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19 <h2 id="FP.x-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)</h2><div class="toc"><a href="#FP_Q103">Q. 103. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q104">Q. 104. THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q105">Q. 105. OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q106">Q. 106. HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q107">Q. 107. THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q108">Q. 108. OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q109">Q. 109. THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q110">Q. 110. HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q111">Q. 111. THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q112">Q. 112. THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q113">Q. 113. OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q114">Q. 114. OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </a><br/><a href="#FP_Q115">Q. 115. OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q116">Q. 116. ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q117">Q. 117. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q118">Q. 118. OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</a><br/><a href="#FP_Q119">Q. 119. OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</a><br/></div>
20 <div id="FP_Q103" class="div3">
21 <h3 id="FP_Q103-p0.1">Q. 103. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
22 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
23 <p id="FP_Q103-p2"> Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof,
24 and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there
25 are eight points of inquiry:
26 </p><p id="FP_Q103-p3"><a href="#FP_Q103_A1"> (1) Whether the world is governed by someone?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p4"><a href="#FP_Q103_A2"> (2) What is the end of this government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p5"><a href="#FP_Q103_A3"> (3) Whether the world is governed by one?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p6"><a href="#FP_Q103_A4"> (4) Of the effects of this government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p7"><a href="#FP_Q103_A5"> (5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p8"><a href="#FP_Q103_A6"> (6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p9"><a href="#FP_Q103_A7"> (7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?</a></p><p id="FP_Q103-p10"><a href="#FP_Q103_A8"> (8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?</a></p>
27 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 pr."><a name="32692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32692]
28 Iª q. 103 pr.</span></a> Postquam praemissum est de creatione
29 rerum et distinctione earum, restat nunc tertio considerandum de
30 rerum gubernatione. Et primo, in communi; secundo, in speciali de
31 effectibus gubernationis. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo,
32 utrum mundus ab aliquo gubernetur. Secundo, quis sit finis
33 gubernationis ipsius. Tertio, utrum gubernetur ab uno. Quarto, de
34 effectibus gubernationis. Quinto, utrum omnia divinae gubernationi
35 subsint. Sexto, utrum omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo. Septimo,
36 utrum divina gubernatio cassetur in aliquo. Octavo, utrum aliquid
37 divinae providentiae contranitatur.</p></div></div></div>
38 <div id="FP_Q103_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A1-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 1. Whether the world is governed by anyone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p2">
39 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work
40 for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have
41 no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.
42 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32693] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
43 proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab aliquo. Illorum
44 enim est gubernari, quae moventur vel operantur propter finem. Sed
45 res naturales, quae sunt magna pars mundi, non moventur aut
46 operantur propter finem, quia non cognoscunt finem. Ergo mundus non
47 gubernatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p3">
48 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but
49 has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.
50 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32694] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
51 eorum est proprie gubernari, quae ad aliquid moventur. Sed mundus
52 non videtur ad aliquid moveri, sed in se stabilitatem habet. Ergo
53 non gubernatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p4">
54 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle
55 of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their
56 actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.
57 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32695] Iª q. 103 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id
58 quod in se habet necessitatem qua determinatur ad unum, non indiget
59 exteriori gubernante. Sed principaliores mundi partes quadam
60 necessitate determinantur ad unum in suis actibus et motibus. Ergo
61 mundus gubernatione non indiget.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5">
62 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
63 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence." And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Thou Who governest this
64 universe by mandate eternal."
65 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32696] Iª q. 103 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
66 quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia
67 providentia</i>. Et Boetius dicit, in libro de Consol., <i>o qui
68 perpetua mundum ratione gubernas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6"> I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance.
69 But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that
70 in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed
71 nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is
72 a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that
73 put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration
74 of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (
75 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A4" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], A[4]</a>;
76 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A2" id="FP_Q103_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[65], A[2]</a>), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as "it belongs to the best to produce the best," it is
77 not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate
78 perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence,
79 so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.
80 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 co."><a name="32697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32697] Iª q. 103 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
81 quod quidam antiqui philosophi gubernationem mundo subtraxerunt,
82 dicentes omnia fortuito agi. Sed haec positio ostenditur esse
83 impossibilis ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex eo quod apparet in ipsis
84 rebus. Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus provenire quod melius est,
85 aut semper aut in pluribus, quod non contingeret, nisi per aliquam
86 providentiam res naturales dirigerentur ad finem boni, quod est
87 gubernare. Unde ipse ordo certus rerum manifeste demonstrat
88 gubernationem mundi, sicut si quis intraret domum bene ordinatam,
89 ex ipsa domus ordinatione ordinatoris rationem perpenderet; ut, ab
90 Aristotele dictum, Tullius introducit in libro de natura deorum.
91 Secundo autem apparet idem ex consideratione divinae bonitatis, per
92 quam res in esse productae sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Cum enim
93 optimi sit optima producere, non convenit summae Dei bonitati quod
94 res productas ad perfectum non perducat. Ultima autem perfectio
95 uniuscuiusque est in consecutione finis. Unde ad divinam bonitatem
96 pertinet ut, sicut produxit res in esse, ita etiam eas ad finem
97 perducat. Quod est gubernare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p7">
98 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures;
99 and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for
100 an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end
101 unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end
102 shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge,
103 shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.
104 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32698] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
105 dicendum quod aliquid movetur vel operatur propter finem
106 dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut agens seipsum in finem, ut homo et
107 aliae creaturae rationales, et talium est cognoscere rationem
108 finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem. Aliquid autem dicitur moveri
109 vel operari propter finem, quasi ab alio actum vel directum in
110 finem, sicut sagitta movetur ad signum directa a sagittante, qui
111 cognoscit finem, non autem sagitta. Unde sicut motus sagittae ad
112 determinatum finem demonstrat aperte quod sagitta dirigitur ab
113 aliquo cognoscente; ita certus cursus naturalium rerum cognitione
114 carentium, manifeste declarat mundum ratione aliqua gubernari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p8">
115 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement
116 we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing,
117 would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later (
118 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A1" id="FP_Q103_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[104], A[1]</a>).
119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32699] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
120 dicendum quod in omnibus rebus creatis est aliquid stabile, ad
121 minus prima materia; et aliquid ad motum pertinens, ut sub motu
122 etiam operationem comprehendamus. Et quantum ad utrumque, res
123 indiget gubernatione, quia hoc ipsum quod in rebus est stabile, in
124 nihilum decideret (quia ex nihilo est), nisi manu gubernatoris
125 servaretur, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A1-p9">
126 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God,
127 directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression
128 from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their
129 nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their
130 nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer,
131 so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.
132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32700] Iª q. 103 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
133 dicendum quod necessitas naturalis inhaerens rebus quae
134 determinantur ad unum, est impressio quaedam Dei dirigentis ad
135 finem, sicut necessitas qua sagitta agitur ut ad certum signum
136 tendat, est impressio sagittantis, et non sagittae. Sed in hoc
137 differt, quia id quod creaturae a Deo recipiunt, est earum natura;
138 quod autem ab homine rebus naturalibus imprimitur praeter earum
139 naturam, ad violentiam pertinet. Unde sicut necessitas violentiae
140 in motu sagittae demonstrat sagittantis directionem; ita necessitas
141 naturalis creaturarum demonstrat divinae providentiae
142 gubernationem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A2-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 2. Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p2">
143 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the
144 government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the
145 thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of
146 things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.
147 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32701] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
148 proceditur. Videtur quod finis gubernationis mundi non sit aliquid
149 extra mundum existens. Illud enim est finis gubernationis rei, ad
150 quod res gubernata perducitur. Sed illud ad quod res aliqua
151 perducitur, est aliquod bonum in ipsa re, sicut infirmus perducitur
152 ad sanitatem, quae est aliquod bonum in ipso. Ergo finis
153 gubernationis rerum non est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, sed aliquod
154 bonum in ipsis rebus existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p3">
155 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): "Some ends are an operation; some are a work"---i.e. produced by an operation.
156 But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic
157 can be the end of the government of things.
158 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32702] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
159 philosophus dicit, I Ethic., quod <i>finium quidam sunt
160 operationes, quidam opera</i>, idest operata. Sed nihil extrinsecum
161 a toto universo potest esse operatum, operatio autem est in ipsis
162 operantibus. Ergo nihil extrinsecum potest esse finis gubernationis
163 rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p4">
164 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the "tranquillity of order," as Augustine
165 says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the
166 world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.
167 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32703] Iª q. 103 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
168 bonum multitudinis videtur esse ordo et pax, quae est tranquillitas
169 ordinis. Ut Augustinus dicit XIX de Civ. Dei. Sed mundus in quadam
170 rerum multitudine consistit. Ergo finis gubernationis mundi est
171 pacificus ordo, qui est in ipsis rebus. Non ergo finis
172 gubernationis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5">
173 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
174 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of
175 all things is something extrinsic to them.
