius resistitur, hoc enim pertinet ad infirmitatem peccantis, ut non facile resistat peccato; peccatum autem quod est ex infirmitate, levius iudicatur. Non ergo peccatum habet gravitatem ex parte suae causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv"> Rom. 7:7, </a> "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36653] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, concupiscentia est generalis quaedam causa peccati, unde dicit Glossa, super illud Rom. VII, <i>nam concupiscentiam nesciebam etc., bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum prohibet</i>. Sed quanto homo fuerit victus maiori concupiscentia, tanto est minus peccatum. Gravitas ergo peccati diminuitur ex magnitudine causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36654] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut rectitudo rationis est causa virtuosi actus, ita defectus rationis videtur esse causa peccati. Sed defectus rationis, quanto fuerit maior, tanto est minus peccatum, intantum quod qui carent usu rationis, omnino excusentur a peccato; et qui ex ignorantia peccat, levius peccat. Ergo gravitas peccati non augetur ex magnitudine causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36655] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Ergo, si causa peccati maior fuerit, peccatum erit gravius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv"> Mat. 7:18, </a> "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin. </p><p id="FS_Q73_A6-p7"> The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 co."><a name="36656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36656] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in genere peccati, sicut et in quolibet alio genere, potest accipi duplex causa. Una quae est propria et per se causa peccati, quae est ipsa voluntas peccandi, comparatur enim ad actum peccati sicut arbor ad fructum, ut dicitur in Glossa, super illud Matth. VII, <i>non potest arbor bona fructus malos facere</i>. Et huiusmodi causa quanto fuerit maior, tanto peccatum erit gravius, quanto enim voluntas fuerit maior ad peccandum, tanto homo gravius peccat. Aliae vero causae peccati accipiuntur quasi extrinsecae et remotae, ex quibus scilicet voluntas inclinatur ad peccandum. Et in his causis est distinguendum. Quaedam enim harum inducunt voluntatem ad peccandum, secundum ipsam naturam voluntatis, sicut finis, quod est proprium obiectum voluntatis. Et ex tali causa augetur peccatum, gravius enim peccat cuius voluntas ex intentione peioris finis inclinatur ad peccandum. Aliae vero causae sunt quae inclinant voluntatem ad peccandum, praeter naturam et ordinem ipsius voluntatis, quae nata est moveri libere ex seipsa secundum iudicium rationis. Unde causae quae diminuunt iudicium rationis, sicut ignorantia; vel quae diminuunt liberum motum voluntatis, sicut infirmitas vel violentia aut metus, aut aliquid huiusmodi, diminuunt peccatum, sicut et diminuunt voluntarium, intantum quod si actus sit omnino involuntarius, non habet rationem peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36657] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de causa movente extrinseca, quae diminuit voluntarium, cuius quidem causae augmentum diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36658] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod si sub concupiscentia includatur etiam ipse motus voluntatis, sic ubi est maior concupiscentia, est maius peccatum. Si vero concupiscentia dicatur passio quaedam, quae est motus vis concupiscibilis, sic maior concupiscentia praecedens iudicium rationis et motum voluntatis, diminuit peccatum, quia qui maiori concupiscentia stimulatus peccat, cadit ex graviori tentatione; unde minus ei imputatur. Si vero concupiscentia sic sumpta sequatur iudicium rationis et motum voluntatis, sic ubi est maior concupiscentia, est maius peccatum, insurgit enim interdum maior concupiscentiae motus ex hoc quod voluntas ineffrenate tendit in suum obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36659] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de causa quae causat involuntarium, et haec diminuit peccatum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A7-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 7. Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36660] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia non aggravet peccatum. Peccatum enim habet gravitatem ex sua specie. Circumstantia autem non dat speciem peccato, cum sit quoddam accidens eius. Ergo gravitas peccati non consideratur ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36661] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, aut circumstantia est mala, aut non. Si circumstantia mala est, ipsa per se causat quandam speciem mali, si vero non sit mala, non habet unde augeat malum. Ergo circumstantia nullo modo auget peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36662] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, malitia peccati est ex parte aversionis. Sed circumstantiae consequuntur peccatum ex parte conversionis. Ergo non augent malitiam peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36663] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod ignorantia circumstantiae diminuit peccatum, qui enim peccat ex ignorantia circumstantiae, meretur veniam, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Hoc autem non esset, nisi circumstantia aggravaret peccatum. Ergo circumstantia peccatum aggravat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), "it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it." Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that "in taking his father's life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic." Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another's property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 co."><a name="36664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36664] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque ex eodem natum est augeri, ex quo causatur; sicut philosophus dicit de habitu virtutis, in II Ethic. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum causatur ex defectu alicuius circumstantiae, ex hoc enim receditur ab ordine rationis, quod aliquis in operando non observat debitas circumstantias. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum natum est aggravari per circumstantiam. Sed hoc quidem contingit tripliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum circumstantia transfert in aliud genus peccati. Sicut peccatum fornicationis consistit in hoc quod homo accedit ad non suam, si autem addatur haec circumstantia, ut illa ad quam accedit sit alterius uxor, transfertur iam in aliud genus peccati, scilicet in iniustitiam, inquantum homo usurpat rem alterius. Et secundum hoc, adulterium est gravius peccatum quam fornicatio. Aliquando vero circumstantia non aggravat peccatum quasi trahens in aliud genus peccati, sed solum quia multiplicat rationem peccati. Sicut si prodigus det quando non debet, et cui non debet, multiplicius peccat eodem genere peccati, quam si solum det cui non debet. Et ex hoc ipso peccatum fit gravius, sicut etiam aegritudo est gravior quae plures partes corporis inficit. Unde et Tullius dicit, in paradoxis, quod <i>in patris vita violanda, multa peccantur, violatur enim is qui procreavit, qui aluit, qui erudivit, qui in sede ac domo, atque in republica collocavit</i>. Tertio modo circumstantia aggravat peccatum ex eo quod auget deformitatem provenientem ex alia circumstantia. Sicut accipere alienum constituit peccatum furti, si autem addatur haec circumstantia, ut multum accipiat de alieno, est peccatum gravius; quamvis accipere multum vel parum, de se non dicat rationem boni vel mali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A10" id="FS_Q73_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[10]</a>). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36665] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliqua circumstantia dat speciem actui morali, ut supra habitum est. Et tamen circumstantia quae non dat speciem, potest aggravare peccatum. Quia sicut bonitas rei non solum pensatur ex sua specie, sed etiam ex aliquo accidente; ita malitia actus non solum pensatur ex specie actus, sed etiam ex circumstantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36666] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod utroque modo circumstantia potest aggravare peccatum. Si enim sit mala, non tamen propter hoc oportet quod semper constituat speciem peccati, potest enim addere rationem malitiae in eadem specie, ut dictum est. Si autem non sit mala, potest aggravare peccatum in ordine ad malitiam alterius circumstantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36667] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio debet ordinare actum non solum quantum ad obiectum, sed etiam quantum ad omnes circumstantias. Et ideo aversio quaedam a regula rationis attenditur secundum corruptionem cuiuslibet circumstantiae, puta si aliquis operetur quando non debet, vel ubi non debet. Et huiusmodi aversio sufficit ad rationem mali. Hanc autem aversionem a regula rationis, sequitur aversio a Deo, cui debet homo per rectam rationem coniungi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A8-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 8. Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A5" id="FS_Q73_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[5]</a>). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36668] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gravitas peccati non augeatur secundum maius nocumentum. Nocumentum enim est quidam eventus consequens actum peccati. Sed eventus sequens non addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur propter maius nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.8" target="asv">8</a>: "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee." If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against God or oneself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36669] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nocumentum maxime invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, quia sibi ipsi nemo vult nocere; Deo autem nemo potest nocere, secundum illud Iob XXXV, <i>si multiplicatae fuerint iniquitates tuae, quid facies contra illum? Homini, qui similis tibi est, nocebit impietas tua</i>. Si ergo peccatum aggravaretur propter maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod peccatum quo quis peccat in proximum, esset gravius peccato quo quis peccat in Deum vel in seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36670] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, maius nocumentum infertur alicui cum privatur vita gratiae, quam cum privatur vita naturae, quia vita gratiae est melior quam vita naturae, intantum quod homo debet vitam naturae contemnere ne amittat vitam gratiae. Sed ille qui inducit aliquam mulierem ad fornicandum, quantum est de se, privat eam vita gratiae, inducens eam ad peccatum mortale. Si ergo peccatum esset gravius propter maius nocumentum, sequeretur quod simplex fornicator gravius peccaret quam homicida, quod est manifeste falsum. Non ergo peccatum est gravius propter maius nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): "Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of nature." Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36671] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Lib. Arb., <i>quia vitium naturae adversatur, tantum additur malitiae vitiorum, quantum integritati naturarum minuitur</i>. Sed diminutio integritatis naturae est nocumentum. Ergo tanto gravius est peccatum, quanto maius est nocumentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A8-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly. </p><p id="FS_Q73_A8-p7"> But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 co."><a name="36672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36672] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod nocumentum tripliciter se habere potest ad peccatum. Quandoque enim nocumentum quod provenit ex peccato, est praevisum et intentum, sicut cum aliquis aliquid operatur animo nocendi alteri, ut homicida vel fur. Et tunc directe quantitas nocumenti adauget gravitatem peccati, quia tunc nocumentum est per se obiectum peccati. Quandoque autem nocumentum est praevisum, sed non intentum, sicut cum aliquis transiens per agrum ut compendiosius vadat ad fornicandum, infert nocumentum his quae sunt seminata in agro, scienter, licet non animo nocendi. Et sic etiam quantitas nocumenti aggravat peccatum, sed indirecte, inquantum scilicet ex voluntate multum inclinata ad peccandum, procedit quod aliquis non praetermittat facere damnum sibi vel alii, quod simpliciter non vellet. Quandoque autem nocumentum nec est praevisum nec intentum. Et tunc si per accidens se habeat ad peccatum, non aggravat peccatum directe, sed propter negligentiam considerandi nocumenta quae consequi possent, imputantur homini ad poenam mala quae eveniunt praeter eius intentionem, si dabat operam rei illicitae. Si vero nocumentum per se sequatur ex actu peccati, licet non sit intentum nec praevisum, directe peccatum aggravat, quia quaecumque per se consequuntur ad peccatum, pertinent quodammodo ad ipsam peccati speciem. Puta si aliquis publice fornicetur, sequitur scandalum plurimorum, quod quamvis ipse non intendat, nec forte praevideat, directe per hoc aggravatur peccatum. Aliter tamen videtur se habere circa nocumentum poenale, quod incurrit ipse qui peccat. Huiusmodi enim nocumentum, si per accidens se habeat ad actum peccati, et non sit praevisum nec intentum, non aggravat peccatum, neque sequitur maiorem gravitatem peccati, sicut si aliquis currens ad occidendum, impingat et laedat sibi pedem. Si vero tale nocumentum per se consequatur ad actum peccati, licet forte nec sit praevisum nec intentum, tunc maius nocumentum non facit gravius peccatum; sed e converso gravius peccatum inducit gravius nocumentum. Sicut aliquis infidelis, qui nihil audivit de poenis Inferni, graviorem poenam in Inferno patietur pro peccato homicidii quam pro peccato furti, quia enim hoc nec intendit nec praevidet, non aggravatur ex hoc peccatum (sicut contingit circa fidelem, qui ex hoc ipso videtur peccare gravius, quod maiores poenas contemnit ut impleat voluntatem peccati), sed gravitas huiusmodi nocumenti solum causatur ex gravitate peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have already stated ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q20_A5" id="FS_Q73_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[5]</a>), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36673] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut etiam supra dictum est, cum de bonitate et malitia exteriorum actuum ageretur, eventus sequens, si sit praevisus et intentus, addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some anxiety. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36674] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis nocumentum aggravet peccatum, non tamen sequitur quod ex solo nocumento peccatum aggravetur, quinimmo peccatum per se est gravius propter inordinationem, ut supra dictum est. Unde et ipsum nocumentum aggravat peccatum, inquantum facit actum esse magis inordinatum. Unde non sequitur quod, si nocumentum maxime habeat locum in peccatis quae sunt contra proximum, quod illa peccata sunt gravissima, quia multo maior inordinatio invenitur in peccatis quae sunt contra Deum, et in quibusdam eorum quae sunt contra seipsum. Et tamen potest dici quod, etsi Deo nullus possit nocere quantum ad eius substantiam, potest tamen nocumentum attentare in his quae Dei sunt, sicut extirpando fidem, violando sacra, quae sunt peccata gravissima. Sibi etiam aliquis quandoque scienter et volenter infert nocumentum, sicut patet in his qui se interimunt, licet finaliter hoc referant ad aliquod bonum apparens, puta ad hoc quod liberentur ab aliqua angustia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A8-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36675] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio non sequitur, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia homicida intendit directe nocumentum proximi, fornicator autem qui provocat mulierem, non intendit nocumentum, sed delectationem. Secundo, quia homicida est per se et sufficiens causa corporalis mortis, spiritualis autem mortis nullus potest esse alteri causa per se et sufficiens; quia nullus spiritualiter moritur nisi propria voluntate peccando.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A9-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 9. Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36676] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod propter conditionem personae in quam peccatur, peccatum non aggravetur. Si enim hoc esset, maxime aggravaretur ex hoc quod aliquis peccat contra aliquem virum iustum et sanctum. Sed ex hoc non aggravatur peccatum, minus enim laeditur ex iniuria illata virtuosus, qui aequanimiter tolerat, quam alii, qui etiam interius scandalizati laeduntur. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): "The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father's life sins many times." But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than another's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36677] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si conditio personae aggravaret peccatum, maxime aggravaretur ex propinquitate, quia sicut Tullius dicit in paradoxis, <i>in servo necando semel peccatur, in patris vita violanda multa peccantur</i>. Sed propinquitas personae in quam peccatur, non videtur aggravare peccatum, quia unusquisque sibi ipsi maxime est propinquus; et tamen minus peccat qui aliquod damnum sibi infert, quam si inferret alteri, puta si occideret equum suum, quam si occideret equum alterius, ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Ergo propinquitas personae non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented," and <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since "there is no respect of persons with God" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.25" target="asv">Col. 3:25</a>), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36678] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, conditio personae peccantis praecipue aggravat peccatum ratione dignitatis vel scientiae, secundum illud Sap. VI, <i>potentes potenter tormenta patientur</i>; et Luc. XII, <i>servus sciens voluntatem domini, et non faciens, plagis vapulabit multis</i>. Ergo, pari ratione, ex parte personae in quam peccatur, magis aggravaret peccatum dignitas aut scientia personae in quam peccatur. Sed non videtur gravius peccare qui facit iniuriam personae ditiori vel potentiori, quam alicui pauperi, quia non est personarum acceptio apud Deum, secundum cuius iudicium gravitas peccati pensatur. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, non aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>): "They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword." Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Mic.7.6" target="asv"> Micah 7:6</a>: "the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother." Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Job.34.18" target="asv">Job 34:18</a>): "Who saith to the king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly." Therefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36679] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod in sacra Scriptura specialiter vituperatur peccatum quod contra servos Dei committitur, sicut III Reg. XIX, <i>altaria tua destruxerunt, et prophetas tuos occiderunt gladio</i>. Vituperatur etiam specialiter peccatum commissum contra personas propinquas, secundum illud Mich. VII, <i>filius contumeliam facit patri, filia consurgit adversus matrem suam</i>. Vituperatur etiam specialiter peccatum quod committitur contra personas in dignitate constitutas, ut patet Iob XXXIV, <i>qui dicit regi, apostata; qui vocat duces impios</i>. Ergo conditio personae in quam peccatur, aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q73_A9-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above <a href="#FS_Q73_A3" id="FS_Q73_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered on the part of these three. </p><p id="FS_Q73_A9-p7"> First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.2.8" target="asv"> Zech. 2:8</a>: "He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye." Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.14.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 14:5</a>: "He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?" On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.28" target="asv">Ex. 22:28</a>): "The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse." In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 co."><a name="36680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36680] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod persona in quam peccatur, est quodammodo obiectum peccati. Dictum est autem supra quod prima gravitas peccati attenditur ex parte obiecti. Ex quo quidem tanto attenditur maior gravitas in peccato, quanto obiectum eius est principalior finis. Fines autem principales humanorum actuum sunt Deus, ipse homo, et proximus, quidquid enim facimus, propter aliquod horum facimus; quamvis etiam horum trium unum sub altero ordinetur. Potest igitur ex parte horum trium considerari maior vel minor gravitas in peccato secundum conditionem personae in quam peccatur. Primo quidem, ex parte Dei, cui tanto magis aliquis homo coniungitur, quanto est virtuosior vel Deo sacratior. Et ideo iniuria tali personae illata, magis redundat in Deum, secundum illud Zach. II, <i>qui vos tetigerit, tangit pupillam oculi mei</i>. Unde peccatum fit gravius ex hoc quod peccatur in personam magis Deo coniunctam, vel ratione virtutis vel ratione officii. Ex parte vero sui ipsius, manifestum est quod tanto aliquis gravius peccat, quanto in magis coniunctam personam, seu naturali necessitudine, seu beneficiis, seu quacumque coniunctione, peccaverit, quia videtur in seipsum magis peccare, et pro tanto gravius peccat, secundum illud Eccli. XIV, <i>qui sibi nequam est, cui bonus erit?</i> Ex parte vero proximi, tanto gravius peccatur, quanto peccatum plures tangit. Et ideo peccatum quod fit in personam publicam, puta regem vel principem, qui gerit personam totius multitudinis, est gravius quam peccatum quod committitur contra unam personam privatam, unde specialiter dicitur Exod. XXII, <i>principi populi tui non maledices</i>. Et similiter iniuria quae fit alicui famosae personae, videtur esse gravior, ex hoc quod in scandalum et in turbationem plurimorum redundat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36681] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ille qui infert iniuriam virtuoso, quantum est in se, turbat eum et interius et exterius. Sed quod iste interius non turbetur, contingit ex eius bonitate, quae non diminuit peccatum iniuriantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his approval. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36682] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod nocumentum quod quis sibi ipsi infert in his quae subsunt dominio propriae voluntatis, sicut in rebus possessis, habet minus de peccato quam si alteri inferatur, quia propria voluntate hoc agit. Sed in his quae non subduntur dominio voluntatis, sicut sunt naturalia et spiritualia bona, est gravius peccatum nocumentum sibi ipsi inferre, gravius enim peccat qui occidit seipsum, quam qui occidit alterum. Sed quia res propinquorum nostrorum non subduntur voluntatis nostrae dominio, non procedit ratio quantum ad nocumenta rebus illorum illata, quod circa ea minus peccetur; nisi forte velint, vel ratum habeant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A9-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36683] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod non est acceptio personarum si Deus gravius punit peccantem contra excellentiores personas, hoc enim fit propter hoc quod hoc redundat in plurium nocumentum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q73_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q73_A10-p0.1">Q. 73. A. 10. Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to God, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.13" target="asv"> Ecclus. 25:13</a>: "How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord." Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.30.18" target="asv">2 Paral. 30: 18,19</a>): "The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified." Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="36684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36684] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod magnitudo personae peccantis non aggravet peccatum. Homo enim maxime redditur magnus ex hoc quod Deo adhaeret, secundum illud Eccli. XXV, <i>quam magnus est qui invenit sapientiam et scientiam. Sed non est super timentem Deum</i>. Sed quanto aliquis magis Deo adhaeret, tanto minus imputatur ei aliquid ad peccatum, dicitur enim II Paralip. XXX, <i>dominus bonus propitiabitur cunctis qui in toto corde requirunt dominum Deum patrum suorum, et non imputabitur eis quod minus sanctificati sunt</i>. Ergo peccatum non aggravatur ex magnitudine personae peccantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no respect of persons with God" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="36685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36685] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, non est personarum acceptio apud Deum, ut dicitur Rom. II. Ergo non magis punit pro uno et eodem peccato, unum quam alium. Non ergo aggravatur ex magnitudine personae peccantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="36686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36686] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nullus debet ex bono incommodum reportare. Reportaret autem, si id quod agit, magis ei imputaretur ad culpam. Ergo propter magnitudinem personae peccantis non aggravatur peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): "A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent person." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 s. c."><a name="36687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36687] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Isidorus dicit, in II de summo bono, <i>tanto maius cognoscitur peccatum esse, quanto maior qui peccat habetur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv">Lk. 12:47</a>) that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q73_A10-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.7" target="asv"> Wis. 6:7</a>: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont to bear them with more indignation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 co."><a name="36688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36688] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est peccatum. Quoddam ex subreptione proveniens, propter infirmitatem humanae naturae. Et tale peccatum minus imputatur ei qui est maior in virtute, eo quod minus negligit huiusmodi peccata reprimere, quae tamen omnino subterfugere infirmitas humana non sinit. Alia vero peccata sunt ex deliberatione procedentia. Et ista peccata tanto magis alicui imputantur, quanto maior est. Et hoc potest esse propter quatuor. Primo quidem, quia facilius possunt resistere peccato maiores, puta qui excedunt in scientia et virtute. Unde dominus dicit, Luc. XII, quod <i>servus sciens voluntatem domini sui, et non faciens, plagis vapulabit multis</i>. Secundo, propter ingratitudinem, quia omne bonum quo quis magnificatur, est Dei beneficium, cui homo fit ingratus peccando. Et quantum ad hoc, quaelibet maioritas, etiam in temporalibus bonis peccatum aggravat, secundum illud Sap. VI, <i>potentes potenter tormenta patientur</i>. Tertio, propter specialem repugnantiam actus peccati ad magnitudinem personae, sicut si princeps iustitiam violet, qui ponitur iustitiae custos; et si sacerdos fornicetur, qui castitatem vovit. Quarto, propter exemplum, sive scandalum, quia, ut Gregorius dicit in pastorali, <i>in exemplum culpa vehementer extenditur, quando pro reverentia gradus peccator honoratur</i>. Ad plurium etiam notitiam perveniunt peccata magnorum; et magis homines ea indigne ferunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="36689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36689] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de his quae per subreptionem infirmitatis humanae negligenter aguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="36690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36690] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non accipit personas, si maiores plus punit, quia ipsorum maioritas facit ad gravitatem peccati, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q73_A10-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 73 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="36691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36691] Iª-IIae q. 73 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod homo magnus non reportat incommodum ex bono quod habet, sed ex malo usu illius.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q74" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q74-p0.1">Q. 74. OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q74-p2"> We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q74-p3"><a href="#FS_Q74_A1"> (1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p4"><a href="#FS_Q74_A2"> (2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p5"><a href="#FS_Q74_A3"> (3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p6"><a href="#FS_Q74_A4"> (4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p7"><a href="#FS_Q74_A5"> (5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p8"><a href="#FS_Q74_A6"> (6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p9"><a href="#FS_Q74_A7"> (7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p10"><a href="#FS_Q74_A8"> (8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p11"><a href="#FS_Q74_A9"> (9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q74-p12"><a href="#FS_Q74_A10"> (10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 pr."><a name="36692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36692] Iª-IIae q. 74 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de subiecto vitiorum, sive peccatorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. Primo, utrum voluntas possit esse subiectum peccati. Secundo, utrum voluntas sola sit peccati subiectum. Tertio, utrum sensualitas possit esse subiectum peccati. Quarto, utrum possit esse subiectum peccati mortalis. Quinto, utrum ratio possit esse subiectum peccati. Sexto, utrum delectatio morosa, vel non morosa, sit in ratione inferiori sicut in subiecto. Septimo, utrum peccatum consensus in actum sit in superiori ratione sicut in subiecto. Octavo, utrum ratio inferior possit esse subiectum peccati mortalis. Nono, utrum ratio superior possit esse subiectum peccati venialis. Decimo, utrum in ratione superiori possit esse peccatum veniale circa proprium obiectum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q74_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A1-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 1. Whether the will is a subject of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36693] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non possit esse subiectum peccati. Dicit enim Dionysius, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>malum est praeter voluntatem et intentionem</i>. Sed peccatum habet rationem mali. Ergo peccatum non potest esse in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36694] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, voluntas est boni, vel apparentis boni. Ex hoc autem quod voluntas vult bonum, non peccat, hoc autem quod vult apparens bonum quod non est vere bonum, magis pertinere videtur ad defectum virtutis apprehensivae quam ad defectum voluntatis. Ergo peccatum nullo modo est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36695] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, non potest esse idem subiectum peccati, et causa efficiens, quia causa efficiens et materialis non incidunt in idem, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas est causa efficiens peccati, prima enim causa peccandi est voluntas, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de duabus animabus. Ergo non est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36696] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., quod <i>voluntas est qua peccatur, et recte vivitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an act, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], AA[1]</a>,6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover." On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. "to desire" and "to know": and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A1" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[1], A[1]</a> ; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A6" id="FS_Q74_A1-p6.3" shape="rect"> Q[18], A[6]</a>), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it follows that sin is in the will as its subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 co."><a name="36697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36697] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum quidam actus est, sicut supra dictum est. Actuum autem quidam transeunt in exteriorem materiam, ut urere et secare, et huiusmodi actus habent pro materia et subiecto id in quod transit actio; sicut philosophus dicit, in III Physic., quod motus est actus mobilis a movente. Quidam vero actus sunt non transeuntes in exteriorem materiam, sed manentes in agente, sicut appetere et cognoscere, et tales actus sunt omnes actus morales, sive sint actus virtutum, sive peccatorum. Unde oportet quod proprium subiectum actus peccati sit potentia quae est principium actus. Cum autem proprium sit actuum moralium quod sint voluntarii, ut supra habitum est; sequitur quod voluntas, quae est principium actuum voluntariorum, sive bonorum sive malorum, quae sunt peccata, sit principium peccatorum. Et ideo sequitur quod peccatum sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36698] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum dicitur esse praeter voluntatem, quia voluntas non tendit in ipsum sub ratione mali. Sed quia aliquod malum est apparens bonum, ideo voluntas aliquando appetit aliquod malum. Et secundum hoc peccatum est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36699] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod si defectus apprehensivae virtutis nullo modo subiaceret voluntati, non esset peccatum nec in voluntate nec in apprehensiva virtute, sicut patet in his qui habent ignorantiam invincibilem. Et ideo relinquitur quod etiam defectus apprehensivae virtutis subiacens voluntati, deputetur in peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36700] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit in causis efficientibus quarum actiones transeunt in materiam exteriorem, et quae non movent se, sed alia. Cuius contrarium est in voluntate. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A2-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 2. Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that "no one sins except by the will." Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36701] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sola voluntas sit subiectum peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de duabus animabus, quod <i>non nisi voluntate peccatur</i>. Sed peccatum est sicut in subiecto in potentia qua peccatur. Ergo sola voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36702] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum est quoddam malum contra rationem. Sed bonum et malum ad rationem pertinens, est obiectum solius voluntatis. Ergo sola voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], "so true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36703] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne peccatum est actus voluntarius, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de Lib. Arb., <i>peccatum adeo est voluntarium, quod si non sit voluntarium, non est peccatum</i>. Sed actus aliarum virium non sunt voluntarii nisi inquantum illae vires moventur a voluntate. Hoc autem non sufficit ad hoc quod sint subiectum peccati, quia secundum hoc etiam membra exteriora, quae moventur a voluntate, essent subiectum peccati; quod patet esse falsum. Ergo sola voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are the subject of virtues, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q56" id="FS_Q74_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[56])</a>. Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36704] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, peccatum virtuti contrariatur. Contraria autem sunt circa idem. Sed aliae etiam vires animae praeter voluntatem, sunt subiecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non sola voluntas est subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As was shown above <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 co."><a name="36705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36705] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, omne quod est principium voluntarii actus, est subiectum peccati. Actus autem voluntarii dicuntur non solum illi qui eliciuntur a voluntate, sed etiam illi qui a voluntate imperantur; ut supra dictum est, cum de voluntario ageretur. Unde non sola voluntas potest esse subiectum peccati, sed omnes illae potentiae quae possunt moveri ad suos actus, vel ab eis reprimi, per voluntatem. Et eaedem etiam potentiae sunt subiecta habituum moralium bonorum vel malorum, quia eiusdem est actus et habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36706] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non peccatur nisi voluntate sicut primo movente, aliis autem potentiis peccatur sicut ab ea motis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36707] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum et malum pertinent ad voluntatem sicut per se obiecta ipsius, sed aliae potentiae habent aliquod determinatum bonum et malum, ratione cuius potest in eis esse et virtus et vitium et peccatum, secundum quod participant voluntate et ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36708] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod membra corporis non sunt principia actuum, sed solum organa, unde et comparantur ad animam moventem sicut servus, qui agitur et non agit. Potentiae autem appetitivae interiores comparantur ad rationem quasi liberae, quia agunt quodammodo et aguntur, ut patet per id quod dicitur I Polit. Et praeterea actus exteriorum membrorum sunt actiones in exteriorem materiam transeuntes, sicut patet de percussione in peccato homicidii. Et propter hoc non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A3-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 3. Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36709] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate non possit esse peccatum. Peccatum enim est proprium homini, qui ex suis actibus laudatur vel vituperatur. Sed sensualitas est communis nobis et brutis. Ergo in sensualitate non potest esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "no man sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since "the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore it is signified by the serpent," as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36710] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> <i>Praeterea, nullus peccat in eo quod vitare non potest</i>; sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb. Sed homo non potest vitare quin actus sensualitatis sit inordinatus, est enim sensualitas perpetuae corruptionis, quandiu in hac mortali vita vivimus; unde et per serpentem significatur, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Ergo inordinatio motus sensualitatis non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now "that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with the deliberation of reason," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36711] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud quod homo ipse non facit, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed hoc solum videmur nos ipsi facere, quod cum deliberatione rationis facimus; ut philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic. Ergo motus sensualitatis qui est sine deliberatione rationis, non imputatur homini ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q74_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36712] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. VII, <i>non enim quod volo bonum, hoc ago; sed quod odi malum, illud facio</i>, quod exponit Augustinus de malo concupiscentiae, quam constat esse motum quendam sensualitatis. Ergo in sensualitate est aliquod peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q74_A2" id="FS_Q74_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 co."><a name="36713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36713] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum potest inveniri in qualibet potentia cuius actus potest esse voluntarius et inordinatus, in quo consistit ratio peccati. Manifestum est autem quod actus sensualitatis potest esse voluntarius, inquantum sensualitas, idest appetitus sensitivus, nata est a voluntate moveri. Unde relinquitur quod in sensualitate possit esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78_A4" id="FS_Q74_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the subject of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36714] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquae vires sensitivae partis, etsi sint communes nobis et brutis, tamen in nobis habent aliquam excellentiam ex hoc quod rationi iunguntur, sicut nos, prae aliis animalibus, habemus in parte sensitiva cogitativam et reminiscentiam, ut in primo dictum est. Et per hunc modum etiam appetitus sensitivus in nobis prae aliis animalibus habet quandam excellentiam, scilicet quod natus est obedire rationi. Et quantum ad hoc, potest esse principium actus voluntarii; et per consequens subiectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the "fomes," which is never completely destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the "fomes" does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36715] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod perpetua corruptio sensualitatis est intelligenda quantum ad fomitem, qui nunquam totaliter tollitur in hac vita, transit enim peccatum originale reatu, et remanet actu. Sed talis corruptio fomitis non impedit quin homo rationabili voluntate possit reprimere singulos motus inordinatos sensualitatis, si praesentiat, puta divertendo cogitationem ad alia. Sed dum homo ad aliud cogitationem divertit, potest etiam circa illud aliquis inordinatus motus insurgere, sicut cum aliquis transfert cogitationem suam a delectabilibus carnis, volens concupiscentiae motus vitare, ad speculationem scientiae, insurgit quandoque aliquis motus inanis gloriae impraemeditatus. Et ideo non potest homo vitare omnes huiusmodi motus, propter corruptionem praedictam, sed hoc solum sufficit ad rationem peccati voluntarii, quod possit vitare singulos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36716] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod homo facit sine deliberatione rationis, non perfecte ipse facit, quia nihil operatur ibi id quod est principale in homine. Unde non est perfecte actus humanus. Et per consequens non potest esse perfecte actus virtutis vel peccati, sed aliquid imperfectum in genere horum. Unde talis motus sensualitatis rationem praeveniens, est peccatum veniale, quod est quiddam imperfectum in genere peccati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A4-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 4. Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36717] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in sensualitate possit esse peccatum mortale. Actus enim ex obiecto cognoscitur. Sed circa obiecta sensualitatis contingit peccare mortaliter, sicut circa delectabilia carnis. Ergo actus sensualitatis potest esse peccatum mortale. Et ita in sensualitate peccatum mortale invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36718] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum mortale contrariatur virtuti. Sed virtus potest esse in sensualitate, temperantia enim et fortitudo sunt virtutes irrationabilium partium, ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Ergo in sensualitate potest esse peccatum mortale, cum contraria sint nata fieri circa idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be there also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36719] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, veniale peccatum est dispositio ad mortale. Sed dispositio et habitus sunt in eodem. Cum igitur veniale peccatum sit in sensualitate, ut dictum est; etiam mortale peccatum esse poterit in eadem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): "The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even be in those who are in a state of grace," in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36720] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., et habetur in Glossa Rom. VII, inordinatus concupiscentiae motus (qui est peccatum sensualitatis) potest etiam esse in his qui sunt in gratia, in quibus tamen peccatum mortale non invenitur. Ergo inordinatus motus sensualitatis non est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q74_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 co."><a name="36721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36721] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut inordinatio corrumpens principium vitae corporalis, causat corporalem mortem; ita etiam inordinatio corrumpens principium spiritualis vitae, quod est finis ultimus, causat mortem spiritualem peccati mortalis, ut supra dictum est. Ordinare autem aliquid in finem non est sensualitatis, sed solum rationis. Inordinatio autem a fine non est nisi eius cuius est ordinare in finem. Unde peccatum mortale non potest esse in sensualitate, sed solum in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36722] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod actus sensualitatis potest concurrere ad peccatum mortale, sed tamen actus peccati mortalis non habet quod sit peccatum mortale, ex eo quod est sensualitatis; sed ex eo quod est rationis, cuius est ordinare in finem. Et ideo peccatum mortale non attribuitur sensualitati, sed rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36723] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam actus virtutis non perficitur per id quod est sensualitatis tantum, sed magis per id quod est rationis et voluntatis, cuius est eligere, nam actus virtutis moralis non est sine electione. Unde semper cum actu virtutis moralis, quae perficit vim appetitivam, est etiam actus prudentiae, quae perficit vim rationalem. Et idem est etiam de peccato mortali, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36724] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio tripliciter se habet ad id ad quod disponit. Quandoque enim est idem et in eodem, sicut scientia inchoata dicitur esse dispositio ad scientiam perfectam. Quandoque autem est in eodem, sed non idem, sicut calor est dispositio ad formam ignis. Quandoque vero nec idem nec in eodem, sicut in his quae habent ordinem ad invicem ut ex uno perveniatur in aliud, sicut bonitas imaginationis est dispositio ad scientiam, quae est in intellectu. Et hoc modo veniale peccatum, quod est in sensualitate, potest esse dispositio ad peccatum mortale, quod est in ratione.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A5-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 5. Whether sin can be in the reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36725] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse in ratione. Cuiuslibet enim potentiae peccatum est aliquis defectus ipsius. Sed defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed magis excusat peccatum, excusatur enim aliquis a peccato propter ignorantiam. Ergo in ratione non potest esse peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36726] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, primum subiectum peccati est voluntas, ut dictum est. Sed ratio praecedit voluntatem, cum sit directiva ipsius. Ergo peccatum esse non potest in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36727] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, non potest esse peccatum nisi circa ea quae sunt in nobis. Sed perfectio et defectus rationis non est eorum quae sunt in nobis, quidam enim sunt naturaliter ratione deficientes, vel ratione solertes. Ergo in ratione non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36728] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro XII de Trin., quod peccatum est in ratione inferiori et in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown ( <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 co."><a name="36729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36729] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in actu ipsius, sicut ex dictis patet. Habet autem ratio duplicem actum, unum quidem secundum se, in comparatione ad proprium obiectum, quod est cognoscere aliquod verum; alius autem actus rationis est inquantum est directiva aliarum virium. Utroque igitur modo contingit esse peccatum in ratione. Et primo quidem, inquantum errat in cognitione veri, quod quidem tunc imputatur ei ad peccatum, quando habet ignorantiam vel errorem circa id quod potest et debet scire. Secundo, quando inordinatos actus inferiorum virium vel imperat, vel etiam post deliberationem non coercet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36730] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de defectu rationis qui pertinet ad actum proprium respectu proprii obiecti, et hoc quando est defectus cognitionis eius quod quis non potest scire. Tunc enim talis defectus rationis non est peccatum, sed excusat a peccato, sicut patet in his quae per furiosos committuntur. Si vero sit defectus rationis circa id quod homo potest et debet scire, non omnino homo excusatur a peccato, sed ipse defectus imputatur ei ad peccatum. Defectus autem qui est solum in dirigendo alias vires, semper imputatur ei ad peccatum, quia huic defectui occurrere potest per proprium actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A1" id="FS_Q74_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[1]</a>), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will's act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36731] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de actibus voluntatis et rationis ageretur, voluntas quodammodo movet et praecedit rationem, et ratio quodammodo voluntatem, unde et motus voluntatis dici potest rationalis, et actus rationis potest dici voluntarius. Et secundum hoc in ratione invenitur peccatum, vel prout est defectus eius voluntarius, vel prout actus rationis est principium actus voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A5-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36732] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium patet responsio ex dictis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A6-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 6. Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q31_A1" id="FS_Q74_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36733] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum morosae delectationis non sit in ratione. Delectatio enim importat motum appetitivae virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Sed vis appetitiva distinguitur a ratione, quae est vis apprehensiva. Ergo delectatio morosa non est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36734] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ex obiectis cognosci potest ad quam potentiam actus pertineat, per quem potentia ordinatur ad obiectum. Sed quandoque est delectatio morosa circa bona sensibilia, et non circa bona rationis. Ergo peccatum delectationis morosae non est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin 'mora'---delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36735] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, morosum dicitur aliquid propter diuturnitatem temporis. Sed diuturnitas temporis non est ratio quod aliquis actus pertineat ad aliquam potentiam. Ergo delectatio morosa non pertinet ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36736] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., quod <i>consensus illecebrae si sola cogitationis delectatione contentus est, sic habendum existimo velut cibum vetitum mulier sola comederit</i>. Per mulierem autem intelligitur ratio inferior, sicut ibidem ipse exponit. Ergo peccatum morosae delectationis est in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated <a href="#FS_Q74_A5" id="FS_Q74_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 co."><a name="36737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36737] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum contingit esse in ratione quandoque quidem inquantum est directiva humanorum actuum. Manifestum est autem quod ratio non solum est directiva exteriorum actuum, sed etiam interiorum passionum. Et ideo quando deficit ratio in directione interiorum passionum, dicitur esse peccatum in ratione, sicut etiam quando deficit in directione exteriorum actuum. Deficit autem in directione passionum interiorum dupliciter. Uno modo, quando imperat illicitas passiones, sicut quando homo ex deliberatione provocat sibi motum irae vel concupiscentiae. Alio modo, quando non reprimit illicitum passionis motum, sicut cum aliquis, postquam deliberavit quod motus passionis insurgens est inordinatus, nihilominus circa ipsum immoratur, et ipsum non expellit. Et secundum hoc dicitur peccatum delectationis morosae esse in ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been stated above <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q74_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36738] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod delectatio quidem est in vi appetitiva sicut in proximo principio, sed in ratione est sicut in primo motivo, secundum hoc quod supra dictum est, quod actiones quae non transeunt in exteriorem materiam, sunt sicut in subiecto in suis principiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36739] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio actum proprium illicitum habet circa proprium obiectum, sed directionem habet circa omnia obiecta inferiorum virium quae per rationem dirigi possunt. Et secundum hoc etiam delectatio circa sensibilia obiecta pertinet ad rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, and fails to drive it away, "deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36740] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio dicitur morosa non ex mora temporis; sed ex eo quod ratio deliberans circa eam immoratur, nec tamen eam repellit, <i>tenens et volvens libenter quae statim ut attigerunt animum, respui debuerunt</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A7-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 7. Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q15_A1" id="FS_Q74_A7-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[1]</a>): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36741] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum consensus in actum non sit in ratione superiori. Consentire enim est actus appetitivae virtutis, ut supra habitum est. Sed ratio est vis apprehensiva. Ergo peccatum consensus in actum non est in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7). [*'Rationes aeternae,' cf. <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q15_A2" id="FS_Q74_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[15], AA[2]</a>,[3] where as in similar passages 'ratio' has been rendered by the English 'type,' because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine 'idea' as the archetype of the creature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law, (cf. A[8], OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36742] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ratio superior intendit rationibus aeternis inspiciendis et consulendis, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin. Sed quandoque consentitur in actum non consultis rationibus aeternis, non enim semper homo cogitat de rebus divinis, quando consentit in aliquem actum. Ergo peccatum consensus in actum non semper est in ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36743] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut per rationes aeternas potest homo regulare actus exteriores, ita etiam interiores delectationes, vel alias passiones. Sed consensus in delectationem absque hoc quod opere statuatur implendum, est rationis inferioris; ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Trin. Ergo etiam consensus in actum peccati debet interdum attribui rationi inferiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="36744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36744] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut ratio superior excedit inferiorem, ita ratio excedit vim imaginativam. Sed quandoque procedit homo in actum per apprehensionem virtutis imaginativae, absque omni deliberatione rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex impraemeditato movet manum aut pedem. Ergo etiam quandoque potest ratio inferior consentire in actum peccati, absque ratione superiori.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden fruit to her husband." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36745] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>si in consensione male utendi rebus quae per sensum corporis sentiuntur, ita decernitur quodcumque peccatum, ut, si potestas sit, etiam corpore compleatur, intelligenda est mulier cibum illicitum viro dedisse</i>, per quem superior ratio significatur. Ergo ad rationem superiorem pertinet consentire in actum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q19_A4" id="FS_Q74_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 co."><a name="36746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36746] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod consensus importat iudicium quoddam de eo in quod consentitur, sicut enim ratio speculativa iudicat et sententiat de rebus intelligibilibus, ita ratio practica iudicat et sententiat de agendis. Est autem considerandum quod in omni iudicio ultima sententia pertinet ad supremum iudicatorium, sicut videmus in speculativis quod ultima sententia de aliqua propositione datur per resolutionem ad prima principia. Quandiu enim remanet aliquod principium altius, adhuc per ipsum potest examinari id de quo quaeritur, unde adhuc est suspensum iudicium, quasi nondum data finali sententia. Manifestum est autem quod actus humani regulari possunt ex regula rationis humanae, quae sumitur ex rebus creatis, quas naturaliter homo cognoscit; et ulterius ex regula legis divinae, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum regula legis divinae sit superior, consequens est ut ultima sententia, per quam iudicium finaliter terminatur, pertineat ad rationem superiorem, quae intendit rationibus aeternis. Cum autem de pluribus occurrit iudicandum, finale iudicium est de eo quod ultimo occurrit. In actibus autem humanis ultimo occurrit ipse actus; praeambulum autem est delectatio, quae inducit ad actum. Et ideo ad rationem superiorem proprie pertinet consensus in actum; ad rationem vero inferiorem, quae habet inferius iudicium, pertinet iudicium praeambulum, quod est de delectatione. Quamvis etiam et de delectatione superior ratio iudicare possit, quia quidquid iudicio subditur inferioris, subditur etiam iudicio superioris, sed non convertitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q15_A3" id="FS_Q74_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[15], A[3]</a>). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36747] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consentire est actus appetitivae virtutis non absolute, sed consequenter ad actum rationis deliberantis et iudicantis, ut supra dictum est, in hoc enim terminatur consensus, quod voluntas tendit in id quod est ratione iudicatum. Unde consensus potest attribui et voluntati et rationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), "the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36748] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod ratio superior non dirigit actus humanos secundum legem divinam, impediens actum peccati, dicitur ipsa consentire; sive cogitet de lege aeterna, sive non. Cum enim cogitat de lege Dei, actu eam contemnit, cum vero non cogitat, eam negligit per modum omissionis cuiusdam. Unde omnibus modis consensus in actum peccati procedit ex superiori ratione, quia, ut Augustinus dicit, XII de Trin., <i>non potest peccatum efficaciter perpetrandum mente decerni, nisi illa mentis intentio penes quam summa potestas est membra in opus movendi vel ab opere cohibendi, malae actioni cedat aut serviat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36749] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio superior, per considerationem legis aeternae, sicut potest dirigere vel cohibere actum exteriorem, ita etiam delectationem interiorem. Sed tamen antequam ad iudicium superioris rationis deveniatur, statim ut sensualitas proponit delectationem, inferior ratio, per rationes temporales deliberans, quandoque huiusmodi delectationem acceptat, et tunc consensus in delectationem pertinet ad inferiorem rationem. Si vero etiam consideratis rationibus aeternis, homo in eodem consensu perseveret, iam talis consensus ad superiorem rationem pertinebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A7-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly by imputed to it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="36750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36750] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod apprehensio virtutis imaginativae est subita et sine deliberatione, et ideo potest aliquem actum causare antequam superior vel inferior ratio etiam habeat tempus deliberandi. Sed iudicium rationis inferioris est cum deliberatione, quae indiget tempore, in quo etiam ratio superior deliberare potest. Unde si non cohibeat ab actu peccati per suam deliberationem, ei imputatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A8-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 8. Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q74_A8-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36751] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod consensus in delectationem non sit peccatum mortale. Consentire enim in delectationem pertinet ad rationem inferiorem, cuius non est intendere rationibus aeternis vel legi divinae, et per consequens nec ab eis averti. Sed omne peccatum mortale est per aversionem a lege divina; ut patet per definitionem Augustini, de peccato mortali datam, quae supra posita est. Ergo consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36752] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, consentire in aliquid non est malum nisi quia illud est malum in quod consentitur. Sed propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis, vel saltem non minus. Non ergo illud in quod consentitur, potest esse minus malum quam consensus. Sed delectatio sine opere non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum. Ergo nec consensus in delectationem est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36753] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, delectationes differunt in bonitate et malitia secundum differentiam operationum, ut dicit philosophus, in X Ethic. Sed alia operatio est interior cogitatio, et alia actus exterior, puta fornicationis. Ergo et delectatio consequens actum interioris cogitationis, tantum differt a delectatione fornicationis in bonitate vel malitia, quantum differt cogitatio interior ab actu exteriori. Et per consequens etiam eodem modo differt consentire in utrumque. Sed cogitatio interior non est peccatum mortale; nec etiam consensus in cogitationem. Ergo per consequens nec consensus in delectationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="36754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36754] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, exterior actus fornicationis vel adulterii non est peccatum mortale ratione delectationis, quae etiam invenitur in actu matrimoniali; sed ratione inordinationis ipsius actus. Sed ille qui consentit in delectationem, non propter hoc consentit in deordinationem actus. Ergo non videtur mortaliter peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of fornication. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5"><a name="36755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36755] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum homicidii est gravius quam simplicis fornicationis. Sed consentire in delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de homicidio, non est peccatum mortale. Ergo multo minus consentire in delectationem quae consequitur cogitationem de fornicatione, est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p7"> <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our trespasses.'" Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6"><a name="36756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36756] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, oratio dominica quotidie dicitur pro remissione venialium, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed consensum in delectationem Augustinus docet esse abolendum per orationem dominicam, dicit enim, in XII de Trin., quod <i>hoc est longe minus peccatum quam si opere statuatur implendum, et ideo de talibus quoque cogitationibus venia petenda est, pectusque percutiendum, atque dicendum, dimitte nobis debita nostra</i>. Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine adds after a few words: "Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them." But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36757] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus post pauca subdit, <i>totus homo damnabitur, nisi haec quae, sine voluntate operandi, sed tamen cum voluntate animum talibus oblectandi, solius cogitationis sentiuntur esse peccata, per mediatoris gratiam remittantur</i>. Sed nullus damnatur nisi pro peccato mortali. Ergo consensus in delectationem est peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q74_A8-p9"> <b>I answer that,</b> There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true. </p><p id="FS_Q74_A8-p10"> But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 co."><a name="36758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36758] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod circa hoc aliqui diversimode opinati sunt. Quidam enim dixerunt quod consensus in delectationem non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale tantum. Alii vero dixerunt quod est peccatum mortale, et haec opinio est communior et verisimilior. Est enim considerandum quod, cum omnis delectatio consequatur aliquam operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic.; et iterum cum omnis delectatio habeat aliquod obiectum, delectatio quaelibet potest comparari ad duo, scilicet ad operationem quam consequitur, et ad obiectum in quo quis delectatur. Contingit autem quod aliqua operatio sit obiectum delectationis, sicut et aliqua alia res, quia ipsa operatio potest accipi ut bonum et finis, in quo quis delectatus requiescit. Et quandoque quidem ipsamet operatio quam consequitur delectatio, est obiectum delectationis, inquantum scilicet vis appetitiva, cuius est delectari, reflectitur in ipsam operationem sicut in quoddam bonum; puta cum aliquis cogitat, et delectatur de hoc ipso quod cogitat, inquantum sua cogitatio placet. Quandoque vero delectatio consequens unam operationem, puta cogitationem aliquam, habet pro obiecto aliam operationem quasi rem cogitatam, et tunc talis delectatio procedit ex inclinatione appetitus non quidem in cogitationem, sed in operationem cogitatam. Sic igitur aliquis de fornicatione cogitans, de duobus potest delectari, uno modo, de ipsa cogitatione; alio modo, de fornicatione cogitata. Delectatio autem de cogitatione ipsa sequitur inclinationem affectus in cogitationem ipsam. Cogitatio autem ipsa secundum se non est peccatum mortale, immo quandoque est veniale tantum, puta cum aliquis inutiliter cogitat; quandoque autem sine peccato omnino, puta cum aliquis utiliter de ea cogitat, sicut cum vult de ea praedicare vel disputare. Et ideo per consequens affectio et delectatio quae sic est de cogitatione fornicationis, non est de genere peccati mortalis; sed quandoque est peccatum veniale, quandoque nullum. Unde nec consensus in talem delectationem est peccatum mortale. Et secundum hoc prima opinio habet veritatem. Quod autem aliquis cogitans de fornicatione, delectetur de ipso actu cogitato, hoc contingit ex hoc quod affectio eius inclinata est in hunc actum. Unde quod aliquis consentiat in talem delectationem, hoc nihil aliud est quam quod ipse consentiat in hoc quod affectus suus sit inclinatus in fornicationem, nullus enim delectatur nisi in eo quod est conforme appetitui eius. Quod autem aliquis ex deliberatione eligat quod affectus suus conformetur his quae secundum se sunt peccata mortalia, est peccatum mortale. Unde talis consensus in delectationem peccati mortalis, est peccatum mortale; ut secunda opinio ponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q74_A8-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason fails in directing them according to the eternal types. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36759] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod consensus in delectationem potest esse non solum rationis inferioris, sed etiam superioris, ut dictum est. Et tamen ipsa etiam ratio inferior potest averti a rationibus aeternis. Quia etsi non intendit eis ut secundum eas regulans, quod est proprium superioris rationis; intendit tamen eis ut secundum eas regulata. Et hoc modo, ab eis se avertens, potest peccare mortaliter. Nam et actus inferiorum virium, et etiam exteriorum membrorum, possunt esse peccata mortalia, secundum quod deficit ordinatio superioris rationis regulantis eos secundum rationes aeternas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36760] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod consensus in peccatum quod est veniale ex genere, est veniale peccatum. Et secundum hoc potest concludi quod consensus in delectationem quae est de ipsa vana cogitatione fornicationis, est peccatum veniale. Sed delectatio quae est in ipso actu fornicationis, de genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod ante consensum sit veniale peccatum tantum, hoc est per accidens, scilicet propter imperfectionem actus. Quae quidem imperfectio tollitur per consensum deliberatum supervenientem. Unde ex hoc adducitur in suam naturam, ut sit peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36761] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de delectatione quae habet cogitationem pro obiecto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="36762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36762] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod delectatio quae habet actum exteriorem pro obiecto, non potest esse absque complacentia exterioris actus secundum se; etiam si non statuatur implendum, propter prohibitionem alicuius superioris. Unde actus fit inordinatus, et per consequens delectatio erit inordinata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 5"><a name="36763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36763] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod etiam consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex complacentia ipsius actus homicidii cogitati, est peccatum mortale. Non autem consensus in delectationem quae procedit ex complacentia cogitationis de homicidio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A8-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 8 ad 6"><a name="36764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36764] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 8 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum quod oratio dominica non solum contra peccata venialia dicenda est, sed etiam contra mortalia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A9-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 9. Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the "higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal law." But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="36765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36765] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse peccatum veniale, secundum quod est directiva inferiorum virium, idest secundum quod consentit in actum peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus, in XII de Trin., quod ratio superior inhaeret rationibus aeternis. Sed peccare mortaliter est per aversionem a rationibus aeternis. Ergo videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse peccatum nisi mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="36766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36766] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, superior ratio se habet in vita spirituali tanquam principium; sicut et cor in vita corporali. Sed infirmitates cordis sunt mortales. Ergo peccata superioris rationis sunt mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="36767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36767] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum veniale fit mortale, si fiat ex contemptu. Sed hoc non videtur esse sine contemptu, quod aliquis ex deliberatione peccet etiam venialiter. Cum ergo consensus rationis superioris semper sit cum deliberatione legis divinae, videtur quod non possit esse sine peccato mortali, propter contemptum divinae legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q74_A7" id="FS_Q74_A9-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 s. c."><a name="36768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36768] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, consensus in actum peccati pertinet ad rationem superiorem, ut supra dictum est. Sed consensus in actum peccati venialis est peccatum veniale. Ergo in superiori ratione potest esse peccatum veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason "is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law"; it contemplates it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act of venial sin is. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 co."><a name="36769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36769] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., ratio superior <i>inhaeret rationibus aeternis conspiciendis aut consulendis</i>, conspiciendis quidem, secundum quod earum veritatem speculatur; consulendis autem, secundum quod per rationes aeternas de aliis iudicat et ordinat; ad quod pertinet quod, deliberando per rationes aeternas, consentit in aliquem actum, vel dissentit ab eo. Contingit autem quod inordinatio actus in quem consentit, non contrariatur rationibus aeternis, quia non est cum aversione a fine ultimo, sicut contrariatur actus peccati mortalis, sed est praeter eas, sicut actus peccati venialis. Unde quando ratio superior in actum peccati venialis consentit, non avertitur a rationibus aeternis. Unde non peccat mortaliter, sed venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="36770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36770] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="36771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36771] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est infirmitas cordis. Una quae est in ipsa substantia cordis, et immutat naturalem complexionem ipsius, et talis infirmitas semper est mortalis. Alia est autem infirmitas cordis propter aliquam inordinationem vel motus eius, vel alicuius eorum quae circumstant cor, et talis infirmitas non semper est mortalis. Et similiter in ratione superiori semper est peccatum mortale, quando tollitur ipsa ordinatio rationis superioris ad proprium obiectum, quod est rationes aeternae. Sed quando est inordinatio circa hoc, non est peccatum mortale, sed veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A9-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the Divine law. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="36772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36772] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod deliberatus consensus in peccatum non semper pertinet ad contemptum legis divinae, sed solum quando peccatum legi divinae contrariatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q74_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q74_A10-p0.1">Q. 74. A. 10. Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="36773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36773] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in superiori ratione non possit esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam, idest secundum quod inspicit rationes aeternas. Actus enim potentiae non invenitur esse deficiens, nisi per hoc quod inordinate se habet circa suum obiectum. Sed obiectum superioris rationis sunt aeternae rationes, a quibus deordinari non est sine peccato mortali. Ergo in superiori ratione non potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="36774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36774] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum ratio sit vis deliberativa, actus rationis semper est cum deliberatione. Sed omnis inordinatus motus in his quae Dei sunt, si sit cum deliberatione, est peccatum mortale. Ergo in ratione superiori secundum seipsam, nunquam est peccatum veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="36775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36775] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, contingit quandoque quod peccatum ex subreptione est peccatum veniale, peccatum autem ex deliberatione est peccatum mortale, per hoc quod ratio deliberans recurrit ad aliquod maius bonum, contra quod homo agens gravius peccat, sicut cum de actu delectabili inordinato ratio deliberat quod est contra legem Dei, gravius peccat consentiendo, quam si solum consideraret quod est contra virtutem moralem. Sed ratio superior non potest recurrere ad aliquod altius quam sit suum obiectum. Ergo si motus ex subreptione non sit peccatum mortale, neque etiam deliberatio superveniens faciet ipsum esse peccatum mortale, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo in ratione superiori secundum seipsam, potest esse peccatum veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as such. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 s. c."><a name="36776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36776] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, motus subreptitius infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. Sed pertinet ad superiorem rationem secundum seipsam. Ergo in ratione superiori potest esse peccatum veniale secundum seipsam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q74_A10-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins. </p><p id="FS_Q74_A10-p7"> With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple "intuition," and "deliberation," in respect of which it again consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 co."><a name="36777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36777] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ratio superior aliter fertur in suum obiectum, atque aliter in obiecta inferiorum virium quae per ipsam diriguntur. In obiecta enim inferiorum virium non fertur nisi inquantum de eis consulit rationes aeternas. Unde non fertur in ea nisi per modum deliberationis. Deliberatus autem consensus in his quae ex genere suo sunt mortalia, est mortale peccatum. Et ideo ratio superior semper mortaliter peccat, si actus inferiorum virium in quos consentit, sint peccata mortalia. Sed circa proprium obiectum habet duos actus, scilicet simplicem intuitum; et deliberationem, secundum quod etiam de proprio obiecto consulit rationes aeternas. Secundum autem simplicem intuitum, potest aliquem inordinatum motum habere circa divina, puta cum quis patitur subitum infidelitatis motum. Et quamvis infidelitas secundum suum genus sit peccatum mortale, tamen subitus motus infidelitatis est peccatum veniale. Quia peccatum mortale non est nisi sit contra legem Dei, potest autem aliquid eorum quae pertinent ad fidem, subito rationi occurrere sub quadam alia ratione, antequam super hoc consulatur, vel consuli possit, ratio aeterna, idest lex Dei; puta cum quis resurrectionem mortuorum subito apprehendit ut impossibilem secundum naturam, et simul apprehendendo renititur, antequam tempus habeat deliberandi quod hoc est nobis traditum ut credendum secundum legem divinam. Si vero post hanc deliberationem motus infidelitatis maneat, est peccatum mortale. Et ideo circa proprium obiectum, etsi sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest ratio superior peccare venialiter in subitis motibus; vel etiam mortaliter per deliberatum consensum. In his autem quae pertinent ad inferiores vires, semper peccat mortaliter in his quae sunt peccata mortalia ex suo genere, non autem in his quae secundum suum genus sunt venialia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="36778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36778] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum quod est contra rationes aeternas, etsi sit peccatum mortale ex genere, potest tamen esse peccatum veniale propter imperfectionem actus subiti, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="36779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36779] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod in operativis ad rationem, ad quam pertinet deliberatio, pertinet etiam simplex intuitus eorum ex quibus deliberatio procedit, sicut etiam in speculativis ad rationem pertinet et syllogizare, et propositiones formare. Et ideo etiam ratio potest habere subitum motum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q74_A10-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 74 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="36780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36780] Iª-IIae q. 74 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod una et eadem res potest diversas considerationes habere, quarum una est altera altior, sicut Deum esse potest considerari vel inquantum est cognoscibile ratione humana, vel inquantum creditur revelatione divina, quae est consideratio altior. Et ideo quamvis obiectum rationis superioris sit quiddam secundum naturam rei altissimum, tamen potest etiam reduci in quandam altiorem considerationem. Et hac ratione, quod in motu subito non erat peccatum mortale, per deliberationem reducentem in altiorem considerationem fit peccatum mortale, sicut supra expositum est.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q75" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q75-p0.1">Q. 75. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q75-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: </p><p id="FS_Q75-p3"><a href="#FS_Q75_A1"> (1) Whether sin has a cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p4"><a href="#FS_Q75_A2"> (2) Whether it has an internal cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p5"><a href="#FS_Q75_A3"> (3) Whether it has an external cause?</a></p><p id="FS_Q75-p6"><a href="#FS_Q75_A4"> (4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 pr."><a name="36781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36781] Iª-IIae q. 75 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causis peccatorum. Et primo, in generali; secundo, in speciali. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum peccatum habeat causam. Secundo, utrum habeat causam interiorem. Tertio, utrum habeat causam exteriorem. Quarto, utrum peccatum sit causa peccati.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q75_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A1-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 1. Whether sin has a cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q75_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36782] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam. Peccatum enim habet rationem mali, ut dictum est. Sed malum non habet causam, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36783] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, causa est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud. Sed quod est ex necessitate, non videtur esse peccatum, eo quod omne peccatum est voluntarium. Ergo peccatum non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36784] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si peccatum habet causam, aut habet pro causa bonum, aut malum. Non autem bonum, quia bonum non facit nisi bonum; <i>non enim potest arbor bona fructus malos facere</i>, ut dicitur Matth. VII similiter autem nec malum potest esse causa peccati, quia malum poenae sequitur ad peccatum; malum autem culpae est idem quod peccatum. Peccatum igitur non habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.5.6" target="asv">Job 5:6</a>, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore sin has a cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36785] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne quod fit, habet causam, quia, ut dicitur Iob V, nihil in terra sine causa fit. Sed peccatum fit, est enim dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei. Ergo peccatum habet causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 co."><a name="36786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36786] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum est quidam actus inordinatus. Ex parte igitur actus, potest habere per se causam, sicut et quilibet alius actus. Ex parte autem inordinationis, habet causam eo modo quo negatio vel privatio potest habere causam. Negationis autem alicuius potest duplex causa assignari. Primo quidem, defectus causae, idest ipsius causae negatio, est causa negationis secundum seipsam, ad remotionem enim causae sequitur remotio effectus; sicut obscuritatis causa est absentia solis. Alio modo, causa affirmationis ad quam sequitur negatio, est per accidens causa negationis consequentis, sicut ignis, causando calorem ex principali intentione, consequenter causat privationem frigiditatis. Quorum primum potest sufficere ad simplicem negationem. Sed cum inordinatio peccati, et quodlibet malum, non sit simplex negatio, sed privatio eius quod quid natum est et debet habere; necesse est quod talis inordinatio habeat causam agentem per accidens, quod enim natum est inesse et debet, nunquam abesset nisi propter causam aliquam impedientem. Et secundum hoc consuevit dici quod malum, quod in quadam privatione consistit, habet causam deficientem, vel agentem per accidens. Omnis autem causa per accidens reducitur ad causam per se. Cum igitur peccatum ex parte inordinationis habeat causam agentem per accidens, ex parte autem actus habeat causam agentem per se; sequitur quod inordinatio peccati consequatur ex ipsa causa actus. Sic igitur voluntas carens directione regulae rationis et legis divinae, intendens aliquod bonum commutabile, causat actum quidem peccati per se, sed inordinationem actus per accidens et praeter intentionem, provenit enim defectus ordinis in actu, ex defectu directionis in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36787] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum non solum significat ipsam privationem boni, quae est inordinatio; sed significat actum sub tali privatione, quae habet rationem mali. Quod quidem qualiter habeat causam, dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36788] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, si illa definitio causae universaliter debeat verificari, oportet ut intelligatur de causa sufficienti et non impedita. Contingit enim aliquid esse causam sufficientem alterius, et tamen non ex necessitate sequitur effectus, propter aliquod impedimentum superveniens, alioquin sequeretur quod omnia ex necessitate contingerent, ut patet in VI Metaphys. Sic igitur, etsi peccatum habeat causam, non tamen sequitur quod sit necessaria, quia effectus potest impediri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36789] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, voluntas sine adhibitione regulae rationis vel legis divinae, est causa peccati. Hoc autem quod est non adhibere regulam rationis vel legis divinae, secundum se non habet rationem mali, nec poenae nec culpae, antequam applicetur ad actum. Unde secundum hoc, peccati primi non est causa aliquod malum, sed bonum aliquod cum absentia alicuius alterius boni.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A2-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 2. Whether sin has an internal cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36790] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam interiorem. Id enim quod est interius alicui rei, semper adest ei. Si igitur peccatum habeat causam interiorem, semper homo peccaret, cum, posita causa, ponatur effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36791] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed interiores motus hominis sunt peccatum. Ergo non sunt causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36792] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quidquid est intra hominem, aut est naturale, aut voluntarium. Sed id quod est naturale, non potest esse peccati causa, quia peccatum est contra naturam, ut dicit Damascenus. Quod autem est voluntarium, si sit inordinatum, iam est peccatum. Non ergo aliquid intrinsecum potest esse causa primi peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that "the will is the cause of sin." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36793] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, quod voluntas est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q75_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q75_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite. </p><p id="FS_Q75_A2-p7"> But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 co."><a name="36794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36794] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, per se causam peccati oportet accipere ex parte ipsius actus. Actus autem humani potest accipi causa interior et mediata, et immediata. Immediata quidem causa humani actus est ratio et voluntas, secundum quam homo est liber arbitrio. Causa autem remota est apprehensio sensitivae partis, et etiam appetitus sensitivus, sicut enim ex iudicio rationis voluntas movetur ad aliquid secundum rationem, ita etiam ex apprehensione sensus appetitus sensitivus in aliquid inclinatur. Quae quidem inclinatio interdum trahit voluntatem et rationem, sicut infra patebit. Sic igitur duplex causa peccati interior potest assignari, una proxima, ex parte rationis et voluntatis; alia vero remota, ex parte imaginationis vel appetitus sensitivi. Sed quia supra dictum est quod causa peccati est aliquod bonum apparens motivum cum defectu debiti motivi, scilicet regulae rationis vel legis divinae; ipsum motivum quod est apparens bonum, pertinet ad apprehensionem sensus et appetitum. Ipsa autem absentia debitae regulae pertinet ad rationem, quae nata est huiusmodi regulam considerare. Sed ipsa perfectio voluntarii actus peccati pertinet ad voluntatem, ita quod ipse voluntatis actus, praemissis suppositis, iam est quoddam peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36795] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod est intrinsecum sicut potentia naturalis, semper inest, id autem quod est intrinsecum sicut actus interior appetitivae vel apprehensivae virtutis, non semper inest. Ipsa autem potentia voluntatis est causa peccati in potentia, sed reducitur in actum per motus praecedentes et sensitivae partis primo, et rationis consequenter. Ex hoc enim quod aliquid proponitur ut appetibile secundum sensum et appetitus sensitivus inclinatur in illud, ratio interdum cessat a consideratione regulae debitae, et sic voluntas producit actum peccati. Quia igitur motus praecedentes non semper sunt in actu, neque peccatum semper est in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36796] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnes motus interiores sunt de substantia peccati, quod consistit principaliter in actu voluntatis, sed quidam praecedunt, et quidam consequuntur ipsum peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36797] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod est causa peccati sicut potentia producens actum, est naturale. Motus etiam sensitivae partis, ex quo sequitur peccatum, interdum est naturalis, sicut cum propter appetitum cibi aliquis peccat. Sed efficitur peccatum innaturale ex hoc ipso quod deficit regula naturalis, quam homo secundum naturam suam debet attendere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A3-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 3. Whether sin has an external cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36798] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non habeat causam exteriorem. Peccatum enim est actus voluntarius. Voluntaria autem sunt eorum quae sunt in nobis; et ita non habent exteriorem causam. Ergo peccatum non habet exteriorem causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36799] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut natura est principium interius, ita etiam voluntas. Sed peccatum in rebus naturalibus nunquam accidit nisi ex aliqua interiori causa, ut puta monstruosi partus proveniunt ex corruptione alicuius principii interioris. Ergo neque in moralibus potest contingere peccatum nisi ex interiori causa. Non ergo habet peccatum causam exteriorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36800] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, multiplicata causa, multiplicatur effectus. Sed quanto plura sunt et maiora exterius inducentia ad peccandum, tanto minus id quod quis inordinate agit, ei imputatur ad peccatum. Ergo nihil exterius est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q75_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.21.16" target="asv">Num. 21:16</a>): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36801] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Num. XXXI, <i>nonne istae sunt quae deceperunt filios Israel, et praevaricari vos fecerunt in domino super peccato Phogor?</i> Ergo aliquid exterius potest esse causa faciens peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10], A[4]), none can move the will inwardly save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being accomplished. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 co."><a name="36802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36802] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, causa interior peccati est et voluntas, ut perficiens actum peccati; et ratio, quantum ad carentiam debitae regulae; et appetitus sensitivus inclinans. Sic ergo aliquid extrinsecum tripliciter posset esse causa peccati, vel quia moveret immediate ipsam voluntatem; vel quia moveret rationem; vel quia moveret appetitum sensitivum. Voluntatem autem, ut supra dictum est, interius movere non potest nisi Deus; qui non potest esse causa peccati, ut infra ostendetur. Unde relinquitur quod nihil exterius potest esse causa peccati, nisi vel inquantum movet rationem, sicut homo vel Daemon persuadens peccatum; vel sicut movens appetitum sensitivum, sicut aliqua sensibilia exteriora movent appetitum sensitivum. Sed neque persuasio exterior in rebus agendis ex necessitate movet rationem; neque etiam res exterius propositae ex necessitate movent appetitum sensitivum, nisi forte aliquo modo dispositum; et tamen etiam appetitus sensitivus non ex necessitate movet rationem et voluntatem. Unde aliquid exterius potest esse aliqua causa movens ad peccandum, non tamen sufficienter ad peccatum inducens, sed causa sufficienter complens peccatum est sola voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36803] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod exteriora moventia ad peccandum non sufficienter et ex necessitate inducunt, sequitur quod remaneat in nobis peccare et non peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36804] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod per hoc quod ponitur interior causa peccati, non excluditur exterior, non enim id quod est exterius est causa peccati, nisi mediante causa interiori, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary and in our power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36805] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, multiplicatis exterioribus causis inclinantibus ad peccandum, multiplicantur actus peccati, quia plures ex illis causis, et pluries, inclinantur ad actus peccati. Sed tamen minuitur ratio culpae, quae consistit in hoc quod aliquid sit voluntarium et in nobis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q75_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q75_A4-p0.1">Q. 75. A. 4. Whether one sin is a cause of another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since "evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36806] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non sit causa peccati. Sunt enim quatuor genera causarum, quorum nullum potest ad hoc congruere quod peccatum sit causa peccati. Finis enim habet rationem boni, quod non competit peccato, quod de sua ratione est malum. Et eadem ratione nec peccatum potest esse causa efficiens, quia malum non est causa agens, sed est infirmum et impotens, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Causa autem materialis et formalis videntur habere solum locum in naturalibus corporibus quae sunt composita ex materia et forma. Ergo peccatum non potest habere causam materialem et formalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing," as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36807] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, agere sibi simile est rei perfectae, ut dicitur in IV Meteor. Sed peccatum de sui ratione est imperfectum. Ergo peccatum non potest esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36808] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si huius peccati sit causa aliud peccatum, eadem ratione et illius erit causa aliquod aliud peccatum, et sic procedetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo peccatum est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): "A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36809] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., <i>peccatum quod per poenitentiam citius non deletur, peccatum est et causa peccati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, as stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q1_A3" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[3]</a>; <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q75_A4-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material while the latter is formal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 co."><a name="36810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36810] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, cum peccatum habeat causam ex parte actus, hoc modo unum peccatum posset esse causa alterius, sicut unus actus humanus potest esse causa alterius. Contingit igitur unum peccatum esse causam alterius secundum quatuor genera causarum. Primo quidem, secundum modum causae efficientis vel moventis, et per se et per accidens. Per accidens quidem, sicut removens prohibens dicitur movens per accidens, cum enim per unum actum peccati homo amittit gratiam, vel caritatem, vel verecundiam, vel quodcumque aliud retrahens a peccato, incidit ex hoc in aliud peccatum; et sic primum peccatum est causa secundi per accidens. Per se autem, sicut cum ex uno actu peccati homo disponitur ad hoc quod alium actum consimilem facilius committit, ex actibus enim causantur dispositiones et habitus inclinantes ad similes actus. Secundum vero genus causae materialis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, inquantum praeparat ei materiam, sicut avaritia praeparat materiam litigio, quod plerumque est de divitiis congregatis. Secundum vero genus causae finalis, unum peccatum est causa alterius, inquantum propter finem unius peccati aliquis committit aliud peccatum, sicut cum aliquis committit simoniam propter finem ambitionis, vel fornicationem propter furtum. Et quia finis dat formam in moralibus, ut supra habitum est, ex hoc etiam sequitur quod unum peccatum sit formalis causa alterius, in actu enim fornicationis quae propter furtum committitur, est quidem fornicatio sicut materiale, furtum vero sicut formale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36811] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum, inquantum est inordinatum, habet rationem mali, sed inquantum est actus quidam, habet aliquod bonum, saltem apparens, pro fine. Et ita ex parte actus potest esse causa et finalis et effectiva alterius peccati, licet non ex parte inordinationis. Materiam autem habet peccatum non ex qua, sed circa quam. Formam autem habet ex fine. Et ideo secundum quatuor genera causarum peccatum potest dici causa peccati, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36812] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum est imperfectum imperfectione morali ex parte inordinationis, sed ex parte actus potest habere perfectionem naturae. Et secundum hoc potest esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q75_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is not caused by another sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 75 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36813] Iª-IIae q. 75 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod non omnis causa peccati est peccatum. Unde non oportet quod procedatur in infinitum; sed potest perveniri ad aliquod primum peccatum, cuius causa non est aliud peccatum.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q76" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q76-p0.1">Q. 76. OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q76-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q76-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will. </p><p id="FS_Q76-p3"> Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q76-p4"><a href="#FS_Q76_A1"> (1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p5"><a href="#FS_Q76_A2"> (2) Whether ignorance is a sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p6"><a href="#FS_Q76_A3"> (3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q76-p7"><a href="#FS_Q76_A4"> (4) Whether it diminishes sin?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 pr."><a name="36814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36814] Iª-IIae q. 76 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causis peccati in speciali. Et primo, de causis interioribus peccati; secundo, de exterioribus; tertio, de peccatis quae sunt causa aliorum peccatorum. Prima autem consideratio, secundum praemissa, erit tripartita, nam primo, agetur de ignorantia, quae est causa peccati ex parte rationis; secundo, de infirmitate seu passione, quae est causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi; tertio, de malitia, quae est causa peccati ex parte voluntatis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum ignorantia sit causa peccati. Secundo, utrum ignorantia sit peccatum. Tertio, utrum totaliter a peccato excuset. Quarto, utrum diminuat peccatum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q76_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A1-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 1. Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36815] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non possit esse causa peccati. Quia quod non est, nullius est causa. Sed ignorantia est non ens, cum sit privatio quaedam scientiae. Ergo ignorantia non est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36816] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, causae peccati sunt accipiendae ex parte conversionis, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed ignorantia videtur respicere aversionem. Ergo non debet poni causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36817] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne peccatum in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Sed voluntas non fertur nisi in aliquod cognitum, quia bonum apprehensum est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo ignorantia non potest esse causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36818] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia, quod quidam per ignorantiam peccant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it directs human acts. </p><p id="FS_Q76_A1-p7"> Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not "through ignorance" but "in ignorance," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1). </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 co."><a name="36819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36819] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VIII Physic., causa movens est duplex, una per se, et alia per accidens. Per se quidem, quae propria virtute movet, sicut generans est causa movens gravia et levia. Per accidens autem, sicut removens prohibens, vel sicut ipsa remotio prohibentis. Et hoc modo ignorantia potest esse causa actus peccati, est enim privatio scientiae perficientis rationem, quae prohibet actum peccati, inquantum dirigit actus humanos. Considerandum est autem quod ratio secundum duplicem scientiam est humanorum actuum directiva, scilicet secundum scientiam universalem, et particularem. Conferens enim de agendis, utitur quodam syllogismo, cuius conclusio est iudicium seu electio vel operatio. Actiones autem in singularibus sunt. Unde conclusio syllogismi operativi est singularis. Singularis autem propositio non concluditur ex universali nisi mediante aliqua propositione singulari, sicut homo prohibetur ab actu parricidii per hoc quod scit patrem non esse occidendum, et per hoc quod scit hunc esse patrem. Utriusque ergo ignorantia potest causare parricidii actum, scilicet et universalis principii, quod est quaedam regula rationis; et singularis circumstantiae. Unde patet quod non quaelibet ignorantia peccantis est causa peccati, sed illa tantum quae tollit scientiam prohibentem actum peccati. Unde si voluntas alicuius esset sic disposita quod non prohiberetur ab actu parricidii, etiam si patrem agnosceret; ignorantia patris non est huic causa peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum. Et ideo talis non peccat propter ignorantiam, sed peccat ignorans, secundum philosophum, in III Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36820] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non ens non potest esse alicuius causa per se, potest tamen esse causa per accidens, sicut remotio prohibentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36821] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod sicut scientia quam tollit ignorantia, respicit peccatum ex parte conversionis; ita etiam ignorantia ex parte conversionis est causa peccati ut removens prohibens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36822] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in illud quod est quantum ad omnia ignotum, non potest ferri voluntas, sed si aliquid est secundum aliquid notum et secundum aliquid ignotum, potest voluntas illud velle. Et hoc modo ignorantia est causa peccati, sicut cum aliquis scit hunc quem occidit, esse hominem, sed nescit eum esse patrem; vel cum aliquis scit aliquem actum esse delectabilem, nescit tamen eum esse peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A2-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 2. Whether ignorance is a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is "a word, deed or desire contrary to God's law," as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A5" id="FS_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[5]</a>). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36823] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non sit peccatum. Peccatum enim est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem Dei, ut supra habitum est. Sed ignorantia non importat aliquem actum, neque interiorem neque exteriorem. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36824] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum directius opponitur gratiae quam scientiae. Sed privatio gratiae non est peccatum, sed magis poena quaedam consequens peccatum. Ergo ignorantia, quae est privatio scientiae, non est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a sin, but rather a result of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36825] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si ignorantia est peccatum, hoc non est nisi inquantum est voluntaria. Sed si ignorantia sit peccatum inquantum est voluntaria, videtur peccatum in ipso actu voluntatis consistere magis quam in ignorantia. Ergo ignorantia non erit peccatum, sed magis aliquid consequens ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36826] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omne peccatum per poenitentiam tollitur; nec aliquod peccatum transiens reatu remanet actu, nisi solum originale. Ignorantia autem non tollitur per poenitentiam, sed adhuc remanet actu, omni reatu per poenitentiam remoto. Ergo ignorantia non est peccatum, nisi forte sit originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="36827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36827] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si ipsa ignorantia sit peccatum, quandiu ignorantia remaneret in homine, tandiu actu peccaret. Sed continue manet ignorantia in ignorante. Ergo ignorans continue peccaret. Quod patet esse falsum, quia sic ignorantia esset gravissimum. Non ergo ignorantia est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance is a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36828] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, nihil meretur poenam nisi peccatum. Sed ignorantia meretur poenam, secundum illud I ad Cor. XIV, <i>si quis ignorat, ignorabitur</i>. Ergo ignorantia est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called "invincible," because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 co."><a name="36829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36829] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ignorantia in hoc a nescientia differt, quod nescientia dicit simplicem scientiae negationem, unde cuicumque deest aliquarum rerum scientia, potest dici nescire illas; secundum quem modum Dionysius in Angelis nescientiam ponit, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ignorantia vero importat scientiae privationem, dum scilicet alicui deest scientia eorum quae aptus natus est scire. Horum autem quaedam aliquis scire tenetur, illa scilicet sine quorum scientia non potest debitum actum recte exercere. Unde omnes tenentur scire communiter ea quae sunt fidei, et universalia iuris praecepta, singuli autem ea quae ad eorum statum vel officium spectant. Quaedam vero sunt quae etsi aliquis natus est scire, non tamen ea scire tenetur, sicut theoremata geometriae, et contingentia particularia, nisi in casu. Manifestum est autem quod quicumque negligit habere vel facere id quod tenetur habere vel facere, peccat peccato omissionis. Unde propter negligentiam, ignorantia eorum quae aliquis scire tenetur, est peccatum. Non autem imputatur homini ad negligentiam, si nesciat ea quae scire non potest. Unde horum ignorantia invincibilis dicitur, quia scilicet studio superari non potest. Et propter hoc talis ignorantia, cum non sit voluntaria, eo quod non est in potestate nostra eam repellere, non est peccatum. Ex quo patet quod nulla ignorantia invincibilis est peccatum, ignorantia autem vincibilis est peccatum, si sit eorum quae aliquis scire tenetur; non autem si sit eorum quae quis scire non tenetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q76_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>, ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36830] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in hoc quod dicitur dictum vel factum vel concupitum, sunt intelligendae etiam negationes oppositae, secundum quod omissio habet rationem peccati. Et ita negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia est peccatum, continetur sub praedicta definitione peccati, inquantum praetermittitur aliquid quod debuit dici vel fieri vel concupisci, ad scientiam debitam acquirendam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36831] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod privatio gratiae, etsi secundum se non sit peccatum, tamen ratione negligentiae praeparandi se ad gratiam, potest habere rationem peccati, sicut et ignorantia. Et tamen quantum ad hoc est dissimile, quia homo potest aliquam scientiam acquirere per suos actus, gratia vero non acquiritur ex nostris actibus, sed ex Dei munere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36832] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in peccato transgressionis peccatum non consistit in solo actu voluntatis, sed etiam in actu volito qui est imperatus a voluntate; ita in peccato omissionis non solum actus voluntatis est peccatum, sed etiam ipsa omissio, inquantum est aliqualiter voluntaria. Et hoc modo ipsa negligentia sciendi, vel inconsideratio, est peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36833] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod licet, transeunte reatu per poenitentiam, remaneat ignorantia secundum quod est privatio scientiae; non tamen remanet negligentia, secundum quam ignorantia peccatum dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge that he ought to have. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="36834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36834] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut in aliis peccatis omissionis solo illo tempore homo actu peccat, pro quo praeceptum affirmativum obligat; ita est etiam de peccato ignorantiae. Non enim continuo ignorans actu peccat, sed solum quando est tempus acquirendi scientiam quam habere tenetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A3-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 3. Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36835] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia, ex toto excuset a peccato. Quia, ut Augustinus dicit, omne peccatum voluntarium est. Sed ignorantia causat involuntarium ut supra habitum est. Ergo ignorantia totaliter excusat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown. Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36836] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id quod aliquis facit praeter intentionem, per accidens agit. Sed intentio non potest esse de eo quod est ignotum. Ergo id quod per ignorantiam homo agit, per accidens se habet in actibus humanis. Sed quod est per accidens, non dat speciem. Nihil ergo quod est per ignorantiam factum, debet iudicari peccatum vel virtuosum in humanis actibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36837] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, homo est subiectum virtutis et peccati inquantum est particeps rationis. Sed ignorantia excludit scientiam, per quam ratio perficitur. Ergo ignorantia totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that "some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved." Now those things alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36838] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Lib. Arb., quod <i>quaedam per ignorantiam facta, recte improbantur</i>. Sed solum illa recte improbantur quae sunt peccata. Ergo quaedam per ignorantiam facta, sunt peccata. Non ergo ignorantia omnino excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ( <a href="#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q76_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act. </p><p id="FS_Q76_A3-p7"> On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 co."><a name="36839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36839] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ignorantia de se habet quod faciat actum quem causat, involuntarium esse. Iam autem dictum est quod ignorantia dicitur causare actum quem scientia opposita prohibebat. Et ita talis actus, si scientia adesset, esset contrarius voluntati, quod importat nomen involuntarii. Si vero scientia quae per ignorantiam privatur, non prohiberet actum, propter inclinationem voluntatis in ipsum; ignorantia huius scientiae non facit hominem involuntarium, sed non volentem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Et talis ignorantia, quae non est causa actus peccati, ut dictum est, quia non causat involuntarium, non excusat a peccato. Et eadem ratio est de quacumque ignorantia non causante, sed consequente vel concomitante actum peccati. Sed ignorantia quae est causa actus, quia causat involuntarium, de se habet quod excuset a peccato, eo quod voluntarium est de ratione peccati. Sed quod aliquando non totaliter excuset a peccato, potest contingere ex duobus. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius rei ignoratae. Intantum enim ignorantia excusat a peccato, inquantum ignoratur aliquid esse peccatum. Potest autem contingere quod aliquis ignoret quidem aliquam circumstantiam peccati, quam si sciret, retraheretur a peccando, sive illa circumstantia faciat ad rationem peccati sive non; et tamen adhuc remanet in eius scientia aliquid per quod cognoscit illud esse actum peccati. Puta si aliquis percutiens aliquem, sciat quidem ipsum esse hominem, quod sufficit ad rationem peccati; non tamen scit eum esse patrem, quod est circumstantia constituens novam speciem peccati; vel forte nescit quod ille se defendens repercutiat eum, quod si sciret, non percuteret, quod non pertinet ad rationem peccati. Unde licet talis propter ignorantiam peccet, non tamen totaliter excusatur a peccato, quia adhuc remanet ei cognitio peccati. Alio modo potest hoc contingere ex parte ipsius ignorantiae, quia scilicet ipsa ignorantia est voluntaria, vel directe, sicut cum aliquis studiose vult nescire aliqua, ut liberius peccet; vel indirecte, sicut cum aliquis propter laborem, vel propter alias occupationes, negligit addiscere id per quod a peccato retraheretur. Talis enim negligentia facit ignorantiam ipsam esse voluntariam et peccatum, dummodo sit eorum quae quis scire tenetur et potest. Et ideo talis ignorantia non totaliter excusat a peccato. Si vero sit talis ignorantia quae omnino sit involuntaria, sive quia est invincibilis, sive quia est eius quod quis scire non tenetur; talis ignorantia omnino excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A8" id="FS_Q76_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36840] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non omnis ignorantia causat involuntarium, sicut supra dictum est. Unde non omnis ignorantia totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his sin is not accidental. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36841] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod inquantum remanet in ignorante de voluntario, intantum remanet de intentione peccati. Et secundum hoc, non erit per accidens peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36842] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, si esset talis ignorantia quae totaliter usum rationis excluderet, omnino a peccato excusaret, sicut patet in furiosis et amentibus. Non autem semper ignorantia causans peccatum est talis. Et ideo non semper totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q76_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q76_A4-p0.1">Q. 76. A. 4. Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that "every evil man is ignorant." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36843] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ignorantia non diminuat peccatum. Illud enim quod est commune in omni peccato, non diminuit peccatum. Sed ignorantia est communis in omni peccato, dicit enim philosophus, in III Ethic., quod omnis malus est ignorans. Ergo ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q76_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it does not diminish a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36844] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum additum peccato facit maius peccatum. Sed ipsa ignorantia est peccatum, ut dictum est. Ergo non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.4" target="asv"> Rom. 2:4, </a> "Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?" says: "Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36845] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, non est eiusdem aggravare et diminuere peccatum. Sed ignorantia aggravat peccatum, quoniam super illud apostoli, <i>ignoras quoniam benignitas Dei,</i> etc., dicit Ambrosius, <i>gravissime peccas, si ignoras</i>. Ergo ignorantia non diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the "punishment is doubled for a drunken man." Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36846] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si aliqua ignorantia diminuit peccatum, hoc maxime videtur de illa quae totaliter tollit usum rationis. Sed huiusmodi ignorantia non minuit peccatum, sed magis auget, dicit enim philosophus, in III Ethic., quod <i>ebrius meretur duplices maledictiones</i>. Ergo ignorantia non minuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q76_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly." Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36847] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quidquid est ratio remissionis peccati, alleviat peccatum. Sed ignorantia est huiusmodi, ut patet I ad Tim. I, <i>misericordiam consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci</i>. Ergo ignorantia diminuit, vel alleviat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q76_A4-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin. </p><p id="FS_Q76_A4-p8"> Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 co."><a name="36848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36848] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium, intantum ignorantia potest diminuere peccatum, inquantum diminuit voluntarium, si autem voluntarium non diminuat, nullo modo diminuet peccatum. Manifestum est autem quod ignorantia quae totaliter a peccato excusat, quia totaliter voluntarium tollit, peccatum non minuit, sed omnino aufert. Ignorantia vero quae non est causa peccati, sed concomitanter se habet ad peccatum, nec minuit peccatum nec auget. Illa igitur sola ignorantia potest peccatum minuere, quae est causa peccati, et tamen totaliter a peccato non excusat. Contingit autem quandoque quod talis ignorantia directe et per se est voluntaria, sicut cum aliquis sua sponte nescit aliquid, ut liberius peccet. Et talis ignorantia videtur augere voluntarium et peccatum, ex intensione enim voluntatis ad peccandum provenit quod aliquis vult subire ignorantiae damnum, propter libertatem peccandi. Quandoque vero ignorantia quae est causa peccati, non est directe voluntaria, sed indirecte vel per accidens, puta cum aliquis non vult laborare in studio, ex quo sequitur eum esse ignorantem; vel cum aliquis vult bibere vinum immoderate, ex quo sequitur eum inebriari et discretione carere. Et talis ignorantia diminuit voluntarium, et per consequens peccatum. Cum enim aliquid non cognoscitur esse peccatum, non potest dici quod voluntas directe et per se feratur in peccatum, sed per accidens, unde est ibi minor contemptus, et per consequens minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ignorance whereby "every evil man is ignorant," is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36849] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ignorantia secundum quam omnis malus est ignorans, non est causa peccati; sed aliquid consequens ad causam, scilicet ad passionem vel habitum inclinantem in peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36850] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum peccato additum facit plura peccata, non tamen facit semper maius peccatum, quia forte non coincidunt in idem peccatum, sed sunt plura. Et potest contingere, si primum diminuat secundum, quod ambo simul non habeant tantam gravitatem quantam unum solum haberet. Sicut homicidium gravius peccatum est a sobrio homine factum, quam si fiat ab ebrio, quamvis haec sint duo peccata, quia ebrietas plus diminuit de ratione sequentis peccati, quam sit sua gravitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36851] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Ambrosii potest intelligi de ignorantia simpliciter affectata. Vel potest intelligi in genere peccati ingratitudinis, in qua summus gradus est quod homo etiam beneficia non recognoscat. Vel potest intelligi de ignorantia infidelitatis, quae fundamentum spiritualis aedificii subvertit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q76_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The drunken man deserves a "double punishment" for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 76 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36852] Iª-IIae q. 76 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod ebrius meretur quidem duplices maledictiones, propter duo peccata quae committit, scilicet ebrietatem et aliud peccatum quod ex ebrietate sequitur. Tamen ebrietas, ratione ignorantiae adiunctae, diminuit sequens peccatum, et forte plus quam sit gravitas ipsius ebrietatis, ut dictum est. Vel potest dici quod illud verbum inducitur secundum ordinationem cuiusdam Pittaci legislatoris, qui statuit <i>ebrios, si percusserint, amplius puniendos; non ad veniam respiciens, quam ebrii debent magis habere; sed ad utilitatem, quia plures iniuriantur ebrii quam sobrii</i>; ut patet per philosophum, in II politicorum.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q77" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q77-p0.1">Q. 77. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q77-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: </p><p id="FS_Q77-p3"><a href="#FS_Q77_A1"> (1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p4"><a href="#FS_Q77_A2"> (2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p5"><a href="#FS_Q77_A3"> (3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p6"><a href="#FS_Q77_A4"> (4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p7"><a href="#FS_Q77_A5"> (5) Of three causes mentioned in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh," and "Pride of life." </a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p8"><a href="#FS_Q77_A6"> (6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p9"><a href="#FS_Q77_A7"> (7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q77-p10"><a href="#FS_Q77_A8"> (8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 pr."