176 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32704] Iª q. 103 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
177 quod dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>universa propter se operatus est
178 dominus</i>. Ipse autem est extra totum ordinem universi. Ergo
179 finis rerum est quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p6">
180 <b>I answer that,</b> As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their
181 beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what
182 has been expounded above (
183 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear
184 that good has the nature
185 of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things
186 is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a
187 particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which
188 is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.
189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 co."><a name="32705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32705] Iª q. 103 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
190 quod, cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut,
191 principio cognito, quid sit rerum finis ignoretur. Cum igitur
192 principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto universo, scilicet
193 Deus, ut ex supra dictis patet; necesse est quod etiam finis rerum
194 sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum. Et hoc ratione apparet. Manifestum
195 est enim quod bonum habet rationem finis. Unde finis particularis
196 alicuius rei est quoddam bonum particulare, finis autem universalis
197 rerum omnium est quoddam bonum universale. Bonum autem universale
198 est quod est per se et per suam essentiam bonum, quod est ipsa
199 essentia bonitatis, bonum autem particulare est quod est
200 participative bonum. Manifestum est autem quod in tota universitate
201 creaturarum nullum est bonum quod non sit participative bonum. Unde
202 illud bonum quod est finis totius universi, oportet quod sit
203 extrinsecum a toto universo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p7">
204 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something
205 done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the
206 buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe
207 being the good to which it is directed.
208 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32706] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
209 dicendum quod bonum aliquod consequimur multipliciter, uno modo,
210 sicut formam in nobis existentem, ut sanitatem aut scientiam; alio
211 modo, ut aliquid per nos operatum, sicut aedificator consequitur
212 finem faciendo domum; alio modo, sicut aliquod bonum habitum vel
213 possessum, ut ille qui emit, consequitur finem possidendo agrum.
214 Unde nihil prohibet illud ad quod perducitur universum, esse
215 quoddam bonum extrinsecum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p8">
216 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the
217 end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder
218 is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made,
219 but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that
220 Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is
221 the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation
222 thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.
223 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32707] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
224 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de finibus artium, quarum
225 quaedam habent pro finibus operationes ipsas, sicut citharistae
226 finis est citharizare; quaedam vero habent pro fine quoddam
227 operatum, sicut aedificatoris finis non est aedificare, sed domus.
228 Contingit autem aliquid extrinsecum esse finem non solum sicut
229 operatum, sed etiam sicut possessum seu habitum, vel etiam sicut
230 repraesentatum, sicut si dicamus quod Hercules est finis imaginis,
231 quae fit ad eum repraesentandum. Sic igitur potest dici quod bonum
232 extrinsecum a toto universo est finis gubernationis rerum sicut
233 habitum et repraesentatum, quia ad hoc unaquaeque res tendit, ut
234 participet ipsum, et assimiletur ei, quantum potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A2-p9">
235 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate
236 end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in
237 Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.
238 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32708] Iª q. 103 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
239 dicendum quod finis quidem universi est aliquod bonum in ipso
240 existens, scilicet ordo ipsius universi, hoc autem bonum non est
241 ultimus finis, sed ordinatur ad bonum extrinsecum ut ad ultimum
242 finem; sicut etiam ordo exercitus ordinatur ad ducem, ut dicitur in
243 XII Metaphys.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A3-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 3. Whether the world is governed by one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p2">
244 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government
245 of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously
246 different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
247 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32709] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
248 proceditur. Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab uno. De causa
249 enim per effectus iudicamus. Sed in gubernatione rerum apparet quod
250 res non uniformiter moventur et operantur, quaedam enim
251 contingenter, quaedam vero ex necessitate, et secundum alias
252 diversitates. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p3">
253 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the
254 ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the
255 case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.
256 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32710] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea
257 quae gubernantur ab uno, a se invicem non dissentiunt nisi propter
258 imperitiam aut impotentiam gubernantis, quae a Deo sunt procul. Sed
259 res creatae a se invicem dissentiunt, et contra se invicem pugnant;
260 ut in contrariis apparet. Non ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4">
261 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" (
262 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.4.9" target="asv">Eccles. 4:9</a>). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.
263 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32711] Iª q. 103 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
264 natura semper invenitur quod melius est. Sed melius est simul esse
265 duos quam unum, ut dicitur Eccle. IV. Ergo mundus non gubernatur ab
266 uno, sed a pluribus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5">
267 <b>On the contrary,</b> We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (
268 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs
269 dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above (
270 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A8" id="FP_Q103_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[8]</a>). Therefore the world is governed by one.
271 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32712] Iª q. 103 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
272 quod unum Deum et unum dominum confitemur; secundum illud apostoli
273 I ad Cor. VIII, <i>nobis est unus Deus, pater, et dominus unus</i>.
274 Quorum utrumque ad gubernationem pertinet, nam ad dominum pertinet
275 gubernatio subditorum; et Dei nomen ex providentia sumitur, ut
276 supra dictum est. Ergo mundus gubernatur ab uno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p6">
277 <b>I answer that,</b> We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which
278 is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the
279 best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things
280 governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness,
281 as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which
282 they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as
283 they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is
284 unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord,
285 except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several
286 things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of
287 the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi,
288 10): "Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler."
289 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 co."><a name="32713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32713] Iª q. 103 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
290 quod necesse est dicere quod mundus ab uno gubernetur. Cum enim
291 finis gubernationis mundi sit quod est essentialiter bonum, quod
292 est optimum, necesse est quod mundi gubernatio sit optima. Optima
293 autem gubernatio est quae fit per unum. Cuius ratio est, quia
294 gubernatio nihil aliud est quam directio gubernatorum ad finem, qui
295 est aliquod bonum. Unitas autem pertinet ad rationem bonitatis; ut
296 Boetius probat, in III de Consol., per hoc quod. Sicut omnia
297 desiderant bonum, ita desiderant unitatem, sine qua esse non
298 possunt. Nam unumquodque intantum est, inquantum unum est, unde
299 videmus quod res repugnant suae divisioni quantum possunt, et quod
300 dissolutio uniuscuiusque rei provenit ex defectu illius rei. Et
301 ideo id ad quod tendit intentio multitudinem gubernantis, est
302 unitas sive pax. Unitatis autem causa per se est unum. Manifestum
303 est enim quod plures multa unire et concordare non possunt, nisi
304 ipsi aliquo modo uniantur. Illud autem quod est per se unum, potest
305 convenientius et melius esse causa unitatis, quam multi uniti. Unde
306 multitudo melius gubernatur per unum quam per plures. Relinquitur
307 ergo quod gubernatio mundi, quae est optima, sit ab uno gubernante.
308 Et hoc est quod philosophus dicit in XII Metaphys., <i>entia nolunt
309 disponi male, nec bonum pluralitas principatuum, unus ergo
310 princeps</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7">
311 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover." Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity
312 of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe (
313 <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A1" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,2;
314 <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A2" id="FP_Q103_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[48], A[2]</a>), and not by a diversity of governors.
315 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32714] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
316 dicendum quod motus est actus mobilis a movente. Difformitas ergo
317 motuum est ex diversitate mobilium, quam requirit perfectio
318 universi, ut supra dictum est; non ex diversitate gubernantium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p8">
319 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so
320 far as they are included in the one order of the universe.
321 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32715] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
322 dicendum quod contraria, etsi dissentiant quantum ad fines
323 proximos, conveniunt tamen quantum ad finem ultimum, prout
324 concluduntur sub uno ordine universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A3-p9">
325 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is
326 possible.
327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32716] Iª q. 103 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
328 dicendum quod in particularibus bonis duo sunt meliora quam unum,
329 sed ei quod est essentialiter bonum, non potest fieri aliqua
330 additio bonitatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A4-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 4. Whether the effect of government is one or many?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p2">
331 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that
332 which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example
333 of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.
334 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32717] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
335 proceditur. Videtur quod effectus gubernationis mundi sit unus
336 tantum, et non plures. Effectus enim gubernationis esse videtur id
337 quod per gubernationem in rebus gubernatis causatur. Hoc autem est
338 unum, scilicet bonum ordinis; ut in exercitu patet. Ergo
339 gubernationis mundi est unus effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p3">
340 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved
341 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A3" id="FP_Q103_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.
342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32718] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ab
343 uno natum est unum tantum procedere. Sed mundus gubernatur ab uno,
344 ut ostensum est. Ergo et gubernationis effectus est unus
345 tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p4">
346 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the
347 many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects
348 of government.
349 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32719] Iª q. 103 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
350 effectus gubernationis non est unus tantum propter unitatem
351 gubernantis, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum multitudinem
352 gubernatorum. Haec autem sunt nobis innumerabilia. Ergo
353 gubernationis effectus non possunt comprehendi sub aliquo certo
354 numero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p5">
355 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs
356 to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.
357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32720] Iª q. 103 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
358 quod Dionysius dicit, quod <i>deitas providentia et bonitate
359 perfecta omnia continet, et seipsa implet</i>. Gubernatio autem ad
360 providentiam pertinet. Ergo gubernationis divinae sunt aliqui
361 determinati effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p6">
362 <b>I answer that,</b> The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected.
363 Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things
364 tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself;
365 and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good.
366 Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature
367 is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in
368 two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly,
369 with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to
370 be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things
371 to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without
372 number.
373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 co."><a name="32721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32721] Iª q. 103 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
374 quod effectus cuiuslibet actionis ex fine eius pensari potest, nam
375 per operationem efficitur ut pertingatur ad finem. Finis autem
376 gubernationis mundi est bonum essentiale, ad cuius participationem
377 et assimilationem omnia tendunt. Effectus igitur gubernationis
378 potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius finis, et sic
379 est unus effectus gubernationis, scilicet assimilari summo bono.
380 Alio modo potest considerari effectus gubernationis secundum ea
381 quibus ad Dei assimilationem creatura perducitur. Et sic in
382 generali sunt duo effectus gubernationis. Creatura enim assimilatur
383 Deo quantum ad duo, scilicet quantum ad id quod Deus bonus est,
384 inquantum creatura est bona; et quantum ad hoc quod Deus est aliis
385 causa bonitatis, inquantum una creatura movet aliam ad bonitatem.
386 Unde duo sunt effectus gubernationis, scilicet conservatio rerum in
387 bono, et motio earum ad bonum. Tertio modo potest considerari
388 effectus gubernationis in particulari, et sic sunt nobis
389 innumerabiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p7">
390 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two
391 things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.
392 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32722] Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
393 dicendum quod ordo universi includit in se et conservationem rerum
394 diversarum a Deo institutarum, et motionem earum, quia secundum
395 haec duo invenitur ordo in rebus, secundum scilicet quod una est
396 melior alia, et secundum quod una ab alia movetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A4-p8"> From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32723] Iª q. 103 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad alia duo patet
397 responsio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A5-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 5. Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2">
398 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (
399 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.11" target="asv">Eccles. 9:11</a>): "I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches
400 to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all." But things subject to the Divine government are not
401 ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine
402 government.
403 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32724] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
404 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia divinae gubernationi subdantur.
405 Dicitur enim Eccle. IX, <i>vidi sub sole nec velocium esse cursum,
406 nec fortium bellum, nec sapientium panem, nec doctorum divitias,
407 nec artificum gratiam, sed tempus casumque in omnibus</i>. Quae
408 autem gubernationi alicuius subsunt, non sunt casualia. Ergo ea
409 quae sunt sub sole, non subduntur divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3">
410 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
411 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God hath no care for oxen." But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject
412 to the Divine government.
413 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32725] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
414 apostolus, I ad Cor. IX, dicit quod <i>non est Deo cura de
415 bobus</i>. Sed unicuique est cura eorum quae gubernantur ab ipso.
416 Non ergo omnia subduntur divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p4">
417 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it
418 is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed.
419 Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.
420 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32726] Iª q. 103 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
421 illud quod seipsum gubernare potest, non videtur alterius
422 gubernatione indigere. Sed creatura rationalis seipsam gubernare
423 potest, cum habeat dominium sui actus, et per se agat; et non solum
424 agatur ab alio, quod videtur esse eorum quae gubernantur. Ergo non
425 omnia subsunt divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p5">
426 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): "Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal,
427 even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their
428 nature." Therefore all things are subject to His government.
429 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32727] Iª q. 103 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
430 quod Augustinus dicit, V de Civ. Dei, quod <i>Deus non solum caelum
431 et terram, nec solum hominem et Angelum, sed nec exigui et
432 contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec avis pennulam, nec herbae
433 flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium convenientia
434 dereliquit</i>. Omnia ergo eius gubernationi subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A5-p6">
435 <b>I answer that,</b> For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection;
436 and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal
437 being, as proved above (
438 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A1" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[44], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government.
439 This can also
440 be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man's government extends over all those things which come under
441 the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown
442 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A2" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have
443 said above (
444 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A4" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[44], A[4]</a>;
445 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A2" id="FP_Q103_A5-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[65], A[2]</a>), so it is impossible for
446 anything to escape from the Divine government.
447 </p><p id="FP_Q103_A5-p7"> Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even
448 human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, "God hath abandoned the earth"
449 (
450 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.9.9" target="asv">Ezech. 9:9</a>).
451 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 co."><a name="32728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32728] Iª q. 103 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
452 quod secundum eandem rationem competit Deo esse gubernatorem rerum,
453 et causam earum, quia eiusdem est rem producere, et ei perfectionem
454 dare, quod ad gubernantem pertinet. Deus autem est causa non quidem
455 particularis unius generis rerum, sed universalis totius entis, ut
456 supra ostensum est. Unde sicut nihil potest esse quod non sit a Deo
457 creatum, ita nihil potest esse quod eius gubernationi non subdatur.
458 Patet etiam hoc idem ex ratione finis. Intantum enim alicuius
459 gubernatio se extendit, inquantum se extendere potest finis
460 gubernationis. Finis autem divinae gubernationis est ipsa sua
461 bonitas, ut supra ostensum est. Unde cum nihil esse possit quod non
462 ordinetur in divinam bonitatem sicut in finem, ut ex supra dictis
463 patet; impossibile est quod aliquod entium subtrahatur gubernationi
464 divinae. Stulta igitur fuit opinio dicentium quod haec inferiora
465 corruptibilia, vel etiam singularia, aut etiam res humanae non
466 gubernantur a Deo. Ex quorum persona dicitur Ezech. IX,
467 <i>dereliquit dominus terram</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p8">
468 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such
469 things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element
470 of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government
471 of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would
472 tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which
473 constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher
474 cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but "time and chance," that is to say, that defects
475 may be found in these things according to some order of time.
476 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32729] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
477 dicendum quod sub sole dicuntur esse ea quae secundum motum solis
478 generantur et corrumpuntur. In quibus omnibus casus invenitur; non
479 ita quod omnia quae in eis fiunt, sint casualia; sed quia in
480 quolibet eorum aliquid casuale inveniri potest. Et hoc ipsum quod
481 aliquid casuale invenitur in huiusmodi rebus, demonstrat ea
482 alicuius gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi enim huiusmodi
483 corruptibilia ab aliquo superiori gubernarentur, nihil intenderent,
484 maxime quae non cognoscunt, et sic non eveniret in eis aliquid
485 praeter intentionem, quod facit rationem casus. Unde ad ostendendum
486 quod casualia secundum ordinem alicuius superioris causae
487 proveniunt, non dicit simpliciter quod vidit casum esse in omnibus,
488 sed dicit tempus et casum; quia scilicet secundum aliquem ordinem
489 temporis, casuales defectus inveniuntur in his rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p9">
490 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable
491 thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is
492 an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover.
493 Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed
494 according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these
495 are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this,
496 that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational
497 creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that "God
498 hath no care for oxen," he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which
499 rational creatures are governed.
500 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32730] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
501 dicendum quod gubernatio est quaedam mutatio gubernatorum a
502 gubernante. Omnis autem motus est actus mobilis a movente, ut
503 dicitur in III Physic. Omnis autem actus proportionatur ei cuius
504 est actus. Et sic oportet quod diversa mobilia diversimode
505 moveantur, etiam secundum motionem unius motoris. Sic igitur
506 secundum unam artem Dei gubernantis, res diversimode gubernantur,
507 secundum earum diversitatem. Quaedam enim secundum suam naturam
508 sunt per se agentia, tanquam habentia dominium sui actus, et ista
509 gubernantur a Deo non solum per hoc quod moventur ab ipso Deo in
510 eis interius operante, sed etiam per hoc quod ab eo inducuntur ad
511 bonum et retrahuntur a malo per praecepta et prohibitiones, praemia
512 et poenas. Hoc autem modo non gubernantur a Deo creaturae
513 irrationales, quae tantum aguntur, et non agunt. Cum ergo apostolus
514 dicit quod Deo non est cura de bobus, non totaliter subtrahit boves
515 a cura gubernationis divinae; sed solum quantum ad modum qui
516 proprie competit rationali creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A5-p10">
517 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the
518 Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own
519 act, it requires to be governed by God.