><a name="36853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36853] Iª-IIae q. 77 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi, utrum passio animae sit causa peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum passio appetitus sensitivi possit movere vel inclinare voluntatem. Secundo, utrum possit superare rationem contra eius scientiam. Tertio, utrum peccatum quod ex passione provenit, sit peccatum ex infirmitate. Quarto, utrum haec passio quae est amor sui, sit causa omnis peccati. Quinto, de illis tribus causis quae ponuntur I Ioan. II, <i>concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, et superbia vitae</i>. Sexto, utrum passio quae est causa peccati, diminuat ipsum. Septimo, utrum totaliter excuset. Octavo, utrum peccatum quod ex passione est, possit esse mortale.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q77_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A1-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 1. Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not move the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36854] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas non moveatur a passione appetitus sensitivi. Nulla enim potentia passiva movetur nisi a suo obiecto. Voluntas autem est potentia passiva et activa simul, inquantum est movens et mota, sicut in III de anima philosophus dicit universaliter de vi appetitiva. Cum ergo obiectum voluntatis non sit passio appetitus sensitivi, sed magis bonum rationis; videtur quod passio appetitus sensitivi non moveat voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36855] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, superior motor non movetur ab inferiori, sicut anima non movetur a corpore. Sed voluntas, quae est appetitus rationis, comparatur ad appetitum sensitivum sicut motor superior ad inferiorem, dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, quod <i>appetitus rationis movet appetitum sensitivum, sicut in corporibus caelestibus sphaera movet sphaeram</i>. Ergo voluntas non potest moveri a passione appetitus sensitivi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36856] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nullum immateriale potest moveri ab aliquo materiali. Sed voluntas est quaedam potentia immaterialis, non enim utitur organo corporali, cum sit in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Appetitus autem sensitivus est vis materialis, utpote fundata in organo corporali. Ergo passio appetitus sensitivi non potest movere appetitum intellectivum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv">Dan. 13:56</a>): "Lust hath perverted thy heart." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36857] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Dan. XIII, <i>concupiscentia subvertit cor tuum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded. </p><p id="FS_Q77_A1-p7"> Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 co."><a name="36858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36858] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod passio appetitus sensitivi non potest directe trahere aut movere voluntatem, sed indirecte potest. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum quandam abstractionem. Cum enim omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicentur, necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur in suo actu, altera in suo actu remittatur, vel etiam totaliter impediatur. Tum quia omnis virtus ad plura dispersa fit minor, unde e contrario, quando intenditur circa unum, minus potest ad alia dispergi. Tum quia in operibus animae requiritur quaedam intentio, quae dum vehementer applicatur ad unum, non potest alteri vehementer attendere. Et secundum hunc modum, per quandam distractionem, quando motus appetitus sensitivi fortificatur secundum quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod remittatur, vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas. Alio modo, ex parte obiecti voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione apprehensum. Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis, et iudicium virtutis aestimativae, ut patet in amentibus. Manifestum est autem quod passionem appetitus sensitivi sequitur imaginationis apprehensio, et iudicium aestimativae, sicut etiam dispositionem linguae sequitur iudicium gustus. Unde videmus quod homines in aliqua passione existentes, non facile imaginationem avertunt ab his circa quae afficiuntur. Unde per consequens iudicium rationis plerumque sequitur passionem appetitus sensitivi; et per consequens motus voluntatis, qui natus est sequi iudicium rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36859] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod per passionem appetitus sensitivi fit aliqua immutatio circa iudicium de obiecto voluntatis, sicut dictum est; quamvis ipsa passio appetitus sensitivi non sit directe voluntatis obiectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36860] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod superius non movetur ab inferiori directe, sed indirecte quodammodo moveri potest, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A1-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Third Objection is solved in like manner.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36861] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A2-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 2. Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is weak and soon passes away. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36862] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ratio non possit superari a passione contra suam scientiam. Fortius enim non vincitur a debiliori. Sed scientia, propter suam certitudinem, est fortissimum eorum quae in nobis sunt. Ergo non potest superari a passione, quae est debilis et cito transiens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36863] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, voluntas non est nisi boni vel apparentis boni. Sed cum passio trahit voluntatem in id quod est vere bonum, non inclinat rationem contra scientiam. Cum autem trahit eam in id quod est apparens bonum et non existens, trahit eam in id quod rationi videtur, hoc autem est in scientia rationis, quod ei videtur. Ergo passio nunquam inclinat rationem contra suam scientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter---on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36864] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod trahit rationem scientem aliquid in universali, ut contrarium iudicet in particulari, contra, universalis et particularis propositio, si opponantur, opponuntur secundum contradictionem, sicut omnis homo et non omnis homo. Sed duae opiniones quae sunt contradictoriarum, sunt contrariae, ut dicitur in II peri Herm. Si igitur aliquis sciens aliquid in universali, iudicaret oppositum in singulari, sequeretur quod haberet simul contrarias opiniones, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="36865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36865] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque scit universale, scit etiam particulare quod novit sub universali contineri; sicut quicumque scit omnem mulam esse sterilem, scit hoc animal esse sterile, dummodo sciat quod sit mula; ut patet per id quod dicitur in I Poster. Sed ille qui scit aliquid in universali, puta nullam fornicationem esse faciendam, scit hoc particulare sub universali contineri, puta hunc actum esse fornicarium. Ergo videtur quod etiam in particulari sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in particular. </p><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p7"> Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="36866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36866] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ea quae sunt in voce, sunt signa intellectus animae, secundum philosophum. Sed homo in passione existens frequenter confitetur id quod eligit esse malum etiam in particulari. Ergo etiam in particulari habet scientiam. Sic igitur videtur quod passiones non possint trahere rationem contra scientiam universalem, quia non potest esse quod habeat scientiam universalem, et existimet oppositum in particulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36867] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati</i>. Lex autem quae est in membris, est concupiscentia, de qua supra locutus fuerat. Cum igitur concupiscentia sit passio quaedam, videtur quod passio trahat rationem etiam contra hoc quod scit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p9"> <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." </p><p id="FS_Q77_A2-p10"> Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the words of <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.47" target="asv"> Lk. 12:47</a>: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.17" target="asv"> James 4:17</a>: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A2-p10.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 co."><a name="36868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36868] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod opinio Socratis fuit, ut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., quod scientia nunquam posset superari a passione. Unde ponebat omnes virtutes esse scientias, et omnia peccata esse ignorantias. In quo quidem aliqualiter recte sapiebat. Quia cum voluntas sit boni vel apparentis boni, nunquam voluntas in malum moveretur, nisi id quod non est bonum, aliqualiter rationi bonum appareret, et propter hoc voluntas nunquam in malum tenderet, nisi cum aliqua ignorantia vel errore rationis. Unde dicitur Prov. XIV, <i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Sed quia experimento patet quod multi agunt contra ea quorum scientiam habent; et hoc etiam auctoritate divina confirmatur, secundum illud Luc. XII, <i>servus qui cognovit voluntatem domini sui et non fecit, plagis vapulabit multis</i>; et Iac. IV dicitur, scienti bonum facere et non facienti, peccatum est illi, non simpliciter verum dixit, sed oportet distinguere, ut philosophus tradit in VII Ethic. Cum enim ad recte agendum homo dirigatur duplici scientia, scilicet universali et particulari; utriusque defectus sufficit ad hoc quod impediatur rectitudo operis et voluntatis, ut supra dictum est. Contingit igitur quod aliquis habeat scientiam in universali, puta nullam fornicationem esse faciendam; sed tamen non cognoscat in particulari hunc actum qui est fornicatio, non esse faciendum. Et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas non sequatur universalem scientiam rationis. Iterum considerandum est quod nihil prohibet aliquid sciri in habitu, quod tamen actu non consideratur. Potest igitur contingere quod aliquis etiam rectam scientiam habeat in singulari, et non solum in universali, sed tamen in actu non consideret. Et tunc non videtur difficile quod praeter id quod actu non considerat, homo agat. Quod autem homo non consideret in particulari id quod habitualiter scit, quandoque quidem contingit ex solo defectu intentionis, puta cum homo sciens geometriam, non intendit ad considerandum geometriae conclusiones, quas statim in promptu habet considerare. Quandoque autem homo non considerat id quod habet in habitu propter aliquod impedimentum superveniens, puta propter aliquam occupationem exteriorem, vel propter aliquam infirmitatem corporalem. Et hoc modo ille qui est in passione constitutus, non considerat in particulari id quod scit in universali, inquantum passio impedit talem considerationem. Impedit autem tripliciter. Primo, per quandam distractionem, sicut supra expositum est. Secundo, per contrarietatem, quia plerumque passio inclinat ad contrarium huius quod scientia universalis habet. Tertio, per quandam immutationem corporalem, ex qua ratio quodammodo ligatur, ne libere in actum exeat, sicut etiam somnus vel ebrietas, quadam corporali transmutatione facta, ligant usum rationis. Et quod hoc contingat in passionibus, patet ex hoc quod aliquando, cum passiones multum intenduntur, homo amittit totaliter usum rationis, multi enim propter abundantiam amoris et irae, sunt in insaniam conversi. Et per hunc modum passio trahit rationem ad iudicandum in particulari contra scientiam quam habet in universali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36869] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod scientia universalis, quae est certissima, non habet principalitatem in operatione, sed magis scientia particularis, eo quod operationes sunt circa singularia. Unde non est mirum si in operabilibus passio agit contra scientiam universalem, absente consideratione in particulari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36870] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod rationi videatur in particulari aliquid bonum quod non est bonum, contingit ex aliqua passione. Et tamen hoc particulare iudicium est contra universalem scientiam rationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36871] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod non posset contingere quod aliquis haberet simul in actu scientiam aut opinionem veram de universali affirmativo, et opinionem falsam de particulari negativo, aut e converso. Sed bene potest contingere quod aliquis habeat veram scientiam habitualiter de universali affirmativo, et falsam opinionem in actu de particulari negativo, actus enim directe non contrariatur habitui, sed actui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="36872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36872] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod ille qui habet scientiam in universali, propter passionem impeditur ne possit sub illa universali sumere, et ad conclusionem pervenire, sed assumit sub alia universali, quam suggerit inclinatio passionis, et sub ea concludit. Unde philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod syllogismus incontinentis habet quatuor propositiones, duas universales, quarum una est rationis, puta nullam fornicationem esse committendam; alia est passionis, puta delectationem esse sectandam. Passio igitur ligat rationem ne assumat et concludat sub prima, unde, ea durante, assumit et concludit sub secunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A2-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="36873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36873] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod, sicut ebrius quandoque proferre potest verba significantia profundas sententias, quas tamen mente diiudicare non potest, ebrietate prohibente; ita in passione existens, etsi ore proferat hoc non esse faciendum, tamen interius hoc animo sentit quod sit faciendum, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A3-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 3. Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be called a sin of weakness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36874] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non debeat dici ex infirmitate. Passio enim est quidam vehemens motus appetitus sensitivi, ut dictum est. Vehementia autem motus magis attestatur fortitudini quam infirmitati. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, non debet dici ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.77.39" target="asv">Ps. 77:39</a>): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due to a passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36875] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, infirmitas hominis maxime attenditur secundum illud quod est in eo fragilius. Hoc autem est caro, unde dicitur in Psalmo LXXVII, <i>recordatus est quia caro sunt</i>. Ergo magis debet dici peccatum ex infirmitate quod est ex aliquo corporis defectu, quam quod est ex animae passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36876] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad ea non videtur homo esse infirmus, quae eius voluntati subduntur. Sed facere vel non facere ea ad quae passio inclinat, hominis voluntati subditur, secundum illud Gen. IV, <i>sub te erit appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius</i>. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, non est ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36877] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Tullius, in IV libro de Tuscul. quaest., passiones animae aegritudines vocat. Aegritudines autem alio nomine infirmitates dicuntur. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, debet dici ex infirmitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 co."><a name="36878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36878] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod causa peccati propria est ex parte animae in qua principaliter est peccatum. Potest autem dici infirmitas in anima ad similitudinem infirmitatis corporis. Dicitur autem corpus hominis esse infirmum, quando debilitatur vel impeditur in executione propriae operationis, propter aliquam inordinationem partium corporis, ita scilicet quod humores et membra hominis non subduntur virtuti regitivae et motivae corporis. Unde et membrum dicitur esse infirmum, quando non potest perficere operationem membri sani, sicut oculus quando non potest clare videre, ut dicit philosophus, in X de historiis animalium. Unde et infirmitas animae dicitur quando impeditur anima in propria operatione, propter inordinationem partium ipsius. Sicut autem partes corporis dicuntur esse inordinatae, quando non sequuntur ordinem naturae; ita et partes animae dicuntur inordinatae, quando non subduntur ordini rationis, ratio enim est vis regitiva partium animae. Sic ergo quando extra ordinem rationis vis concupiscibilis aut irascibilis aliqua passione afficitur, et per hoc impedimentum praestatur modo praedicto debitae actioni hominis, dicitur peccatum esse ex infirmitate. Unde et philosophus, in I Ethic., comparat incontinentem paralytico, cuius partes moventur in contrarium eius quod ipse disponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36879] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut quanto fuerit motus fortior in corpore praeter ordinem naturae, tanto est maior infirmitas; ita quanto fuerit motus fortior passionis praeter ordinem rationis, tanto est maior infirmitas animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36880] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, qui non impeditur per corporis infirmitatem, potest enim qui est corpore infirmus, promptam habere voluntatem ad aliquid faciendum. Impeditur autem per passionem, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum dicitur peccatum esse ex infirmitate, magis est referendum ad infirmitatem animae quam ad infirmitatem corporis. Dicitur tamen etiam ipsa infirmitas animae infirmitas carnis, inquantum ex conditione carnis passiones animae insurgunt in nobis, eo quod appetitus sensitivus est virtus utens organo corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36881] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in potestate quidem voluntatis est assentire vel non assentire his in quae passio inclinat, et pro tanto dicitur noster appetitus sub nobis esse. Sed tamen ipse assensus vel dissensus voluntatis impeditur per passionem, modo praedicto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A4-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 4. Whether self-love is the source of every sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36882] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sui non sit principium omnis peccati. Id enim quod est secundum se bonum et debitum, non est propria causa peccati. Sed amor sui est secundum se bonum et debitum, unde et praecipitur homini ut diligat proximum sicut seipsum, Levit. XIX. Ergo amor sui non potest esse propria causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above ( <a href="FS_i.html#FS_Q3_A2" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q77_A4-p3.3" shape="rect"> Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36883] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, <i>occasione accepta, peccatum per mandatum operatum est in me omnem concupiscentiam</i>, ubi Glossa dicit quod <i>bona est lex, quae, dum concupiscentiam prohibet, omne malum prohibet</i>, quod dicitur propter hoc, quia concupiscentia est causa omnis peccati. Sed concupiscentia est alia passio ab amore, ut supra habitum est. Ergo amor sui non est causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine in commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.79.17" target="asv"> Ps. 79:17, </a> "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility." Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36884] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus, super illud Psalmi, incensa igni et suffossa, dicit quod omne peccatum est <i>ex amore male inflammante, vel ex timore male humiliante</i>. Non ergo solus amor sui est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="36885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36885] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut homo quandoque peccat propter inordinatum sui amorem, ita etiam interdum peccat propter inordinatum amorem proximi. Ergo amor sui non est causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36886] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod <i>amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, facit civitatem Babylonis</i>. Sed per quodlibet peccatum pertinet homo ad civitatem Babylonis. Ergo amor sui est causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q75_A1" id="FS_Q77_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[1]</a>), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 co."><a name="36887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36887] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, propria et per se causa peccati accipienda est ex parte conversionis ad commutabile bonum; ex qua quidem parte omnis actus peccati procedit ex aliquo inordinato appetitu alicuius temporalis boni. Quod autem aliquis appetat inordinate aliquod temporale bonum, procedit ex hoc quod inordinate amat seipsum, hoc enim est amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod inordinatus amor sui est causa omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36888] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amor sui ordinatus est debitus et naturalis, ita scilicet quod velit sibi bonum quod congruit. Sed amor sui inordinatus, qui perducit ad contemptum Dei, ponitur esse causa peccati secundum Augustinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36889] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod concupiscentia, qua aliquis appetit sibi bonum, reducitur ad amorem sui sicut ad causam, ut iam dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires good things, or avoids evil things. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36890] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquis dicitur amare et illud bonum quod optat sibi, et se, cui bonum optat. Amor igitur secundum quod dicitur eius esse quod optatur, puta quod aliquis dicitur amare vinum vel pecuniam, recipit pro causa timorem, qui pertinet ad fugam mali. Omne enim peccatum provenit vel ex inordinato appetitu alicuius boni, vel ex inordinata fuga alicuius mali. Sed utrumque horum reducitur ad amorem sui. Propter hoc enim homo vel appetit bona vel fugit mala, quia amat seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed through self-love. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36891] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod amicus est quasi alter ipse. Et ideo quod peccatur propter amorem amici, videtur propter amorem sui peccari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A5-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 5. Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="36892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36892] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur causae peccatorum esse concupiscentia carnis, concupiscentia oculorum, et superbia vitae. Quia secundum apostolum, I ad Tim. ult., <i>radix omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>. Sed superbia vitae sub cupiditate non continetur. Ergo non oportet poni inter causas peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.13.56" target="asv"> Dan. 13:56</a>: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="36893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36893] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, concupiscentia carnis maxime ex visione oculorum excitatur, secundum illud Dan. XIII, <i>species decepit te</i>. Ergo non debet dividi concupiscentia oculorum contra concupiscentiam carnis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q30_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[30], A[2]</a>). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="36894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36894] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, concupiscentia est delectabilis appetitus, ut supra habitum est. Delectationes autem contingunt non solum secundum visum, sed etiam secundum alios sensus. Ergo deberet etiam poni concupiscentia auditus, et aliorum sensuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="36895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36895] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut homo inducitur ad peccandum ex inordinata concupiscentia boni, ita etiam ex inordinata fuga mali, ut dictum est. Sed nihil hic enumeratur pertinens ad fugam mali. Ergo insufficienter causae peccatorum tanguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.19" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:19</a>): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 s. c."><a name="36896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36896] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. II, <i>omne quod est in mundo, aut est concupiscentia carnis, aut concupiscentia oculorum, aut superbia vitae</i>. In mundo autem dicitur aliquid esse propter peccatum, unde et ibidem, dicit quod <i>totus mundus in maligno positus est</i>. Ergo praedicta tria sunt causae peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q77_A4" id="FS_Q77_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others. </p><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p8"> The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall state further on (Q[84], A[2]; <a href="SS_iii.html#SS_Q162_A1" id="FS_Q77_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[162], A[1]</a>). </p><p id="FS_Q77_A5-p9"> It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 co."><a name="36897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36897] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, inordinatus amor sui est causa omnis peccati. In amore autem sui includitur inordinatus appetitus boni, unusquisque enim appetit bonum ei quem amat. Unde manifestum est quod inordinatus appetitus boni est causa omnis peccati. Bonum autem dupliciter est obiectum sensibilis appetitus, in quo sunt animae passiones, quae sunt causa peccati, uno modo, absolute, secundum quod est obiectum concupiscibilis; alio modo, sub ratione ardui, prout est obiectum irascibilis, ut supra dictum est. Est autem duplex concupiscentia, sicut supra habitum est. Una quidem naturalis, quae est eorum quibus natura corporis sustentatur; sive quantum ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus et alia huiusmodi; sive quantum ad conservationem speciei, sicut in venereis. Et horum inordinatus appetitus dicitur concupiscentia carnis. Alia est concupiscentia animalis, eorum scilicet quae per sensum carnis sustentationem aut delectationem non afferunt, sed sunt delectabilia secundum apprehensionem imaginationis, aut alicuius huiusmodi acceptionis, sicut sunt pecunia, ornatus vestium, et alia huiusmodi. Et haec quidem animalis concupiscentia vocatur concupiscentia oculorum, sive intelligatur concupiscentia oculorum, idest ipsius visionis, quae fit per oculos, ut referatur ad curiositatem, secundum quod Augustinus exponit, X Confess.; sive referatur ad concupiscentiam rerum quae exterius oculis proponuntur, ut referatur ad cupiditatem, secundum quod ab aliis exponitur. Appetitus autem inordinatus boni ardui pertinet ad superbiam vitae, nam superbia est appetitus inordinatus excellentiae, ut inferius dicetur. Et sic patet quod ad ista tria reduci possunt omnes passiones, quae sunt causa peccati. Nam ad duo prima reducuntur omnes passiones concupiscibilis, ad tertium autem omnes passiones irascibilis; quod ideo non dividitur in duo, quia omnes passiones irascibilis conformantur concupiscentiae animali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on ( <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q77_A5-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[1]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="36898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36898] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod secundum quod cupiditas importat universaliter appetitum cuiuscumque boni, sic etiam superbia vitae continetur sub cupiditate. Quomodo autem cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale vitium, quod avaritia nominatur, sit radix omnium peccatorum, infra dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="36899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36899] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod concupiscentia oculorum non dicitur hic concupiscentia omnium rerum quae oculis videri possunt, sed solum earum in quibus non quaeritur delectatio carnis, quae est secundum tactum, sed solum delectatio oculi, idest cuiuscumque apprehensivae virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="36900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36900] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus visus est excellentior inter omnes sensus, et ad plura se extendens, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Et ideo nomen eius transfertur ad omnes alios sensus, et etiam ad omnes interiores apprehensiones, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de verbis domini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>; <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q39_A2" id="FS_Q77_A5-p13.2" shape="rect"> Q[39], A[2]</a>); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="36901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36901] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod fuga mali causatur ex appetitu boni, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo ponuntur solum passiones inclinantes ad bonum, tanquam causae earum quae faciunt inordinate fugam mali.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A6-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 6. Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated <a href="#FS_Q77_A5" id="FS_Q77_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="36902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36902] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non allevietur propter passionem. Augmentum enim causae auget effectum, si enim calidum dissolvit, magis calidum magis dissolvit. Sed passio est causa peccati, ut habitum est. Ergo quanto est intensior passio, tanto est maius peccatum. Passio igitur non minuit peccatum, sed auget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="36903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36903] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut se habet passio bona ad meritum, ita se habet mala passio ad peccatum. Sed bona passio auget meritum, tanto enim aliquis magis videtur mereri, quanto ex maiori misericordia pauperi subvenit. Ergo etiam mala passio magis aggravat peccatum quam alleviat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="36904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36904] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto intensiori voluntate aliquis facit peccatum, tanto gravius videtur peccare. Sed passio impellens voluntatem, facit eam vehementius ferri in actum peccati. Ergo passio aggravat peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 s. c."><a name="36905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36905] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, passio ipsa concupiscentiae vocatur tentatio carnis. Sed quanto aliquis maiori tentatione prosternitur, tanto minus peccat, ut patet per Augustinum. Ergo passio diminuit peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite. </p><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p7"> Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness. </p><p id="FS_Q77_A6-p8"> On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 co."><a name="36906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36906] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum essentialiter consistit in actu liberi arbitrii, quod est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Passio autem est motus appetitus sensitivi. Appetitus autem sensitivus potest se habere ad liberum arbitrium et antecedenter, et consequenter. Antecedenter quidem, secundum quod passio appetitus sensitivi trahit vel inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Consequenter autem, secundum quod motus superiorum virium, si sint vehementes, redundant in inferiores, non enim potest voluntas intense moveri in aliquid, quin excitetur aliqua passio in appetitu sensitivo. Si igitur accipiatur passio secundum quod praecedit actum peccati, sic necesse est quod diminuat peccatum. Actus enim intantum est peccatum, inquantum est voluntarium et in nobis existens. In nobis autem aliquid esse dicitur per rationem et voluntatem. Unde quanto ratio et voluntas ex se aliquid agunt, non ex impulsu passionis, magis est voluntarium et in nobis existens. Et secundum hoc passio minuit peccatum, inquantum minuit voluntarium. Passio autem consequens non diminuit peccatum, sed magis auget, vel potius est signum magnitudinis eius, inquantum scilicet demonstrat intensionem voluntatis ad actum peccati. Et sic verum est quod quanto aliquis maiori libidine vel concupiscentia peccat, tanto magis peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else---accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="36907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36907] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. Gravitas autem peccati magis attenditur ex parte aversionis; quae quidem ex conversione sequitur per accidens, idest praeter intentionem peccantis. Causae autem per accidens augmentatae non augmentant effectus, sed solum causae per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="36908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36908] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bona passio consequens iudicium rationis, augmentat meritum. Si autem praecedat, ut scilicet homo magis ex passione quam ex iudicio rationis moveatur ad bene agendum, talis passio diminuit bonitatem et laudem actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A6-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="36909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36909] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi motus voluntatis sit intensior ex passione incitatus, non tamen ita est voluntatis proprius, sicut si sola ratione moveretur ad peccandum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A7-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 7. Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.17" target="asv"> Gal. 5:17</a>: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="36910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36910] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod passio totaliter excuset a peccato. Quidquid enim causat involuntarium, excusat totaliter a peccato. Sed concupiscentia carnis, quae est quaedam passio, causat involuntarium, secundum illud Gal. V, <i>caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, ut non quaecumque vultis, illa faciatis</i>. Ergo passio totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q77_A2" id="FS_Q77_A7-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2];</a> Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="36911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36911] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, passio causat ignorantiam quandam in particulari, ut dictum est. Sed ignorantia particularis totaliter excusat a peccato, sicut supra habitum est. Ergo passio totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="36912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36912] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, infirmitas animae gravior est quam infirmitas corporis. Sed infirmitas corporis totaliter excusat a peccato, ut patet in phreneticis. Ergo multo magis passio, quae est infirmitas animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) speaks of the passions as "passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 s. c."><a name="36913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36913] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus, Rom. VII, vocat passiones peccatorum, non nisi quia peccata causant. Quod non esset, si a peccato totaliter excusarent. Ergo passiones non totaliter a peccato excusant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q77_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not. </p><p id="FS_Q77_A7-p7"> Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q17_A9" id="FS_Q77_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[9]</a>): wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 co."><a name="36914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36914] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod secundum hoc solum actus aliquis qui de genere suo est malus, totaliter a peccato excusatur, quod totaliter involuntarius redditur. Unde si sit talis passio quae totaliter involuntarium reddat actum sequentem, totaliter a peccato excusat, alioquin, non totaliter. Circa quod duo consideranda videntur. Primo quidem, quod aliquid potest esse voluntarium vel secundum se, sicut quando voluntas directe in ipsum fertur, vel secundum suam causam, quando voluntas fertur in causam et non in effectum, ut patet in eo qui voluntarie inebriatur; ex hoc enim quasi voluntarium ei imputatur quod per ebrietatem committit. Secundo considerandum est quod aliquid dicitur voluntarium directe, vel indirecte, directe quidem, id in quod voluntas fertur; indirecte autem, illud quod voluntas potuit prohibere, sed non prohibet. Secundum hoc igitur distinguendum est. Quia passio quandoque quidem est tanta quod totaliter aufert usum rationis, sicut patet in his qui propter amorem vel iram insaniunt. Et tunc si talis passio a principio fuit voluntaria, imputatur actus ad peccatum, quia est voluntarius in sua causa, sicut etiam de ebrietate dictum est. Si vero causa non fuit voluntaria, sed naturalis, puta cum aliquis ex aegritudine, vel aliqua huiusmodi causa, incidit in talem passionem quae totaliter aufert usum rationis; actus omnino redditur involuntarius, et per consequens totaliter a peccato excusatur. Quandoque vero passio non est tanta quod totaliter intercipiat usum rationis. Et tunc ratio potest passionem excludere, divertendo ad alias cogitationes; vel impedire ne suum consequatur effectum, quia membra non applicantur operi nisi per consensum rationis, ut supra dictum est. Unde talis passio non totaliter excusat a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv"> Rom. 7:19</a>: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="36915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36915] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc quod dicitur, <i>ut non quaecumque vultis, illa faciatis</i>, non est referendum ad ea quae fiunt per exteriorem actum, sed ad interiorem concupiscentiae motum, vellet enim homo nunquam concupiscere malum. Sicut etiam exponitur id quod dicitur Rom. VII, quod <i>odi malum, illud facio</i>. Vel potest referri ad voluntatem praecedentem passionem, ut patet in continentibus qui contra suum propositum agunt propter suam concupiscentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="36916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36916] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ignorantia particularis quae totaliter excusat, est ignorantia circumstantiae quam quidem quis scire non potest, debita diligentia adhibita. Sed passio causat ignorantiam iuris in particulari, dum impedit applicationem communis scientiae ad particularem actum. Quam quidem passionem ratio repellere potest, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A7-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="36917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36917] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod infirmitas corporis est involuntaria. Esset autem simile, si esset voluntaria, sicut de ebrietate dictum est, quae est quaedam corporalis infirmitas.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q77_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q77_A8-p0.1">Q. 77. A. 8. Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="36918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36918] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum quod est ex passione, non possit esse mortale. Veniale enim peccatum dividitur contra mortale. Sed peccatum quod est ex infirmitate, est veniale, cum habeat in se causam veniae. Cum igitur peccatum quod est ex passione, sit ex infirmitate, videtur quod non possit esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q74_A4" id="FS_Q77_A8-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[4]</a>). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="36919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36919] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, causa non est potior effectu. Sed passio non potest esse peccatum mortale, non enim in sensualitate est peccatum mortale, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, non potest esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above ( <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q77_A8-p4.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="36920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36920] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, passio abducit a ratione, ut ex dictis patet. Sed rationis est converti ad Deum vel averti ab eo, in quo consistit ratio peccati mortalis. Peccatum ergo quod est ex passione, non potest esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>) that "the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 s. c."><a name="36921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36921] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. VII, quod <i>passiones peccatorum operantur in membris nostris ad fructificandum morti</i>. Hoc autem est proprium mortalis peccati, quod fructificet morti. Ergo peccatum quod est ex passione, potest esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Mortal sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q77_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed through passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 co."><a name="36922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36922] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est, consistit in aversione ab ultimo fine, qui est Deus, quae quidem aversio pertinet ad rationem deliberantem, cuius etiam est ordinare in finem. Hoc igitur solo modo potest contingere quod inclinatio animae in aliquid quod contrariatur ultimo fini, non sit peccatum mortale quia ratio deliberans non potest occurrere, quod contingit in subitis motibus. Cum autem ex passione aliquis procedit ad actum peccati, vel ad consensum deliberatum, hoc non fit subito. Unde ratio deliberans potest hic occurrere, potest enim excludere, vel saltem impedire passionem, ut dictum est. Unde si non occurrat, est peccatum mortale, sicut videmus quod multa homicidia et adulteria per passionem committuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards the first kind. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="36923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36923] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veniale dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, ex causa, quia scilicet habet aliquam causam veniae, quae diminuit peccatum, et sic peccatum ex infirmitate et ignorantia dicitur veniale. Alio modo, ex eventu, sicut omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit veniale, idest veniam consecutum. Tertio modo dicitur veniale ex genere, sicut verbum otiosum. Et hoc solum veniale opponitur mortali, obiectio autem procedit de primo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the argument does not prove. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="36924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36924] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod passio est causa peccati ex parte conversionis. Quod autem sit mortale, est ex parte aversionis, quae per accidens sequitur ad conversionem, ut dictum est. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q77_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal or venial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 77 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="36925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36925] Iª-IIae q. 77 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio non semper in suo actu totaliter a passione impeditur, unde remanet ei liberum arbitrium, ut possit averti vel converti ad Deum. Si autem totaliter tolleretur usus rationis, iam non esset peccatum nec mortale nec veniale.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q78" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q78-p0.1">Q. 78. OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q78-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: </p><p id="FS_Q78-p3"><a href="#FS_Q78_A1"> (1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p4"><a href="#FS_Q78_A2"> (2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p5"><a href="#FS_Q78_A3"> (3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q78-p6"><a href="#FS_Q78_A4"> (4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 pr."><a name="36926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36926] Iª-IIae q. 78 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa peccati quae est ex parte voluntatis, quae dicitur malitia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliquis possit ex certa malitia, seu industria, peccare. Secundo, utrum quicumque peccat ex habitu, peccet ex certa malitia. Tertio, utrum quicumque peccat ex certa malitia, peccet ex habitu. Quarto, utrum ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, gravius peccet quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q78_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A1-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 1. Whether anyone sins through certain malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36927] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullus peccet ex industria, sive ex certa malitia. Ignorantia enim opponitur industriae, seu certae malitiae. Sed omnis malus est ignorans, secundum philosophum. Et Prov. XIV, dicitur, <i>errant qui operantur malum</i>. Ergo nullus peccat ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36928] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>nullus intendens ad malum operatur</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse peccare ex malitia, intendere malum in peccando, quod enim est praeter intentionem, est quasi per accidens, et non denominat actum. Ergo nullus ex malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36929] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, malitia ipsa peccatum est. Si igitur malitia sit causa peccati, sequetur quod peccatum sit causa peccati in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Nullus igitur ex malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.27" target="asv">Job 34:27</a>): "[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His ways." Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36930] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, <i>quasi de industria recesserunt a Deo, et vias eius intelligere noluerunt</i>. Sed recedere a Deo est peccare. Ergo aliqui peccant ex industria, seu ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 co."><a name="36931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36931] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod homo, sicut et quaelibet alia res, naturaliter habet appetitum boni. Unde quod ad malum eius appetitus declinet, contingit ex aliqua corruptione seu inordinatione in aliquo principiorum hominis, sic enim in actionibus rerum naturalium peccatum invenitur. Principia autem humanorum actuum sunt intellectus et appetitus, tam rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, quam sensitivus. Peccatum igitur in humanis actibus contingit quandoque, sicut ex defectu intellectus, puta cum aliquis per ignorantiam peccat; et ex defectu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum aliquis ex passione peccat; ita etiam ex defectu voluntatis, qui est inordinatio ipsius. Est autem voluntas inordinata, quando minus bonum magis amat. Consequens autem est ut aliquis eligat pati detrimentum in bono minus amato, ad hoc quod potiatur bono magis amato, sicut cum homo vult pati abscissionem membri etiam scienter, ut conservet vitam, quam magis amat. Et per hunc modum, quando aliqua inordinata voluntas aliquod bonum temporale plus amat, puta divitias vel voluptatem, quam ordinem rationis vel legis divinae, vel caritatem Dei, vel aliquid huiusmodi; sequitur quod velit dispendium pati in aliquo spiritualium bonorum, ut potiatur aliquo temporali bono. Nihil autem est aliud malum quam privatio alicuius boni. Et secundum hoc aliquis scienter vult aliquod malum spirituale, quod est malum simpliciter, per quod bonum spirituale privatur, ut bono temporali potiatur. Unde dicitur ex certa malitia, vel ex industria peccare, quasi scienter malum eligens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36932] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ignorantia quandoque quidem excludit scientiam qua aliquis simpliciter scit hoc esse malum quod agitur, et tunc dicitur ex ignorantia peccare. Quandoque autem excludit scientiam qua homo scit hoc nunc esse malum, sicut cum ex passione peccatur. Quandoque autem excludit scientiam qua aliquis scit hoc malum non sustinendum esse propter consecutionem illius boni, scit tamen simpliciter hoc esse malum, et sic dicitur ignorare qui ex certa malitia peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's anger, to being deprived of the pleasure. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36933] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod malum non potest esse secundum se intentum ab aliquo, potest tamen esse intentum ad vitandum aliud malum, vel ad consequendum aliud bonum, ut dictum est. Et in tali casu aliquis eligeret consequi bonum per se intentum, absque hoc quod pateretur detrimentum alterius boni. Sicut aliquis lascivus vellet frui delectatione absque offensa Dei, sed duobus propositis, magis vult peccando incurrere offensam Dei, quam delectatione privetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above ( <a href="#FS_Q75_A4" id="FS_Q78_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>, ad 3). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36934] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod malitia ex qua aliquis dicitur peccare, potest intelligi malitia habitualis, secundum quod habitus malus a philosopho nominatur malitia, sicut habitus bonus nominatur virtus. Et secundum hoc aliquis dicitur ex malitia peccare, quia peccat ex inclinatione habitus. Potest etiam intelligi malitia actualis. Sive ipsa mali electio malitia nominetur, et sic dicitur aliquis ex malitia peccare, inquantum ex mali electione peccat. Sive etiam malitia dicatur aliqua praecedens culpa, ex qua oritur subsequens culpa, sicut cum aliquis impugnat fraternam gratiam ex invidia. Et tunc idem non est causa sui ipsius, sed actus interior est causa actus exterioris. Et unum peccatum est causa alterius, non tamen in infinitum, quia est devenire ad aliquod primum peccatum, quod non causatur ex aliquo priori peccato, ut ex supradictis patet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A2-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 2. Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36935] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis qui peccat ex habitu, peccet ex certa malitia. Peccatum enim quod est ex certa malitia, videtur esse gravissimum. Sed quandoque homo aliquod leve peccatum committit ex habitu, sicut cum dicit verbum otiosum. Non ergo omne peccatum quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36936] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> <i>Praeterea, actus ex habitu procedentes sunt similes actibus ex quibus habitus generantur</i>, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed actus praecedentes habitum vitiosum non sunt ex certa malitia. Ergo etiam peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv"> Prov. 2:14</a>: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36937] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in his quae aliquis ex certa malitia committit, gaudet postquam commisit, secundum illud Prov. II, <i>qui laetantur cum male fecerint et exultant in rebus pessimis</i>. Et hoc ideo, quia unicuique est delectabile cum consequitur id quod intendit, et qui operatur quod est ei quodammodo connaturale secundum habitum. Sed illi qui peccant ex habitu, post peccatum commissum dolent, poenitudine enim replentur pravi, idest habentes habitum vitiosum, ut dicitur in IX Ethic. Ergo peccata quae sunt ex habitu, non sunt ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36938] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, peccatum ex certa malitia dicitur esse quod est ex electione mali. Sed unicuique est eligibile id ad quod inclinatur per proprium habitum; ut dicitur in VI Ethic. de habitu virtuoso. Ergo peccatum quod est ex habitu, est ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something we use when we will," as stated above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q78_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[1]</a>). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 co."><a name="36939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36939] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod non est idem peccare habentem habitum, et peccare ex habitu. Uti enim habitu non est necessarium, sed subiacet voluntati habentis, unde et habitus definitur esse quo quis utitur cum voluerit. Et ideo sicut potest contingere quod aliquis habens habitum vitiosum, prorumpat in actum virtutis, eo quod ratio non totaliter corrumpitur per malum habitum, sed aliquid eius integrum manet, ex quo provenit quod peccator aliqua operatur de genere bonorum; ita etiam potest contingere quod aliquis habens habitum, interdum non ex habitu operetur, sed ex passione insurgente, vel etiam ex ignorantia. Sed quandocumque utitur habitu vitioso, necesse est quod ex certa malitia peccet. Quia unicuique habenti habitum, est per se diligibile id quod est ei conveniens secundum proprium habitum, quia fit ei quodammodo connaturale, secundum quod consuetudo et habitus vertitur in naturam. Hoc autem quod est alicui conveniens secundum habitum vitiosum, est id quod excludit bonum spirituale. Ex quo sequitur quod homo eligat malum spirituale, ut adipiscatur bonum quod est ei secundum habitum conveniens. Et hoc est ex certa malitia peccare. Unde manifestum est quod quicumque peccat ex habitu, peccet ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36940] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non excludunt bonum spirituale, quod est gratia Dei vel caritas. Unde non dicuntur mala simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et propter hoc nec habitus ipsorum possunt dici simpliciter mali, sed solum secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36941] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod actus qui procedunt ex habitibus, sunt similes secundum speciem actibus ex quibus habitus generantur, differunt tamen ab eis sicut perfectum ab imperfecto. Et talis est differentia peccati quod committitur ex certa malitia, ad peccatum quod committitur ex aliqua passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36942] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui peccat ex habitu, semper gaudet de hoc quod ex habitu operatur, quandiu habitu utitur. Sed quia potest habitu non uti, sed per rationem, quae non est totaliter corrupta, aliquid aliud meditari; potest contingere quod, non utens habitu, doleat de hoc quod per habitum commisit. Plerumque tamen tales poenitent de peccato, non quia eis peccatum secundum se displiceat; sed propter aliquod incommodum quod ex peccato incurrunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A3-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 3. Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that "an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it," i.e. through choice, "unless it be done through habit." Now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q78_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36943] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod quicumque peccat ex certa malitia, peccet ex habitu. Dicit enim philosophus, in V Ethic., quod non est cuiuslibet iniusta facere qualiter iniustus facit, scilicet ex electione, sed solum habentis habitum. Sed peccare ex certa malitia est peccare ex electione mali, ut dictum est. Ergo peccare ex certa malitia non est nisi habentis habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that "a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little." But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36944] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Origenes dicit, in I peri archon, quod <i>non ad subitum quis evacuatur aut deficit, sed paulatim per partes defluere necesse est</i>. Sed maximus defluxus esse videtur ut aliquis ex certa malitia peccet. Ergo non statim a principio, sed per multam consuetudinem, ex qua habitus generari potest, aliquis ad hoc devenit ut ex certa malitia peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as stated ( <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q78_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>). Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice, he sins through habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36945] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quandocumque aliquis ex certa malitia peccat, oportet quod ipsa voluntas de se inclinetur ad malum quod eligit. Sed ex natura potentiae non inclinatur homo ad malum, sed magis ad bonum. Ergo oportet, si eligit malum, quod hoc sit ex aliquo supervenienti, quod est passio vel habitus. Sed quando aliquis peccat ex passione, non peccat ex certa malitia, sed ex infirmitate, ut dictum est. Ergo quandocumque aliquis peccat ex certa malitia, oportet quod peccet ex habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36946] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, sicut se habet habitus bonus ad electionem boni, ita habitus malus ad electionem mali. Sed quandoque aliquis non habens habitum virtutis, eligit id quod est bonum secundum virtutem. Ergo etiam quandoque aliquis non habens habitum vitiosum, potest eligere malum, quod est ex certa malitia peccare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 co."><a name="36947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36947] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod voluntas aliter se habet ad bonum, et aliter ad malum. Ex natura enim suae potentiae inclinatur ad bonum rationis, sicut ad proprium obiectum, unde et omne peccatum dicitur esse contra naturam. Quod ergo in aliquod malum voluntas eligendo inclinetur, oportet quod aliunde contingat. Et quandoque quidem contingit ex defectu rationis, sicut cum aliquis ex ignorantia peccat, quandoque autem ex impulsu appetitus sensitivi, sicut cum peccat ex passione. Sed neutrum horum est ex certa malitia peccare; sed tunc solum ex certa malitia aliquis peccat, quando ipsa voluntas ex seipsa movetur ad malum. Quod potest contingere dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, per hoc quod homo habet aliquam dispositionem corruptam inclinantem ad malum, ita quod secundum illam dispositionem fit homini quasi conveniens et simile aliquod malum, et in hoc, ratione convenientiae, tendit voluntas quasi in bonum, quia unumquodque secundum se tendit in id quod sibi est conveniens. Talis autem dispositio corrupta vel est aliquis habitus acquisitus ex consuetudine, quae vertitur in naturam, vel est aliqua aegritudinalis habitudo ex parte corporis, sicut aliquis habens quasdam naturales inclinationes ad aliqua peccata, propter corruptionem naturae in ipso. Alio modo contingit quod voluntas per se tendit in aliquod malum, per remotionem alicuius prohibentis. Puta si aliquis prohibeatur peccare non quia peccatum ei secundum se displiceat, sed propter spem vitae aeternae vel propter timorem Gehennae; remota spe per desperationem, vel timore per praesumptionem, sequitur quod ex certa malitia, quasi absque freno, peccet. Sic igitur patet quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, semper praesupponit in homine aliquam inordinationem, quae tamen non semper est habitus. Unde non est necessarium quod quicumque peccat ex certa malitia, peccet ex habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p7"> It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins through habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36948] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operari qualiter iniustus operatur, non solum est operari iniusta ex certa malitia, sed etiam delectabiliter, et sine gravi renisu rationis. Quod non est nisi eius qui habet habitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36949] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non statim ad hoc aliquis labitur quod ex certa malitia peccet, sed praesupponitur aliquid, quod tamen non semper est habitus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is not always a habit, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36950] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illud propter quod voluntas inclinatur ad malum, non semper habitus est vel passio, sed quaedam alia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfect without the evil of fault. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="36951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36951] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod non est similis ratio de electione boni, et de electione mali. Quia malum nunquam est sine bono naturae, sed bonum potest esse sine malo culpae perfecte.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q78_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q78_A4-p0.1">Q. 78. A. 4. Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36952] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, non peccet gravius quam ille qui peccat ex passione. Ignorantia enim excusat peccatum vel in toto vel in parte. Sed maior est ignorantia in eo qui peccat ex certa malitia, quam in eo qui peccat ex passione, nam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, patitur ignorantiam principii, quae est maxima, ut philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic.; habet enim malam existimationem de fine, qui est principium in operativis. Ergo magis excusatur a peccato qui peccat ex certa malitia, quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36953] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quanto aliquis habet maius impellens ad peccandum, tanto minus peccat, sicut patet de eo qui maiori impetu passionis deiicitur in peccatum. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, impellitur ab habitu, cuius est fortior impulsio quam passionis. Ergo ille qui peccat ex habitu, minus peccat quam ille qui peccat ex passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36954] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccare ex certa malitia est peccare ex electione mali. Sed ille qui peccat ex passione, etiam eligit malum. Ergo non minus peccat quam ille qui peccat ex certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q78_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.26" target="asv"> Job 34:26</a>: "He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him." Now punishment is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36955] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod peccatum quod ex industria committitur, ex hoc ipso graviorem poenam meretur, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, <i>quasi impios percussit eos in loco videntium, qui quasi de industria recesserunt ab eo</i>. Sed poena non augetur nisi propter gravitatem culpae. Ergo peccatum ex hoc aggravatur, quod est ex industria, seu certa malitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 co."><a name="36956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36956] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum quod est ex certa malitia, est gravius peccato quod est ex passione, triplici ratione. Primo quidem quia, cum peccatum principaliter in voluntate consistat, quanto motus peccati est magis proprius voluntati, tanto peccatum est gravius, ceteris paribus. Cum autem ex certa malitia peccatur, motus peccati est magis proprius voluntati, quae ex seipsa in malum movetur, quam quando ex passione peccatur, quasi ex quodam extrinseco impulsu ad peccandum. Unde peccatum ex hoc ipso quod est ex malitia, aggravatur, et tanto magis, quanto fuerit vehementior malitia. Ex eo vero quod est ex passione, diminuitur, et tanto magis, quanto passio fuerit magis vehemens. Secundo, quia passio quae inclinat voluntatem ad peccandum, cito transit, et sic homo cito redit ad bonum propositum, poenitens de peccato. Sed habitus, quo homo ex malitia peccat, est qualitas permanens, et ideo qui ex malitia peccat, diuturnius peccat. Unde philosophus, in VII Ethic., comparat intemperatum, qui peccat ex malitia, infirmo qui continue laborat; incontinentem autem, qui peccat ex passione, ei qui laborat interpolate. Tertio, quia ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, est male dispositus quantum ad ipsum finem, qui est principium in operabilibus. Et sic eius defectus est periculosior quam eius qui ex passione peccat, cuius propositum tendit in bonum finem, licet hoc propositum interrumpatur ad horam propter passionem. Semper autem defectus principii est pessimus. Unde manifestum est quod gravius est peccatum quod est ex malitia, quam quod est ex passione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q76_A4" id="FS_Q78_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[4]</a>). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36957] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ignorantia electionis, de qua obiectio procedit, neque excusat neque diminuit peccatum, ut supra dictum est. Unde neque maior ignorantia talis facit esse minus peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36958] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod impulsio quae est ex passione, est quasi ex exteriori respectu voluntatis, sed per habitum inclinatur voluntas quasi ab interiori. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q78_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained ( <a href="#FS_Q78_A2" id="FS_Q78_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin "through" choosing. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 78 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36959] Iª-IIae q. 78 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod aliud est peccare eligentem, et aliud peccare ex electione. Ille enim qui peccat ex passione, peccat quidem eligens, non tamen ex electione, quia electio non est in eo primum peccati principium, sed inducitur ex passione ad eligendum id quod extra passionem existens non eligeret. Sed ille qui peccat ex certa malitia, secundum se eligit malum, eo modo quo dictum est. Et ideo electio in ipso est principium peccati; et propter hoc dicitur ex electione peccare.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q79" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q79-p0.1">Q. 79. OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q79-p2"> We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man. </p><p id="FS_Q79-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q79-p4"><a href="#FS_Q79_A1"> (1) Whether God is a cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p5"><a href="#FS_Q79_A2"> (2) Whether the act of sin is from God?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p6"><a href="#FS_Q79_A3"> (3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</a></p><p id="FS_Q79-p7"><a href="#FS_Q79_A4"> (4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 pr."><a name="36960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36960] Iª-IIae q. 79 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causis exterioribus peccati. Et primo, ex parte Dei; secundo, ex parte Diaboli; tertio, ex parte hominis. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit causa peccati. Secundo, utrum actus peccati sit a Deo. Tertio, utrum Deus sit causa excaecationis et obdurationis. Quarto, utrum haec ordinentur ad salutem eorum qui excaecantur vel obdurantur.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q79_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A1-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 1. Whether God is a cause of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.28" target="asv">Rom. 1:28</a>): "God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: 'convenient']," and a gloss comments on this by saying that "God works in men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil." Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36961] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. I, de quibusdam, <i>tradidit eos Deus in reprobum sensum, ut faciant ea quae non conveniunt</i>. Et Glossa ibidem dicit quod <i>Deus operatur in cordibus hominum, inclinando voluntates eorum in quodcumque voluerit, sive in bonum sive in malum</i>. Sed facere quae non conveniunt, et inclinari secundum voluntatem ad malum, est peccatum. Ergo Deus hominibus est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.11" target="asv">Wis. 14:11</a>): "The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men." But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FS_Q79_A1-p3.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[44], A[1]</a>, it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36962] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Sap. XIV, dicitur, <i>creaturae Dei in odium factae sunt, et in tentationem animae hominum</i>. Sed tentatio solet dici provocatio ad peccandum. Cum ergo creaturae non sint factae nisi a Deo, ut in primo habitum est, videtur quod Deus sit causa peccati provocans homines ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36963] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quidquid est causa causae, est causa effectus. Sed Deus est causa liberi arbitrii, quod est causa peccati. Ergo Deus est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.45.7" target="asv">Is. 45:7</a>) that God creates evil, and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.3.6" target="asv">Amos 3:6</a>): "Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?" Therefore it is not incompatible with God's goodness that He should cause the evil of fault. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="36964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36964] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omne malum opponitur bono. Sed non repugnat divinae bonitati quod ipse sit causa mali poenae, de isto enim malo dicitur Isaiae XLV, quod <i>Deus est creans malum</i>; et Amos III, <i>si est malum in civitate quod Deus non fecerit?</i> Ergo etiam divinae bonitati non repugnat quod Deus sit causa culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Now God hates sin, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful." Therefore God is not a cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 s. c."><a name="36965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36965] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, Sap. XI, dicitur de Deo, <i>nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti</i>. Odit autem Deus peccatum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>odio est Deo impius, et impietas eius</i>. Ergo Deus non est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another's sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another's will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.3.18" target="asv">Ezech. 3:18</a>) it is said to the watchman: "If thou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: "If, when I say to the wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it not to him."] . . . I will require his blood at thy hand." Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 co."><a name="36966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36966] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod homo dupliciter est causa peccati vel sui vel alterius. Uno modo, directe, inclinando scilicet voluntatem suam vel alterius ad peccandum. Alio modo, indirecte, dum scilicet non retrahit aliquos a peccato, unde Ezech. III speculatori dicitur, <i>si non dixeris impio, morte morieris, sanguinem eius de manu tua requiram</i>. Deus autem non potest esse directe causa peccati vel sui vel alterius. Quia omne peccatum est per recessum ab ordine qui est in ipsum sicut in finem. Deus autem omnia inclinat et convertit in seipsum sicut in ultimum finem, sicut Dionysius dicit, I cap. de Div. Nom. Unde impossibile est quod sit sibi vel aliis causa discedendi ab ordine qui est in ipsum. Unde non potest directe esse causa peccati. Similiter etiam neque indirecte. Contingit enim quod Deus aliquibus non praebet auxilium ad vitandum peccata, quod si praeberet, non peccarent. Sed hoc totum facit secundum ordinem suae sapientiae et iustitiae, cum ipse sit sapientia et iustitia. Unde non imputatur ei quod alius peccat, sicut causae peccati, sicut gubernator non dicitur causa submersionis navis ex hoc quod non gubernat navem, nisi quando subtrahit gubernationem potens et debens gubernare. Et sic patet quod Deus nullo modo est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that "God inclines men's wills to good and evil," is to be understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="36967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36967] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quantum ad verba apostoli, ex ipso textu patet solutio. Si enim Deus tradit aliquos in reprobum sensum, iam ergo reprobum sensum habent ad faciendum ea quae non conveniunt. Dicitur ergo tradere eos in reprobum sensum, inquantum non prohibet eos quin suum sensum reprobum sequantur, sicut dicimur exponere illos quos non tuemur. Quod autem Augustinus dicit, in libro de gratia et libero arbitrio, unde sumpta est Glossa, quod <i>Deus inclinat voluntates hominum in bonum et malum</i>; sic intelligendum est quod in bonum quidem directe inclinat voluntatem, in malum autem inquantum non prohibet, sicut dictum est. Et tamen hoc etiam contingit ex merito praecedentis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said the "creatures of God are turned 'to' an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men," the preposition "to" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin "factae sunt in abominationem" admits of the translation "were made to be an abomination," which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, "and a snare to the feet of the unwise," who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were made. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="36968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36968] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur, <i>creaturae Dei factae sunt in odium et in tentationem animae hominum</i>, haec praepositio in non ponitur causaliter, sed consecutive, non enim Deus fecit creaturas ad malum hominum, sed hoc consecutum est propter insipientiam hominum. Unde subditur, et in muscipulam pedibus insipientium, qui scilicet per suam insipientiam utuntur creaturis ad aliud quam ad quod factae sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="36969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36969] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod effectus causae mediae procedens ab ea secundum quod subditur ordini causae primae, reducitur etiam in causam primam. Sed si procedat a causa media secundum quod exit ordinem causae primae, non reducitur in causam primam, sicut si minister faciat aliquid contra mandatum domini, hoc non reducitur in dominum sicut in causam. Et similiter peccatum quod liberum arbitrium committit contra praeceptum Dei, non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison between fault and punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="36970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36970] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod poena opponitur bono eius qui punitur, qui privatur quocumque bono. Sed culpa opponitur bono ordinis qui est in Deum, unde directe opponitur bonitati divinae. Et propter hoc non est similis ratio de culpa et poena.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A2-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 2. Whether the act of sin is from God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "the act of sin is not a thing." Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="36971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36971] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod actus peccati non sit a Deo. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de perfectione iustitiae, quod <i>actus peccati non est res aliqua</i>. Omne autem quod est a Deo, est res aliqua. Ergo actus peccati non est a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for "no one works, intending evil," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="36972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36972] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, homo non dicitur esse causa peccati nisi quia homo est causa actus peccati, nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed Deus non est causa peccati, ut dictum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="36973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36973] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, aliqui actus secundum suam speciem sunt mali et peccata, ut ex supradictis patet. Sed quidquid est causa alicuius, est causa eius quod convenit ei secundum suam speciem. Si ergo Deus esset causa actus peccati, sequeretur quod esset causa peccati. Sed hoc non est verum, ut ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now "the will of God is the cause of every movement," as Augustine declares (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God's will is the cause of the act of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 s. c."><a name="36974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36974] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, actus peccati est quidam motus liberi arbitrii. Sed voluntas Dei est causa omnium motionum, ut Augustinus dicit, III de Trin. Ergo voluntas Dei est causa actus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 co."><a name="36975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36975] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod actus peccati et est ens, et est actus; et ex utroque habet quod sit a Deo. Omne enim ens, quocumque modo sit, oportet quod derivetur a primo ente; ut patet per Dionysium, V cap. de Div. Nom. Omnis autem actio causatur ab aliquo existente in actu, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod est actu, omne autem ens actu reducitur in primum actum, scilicet Deum, sicut in causam, qui est per suam essentiam actus. Unde relinquitur quod Deus sit causa omnis actionis, inquantum est actio. Sed peccatum nominat ens et actionem cum quodam defectu. Defectus autem ille est ex causa creata, scilicet libero arbitrio, inquantum deficit ab ordine primi agentis, scilicet Dei. Unde defectus iste non reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, sed in liberum arbitrium, sicut defectus claudicationis reducitur in tibiam curvam sicut in causam, non autem in virtutem motivam, a qua tamen causatur quidquid est motionis in claudicatione. Et secundum hoc, Deus est causa actus peccati, non tamen est causa peccati, quia non est causa huius, quod actus sit cum defectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this passage Augustine calls by the name of "thing," that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="36976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36976] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus nominat ibi rem id quod est res simpliciter, scilicet substantiam. Sic enim actus peccati non est res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="36977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36977] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod in hominem sicut in causam reducitur non solum actus, sed etiam ipse defectus, quia scilicet non subditur ei cui debet subdi, licet hoc ipse non intendat principaliter. Et ideo homo est causa peccati. Sed Deus sic est causa actus, quod nullo modo est causa defectus concomitantis actum. Et ideo non est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A1" id="FS_Q79_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[1]</a>), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="36978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36978] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dictum est supra, actus et habitus non recipiunt speciem ex ipsa privatione, in qua consistit ratio mali; sed ex aliquo obiecto cui coniungitur talis privatio. Et sic ipse defectus, qui dicitur non esse a Deo, pertinet ad speciem actus consequenter, et non quasi differentia specifica.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A3-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 3. Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="36979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36979] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit causa excaecationis et indurationis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>Deus non est causa eius quod homo sit deterior</i>. Sed per excaecationem et obdurationem fit homo deterior. Ergo Deus non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): "God does not punish what He causes." Now God punishes the hardened heart, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.3.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 3:27</a>: "A hard heart shall fear evil at the last." Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="36980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36980] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Fulgentius dicit quod <i>Deus non est ultor illius rei cuius est auctor</i>. Sed Deus est ultor cordis obdurati, secundum illud Eccli. III, <i>cor durum male habebit in novissimo</i>. Ergo Deus non est causa obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.21" target="asv"> Wis. 2:21</a>: "For their own malice blinded them," and again, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:4</a>: "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers": which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="36981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36981] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, idem effectus non attribuitur causis contrariis. Sed causa excaecationis dicitur esse malitia hominis, secundum illud Sap. II, <i>excaecavit enim eos malitia eorum</i>; et etiam Diabolus, secundum illud II ad Cor. IV, <i>Deus huius saeculi excaecavit mentes infidelium</i>; quae quidem causae videntur esse contrariae Deo. Deus ergo non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.10" target="asv">Is. 6:10</a>): "Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy," and <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.18" target="asv"> Rom. 9:18</a>: "He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 s. c."><a name="36982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36982] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Isaiae VI, <i>excaeca cor populi huius, et aures eius aggrava</i>. Et Rom. IX dicitur, <i>cuius vult, miseretur; et quem vult, indurat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. </p><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p7"> Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9</a>: "That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," even as the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart. </p><p id="FS_Q79_A3-p8"> These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that spiritual "blindness" corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 co."><a name="36983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36983] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod excaecatio et obduratio duo important. Quorum unum est motus animi humani inhaerentis malo, et aversi a divino lumine. Et quantum ad hoc Deus non est causa excaecationis et obdurationis, sicut non est causa peccati. Aliud autem est subtractio gratiae, ex qua sequitur quod mens divinitus non illuminetur ad recte videndum, et cor hominis non emolliatur ad recte vivendum. Et quantum ad hoc Deus est causa excaecationis et obdurationis. Est autem considerandum quod Deus est causa universalis illuminationis animarum, secundum illud Ioan. I, <i>erat lux vera quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum</i>, sicut sol est universalis causa illuminationis corporum. Aliter tamen et aliter, nam sol agit illuminando per necessitatem naturae; Deus autem agit voluntarie, per ordinem suae sapientiae. Sol autem, licet quantum est de se omnia corpora illuminet, si quod tamen impedimentum inveniat in aliquo corpore, relinquit illud tenebrosum, sicut patet de domo cuius fenestrae sunt clausae. Sed tamen illius obscurationis nullo modo causa est sol, non enim suo iudicio agit ut lumen interius non immittat, sed causa eius est solum ille qui claudit fenestram. Deus autem proprio iudicio lumen gratiae non immittit illis in quibus obstaculum invenit. Unde causa subtractionis gratiae est non solum ille qui ponit obstaculum gratiae, sed etiam Deus, qui suo iudicio gratiam non apponit. Et per hunc modum Deus est causa excaecationis, et aggravationis aurium, et obdurationis cordis. Quae quidem distinguuntur secundum effectus gratiae, quae et perficit intellectum dono sapientiae, et affectum emollit igne caritatis. Et quia ad cognitionem intellectus maxime deserviunt duo sensus, scilicet visus et auditus, quorum unus deservit inventioni, scilicet visus, alius disciplinae, scilicet auditus, ideo quantum ad visum, ponitur excaecatio; quantum ad auditum, aurium aggravatio; quantum ad affectum, obduratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="36984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36984] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum excaecatio et induratio, ex parte subtractionis gratiae, sint quaedam poenae, ex hac parte eis homo non fit deterior, sed deterior factus per culpam, haec incurrit, sicut et ceteras poenas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="36985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36985] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de obduratione secundum quod est culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="36986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36986] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod malitia est causa excaecationis meritoria, sicut culpa est causa poenae. Et hoc etiam modo Diabolus excaecare dicitur, inquantum inducit ad culpam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q79_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q79_A4-p0.1">Q. 79. A. 4. Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q79_A3" id="FS_Q79_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="36987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36987] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod excaecatio et obduratio semper ordinentur ad salutem eius qui excaecatur et obduratur. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., quod <i>Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo modo permitteret fieri aliquod malum, nisi posset ex quolibet malo elicere bonum</i>. Multo igitur magis ordinat ad bonum illud malum cuius ipse est causa. Sed excaecationis et obdurationis Deus est causa, ut dictum est. Ergo haec ordinantur ad salutem eius qui excaecatur vel induratur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>) that "God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.']." Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="36988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36988] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Sap. I dicitur quod <i>Deus non delectatur in perditione impiorum</i>. Videretur autem in eorum perditione delectari, si eorum excaecationem in bonum eorum non converteret, sicut medicus videretur delectari in afflictione infirmi, si medicinam amaram, quam infirmo propinat, ad eius sanitatem non ordinaret. Ergo Deus excaecationem convertit in bonum excaecatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "God is not a respecter of persons" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34</a>). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="36989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36989] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, Deus non est personarum acceptor</i>, ut dicitur Act. X. Sed quorundam excaecationem ordinat ad eorum salutem, sicut quorundam Iudaeorum, qui excaecati sunt ut Christo non crederent, et non credentes occiderent, et postmodum compuncti converterentur, sicut de quibusdam legitur Act. II; ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de quaest. Evang. Ergo Deus omnium excaecationem convertit in eorum salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> On the other hand, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.8" target="asv"> Rom. 3:8, </a> evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of their welfare. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 s. c."><a name="36990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36990] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, non sunt facienda mala ut veniant bona, ut dicitur Rom. III. Sed excaecatio est malum. Ergo Deus non excaecat aliquos propter eorum bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation---to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's damnation---to another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom "all things work together unto good" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q79_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. Evang. iii). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 co."><a name="36991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36991] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod excaecatio est quoddam praeambulum ad peccatum. Peccatum autem ad duo ordinatur, ad unum quidem per se, scilicet ad damnationem; ad aliud autem ex misericordi Dei providentia, scilicet ad sanationem, inquantum Deus permittit aliquos cadere in peccatum, ut peccatum suum agnoscentes, humilientur et convertantur, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura et gratia. Unde et excaecatio ex sui natura ordinatur ad damnationem eius qui excaecatur, propter quod etiam ponitur reprobationis effectus, sed ex divina misericordia excaecatio ad tempus ordinatur medicinaliter ad salutem eorum qui excaecantur. Sed haec misericordia non omnibus impenditur excaecatis, <i>sed praedestinatis solum, quibus omnia cooperantur in bonum</i>, sicut dicitur Rom. VIII. Unde quantum ad quosdam, excaecatio ordinatur ad sanationem, quantum autem ad alios, ad damnationem, ut Augustinus dicit, in III de quaest. Evang.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="36992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36992] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnia mala quae Deus facit vel permittit fieri, ordinantur in aliquod bonum, non tamen semper in bonum eius in quo est malum, sed quandoque ad bonum alterius, vel etiam totius universi. Sicut culpam tyrannorum ordinavit in bonum martyrum; et poenam damnatorum ordinat in gloriam suae iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="36993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36993] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum quantum ad ipsam perditionem, sed ratione suae iustitiae, vel propter bonum quod inde provenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a respecter of persons, as explained in the <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q23_A5" id="FS_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[23], A[5]</a>, ad 3. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="36994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36994] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc quod Deus aliquorum excaecationem ordinat in eorum salutem, misericordiae est, quod autem excaecatio aliorum ordinetur ad eorum damnationem, iustitiae est. Quod autem misericordiam quibusdam impendit et non omnibus, non facit personarum acceptionem in Deo, sicut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q79_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 79 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="36995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36995] Iª-IIae q. 79 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod mala culpae non sunt facienda ut veniant bona, sed mala poenae sunt inferenda propter bonum.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q80" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q80-p0.1">Q. 80. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q80-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q80-p3"><a href="#FS_Q80_A1"> (1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p4"><a href="#FS_Q80_A2"> (2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p5"><a href="#FS_Q80_A3"> (3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q80-p6"><a href="#FS_Q80_A4"> (4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 pr."><a name="36996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36996] Iª-IIae q. 80 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa peccati ex parte Diaboli. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Diabolus sit directe causa peccati. Secundo, utrum Diabolus inducat ad peccandum interius persuadendo. Tertio, utrum possit necessitatem peccandi inducere. Quarto, utrum omnia peccata ex Diaboli suggestione proveniant.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q80_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A1-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 1. Whether the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that "the devil inspires his friends with evil desires"; and Bede, commenting on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.3" target="asv"> Acts 5:3, </a> says that the devil "draws the mind to evil desires"; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil "fills men's hearts with secret lusts." Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="36997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36997] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus sit homini directe causa peccandi. Peccatum enim directe in affectu consistit. Sed Augustinus dicit, IV de Trin., quod <i>Diabolus suae societati malignos affectus inspirat</i>. Et Beda, super Act., dicit quod <i>Diabolus animam in affectum malitiae trahit</i>. Et Isidorus dicit, in libro de summo bono, quod <i>Diabolus corda hominum occultis cupiditatibus replet</i>. Ergo Diabolus directe est causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that "as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil." But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="36998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36998] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit quod <i>sicut Deus est perfector boni, ita Diabolus est perfector mali</i>. Sed Deus est directe causa bonorum nostrorum. Ergo Diabolus est directe causa peccatorum nostrorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): "There must needs be some extrinsic principle of human counsel." Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="36999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[36999] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus probat, in quodam cap. Ethicae Eudemicae, quod oportet esse quoddam principium extrinsecum humani consilii. Consilium autem humanum non solum est de bonis, sed etiam de malis. Ergo sicut Deus movet ad consilium bonum, et per hoc directe est causa boni; ita Diabolus movet hominem ad consilium malum, et per hoc sequitur quod Diabolus directe sit causa peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that "nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire." Now man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man's own will alone. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37000] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus probat, in I et III de Lib. Arb., <i>quod nulla alia re fit mens hominis serva libidinis, nisi propria voluntate</i>. Sed homo non fit servus libidinis nisi per peccatum. Ergo causa peccati non potest esse Diabolus, sed sola propria voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act. </p><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p7"> Now the will, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A3" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[9], AA[3]</a>,4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q79_A1" id="FS_Q80_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[79], A[1]</a>). Therefore it follows that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin. </p><p id="FS_Q80_A1-p8"> As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q10_A1" id="FS_Q80_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[10], AA[1]</a>,2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 co."><a name="37001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37001] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum actus quidam est. Unde hoc modo potest esse aliquid directe causa peccati, per quem modum aliquis directe est causa alicuius actus. Quod quidem non contingit nisi per hoc quod proprium principium illius actus movet ad agendum. Proprium autem principium actus peccati est voluntas, quia omne peccatum est voluntarium. Unde nihil potest directe esse causa peccati, nisi quod potest movere voluntatem ad agendum. Voluntas autem, sicut supra dictum est, a duobus moveri potest, uno modo, ab obiecto, sicut dicitur quod appetibile apprehensum movet appetitum; alio modo, ab eo quod interius inclinat voluntatem ad volendum. Hoc autem non est nisi vel ipsa voluntas, vel Deus, ut supra ostensum est. Deus autem non potest esse causa peccati, ut dictum est. Relinquitur ergo quod ex hac parte sola voluntas hominis sit directe causa peccati eius. Ex parte autem obiecti, potest intelligi quod aliquid moveat voluntatem tripliciter. Uno modo, ipsum obiectum propositum, sicut dicimus quod cibus excitat desiderium hominis ad comedendum. Alio modo, ille qui proponit vel offert huiusmodi obiectum. Tertio modo, ille qui persuadet obiectum propositum habere rationem boni, quia et hic aliqualiter proponit proprium obiectum voluntati, quod est rationis bonum verum vel apparens. Primo igitur modo, res sensibiles exterius apparentes movent voluntatem hominis ad peccandum, secundo autem et tertio modo, vel Diabolus, vel etiam homo, potest incitare ad peccandum, vel offerendo aliquid appetibile sensui, vel persuadendo rationi. Sed nullo istorum trium modorum potest aliquid esse directa causa peccati, quia voluntas non ex necessitate movetur ab aliquo obiecto nisi ab ultimo fine, ut supra dictum est; unde non est sufficiens causa peccati neque res exterius oblata, neque ille qui eam proponit, neque ille qui persuadet. Unde sequitur quod Diabolus non sit causa peccati directe et sufficienter; sed solum per modum persuadentis, vel proponentis appetibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37002] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnes illae auctoritates, et si quae similes inveniantur, sunt referendae ad hoc quod Diabolus suggerendo, vel aliqua appetibilia proponendo, inducit in affectum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37003] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod similitudo illa est attendenda quantum ad hoc, quod Diabolus quodammodo est causa peccatorum nostrorum, sicut Deus est aliquo modo causa bonorum nostrorum. Non tamen attenditur quantum ad modum causandi, nam Deus causat bona interius movendo voluntatem, quod Diabolo convenire non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37004] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus humani, sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana; et a Diabolo per modum persuadentis, vel appetibilia proponentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A2-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 2. Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37005] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus non possit inducere ad peccandum interius instigando. Interiores enim motus animae sunt quaedam opera vitae. Sed nullum opus vitae potest esse nisi a principio intrinseco; nec etiam opus animae vegetabilis, quod est infimum inter opera vitae. Ergo Diabolus secundum interiores motus non potest hominem instigare ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FS_Q80_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[4]</a>. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived by the external senses. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37006] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnes interiores motus, secundum ordinem naturae, a sensibus exterioribus oriuntur. Sed praeter ordinem naturae aliquid operari est solius Dei, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo Diabolus non potest in interioribus motibus hominis aliquid operari, nisi secundum ea quae exterioribus sensibus apparent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these, because, as stated in the <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>; <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FS_Q80_A2-p4.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], AA[2]</a>,3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37007] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, interiores actus animae sunt intelligere et imaginari. Sed quantum ad neutrum horum potest Diabolus aliquid operari. Quia, ut in primo habitum est, Diabolus non imprimit in intellectum humanum. In phantasiam etiam videtur quod imprimere non possit, quia formae imaginatae, tanquam magis spirituales, sunt digniores quam formae quae sunt in materia sensibili; quas tamen Diabolus imprimere non potest, ut patet ex his quae in primo habita sunt. Ergo Diabolus non potest secundum interiores motus inducere hominem ad peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37008] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia secundum hoc nunquam tentaret hominem nisi visibiliter apparendo. Quod patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated <a href="#FS_Q80_A1" id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FS_Q80_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[111], A[1]</a>) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard; rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetite to some passion or other. </p><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p7"> The reason of this is, that as stated in the <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FS_Q80_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[110], A[3]</a>, the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. iii, iv.] that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time." Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play. </p><p id="FS_Q80_A2-p8"> In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), "lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved." It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 co."><a name="37009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37009] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod interior pars animae est intellectiva et sensitiva. Intellectiva autem continet intellectum et voluntatem. Et de voluntate quidem iam dictum est quomodo ad eam Diabolus se habet. Intellectus autem per se quidem movetur ab aliquo illuminante ipsum ad cognitionem veritatis, quod Diabolus circa hominem non intendit, sed magis obtenebrare rationem ipsius ad consentiendum peccato. Quae quidem obtenebratio provenit ex phantasia et appetitu sensitivo. Unde tota interior operatio Diaboli esse videtur circa phantasiam et appetitum sensitivum. Quorum utrumque commovendo, potest inducere ad peccatum, potest enim operari ad hoc quod imaginationi aliquae formae imaginariae praesententur; potest etiam facere quod appetitus sensitivus concitetur ad aliquam passionem. Dictum est enim in primo libro quod natura corporalis spirituali naturaliter obedit ad motum localem. Unde et Diabolus omnia illa causare potest quae ex motu locali corporum inferiorum provenire possunt, nisi virtute divina reprimatur. Quod autem aliquae formae repraesententur imaginationi, consequitur quandoque ad motum localem. Dicit enim philosophus, in libro de somno et vigilia, quod <i>cum animal dormierit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus</i>, sive impressiones relictae ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in sensibilibus speciebus conservantur, et movent principium apprehensivum, ita quod apparent ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis exterioribus immutaretur. Unde talis motus localis spirituum vel humorum potest procurari a Daemonibus, sive dormiant sive vigilent homines, et sic sequitur quod homo aliqua imaginetur. Similiter etiam appetitus sensitivus concitatur ad aliquas passiones secundum quendam determinatum motum cordis et spirituum. Unde ad hoc etiam Diabolus potest cooperari. Et ex hoc quod passiones aliquae concitantur in appetitu sensitivo, sequitur quod et motum sive intentionem sensibilem praedicto modo reductam ad principium apprehensivum, magis homo percipiat, quia, ut philosophus in eodem libro dicit, <i>amantes modica similitudine in apprehensionem rei amatae moventur</i>. Contingit etiam ex hoc quod passio est concitata, ut id quod proponitur imaginationi, iudicetur prosequendum, quia ei qui a passione detinetur, videtur esse bonum id ad quod per passionem inclinatur. Et per hunc modum Diabolus interius inducit ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37010] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod opera vitae semper etsi sint ab aliquo principio intrinseco, tamen ad ea potest cooperari aliquod exterius agens, sicut etiam ad opera animae vegetabilis operatur calor exterior, ut facilius digeratur cibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according to local movement, as explained above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37011] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod huiusmodi apparitio formarum imaginabilium non est omnino praeter ordinem naturae. Nec est per solum imperium, sed per motum localem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A2-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37012] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet responsio ad tertium, quia formae illae sunt a sensibus acceptae primordialiter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A3-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 3. Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.41.24" target="asv">Job 41:24</a>) that "there is no power on earth that can compare with him." Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37013] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod Diabolus possit necessitatem inferre ad peccandum. Potestas enim maior potest necessitatem inferre minori. Sed de Diabolo dicitur Iob XLI, <i>non est potestas super terram quae ei valeat comparari</i>. Ergo potest homini terreno necessitatem inferre ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because "all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q80_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>; and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that "this evil," of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, "extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor." Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37014] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ratio hominis non potest moveri nisi secundum ea quae exterius sensibus proponuntur et imaginationi repraesentantur, quia omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet a sensu, <i>et non est intelligere sine phantasmate</i>, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Sed Diabolus potest movere imaginationem hominis, ut dictum est, et etiam exteriores sensus, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod <i>serpit hoc malum</i>, scilicet quod est a Diabolo, <i>per omnes aditus sensuales; dat se figuris, accommodat coloribus, adhaeret sonis, infundit saporibus</i>. Ergo potest rationem hominis ex necessitate inclinare ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that "there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit." Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q80_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37015] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, <i>nonnullum peccatum est, cum caro concupiscit adversus spiritum</i>. Sed concupiscentiam carnis Diabolus potest causare, sicut et ceteras passiones, eo modo quo supra dictum est. Ergo ex necessitate potest inducere ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q80_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour." Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity. </p><p id="FS_Q80_A3-p6"> Further, it is likewise written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.7" target="asv">Jam. 4:7</a>): "Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you," which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37016] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur I Petr. ult., <i>adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit, quaerens quem devoret, cui resistite fortes in fide</i>. Frustra autem talis admonitio daretur, si homo ei ex necessitate succumberet. Non ergo potest homini necessitatem inducere ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q77_A7" id="FS_Q80_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[7]</a>). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 co."><a name="37017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37017] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Diabolus propria virtute, nisi refraenetur a Deo, potest aliquem inducere ex necessitate ad faciendum aliquem actum qui de suo genere peccatum est, non autem potest inducere necessitatem peccandi. Quod patet ex hoc quod homo motivo ad peccandum non resistit nisi per rationem, cuius usum totaliter impedire potest movendo imaginationem et appetitum sensitivum, sicut in arreptitiis patet. Sed tunc, ratione sic ligata, quidquid homo agat, non imputatur ei ad peccatum. Sed si ratio non sit totaliter ligata, ex ea parte qua est libera, potest resistere peccato, sicut supra dictum est. Unde manifestum est quod Diabolus nullo modo potest necessitatem inducere homini ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; God alone can do this, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q9_A6" id="FS_Q80_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[6]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37018] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non quaelibet potestas maior homine, potest movere voluntatem hominis, sed solus Deus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37019] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod est apprehensum per sensum vel imaginationem, non ex necessitate movet voluntatem, si homo habeat usum rationis. Nec semper huiusmodi apprehensio ligat rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37020] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod concupiscentia carnis contra spiritum, quando ratio ei actualiter resistit, non est peccatum, sed materia exercendae virtutis. Quod autem ratio ei non resistat, non est in potestate Diaboli. Et ideo non potest inducere necessitatem peccati.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q80_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q80_A4-p0.1">Q. 80. A. 4. Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37021] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnia peccata hominum sint ex suggestione Diaboli. Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>multitudo Daemonum causa est omnium malorum et sibi et aliis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.34" target="asv"> Jn. 8:34</a>: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q80_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiPet.2.19" target="asv">2 Pet. 2:19</a>). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37022] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque peccat mortaliter, efficitur servus Diaboli; secundum illud Ioan. VIII, <i>qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. Sed ei aliquis in servitutem addicitur, a quo superatus est</i>, ut dicitur II Petr. II. Ergo quicumque facit peccatum, superatus est a Diabolo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37023] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Gregorius dicit quod peccatum Diaboli est irreparabile, quia cecidit nullo suggerente. Si igitur aliqui homines peccarent per liberum arbitrium, nullo suggerente, eorum peccatum esset irremediabile, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo omnia peccata humana a Diabolo suggeruntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37024] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur in libro de ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, <i>non omnes cogitationes nostrae malae a Diabolo excitantur, sed aliquoties ex nostri arbitrii motu emergunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 co."><a name="37025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37025] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod occasionaliter quidem et indirecte Diabolus est causa omnium peccatorum nostrorum, inquantum induxit primum hominem ad peccandum, ex cuius peccato intantum vitiata est humana natura, ut omnes simus ad peccandum proclives, sicut diceretur esse causa combustionis lignorum qui ligna siccaret, ex quo sequeretur quod facile incenderentur. Directe autem non est causa omnium peccatorum humanorum, ita quod singula peccata persuadeat. Quod Origenes probat ex hoc, quia etiam si Diabolus non esset, homines haberent appetitum cibi et venereorum et similium, qui posset esse inordinatus nisi ratione ordinaretur, quod subiacet libero arbitrio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37026] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod multitudo Daemonum est causa omnium malorum nostrorum secundum primam originem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37027] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non solum fit servus alicuius qui ab eo superatur, sed etiam qui se ei voluntarie subiicit. Et hoc modo fit servus Diaboli qui motu proprio peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q80_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 80 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37028] Iª-IIae q. 80 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum Diaboli fuit irremediabile, quia nec aliquo suggerente peccavit, nec habuit aliquam pronitatem ad peccandum ex praecedenti suggestione causatam. Quod de nullo hominis peccato dici potest.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q81" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q81-p0.1">Q. 81. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q81-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject. </p><p id="FS_Q81-p3"> Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q81-p4"><a href="#FS_Q81_A1"> (1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p5"><a href="#FS_Q81_A2"> (2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin? </a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p6"><a href="#FS_Q81_A3"> (3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p7"><a href="#FS_Q81_A4"> (4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?</a></p><p id="FS_Q81-p8"><a href="#FS_Q81_A5"> (5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 pr."><a name="37029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37029] Iª-IIae q. 81 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa peccati ex parte hominis. Cum autem homo sit causa peccati alteri homini exterius suggerendo, sicut et Diabolus, habet quendam specialem modum causandi peccatum in alterum per originem. Unde de peccato originali dicendum est. Circa quod tria consideranda occurrunt, primo, de eius traductione; secundo, de eius essentia; tertio, de eius subiecto. Circa primum quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum primum peccatum hominis derivetur per originem in posteros. Secundo, utrum omnia alia peccata primi parentis, vel etiam aliorum parentum, per originem in posteros deriventur. Tertio, utrum peccatum originale derivetur ad omnes qui ex Adam per viam seminis generantur. Quarto, utrum derivaretur ad illos qui miraculose ex aliqua parte humani corporis formarentur. Quinto, utrum si femina peccasset, viro non peccante, traduceretur originale peccatum.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q81_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A1-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 1. Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of origin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37030] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primum peccatum primi parentis non traducatur ad alios per originem. Dicitur enim Ezech. XVIII, <i>filius non portabit iniquitatem patris</i>. Portaret autem, si ab eo iniquitatem traheret. Ergo nullus trahit ab aliquo parentum per originem aliquod peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A2" id="FS_Q81_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[118], A[2]</a>. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37031] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, accidens non traducitur per originem, nisi traducto subiecto, eo quod accidens non transit de subiecto in subiectum. Sed anima rationalis, quae est subiectum culpae, non traducitur per originem, ut in primo ostensum est. Ergo neque aliqua culpa per originem traduci potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37032] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne illud quod traducitur per originem humanam, causatur ex semine. Sed semen non potest causare peccatum, eo quod caret rationali parte animae, quae sola potest esse causa peccati. Ergo nullum peccatum potest trahi per originem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37033] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod est perfectius in natura, virtuosius est ad agendum. Sed caro perfecta non potest inficere animam sibi unitam, alioquin anima non posset emundari a culpa originali dum est carni unita. Ergo multo minus semen potest inficere animam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so through want of exercise and through carelessness." Now those are said to be "naturally ugly," who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="37034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37034] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod <i>propter naturam turpes nullus increpat, sed eos qui propter desidiam et negligentiam</i>. Dicuntur autem natura turpes qui habent turpitudinem ex sua origine. Ergo nihil quod est per originem, est increpabile, neque peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.24" target="asv">Wis. 2:24</a>): "By the envy of the devil, death came into this world." It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37035] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit</i>. Quod non potest intelligi per modum imitationis, propter hoc quod dicitur Sap. II, <i>invidia Diaboli mors intravit in orbem terrarum</i>. Restat ergo quod per originem a primo homine peccatum in mundo intravit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii.] </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p9"> In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child---thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul's defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt. </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p10"> But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him." </p><p id="FS_Q81_A1-p11"> Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the "sin of nature," according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.3" target="asv"> Eph. 2:3</a>: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 co."><a name="37036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37036] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam est tenendum quod primum peccatum primi hominis originaliter transit in posteros. Propter quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad Baptismum, tanquam ab aliqua infectione culpae abluendi. Contrarium autem est haeresis Pelagianae, ut patet per Augustinum in plurimis suis libris. Ad investigandum autem qualiter peccatum primi parentis originaliter possit transire in posteros, diversi diversis viis processerunt. Quidam enim, considerantes quod peccati subiectum est anima rationalis, posuerunt quod cum semine rationalis anima traducatur, ut sic ex infecta anima animae infectae derivari videantur. Alii vero, hoc repudiantes tanquam erroneum, conati sunt ostendere quomodo culpa animae parentis traducitur in prolem, etiam si anima non traducatur, per hoc quod corporis defectus traducuntur a parente in prolem, sicut si leprosus generat leprosum, et podagricus podagricum, propter aliquam corruptionem seminis, licet talis corruptio non dicatur lepra vel podagra. Cum autem corpus sit proportionatum animae, et defectus animae redundent in corpus, et e converso; simili modo dicunt quod culpabilis defectus animae per traductionem seminis in prolem derivatur, quamvis semen actualiter non sit culpae subiectum. Sed omnes huiusmodi viae insufficientes sunt. Quia dato quod aliqui defectus corporales a parente transeant in prolem per originem; et etiam aliqui defectus animae ex consequenti, propter corporis indispositionem, sicut interdum ex fatuis fatui generantur, tamen hoc ipsum quod est ex origine aliquem defectum habere, videtur excludere rationem culpae, de cuius ratione est quod sit voluntaria. Unde etiam posito quod anima rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc ipso quod infectio animae prolis non esset in eius voluntate, amitteret rationem culpae obligantis ad poenam, quia, ut philosophus dicit in III Ethic., <i>nullus improperabit caeco nato, sed magis miserebitur</i>. Et ideo alia via procedendum est, dicendo quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, inquantum conveniunt in natura, quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus omnes qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et tota communitas quasi unus homo. Porphyrius etiam dicit quod <i>participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo</i>. Sic igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati, sunt tanquam multa membra unius corporis. Actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animae, quae primo movet membra. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se ut divisa a corpore, sed imputatur ei inquantum est aliquid hominis quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur inordinatio quae est in isto homine, ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet motione generationis omnes qui ex eius origine derivantur, sicut voluntas animae movet omnia membra ad actum. Unde peccatum quod sic a primo parente in posteros derivatur, dicitur originale, sicut peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale. Et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod committitur, non est peccatum illius membri nisi inquantum illud membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur peccatum humanum; ita peccatum originale non est peccatum huius personae, nisi inquantum haec persona recipit naturam a primo parente. Unde et vocatur peccatum naturae; secundum illud Ephes. II, <i>eramus natura filii irae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37037] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod filius dicitur non portare peccatum patris, quia non punitur pro peccato patris, nisi sit particeps culpae. Et sic est in proposito, derivatur enim per originem culpa a patre in filium, sicut et peccatum actuale per imitationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37038] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi anima non traducatur, quia virtus seminis non potest causare animam rationalem; movet tamen ad ipsam dispositive. Unde per virtutem seminis traducitur humana natura a parente in prolem, et simul cum natura naturae infectio, ex hoc enim fit iste qui nascitur consors culpae primi parentis, quod naturam ab eo sortitur per quandam generativam motionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37039] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, etsi culpa non sit actu in semine, est tamen ibi virtute humana natura, quam concomitatur talis culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37040] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod semen est principium generationis, quae est proprius actus naturae, eius propagationi deserviens. Et ideo magis inficitur anima per semen quam per carnem iam perfectam, quae iam determinata est ad personam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A1-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a crime committed by one of his forbears. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="37041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37041] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod illud quod est per originem, non est increpabile, si consideretur iste qui nascitur secundum se. Sed si consideretur prout refertur ad aliquod principium, sic potest esse ei increpabile, sicut aliquis qui nascitur patitur ignominiam generis ex culpa alicuius progenitorum causatam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A2-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 2. Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37042] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod etiam alia peccata vel ipsius primi parentis, vel proximorum parentum, traducantur in posteros. Poena enim nunquam debetur nisi culpae. Sed aliqui puniuntur iudicio divino pro peccato proximorum parentum; secundum illud Exod. XX, <i>ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios, in tertiam et quartam generationem</i>. Iudicio etiam humano, in crimine laesae maiestatis, filii exheredantur pro peccato parentum. Ergo etiam culpa proximorum parentum transit ad posteros.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37043] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, magis potest transferre in alterum id quod habet aliquis a seipso, quam id quod habet ex alio, sicut ignis magis potest calefacere quam aqua calefacta, sed homo transfert in prolem per originem peccatum quod habet ab Adam. Ergo multo magis peccatum quod ipse commisit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.22.11" target="asv"> Apoc. 22:11</a>: "He that is filthy, let him be filthier still." Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37044] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ideo contrahimus a primo parente peccatum originale, quia in eo fuimus sicut in principio naturae, quam ipse corrupit. Sed similiter fuimus in proximis parentibus sicut in quibusdam principiis naturae, quae etsi sit corrupta, potest adhuc magis corrumpi per peccatum, secundum illud Apoc. ult., <i>qui in sordibus est, sordescat adhuc</i>. Ergo filii contrahunt peccata proximorum parentum per originem, sicut et primi parentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much less therefore are their sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37045] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, bonum est magis diffusivum sui quam malum. Sed merita proximorum parentum non traducuntur ad posteros. Ergo multo minus peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q81_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those that are purely personal, as stated above. </p><p id="FS_Q81_A2-p7"> Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q100_A1" id="FS_Q81_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[100], A[1]</a>, was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 co."><a name="37046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37046] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod Augustinus hanc quaestionem movet in Enchiridio, et insolutam relinquit. Sed si quis diligenter attendit, impossibile est quod aliqua peccata proximorum parentum, vel etiam primi parentis praeter primum, per originem traducantur. Cuius ratio est quia homo generat sibi idem in specie, non autem secundum individuum. Et ideo ea quae directe pertinent ad individuum, sicut personales actus et quae ad eos pertinent, non traducuntur a parentibus in filios, non enim grammaticus traducit in filium scientiam grammaticae, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quae pertinent ad naturam speciei, traducuntur a parentibus in filios, nisi sit defectus naturae, sicut oculatus generat oculatum, nisi natura deficiat. Et si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad dispositionem naturae, sicut velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia huiusmodi, nullo autem modo ea quae sunt pure personalia, ut dictum est. Sicut autem ad personam pertinet aliquid secundum seipsam, et aliquid ex dono gratiae; ita etiam ad naturam potest aliquid pertinere secundum seipsam, scilicet quod causatur ex principiis eius, et aliquid ex dono gratiae. Et hoc modo iustitia originalis, sicut in primo dictum est, erat quoddam donum gratiae toti humanae naturae divinitus collatum in primo parente. Quod quidem primus homo amisit per primum peccatum. Unde sicut illa originalis iustitia traducta fuisset in posteros simul cum natura, ita etiam inordinatio opposita. Sed alia peccata actualia vel primi parentis vel aliorum, non corrumpunt naturam quantum ad id quod naturae est; sed solum quantum ad id quod personae est, idest secundum pronitatem ad actum. Unde alia peccata non traducuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul is God's immediate property, as stated in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.4" target="asv"> Ezech. 18:4.</a> Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part of its father. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37047] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod poena spirituali, sicut Augustinus dicit in epistola ad avitum, nunquam puniuntur filii pro parentibus, nisi communicent in culpa, vel per originem vel per imitationem, quia omnes animae immediate sunt Dei, ut dicitur Ezech. XVIII. Sed poena corporali interdum, iudicio divino vel humano, puniuntur filii pro parentibus, inquantum filius est aliquid patris secundum corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37048] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod habet aliquis ex se, magis potest traducere, dummodo sit traducibile. Sed peccata actualia proximorum parentum non sunt traducibilia, quia sunt pure personalia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption pertaining only to the person. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37049] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod primum peccatum corrumpit naturam humanam corruptione ad naturam pertinente, alia vero peccata corrumpunt eam corruptione pertinente ad solam personam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A3-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 3. Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.14" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:14</a>: "We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept." Therefore they do not contract original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37050] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum primi parentis non transeat per originem in omnes homines. Mors enim est poena consequens originale peccatum. Sed non omnes qui procedunt seminaliter ex Adam, morientur, illi enim qui vivi reperientur in adventu domini, nunquam morientur, ut videtur per quod dicitur I Thessal. IV, <i>nos qui vivimus, non praeveniemus in adventu domini eos qui dormierunt</i>. Ergo illi non contrahunt originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not transmit it to his children. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37051] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nullus dat alteri quod ipse non habet. Sed homo baptizatus non habet peccatum originale. Ergo non traducit ipsum in prolem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.15" target="asv">Rom. 5:15, </a> seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37052] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, donum Christi est maius quam peccatum Adae, ut apostolus dicit, Rom. V. Sed donum Christi non transit in omnes homines. Ergo nec peccatum Adae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37053] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>mors in omnes pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf. Translator's note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just as, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 co."><a name="37054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37054] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod secundum fidem Catholicam firmiter est tenendum quod omnes homines, praeter solum Christum, ex Adam derivati, peccatum originale ex eo contrahunt, alioquin non omnes indigerent redemptione quae est per Christum; quod est erroneum. Ratio autem sumi potest ex hoc quod supra dictum est, quod sic ex peccato primi parentis traducitur culpa originalis in posteros, sicut a voluntate animae per motionem membrorum traducitur peccatum actuale ad membra corporis. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum actuale traduci potest ad omnia membra quae nata sunt moveri a voluntate. Unde et culpa originalis traducitur ad omnes illos qui moventur ab Adam motione generationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP ( <a href="XP_iii.html#XP_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q81_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">XP, Q[78], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body---Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37055] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod probabilius et communius tenetur quod omnes illi qui in adventu domini reperientur, morientur, et post modicum resurgent, ut in tertio plenius dicetur. Si tamen hoc verum sit quod alii dicunt, quod illi nunquam morientur, sicut Hieronymus narrat diversorum opiniones in quadam epistola ad Minerium, de resurrectione carnis; dicendum est ad argumentum, quod illi etsi non moriantur, est tamen in eis reatus mortis, sed poena aufertur a Deo, qui etiam peccatorum actualium poenas condonare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the "fomes," which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37056] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum originale per Baptismum aufertur reatu, inquantum anima recuperat gratiam quantum ad mentem. Remanet tamen peccatum originale actu quantum ad fomitem, qui est inordinatio inferiorum partium animae et ipsius corporis, secundum quod homo generat, et non secundum mentem. Et ideo baptizati traducunt peccatum originale, non enim generant inquantum sunt renovati per Baptismum, sed inquantum retinent adhuc aliquid de vetustate primi peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37057] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut peccatum Adae traducitur in omnes qui ab Adam corporaliter generantur, ita gratia Christi traducitur in omnes qui ab eo spiritualiter generantur per fidem et Baptismum, et non solum ad removendam culpam primi parentis, sed etiam ad removendum peccata actualia, et ad introducendum in gloriam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A4-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 4. Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv"> Gn. 4:1 </a>says that "Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned." But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would contract original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37058] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si aliquis formaretur ex carne humana miraculose, contraheret originale peccatum. Dicit enim quaedam Glossa Gen. IV, quod <i>in lumbis Adae fuit tota posteritas corrupta, quia non est separata prius in loco vitae, sed postea in loco exilii</i>. Sed si aliquis homo sic formaretur sicut dictum est, caro eius separaretur in loco exilii. Ergo contraheret originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted. Therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37059] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale causatur in nobis inquantum anima inficitur ex carne. Sed caro tota hominis est infecta. Ergo ex quacumque parte carnis homo formaretur, anima eius inficeretur infectione originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37060] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale a primo parente pervenit in omnes, inquantum omnes in eo peccante fuerunt. Sed illi qui ex carne humana formarentur, in Adam fuissent. Ergo peccatum originale contraherent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> They would not have been in Adam "according to seminal virtue," which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37061] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia non fuissent in Adam secundum seminalem rationem; quod solum causat traductionem peccati originalis, ut Augustinus dicit, X super Gen. ad Litt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation originally derived from Adam, i.e. who are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by the man's will, but by some external power. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 co."><a name="37062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37062] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, peccatum originale a primo parente traducitur in posteros, inquantum moventur ab ipso per generationem, sicut membra moventur ab anima ad peccatum actuale. Non autem est motio ad generationem nisi per virtutem activam in generatione. Unde illi soli peccatum originale contrahunt, qui ab Adam descendunt per virtutem activam in generatione originaliter ab Adam derivatam, quod est secundum seminalem rationem ab eo descendere, nam ratio seminalis nihil aliud est quam vis activa in generatione. Si autem aliquis formaretur virtute divina ex carne humana, manifestum est quod vis activa non derivaretur ab Adam. Unde non contraheret peccatum originale, sicut nec actus manus pertineret ad peccatum humanum, si manus non moveretur a voluntate hominis, sed ab aliquo extrinseco movente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37063] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Adam non fuit in loco exilii nisi post peccatum. Unde non propter locum exilii, sed propter peccatum, traducitur originalis culpa ad eos ad quos activa eius generatio pervenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37064] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod caro non inficit animam nisi inquantum est principium activum in generatione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, "by way of bodily substance" [*The expression is St. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica <a href="TP_ii.html#TP_Q31_A6" id="FS_Q81_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">TP, Q[31], A[6]</a>, Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37065] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui formaretur ex carne humana, fuisset in Adam secundum corpulentam substantiam; sed non secundum seminalem rationem, ut dictum est. Et ideo non contraheret originale peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q81_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q81_A5-p0.1">Q. 81. A. 5. Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned." Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37066] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod, si Adam non peccasset, Eva peccante, filii originale peccatum contraherent. Peccatum enim originale a parentibus contrahimus, inquantum in eis fuimus, secundum illud apostoli, Rom. V, <i>in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>. Sed sicut homo praeexistit in patre suo, ita in matre. Ergo ex peccato matris homo peccatum originale contraheret, sicut et ex peccato patris.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is "the mother" that "provides the matter in generation" as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would contract original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37067] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si Eva peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii passibiles et mortales nascerentur, mater enim dat materiam in generatione, ut dicit philosophus, in II de Generat. Animal.; mors autem, et omnis passibilitas, provenit ex necessitate materiae. Sed passibilitas et necessitas moriendi sunt poena peccati originalis. Ergo, si Eva peccasset, Adam non peccante, filii contraherent originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin," (of whom Christ was to be born without original sin) "purifying her." But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37068] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in libro III, quod spiritus sanctus praevenit in virginem, de qua Christus erat absque peccato originali nasciturus, purgans eam. Sed illa purgatio non fuisset necessaria, si infectio originalis peccati non traheretur ex matre. Ergo infectio originalis peccati ex matre trahitur. Et sic, Eva peccante, eius filii peccatum originale contraherent, etiam si Adam non peccasset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By one man sin entered into this world." Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37069] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit</i>. Magis autem fuisset dicendum quod per duos intrasset, cum ambo peccaverint; vel potius per mulierem, quae primo peccavit; si femina peccatum originale in prolem transmitteret. Non ergo peccatum originale derivatur in filios a matre, sed a patre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said <a href="#FS_Q81_A4" id="FS_Q81_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a> that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 co."><a name="37070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37070] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod huius dubitationis solutio ex praemissis apparet. Dictum est enim supra quod peccatum originale a primo parente traducitur inquantum ipse movet ad generationem natorum, unde dictum est quod, si materialiter tantum aliquis ex carne humana generaretur, originale peccatum non contraheret. Manifestum est autem secundum doctrinam philosophorum, quod principium activum in generatione est a patre, materiam autem mater ministrat. Unde peccatum originale non contrahitur a matre, sed a patre. Et secundum hoc, si, Adam non peccante, Eva peccasset, filii originale peccatum non contraherent. E converso autem esset, si Adam peccasset, et Eva non peccasset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. Consequently the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37071] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in patre praeexistit filius sicut in principio activo, sed in matre sicut in principio materiali et passivo. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q81_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], AA[1]</a>, 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37072] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod quibusdam videtur quod, Eva peccante, si Adam non peccasset, filii essent immunes a culpa, paterentur tamen necessitatem moriendi, et alias passibilitates provenientes ex necessitate materiae, quam mater ministrat, non sub ratione poenae, sed sicut quosdam naturales defectus. Sed hoc non videtur conveniens. Immortalitas enim et impassibilitas primi status non erat ex conditione materiae, ut in primo dictum est; sed ex originali iustitiae, per quam corpus subdebatur animae, quandiu anima esset subiecta Deo. Defectus autem originalis iustitiae est peccatum originale. Si igitur, Adam non peccante, peccatum originale non transfunderetur in posteros propter peccatum Evae; manifestum est quod in filiis non esset defectus originalis iustitiae. Unde non esset in eis passibilitas vel necessitas moriendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy to receive God unless it be pure, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q81_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.92.5" target="asv"> Ps. 92:5</a>: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 81 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37073] Iª-IIae q. 81 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illa purgatio praeveniens in beata virgine, non requirebatur ad auferendum transfusionem originalis peccati, sed quia oportebat ut mater Dei maxima puritate niteret. Non enim est aliquid digne receptaculum Dei, nisi sit mundum; secundum illud Psalmi XCII, <i>domum tuam, domine, decet sanctitudo</i>.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q82" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q82-p0.1">Q. 82. OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q82-p2"> We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q82-p3"><a href="#FS_Q82_A1"> (1) Whether original sin is a habit?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p4"><a href="#FS_Q82_A2"> (2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p5"><a href="#FS_Q82_A3"> (3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?</a></p><p id="FS_Q82-p6"><a href="#FS_Q82_A4"> (4) Whether original sin is equally in all?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 pr."><a name="37074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37074] Iª-IIae q. 82 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de peccato originali quantum ad suam essentiam. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum originale peccatum sit habitus. Secundo, utrum sit unum tantum in uno homine. Tertio, utrum sit concupiscentia. Quarto, utrum sit aequaliter in omnibus.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q82_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A1-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 1. Whether original sin is a habit?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37075] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod originale peccatum non sit habitus. Originale enim peccatum est carentia originalis iustitiae, ut Anselmus dicit, in libro de concepto virginali, et sic originale peccatum est quaedam privatio. Sed privatio opponitur habitui. Ergo originale peccatum non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit has the nature of a fault. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37076] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actuale peccatum habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale, inquantum habet plus de ratione voluntarii. Sed habitus actualis peccati non habet rationem culpae, alioquin sequeretur quod homo dormiens culpabiliter, peccaret. Ergo nullus habitus originalis habet rationem culpae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37077] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in malis actus semper praecedit habitum, nullus enim habitus malus est infusus, sed acquisitus. Sed originale peccatum non praecedit aliquis actus. Ergo originale peccatum non est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original sin is a habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37078] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de Baptismo puerorum, quod secundum peccatum originale parvuli sunt concupiscibiles, etsi non sint actu concupiscentes. Sed habilitas dicitur secundum aliquem habitum. Ergo peccatum originale est habitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q49_A4" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[4]</a>; <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.2" shape="rect"> Q[50], A[1]</a>), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health. Hence it is that original sin is called the "languor of nature" [*Cf. Augustine, In <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.118" target="asv">Ps. 118</a>, serm. iii]. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 co."><a name="37079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37079] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est habitus. Unus quidem quo inclinatur potentia ad agendum, sicut scientiae et virtutes habitus dicuntur. Et hoc modo peccatum originale non est habitus. Alio modo dicitur habitus dispositio alicuius naturae ex multis compositae, secundum quam bene se habet vel male ad aliquid, et praecipue cum talis dispositio versa fuerit quasi in naturam, ut patet de aegritudine et sanitate. Et hoc modo peccatum originale est habitus. Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis iustitiae, sicut etiam aegritudo corporalis est quaedam inordinata dispositio corporis, secundum quam solvitur aequalitas in qua consistit ratio sanitatis. Unde peccatum originale languor naturae dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37080] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut aegritudo corporalis habet aliquid de privatione, inquantum tollitur aequalitas sanitatis; et aliquid habet positive, scilicet ipsos humores inordinate dispositos, ita etiam peccatum originale habet privationem originalis iustitiae, et cum hoc inordinatam dispositionem partium animae. Unde non est privatio pura, sed est quidam habitus corruptus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q82_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37081] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod actuale peccatum est inordinatio quaedam actus, originale vero, cum sit peccatum naturae, est quaedam inordinata dispositio ipsius naturae, quae habet rationem culpae inquantum derivatur ex primo parente, ut dictum est. Huiusmodi autem dispositio naturae inordinata habet rationem habitus, sed inordinata dispositio actus non habet rationem habitus. Et propter hoc, peccatum originale potest esse habitus, non autem peccatum actuale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that original sin is a habit "infused," or a habit "acquired" (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a habit "inborn" due to our corrupt origin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37082] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de habitu quo potentia inclinatur in actum, talis autem habitus non est peccatum originale. Quamvis etiam ex peccato originali sequatur aliqua inclinatio in actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis iustitiae, quae prohibebat inordinatos motus, sicut etiam ex aegritudine corporali indirecte sequitur inclinatio ad motus corporales inordinatos. Nec debet dici quod peccatum originale sit habitus infusus; aut acquisitus per actum nisi primi parentis, non autem huius personae; sed per vitiatam originem innatus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A2-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 2. Whether there are several original sins in one man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.1.7" target="asv">Ps. 1:7</a>): "Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me." But the sin in which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37083] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod in uno homine sint multa originalia peccata. Dicitur enim in Psalmo l, <i>ecce enim in iniquitatibus conceptus sum, et in peccatis concepit me mater mea</i>. Sed peccatum in quo homo concipitur, est originale. Ergo plura peccata originalia sunt in uno homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one habit; but several. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37084] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unus et idem habitus non inclinat ad contraria, habitus enim inclinat per modum naturae, quae tendit in unum. Sed peccatum originale, etiam in uno homine, inclinat ad diversa peccata et contraria. Ergo peccatum originale non est unus habitus, sed plures.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q74" id="FS_Q82_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74])</a>. Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37085] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale inficit omnes animae partes. Sed diversae partes animae sunt diversa subiecta peccati, ut ex praemissis patet. Cum igitur unum peccatum non possit esse in diversis subiectis, videtur quod peccatum originale non sit unum, sed multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>): "Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world": and the reason for the employment of the singular is that the "sin of the world" is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37086] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>ecce agnus Dei, ecce qui tollit peccatum mundi</i>. Quod singulariter dicitur, quia peccatum mundi, quod est peccatum originale, est unum; ut Glossa ibidem exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original sin. For it has been stated ( <a href="#FS_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 co."><a name="37087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37087] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in uno homine est unum peccatum originale. Cuius ratio dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, ex parte causae peccati originalis. Dictum est enim supra quod solum primum peccatum primi parentis in posteros traducitur. Unde peccatum originale in uno homine est unum numero; et in omnibus hominibus est unum proportione, in respectu scilicet ad primum principium. Alio modo potest accipi ratio eius ex ipsa essentia originalis peccati. In omni enim inordinata dispositione unitas speciei consideratur ex parte causae; unitas autem secundum numerum, ex parte subiecti. Sicut patet in aegritudine corporali, sunt enim diversae aegritudines specie quae ex diversis causis procedunt, puta ex superabundantia calidi vel frigidi, vel ex laesione pulmonis vel hepatis; una autem aegritudo secundum speciem, in uno homine non est nisi una numero. Causa autem huius corruptae dispositionis quae dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam sublata est subiectio humanae mentis ad Deum. Et ideo peccatum originale est unum specie. Et in uno homine non potest esse nisi unum numero, in diversis autem hominibus est unum specie et proportione, diversum autem numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The employment of the plural---"in sins"---may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of the plural for the singular, e.g. "They are dead that sought the life of the child"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37088] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pluraliter dicitur in peccatis, secundum illum morem divinae Scripturae quo frequenter ponitur pluralis numerus pro singulari, sicut Matth. II, <i>defuncti sunt qui quaerebant animam pueri</i>. Vel quia in peccato originali virtualiter praeexistunt omnia peccata actualia, sicut in quodam principio, unde est multiplex virtute. Vel quia in peccato primi parentis quod per originem traducitur, fuerunt plures deformitates, scilicet superbiae, inobedientiae, gulae, et alia huiusmodi. Vel quia multae partes animae inficiuntur per peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37089] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod unus habitus non potest inclinare per se et directe, idest per propriam formam, ad contraria. Sed indirecte et per accidens, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, nihil prohibet, sicut, soluta harmonia corporis mixti, elementa tendunt in loca contraria. Et similiter, soluta harmonia originalis iustitiae, diversae animae potentiae in diversa feruntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man, although the various parts of the body are affected. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37090] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum originale inficit diversas partes animae, secundum quod sunt partes unius totius, sicut et iustitia originalis continebat omnes animae partes in unum. Et ideo est unum tantum peccatum originale. Sicut etiam est una febris in uno homine, quamvis diversae partes corporis graventur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A3-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 3. Whether original sin is concupiscence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37091] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit concupiscentia. Omne enim peccatum est contra naturam, ut dicit Damascenus, in II libro. Sed concupiscentia est secundum naturam, est enim proprius actus virtutis concupiscibilis, quae est potentia naturalis. Ergo concupiscentia non est peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through original sin "the passions of sins" are in us, according to the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q23_A4" id="FS_Q82_A3-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37092] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, per peccatum originale sunt in nobis passiones peccatorum; ut patet per apostolum, Rom. VII. Sed multae aliae sunt passiones praeter concupiscentiam, ut supra habitum est. Ergo peccatum originale non magis est concupiscentia quam aliqua alia passio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is the highest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37093] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, per peccatum originale deordinantur omnes animae partes, ut dictum est. Sed intellectus est suprema inter animae partes; ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Ergo peccatum originale magis est ignorantia quam concupiscentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): "Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37094] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro Retract., <i>concupiscentia est reatus originalis peccati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated <a href="#FS_Q82_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1] ), so that the will being turned away from God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 co."><a name="37095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37095] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque habet speciem a sua forma. Dictum est autem supra quod species peccati originalis sumitur ex sua causa. Unde oportet quod id quod est formale in originali peccato, accipiatur ex parte causae peccati originalis. Oppositorum autem oppositae sunt causae. Est igitur attendenda causa originalis peccati ex causa originalis iustitiae, quae ei opponitur. Tota autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae ex hoc est, quod voluntas hominis erat Deo subiecta. Quae quidem subiectio primo et principaliter erat per voluntatem, cuius est movere omnes alias partes in finem, ut supra dictum est. Unde ex aversione voluntatis a Deo, consecuta est inordinatio in omnibus aliis animae viribus. Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali, omnis autem alia inordinatio virium animae se habet in peccato originali sicut quiddam materiale. Inordinatio autem aliarum virium animae praecipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commutabile, quae quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici concupiscentia. Et ita peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia; formaliter vero, defectus originalis iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37096] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia in homine concupiscibilis naturaliter regitur ratione, intantum concupiscere est homini naturale, inquantum est secundum rationis ordinem, concupiscentia autem quae transcendit limites rationis, est homini contra naturam. Et talis est concupiscentia originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A1" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37097] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, omnes passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis reducuntur, sicut ad principaliores. Inter quas concupiscentia vehementius movet, et magis sentitur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo concupiscentiae attribuitur, tanquam principaliori, et in qua quodammodo omnes aliae passiones includuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[77], AA[1]</a>,2; <a href="#FS_Q80_A2" id="FS_Q82_A3-p9.2" shape="rect"> Q[80], A[2]</a>). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects of original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37098] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in bonis intellectus et ratio principalitatem habent, ita e converso in malis inferior pars animae principalior invenitur, quae obnubilat et trahit rationem, ut supra dictum est. Et propter hoc peccatum originale magis dicitur esse concupiscentia quam ignorantia, licet etiam ignorantia inter defectus materiales peccati originalis contineatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q82_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q82_A4-p0.1">Q. 82. A. 4. Whether original sin is equally in all?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37099] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit aequaliter in omnibus. Est enim peccatum originale concupiscentia inordinata, ut dictum est. Sed non omnes aequaliter sunt proni ad concupiscendum. Ergo peccatum originale non est aequaliter in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37100] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale est quaedam inordinata dispositio animae, sicut aegritudo est quaedam inordinata dispositio corporis. Sed aegritudo recipit magis et minus. Ergo peccatum originale recipit magis et minus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37101] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in libro de Nupt. et Concupisc., quod <i>libido transmittit originale peccatum in prolem</i>. Sed contingit esse maiorem libidinem unius in actu generationis, quam alterius. Ergo peccatum originale potest esse maius in uno quam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q82_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37102] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia peccatum originale est peccatum naturae, ut dictum est. Sed natura aequaliter est in omnibus. Ergo et peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q73_A2" id="FS_Q82_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[73], A[2]</a>). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 co."><a name="37103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37103] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in originali peccato sunt duo, quorum unum est defectus originalis iustitiae; aliud autem est relatio huius defectus ad peccatum primi parentis, a quo per vitiatam originem deducitur. Quantum autem ad primum, peccatum originale non recipit magis et minus, quia totum donum originalis iustitiae est sublatum; privationes autem totaliter aliquid privantes, ut mors et tenebrae, non recipiunt magis et minus, sicut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam nec quantum ad secundum, aequaliter enim omnes relationem habent ad primum principium vitiatae originis, ex quo peccatum originale recipit rationem culpae; relationes enim non recipiunt magis et minus. Unde manifestum est quod peccatum originale non potest esse magis in uno quam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37104] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, soluto vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo quodam ordine omnes vires animae continebantur, unaquaeque vis animae tendit in suum proprium motum; et tanto vehementius, quanto fuerit fortior. Contingit autem vires aliquas animae esse fortiores in uno quam in alio, propter diversas corporis complexiones. Quod ergo unus homo sit pronior ad concupiscendum quam alter, non est ratione peccati originalis, cum in omnibus aequaliter solvatur vinculum originalis iustitiae, et aequaliter in omnibus partes inferiores animae sibi relinquantur, sed accidit hoc ex diversa dispositione potentiarum, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37105] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod aegritudo corporalis non habet in omnibus aequalem causam, etiam si sit eiusdem speciei, puta, si sit febris ex cholera putrefacta, potest esse maior vel minor putrefactio, et propinquior vel remotior a principio vitae. Sed causa originalis peccati in omnibus est aequalis. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q82_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 82 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37106] Iª-IIae q. 82 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod libido quae transmittit peccatum originale in prolem, non est libido actualis, quia dato quod virtute divina concederetur alicui quod nullam inordinatam libidinem in actu generationis sentiret, adhuc transmitteret in prolem originale peccatum. Sed libido illa est intelligenda habitualiter, secundum quod appetitus sensitivus non continetur sub ratione vinculo originalis iustitiae. Et talis libido in omnibus est aequalis.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q83" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q83-p0.1">Q. 83. OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q83-p2"> We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q83-p3"><a href="#FS_Q83_A1"> (1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p4"><a href="#FS_Q83_A2"> (2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p5"><a href="#FS_Q83_A3"> (3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q83-p6"><a href="#FS_Q83_A4"> (4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch? </a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 pr."><a name="37107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37107] Iª-IIae q. 83 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de subiecto originalis peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum subiectum originalis peccati per prius sit caro vel anima. Secundo, si anima, utrum per essentiam aut per potentias suas. Tertio, utrum voluntas per prius sit subiectum peccati originalis quam aliae potentiae. Quarto, utrum aliquae potentiae animae sint specialiter infectae, scilicet generativa, vis concupiscibilis et sensus tactus.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q83_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A1-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 1. Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37108] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale magis sit in carne quam in anima. Repugnantia enim carnis ad mentem ex corruptione originalis peccati procedit. Sed radix huius repugnantiae in carne consistit, dicit enim apostolus ad Rom. VII, <i>video aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis meae</i>. Ergo originale peccatum in carne principaliter consistit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37109] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unumquodque potius est in causa quam in effectu, sicut calor magis est in igne calefaciente quam in aqua calefacta. Sed anima inficitur infectione originalis peccati per semen carnale. Ergo peccatum originale magis est in carne quam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37110] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale ex primo parente contrahimus, prout in eo fuimus secundum rationem seminalem. Sic autem non fuit ibi anima, sed sola caro. Ergo originale peccatum non est in anima, sed in carne.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's creation and fusion. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37111] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, anima rationalis creata a Deo corpori infunditur. Si igitur anima per peccatum originale inficeretur, consequens esset quod ex sua creatione vel infusione inquinaretur. Et sic Deus esset causa peccati, qui est auctor creationis et infusionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="37112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37112] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nullus sapiens liquorem pretiosum vasi infunderet ex quo sciret ipsum liquorem infici. Sed anima rationalis est pretiosior omni liquore. Si ergo anima ex corporis unione infici posset infectione originalis culpae, Deus, qui ipsa sapientia est, nunquam animam tali corpori infunderet. Infundit autem. Non ergo inquinatur ex carne. Sic igitur peccatum originale non est in anima, sed in carne.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue: for the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37113] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod idem est subiectum virtutis et vitii sive peccati, quod contrariatur virtuti. Sed caro non potest esse subiectum virtutis, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VII, <i>scio quod non habitat in me, hoc est in carne mea, bonum</i>. Ergo caro non potest esse subiectum originalis peccati, sed solum anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q83_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "In whom all have sinned": whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul. </p><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p9"> The reason for this is that, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt. </p><p id="FS_Q83_A1-p10"> Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the flesh. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 co."><a name="37114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37114] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid potest esse in aliquo dupliciter, uno modo, sicut in causa, vel principali vel instrumentali; alio modo, sicut in subiecto. Peccatum ergo originale omnium hominum fuit quidem in ipso Adam sicut in prima causa principali; secundum illud apostoli, Rom. V, <i>in quo omnes peccaverunt</i>. In semine autem corporali est peccatum originale sicut in causa instrumentali, eo quod per virtutem activam seminis traducitur peccatum originale in prolem, simul cum natura humana. Sed sicut in subiecto, peccatum originale nullo modo potest esse in carne, sed solum in anima. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est, hoc modo ex voluntate primi parentis peccatum originale traducitur in posteros per quandam generativam motionem, sicut a voluntate alicuius hominis derivatur peccatum actuale ad alias partes eius. In qua quidem derivatione hoc potest attendi, quod quidquid provenit ex motione voluntatis peccati ad quamcumque partem hominis quae quocumque modo potest esse particeps peccati, vel per modum subiecti vel per modum instrumenti, habet rationem culpae, sicut ex voluntate gulae provenit concupiscentia cibi ad concupiscibilem, et sumptio cibi ad manus et os, quae inquantum moventur a voluntate ad peccatum, sunt instrumenta peccati. Quod vero ulterius derivatur ad vim nutritivam et ad interiora membra, quae non sunt nata moveri a voluntate, non habet rationem culpae. Sic igitur, cum anima possit esse subiectum culpae, caro autem de se non habeat quod sit subiectum culpae; quidquid provenit de corruptione primi peccati ad animam, habet rationem culpae; quod autem provenit ad carnem, non habet rationem culpae, sed poenae. Sic igitur anima est subiectum peccati originalis, non autem caro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell "in the flesh." Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37115] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro Retract., apostolus loquitur ibi de homine iam redempto, qui liberatus est a culpa, sed subiacet poenae, ratione cuius peccatum dicitur habitare in carne. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod caro sit subiectum culpae, sed solum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had the nature of actual sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37116] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum originale causatur ex semine sicut ex causa instrumentali. Non autem oportet quod aliquid sit principalius in causa instrumentali quam in effectu, sed solum in causa principali. Et hoc modo peccatum originale potiori modo fuit in Adam, in quo fuit secundum rationem actualis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37117] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod anima huius hominis non fuit secundum seminalem rationem in Adam peccante sicut in principio effectivo, sed sicut in principio dispositivo, eo quod semen corporale, quod ex Adam traducitur, sua virtute non efficit animam rationalem, sed ad eam disponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37118] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod infectio originalis peccati nullo modo causatur a Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi parentis per carnalem generationem. Et ideo, cum creatio importet respectum animae ad solum Deum, non potest dici quod anima ex sua creatione inquinetur. Sed infusio importat respectum et ad Deum infundentem, et ad carnem cui infunditur anima. Et ideo, habito respectu ad Deum infundentem, non potest dici quod anima per infusionem maculetur; sed solum habito respectu ad corpus cui infunditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q90_A4" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[90], A[4]</a>; <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A3" id="FS_Q83_A1-p15.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[118], A[3]</a>. And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="37119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37119] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod bonum commune praefertur bono singulari. Unde Deus, secundum suam sapientiam, non praetermittit universalem ordinem rerum, qui est ut tali corpori talis anima infundatur, ut vitetur singularis infectio huius animae, praesertim cum natura animae hoc habeat, ut esse non incipiat nisi in corpore, ut in primo habitum est. Melius est autem ei sic esse secundum naturam, quam nullo modo esse, praesertim cum possit per gratiam damnationem evadere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A2-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 2. Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only according to the powers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37120] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non sit per prius in essentia animae quam in potentiis. Anima enim nata est esse subiectum peccati, quantum ad id quod potest a voluntate moveri. Sed anima non movetur a voluntate secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias. Ergo peccatum originale non est in anima secundum suam essentiam, sed solum secundum potentias.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37121] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale opponitur originali iustitiae. Sed originalis iustitia erat in aliqua potentia animae, quae est subiectum virtutis. Ergo et peccatum originale est magis in potentia animae quam in eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37122] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut a carne peccatum originale derivatur ad animam, ita ab essentia animae derivatur ad potentias. Sed peccatum originale magis est in anima quam in carne. Ergo etiam magis est in potentiis animae quam in essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated ( <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q83_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37123] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale dicitur esse concupiscentia, ut dictum est. Sed concupiscentia est in potentiis animae. Ergo et peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q76_A6" id="FS_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37124] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod peccatum originale dicitur esse peccatum naturale, ut supra dictum est. Anima autem est forma et natura corporis secundum essentiam suam, et non secundum potentias, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo anima est subiectum originalis peccati principaliter secundum suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q76_A6" id="FS_Q83_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[76], A[6]</a>. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 co."><a name="37125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37125] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod illud animae est principaliter subiectum alicuius peccati, ad quod primo pertinet causa motiva illius peccati, sicut si causa motiva ad peccandum sit delectatio sensus, quae pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem sicut obiectum proprium eius, sequitur quod vis concupiscibilis sit proprium subiectum illius peccati. Manifestum est autem quod peccatum originale causatur per originem. Unde illud animae quod primo attingitur ab origine hominis, est primum subiectum originalis peccati. Attingit autem origo animam ut terminum generationis, secundum quod est forma corporis; quod quidem convenit ei secundum essentiam propriam, ut in primo habitum est. Unde anima secundum essentiam est primum subiectum originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37126] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut motio voluntatis alicuius propriae pervenit ad potentias animae, non autem ad animae essentiam; ita motio voluntatis primi generantis, per viam generationis, pervenit primo ad animae essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37127] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam originalis iustitia pertinebat primordialiter ad essentiam animae, erat enim donum divinitus datum humanae naturae, quam per prius respicit essentia animae quam potentiae. Potentiae enim magis videntur pertinere ad personam, inquantum sunt principia personalium actuum. Unde sunt propria subiecta peccatorum actualium, quae sunt peccata personalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37128] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod corpus comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam, quae etsi sit posterior ordine generationis, est tamen prior ordine perfectionis et naturae. Essentia autem animae comparatur ad potentias sicut subiecta ad accidentia propria, quae sunt posteriora subiecto et ordine generationis et etiam perfectionis. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q83_A2-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37129] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod concupiscentia se habet materialiter et ex consequenti in peccato originali, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A3-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 3. Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power more than to the others. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37130] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum originale non per prius inficiat voluntatem quam alias potentias. Omne enim peccatum principaliter pertinet ad potentiam per cuius actum causatur. Sed peccatum originale causatur per actum generativae potentiae. Ergo inter ceteras potentias animae, videtur magis pertinere ad generativam potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than in the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37131] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale per semen carnale traducitur. Sed aliae vires animae propinquiores sunt carni quam voluntas, sicut patet de omnibus sensitivis, quae utuntur organo corporali. Ergo in eis magis est peccatum originale quam in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37132] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, intellectus est prior voluntate, non enim est voluntas nisi de bono intellecto. Si ergo peccatum originale inficit omnes potentias animae, videtur quod per prius inficiat intellectum, tanquam priorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is "rectitude of the will," as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37133] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod iustitia originalis per prius respicit voluntatem, est enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut Anselmus dicit, in libro de conceptu virginali. Ergo et peccatum originale, quod ei opponitur, per prius respicit voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q83_A2" id="FS_Q83_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 co."><a name="37134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37134] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in infectione peccati originalis duo est considerare. Primo quidem, inhaerentiam eius ad subiectum, et secundum hoc primo respicit essentiam animae, ut dictum est. Deinde oportet considerare inclinationem eius ad actum, et hoc modo respicit potentias animae. Oportet ergo quod illam per prius respiciat, quae primam inclinationem habet ad peccandum. Haec autem est voluntas, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde peccatum originale per prius respicit voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37135] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale non causatur in homine per potentiam generativam prolis, sed per actum potentiae generativae parentis. Unde non oportet quod sua potentia generativa sit primum subiectum originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of original sin reaches it first. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37136] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum originale habet duplicem processum, unum quidem a carne ad animam; alium vero ab essentia animae ad potentias. Primus quidem processus est secundum ordinem generationis, secundus autem secundum ordinem perfectionis. Et ideo quamvis aliae potentiae, scilicet sensitivae, propinquiores sint carni; quia tamen voluntas est propinquior essentiae animae, tanquam superior potentia, primo pervenit ad ipsam infectio originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37137] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus quodam modo praecedit voluntatem, inquantum proponit ei suum obiectum. Alio vero modo voluntas praecedit intellectum, secundum ordinem motionis ad actum, quae quidem motio pertinet ad peccatum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q83_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q83_A4-p0.1">Q. 83. A. 4. Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37138] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedictae potentiae non sint magis infectae quam aliae. Infectio enim originalis peccati magis videtur pertinere ad illam animae partem quae prius potest esse subiectum peccati. Haec autem est rationalis pars, et praecipue voluntas. Ergo ipsa est magis infecta per peccatum originale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37139] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nulla vis animae inficitur per culpam, nisi inquantum potest obedire rationi. Generativa autem non potest obedire, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo generativa non est maxime infecta per originale peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37140] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, visus inter alios sensus est spiritualior et propinquior rationi, inquantum plures differentias rerum ostendit, ut dicitur in I Metaphys. Sed infectio culpae primo est in ratione. Ergo visus magis est infectus quam tactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37141] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod infectio originalis culpae maxime apparet in motu genitalium membrorum, qui rationi non subditur. Sed illa membra deserviunt generativae virtuti in commixtione sexuum, in qua est delectatio secundum tactum, quae maxime concupiscentiam movet. Ergo infectio originalis peccati maxime pertinet ad ista tria, scilicet potentiam generativam, vim concupiscibilem et sensum tactus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q81_A1" id="FS_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[1]</a>). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 co."><a name="37142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37142] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod illa corruptio praecipue infectio nominari solet, quae nata est in aliud transferri, unde et morbi contagiosi, sicut lepra et scabies et huiusmodi, infectiones dicuntur. Corruptio autem originalis peccati traducitur per actum generationis, sicut supra dictum est. Unde potentiae quae ad huiusmodi actum concurrunt, maxime dicuntur esse infectae. Huiusmodi autem actus deservit generativae, inquantum ad generationem ordinatur, habet autem in se delectationem tactus, quae est maximum obiectum concupiscibilis. Et ideo, cum omnes partes animae dicantur esse corruptae per peccatum originale, specialiter tres praedictae dicuntur esse corruptae et infectae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q83_A3" id="FS_Q83_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37143] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum originale ex ea parte qua inclinat in peccata actualia, praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem, ut dictum est. Sed ex ea parte qua traducitur in prolem, pertinet propinque ad potentias praedictas, ad voluntatem autem remote.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37144] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod infectio actualis culpae non pertinet nisi ad potentias quae moventur a voluntate peccantis. Sed infectio originalis culpae non derivatur a voluntate eius qui ipsam contrahit, sed per originem naturae, cui deservit potentia generativa. Et ideo in ea est infectio originalis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q83_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than to the sight. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 83 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37145] Iª-IIae q. 83 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod visus non pertinet ad actum generationis nisi secundum dispositionem remotam, prout scilicet per visum apparet species concupiscibilis. Sed delectatio perficitur in tactu. Et ideo talis infectio magis attribuitur tactui quam visui.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q84" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q84-p0.1">Q. 84. OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q84-p2"> We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: </p><p id="FS_Q84-p3"><a href="#FS_Q84_A1"> (1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p4"><a href="#FS_Q84_A2"> (2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p5"><a href="#FS_Q84_A3"> (3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?</a></p><p id="FS_Q84-p6"><a href="#FS_Q84_A4"> (4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 pr."><a name="37146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37146] Iª-IIae q. 84 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de causa peccati secundum quod unum peccatum est causa alterius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum cupiditas sit radix omnium peccatorum. Secundo, utrum superbia sit initium omnis peccati. Tertio, utrum praeter superbiam et avaritiam, debeant dici capitalia vitia aliqua specialia peccata. Quarto, quot et quae sint capitalia vitia.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q84_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A1-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 1. Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37147] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod cupiditas non sit radix omnium peccatorum. Cupiditas enim, quae est immoderatus appetitus divitiarum, opponitur virtuti liberalitatis. Sed liberalitas non est radix omnium virtutum. Ergo cupiditas non est radix omnium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds from some deeper root. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37148] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, appetitus eorum quae sunt ad finem, procedit ex appetitu finis. Sed divitiae, quarum appetitus est cupiditas, non appetuntur nisi ut utiles ad aliquem finem, sicut dicitur in I Ethic. Ergo cupiditas non est radix omnis peccati, sed procedit ex alia priori radice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37149] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, frequenter invenitur quod avaritia, quae cupiditas nominatur, oritur ex aliis peccatis, puta cum quis appetit pecuniam propter ambitionem, vel ut satisfaciat gulae. Non ergo est radix omnium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.10" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:10</a>): "The desire of money is the root of all evil." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37150] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ult., <i>radix omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A2" id="FS_Q84_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[2]</a>). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things. </p><p id="FS_Q84_A1-p7"> Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they "will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils." Hence it is evident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.10.19" target="asv"> Eccles. 10:19</a>: "All things obey money": so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 co."><a name="37151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37151] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod secundum quosdam cupiditas multipliciter dicitur. Uno modo, prout est appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et sic est speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum quod significat inordinatum appetitum cuiuscumque boni temporalis. Et sic est genus omnis peccati, nam in omni peccato est inordinata conversio ad commutabile bonum, ut dictum est. Tertio modo sumitur prout significat quandam inclinationem naturae corruptae ad bona corruptibilia inordinate appetenda. Et sic dicunt cupiditatem esse radicem omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae ex terra trahit alimentum, sic enim ex amore rerum temporalium omne peccatum procedit. Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, non tamen videntur esse secundum intentionem apostoli, qui dixit cupiditatem esse radicem omnium peccatorum. Manifeste enim ibi loquitur contra eos qui, <i>cum velint divites fieri, incidunt in tentationes et in laqueum Diaboli, eo quod radix omnium malorum est cupiditas</i>, unde manifestum est quod loquitur de cupiditate secundum quod est appetitus inordinatus divitiarum. Et secundum hoc, dicendum est quod cupiditas, secundum quod est speciale peccatum, dicitur radix omnium peccatorum, ad similitudinem radicis arboris, quae alimentum praestat toti arbori. Videmus enim quod per divitias homo acquirit facultatem perpetrandi quodcumque peccatum, et adimplendi desiderium cuiuscumque peccati, eo quod ad habenda quaecumque temporalia bona, potest homo per pecuniam iuvari; secundum quod dicitur Eccle. X, <i>pecuniae obediunt omnia</i>. Et secundum hoc, patet quod cupiditas divitiarum est radix omnium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37152] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non ab eodem oritur virtus et peccatum. Oritur enim peccatum ex appetitu commutabilis boni, et ideo appetitus illius boni quod iuvat ad consequenda omnia temporalia bona, radix peccatorum dicitur. Virtus autem oritur ex appetitu incommutabilis boni, et ideo caritas, quae est amor Dei, ponitur radix virtutum; secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et fundati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by means of money. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37153] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod appetitus pecuniarum dicitur esse radix peccatorum, non quia divitiae propter se quaerantur, tanquam ultimus finis, sed quia multum quaeruntur ut utiles ad omnem temporalem finem. Et quia universale bonum est appetibilius quam aliquod particulare bonum, ideo magis movent appetitum quam quaedam bona singularia, quae simul cum multis aliis per pecuniam haberi possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37154] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut in rebus naturalibus non quaeritur quid semper fiat, sed quid in pluribus accidit, eo quod natura corruptibilium rerum impediri potest, ut non semper eodem modo operetur; ita etiam in moralibus consideratur quod ut in pluribus est, non autem quod est semper, eo quod voluntas non ex necessitate operatur. Non igitur dicitur avaritia radix omnis mali, quin interdum aliquod aliud malum sit radix eius, sed quia ex ipsa frequentius alia mala oriuntur, ratione praedicta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A2-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 2. Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37155] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod superbia non sit initium omnis peccati. Radix enim est quoddam principium arboris, et ita videtur idem esse radix peccati et initium peccati. Sed cupiditas est radix omnis peccati, ut dictum est. Ergo ipsa etiam est initium omnis peccati, non autem superbia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:14</a>): "The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God." But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37156] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Eccli. X dicitur, <i>initium superbiae hominis apostatare a Deo</i>. Sed apostasia a Deo est quoddam peccatum. Ergo aliquod peccatum est initium superbiae, et ipsa non est initium omnis peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "builds up the city of Babylon." Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37157] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud videtur esse initium omnis peccati, quod facit omnia peccata. Sed hoc est inordinatus amor sui, qui facit civitatem Babylonis, ut Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo amor sui est initium omnis peccati, non autem superbia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37158] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. X, <i>initium omnis peccati superbia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason covetousness is called the "root"; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the "beginning," because the beginning of evil consists in turning away from God. </p><p id="FS_Q84_A2-p7"> Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.10.15" target="asv">Ecclus. 10:15</a>): "Pride is the beginning of all sin." For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows (verse 17): "God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes"; indeed this is the point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18], A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is said to be the "beginning" of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the "root" of all evils, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 co."><a name="37159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37159] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dicunt superbiam dici tripliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod superbia significat inordinatum appetitum propriae excellentiae. Et sic est speciale peccatum. Alio modo, secundum quod importat quendam actualem contemptum Dei, quantum ad hunc effectum qui est non subdi eius praecepto. Et sic dicunt quod est generale peccatum. Tertio modo, secundum quod importat quandam inclinationem ad huiusmodi contemptum, ex corruptione naturae. Et sic dicunt quod est initium omnis peccati. Et differt a cupiditate, quia cupiditas respicit peccatum ex parte conversionis ad bonum commutabile, ex quo peccatum quodammodo nutritur et fovetur, et propter hoc cupiditas dicitur radix, sed superbia respicit peccatum ex parte aversionis a Deo, cuius praecepto homo subdi recusat; et ideo vocatur initium, quia ex parte aversionis incipit ratio mali. Et haec quidem quamvis vera sint, tamen non sunt secundum intentionem sapientis, qui dixit, initium omnis peccati est superbia. Manifeste enim loquitur de superbia secundum quod est inordinatus appetitus propriae excellentiae, ut patet per hoc quod subdit, <i>sedes ducum superborum destruxit Deus</i>. Et de hac materia fere loquitur in toto capitulo. Et ideo dicendum est quod superbia, etiam secundum quod est speciale peccatum, est initium omnis peccati. Considerandum est enim quod in actibus voluntariis, cuiusmodi sunt peccata, duplex ordo invenitur, scilicet intentionis, et executionis. In primo quidem ordine, habet rationem principii finis, ut supra multoties dictum est. Finis autem in omnibus bonis temporalibus acquirendis, est ut homo per illa quandam perfectionem et excellentiam habeat. Et ideo ex hac parte superbia, quae est appetitus excellentiae, ponitur initium omnis peccati. Sed ex parte executionis, est primum id quod praebet opportunitatem adimplendi omnia desideria peccati, quod habet rationem radicis, scilicet divitiae. Et ideo ex hac parte avaritia ponitur esse radix omnium malorum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37160] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted up, in respect of the other species of pride. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37161] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae ex parte aversionis, ex hoc enim quod homo non vult subdi Deo, sequitur quod inordinate velit propriam excellentiam in rebus temporalibus. Et sic apostasia a Deo non sumitur ibi quasi speciale peccatum, sed magis ut quaedam conditio generalis omnis peccati, quae est aversio ab incommutabili bono. Vel potest dici quod apostatare a Deo dicitur esse initium superbiae, quia est prima superbiae species. Ad superbiam enim pertinet cuicumque superiori nolle subiici, et praecipue nolle subdi Deo; ex quo contingit quod homo supra seipsum indebite extollatur, quantum ad alias superbiae species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37162] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in hoc homo se amat, quod sui excellentiam vult, idem enim est se amare quod sibi velle bonum. Unde ad idem pertinet quod ponatur initium omnis peccati superbia, vel amor proprius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A3-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 3. Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because "the head seems to be to an animal, what the root is to a plant," as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called the "root of all evils," it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37163] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter superbiam et avaritiam, non sint quaedam alia peccata specialia quae dicantur capitalia. <i>Ita enim se videtur habere caput ad animalia, sicut radix ad plantas</i>, ut dicitur in II de anima, nam radices sunt ori similes. Si igitur cupiditas dicitur radix omnium malorum, videtur quod ipsa sola debeat dici vitium capitale, et nullum aliud peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called capital. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37164] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, caput habet quendam ordinem ad alia membra, inquantum a capite diffunditur quodammodo sensus et motus. Sed peccatum dicitur per privationem ordinis. Ergo peccatum non habet rationem capitis. Et ita non debent poni aliqua capitalia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37165] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, capitalia crimina dicuntur quae capite plectuntur. Sed tali poena puniuntur quaedam peccata in singulis generibus. Ergo vitia capitalia non sunt aliqua determinata secundum speciem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37166] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., enumerat quaedam specialia vitia, quae dicit esse capitalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The word capital is derived from "caput" [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body, which is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from "head" taken in the proper sense, and thus the name "capital" is given to a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in which the term "capital" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A6" id="FS_Q84_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[6]</a>). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the "leaders of an army." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 co."><a name="37167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37167] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod capitale a capite dicitur. Caput autem proprie quidem est quoddam membrum animalis, quod est principium et directivum totius animalis. Unde metaphorice omne principium caput vocatur, et etiam homines qui alios dirigunt et gubernant, capita aliorum dicuntur. Dicitur ergo vitium capitale uno modo a capite proprie dicto, et secundum hoc, peccatum capitale dicitur peccatum quod capitis poena punitur. Sed sic nunc non intendimus de capitalibus peccatis, sed secundum quod alio modo dicitur peccatum capitale a capite prout metaphorice significat principium vel directivum aliorum. Et sic dicitur vitium capitale ex quo alia vitia oriuntur, et praecipue secundum originem causae finalis, quae est formalis origo, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo vitium capitale non solum est principium aliorum, sed etiam est directivum et quodammodo ductivum aliorum, semper enim ars vel habitus ad quem pertinet finis, principatur et imperat circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde Gregorius, XXXI Moral., huiusmodi vitia capitalia ducibus exercituum comparat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "capital" is taken from "caput" and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the "root," and pride which is called the beginning, but also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37168] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod capitale dicitur denominative a capite, quod quidem est per quandam derivationem vel participationem capitis, sicut habens aliquam proprietatem capitis, non sicut simpliciter caput. Et ideo capitalia vitia dicuntur non solum illa quae habent rationem primae originis, sicut avaritia, quae dicitur radix, et superbia, quae dicitur initium, sed etiam illa quae habent rationem originis propinquae respectu plurium peccatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is "the privation of mode, species and order." But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37169] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum caret ordine ex parte aversionis, ex hac enim parte habet rationem mali; <i>malum autem</i>, secundum Augustinum, in libro de natura boni, <i>est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis</i>. Sed ex parte conversionis, respicit quoddam bonum. Et ideo ex hac parte potest habere ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37170] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de capitali peccato secundum quod dicitur a reatu poenae. Sic autem hic non loquimur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q84_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q84_A4-p0.1">Q. 84. A. 4. Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[2]</a>). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37171] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum septem esse vitia capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, avaritia, gula, luxuria. Peccata enim virtutibus opponuntur. Virtutes autem principales sunt quatuor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et vitia principalia, sive capitalia, non sunt nisi quatuor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q77" id="FS_Q84_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[77])</a>. But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37172] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, passiones animae sunt quaedam causae peccati, ut supra dictum est. Sed passiones animae principales sunt quatuor. De quarum duabus nulla fit mentio inter praedicta peccata, scilicet de spe et timore. Enumerantur autem aliqua vitia ad quae pertinet delectatio et tristitia, nam delectatio pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam, tristitia vero ad acediam et invidiam. Ergo inconvenienter enumerantur principalia peccata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37173] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ira non est principalis passio. Non ergo debuit poni inter principalia vitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q84_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37174] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut cupiditas, sive avaritia, est radix peccati, ita superbia est peccati initium, ut supra dictum est. Sed avaritia ponitur unum de septem vitiis capitalibus. Ergo superbia inter vitia capitalia enumeranda esset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="37175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37175] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, quaedam peccata committuntur quae ex nullo horum causari possunt, sicut cum aliquis errat ex ignorantia; vel cum aliquis ex aliqua bona intentione committit aliquod peccatum, puta cum aliquis furatur ut det eleemosynam. Ergo insufficienter capitalia vitia enumerantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37176] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Gregorii sic enumerantis, XXXI Moralium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q84_A3" id="FS_Q84_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man's particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art. </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p9"> Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil. </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p10"> Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately by "vainglory." Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness" is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils. </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p11"> Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by "pride" or "vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, 6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue. </p><p id="FS_Q84_A4-p12"> On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to "envy," which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 co."><a name="37177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37177] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitia capitalia dicuntur ex quibus alia oriuntur, praecipue secundum rationem causae finalis. Huiusmodi autem origo potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum conditionem peccantis, qui sic dispositus est ut maxime afficiatur ad unum finem, ex quo ut plurimum in alia peccata procedat. Sed iste modus originis sub arte cadere non potest, eo quod infinitae sunt particulares hominum dispositiones. Alio modo, secundum naturalem habitudinem ipsorum finium ad invicem. Et secundum hoc, ut in pluribus unum vitium ex alio oritur. Unde iste modus originis sub arte cadere potest. Secundum hoc ergo, illa vitia capitalia dicuntur, quorum fines habent quasdam primarias rationes movendi appetitum, et secundum harum rationum distinctionem, distinguuntur capitalia vitia. Movet autem aliquid appetitum dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et per se, et hoc modo bonum movet appetitum ad prosequendum, malum autem, secundum eandem rationem, ad fugiendum. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per aliud, sicut aliquis aliquod malum prosequitur propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, vel aliquod bonum fugit propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Bonum autem hominis est triplex. Est enim primo quoddam bonum animae, quod scilicet ex sola apprehensione rationem appetibilitatis habet, scilicet excellentia laudis vel honoris, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur inanis gloria. Aliud est bonum corporis, et hoc vel pertinet ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur gula; aut ad conservationem speciei, sicut coitus, et ad hoc ordinatur luxuria. Tertium bonum est exterius, scilicet divitiae, et ad hoc ordinatur avaritia. Et eadem quatuor vitia inordinate fugiunt mala contraria. Vel aliter, bonum praecipue movet appetitum ex hoc quod participat aliquid de proprietate felicitatis, quam naturaliter omnes appetunt. De cuius ratione est quidem primo quaedam perfectio, nam felicitas est perfectum bonum, ad quod pertinet excellentia vel claritas, quam appetit superbia vel inanis gloria. Secundo de ratione eius est sufficientia, quam appetit avaritia in divitiis eam promittentibus. Tertio est de conditione eius delectatio, sine qua felicitas esse non potest, ut dicitur in I et X Ethic., et hanc appetunt gula et luxuria. Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad vindictam, et sic est ira. Et ad eadem etiam vitia pertinet prosecutio mali oppositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37178] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est eadem ratio originis in virtutibus et vitiis, nam virtutes causantur per ordinem appetitus ad rationem, vel etiam ad bonum incommutabile, quod est Deus; vitia autem oriuntur ex appetitu boni commutabilis. Unde non oportet quod principalia vitia opponantur principalibus virtutibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iii.html#FS_Q25_A4" id="FS_Q84_A4-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[4]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37179] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod timor et spes sunt passiones irascibilis. Omnes autem passiones irascibilis oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, quae etiam omnes ordinantur quodammodo ad delectationem et tristitiam. Et ideo delectatio et tristitia principaliter connumerantur in peccatis capitalibus, tanquam principalissimae passiones, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right to vengeance. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37180] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ira, licet non sit principalis passio, quia tamen habet specialem rationem appetitivi motus, prout aliquis impugnat bonum alterius sub ratione honesti, idest iusti vindicativi; ideo distinguitur ab aliis capitalibus vitiis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q84_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>: and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q84_A1" id="FS_Q84_A4-p16.2" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37181] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse initium omnis peccati secundum rationem finis, ut dictum est. Et secundum eandem rationem accipitur principalitas vitiorum capitalium. Et ideo superbia, quasi universale vitium, non connumeratur, sed magis ponitur velut regina quaedam omnium vitiorum, sicut Gregorius dicit. Avaritia autem dicitur radix secundum aliam rationem, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q84_A4-p17"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q76_A2" id="FS_Q84_A4-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done that good may come of it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 84 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="37182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37182] Iª-IIae q. 84 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod ista vitia dicuntur capitalia, quia ex eis ut frequentius alia oriuntur. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua peccata interdum ex aliis causis oriri. Potest tamen dici quod omnia peccata quae ex ignorantia proveniunt, possunt reduci ad acediam, ad quam pertinet negligentia qua aliquis recusat bona spiritualia acquirere propter laborem, ignorantia enim quae potest esse causa peccati, ex negligentia provenit, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem aliquis committat aliquod peccatum ex bona intentione, videtur ad ignorantiam pertinere, inquantum scilicet ignorat quod non sunt facienda mala ut veniant bona.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q85" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q85-p0.1">Q. 85. OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q85-p2"> We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment. </p><p id="FS_Q85-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q85-p4"><a href="#FS_Q85_A1"> (1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p5"><a href="#FS_Q85_A2"> (2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p6"><a href="#FS_Q85_A3"> (3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p7"><a href="#FS_Q85_A4"> (4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p8"><a href="#FS_Q85_A5"> (5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q85-p9"><a href="#FS_Q85_A6"> (6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 pr."><a name="37183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37183] Iª-IIae q. 85 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de effectibus peccati. Et primo quidem, de corruptione boni naturae; secundo, de macula animae; tertio, de reatu poenae. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum bonum naturae diminuatur per peccatum. Secundo, utrum totaliter tolli possit. Tertio, de quatuor vulneribus quae Beda ponit, quibus natura humana vulnerata est propter peccatum. Quarto, utrum privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, sit effectus peccati. Quinto, utrum mors et alii defectus corporales sint effectus peccati. Sexto, utrum sint aliquo modo homini naturales.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q85_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A1-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 1. Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37184] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non diminuat bonum naturae. Peccatum enim hominis non est gravius quam peccatum Daemonis. Sed bona naturalia in Daemonibus manent integra post peccatum, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo peccatum etiam bonum naturae humanae non diminuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37185] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, transmutato posteriori, non transmutatur prius, manet enim substantia eadem, transmutatis accidentibus. Sed natura praeexistit actioni voluntariae. Ergo, facta deordinatione circa actionem voluntariam per peccatum, non transmutatur propter hoc natura, ita quod bonum naturae diminuatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good of his nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37186] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum est actus quidam, diminutio autem passio. Nullum autem agens, ex hoc ipso quod agit, patitur, potest autem contingere quod in unum agat, et ab alio patiatur. Ergo ille qui peccat, per peccatum non diminuit bonum suae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37187] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, nullum accidens agit in suum subiectum, quia quod patitur, est potentia ens; quod autem subiicitur accidenti, iam est actu ens secundum accidens illud. Sed peccatum est in bono naturae sicut accidens in subiecto. Ergo peccatum non diminuit bonum naturae, diminuere enim quoddam agere est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> "A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.10.30" target="asv">Lk. 10:30</a>), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature," as Bede [*The quotation is from the Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37188] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod, sicut dicitur Luc. X, <i>homo descendens a Ierusalem in Iericho, idest in defectum peccati, expoliatur gratuitis et vulneratur in naturalibus</i>, ut Beda exponit. Ergo peccatum diminuit bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q60_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[60], A[1]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q63_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p7.2" shape="rect"> Q[63], A[1]</a>), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A1-p8"> Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q50_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[1]</a>). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 co."><a name="37189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37189] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod bonum naturae humanae potest tripliciter dici. Primo, ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae et alia huiusmodi. Secundo, quia homo a natura habet inclinationem ad virtutem, ut supra habitum est, ipsa inclinatio ad virtutem est quoddam bonum naturae. Tertio modo potest dici bonum naturae donum originalis iustitiae, quod fuit in primo homine collatum toti humanae naturae. Primum igitur bonum naturae nec tollitur nec diminuitur per peccatum. Tertium vero bonum naturae totaliter est ablatum per peccatum primi parentis. Sed medium bonum naturae, scilicet ipsa naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, diminuitur per peccatum. Per actus enim humanos fit quaedam inclinatio ad similes actus, ut supra habitum est. Oportet autem quod ex hoc quod aliquid inclinatur ad unum contrariorum, diminuatur inclinatio eius ad aliud. Unde cum peccatum sit contrarium virtuti, ex hoc ipso quod homo peccat, diminuitur bonum naturae quod est inclinatio ad virtutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in "being, living and understanding," as anyone may see who reads the context. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37190] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de bono primo naturae, quod est esse, vivere et intelligere; ut patet eius verba intuenti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37191] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod natura, etsi sit prior quam voluntaria actio, tamen habet inclinationem ad quandam voluntariam actionem. Unde ipsa natura secundum se non variatur propter variationem voluntariae actionis, sed ipsa inclinatio variatur ex illa parte qua ordinatur ad terminum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits ( <a href="FS_iv.html#FS_Q51_A2" id="FS_Q85_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37192] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod actio voluntaria procedit ex diversis potentiis, quarum una est activa et alia passiva. Et ex hoc contingit quod per actiones voluntarias causatur aliquid, vel aufertur ab homine sic agente, ut supra dictum est, cum de generatione habituum ageretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q77_A1" id="FS_Q85_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[77], AA[1]</a>, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37193] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod accidens non agit effective in subiectum; agit tamen formaliter in ipsum, eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod albedo facit album. Et sic nihil prohibet quod peccatum diminuat bonum naturae, eo tamen modo quo est ipsa diminutio boni naturae, inquantum pertinet ad inordinationem actus. Sed quantum ad inordinationem agentis, oportet dicere quod talis inordinatio causatur per hoc quod in actibus animae aliquid est activum et aliquid passivum, sicut sensibile movet appetitum sensitivum, et appetitus sensitivus inclinat rationem et voluntatem, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc causatur inordinatio, non quidem ita quod accidens agat in proprium subiectum; sed secundum quod obiectum agit in potentiam, et una potentia agit in aliam, et deordinat ipsam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A2-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 2. Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37194] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod totum bonum humanae naturae possit per peccatum auferri. Bonum enim naturae humanae finitum est, cum et ipsa natura humana sit finita. Sed quodlibet finitum totaliter consumitur, facta continua ablatione. Cum ergo bonum naturae continue per peccatum diminui possit, videtur quod possit quandoque totaliter consumi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37195] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eorum quae sunt unius naturae, similis est ratio de toto et de partibus, sicut patet in aere et in aqua et carne, et omnibus corporibus similium partium. Sed bonum naturae est totaliter uniforme. Cum igitur pars eius possit auferri per peccatum, totum etiam per peccatum auferri posse videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37196] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum naturae quod per peccatum minuitur, est habilitas ad virtutem. Sed in quibusdam propter peccatum habilitas praedicta totaliter tollitur, ut patet in damnatis, qui reparari ad virtutem non possunt, sicut nec caecus ad visum. Ergo peccatum potest totaliter tollere bonum naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that "evil does not exist except in some good." But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37197] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod malum non est nisi in bono. Sed malum culpae non potest esse in bono virtutis vel gratiae, quia est ei contrarium. Ergo oportet quod sit in bono naturae. Non ergo totaliter tollit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p7"> Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A2-p8"> We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 co."><a name="37198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37198] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, bonum naturae quod per peccatum diminuitur, est naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem. Quae quidem convenit homini ex hoc ipso quod rationalis est, ex hoc enim habet quod secundum rationem operetur, quod est agere secundum virtutem. Per peccatum autem non potest totaliter ab homine tolli quod sit rationalis, quia iam non esset capax peccati. Unde non est possibile quod praedictum naturae bonum totaliter tollatur. Cum autem inveniatur huiusmodi bonum continue diminui per peccatum, quidam ad huius manifestationem usi sunt quodam exemplo, in quo invenitur aliquod finitum in infinitum diminui, nunquam tamen totaliter consumi. Dicit enim philosophus, in III Physic., quod si ab aliqua magnitudine finita continue auferatur aliquid secundum eandem quantitatem, totaliter tandem consumetur, puta si a quacumque quantitate finita semper subtraxero mensuram palmi. Si vero fiat subtractio semper secundum eandem proportionem, et non secundum eandem quantitatem, poterit in infinitum subtrahi, puta, si quantitas dividatur in duas partes, et a dimidio subtrahatur dimidium, ita in infinitum poterit procedi; ita tamen quod semper quod posterius subtrahitur, erit minus eo quod prius subtrahebatur. Sed hoc in proposito non habet locum, non enim sequens peccatum minus diminuit bonum naturae quam praecedens, sed forte magis, si sit gravius. Et ideo aliter est dicendum quod praedicta inclinatio intelligitur ut media inter duo, fundatur enim sicut in radice in natura rationali, et tendit in bonum virtutis sicut in terminum et finem. Dupliciter igitur potest intelligi eius diminutio, uno modo, ex parte radicis; alio modo, ex parte termini. Primo quidem modo non diminuitur per peccatum, eo quod peccatum non diminuit ipsam naturam, ut supra dictum est. Sed diminuitur secundo modo, inquantum scilicet ponitur impedimentum pertingendi ad terminum. Si autem primo modo diminueretur, oporteret quod quandoque totaliter consumeretur, natura rationali totaliter consumpta. Sed quia diminuitur ex parte impedimenti quod apponitur ne pertingat ad terminum, manifestum est quod diminui quidem potest in infinitum, quia in infinitum possunt impedimenta apponi, secundum quod homo potest in infinitum addere peccatum peccato, non tamen potest totaliter consumi, quia semper manet radix talis inclinationis. Sicut patet in diaphano corpore, quod quidem habet inclinationem ad susceptionem lucis ex hoc ipso quod est diaphanum, diminuitur autem haec inclinatio vel habilitas ex parte nebularum supervenientium, cum tamen semper maneat in radice naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37199] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quando fit diminutio per subtractionem. Hic autem fit diminutio per appositionem impedimenti, quod neque tollit neque diminuit radicem inclinationis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37200] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod inclinatio naturalis est quidem tota uniformis, sed tamen habet respectum et ad principium et ad terminum, secundum quam diversitatem quodammodo diminuitur et quodammodo non diminuitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37201] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam in damnatis manet naturalis inclinatio ad virtutem, alioquin non esset in eis remorsus conscientiae. Sed quod non reducatur in actum, contingit quia deest gratia, secundum divinam iustitiam. Sicut etiam in caeco remanet aptitudo ad videndum in ipsa radice naturae, inquantum est animal naturaliter habens visum, sed non reducitur in actum, quia deest causa quae reducere possit formando organum quod requiritur ad videndum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A3-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 3. Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been said above ( <a href="#FS_Q76_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[1]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.2" shape="rect"> Q[77], AA[3]</a>,5; <a href="#FS_Q78_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p2.3" shape="rect"> Q[78], A[1]</a>). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37202] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter ponantur vulnera naturae esse, ex peccato consequentia, infirmitas, ignorantia, malitia et concupiscentia. Non enim idem est effectus et causa eiusdem. Sed ista ponuntur causae peccatorum, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo non debent poni effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37203] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, malitia nominat quoddam peccatum. Non ergo debet poni inter effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37204] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, concupiscentia est quiddam naturale, cum sit actus virtutis concupiscibilis. Sed illud quod est naturale, non debet poni vulnus naturae. Ergo concupiscentia non debet poni vulnus naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it has been stated ( <a href="#FS_Q77_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[77], A[3]</a>) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37205] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, dictum est quod idem est peccare ex infirmitate, et ex passione. Sed concupiscentia passio quaedam est. Ergo non debet contra infirmitatem dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p6"> <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons "two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz. ignorance and difficulty," from which arise "error and vexation," which four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="37206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37206] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus, in libro de natura et gratia, ponit duo poenalia animae peccanti, scilicet ignorantiam et difficultatem, ex quibus oritur error et cruciatus, quae quidem quatuor non concordant istis quatuor. Ergo videtur quod alterum eorum insufficienter ponatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p7"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known]. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37207] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> In contrarium est auctoritas Bedae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated ( <a href="#FS_Q81_A2" id="FS_Q85_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[2]</a>); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p9"> Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q61_A2" id="FS_Q85_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[61], A[2]</a>), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A3-p10"> Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above ( <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>, 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 co."><a name="37208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37208] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod per iustitiam originalem perfecte ratio continebat inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. Haec autem originalis iustitia subtracta est per peccatum primi parentis, sicut iam dictum est. Et ideo omnes vires animae remanent quodammodo destitutae proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutio vulneratio naturae dicitur. Sunt autem quatuor potentiae animae quae possunt esse subiecta virtutum, ut supra dictum est, scilicet ratio, in qua est prudentia; voluntas, in qua est iustitia; irascibilis, in qua est fortitudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est temperantia. Inquantum ergo ratio destituitur suo ordine ad verum, est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad bonum, est vulnus malitiae; inquantum vero irascibilis destituitur suo ordine ad arduum, est vulnus infirmitatis; inquantum vero concupiscentia destituitur ordine ad delectabile moderatum ratione, est vulnus concupiscentiae. Sic igitur ita quatuor sunt vulnera inflicta toti humanae naturae ex peccato primi parentis. Sed quia inclinatio ad bonum virtutis in unoquoque diminuitur per peccatum actuale, ut ex dictis patet, et ista sunt quatuor vulnera ex aliis peccatis consequentia, inquantum scilicet per peccatum et ratio hebetatur, praecipue in agendis; et voluntas induratur ad bonum; et maior difficultas bene agendi accrescit; et concupiscentia magis exardescit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to sin again. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37209] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est effectus unius peccati, esse causam peccati alterius. Ex hoc enim quod anima deordinatur per peccatum praecedens, facilius inclinatur ad peccandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.8.21" target="asv"> Gn. 8:21</a>: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth.']. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37210] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod malitia non sumitur hic pro peccato, sed pro quadam pronitate voluntatis ad malum; secundum quod dicitur Gen. VIII, <i>proni sunt sensus hominis ad malum ab adolescentia sua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q82_A3" id="FS_Q85_A3-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[3]</a>, ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37211] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, concupiscentia intantum est naturalis homini, inquantum subditur rationi. Quod autem excedat limites rationis, hoc est homini contra naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p14"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="37212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37212] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod infirmitas communiter potest dici omnis passio, inquantum debilitat robur animae et impedit rationem. Sed Beda accepit infirmitatem stricte, secundum quod opponitur fortitudini, quae pertinet ad irascibilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A3-p15"> <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="37213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37213] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum quod difficultas quae ponitur in libro Augustini, includit ista tria quae pertinent ad appetitivas potentias, scilicet malitiam, infirmitatem et concupiscentiam, ex his enim tribus contingit quod aliquis non facile tendit in bonum. Error autem et dolor sunt vulnera consequentia, ex hoc enim aliquis dolet, quod infirmatur circa ea quae concupiscit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A4-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 4. Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that "where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at all." But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37214] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non sit effectus peccati. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, quod <i>ubi haec tria magna sunt, magnum bonum est; ubi parva, parvum; ubi nulla, nullum</i>. Sed peccatum non annullat bonum naturae. Ergo non privat modum, speciem et ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the "privation of mode, species and order," as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37215] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil est causa sui ipsius. Sed ipsum peccatum est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni. Ergo privatio modi, speciei et ordinis, non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37216] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, diversa peccata diversos habent effectus. Sed modus, species et ordo, cum sint quaedam diversa, diversas privationes habere videntur. Ergo per diversa peccata privantur. Non ergo est effectus cuiuslibet peccati privatio modi, speciei et ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.6.3" target="asv"> Ps. 6:3, </a> "Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak." Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37217] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod peccatum est in anima sicut infirmitas in corpore; secundum illud Psalmi VI, <i>miserere mei, domine, quoniam infirmus sum</i>. Sed infirmitas privat modum, speciem et ordinem ipsius corporis. Ergo peccatum privat modum, speciem et ordinem animae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q5_A5" id="FS_Q85_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>, mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its "species." Again, any kind of form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that "the forms of things are like numbers," so that a form has a certain "mode" corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of "order" to something else. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A4-p7"> Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q85_A1" id="FS_Q85_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a> ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species and order. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 co."><a name="37218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37218] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in primo dictum est, modus, species et ordo consequuntur unumquodque bonum creatum inquantum huiusmodi, et etiam unumquodque ens. Omne enim esse et bonum consideratur per aliquam formam, secundum quam sumitur species. Forma autem uniuscuiusque rei, qualiscumque sit, sive substantialis sive accidentalis, est secundum aliquam mensuram, unde et in VIII Metaphys. dicitur quod formae rerum sunt sicut numeri. Et ex hoc habet modum quendam, qui mensuram respicit. Ex forma vero sua unumquodque ordinatur ad aliud. Sic igitur secundum diversos gradus bonorum, sunt diversi gradus modi, speciei et ordinis. Est ergo quoddam bonum pertinens ad ipsam substantiam naturae, quod habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et illud nec privatur nec diminuitur per peccatum. Est etiam quoddam bonum naturalis inclinationis, et hoc etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc diminuitur per peccatum, ut dictum est, sed non totaliter tollitur. Est etiam quoddam bonum virtutis et gratiae, quod etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et hoc totaliter tollitur per peccatum mortale. Est etiam quoddam bonum quod est ipse actus ordinatus, quod etiam habet suum modum, speciem et ordinem, et huius privatio est essentialiter ipsum peccatum. Et sic patet qualiter peccatum et est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis; et privat vel diminuit modum, speciem et ordinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1&2:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37219] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet responsio ad duo prima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37220] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod modus, species et ordo se consequuntur, sicut ex dictis patet. Unde simul privantur et diminuuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A5-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 5. Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q82_A4" id="FS_Q85_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37221] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et alii corporales defectus non sint effectus peccati. Si enim causa fuerit aequalis, et effectus erit aequalis. Sed huiusmodi defectus non sunt aequales in omnibus, sed in quibusdam huiusmodi defectus magis abundant, cum tamen peccatum originale sit in omnibus aequale, sicut dictum est, cuius videntur huiusmodi defectus maxime esse effectus. Ergo mors et huiusmodi defectus non sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37222] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, remota causa, removetur effectus. Sed remoto omni peccato per Baptismum vel poenitentiam, non removentur huiusmodi defectus. Ergo non sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37223] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum actuale habet plus de ratione culpae quam originale. Sed peccatum actuale non transmutat naturam corporis ad aliquem defectum. Ergo multo minus peccatum originale. Non ergo mors et alii defectus corporales sunt effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>), "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37224] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. V, <i>per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that "by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon." In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q85_A3" id="FS_Q85_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3];</a> Q[82], A[3]), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A5-p7"> Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 co."><a name="37225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37225] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid est causa alterius dupliciter, uno quidem modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Per se quidem est causa alterius quod secundum virtutem suae naturae vel formae producit effectum, unde sequitur quod effectus sit per se intentus a causa. Unde cum mors et huiusmodi defectus sint praeter intentionem peccantis, manifestum est quod peccatum non est per se causa istorum defectuum. Per accidens autem aliquid est causa alterius, si sit causa removendo prohibens, sicut dicitur in VIII Physic. quod <i>divellens columnam, per accidens movet lapidem columnae superpositum</i>. Et hoc modo peccatum primi parentis est causa mortis et omnium huiusmodi defectuum in natura humana, inquantum per peccatum primi parentis sublata est originalis iustitia, per quam non solum inferiores animae vires continebantur sub ratione absque omni deordinatione, sed totum corpus continebatur sub anima absque omni defectu, ut in primo habitum est. Et ideo, subtracta hac originali iustitia per peccatum primi parentis, sicut vulnerata est humana natura quantum ad animam per deordinationem potentiarum, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam est corruptibilis effecta per deordinationem ipsius corporis. Subtractio autem originalis iustitiae habet rationem poenae, sicut etiam subtractio gratiae. Unde etiam mors, et omnes defectus corporales consequentes, sunt quaedam poenae originalis peccati. Et quamvis huiusmodi defectus non sint intenti a peccante, sunt tamen ordinati secundum iustitiam Dei punientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37226] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aequalitas causae per se, causat aequalem effectum, augmentata enim vel diminuta causa per se, augetur vel diminuitur effectus. Sed aequalitas causae removentis prohibens, non ostendit aequalitatem effectuum. Si quis enim aequali impulsu divellat duas columnas, non sequitur quod lapides superpositi aequaliter moveantur, sed ille velocius movebitur qui gravior erit secundum proprietatem suae naturae, cui relinquitur remoto prohibente. Sic igitur, remota originali iustitia, natura corporis humani relicta est sibi, et secundum hoc, secundum diversitatem naturalis complexionis, quorundam corpora pluribus defectibus subiacent, quorundam vero paucioribus, quamvis existente originali peccato aequali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.11" target="asv">Rom. 8:11</a>): "He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you": but each is done according to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37227] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod culpa originalis et actualis removetur ab eodem a quo etiam removentur et huiusmodi defectus, secundum illud apostoli, Rom. VIII, <i>vivificabit mortalia corpora vestra per inhabitantem spiritum eius in vobis</i>, sed utrumque fit secundum ordinem divinae sapientiae, congruo tempore. Oportet enim quod ad immortalitatem et impassibilitatem gloriae, quae in Christo inchoata est, et per Christum nobis acquisita, perveniamus conformati prius passionibus eius. Unde oportet quod ad tempus passibilitas in nostris corporibus remaneat, ad impassibilitatem gloriae promerendam conformiter Christo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A5-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37228] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in peccato actuali duo possumus considerare, scilicet ipsam substantiam actus, et rationem culpae. Ex parte quidem substantiae actus, potest peccatum actuale aliquem defectum corporalem causare, sicut ex superfluo cibo aliqui infirmantur et moriuntur. Sed ex parte culpae, privat gratiam quae datur homini ad rectificandum animae actus, non autem ad cohibendum defectus corporales, sicut originalis iustitia cohibebat. Et ideo peccatum actuale non causat huiusmodi defectus, sicut originale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q85_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q85_A6-p0.1">Q. 85. A. 6. Whether death and other defects are natural to man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37229] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini naturales. <i>Corruptibile enim et incorruptibile differunt genere</i>, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed homo est eiusdem generis cum aliis animalibus, quae sunt naturaliter corruptibilia. Ergo homo est naturaliter corruptibilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37230] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne quod est compositum ex contrariis, est naturaliter corruptibile, quasi habens in se causam corruptionis suae. Sed corpus humanum est huiusmodi. Ergo est naturaliter corruptibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like defects are natural to man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37231] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, calidum naturaliter consumit humidum. Vita autem hominis conservatur per calidum et humidum. Cum igitur operationes vitae expleantur per actum caloris naturalis, ut dicitur in II de anima, videtur quod mors et huiusmodi defectus sint homini naturales.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now "God made not death" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q85_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>). Therefore death is not natural to man. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p6"> (2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q85_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore they are not natural to man. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p7"> (3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A6" id="FS_Q85_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[6]</a>. Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1"><a name="37232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37232] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, quidquid est homini naturale, Deus in homine fecit. Sed Deus mortem non fecit, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo mors non est homini naturalis.</p><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2"><a name="37233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37233] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id quod est secundum naturam, non potest dici poena nec malum, quia unicuique rei est conveniens id quod est ei naturale. Sed mors et huiusmodi defectus sunt poena peccati originalis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non sunt homini naturales.</p><p title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3"><a name="37234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37234] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 s. c. 3</span></a> Praeterea, materia proportionatur formae, et quaelibet res suo fini. Finis autem hominis est beatitudo perpetua, ut supra dictum est. Forma etiam humani corporis est anima rationalis, quae est incorruptibilis, ut in primo habitum est. Ergo corpus humanum est naturaliter incorruptibile.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p8"> <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which it belongs. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p9"> On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be "the Nature Who makes nature." This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation of its own, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q75_A2" id="FS_Q85_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[75], A[2]</a>. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of his form. </p><p id="FS_Q85_A6-p10"> The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention, nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q97_A1" id="FS_Q85_A6-p10.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[97], A[1]</a>. It is in this sense that it is said that "God made not death," and that death is the punishment of sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 co."><a name="37235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37235] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod de unaquaque re corruptibili dupliciter loqui possumus, uno modo, secundum naturam universalem; alio modo, secundum naturam particularem. Natura quidem particularis est propria virtus activa et conservativa uniuscuiusque rei. Et secundum hanc, omnis corruptio et defectus est contra naturam, ut dicitur in II de caelo, quia huiusmodi virtus intendit esse et conservationem eius cuius est. Natura vero universalis est virtus activa in aliquo universali principio naturae, puta in aliquo caelestium corporum; vel alicuius superioris substantiae, secundum quod etiam Deus a quibusdam dicitur natura naturans. Quae quidem virtus intendit bonum et conservationem universi, ad quod exigitur alternatio generationis et corruptionis in rebus. Et secundum hoc, corruptiones et defectus rerum sunt naturales, non quidem secundum inclinationem formae, quae est principium essendi et perfectionis; sed secundum inclinationem materiae, quae proportionaliter attribuitur tali formae secundum distributionem universalis agentis. Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse quantum potest, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi perpetuitatem sui, praeter animam rationalem, eo quod ipsa non est subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae formae; quinimmo habet propriam operationem immaterialem, ut in primo habitum est. Unde ex parte suae formae, naturalior est homini incorruptio quam aliis rebus corruptibilibus. Sed quia et ipsa habet materiam ex contrariis compositam, ex inclinatione materiae sequitur corruptibilitas in toto. Et secundum hoc, homo est naturaliter corruptibilis secundum naturam materiae sibi relictae, sed non secundum naturam formae. Primae autem tres rationes procedunt ex parte materiae, aliae vero tres procedunt ex parte formae. Unde ad earum solutionem, considerandum est quod forma hominis, quae est anima rationalis, secundum suam incorruptibilitatem proportionata est suo fini, qui est beatitudo perpetua. Sed corpus humanum, quod est corruptibile secundum suam naturam consideratum, quodammodo proportionatum est suae formae, et quodammodo non. Duplex enim conditio potest attendi in aliqua materia, una scilicet quam agens eligit; alia quae non est ab agente electa, sed est secundum conditionem naturalem materiae. Sicut faber ad faciendum cultellum eligit materiam duram et ductilem, quae subtiliari possit ut sit apta incisioni, et secundum hanc conditionem ferrum est materia proportionata cultello, sed hoc quod ferrum sit frangibile et rubiginem contrahens, consequitur ex naturali dispositione ferri, nec hoc eligit artifex in ferro, sed magis repudiaret si posset. Unde haec dispositio materiae non est proportionata intentioni artificis, nec intentioni artis. Similiter corpus humanum est materia electa a natura quantum ad hoc, quod est temperatae complexionis, ut possit esse convenientissimum organum tactus et aliarum virtutum sensitivarum et motivarum. Sed quod sit corruptibile, hoc est ex conditione materiae, nec est electum a natura, quin potius natura eligeret materiam incorruptibilem, si posset. Sed Deus, cui subiacet omnis natura, in ipsa institutione hominis supplevit defectum naturae, et dono iustitiae originalis dedit corpori incorruptibilitatem quandam, ut in primo dictum est. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod Deus mortem non fecit, et quod mors est poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q85_A6-p11"><b>Reply to Objection 1--3:</b> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 85 a. 6 ad arg."><a name="37236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37236] Iª-IIae q. 85 a. 6 ad arg.</span></a> Unde patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q86" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q86-p0.1">Q. 86. OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q86-p2"> We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q86-p3"><a href="#FS_Q86_A1"> (1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q86-p4"><a href="#FS_Q86_A2"> (2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 pr."><a name="37237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37237] Iª-IIae q. 86 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de macula peccati. Et circa hoc quaeruntur duo. Primo, utrum macula animae sit effectus peccati. Secundo, utrum remaneat in anima post actum peccati.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q86_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q86_A1-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 1. Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37238] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non causet aliquam maculam in anima. Natura enim superior non potest inquinari ex contactu naturae inferioris, unde radius solaris non inquinatur per tactum corporum fetidorum, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra quinque haereses. Sed anima humana est multo superioris naturae quam res commutabiles, ad quas peccando convertitur. Ergo ex eis maculam non contrahit peccando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q86_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], AA[1]</a>,2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37239] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum est principaliter in voluntate, ut supra dictum est. Voluntas autem est in ratione, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed ratio, sive intellectus, non maculatur ex consideratione quarumcumque rerum, sed magis perficitur. Ergo nec voluntas ex peccato maculatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37240] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si peccatum maculam causat, aut macula illa est aliquid positive, aut est privatio pura. Si sit aliquid positive, non potest esse nisi dispositio vel habitus, nihil enim aliud videtur ex actu causari. Dispositio autem et habitus non est, contingit enim, remota dispositione vel habitu, adhuc remanere maculam; ut patet in eo qui peccavit mortaliter prodigalitate, et postea transmutatur, mortaliter peccando, in habitum vitii oppositi. Non ergo macula ponit aliquid positive in anima. Similiter etiam nec est privatio pura. Quia omnia peccata conveniunt ex parte aversionis et privationis gratiae. Sequeretur ergo quod omnium peccatorum esset macula una. Ergo macula non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Solomon ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.47.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 47:22</a>): "Thou hast stained thy glory": and it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle": and in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37241] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur, Eccli. XLVII, Salomoni, <i>dedisti maculam in gloria tua</i>. Et Ephes. V, <i>ut exhiberet sibi gloriosam Ecclesiam non habentem maculam aut rugam</i>. Et utrobique loquitur de macula peccati. Ergo macula est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A6" id="FS_Q86_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[6]</a>). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 co."><a name="37242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37242] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod macula proprie dicitur in corporalibus, quando aliquod corpus nitidum perdit suum nitorem ex contactu alterius corporis, sicut vestis et aurum et argentum, aut aliud huiusmodi. In rebus autem spiritualibus ad similitudinem huius oportet maculam dici. Habet autem anima hominis duplicem nitorem, unum quidem ex refulgentia luminis naturalis rationis, per quam dirigitur in suis actibus; alium vero ex refulgentia divini luminis, scilicet sapientiae et gratiae, per quam etiam homo perficitur ad bene et decenter agendum. Est autem quasi quidam animae tactus, quando inhaeret aliquibus rebus per amorem. Cum autem peccat, adhaeret rebus aliquibus contra lumen rationis et divinae legis, ut ex supradictis patet. Unde ipsum detrimentum nitoris ex tali contactu proveniens, macula animae metaphorice vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37243] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod anima non inquinatur ex rebus inferioribus virtute earum, quasi agentibus eis in animam, sed magis e converso anima sua actione se inquinat, inordinate eis inhaerendo, contra lumen rationis et divinae legis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves inordinately, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They . . . became abominable as those things were which they loved." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37244] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod actio intellectus perficitur secundum quod res intelligibiles sunt in intellectu per modum ipsius intellectus, et ideo intellectus ex eis non inficitur, sed magis perficitur. Sed actus voluntatis consistit in motu ad ipsas res, ita quod amor conglutinat animam rei amatae. Et ex hoc anima maculatur, quando in ordinate inhaeret; secundum illud Osee IX, <i>facti sunt abominabiles, sicut ea quae dilexerunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37245] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod macula non est aliquid positive in anima, nec significat privationem solam, sed significat privationem quandam nitoris animae in ordine ad suam causam, quae est peccatum. Et ideo diversa peccata diversas maculas inducunt. Et est simile de umbra, quae est privatio luminis ex obiecto alicuius corporis, et secundum diversitatem corporum obiectorum diversificantur umbrae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q86_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q86_A2-p0.1">Q. 86. A. 2. Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37246] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod macula non maneat in anima post actum peccati. Nihil enim manet in anima post actum, nisi habitus vel dispositio. Sed macula non est habitus vel dispositio, ut supra habitum est. Ergo macula non manet in anima post actum peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37247] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, hoc modo se habet macula ad peccatum, sicut umbra ad corpus, ut supra dictum est. Sed transeunte corpore, non manet umbra. Ergo, transeunte actu peccati, non manet macula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37248] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis effectus dependet ex sua causa. Causa autem maculae est actus peccati. Ergo, remoto actu peccati, non remanet macula in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q86_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Josh.22.17" target="asv">Jos. 22:17</a>): "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] to this day?" </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37249] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Iosue XXII, <i>an parum vobis est quod peccastis in Beelphegor, et usque in praesentem diem macula huius sceleris in vobis permanet?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above (A[1] ), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 co."><a name="37250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37250] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod macula peccati remanet in anima, etiam transeunte actu peccati. Cuius ratio est quia macula, sicut dictum est, importat quendam defectum nitoris propter recessum a lumine rationis vel divinae legis. Et ideo quandiu homo manet extra huiusmodi lumen, manet in eo macula peccati, sed postquam redit ad lumen divinum et ad lumen rationis, quod fit per gratiam, tunc macula cessat. Licet autem cesset actus peccati, quo homo discessit a lumine rationis vel legis divinae, non tamen statim homo ad illud redit in quo fuerat, sed requiritur aliquis motus voluntatis contrarius primo motui. Sicut si aliquis sit distans alicui per aliquem motum, non statim cessante motu fit ei propinquus, sed oportet quod appropinquet rediens per motum contrarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37251] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod post actum peccati nihil positive remanet in anima nisi dispositio vel habitus, remanet tamen aliquid privative, scilicet privatio coniunctionis ad divinum lumen.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and so there is no comparison. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37252] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, transeunte obstaculo corporis, remanet corpus diaphanum in aequali propinquitate et habitudine ad corpus illuminans, et ideo statim umbra transit. Sed remoto actu peccati, non remanet anima in eadem habitudine ad Deum. Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q86_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 86 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37253] Iª-IIae q. 86 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod actus peccati facit distantiam a Deo, quam quidem distantiam sequitur defectus nitoris, hoc modo sicut motus localis facit localem distantiam. Unde sicut, cessante motu, non tollitur distantia localis; ita nec, cessante actu peccati, tollitur macula.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q87" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q87-p0.1">Q. 87. OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q87-p2"> We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them. </p><p id="FS_Q87-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q87-p4"><a href="#FS_Q87_A1"> (1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p5"><a href="#FS_Q87_A2"> (2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p6"><a href="#FS_Q87_A3"> (3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p7"><a href="#FS_Q87_A4"> (4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p8"><a href="#FS_Q87_A5"> (5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p9"><a href="#FS_Q87_A6"> (6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p10"><a href="#FS_Q87_A7"> (7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q87-p11"><a href="#FS_Q87_A8"> (8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 pr."><a name="37254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37254] Iª-IIae q. 87 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de reatu poenae. Et primo, de ipso reatu; secundo, de mortali et veniali peccato, quae distinguuntur secundum reatum. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum reatus poenae sit effectus peccati. Secundo, utrum peccatum possit esse poena alterius peccati. Tertio, utrum aliquod peccatum faciat reum aeterna poena. Quarto, utrum faciat reum poena infinita secundum quantitatem. Quinto, utrum omne peccatum faciat reum aeterna et infinita poena. Sexto, utrum reatus poenae possit remanere post peccatum. Septimo, utrum omnis poena inferatur pro aliquo peccato. Octavo, utrum unus sit reus poenae pro peccato alterius.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q87_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A1-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 1. Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37255] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non sit effectus peccati. Quod enim per accidens se habet ad aliquid, non videtur esse proprius effectus eius. Sed reatus poenae per accidens se habet ad peccatum, cum sit praeter intentionem peccantis. Ergo reatus poenae non est effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37256] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, malum non est causa boni. Sed poena bona est, cum sit iusta, et a Deo. Ergo non est effectus peccati, quod est malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that "every inordinate affection is its own punishment." But punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37257] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, in I Confess., quod <i>omnis inordinatus animus sibi ipsi est poena</i>. Sed poena non causat reatum alterius poenae, quia sic iretur in infinitum. Ergo peccatum non causat reatum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.9" target="asv">Rom. 2:9</a>): "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil." But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words "tribulation and anguish." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37258] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. II, <i>tribulatio et angustia in animam omnem operantis malum</i>. Sed operari malum est peccare. Ergo peccatum inducit poenam, quae nomine tribulationis et angustiae designatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A1-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason "hot water freezes more rapidly," as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment. </p><p id="FS_Q87_A1-p7"> Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 co."><a name="37259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37259] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod ex rebus naturalibus ad res humanas derivatur ut id quod contra aliquid insurgit, ab eo detrimentum patiatur. Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus quod unum contrarium vehementius agit, altero contrario superveniente, propter quod aquae calefactae magis congelantur, ut dicitur in I Meteor. Unde in hominibus hoc ex naturali inclinatione invenitur, ut unusquisque deprimat eum qui contra ipsum insurgit. Manifestum est autem quod quaecumque continentur sub aliquo ordine, sunt quodammodo unum in ordine ad principium ordinis. Unde quidquid contra ordinem aliquem insurgit, consequens est ut ab ipso ordine, vel principe ordinis, deprimatur. Cum autem peccatum sit actus inordinatus, manifestum est quod quicumque peccat, contra aliquem ordinem agit. Et ideo ab ipso ordine consequens est quod deprimatur. Quae quidem depressio poena est. Unde secundum tres ordines quibus subditur humana voluntas, triplici poena potest homo puniri. Primo quidem enim subditur humana natura ordini propriae rationis; secundo, ordini exterioris hominis gubernantis vel spiritualiter vel temporaliter, politice seu oeconomice; tertio, subditur universali ordini divini regiminis. Quilibet autem horum ordinum per peccatum pervertitur, dum ille qui peccat, agit et contra rationem, et contra legem humanam, et contra legem divinam. Unde triplicem poenam incurrit, unam quidem a seipso, quae est conscientiae remorsus, aliam vero ab homine, tertiam vero a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37260] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod poena consequitur peccatum inquantum malum est, ratione suae inordinationis. Unde sicut malum est per accidens in actu peccantis, praeter intentionem ipsius, ita et reatus poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37261] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod poena quidem iusta esse potest et a Deo et ab homine inflicta, unde ipsa poena non est effectus peccati directe, sed solum dispositive. Sed peccatum facit hominem esse reum poenae, quod est malum, dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>puniri non est malum, sed fieri poena dignum</i>. Unde reatus poenae directe ponitur effectus peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37262] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod poena illa inordinati animi debetur peccato ex hoc quod ordinem rationis pervertit. Fit autem reus alterius poenae, per hoc quod pervertit ordinem legis divinae vel humanae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A2-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 2. Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37263] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum non possit esse poena peccati. Poenae enim sunt inductae ut per eas homines reducantur ad bonum virtutis, ut patet per philosophum, in X Ethic. Sed per peccatum non reducitur homo in bonum virtutis, sed in oppositum. Ergo peccatum non est poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37264] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, poenae iustae sunt a Deo, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Peccatum autem non est a Deo, et est iniustum. Non ergo peccatum potest esse poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above ( <a href="#FS_Q74_A1" id="FS_Q87_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74], AA[1]</a> ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37265] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, de ratione poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem. Sed peccatum est a voluntate, ut ex supradictis patet. Ergo peccatum non potest esse poena peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37266] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, super Ezech., quod quaedam peccata sunt poenae peccati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in the <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 co."><a name="37267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37267] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod de peccato dupliciter loqui possumus, per se, et per accidens. Per se quidem nullo modo peccatum potest esse poena peccati. Peccatum enim per se consideratur secundum quod egreditur a voluntate, sic enim habet rationem culpae. De ratione autem poenae est quod sit contra voluntatem, ut in primo habitum est. Unde manifestum est quod nullo modo, per se loquendo, peccatum potest esse poena peccati. Per accidens autem peccatum potest esse poena peccati, tripliciter. Primo quidem, ex parte causae quae est remotio prohibentis. Sunt enim causae inclinantes ad peccatum passiones, tentatio Diaboli, et alia huiusmodi; quae quidem causae impediuntur per auxilium divinae gratiae, quae subtrahitur per peccatum. Unde cum ipsa subtractio gratiae sit quaedam poena, et a Deo, ut supra dictum est; sequitur quod per accidens etiam peccatum quod ex hoc sequitur, poena dicatur. Et hoc modo loquitur apostolus, Rom. I, dicens, <i>propter quod tradidit eos Deus in desideria cordis eorum</i>, quae sunt animae passiones, quia scilicet deserti homines ab auxilio divinae gratiae, vincuntur a passionibus. Et hoc modo semper peccatum dicitur esse poena praecedentis peccati. Alio modo ex parte substantiae actus, quae afflictionem inducit, sive sit actus interior, ut patet in ira et invidia; sive actus exterior, ut patet cum aliqui gravi labore opprimuntur et damno, ut expleant actum peccati, secundum illud Sap. V, <i>lassati sumus in via iniquitatis</i>. Tertio modo, ex parte effectus, ut scilicet aliquod peccatum dicatur poena respectu effectus consequentis. Et his duobus ultimis modis, unum peccatum non solum est poena praecedentis peccati, sed etiam sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7"> On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q79_A3" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[3]</a>), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.24" target="asv">Rom. 1:24</a>) when he says: "Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart," i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.5.7" target="asv"> Wis. 5:7</a>: "We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity." Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with regard to itself. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37268] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc etiam quod aliqui puniuntur a Deo, dum permittit eos in aliqua peccata profluere, ad bonum virtutis ordinatur. Quandoque quidem etiam ipsorum qui peccant, cum scilicet post peccatum humiliores et cautiores resurgunt. Semper autem est ad emendationem aliorum, qui videntes aliquos ruere de peccato in peccatum, magis reformidant peccare. In aliis autem duobus modis, manifestum est quod poena ordinatur ad emendationem quia hoc ipsum quod homo laborem et detrimentum patitur in peccando, natum est retrahere homines a peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37269] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato secundum se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37270] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A3-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 3. Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality: wherefore it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.8" target="asv">Is. 27:8</a>): "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37271] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod nullum peccatum inducat reatum aeternae poenae. Poena enim iusta adaequatur culpae, iustitia enim aequalitas est. Unde dicitur Isaiae XXVII, <i>in mensura contra mensuram, cum abiecta fuerit, iudicabit eam</i>. Sed peccatum est temporale. Ergo non inducit reatum poenae aeternae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, and "what is directed to an end, is not infinite," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37272] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, poenae medicinae quaedam sunt, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed nulla medicina debet esse infinita, quia ordinatur ad finem; <i>quod autem ordinatur ad finem, non est infinitum</i>, ut philosophus dicit, in I Polit. Ergo nulla poena debet esse infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But "God hath not pleasure in the destruction of men" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37273] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nullus semper facit aliquid, nisi propter se in ipso delectetur. <i>Sed Deus non delectatur in perditione hominum</i>, ut dicitur Sap. I. Ergo non puniet homines poena sempiterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="37274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37274] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, nihil quod est per accidens, est infinitum. Sed poena est per accidens, non est enim secundum naturam eius qui punitur. Ergo non potest in infinitum durare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.46" target="asv">Mat. 25:46</a>): "These shall go into everlasting punishment"; and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.3.29" target="asv">Mk. 3:29</a>): "He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37275] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Matth. XXV, <i>ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum</i>. Et Marc. III dicitur, <i>qui autem blasphemaverit in spiritum sanctum, non habebit remissionem in aeternum, sed erit reus aeterni delicti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q87_A1" id="FS_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 co."><a name="37276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37276] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum ex hoc inducit reatum poenae, quod pervertit aliquem ordinem. Manente autem causa, manet effectus. Unde quandiu perversitas ordinis remanet, necesse est quod remaneat reatus poenae. Pervertit autem aliquis ordinem quandoque quidem reparabiliter, quandoque autem irreparabiliter. Semper enim defectus quo subtrahitur principium, irreparabilis est, si autem salvetur principium, eius virtute defectus reparari possunt. Sicut si corrumpatur principium visivum, non potest fieri visionis reparatio, nisi sola virtute divina, si vero, salvo principio visivo, aliqua impedimenta adveniant visioni, reparari possunt per naturam vel per artem. Cuiuslibet autem ordinis est aliquod principium, per quod aliquis fit particeps illius ordinis. Et ideo si per peccatum corrumpatur principium ordinis quo voluntas hominis subditur Deo, erit inordinatio, quantum est de se, irreparabilis, etsi reparari possit virtute divina. Principium autem huius ordinis est ultimus finis, cui homo inhaeret per caritatem. Et ideo quaecumque peccata avertunt a Deo, caritatem auferentia, quantum est de se, inducunt reatum aeternae poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life---sometimes even by death; wherein account is not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37277] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod poena peccato proportionatur secundum acerbitatem, tam in iudicio divino quam in humano, sicut Augustinus dicit, XXI de Civ. Dei, in nullo iudicio requiritur ut poena adaequetur culpae secundum durationem. Non enim quia adulterium vel homicidium in momento committitur, propter hoc momentanea poena punitur, sed quandoque quidem perpetuo carcere vel exilio, quandoque etiam morte. In qua non consideratur occisionis mora, sed potius quod in perpetuum auferatur a societate viventium, et sic repraesentat suo modo aeternitatem poenae inflictae divinitus. Iustum autem est, secundum Gregorium, quod qui in suo aeterno peccavit contra Deum, in aeterno Dei puniatur. Dicitur autem aliquis in suo aeterno peccasse, non solum secundum continuationem actus in tota hominis vita durantis, sed quia ex hoc ipso quod finem in peccato constituit, voluntatem habet in aeternum peccandi. Unde dicit Gregorius, XXXIV Moral., quod <i>iniqui voluissent sine fine vivere, ut sine fine potuissent in iniquitatibus permanere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.19.25" target="asv">Prov. 19:25</a>: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.59.6" target="asv"> Ps. 59:6</a>: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37278] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod poena etiam quae secundum leges humanas infligitur, non semper est medicinalis ei qui punitur, sed solum aliis, sicut cum latro suspenditur, non ut ipse emendetur, sed propter alios, ut saltem metu poenae peccare desistant; secundum illud Prov. XIX, <i>pestilente flagellato, stultus sapientior erit</i>. Sic igitur et aeternae poenae reproborum a Deo inflictae, sunt medicinales his qui consideratione poenarum abstinent a peccatis; secundum illud Psalmi LIX, <i>dedisti metuentibus te significationem, ut fugiant a facie arcus, ut liberentur dilecti tui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37279] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non delectatur in poenis propter ipsas; sed delectatur in ordine suae iustitiae, quae haec requirit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A3-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="37280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37280] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod poena, etsi per accidens ordinetur ad naturam, per se tamen ordinatur ad privationem ordinis et ad Dei iustitiam. Et ideo, durante inordinatione, semper durat poena.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A4-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 4. Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing." Now God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37281] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccato debeatur poena infinita secundum quantitatem. Dicitur enim Ierem. X, <i>corripe me, domine, veruntamen in iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas me</i>. Ira autem vel furor Dei metaphorice significat vindictam divinae iustitiae, redigi autem in nihilum est poena infinita, sicut et ex nihilo aliquid facere est virtutis infinitae. Ergo secundum vindictam divinam, peccatum punitur poena infinita secundum quantitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now a sin which is committed against God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God's greatness is infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37282] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quantitati culpae respondet quantitas poenae; secundum illud Deuteron. XXV, <i>pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus</i>. Sed peccatum quod contra Deum committitur, est infinitum, tanto enim gravius est peccatum, quanto maior est persona contra quam peccatur, sicut gravius peccatum est percutere principem quam percutere hominem privatum; Dei autem magnitudo est infinita. Ergo poena infinita debetur pro peccato quod contra Deum committitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore it is infinite in quantity also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37283] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, dupliciter est aliquid infinitum, duratione scilicet, et quantitate. Sed duratione est poena infinita. Ergo et quantitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37284] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia secundum hoc omnium mortalium peccatorum poenae essent aequales, non enim est infinitum infinito maius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of loss," which also is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment is the "pain of sense," which is also finite. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 co."><a name="37285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37285] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod poena proportionatur peccato. In peccato autem duo sunt. Quorum unum est aversio ab incommutabili bono, quod est infinitum, unde ex hac parte peccatum est infinitum. Aliud quod est in peccato, est inordinata conversio ad commutabile bonum. Et ex hac parte peccatum est finitum, tum quia ipsum bonum commutabile est finitum; tum quia ipsa conversio est finita, non enim possunt esse actus creaturae infiniti. Ex parte igitur aversionis, respondet peccato poena damni, quae etiam est infinita, est enim amissio infiniti boni, scilicet Dei. Ex parte autem inordinatae conversionis, respondet ei poena sensus, quae etiam est finita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. The expression "to be brought to nothing" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>: "If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37286] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omnino redigi in nihilum eum qui peccat, non convenit divinae iustitiae, quia repugnat perpetuitati poenae, quae est secundum divinam iustitiam, ut dictum est. Sed in nihilum redigi dicitur qui spiritualibus bonis privatur; secundum illud I Cor. XIII, <i>si non habuero caritatem, nihil sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37287] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato ex parte aversionis, sic enim homo contra Deum peccat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37288] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod duratio poenae respondet durationi culpae, non quidem ex parte actus, sed ex parte maculae, qua durante manet reatus poenae. Sed acerbitas poenae respondet gravitati culpae. Culpa autem quae est irreparabilis, de se habet quod perpetuo duret, et ideo debetur ei poena aeterna. Non autem ex parte conversionis habet infinitatem, et ideo non debetur ei ex hac parte poena infinita secundum quantitatem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A5-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 5. Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q87_A4" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q87_A4" id="FS_Q87_A5-p2.2" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37289] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omne peccatum inducat reatum poenae aeternae. Poena enim, ut dictum est, proportionatur culpae. Sed poena aeterna differt a temporali in infinitum. Nullum autem peccatum differre videtur ab altero in infinitum, cum omne peccatum sit humanus actus, qui infinitus esse non potest. Cum ergo alicui peccato debeatur poena aeterna, sicut dictum est, videtur quod nulli peccato debeatur poena temporalis tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that "the lightest punishment is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone." But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.3" target="asv">Jn. 3:3</a>): " Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37290] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum originale est minimum peccatorum, unde et Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>mitissima poena est eorum qui pro solo peccato originali puniuntur</i>. Sed peccato originali debetur poena perpetua, nunquam enim videbunt regnum Dei pueri qui sine Baptismo decesserunt cum originali peccato; ut patet per id quod dominus dicit, Ioan. III, <i>nisi quis renatus fuerit denuo, non potest videre regnum Dei</i>. Ergo multo magis omnium aliorum peccatorum poena erit aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37291] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccato non debetur maior poena ex hoc quod alteri peccato adiungitur, cum utrumque peccatum suam habeat poenam taxatam secundum divinam iustitiam. Sed peccato veniali debetur poena aeterna, si cum mortali peccato inveniatur in aliquo damnato, quia in Inferno nulla potest esse remissio. Ergo peccato veniali simpliciter debetur poena aeterna. Nulli ergo peccato debetur poena temporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished eternally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37292] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog., quod quaedam leviores culpae post hanc vitam remittuntur. Non ergo omnia peccata aeterna poena puniuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 co."><a name="37293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37293] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, peccatum causat reatum poenae aeternae, inquantum irreparabiliter repugnat ordini divinae iustitiae, per hoc scilicet quod contrariatur ipsi principio ordinis, quod est ultimus finis. Manifestum est autem quod in quibusdam peccatis est quidem aliqua inordinatio, non tamen per contrarietatem ad ultimum finem, sed solum circa ea quae sunt ad finem, inquantum plus vel minus debite eis intenditur, salvato tamen ordine ad ultimum finem, puta cum homo, etsi nimis ad aliquam rem temporalem afficiatur, non tamen pro ea vellet Deum offendere, aliquid contra praeceptum eius faciendo. Unde huiusmodi peccatis non debetur aeterna poena, sed temporalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs infinitely from the things that are referred to it. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37294] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccata non differunt in infinitum ex parte conversionis ad bonum commutabile, in qua consistit substantia actus, differunt autem in infinitum ex parte aversionis. Nam quaedam peccata committuntur per aversionem ab ultimo fine, quaedam vero per inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Finis autem ultimus ab his quae sunt ad finem, in infinitum differt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37295] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccato originali non debetur poena aeterna ratione suae gravitatis, sed ratione conditionis subiecti, scilicet hominis qui sine gratia invenitur, per quam solam fit remissio poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A5-p9"> The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q87_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37296] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter dicendum est ad tertium, de veniali peccato. Aeternitas enim poenae non respondet quantitati culpae, sed irremissibilitati ipsius, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A6-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 6. Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37297] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod reatus poenae non remaneat post peccatum. Remota enim causa, removetur effectus. Sed peccatum est causa reatus poenae. Ergo, remoto peccato, cessat reatus poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37298] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum removetur per hoc quod homo ad virtutem redit. Sed virtuoso non debetur poena, sed magis praemium. Ergo, remoto peccato, non remanet reatus poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Punishments are a kind of medicine" (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37299] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, poenae sunt medicinae, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed postquam aliquis iam est ab infirmitate curatus, non adhibetur sibi medicina. Ergo, remoto peccato, non remanet debitum poenae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.12.13" target="asv">2 Kings xii. 13,14</a>): "David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child that is born to thee shall die." Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment remains, when the sin has been removed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37300] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur II Reg. XII, quod <i>David dixit ad Nathan, peccavi domino. Dixitque Nathan ad David, dominus quoque transtulit peccatum tuum, non morieris. Veruntamen quia blasphemare fecisti inimicos nomen domini, filius qui natus est tibi, morte morietur</i>. Punitur ergo aliquis a Deo etiam postquam ei peccatum dimittitur. Et sic reatus poenae remanet, peccato remoto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment. </p><p id="FS_Q87_A6-p7"> But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q86_A1" id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q6_A6" id="FS_Q87_A6-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[6], A[6]</a>). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 co."><a name="37301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37301] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod in peccato duo possunt considerari, scilicet actus culpae, et macula sequens. Planum est autem quod, cessante actu peccati, remanet reatus, in omnibus peccatis actualibus. Actus enim peccati facit hominem reum poenae, inquantum transgreditur ordinem divinae iustitiae; ad quem non redit nisi per quandam recompensationem poenae, quae ad aequalitatem iustitiae reducit; ut scilicet qui plus voluntati suae indulsit quam debuit, contra mandatum Dei agens, secundum ordinem divinae iustitiae, aliquid contra illud quod vellet, spontaneus vel invitus patiatur. Quod etiam in iniuriis hominibus factis observatur, ut per recompensationem poenae reintegretur aequalitas iustitiae. Unde patet quod, cessante actu peccati vel iniuriae illatae, adhuc remanet debitum poenae. Sed si loquamur de ablatione peccati quantum ad maculam, sic manifestum est quod macula peccati ab anima auferri non potest, nisi per hoc quod anima Deo coniungitur, per cuius distantiam detrimentum proprii nitoris incurrebat, quod est macula, ut supra dictum est. Coniungitur autem homo Deo per voluntatem. Unde macula peccati ab homine tolli non potest nisi voluntas hominis ordinem divinae iustitiae acceptet, ut scilicet vel ipse poenam sibi spontaneus assumat in recompensationem culpae praeteritae, vel etiam a Deo illatam patienter sustineat, utroque enim modo poena rationem satisfactionis habet. Poena autem satisfactoria diminuit aliquid de ratione poenae. Est enim de ratione poenae quod sit contra voluntatem. Poena autem satisfactoria, etsi secundum absolutam considerationem sit contra voluntatem, tamen tunc, et pro hoc, est voluntaria. Unde simpliciter est voluntaria, secundum quid autem involuntaria, sicut patet ex his quae supra de voluntario et involuntario dicta sunt. Dicendum est ergo quod, remota macula culpae, potest quidem remanere reatus non poenae simpliciter, sed satisfactoriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q86_A2" id="FS_Q87_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[2]</a>), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37302] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut, cessante actu peccati, remanet macula, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam potest remanere reatus. Cessante vero macula, non remanet reatus secundum eandem rationem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37303] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod virtuoso non debetur poena simpliciter, potest tamen sibi deberi poena ut satisfactoria, quia hoc ipsum ad virtutem pertinet, ut satisfaciat pro his in quibus offendit vel Deum vel hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37304] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, remota macula, sanatum est vulnus peccati quantum ad voluntatem. Requiritur autem adhuc poena ad sanationem aliarum virium animae, quae per peccatum praecedens deordinatae fuerunt, ut scilicet per contraria curentur. Requiritur etiam ad restituendum aequalitatem iustitiae; et ad amovendum scandalum aliorum, ut aedificentur in poena qui sunt scandalizati in culpa; ut patet ex exemplo de David inducto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A7-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 7. Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.9.3" target="asv">Jn. 9:3</a>, <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.2" target="asv">2</a>) about the man born blind: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind." In like manner we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="37305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37305] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non omnis poena sit propter aliquam culpam. Dicitur enim Ioan. IX, de caeco nato, <i>neque hic peccavit, neque parentes eius, ut nasceretur caecus</i>. Et similiter videmus quod multi pueri, etiam baptizati, graves poenas patiuntur, ut puta febres, Daemonum oppressiones, et multa huiusmodi, cum tamen in eis non sit peccatum, postquam sunt baptizati. Et antequam sint baptizati, non est in eis plus de peccato quam in aliis pueris, qui haec non patiuntur. Non ergo omnis poena est pro peccato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.5" target="asv">Ps. 72:5</a>): "They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men"; and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Job.21.7" target="asv">Job 21:7</a>): "[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches" (?)[*The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hab.1.13" target="asv">Hab. 1:13</a>): "Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="37306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37306] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, eiusdem rationis esse videtur quod peccatores prosperentur, et quod aliqui innocentes puniantur. Utrumque autem in rebus humanis frequenter invenimus, dicitur enim de iniquis in Psalmo LXXII, <i>in labore hominum non sunt, et cum hominibus non flagellabuntur</i>; et Iob XXI, <i>impii vivunt, sublevati sunt, confortatique divitiis</i>; et Habacuc I, dicitur, <i>quare respicis contemptores et taces, conculcante impio iustiorem se?</i> Non ergo omnis poena infligitur pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written of Christ ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.22" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:22</a>) that "He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth." And yet it is said ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.21" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:21</a>) that "He suffered for us." Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="37307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37307] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, de Christo dicitur I Pet. II, quod <i>peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est dolus in ore eius</i>. Et tamen ibidem dicitur quod <i>passus est pro nobis</i>. Ergo non semper poena a Deo dispensatur pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.4.7" target="asv">Job 4:7, </a> seqq.): "Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God"; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that "all punishment is just, and is inflicted for a sin." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 s. c."><a name="37308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37308] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Iob IV, <i>quis unquam innocens periit? Aut quando recti deleti sunt? Quin potius vidi eos qui operantur iniquitatem, flante Deo, periisse</i>. Et Augustinus dicit, in I Retract., quod <i>omnis poena iusta est, et pro peccato aliquo impenditur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A7-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated <a href="#FS_Q87_A6" id="FS_Q87_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>, punishment can be considered in two ways---simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently---principally, the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result from this defect in human nature. </p><p id="FS_Q87_A7-p7"> Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in the <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>. Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 co."><a name="37309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37309] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, poena potest dupliciter considerari, simpliciter, et inquantum est satisfactoria. Poena quidem satisfactoria est quodammodo voluntaria. Et quia contingit eos qui differunt in reatu poenae, esse unum secundum voluntatem unione amoris, inde est quod interdum aliquis qui non peccavit, poenam voluntarius pro alio portat, sicut etiam in rebus humanis videmus quod aliquis in se transfert alterius debitum. Si vero loquamur de poena simpliciter, secundum quod habet rationem poenae, sic semper habet ordinem ad culpam propriam, sed quandoque quidem ad culpam actualem, puta quando aliquis vel a Deo vel ab homine pro peccato commisso punitur; quandoque vero ad culpam originalem. Et hoc quidem vel principaliter, vel consequenter. Principaliter quidem poena originalis peccati est quod natura humana sibi relinquitur, destituta auxilio originalis iustitiae, sed ad hoc consequuntur omnes poenalitates quae ex defectu naturae in hominibus contingunt. Sciendum tamen est quod quandoque aliquid videtur esse poenale, quod tamen non habet simpliciter rationem poenae. Poena enim est species mali, ut in primo dictum est. Malum autem est privatio boni. Cum autem sint plura hominis bona, scilicet animae, corporis, et exteriorum rerum; contingit interdum quod homo patiatur detrimentum in minori bono, ut augeatur in maiori, sicut cum patitur detrimentum pecuniae propter sanitatem corporis, vel in utroque horum propter salutem animae et propter gloriam Dei. Et tunc tale detrimentum non est simpliciter malum hominis, sed secundum quid. Unde non dicit simpliciter rationem poenae, sed medicinae, nam et medici austeras potiones propinant infirmis, ut conferant sanitatem. Et quia huiusmodi non proprie habent rationem poenae, non reducuntur ad culpam sicut ad causam, nisi pro tanto, quia hoc ipsum quod oportet humanae naturae medicinas poenales exhibere, est ex corruptione naturae, quae est poena originalis peccati. In statu enim innocentiae non oportuisset aliquem ad profectum virtutis inducere per poenalia exercitia. Unde hoc ipsum quod est poenale in talibus reducitur ad originalem culpam sicut ad causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q85_A5" id="FS_Q87_A7-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[85], A[5]</a>, ad 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are admonished by their means---and also to the glory of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="37310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37310] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod huiusmodi defectus eorum qui nascuntur, vel etiam puerorum, sunt effectus et poenae originalis peccati, ut dictum est. Et manent etiam post Baptismum, propter causam superius dictam. Et quod non sint aequaliter in omnibus, contingit propter naturae diversitatem, quae sibi relinquitur, ut supra dictum est. Ordinantur tamen huiusmodi defectus, secundum divinam providentiam, ad salutem hominum, vel eorum qui patiuntur, vel aliorum, qui poenis admonentur; et etiam ad gloriam Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath held them fast." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="37311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37311] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod bona temporalia et corporalia sunt quidem aliqua bona hominis, sed parva, bona vero spiritualia sunt magna hominis bona. Pertinet igitur ad divinam iustitiam ut virtuosis det spiritualia bona; et de temporalibus bonis vel malis tantum det eis, quantum sufficit ad virtutem, ut enim Dionysius dicit, VIII cap. de Div. Nom., <i>divinae iustitiae est non emollire optimorum fortitudinem materialium donationibus</i>. Aliis vero hoc ipsum quod temporalia dantur, in malum spiritualium cedit. Unde in Psalmo LXXII concluditur, <i>ideo tenuit eos superbia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A7-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="37312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37312] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod Christus poenam sustinuit satisfactoriam non pro suis, sed pro nostris peccatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q87_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q87_A8-p0.1">Q. 87. A. 8. Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.5" target="asv">Ex. 20:5</a>): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me"; and ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.35" target="asv">Mat. 23:35</a>): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="37313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37313] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis puniatur pro peccato alterius. Dicitur enim Exodi XX, <i>ego sum Deus Zelotes, visitans iniquitatem patrum in filios in tertiam et quartam generationem, his qui oderunt me</i>. Et Matth. XXIII dicitur, <i>ut veniat super vos omnis sanguis iustus qui effusus est super terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="37314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37314] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, iustitia humana derivatur a iustitia divina. Sed secundum iustitiam humanam aliquando filii puniuntur pro parentibus, sicut patet in crimine laesae maiestatis. Ergo etiam secundum divinam iustitiam, unus punitur pro peccato alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their parents. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="37315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37315] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si dicatur filius non puniri pro peccato patris, sed pro peccato proprio, inquantum imitatur malitiam paternam, non magis hoc diceretur de filiis quam de extraneis, qui simili poena puniuntur his quorum peccata imitantur. Non ergo videtur quod filii pro peccatis propriis puniantur, sed pro peccatis parentum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q87_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.20" target="asv">Ezech. 18:20</a>): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 s. c."><a name="37316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37316] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Ezech. XVIII, <i>filius non portabit iniquitatem patris</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q87_A8-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q87_A7" id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated <a href="#FS_Q87_A7" id="FS_Q87_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a> that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it patiently. </p><p id="FS_Q87_A8-p7"> With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying (Ezech. 18:4): "All souls are Mine." </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 co."><a name="37317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37317] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de poena satisfactoria, quae voluntarie assumitur, contingit quod unus portet poenam alterius inquantum sunt quodammodo unum, sicut iam dictum est. Si autem loquamur de poena pro peccato inflicta, inquantum habet rationem poenae, sic solum unusquisque pro peccato suo punitur, quia actus peccati aliquid personale est. Si autem loquamur de poena quae habet rationem medicinae, sic contingit quod unus punitur pro peccato alterius. Dictum est enim quod detrimenta corporalium rerum, vel etiam ipsius corporis, sunt quaedam poenales medicinae ordinatae ad salutem animae. Unde nihil prohibet talibus poenis aliquem puniri pro peccato alterius, vel a Deo vel ab homine, utpote filios pro patribus, et subditos pro dominis, inquantum sunt quaedam res eorum. Ita tamen quod, si filius vel subditus est particeps culpae, huiusmodi poenalis defectus habet rationem poenae quantum ad utrumque, scilicet eum qui punitur, et eum pro quo punitur. Si vero non sit particeps culpae, habet rationem poenae quantum ad eum pro quo punitur, quantum vero ad eum qui punitur, rationem medicinae tantum, nisi per accidens, inquantum peccato alterius consentit; ordinatur enim ei ad bonum animae, si patienter sustineat. Poenae vero spirituales non sunt medicinales tantum, quia bonum animae non ordinatur ad aliud melius bonum. Unde in bonis animae nullus patitur detrimentum sine culpa propria. Et propter hoc etiam talibus poenis, ut dicit Augustinus in epistola ad avitum, unus non punitur pro alio, quia quantum ad animam, filius non est res patris. Unde et huius causam dominus assignans, dicit, Ezech. XVIII, <i>omnes animae meae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, "Of them that hate Me," and in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: "Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers." The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents' example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, "to the third and fourth generation," because men are wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="37318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37318] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod utrumque dictum videtur esse referendum ad poenas temporales vel corporales, inquantum filii sunt res quaedam parentum, et successores praedecessorum. Vel si referatur ad poenas spirituales, hoc dicitur propter imitationem culpae, unde in Exodo additur, <i>his qui oderunt me</i>; et in Matthaeo dicitur, <i>et vos implete mensuram patrum vestrorum</i>. Dicit autem puniri peccata patrum in filiis, quia filii, in peccatis parentum nutriti, proniores sunt ad peccandum, tum propter consuetudinem; tum etiam propter exemplum, patrum quasi auctoritatem sequentes. Sunt etiam maiori poena digni, si, poenas patrum videntes, correcti non sunt. Ideo autem addidit, in tertiam et quartam generationem, quia tantum consueverunt homines vivere, ut tertiam et quartam generationem videant; et sic mutuo videre possunt et filii peccata patrum ad imitandum, et patres poenas filiorum ad dolendum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="37319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37319] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod poenae illae sunt corporales et temporales quas iustitia humana uni pro peccato alterius infligit. Et sunt remedia quaedam, vel medicinae, contra culpas sequentes, ut vel ipsi qui puniuntur, vel alii, cohibeantur a similibus culpis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q87_A8-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 87 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="37320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37320] Iª-IIae q. 87 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod magis dicuntur puniri pro peccatis aliorum propinqui quam extranei, tum quia poena propinquorum quodammodo redundat in illos qui peccaverunt, ut dictum est, inquantum filius est quaedam res patris. Tum etiam quia et domestica exempla, et domesticae poenae, magis movent. Unde quando aliquis nutritus est in peccatis parentum, vehementius ea sequitur; et si ex eorum poenis non est deterritus, obstinatior videtur; unde et maiori poena dignus.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q88" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q88-p0.1">Q. 88. OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q88-p2"> In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself. </p><p id="FS_Q88-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q88-p4"><a href="#FS_Q88_A1"> (1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p5"><a href="#FS_Q88_A2"> (2) Whether they differ generically?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p6"><a href="#FS_Q88_A3"> (3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p7"><a href="#FS_Q88_A4"> (4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p8"><a href="#FS_Q88_A5"> (5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?</a></p><p id="FS_Q88-p9"><a href="#FS_Q88_A6"> (6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 pr."><a name="37321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37321] Iª-IIae q. 88 pr.</span></a> Deinde, quia peccatum veniale et mortale distinguuntur secundum reatum, considerandum est de eis. Et primo, considerandum est de veniali per comparationem ad mortale; secundo, de veniali secundum se. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum veniale peccatum convenienter dividatur contra mortale. Secundo, utrum distinguantur genere. Tertio, utrum veniale peccatum sit dispositio ad mortale. Quarto, utrum veniale peccatum possit fieri mortale. Quinto, utrum circumstantia aggravans possit de veniali peccato facere mortale. Sexto, utrum peccatum mortale possit fieri veniale.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q88_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A1-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 1. Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): "Sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law." But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37322] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod veniale peccatum non convenienter dividatur contra mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXII libro contra Faustum, <i>peccatum est dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem aeternam</i>. Sed esse contra legem aeternam, dat peccato quod sit mortale. Ergo omne peccatum est mortale. Non ergo peccatum veniale dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God." Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37323] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, apostolus dicit, I Cor. X, <i>sive manducatis, sive bibitis, sive aliquid aliud facitis, omnia in gloriam Dei facite</i>. Sed contra hoc praeceptum facit quicumque peccat, non enim peccatum fit propter gloriam Dei. Cum ergo facere contra praeceptum sit peccatum mortale, videtur quod quicumque peccat, mortaliter peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now "to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness," as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since "perverseness" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow, to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37324] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque amore alicui rei inhaeret, inhaeret ei vel sicut fruens, vel sicut utens; ut patet per Augustinum, in I de Doctr. Christ. Sed nullus peccans inhaeret bono commutabili quasi utens, non enim refert ipsum ad bonum quod nos beatos facit, quod proprie est uti, ut Augustinus dicit ibidem. Ergo quicumque peccat, fruitur bono commutabili. <i>Sed frui rebus utendis est humana perversitas</i>, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest. Cum ergo perversitas peccatum mortale nominet, videtur quod quicumque peccat, mortaliter peccet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="37325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37325] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque accedit ad unum terminum, ex hoc ipso recedit ab alio. Sed quicumque peccat, accedit ad bonum commutabile. Ergo recedit a bono incommutabili. Ergo peccat mortaliter. Non ergo convenienter peccatum veniale contra mortale dividitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that "a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not." But a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37326] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in Homil. XLI super Ioan., <i>quod crimen est quod damnationem meretur, veniale autem est quod non meretur damnationem</i>. Sed crimen nominat peccatum mortale. Ergo veniale peccatum convenienter dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: thus "to smile" is not opposed to "being dry"; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p8"> For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q71_A1" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[71], A[1]</a>, ad 3; <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.2" shape="rect"> Q[72], A[5]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q74_A9" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.3" shape="rect"> Q[74], A[9]</a>, ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.4" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.5" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>; <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.6" shape="rect"> Q[87], A[3]</a>): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.7" shape="rect">Q[87], A[3]</a>), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above ( <a href="#FS_Q87_A6" id="FS_Q88_A1-p8.8" shape="rect">Q[87], A[6]</a>). </p><p id="FS_Q88_A1-p9"> Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 co."><a name="37327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37327] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod aliqua, secundum quod proprie accipiuntur, non videntur esse opposita, quae si metaphorice accipiantur, opponi inveniuntur, sicut ridere non opponitur ei quod est arescere; sed secundum quod ridere metaphorice de prato dicitur propter eius floritionem et virorem, opponitur ei quod est arescere. Similiter si mortale proprie accipiatur, prout refertur ad mortem corporalem, non videtur oppositionem habere cum veniali, nec ad idem genus pertinere. Sed si mortale accipiatur metaphorice, secundum quod dicitur in peccatis, mortale opponitur ei quod est veniale. Cum enim peccatum sit quaedam infirmitas animae, ut supra habitum est, peccatum aliquod mortale dicitur ad similitudinem morbi, qui dicitur mortalis ex eo quod inducit defectum irreparabilem per destitutionem alicuius principii, ut dictum est. Principium autem spiritualis vitae, quae est secundum virtutem, est ordo ad ultimum finem, ut supra dictum est. Qui quidem si destitutus fuerit, reparari non potest per aliquod principium intrinsecum, sed solum per virtutem divinam, ut supra dictum est, quia inordinationes eorum quae sunt ad finem, reparantur ex fine, sicut error qui accidit circa conclusiones, per veritatem principiorum. Defectus ergo ordinis ultimi finis non potest per aliquid aliud reparari quod sit principalius; sicut nec error qui est circa principia. Et ideo huiusmodi peccata dicuntur mortalia, quasi irreparabilia. Peccata autem quae habent inordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, conservato ordine ad ultimum finem, reparabilia sunt. Et haec dicuntur venialia, tunc enim peccatum veniam habet, quando reatus poenae tollitur, qui cessat cessante peccato, ut dictum est. Secundum hoc ergo, mortale et veniale opponuntur sicut reparabile et irreparabile. Et hoc dico per principium interius, non autem per comparationem ad virtutem divinam, quae omnem morbum et corporalem et spiritualem potest reparare. Et propter hoc veniale peccatum convenienter dividitur contra mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37328] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divisio peccati venialis et mortalis non est divisio generis in species, quae aequaliter participent rationem generis, sed analogi in ea de quibus praedicatur secundum prius et posterius. Et ideo perfecta ratio peccati, quam Augustinus ponit, convenit peccato mortali. Peccatum autem veniale dicitur peccatum secundum rationem imperfectam, et in ordine ad peccatum mortale, sicut accidens dicitur ens in ordine ad substantiam, secundum imperfectam rationem entis. Non enim est contra legem, quia venialiter peccans non facit quod lex prohibet, nec praetermittit id ad quod lex per praeceptum obligat; sed facit praeter legem, quia non observat modum rationis quem lex intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37329] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod illud praeceptum apostoli est affirmativum, unde non obligat ad semper. Et sic non facit contra hoc praeceptum quicumque non actu refert in gloriam Dei omne quod facit. Sufficit ergo quod aliquis habitualiter referat se et omnia sua in Deum, ad hoc quod non semper mortaliter peccet, cum aliquem actum non refert in gloriam Dei actualiter. Veniale autem peccatum non excludit habitualem ordinationem actus humani in gloriam Dei, sed solum actualem, quia non excludit caritatem, quae habitualiter ordinat in Deum. Unde non sequitur quod ille qui peccat venialiter, peccet mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37330] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui peccat venialiter, inhaeret bono temporali non ut fruens, quia non constituit in eo finem; sed ut utens, referens in Deum non actu, sed habitu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A1-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of finality. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="37331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37331] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod bonum commutabile non accipitur ut terminus contrapositus incommutabili bono, nisi quando constituitur in eo finis. Quod enim est ad finem, non habet rationem termini.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A2-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 2. Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A2" id="FS_Q88_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[2]</a>). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37332] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale et mortale non differant genere, ita scilicet quod aliquod sit peccatum mortale ex genere, et aliquod veniale ex genere. Bonum enim et malum ex genere in actibus humanis accipitur per comparationem ad materiam sive ad obiectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed secundum quodlibet obiectum vel materiam, contingit peccare mortaliter et venialiter, quodlibet enim bonum commutabile potest homo diligere vel infra Deum, quod est peccare venialiter, vel supra Deum quod est peccare mortaliter. Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non differunt genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1];</a> Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37333] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut dictum est supra, peccatum mortale dicitur quod est irreparabile, peccatum autem veniale quod est reparabile. Sed esse irreparabile convenit peccato quod fit ex malitia, quod secundum quosdam irremissibile dicitur, esse autem reparabile convenit peccato quod fit per infirmitatem vel ignorantiam, quod dicitur remissibile. Ergo peccatum mortale et veniale differunt sicut peccatum quod est ex malitia commissum, vel ex infirmitate et ignorantia. Sed secundum hoc non differunt peccata genere, sed causa, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale et mortale non differunt genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q74_A3" id="FS_Q88_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[3]</a>, ad 3; A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37334] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, supra dictum est quod subiti motus tam sensualitatis quam rationis, sunt peccata venialia. Sed subiti motus inveniuntur in quolibet peccati genere. Ergo non sunt aliqua peccata venialia ex genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37335] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in sermone de Purgatorio, enumerat quaedam genera peccatorum venialium, et quaedam genera peccatorum mortalium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Venial sin is so called from "venia" [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that "penance makes every sin venial": and this is called venial "from the result." Secondly, a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial "from the cause": totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p7"> For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of the agent, as stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A4" id="FS_Q88_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[18], AA[4]</a>,6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal because venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 co."