520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32731] Iª q. 103 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
521 dicendum quod creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam per intellectum
522 et voluntatem, quorum utrumque indiget regi et perfici ab
523 intellectu et voluntate Dei. Et ideo supra gubernationem qua
524 creatura rationalis gubernat seipsam tanquam domina sui actus,
525 indiget gubernari a Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A6-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 6. Whether all things are immediately governed by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p2">
526 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the
527 opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly
528 things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to
529 watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain
530 spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.
531 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32732] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
532 proceditur. Videtur quod omnia immediate gubernentur a Deo.
533 Gregorius enim Nyssenus reprehendit opinionem Platonis, qui divisit
534 providentiam in tria, primam quidem primi Dei, qui providet rebus
535 caelestibus, et universalibus omnibus; secundam vero providentiam
536 esse dixit secundorum deorum, qui caelum circumeunt, scilicet
537 respectu eorum quae sunt in generatione et corruptione; tertiam
538 vero providentiam dixit quorundam Daemonum, qui sunt custodes circa
539 terram humanarum actionum. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate a Deo
540 gubernentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p3">
541 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But
542 God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.
543 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32733] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
544 melius est aliquid fieri per unum quam per multa, si sit possibile,
545 ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Sed Deus potest per seipsum absque
546 mediis causis omnia gubernare. Ergo videtur quod omnia immediate
547 gubernet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p4">
548 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others;
549 thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the
550 same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.
551 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32734] Iª q. 103 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
552 nihil in Deo est deficiens et imperfectum. Sed ad defectum
553 gubernatoris pertinere videtur quod mediantibus aliquibus gubernet,
554 sicut rex terrenus, quia non sufficit ad omnia agenda, nec ubique
555 est praesens in suo regno, propter hoc oportet quod habeat suae
556 gubernationis ministros. Ergo Deus immediate omnia gubernat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p5">
557 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater
558 subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled
559 by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself."
560 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32735] Iª q. 103 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
561 quod Augustinus dicit, in III de Trin., <i>quemadmodum corpora
562 crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine
563 reguntur; ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem, et
564 spiritus vitae rationalis desertor atque peccator per spiritum
565 vitae rationalem pium et iustum, et ille per ipsum Deum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p6">
566 <b>I answer that,</b> In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution
567 of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some
568 things by means of others.
569 </p><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p7"> The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest
570 degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design
571 of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his
572 attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we
573 must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.
574 </p><p id="FP_Q103_A6-p8"> But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better
575 in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself
576 and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some
577 of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils,
578 but gives also the faculty of teaching others.
579 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 co."><a name="32736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32736] Iª q. 103 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
580 quod in gubernatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ratio
581 gubernationis, quae est ipsa providentia; et executio. Quantum
582 igitur ad rationem gubernationis pertinet, Deus immediate omnia
583 gubernat, quantum autem pertinet ad executionem gubernationis, Deus
584 gubernat quaedam mediantibus aliis. Cuius ratio est quia, cum Deus
585 sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo
586 secundum sui optimum. Optimum autem in omni genere vel ratione vel
587 cognitione practica, qualis est ratio gubernationis, in hoc
588 consistit, quod particularia cognoscantur, in quibus est actus,
589 sicut optimus medicus est, non qui considerat sola universalia, sed
590 qui potest etiam considerare minima particularium; et idem patet in
591 ceteris. Unde oportet dicere quod Deus omnium etiam minimorum
592 particularium rationem gubernationis habeat. Sed cum per
593 gubernationem res quae gubernantur sint ad perfectionem
594 perducendae; tanto erit melior gubernatio, quanto maior perfectio a
595 gubernante rebus gubernatis communicatur. Maior autem perfectio est
596 quod aliquid in se sit bonum, et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis,
597 quam si esset solummodo in se bonum. Et ideo sic Deus gubernat res,
598 ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat, sicut si aliquis
599 magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam
600 aliorum doctores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p9">
601 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of
602 government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.
603 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32737] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
604 dicendum quod opinio Platonis reprehenditur, quia etiam quantum ad
605 rationem gubernationis, posuit Deum non immediate omnia gubernare.
606 Quod patet per hoc, quod divisit in tria providentiam, quae est
607 ratio gubernationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p10">
608 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would
609 not be accomplished by one.
610 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32738] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
611 dicendum quod, si solus Deus gubernaret, subtraheretur perfectio
612 causalis a rebus. Unde non totum fieret per unum, quod fit per
613 multa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A6-p11">
614 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his
615 dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.
616 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32739] Iª q. 103 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
617 dicendum quod non solum pertinet ad imperfectionem regis terreni
618 quod executores habeat suae gubernationis, sed etiam ad regis
619 dignitatem, quia ex ordine ministrorum potestas regia praeclarior
620 redditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A7-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 7. Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p2">
621 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol.
622 iii) that "God disposes all for good." Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would
623 follow that no evil exists.
624 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32740] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
625 proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid praeter ordinem divinae
626 gubernationis contingere possit. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de
627 Consol., quod <i>Deus per bonum cuncta disponit</i>. Si ergo nihil
628 in rebus contingit praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis,
629 sequeretur quod nihil esset malum in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p3">
630 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs
631 outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.
632 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32741] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
633 nihil est casuale quod evenit secundum praeordinationem alicuius
634 gubernantis. Si igitur nihil accidit in rebus praeter ordinem
635 gubernationis divinae, sequitur quod nihil in rebus sit fortuitum
636 et casuale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p4">
637 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.
638 Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity,
639 and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine
640 government.
641 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32742] Iª q. 103 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ordo
642 divinae gubernationis est certus et immutabilis, quia est secundum
643 rationem aeternam. Si igitur nihil possit contingere in rebus
644 praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sequitur quod omnia ex
645 necessitate eveniant, et nihil sit in rebus contingens, quod est
646 inconveniens. Potest igitur in rebus aliquid contingere praeter
647 ordinem gubernationis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5">
648 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
649 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Esth.13.9" target="asv">Esther 13:9</a>): "O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will."
650 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32743] Iª q. 103 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
651 quod dicitur Esther XIII, <i>domine Deus, rex omnipotens, in
652 ditione tua cuncta sunt posita, et non est qui possit resistere
653 tuae voluntati</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p6">
654 <b>I answer that,</b> It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal
655 cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding
656 cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of
657 the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which
658 again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the
659 first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside
660 the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order
661 of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards
662 some other
663 cause.
664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 co."><a name="32744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32744] Iª q. 103 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
665 quod praeter ordinem alicuius particularis causae, aliquis effectus
666 evenire potest; non autem praeter ordinem causae universalis. Cuius
667 ratio est, quia praeter ordinem particularis causae nihil provenit
668 nisi ex aliqua alia causa impediente, quam quidem causam necesse
669 est reducere in primam causam universalem, sicut indigestio
670 contingit praeter ordinem virtutis nutritivae, ex aliquo
671 impedimento, puta ex grossitie cibi, quam necesse est reducere in
672 aliquam aliam causam, et sic usque ad causam primam universalem.
673 Cum igitur Deus sit prima causa universalis non unius generis
674 tantum, sed universaliter totius entis; impossibile est quod
675 aliquid contingat praeter ordinem divinae gubernationis, sed ex hoc
676 ipso quod aliquid ex una parte videtur exire ab ordine divinae
677 providentiae qui consideratur secundum aliquam particularem causam,
678 necesse est quod in eundem ordinem relabatur secundum aliam
679 causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p7">
680 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above (
681 <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q48_A3" id="FP_Q103_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[48], A[3]</a>). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped
682 from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.
683 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32745] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
684 dicendum quod nihil invenitur in mundo quod sit totaliter malum,
685 quia malum semper fundatur in bono, ut supra ostensum est. Et ideo
686 res aliqua dicitur mala, per hoc quod exit ab ordine alicuius
687 particularis boni. Si autem totaliter exiret ab ordine
688 gubernationis divinae, totaliter nihil esset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p8">
689 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order
690 of Divine providence, "nothing in the world happens by chance," as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).
691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32746] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
692 dicendum quod aliqua dicuntur esse casualia in rebus, per ordinem
693 ad causas particulares, extra quarum ordinem fiunt. Sed quantum ad
694 divinam providentiam pertinet, nihil fit casu in mundo, ut
695 Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A7-p9">
696 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not
697 as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside
698 the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.
699 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32747] Iª q. 103 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
700 dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui effectus contingentes, per
701 comparationem ad proximas causas, quae in suis effectibus deficere
702 possunt, non propter hoc quod aliquid fieri possit extra totum
703 ordinem gubernationis divinae. Quia hoc ipsum quod aliquid
704 contingit praeter ordinem causae proximae, est ex aliqua causa
705 subiecta gubernationi divinae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q103_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q103_A8-p0.1">Q. 103. A. 8. Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2">
706 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (
707 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.8" target="asv">Is. 3:8</a>): "Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord."
708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32748] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
709 proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid possit reniti contra ordinem
710 gubernationis divinae. Dicitur enim Isaiae III, <i>lingua eorum et
711 adinventiones eorum contra dominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p3">
712 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against
713 God's commands, no one would be justly punished by God.
714 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32749] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
715 nullus rex iuste punit eos qui eius ordinationi non repugnant. Si
716 igitur nihil contraniteretur divinae ordinationi, nullus iuste
717 puniretur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p4">
718 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things
719 rebel against the order of the Divine government.
720 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32750] Iª q. 103 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
721 quaelibet res est subiecta ordini divinae gubernationis. Sed una
722 res ab alia impugnatur. Ergo aliqua sunt quae contranituntur
723 divinae gubernationi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5">
724 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign
725 good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (
726 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q103_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8" target="asv">Wis. 8</a>) of Divine wisdom.
727 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32751] Iª q. 103 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
728 quod dicit Boetius, in III de Consol., <i>non est aliquid quod
729 summo huic bono vel velit vel possit obsistere. Est igitur summum
730 bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter, suaviterque disponit</i>; ut
731 dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q103_A8-p6">
732 <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause
733 of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.
734 </p><p id="FP_Q103_A8-p7"> Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly
735 from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and
736 effort tends to good only, "for no one acts intending evil," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that,
737 as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is
738 nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but
739 an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end,
740 as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said "to order all things sweetly."
741 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 co."><a name="32752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32752] Iª q. 103 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
742 quod ordo divinae providentiae dupliciter potest considerari, uno
743 modo in generali, secundum scilicet quod progreditur a causa
744 gubernativa totius; alio modo in speciali, secundum scilicet quod
745 progreditur ex aliqua causa particulari, quae est executiva divinae
746 gubernationis. Primo igitur modo, nihil contranititur ordini
747 divinae gubernationis. Quod ex duobus patet. Primo quidem, ex hoc
748 quod ordo divinae gubernationis totaliter in bonum tendit, et
749 unaquaeque res in sua operatione et conatu non tendit nisi ad
750 bonum, nullus enim respiciens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius
751 dicit. Alio modo apparet idem ex hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est,
752 omnis inclinatio alicuius rei vel naturalis vel voluntaria, nihil
753 est aliud quam quaedam impressio a primo movente, sicut inclinatio
754 sagittae ad signum determinatum, nihil aliud est quam quaedam
755 impressio a sagittante. Unde omnia quae agunt vel naturaliter vel
756 voluntarie, quasi propria sponte perveniunt in id ad quod divinitus
757 ordinantur. Et ideo dicitur Deus omnia disponere suaviter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p8">
758 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for
759 even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their
760 nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.
761 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32753] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
762 dicendum quod dicuntur aliqui vel cogitare vel loqui vel agere
763 contra Deum, non quia totaliter renitantur ordini divinae
764 gubernationis, quia etiam peccantes intendunt aliquod bonum, sed
765 quia contranituntur cuidam determinato bono, quod est eis
766 conveniens secundum suam naturam aut statum. Et ideo puniuntur
767 iuste a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p9"> <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> is clear from the above.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32754] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet
768 solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q103_A8-p10">
769 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause;
770 but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.
771 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 103 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32755] Iª q. 103 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
772 dicendum quod ex hoc quod una res alteri contrapugnat, ostenditur
773 quod aliquid reniti potest ordini qui est ex aliqua causa
774 particulari, non autem ordini qui dependet a causa universali
775 totius.</p></div></div></div></div>
776 <div id="FP_Q104" class="div3">
777 <h3 id="FP_Q104-p0.1">Q. 104. THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
778 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
779 <p id="FP_Q104-p2"> We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:</p><p id="FP_Q104-p3"><a href="#FP_Q104_A1"> (1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p4"><a href="#FP_Q104_A2"> (2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p5"><a href="#FP_Q104_A3"> (3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?</a></p><p id="FP_Q104-p6"><a href="#FP_Q104_A4"> (4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?</a></p>
780 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 pr."><a name="32756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32756]
781 Iª q. 104 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
782 effectibus divinae gubernationis in speciali. Et circa hoc
783 quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creaturae indigeant ut
784 conserventur in esse a Deo. Secundo, utrum conserventur a Deo
785 immediate. Tertio, utrum Deus possit aliquid redigere in nihilum.
786 Quarto, utrum aliquid in nihilum redigatur.</p></div></div></div>
787 <div id="FP_Q104_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A1-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 1. Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2">
788 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in
789 being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature
790 cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which
791 is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be
792 in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself,
793 because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of
794 the angels (
795 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A2" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[50], AA[2]</a>,5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality
796 to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (
797 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q66_A2" id="FP_Q104_A1-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[66], A[2]</a>). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality
798 to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since
799 it is not in potentiality to any other form.
800 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32757] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
801 proceditur. Videtur quod creaturae non indigeant ut a Deo
802 conserventur in esse. Quod enim non potest non esse, non indiget ut
803 conservetur in esse, sicut quod non potest abscedere, non indiget
804 ut conservetur ne abscedat. Sed quaedam creaturae sunt quae
805 secundum sui naturam non possunt non esse. Ergo non omnes creaturae
806 indigent ut a Deo conserventur in esse. Probatio mediae. Quod per
807 se inest alicui, necesse est ei inesse, et oppositum eius
808 impossibile est ei inesse, sicut necessarium est binarium esse
809 parem, et impossibile est eum esse imparem. Esse autem per se
810 consequitur ad formam, quia unumquodque secundum hoc est ens actu,
811 quod habet formam. Quaedam autem creaturae sunt, quae sunt formae
812 quaedam subsistentes, sicut de Angelis dictum est; et sic per se
813 inest eis esse. Et eadem ratio est de illis quorum materia non est
814 in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut supra dictum est de
815 corporibus caelestibus. Huiusmodi ergo creaturae secundum suam
816 naturam ex necessitate sunt, et non possunt non esse, potentia enim
817 ad non esse non potest fundari neque in forma, quam per se sequitur
818 esse; neque in materia existente sub forma quam non potest
819 amittere, cum non sit in potentia ad aliam formam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p3">
820 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect
821 to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for
822 some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He
823 has ceased to create it.
824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32758] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
825 est potentior quolibet creato agente. Sed aliquod creatum agens
826 potest communicare suo effectui ut conservetur in esse, etiam eius
827 operatione cessante, sicut cessante actione aedificatoris, remanet
828 domus; et cessante actione ignis, remanet aqua calefacta per
829 aliquod tempus. Ergo multo magis Deus potest suae creaturae
830 conferre quod conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p4">
831 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and
832 violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through
833 some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are
834 spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to
835 not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.
836 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32759] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
837 nullum violentum potest contingere absque aliqua causa agente. Sed
838 tendere ad non esse est innaturale et violentum cuilibet creaturae,
839 quia quaelibet creatura naturaliter appetit esse. Ergo nulla
840 creatura potest tendere in non esse, nisi aliquo agente ad
841 corruptionem. Sed quaedam sunt ad quorum corruptionem nihil agere
842 potest; sicut spirituales substantiae, et corpora caelestia. Ergo
843 huiusmodi creaturae non possunt tendere in non esse, etiam Dei
844 operatione cessante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p5">
845 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious,
846 produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is
847 not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does
848 it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature
849 in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore
850 creatures are not kept in being by God.
851 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="32760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32760] Iª q. 104 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
852 Deus conservat res in esse, hoc erit per aliquam actionem. Per
853 quamlibet autem actionem agentis, si sit efficax, aliquid fit in
854 effectu. Oportet igitur quod per actionem Dei conservantis aliquid
855 fiat in creatura. Sed hoc non videtur. Non enim per huiusmodi
856 actionem fit ipsum esse creaturae, quia quod iam est, non fit.
857 Neque iterum aliquid aliud superadditum, quia vel non continue Deus
858 conservaret creaturam in esse, vel continue aliquid adderetur
859 creaturae, quod est inconveniens. Non igitur creaturae conservantur
860 in esse a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6">
861 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
862 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>): "Upholding all things by the word of His power."
863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32761] Iª q. 104 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
864 quod dicitur Heb. I, <i>portans omnia verbo virtutis suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p7">
865 <b>I answer that,</b> Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a
866 thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything
867 by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire.
868 In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a
869 nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said
870 to preserve another 'per se' and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot
871 exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God,
872 so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the
873 Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).
874 </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p8"> This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an
875 agent may be the cause of the "becoming" of its effect, but not directly of its "being." This may be seen both in artificial
876 and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its "becoming," but he is not the direct cause of its "being."