><a name="37336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37336] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum veniale a venia dicitur. Potest igitur aliquod peccatum dici veniale uno modo, quia est veniam consecutum, et sic dicit Ambrosius quod <i>omne peccatum per poenitentiam fit veniale</i>. Et hoc dicitur veniale ex eventu. Alio modo dicitur veniale, quia non habet in se unde veniam non consequatur vel totaliter vel in parte. In parte quidem, sicut cum habet in se aliquid diminuens culpam, ut cum fit ex infirmitate vel ignorantia. Et hoc dicitur veniale ex causa. In toto autem, ex eo quod non tollit ordinem ad ultimum finem, unde non meretur poenam aeternam, sed temporalem. Et de hoc veniali ad praesens intendimus. De primis enim duobus constat quod non habent genus aliquod determinatum. Sed veniale tertio modo dictum, potest habere genus determinatum, ita quod aliquod peccatum dicatur veniale ex genere, et aliquod mortale ex genere, secundum quod genus vel species actus determinantur ex obiecto. Cum enim voluntas fertur in aliquid quod secundum se repugnat caritati, per quam homo ordinatur in ultimum finem, peccatum ex suo obiecto habet quod sit mortale. Unde est mortale ex genere, sive sit contra dilectionem Dei, sicut blasphemia, periurium, et huiusmodi; sive contra dilectionem proximi, sicut homicidium, adulterium, et similia. Unde huiusmodi sunt peccata mortalia ex suo genere. Quandoque vero voluntas peccantis fertur in id quod in se continet quandam inordinationem, non tamen contrariatur dilectioni Dei et proximi, sicut verbum otiosum, risus superfluus, et alia huiusmodi. Et talia sunt peccata venialia ex suo genere. Sed quia actus morales recipiunt rationem boni et mali non solum ex obiecto, sed etiam ex aliqua dispositione agentis, ut supra habitum est; contingit quandoque quod id quod est peccatum veniale ex genere ratione sui obiecti, fit mortale ex parte agentis, vel quia in eo constituit finem ultimum, vel quia ordinat ipsum ad aliquid quod est peccatum mortale ex genere, puta cum aliquis ordinat verbum otiosum ad adulterium committendum. Similiter etiam ex parte agentis contingit quod aliquod peccatum quod ex suo genere est mortale, fit veniale, propter hoc scilicet quod actus est imperfectus, idest non deliberatus ratione, quae est principium proprium mali actus, sicut supra dictum est de subitis motibus infidelitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37337] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod aliquis eligit id quod repugnat divinae caritati, convincitur praeferre illud caritati divinae, et per consequens plus amare ipsum quam Deum. Et ideo aliqua peccata ex genere, quae de se repugnant caritati, habent quod aliquid diligatur supra Deum. Et sic sunt ex genere suo mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37338] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato veniali ex causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37339] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de peccato quod est veniale propter imperfectionem actus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A3-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 3. Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37340] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale non sit dispositio ad mortale. Unum enim oppositum non disponit ad aliud. Sed peccatum veniale et mortale ex opposito dividuntur, ut dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale non est dispositio ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that "from like acts like dispositions and habits are engendered." But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37341] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, actus disponit ad aliquid simile in specie sibi, unde in II Ethic. dicitur quod <i>ex similibus actibus generantur similes dispositiones et habitus</i>. Sed peccatum mortale et veniale differunt genere seu specie, ut dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale non disponit ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that "pride lies in wait for good works that it may destroy them." Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37342] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si peccatum dicatur veniale quia disponit ad mortale, oportebit quod quaecumque disponunt ad mortale peccatum, sint peccata venialia. Sed omnia bona opera disponunt ad peccatum mortale, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, quod superbia bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant. Ergo etiam bona opera erunt peccata venialia, quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 19:1</a>): "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little." Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37343] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XIX, <i>qui spernit minima, paulatim defluit</i>. Sed ille qui peccat venialiter, videtur minima spernere. Ergo paulatim disponitur ad hoc quod totaliter defluat per peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition. For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 co."><a name="37344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37344] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod disponens est quodammodo causa. Unde secundum duplicem modum causae, est duplex dispositionis modus. Est enim causa quaedam movens directe ad effectum, sicut calidum calefacit. Est etiam causa indirecte movens, removendo prohibens, sicut removens columnam dicitur removere lapidem superpositum. Et secundum hoc, actus peccati dupliciter ad aliquid disponit. Uno quidem modo, directe, et sic disponit ad actum similem secundum speciem. Et hoc modo, primo et per se peccatum veniale ex genere non disponit ad mortale ex genere, cum differant specie. Sed per hunc modum peccatum veniale potest disponere, per quandam consequentiam, ad peccatum quod est mortale ex parte agentis. Augmentata enim dispositione vel habitu per actus peccatorum venialium, intantum potest libido peccandi crescere, quod ille qui peccat, finem suum constituet in peccato veniali, nam unicuique habenti habitum, inquantum huiusmodi, finis est operatio secundum habitum. Et sic, multoties peccando venialiter, disponetur ad peccatum mortale. Alio modo actus humanus disponit ad aliquid removendo prohibens. Et hoc modo peccatum veniale ex genere potest disponere ad peccatum mortale ex genere. Qui enim peccat venialiter ex genere, praetermittit aliquem ordinem, et ex hoc quod consuescit voluntatem suam in minoribus debito ordini non subiicere, disponitur ad hoc quod etiam voluntatem suam non subiiciat ordini ultimi finis, eligendo id quod est peccatum mortale ex genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37345] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccatum veniale et mortale non dividuntur ex opposito, sicut duae species unius generis, ut dictum est, sed sicut accidens contra substantiam dividitur. Unde sicut accidens potest esse dispositio ad formam substantialem, ita et veniale peccatum ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit in different ways, as stated ( <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37346] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum veniale non est simile mortali in specie, est tamen simile ei in genere, inquantum utrumque importat defectum debiti ordinis, licet aliter et aliter, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37347] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod opus bonum non est per se dispositio ad mortale peccatum, potest tamen esse materia vel occasio peccati mortalis per accidens. Sed peccatum veniale per se disponit ad mortale, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A4-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 4. Whether a venial sin can become mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q88_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.36" target="asv"> Jn. 3:36</a>: "He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life," says (Tract. xii in Joan.): "The slightest," i.e. venial, "sins kill if we make little of them." Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37348] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit fieri mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, exponens illud Ioan. III, <i>qui incredulus est filio, non videbit vitam</i>, peccata minima (idest venialia), si negligantur, occidunt. Sed ex hoc dicitur peccatum mortale, quod spiritualiter occidit animam. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q74_A8" id="FS_Q88_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[74], A[8]</a>, ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37349] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, motus sensualitatis ante consensum rationis est peccatum veniale, post consensum vero est peccatum mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37350] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum veniale et mortale differunt sicut morbus curabilis et incurabilis, ut dictum est. Sed morbus curabilis potest fieri incurabilis. Ergo peccatum veniale potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="37351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37351] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, dispositio potest fieri habitus. Sed peccatum veniale est dispositio ad mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo veniale peccatum potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Those which differ infinitely, are not be transformed one to another. But a mortal sin differs infinitely from a venial sin, as is apparent from the above <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q88_A4-p5a" shape="rect">(Q[87] A[5])</a>. Therefore venial [sin] cannot become mortal. [HST translation, missing from original]</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37352] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ea quae differunt in infinitum, non transmutantur in invicem. Sed peccatum mortale et veniale differunt in infinitum, ut ex praedictis patet. Ergo veniale non potest fieri mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p7"> Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p8"> Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q87_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[87], AA[3]</a>,5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one another. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A4-p9"> If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q88_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 co."><a name="37353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37353] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod peccatum veniale fieri mortale, potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo sic quod idem actus numero, primo sit peccatum veniale, et postea mortale. Et hoc esse non potest. Quia peccatum principaliter consistit in actu voluntatis, sicut et quilibet actus moralis. Unde non dicitur unus actus moraliter, si voluntas mutetur, quamvis etiam actio secundum naturam sit continua. Si autem voluntas non mutetur, non potest esse quod de veniali fiat mortale. Alio modo potest intelligi ut id quod est veniale ex genere, fiat mortale. Et hoc quidem possibile est, inquantum constituitur in eo finis, vel inquantum refertur ad mortale peccatum sicut ad finem, ut dictum est. Tertio modo potest intelligi ita quod multa venialia peccata constituant unum peccatum mortale. Quod si sic intelligatur quod ex multis peccatis venialibus integraliter constituatur unum peccatum mortale, falsum est. Non enim omnia peccata venialia de mundo, possunt habere tantum de reatu, quantum unum peccatum mortale. Quod patet ex parte durationis, quia peccatum mortale habet reatum poenae aeternae, peccatum autem veniale reatum poenae temporalis, ut dictum est. Patet etiam ex parte poenae damni, quia peccatum mortale meretur carentiam visionis divinae, cui nulla alia poena comparari potest ut Chrysostomus dicit. Patet etiam ex parte poenae sensus, quantum ad vermem conscientiae, licet forte quantum ad poenam ignis, non sint improportionales poenae. Si vero intelligatur quod multa peccata venialia faciunt unum mortale dispositive, sic verum est, sicut supra ostensum est, secundum duos modos dispositionis, quo peccatum veniale disponit ad mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37354] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in illo sensu, quod multa peccata venialia dispositive causant mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37355] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod ille idem motus sensualitatis qui praecessit consensum rationis nunquam fiet peccatum mortale, sed ipse actus rationis consentientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37356] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod morbus corporalis non est actus, sed dispositio quaedam permanens, unde eadem manens, potest mutari. Sed peccatum veniale est actus transiens, qui resumi non potest. Et quantum ad hoc, non est simile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A4-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="37357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37357] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod dispositio quae fit habitus, est sicut imperfectum in eadem specie, sicut imperfecta scientia, dum perficitur, fit habitus. Sed veniale peccatum est dispositio alterius generis, sicut accidens ad formam substantialem, in quam nunquam mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A5-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 5. Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that "if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins." But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37358] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod circumstantia possit de veniali peccato facere mortale. Dicit enim Augustinus, in sermone de Purgatorio, quod <i>si diu teneatur iracundia, et ebrietas si assidua sit, transeunt in numerum peccatorum mortalium</i>. Sed ira et ebrietas non sunt ex suo genere peccata mortalia, sed venialia, alioquin semper essent mortalia. Ergo circumstantia facit peccatum veniale esse mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says ( Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See <a href="#FS_Q74_A6" id="FS_Q88_A5-p3.1" shape="rect"> Q[74], A[6]</a>], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37359] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Magister dicit, XXIV dist. II libri Sent., quod delectatio, si sit morosa, est peccatum mortale; si autem non sit morosa, est peccatum veniale. Sed morositas est quaedam circumstantia. Ergo circumstantia facit de peccato veniali mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37360] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, plus differunt malum et bonum quam veniale peccatum et mortale, quorum utrumque est in genere mali. Sed circumstantia facit de actu bono malum, sicut patet cum quis dat eleemosynam propter inanem gloriam. Ergo multo magis potest facere de peccato veniali mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said ( <a href="#FS_Q72_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[72], A[5]</a>, ad 1; <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p5.2" shape="rect"> Q[87], A[5] </a>, ad 1). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37361] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod, cum circumstantia sit accidens, quantitas eius non potest excedere quantitatem ipsius actus, quam habet ex suo genere, semper enim subiectum praeeminet accidenti. Si igitur actus ex suo genere sit peccatum veniale, non poterit per circumstantiam fieri peccatum mortale, cum peccatum mortale in infinitum quodammodo excedat quantitatem venialis, ut ex dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; <a href="#FS_Q88_A10" id="FS_Q88_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[10]</a> ,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p7"> It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it has been stated above <a href="#FS_Q88_A1" id="FS_Q88_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference of the moral act. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 co."><a name="37362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37362] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cum de circumstantiis ageretur, circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, est accidens actus moralis, contingit tamen circumstantiam accipi ut differentiam specificam actus moralis, et tunc amittit rationem circumstantiae, et constituit speciem moralis actus. Hoc autem contingit in peccatis quando circumstantia addit deformitatem alterius generis sicut cum aliquis accedit ad non suam, est actus deformis deformitate opposita castitati; sed si accedat ad non suam quae est alterius uxor, additur deformitas opposita iustitiae, contra quam est ut aliquis usurpet rem alienam; et secundum hoc huiusmodi circumstantia constituit novam speciem peccati, quae dicitur adulterium. Impossibile est autem quod circumstantia de peccato veniali faciat mortale, nisi afferat deformitatem alterius generis. Dictum est enim quod peccatum veniale habet deformitatem per hoc quod importat deordinationem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, peccatum autem mortale habet deformitatem per hoc quod importat deordinationem respectu ultimi finis. Unde manifestum est quod circumstantia non potest de veniali peccato facere mortale, manens circumstantia, sed solum tunc quando transfert in aliam speciem, et fit quodammodo differentia specifica moralis actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p9"> We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal or something of the kind. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A5-p10"> With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37363] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod diuturnitas non est circumstantia trahens in aliam speciem, similiter nec frequentia vel assiduitas, nisi forte per accidens ex aliquo supervenienti. Non enim aliquid acquirit novam speciem ex hoc quod multiplicatur vel protelatur, nisi forte in actu protelato vel multiplicato superveniat aliquid quod variet speciem, puta inobedientia vel contemptus, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Dicendum est ergo quod, cum ira sit motus animi ad nocendum proximo, si sit tale nocumentum in quod tendit motus irae, quod ex genere suo sit peccatum mortale, sicut homicidium vel furtum, talis ira ex genere suo est peccatum mortale. Sed quod sit peccatum veniale, habet ex imperfectione actus, inquantum est motus subitus sensualitatis. Si vero sit diuturna, redit ad naturam sui generis per consensum rationis. Si vero nocumentum in quod tendit motus irae, esset veniale ex genere suo, puta cum aliquis in hoc irascitur contra aliquem, quod vult ei dicere aliquod verbum leve et iocosum, quod modicum ipsum contristet; non erit ira peccatum mortale, quantumcumque sit diuturna; nisi forte per accidens, puta si ex hoc grave scandalum oriatur, vel propter aliquid huiusmodi. De ebrietate vero dicendum est quod secundum suam rationem habet quod sit peccatum mortale, quod enim homo absque necessitate reddat se impotentem ad utendum ratione, per quam homo in Deum ordinatur et multa peccata occurrentia vitat, ex sola voluptate vini, expresse contrariatur virtuti. Sed quod sit peccatum veniale, contingit propter ignorantiam quandam vel infirmitatem, puta cum homo nescit virtutem vini, aut propriam debilitatem, unde non putat se inebriari, tunc enim non imputatur ei ebrietas ad peccatum, sed solum superabundantia potus. Sed quando frequenter inebriatur, non potest per hanc ignorantiam excusari quin videatur voluntas eius eligere magis pati ebrietatem, quam abstinere a vino superfluo. Unde redit peccatum ad suam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37364] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio morosa non dicitur esse peccatum mortale, nisi in his quae ex suo genere sunt peccata mortalia; in quibus si delectatio non morosa sit, peccatum veniale est ex imperfectione actus, sicut et de ira dictum est. Dicitur enim ira diuturna, et delectatio morosa, propter approbationem rationis deliberantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A5-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above ( <a href="FS_ii.html#FS_Q18_A5" id="FS_Q88_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[18], A[5]</a> , ad 4). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37365] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod circumstantia non facit de bono actu malum, nisi constituens speciem peccati, ut supra etiam habitum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q88_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q88_A6-p0.1">Q. 88. A. 6. Whether a mortal sin can become venial?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above <a href="#FS_Q88_A5" id="FS_Q88_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37366] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum mortale possit fieri veniale. Aequaliter enim distat peccatum veniale a mortali, et e contrario. Sed peccatum veniale fit mortale, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam peccatum mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37367] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum veniale et mortale ponuntur differre secundum hoc, quod peccans mortaliter diligit creaturam plus quam Deum, peccans autem venialiter diligit creaturam infra Deum. Contingit autem quod aliquis committens id quod est ex genere suo peccatum mortale, diligat creaturam infra Deum, puta si aliquis, nesciens fornicationem simplicem esse peccatum mortale et contrariam divino amori, fornicetur, ita tamen quod propter divinum amorem paratus esset fornicationem praetermittere, si sciret fornicando se contra divinum amorem agere. Ergo peccabit venialiter. Et sic peccatum mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a mortal sin become venial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37368] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut dictum est, plus differt bonum a malo quam veniale a mortali. Sed actus qui est de se malus, potest fieri bonus, sicut homicidium potest fieri actus iustitiae, sicut patet in iudice qui occidit latronem. Ergo multo magis peccatum mortale potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37369] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod aeternum nunquam potest fieri temporale. Sed peccatum mortale meretur poenam aeternam, peccatum autem veniale poenam temporalem. Ergo peccatum mortale nunquam potest fieri veniale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q88_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity. </p><p id="FS_Q88_A6-p7"> Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said above <a href="#FS_Q88_A2" id="FS_Q88_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is destroyed. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 co."><a name="37370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37370] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod veniale et mortale differunt sicut perfectum et imperfectum in genere peccati, ut dictum est. Imperfectum autem per aliquam additionem potest ad perfectionem venire. Unde et veniale, per hoc quod additur ei deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati mortalis, efficitur mortale, sicut cum quis dicit verbum otiosum ut fornicetur. Sed id quod est perfectum, non potest fieri imperfectum per additionem. Et ideo peccatum mortale non fit veniale per hoc quod additur ei aliqua deformitas pertinens ad genus peccati venialis, non enim diminuitur peccatum eius qui fornicatur ut dicat verbum otiosum, sed magis aggravatur propter deformitatem adiunctam. Potest tamen id quod est ex genere mortale, esse veniale propter imperfectionem actus, quia non perfecte pertingit ad rationem actus moralis, cum non sit deliberatus sed subitus, ut ex dictis patet. Et hoc fit per subtractionem quandam, scilicet deliberatae rationis. Et quia a ratione deliberata habet speciem moralis actus, inde est quod per talem subtractionem solvitur species.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37371] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veniale differt a mortali sicut imperfectum a perfecto, ut puer a viro. Fit autem ex puero vir, sed non convertitur. Unde ratio non cogit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37372] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod, si sit talis ignorantia quae peccatum omnino excuset, sicut est furiosi vel amentis, tunc ex tali ignorantia fornicationem committens nec mortaliter nec venialiter peccat. Si vero sit ignorantia non invincibilis, tunc ignorantia ipsa est peccatum, et continet in se defectum divini amoris, inquantum negligit homo addiscere ea per quae potest se in divino amore conservare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q88_A6-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), "those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end." Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 88 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37373] Iª-IIae q. 88 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro contra mendacium, <i>ea quae sunt secundum se mala, nullo fine bene fieri possunt</i>. Homicidium autem est occisio innocentis, et hoc nullo modo bene fieri potest. Sed iudex qui occidit latronem, vel miles qui occidit hostem reipublicae, non appellantur homicidae, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de libero arbitrio.</p></div></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q89" class="div3"> <h3 id="FS_Q89-p0.1">Q. 89. OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> <p id="FS_Q89-p2"> We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FS_Q89-p3"><a href="#FS_Q89_A1"> (1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p4"><a href="#FS_Q89_A2"> (2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>); </a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p5"><a href="#FS_Q89_A3"> (3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p6"><a href="#FS_Q89_A4"> (4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p7"><a href="#FS_Q89_A5"> (5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?</a></p><p id="FS_Q89-p8"><a href="#FS_Q89_A6"> (6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?</a></p> </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 pr."><a name="37374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37374] Iª-IIae q. 89 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de peccato veniali secundum se. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum peccatum veniale causet maculam in anima. Secundo, de distinctione peccati venialis, prout figuratur per lignum, faenum et stipulam, I Cor. III. Tertio, utrum homo in statu innocentiae potuerit peccare venialiter. Quarto, utrum Angelus bonus vel malus possit peccare venialiter. Quinto, utrum primi motus infidelium sint peccata venialia. Sexto, utrum peccatum veniale possit esse in aliquo simul cum solo peccato originali.</p></div></div></div> <div id="FS_Q89_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A1-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 1. Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="37375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37375] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale causet maculam in anima. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Poenit., quod peccata venialia, si multiplicentur, decorem nostrum ita exterminant, ut a caelestis sponsi amplexibus nos separent. Sed nihil aliud est macula quam detrimentum decoris. Ergo peccata venialia causant maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="37376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37376] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum mortale causat maculam in anima propter inordinationem actus et affectus ipsius peccantis. Sed in peccato veniali est quaedam deordinatio actus et affectus. Ergo peccatum veniale causat maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q86_A1" id="FS_Q89_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[86], A[1]</a>). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="37377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37377] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, macula animae causatur ex contactu rei temporalis per amorem, ut supra dictum est. Sed in peccato veniali anima inordinato amore contingit rem temporalem. Ergo peccatum veniale inducit maculam in anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written, ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.27" target="asv">Eph. 5:27</a>): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 s. c."><a name="37378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37378] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. V, <i>ut exhiberet ipse sibi gloriosam Ecclesiam non habentem maculam</i>; Glossa, <i>idest aliquod peccatum criminale</i>. Ergo proprium peccati mortalis esse videtur quod maculam in anima causet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p6"> I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on ( <a href="SS_i.html#SS_Q24_A10" id="FS_Q89_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[24], A[10]</a>; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 co."><a name="37379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37379] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, macula importat detrimentum nitoris ex aliquo contactu, sicut in corporalibus patet, ex quibus per similitudinem nomen maculae ad animam transfertur. Sicut autem in corpore est duplex nitor, unus quidem ex intrinseca dispositione membrorum et coloris, alius autem ex exteriori claritate superveniente; ita etiam in anima est duplex nitor, unus quidem habitualis, quasi intrinsecus, alius autem actualis, quasi exterior fulgor. Peccatum autem veniale impedit quidem nitorem actualem, non tamen habitualem, quia non excludit neque diminuit habitum caritatis et aliarum virtutum, ut infra patebit, sed solum impedit earum actum. Macula autem importat aliquid manens in re maculata, unde magis videtur pertinere ad detrimentum habitualis nitoris quam actualis. Unde, proprie loquendo, peccatum veniale non causat maculam in anima. Et si alicubi dicatur maculam inducere, hoc est secundum quid, inquantum impedit nitorem qui est ex actibus virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="37380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37380] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur in eo casu in quo multa peccata venialia dispositive inducunt ad mortale. Aliter enim non separarent ab amplexu caelestis sponsi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="37381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37381] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod inordinatio actus in peccato mortali corrumpit habitum virtutis, non autem in peccato veniali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A1-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="37382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37382] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod in peccato mortali anima per amorem contingit rem temporalem quasi finem, et per hoc totaliter impeditur influxus splendoris gratiae, qui provenit in eos qui Deo adhaerent ut ultimo fini per caritatem. Sed in peccato veniali non adhaeret homo creaturae tanquam fini ultimo. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A2-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 2. Whether venial sins are suitably designated as "wood, hay, and stubble"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as "wood," "hay," and "stubble." Because wood hay and stubble are said ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="37383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37383] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter peccata venialia per lignum, faenum et stipulam designentur. Lignum enim, faenum et stipula dicuntur superaedificari spirituali fundamento. Sed peccata venialia sunt praeter spirituale aedificium, sicut etiam quaelibet falsae opiniones sunt praeter scientiam. Ergo peccata venialia non convenienter designantur per lignum, faenum et stipulam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire" ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="37384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37384] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, sic salvus erit quasi per ignem. Sed quandoque ille qui committit peccata venialia, non erit salvus etiam per ignem, puta cum peccata venialia inveniuntur in eo qui decedit cum peccato mortali. Ergo inconvenienter per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata venialia designantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Apostle ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:12</a>) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.1.8" target="asv">1 Jn. 1:8</a>): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="37385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37385] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, secundum apostolum, alii sunt qui aedificant aurum, argentum, lapides pretiosos, idest amorem Dei et proximi et bona opera; et alii qui aedificant lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sed peccata venialia committunt etiam illi qui diligunt Deum et proximum, et bona opera faciunt, dicitur enim I Ioan. I, <i>si dixerimus quia peccatum non habemus, nosipsos seducimus</i>. Ergo non convenienter designantur peccata venialia per ista tria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p5"> <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="37386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37386] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, multo plures differentiae et gradus sunt peccatorum venialium quam tres. Ergo inconvenienter sub his tribus comprehenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:15</a>) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q87_A5" id="FS_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[87], A[5]</a>). Therefore these three signify venial sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 s. c."><a name="37387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37387] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit de eo qui superaedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, quod salvus erit quasi per ignem, et sic patietur poenam, sed non aeternam. Reatus autem poenae temporalis proprie pertinet ad peccatum veniale, ut dictum est. Ergo per illa tria significantur peccata venialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p7"> <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.21" target="asv">Gal. 5:21</a>), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal sins. </p><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p8"> Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble." </p><p id="FS_Q89_A2-p9"> We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, and yet he is saved for ever. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 co."><a name="37388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37388] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod quidam intellexerunt fundamentum esse fidem informem, super quam aliqui aedificant bona opera, quae significantur per aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos; quidam vero peccata etiam mortalia, quae significantur, secundum eos, per lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sed hanc expositionem improbat Augustinus, in libro de fide et operibus, quia, ut apostolus dicit, ad Gal. V, qui opera carnis facit, regnum Dei non consequetur, quod est salvum fieri; apostolus autem dicit quod ille qui aedificat lignum, faenum et stipulam, salvus erit quasi per ignem. Unde non potest intelligi quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam peccata mortalia designentur. Quidam vero dicunt quod per lignum, faenum et stipulam significantur opera bona, quae superaedificantur quidem spirituali aedificio, sed tamen commiscent se eis peccata venialia sicut, cum aliquis habet curam rei familiaris, quod bonum est, commiscet se superfluus amor vel uxoris vel filiorum vel possessionum, sub Deo tamen, ita scilicet quod pro his homo nihil vellet facere contra Deum. Sed hoc iterum non videtur convenienter dici. Manifestum est enim quod omnia opera bona referuntur ad caritatem Dei et proximi, unde pertinent ad aurum, argentum et lapides pretiosos. Non ergo ad lignum, faenum et stipulam. Et ideo dicendum est quod ipsa peccata venialia quae admiscent se procurantibus terrena, significantur per lignum, faenum et stipulam. Sicut enim huiusmodi congregantur in domo, et non pertinent ad substantiam aedificii, et possunt comburi aedificio remanente; ita etiam peccata venialia multiplicantur in homine, manente spirituali aedificio; et pro istis patitur ignem vel temporalis tribulationis in hac vita, vel Purgatorii post hanc vitam; et tamen salutem consequitur aeternam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.136.1" target="asv">Ps. 136:1</a>): "Upon the waters of Babylon," i.e. "beside the waters": because venial sins do not destroy the edifice. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="37389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37389] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod peccata venialia non dicuntur superaedificari spirituali fundamento quasi directe supra ipsum posita, sed quia ponuntur iuxta ipsum; sicut accipitur ibi, super flumina Babylonis, idest iuxta. Quia peccata venialia non destruunt spirituale aedificium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build "upon" the "foundation." And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.17" target="asv"> Eph. 3:17</a>: "Rooted and founded in charity." Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="37390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37390] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non dicitur de quocumque aedificante lignum, faenum et stipulam, quod salvus sit quasi per ignem, sed solum de eo qui aedificat supra fundamentum. Quod quidem non est fides informis, ut quidam aestimabant, sed fides formata caritate, secundum illud Ephes. III, <i>in caritate radicati et fundati</i>. Ille ergo qui decedit cum peccato mortali et venialibus, habet quidem lignum, faenum et stipulam, sed non superaedificata supra fundamentum spirituale. Et ideo non erit salvus sic quasi per ignem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p12"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="37391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37391] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illi qui sunt abstracti a cura temporalium rerum, etsi aliquando venialiter peccent, tamen levia peccata venialia committunt, et frequentissime per fervorem caritatis purgantur. Unde tales non superaedificant venialia, quia in eis modicum manent. Sed peccata venialia ipsorum qui circa terrena occupantur, diutius manent, quia non ita frequenter recurrere possunt ad huiusmodi peccata delenda per caritatis fervorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A2-p13"> <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), "all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end." Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to "wood," which remains longer in the fire; "stubble," which is burnt up at once; and "hay," which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less attached to them. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="37392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37392] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit, in I de caelo, omnia tribus includuntur, scilicet principio, medio et fine. Et secundum hoc, omnes gradus venialium peccatorum ad tria reducuntur, scilicet ad lignum, quod diutius manet in igne; ad stipulam, quae citissime expeditur; ad faenum, quod medio modo se habet. Secundum enim quod peccata venialia sunt maioris vel minoris adhaerentiae vel gravitatis, citius vel tardius per ignem purgantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A3-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 3. Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14, </a> "Adam was not seduced," a gloss says: "Having had no experience of God's severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin." But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="37393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37393] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo in statu innocentiae potuerit peccare venialiter. Quia super illud I ad Tim. II, <i>Adam non est seductus</i>, dicit Glossa, <i>inexpertus divinae severitatis, in eo falli potuit, ut crederet veniale esse commissum</i>. Sed hoc non credidisset, nisi venialiter peccare potuisset. Ergo venialiter peccare potuit, non peccando mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): "We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked." Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that "man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit." Again there seems to have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.3" target="asv">Gn. 3:3</a>): "Lest perhaps we die." Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="37394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37394] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XI super Gen. ad Litt., <i>non est arbitrandum quod esset hominem deiecturus tentator, nisi praecessisset in anima hominis quaedam elatio comprimenda</i>. Elatio autem deiectionem praecedens, quae facta est per peccatum mortale, non potuit esse nisi peccatum veniale. Similiter etiam in eodem Augustinus dicit quod <i>virum sollicitavit aliqua experiendi cupiditas, cum mulierem videret, sumpto vetito pomo, non esse mortuam</i>. Videtur etiam in Eva fuisse aliquis infidelitatis motus, in hoc quod de verbis domini dubitavit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit, ne forte moriamur, ut habetur Gen. III. Haec autem videntur esse venialia peccata. Ergo homo potuit venialiter peccare, antequam mortaliter peccaret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="37395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37395] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, peccatum mortale magis opponitur integritati primi status quam peccatum veniale. Sed homo potuit peccare mortaliter, non obstante integritate primi status. Ergo etiam potuit peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 s. c."><a name="37396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37396] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod cuilibet peccato debetur aliqua poena. Sed nihil poenale esse potuit in statu innocentiae, ut Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo non potuit peccare aliquo peccato quo non eiiceretur ab illo integritatis statu. Sed peccatum veniale non mutat statum hominis. Ergo non potuit peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FS_Q89_A3-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally. </p><p id="FS_Q89_A3-p7"> The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q95_A1" id="FS_Q89_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[95], A[1]</a>, there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin. </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 co."><a name="37397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37397] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod communiter ponitur quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit venialiter peccare. Hoc autem non est sic intelligendum, quasi id quod nobis est veniale, si ipse committeret, esset sibi mortale, propter altitudinem sui status. Dignitas enim personae est quaedam circumstantia aggravans peccatum, non tamen transfert in aliam speciem, nisi forte superveniente deformitate inobedientiae vel voti, vel alicuius huiusmodi, quod in proposito dici non potest. Unde id quod est de se veniale, non potuit transferri in mortale, propter dignitatem primi status. Sic ergo intelligendum est quod non potuit peccare venialiter, quia non potuit esse ut committeret aliquid quod esset de se veniale, antequam integritatem primi status amitteret peccando mortaliter. Cuius ratio est quia peccatum veniale in nobis contingit vel propter imperfectionem actus, sicut subiti motus in genere peccatorum mortalium, vel propter inordinationem existentem circa ea quae sunt ad finem, servato debito ordine ad finem. Utrumque autem horum contingit propter quendam defectum ordinis, ex eo quod inferius non continetur firmiter sub superiori. Quod enim in nobis insurgat subitus motus sensualitatis, contingit ex hoc quod sensualitas non est omnino subdita rationi. Quod vero insurgat subitus motus in ratione ipsa, provenit in nobis ex hoc quod ipsa executio actus rationis non subditur deliberationi quae est ex altiori bono, ut supra dictum est. Quod vero humanus animus inordinetur circa ea quae sunt ad finem, servato debito ordine ad finem, provenit ex hoc quod ea quae sunt ad finem non ordinantur infallibiliter sub fine, qui tenet summum locum, quasi principium in appetibilibus, ut supra dictum est. In statu autem innocentiae, ut in primo habitum est, erat infallibilis ordinis firmitas, ut semper inferius contineretur sub superiori, quandiu summum hominis contineretur sub Deo, ut etiam Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei. Et ideo oportebat quod inordinatio in homine non esset, nisi inciperet ab hoc quod summum hominis non subderetur Deo; quod fit per peccatum mortale. Ex quo patet quod homo in statu innocentiae non potuit peccare venialiter, antequam peccaret mortaliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="37398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37398] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veniale non sumitur ibi secundum quod nunc de veniali loquimur, sed dicitur veniale quod est facile remissibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="37399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37399] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod illa elatio quae praecessit in animo hominis, fuit primum hominis peccatum mortale, dicitur autem praecessisse deiectionem eius in exteriorem actum peccati. Huiusmodi autem elationem subsecuta est et experiendi cupiditas in viro, et dubitatio in muliere; quae ex hoc solo in quandam elationem prorupit, quod praecepti mentionem a serpente audivit, quasi nollet sub praecepto contineri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A3-p10"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="37400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37400] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod peccatum mortale intantum opponitur integritati primi status, quod corrumpit ipsum, quod peccatum veniale facere non potest. Et quia non potest simul esse quaecumque inordinatio cum integritate primi status, consequens est quod primus homo non potuerit peccare venialiter, antequam peccaret mortaliter.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A4-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 4. Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that "man understands in common with the angels." But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="37401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37401] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus bonus vel malus possit peccare venialiter. Homo enim cum Angelis convenit in superiori animae parte, quae mens vocatur; secundum illud Gregorii, in Homil., <i>homo intelligit cum Angelis</i>. Sed homo secundum superiorem partem animae potest peccare venialiter. Ergo et Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="37402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37402] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quicumque potest quod est plus, potest etiam quod est minus. Sed Angelus potuit diligere bonum creatum plus quam Deum, quod fecit peccando mortaliter. Ergo etiam potuit bonum creatum diligere infra Deum inordinate, venialiter peccando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above <a href="#FS_Q89_A3" id="FS_Q89_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="37403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37403] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Angeli mali videntur aliqua facere quae sunt ex genere suo venialia peccata, provocando homines ad risum, et ad alias huiusmodi levitates. Sed circumstantia personae non facit de veniali mortale, ut dictum est, nisi speciali prohibitione superveniente, quod non est in proposito. Ergo Angelus potest peccare venialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 s. c."><a name="37404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37404] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod maior est perfectio Angeli quam perfectio hominis in primo statu. Sed homo in primo statu non potuit peccare venialiter. Ergo multo minus Angelus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> An angel's intellect, as stated above in the <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A3" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">FP, Q[58], A[3]</a>; <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q79_A8" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">FP, Q[79], A[8]</a>, is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], A[5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not directed to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ( <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q63_A4" id="FS_Q89_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">FP, Q[63], A[4]</a>; Q[64], A[2], ad 5). </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 co."><a name="37405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37405] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus Angeli, sicut in primo dictum est, non est discursivus, ut scilicet procedat a principiis in conclusiones, seorsum utrumque intelligens, sicut in nobis contingit. Unde oportet quod quandocumque considerat conclusiones, consideret eas prout sunt in principiis. In appetibilibus autem, sicut multoties dictum est, fines sunt sicut principia; ea vero quae sunt ad finem, sunt sicut conclusiones. Unde mens Angeli non fertur in ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi secundum quod constant sub ordine finis. Propter hoc ex natura sua habent quod non possit in eis esse deordinatio circa ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi simul sit deordinatio circa finem ipsum, quod est per peccatum mortale. Sed Angeli boni non moventur in ea quae sunt ad finem, nisi in ordine ad finem debitum, qui est Deus. Et propter hoc omnes eorum actus sunt actus caritatis. Et sic in eis non potest esse peccatum veniale. Angeli vero mali in nihil moventur nisi in ordine ad finem peccati superbiae ipsorum. Et ideo in omnibus peccant mortaliter, quaecumque propria voluntate agunt. Secus autem est de appetitu naturalis boni qui est in eis, ut in primo dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="37406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37406] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo convenit quidem cum Angelis in mente, sive in intellectu; sed differt in modo intelligendi, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="37407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37407] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod Angelus non potuit minus diligere creaturam quam Deum, nisi simul referens eam in Deum, sicut in ultimum finem, vel aliquem finem inordinatum, ratione iam dicta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A4-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="37408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37408] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa quae videntur esse venialia, Daemones procurant ut homines ad sui familiaritatem attrahant, et sic deducant eos in peccatum mortale. Unde in omnibus talibus mortaliter peccant, propter intentionem finis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A5-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 5. Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.1" target="asv">Rom. 8:1</a>) that "there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh": and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="37409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37409] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod primi motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sint peccata mortalia. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. VIII, quod <i>nihil est damnationis his qui sunt in Christo Iesu, qui non secundum carnem ambulant</i>, et loquitur ibi de concupiscentia sensualitatis, ut ex praemissis apparet. Haec ergo causa est quare concupiscere non sit damnabile his qui non secundum carnem ambulant, consentiendo scilicet concupiscentiae, quia sunt in Christo Iesu. Sed infideles non sunt in Christo Iesu. Ergo in infidelibus est damnabile. Primi igitur motus infidelium sunt peccata mortalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh." But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are mortal sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="37410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37410] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in libro de gratia et Lib. Arb., <i>qui non sunt in Christo, sentientes carnem, sequuntur damnationem, etiam si non secundum carnem ambulant</i>. Sed damnatio non debetur nisi peccato mortali. Ergo, cum homo sentiat carnem secundum primum motum concupiscentiae, videtur quod primus motus concupiscentiae in infidelibus sit peccatum mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): "Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence." Now this liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="37411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37411] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, in eodem libro, <i>sic factus est homo, ut concupiscentiam sentire non deberet</i>. Hoc autem debitum videtur homini remissum per gratiam baptismalem, quam infideles non habent. Ergo quandocumque infidelis concupiscit, etiam si non consentiat, peccat mortaliter, contra debitum faciens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34 </a>that "God is not a respecter of persons." Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to unbelievers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 s. c."><a name="37412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37412] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quod dicitur Act. X, <i>non est personarum acceptor Deus</i>. Quod ergo uni non imputat ad damnationem, nec alteri. Sed primos motus fidelibus non imputat ad damnationem. Ergo etiam nec infidelibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q79_A4" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[79], A[4]</a>). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q73_A10" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[73], A[10]</a>). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.13" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:13</a>: "I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief": whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A5-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.29" target="asv"> Heb. 10:29</a>: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?" </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 co."><a name="37413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37413] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod irrationabiliter dicitur quod primi motus infidelium sint peccata mortalia, si eis non consentiatur. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, quia ipsa sensualitas non potest esse subiectum peccati mortalis, ut supra habitum est. Est autem eadem natura sensualitatis in infidelibus et fidelibus. Unde non potest esse quod solus motus sensualitatis in infidelibus sit peccatum mortale. Alio modo, ex statu ipsius peccantis. Nunquam enim dignitas personae diminuit peccatum, sed magis auget, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde nec peccatum est minus in fideli quam in infideli, sed multo maius. Nam et infidelium peccata magis merentur veniam, propter ignorantiam, secundum illud I ad Tim. I, <i>misericordiam Dei consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in incredulitate mea</i>; et peccata fidelium aggravantur propter gratiae sacramenta, secundum illud Heb. X, <i>quanto magis putatis deteriora mereri supplicia, qui sanguinem testamenti, in quo sanctificatus est, pollutum duxerit?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, although the "fomes" of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="37414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37414] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus loquitur de damnatione debita peccato originali, quae aufertur per gratiam Iesu Christi, quamvis maneat concupiscentiae fomes. Unde hoc quod fideles concupiscunt, non est in eis signum damnationis originalis peccati, sicut est in infidelibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p8"> In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="37415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37415] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Et hoc etiam modo intelligendum est dictum Anselmi. Unde patet solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A5-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="37416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37416] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod illud debitum non concupiscendi erat per originalem iustitiam. Unde id quod opponitur tali debito, non pertinet ad peccatum actuale, sed ad peccatum originale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FS_Q89_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FS_Q89_A6-p0.1">Q. 89. A. 6. Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p2"> <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ( <a href="#FS_Q88_A3" id="FS_Q89_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[88], A[3]</a>). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="37417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37417] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod peccatum veniale possit esse in aliquo cum solo originali. Dispositio enim praecedit habitum. Sed veniale est dispositio ad mortale, ut supra dictum est. Ergo veniale in infideli, cui non remittitur originale, invenitur ante mortale. Et sic quandoque infideles habent peccata venialia cum originali, sine mortalibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p3"> <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="37418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37418] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, minus habet de connexione et convenientia veniale cum mortali, quam mortale peccatum cum mortali. Sed infidelis subiectus originali peccato, potest committere unum peccatum mortale et non aliud. Ergo etiam potest committere peccatum veniale, et non mortale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p4"> <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="37419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37419] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, determinari potest tempus in quo puer primo potest esse actor peccati actualis. Ad quod tempus cum pervenerit, potest ad minus per aliquod breve spatium stare, quin peccet mortaliter, quia hoc etiam in maximis sceleratis contingit. In illo autem spatio, quantumcumque brevi, potest peccare venialiter. Ergo peccatum veniale potest esse in aliquo cum originali peccato, absque mortali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p5"> <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on ( <a href="SS_ii.html#SS_Q69_A6" id="FS_Q89_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">SS, Q[69], A[6]</a>): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original sin. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 s. c."><a name="37420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37420] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est quia pro peccato originali puniuntur homines in Limbo puerorum, ubi non est poena sensus, ut infra dicetur. In Inferno autem detruduntur homines propter solum peccatum mortale. Ergo non erit locus in quo possit puniri ille qui habet peccatum veniale cum originali solo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p6"> <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 co."><a name="37421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37421] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est quod peccatum veniale sit in aliquo cum originali peccato, absque mortali. Cuius ratio est quia antequam ad annos discretionis perveniat, defectus aetatis, prohibens usum rationis, excusat eum a peccato mortali, unde multo magis excusat eum a peccato veniali, si committat aliquid quod sit ex genere suo tale. Cum vero usum rationis habere inceperit, non omnino excusatur a culpa venialis et mortalis peccati. Sed primum quod tunc homini cogitandum occurrit, est deliberare de seipso. Et si quidem seipsum ordinaverit ad debitum finem, per gratiam consequetur remissionem originalis peccati. Si vero non ordinet seipsum ad debitum finem, secundum quod in illa aetate est capax discretionis, peccabit mortaliter, non faciens quod in se est. Et ex tunc non erit in eo peccatum veniale sine mortali, nisi postquam totum fuerit sibi per gratiam remissum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p7"> <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="37422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37422] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veniale non est dispositio ex necessitate praecedens mortale, sed contingenter, sicut labor disponit quandoque ad febrem, non autem sicut calor disponit ad formam ignis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p8"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above. </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="37423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37423] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum dicendum quod non impeditur peccatum veniale esse simul cum solo originali propter distantiam eius vel convenientiam; sed propter defectum usus rationis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying ( <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q89_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I-II q. 89 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="37424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[37424] Iª-IIae q. 89 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum quod ab aliis peccatis mortalibus potest puer incipiens habere usum rationis, per aliquod tempus abstinere, sed a peccato omissionis praedictae non liberatur, nisi quam cito potest, se convertat ad Deum. Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad finem, finis enim est prior in intentione. Et ideo hoc est tempus pro quo obligatur ex Dei praecepto affirmativo, quo dominus dicit, <i>convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos</i>, Zachariae I.</p></div></div></div></div> ` </div> </body> </html>