877 For it is clear that the "being" of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and
878 arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying
879 the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able
880 to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the "being" of a house depends on the nature of these
881 materials, just as its "becoming" depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For
882 if
883 an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of "being" which results from that form;
884 but it will be the cause of the effect, in its "becoming" only.
885 </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p9"> Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such, since it would
886 then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this
887 form for as much as it is in matter---in other words, it may be the cause that "this matter" receives "this form." And this
888 is to be the cause of "becoming," as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is
889 such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause,
890 then the "becoming" of the effect, but not its "being," depends on the agent.
891 </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p10"> Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists
892 in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus
893 the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause
894 of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of
895 "becoming" but also the cause of "being."
896 </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p11"> Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the "becoming" of
897 the effect: so neither can the "being" of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of
898 the effect not only in "becoming" but also in "being." This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's
899 action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to
900 act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if
901 it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly
902 and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On
903 the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the
904 principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.
905 </p><p id="FP_Q104_A1-p12"> Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by
906 its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence,
907 since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence.
908 Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His
909 creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse." In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says:
910 "As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns
911 at once to darkness."
912 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 co."><a name="32762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32762] Iª q. 104 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
913 quod necesse est dicere, et secundum fidem et secundum rationem,
914 quod creaturae conservantur in esse a Deo. Ad cuius evidentiam,
915 considerandum est quod aliquid conservatur ab altero dupliciter.
916 Uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, sicut ille dicitur rem
917 conservare, qui removet corrumpens; puta si aliquis puerum
918 custodiat ne cadat in ignem, dicitur eum conservare. Et sic etiam
919 Deus dicitur aliqua conservare, sed non omnia, quia quaedam sunt
920 quae non habent corrumpentia, quae necesse sit removere ad rei
921 conservationem. Alio modo dicitur aliquid rem aliquam conservare
922 per se et directe, inquantum scilicet illud quod conservatur,
923 dependet a conservante, ut sine eo esse non possit. Et hoc modo
924 omnes creaturae indigent divina conservatione. Dependet enim esse
925 cuiuslibet creaturae a Deo, ita quod nec ad momentum subsistere
926 possent, sed in nihilum redigerentur, nisi operatione divinae
927 virtutis conservarentur in esse, sicut Gregorius dicit. Et hoc sic
928 perspici potest. Omnis enim effectus dependet a sua causa, secundum
929 quod est causa eius. Sed considerandum est quod aliquod agens est
930 causa sui effectus secundum fieri tantum, et non directe secundum
931 esse eius. Quod quidem contingit et in artificialibus, et in rebus
932 naturalibus. Aedificator enim est causa domus quantum ad eius
933 fieri, non autem directe quantum ad esse eius. Manifestum est enim
934 quod esse domus consequitur formam eius, forma autem domus est
935 compositio et ordo, quae quidem forma consequitur naturalem
936 virtutem quarundam rerum. Sicut enim coquus coquit cibum adhibendo
937 aliquam virtutem naturalem activam, scilicet ignis; ita aedificator
938 facit domum adhibendo caementum, lapides et ligna, quae sunt
939 susceptiva et conservativa talis compositionis et ordinis. Unde
940 esse domus dependet ex naturis harum rerum, sicut fieri domus
941 dependet ex actione aedificatoris. Et simili ratione est
942 considerandum in rebus naturalibus. Quia si aliquod agens non est
943 causa formae inquantum huiusmodi, non erit per se causa esse quod
944 consequitur ad talem formam, sed erit causa effectus secundum fieri
945 tantum. Manifestum est autem quod, si aliqua duo sunt eiusdem
946 speciei, unum non potest esse per se causa formae alterius,
947 inquantum est talis forma, quia sic esset causa formae propriae,
948 cum sit eadem ratio utriusque. Sed potest esse causa huiusmodi
949 formae secundum quod est in materia, idest quod haec materia
950 acquirat hanc formam. Et hoc est esse causa secundum fieri; sicut
951 cum homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. Et ideo quandocumque
952 naturalis effectus est natus impressionem agentis recipere secundum
953 eandem rationem secundum quam est in agente, tunc fieri effectus
954 dependet ab agente, non autem esse ipsius. Sed aliquando effectus
955 non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem
956 rationem secundum quam est in agente, sicut patet in omnibus
957 agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia
958 corpora sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium
959 secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse causa formae secundum
960 rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac
961 materia, et ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Sicut
962 igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione agentis quod
963 est causa effectus secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest
964 remanere, cessante actione agentis quod est causa effectus non
965 solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio
966 quare aqua calefacta retinet calorem, cessante actione ignis; non
967 autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, cessante actione
968 solis. Quia scilicet materia aquae susceptiva est caloris ignis
969 secundum eandem rationem qua est in igne, unde si perfecte
970 perducatur ad formam ignis, retinebit calorem semper; si autem
971 imperfecte participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum quandam
972 inchoationem, calor non semper remanebit, sed ad tempus, propter
973 debilem participationem principii caloris. Aer autem nullo modo
974 natus est recipere lumen secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est
975 in sole, ut scilicet recipiat formam solis, quae est principium
976 luminis, et ideo, quia non habet radicem in aere, statim cessat
977 lumen, cessante actione solis. Sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad
978 Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens
979 per suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a
980 sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita solus Deus est ens
981 per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem
982 creatura est ens participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius
983 esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt.,
984 <i>virtus Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret
985 aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque natura
986 concideret</i>. Et in VIII eiusdem libri dicit quod, <i>sicut aer
987 praesente lumine fit lucidus, sic homo, Deo sibi praesente,
988 illuminatur, absente autem, continuo tenebratur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p13">
989 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Being" naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from
990 the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures
991 and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.
992 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32763] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
993 dicendum quod esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito
994 tamen influxu Dei, sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum aeris, supposito
995 influxu solis. Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis
996 et corporibus caelestibus, magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere
997 suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p14">
998 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make
999 it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an
1000 effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of 'being' but
1001 only of "becoming."
1002 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32764] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1003 dicendum quod Deus non potest communicare alicui creaturae ut
1004 conservetur in esse, sua operatione cessante; sicut non potest ei
1005 communicare quod non sit causa esse illius. Intantum enim indiget
1006 creatura conservari a Deo, inquantum esse effectus dependet a causa
1007 essendi. Unde non est simile de agente quod non est causa essendi,
1008 sed fieri tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p15">
1009 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not
1010 need to be preserved thus, as stated above.
1011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32765] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1012 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de conservatione quae est per
1013 remotionem corrumpentis; qua non indigent omnes creaturae, ut
1014 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A1-p16">
1015 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either
1016 motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.
1017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="32766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32766] Iª q. 104 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
1018 dicendum quod conservatio rerum a Deo non est per aliquam novam
1019 actionem; sed per continuationem actionis qua dat esse, quae quidem
1020 actio est sine motu et tempore. Sicut etiam conservatio luminis in
1021 aere est per continuatum influxum a sole.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A2-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 2. Whether God preserves every creature immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p2">
1022 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as
1023 above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.
1024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32767] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
1025 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus immediate omnem creaturam conservet.
1026 Eadem enim actione Deus est conservator rerum, qua et creator, ut
1027 dictum est. Sed Deus immediate est creator omnium. Ergo immediate
1028 est etiam conservator.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p3">
1029 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less
1030 therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause
1031 preserving them.
1032 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32768] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1033 unaquaeque res magis est proxima sibi, quam rei alteri. Sed non
1034 potest communicari alicui creaturae quod conservet seipsam. Ergo
1035 multo minus potest ei communicari quod conservet aliam. Ergo Deus
1036 omnia conservat absque aliqua media causa conservante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p4">
1037 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its "becoming," but also of its being. But all created causes
1038 do not seem to cause their effects except in their "becoming," for they cause only by moving, as above stated (
1039 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q45_A3" id="FP_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[45], A[3]</a>). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.
1040 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32769] Iª q. 104 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1041 effectus conservatur in esse ab eo quod est causa eius non solum
1042 secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Sed omnes causae creatae,
1043 ut videtur, non sunt causae suorum effectuum nisi secundum fieri,
1044 non sunt enim causae nisi movendo, ut supra habitum est. Ergo non
1045 sunt causae conservantes suos effectus in esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p5">
1046 <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore
1047 He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.
1048 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32770] Iª q. 104 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1049 quod per idem conservatur res, per quod habet esse. Sed Deus dat
1050 esse rebus mediantibus aliquibus causis mediis. Ergo etiam res in
1051 esse conservat mediantibus aliquibus causis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A2-p6">
1052 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
1053 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A1" id="FP_Q104_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a
1054 corrupting cause; secondly, directly and "per se," by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as the being of
1055 the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal
1056 things there are many causes which
1057 hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction;
1058 and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when
1059 we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally
1060 on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the
1061 principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all
1062 the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.
1063 </p><p id="FP_Q104_A2-p7"> For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes:
1064 thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation
1065 of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation
1066 and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which
1067 are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.
1068 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 co."><a name="32771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32771] Iª q. 104 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1069 quod, sicut dictum est, dupliciter aliquid rem aliquam in esse
1070 conservat, uno modo, indirecte et per accidens, per hoc quod
1071 removet vel impedit actionem corrumpentis; alio modo, directe et
1072 per se, quia ab eo dependet esse alterius, sicut a causa dependet
1073 esse effectus. Utroque autem modo aliqua res creata invenitur esse
1074 alterius conservativa. Manifestum est enim quod etiam in rebus
1075 corporalibus multa sunt quae impediunt actiones corrumpentium, et
1076 per hoc dicuntur rerum conservativa; sicut sal impedit carnes a
1077 putrefactione, et simile est in multis aliis. Invenitur etiam quod
1078 ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum suum esse.
1079 Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus
1080 dependeat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima; secundario
1081 vero ab omnibus causis mediis. Et ideo principaliter quidem prima
1082 causa est effectus conservativa; secundario vero omnes mediae
1083 causae, et tanto magis quanto causa fuerit altior et primae causae
1084 proximior. Unde superioribus causis, etiam in corporalibus rebus,
1085 attribuitur conservatio et permanentia rerum, sicut philosophus
1086 dicit, in XII Metaphys., quod primus motus, scilicet diurnus, est
1087 causa continuitatis generationis; secundus autem motus, qui est per
1088 zodiacum, est causa diversitatis quae est secundum generationem et
1089 corruptionem. Et similiter astrologi, attribuunt Saturno, qui est
1090 supremus planetarum; res fixas et permanentes. Sic igitur dicendum
1091 est quod Deus conservat res quasdam in esse, mediantibus aliquibus
1092 causis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p8">
1093 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend
1094 on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation.
1095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32772] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1096 dicendum quod Deus immediate omnia creavit, sed in ipsa rerum
1097 creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis
1098 dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse;
1099 praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p9">
1100 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only
1101 produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving
1102 another.
1103 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32773] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1104 dicendum quod, cum propria causa sit conservativa effectus ab ea
1105 dependentis; sicut nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit causa
1106 sui ipsius, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit causa alterius; ita
1107 etiam nulli effectui praestari potest quod sit sui ipsius
1108 conservativus, potest tamen ei praestari quod sit conservativus
1109 alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A2-p10">
1110 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue
1111 of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in
1112 the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is
1113 lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of
1114 the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.
1115 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32774] Iª q. 104 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1116 dicendum quod nulla creatura potest esse causa alterius, quantum ad
1117 hoc quod acquirat novam formam vel dispositionem, nisi per modum
1118 alicuius mutationis, quia semper agit praesupposito aliquo
1119 subiecto. Sed postquam formam vel dispositionem induxit in effectu,
1120 absque alia immutatione effectus, huiusmodi formam vel
1121 dispositionem conservat. Sicut in aere, prout illuminatur de novo,
1122 intelligitur quaedam mutatio; sed conservatio luminis est absque
1123 aeris immutatione, ex sola praesentia illuminantis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A3-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 3. Whether God can annihilate anything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p2">
1124 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that "God is not the cause of anything
1125 tending to non-existence." But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate
1126 anything.
1127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32775] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
1128 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit aliquid in nihilum
1129 redigere. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.,
1130 quod <i>Deus non est causa tendendi in non esse</i>. Hoc autem
1131 contingeret, si aliquam creaturam redigeret in nihilum. Ergo Deus
1132 non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p3">
1133 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because
1134 God is good, we exist." But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be
1135 the case were He to annihilate anything.
1136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32776] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
1137 est causa rerum ut sint, per suam bonitatem, quia, ut Augustinus
1138 dicit in libro de Doct. Christ., <i>inquantum Deus bonus est,
1139 sumus</i>. Sed Deus non potest non esse bonus. Ergo non potest
1140 facere ut res non sint. Quod faceret, si eas in nihilum
1141 redigeret.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p4">
1142 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action
1143 is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated
1144 another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.
1145 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32777] Iª q. 104 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
1146 Deus in nihilum aliqua redigeret, oporteret quod hoc fieret per
1147 aliquam actionem. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia omnis actio
1148 terminatur ad aliquod ens; unde etiam actio corrumpentis terminatur
1149 ad aliquid generatum, quia generatio unius est corruptio alterius.
1150 Ergo Deus non potest aliquid in nihilum redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5">
1151 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
1152 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.24" target="asv">Jer. 10:24</a>): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
1153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32778] Iª q. 104 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1154 quod dicitur Ierem. X, <i>corripe me, domine, verumtamen in
1155 iudicio, et non in furore tuo, ne forte ad nihilum redigas
1156 me</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6">
1157 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate
1158 anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above (
1159 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things
1160 of His own free-will, according to
1161 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.134.6" target="asv"> Ps. 134:6</a>: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He
1162 hath done." Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence
1163 otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed,
1164 God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence;
1165 and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.
1166 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 co."><a name="32779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32779] Iª q. 104 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1167 quod quidam posuerunt quod Deus res in esse produxit agendo de
1168 necessitate naturae. Quod si esset verum, Deus non posset rem
1169 aliquam in nihilum redigere; sicut non potest a sua natura mutari.
1170 Sed, sicut supra est habitum, haec positio est falsa, et a fide
1171 Catholica penitus aliena, quae confitetur Deum res libera voluntate
1172 produxisse in esse, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>omnia quaecumque
1173 voluit dominus, fecit</i>. Hoc igitur quod Deus creaturae esse
1174 communicat, ex Dei voluntate dependet. Nec aliter res in esse
1175 conservat, nisi inquantum eis continue influit esse. Ut dictum est.
1176 Sicut ergo antequam res essent, potuit eis non communicare esse, et
1177 sic eas non facere; ita postquam iam factae sunt, potest eis non
1178 influere esse, et sic esse desisterent. Quod est eas in nihilum
1179 redigere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p7">
1180 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as
1181 such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has
1182 this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to
1183 non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.
1184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32780] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1185 dicendum quod non esse non habet causam per se, quia nihil potest
1186 esse causa nisi inquantum est ens; ens autem, per se loquendo, est
1187 causa essendi. Sic igitur Deus non potest esse causa tendendi in
1188 non esse; sed hoc habet creatura ex seipsa, inquantum est de
1189 nihilo. Sed per accidens Deus potest esse causa quod res in nihilum
1190 redigantur, subtrahendo scilicet suam actionem a rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p8">
1191 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on
1192 creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence,
1193 so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.
1194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32781] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1195 dicendum quod bonitas Dei est causa rerum, non quasi ex necessitate
1196 naturae, quia divina bonitas non dependet ex rebus creatis; sed per
1197 liberam voluntatem. Unde sicut potuit sine praeiudicio bonitatis
1198 suae, res non producere in esse; ita absque detrimento suae
1199 bonitatis, potest res in esse non conservare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A3-p9">
1200 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
1201 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32782] Iª q. 104 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1202 dicendum quod, si Deus rem aliquam redigeret in nihilum, hoc non
1203 esset per aliquam actionem; sed per hoc quod ab agendo
1204 cessaret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q104_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q104_A4-p0.1">Q. 104. A. 4. Whether anything is annihilated?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p2">
1205 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing
1206 but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced
1207 to nothing.
1208 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32783] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
1209 proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid in nihilum redigatur. Finis enim
1210 respondet principio. Sed a principio nihil erat nisi Deus. Ergo ad
1211 hunc finem res perducentur, ut nihil sit nisi Deus. Et ita
1212 creaturae in nihilum redigentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p3">
1213 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves
1214 (Phys. viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time." Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration;
1215 and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.
1216 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32784] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1217 omnis creatura habet potentiam finitam. Sed nulla potentia finita
1218 se extendit ad infinitum, unde in VIII Physic. probatur quod
1219 potentia finita non potest movere tempore infinito. Ergo nulla
1220 creatura potest durare in infinitum. Et ita quandoque in nihilum
1221 redigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p4">
1222 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are
1223 reduced to nothing.
1224 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32785] Iª q. 104 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1225 forma et accidentia non habent materiam partem sui. Sed quandoque
1226 desinunt esse. Ergo in nihilum rediguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5">
1227 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
1228 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever."
1229 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32786] Iª q. 104 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1230 quod dicitur Eccle. III. <i>Didici quod omnia opera quae fecit
1231 Deus, perseverant in aeternum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q104_A4-p6">
1232 <b>I answer that,</b> Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously,
1233 and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (
1234 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things
1235 which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To
1236 each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (
1237 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.
1238 </p><p id="FP_Q104_A4-p7"> Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no
1239 potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible,
1240 since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation
1241 of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in
1242 existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.
1243 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 co."><a name="32787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32787] Iª q. 104 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1244 quod eorum quae a Deo fiunt circa creaturam, quaedam proveniunt
1245 secundum naturalem cursum rerum; quaedam vero miraculose operatur
1246 praeter ordinem naturalem creaturis inditum, ut infra dicetur. Quae
1247 autem facturus est Deus secundum ordinem naturalem rebus inditum,
1248 considerari possunt ex ipsis rerum naturis, quae vero miraculose
1249 fiunt, ordinantur ad gratiae manifestationem, secundum illud
1250 apostoli I ad Cor. XII, <i>unicuique datur manifestatio spiritus ad
1251 utilitatem</i>; et postmodum, inter cetera, subdit de miraculorum
1252 operatione. Creaturarum autem naturae hoc demonstrant, ut nulla
1253 earum in nihilum redigatur, quia vel sunt immateriales, et sic in
1254 eis non est potentia ad non esse; vel sunt materiales, et sic
1255 saltem remanent semper secundum materiam, quae incorruptibilis est,
1256 utpote subiectum existens generationis et corruptionis. Redigere
1257 etiam aliquid in nihilum, non pertinet ad gratiae manifestationem,
1258 cum magis per hoc divina potentia et bonitas ostendatur, quod res
1259 in esse conservat. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod nihil omnino
1260 in nihilum redigetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8">
1261 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that
1262 they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving
1263 all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (
1264 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q104_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>).
1265 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32788] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1266 dicendum quod hoc quod res in esse productae sunt, postquam non
1267 fuerunt, declarat potentiam producentis. Sed quod in nihilum
1268 redigerentur, huiusmodi manifestationem impediret, cum Dei potentia
1269 in hoc maxime ostendatur, quod res in esse conservat, secundum
1270 illud apostoli Heb. I, <i>portans omnia verbo virtutis
1271 suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p9">
1272 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence
1273 is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things,
1274 however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent
1275 from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot
1276 resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue
1277 to exist for ever.
1278 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32789] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1279 dicendum quod potentia creaturae ad essendum est receptiva tantum;
1280 sed potentia activa est ipsius Dei, a quo est influxus essendi.
1281 Unde quod res in infinitum durent, sequitur infinitatem divinae
1282 virtutis. Determinatur tamen quibusdam rebus virtus ad manendum
1283 tempore determinato, inquantum impediri possunt ne percipiant
1284 influxum essendi qui est ab eo, ex aliquo contrario agente, cui
1285 finita virtus non potest resistere tempore infinito, sed solum
1286 tempore determinato. Et ideo ea quae non habent contrarium, quamvis
1287 habeant finitam virtutem, perseverant in aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q104_A4-p10">
1288 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for
1289 it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely
1290 reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of
1291 the subject.
1292 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 104 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32790] Iª q. 104 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1293 dicendum quod formae et accidentia non sunt entia completa, cum non
1294 subsistant, sed quodlibet eorum est aliquid entis, sic enim ens
1295 dicitur, quia eo aliquid est. Et tamen eo modo quo sunt, non omnino
1296 in nihilum rediguntur; non quia aliqua pars eorum remaneat, sed
1297 remanent in potentia materiae vel subiecti.</p></div></div></div></div>
1298 <div id="FP_Q105" class="div3">
1299 <h3 id="FP_Q105-p0.1">Q. 105. OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
1300 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
1301 <p id="FP_Q105-p2"> We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures
1302 by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another.
1303 </p><p id="FP_Q105-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q105-p4"><a href="#FP_Q105_A1"> (1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p5"><a href="#FP_Q105_A2"> (2) Whether He can immediately move a body?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p6"><a href="#FP_Q105_A3"> (3) Whether He can move the intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p7"><a href="#FP_Q105_A4"> (4) Whether He can move the will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p8"><a href="#FP_Q105_A5"> (5) Whether God works in every worker?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p9"><a href="#FP_Q105_A6"> (6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p10"><a href="#FP_Q105_A7"> (7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?</a></p><p id="FP_Q105-p11"><a href="#FP_Q105_A8"> (8) Of the diversity of miracles.</a></p>
1304 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 pr."><a name="32791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32791]
1305 Iª q. 105 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de secundo
1306 effectu gubernationis divinae qui est mutatio creaturarum. Et
1307 primo, de mutatione creaturarum a Deo; secundo, de mutatione unius
1308 creaturae ab alia. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deus
1309 immediate possit movere materiam ad formam. Secundo, utrum
1310 immediate possit movere aliquod corpus. Tertio, utrum possit movere
1311 intellectum. Quarto, utrum possit movere voluntatem. Quinto, utrum
1312 Deus operetur in omni operante. Sexto, utrum possit aliquid facere
1313 praeter ordinem rebus inditum. Septimo, utrum omnia quae sic Deus
1314 facit, sint miracula. Octavo, de diversitate miraculorum.</p></div></div></div>
1315 <div id="FP_Q105_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A1-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 1. Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p2">
1316 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii,
1317 Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets
1318 like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.
1319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32792] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
1320 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere materiam
1321 ad formam. Sicut enim probat philosophus in VII Metaphys., formam
1322 in hac materia nihil facere potest nisi forma quae est in materia,
1323 quia simile facit sibi simile. Sed Deus non est forma in materia.
1324 Ergo non potest causare formam in materia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p3">
1325 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by
1326 some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means
1327 of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any
1328 particular form, except by means of a particular agent.
1329 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32793] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
1330 aliquod agens se habeat ad multa, nullum eorum producet, nisi
1331 determinetur ad ipsum per aliquid aliud, ut enim in III de anima
1332 dicitur, universalis opinio non movet nisi mediante aliqua
1333 particulari apprehensione. Sed virtus divina est universalis causa
1334 omnium. Ergo non potest producere aliquam particularem formam, nisi
1335 mediante aliquo particulari agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p4">
1336 <b>Objection 3:</b> As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as
1337 we have seen above (
1338 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[104], A[2]</a>). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God,
1339 only by means of particular causes.
1340 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32794] Iª q. 105 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1341 sicut esse commune dependet a prima causa universali, ita esse
1342 determinatum dependet a determinatis causis particularibus, ut
1343 supra habitum est. Sed determinatum esse alicuius rei est per
1344 propriam eius formam. Ergo propriae rerum formae non producuntur a
1345 Deo, nisi mediantibus causis particularibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5">
1346 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
1347 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth."
1348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32795] Iª q. 105 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1349 quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>formavit Deus hominem de limo
1350 terrae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p6">
1351 <b>I answer that,</b> God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active
1352 power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it
1353 can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing
1354 else but the act of matter.
1355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 co."><a name="32796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32796] Iª q. 105 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1356 quod Deus immediate potest movere materiam ad formam. Quia ens in
1357 potentia passiva reduci potest in actum, a potentia activa quae eam
1358 sub sua potestate continet. Cum igitur materia contineatur sub
1359 potestate divina, utpote a Deo producta, potest reduci in actum per
1360 divinam potentiam. Et hoc est moveri materiam ad formam, quia forma
1361 nihil aliud est quam actus materiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7">
1362 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man,
1363 and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in
1364 its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they
1365 are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that
1366 over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (
1367 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
1368 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q105_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the
1369 composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating
1370 a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But
1371 no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence
1372 angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
1373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32797] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1374 dicendum quod effectus aliquis invenitur assimilari causae agenti
1375 dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum eandem speciem; ut homo generatur ab
1376 homine, et ignis ab igne. Alio modo, secundum virtualem
1377 continentiam, prout scilicet forma effectus virtualiter continetur
1378 in causa, et sic animalia ex putrefactione generata, et plantae et
1379 corpora mineralia assimilantur soli et stellis, quorum virtute
1380 generantur. Sic igitur effectus causae agenti similatur secundum
1381 totum illud ad quod se extendit virtus agentis. Virtus autem Dei se
1382 extendit ad formam et materiam, ut supra habitum est. Unde
1383 compositum quod generatur, similatur Deo secundum virtualem
1384 continentiam, sicut similatur composito generanti per similitudinem
1385 speciei. Unde sicut compositum generans potest movere materiam ad
1386 formam generando compositum sibi simile, ita et Deus. Non autem
1387 aliqua alia forma non in materia existens, quia materia non
1388 continetur in virtute alterius substantiae separatae. Et ideo
1389 Daemones et Angeli operantur circa haec visibilia, non quidem
1390 imprimendo formas, sed adhibendo corporalia semina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p8">
1391 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows
1392 the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that
1393 form on matter.
1394 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32798] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1395 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus ageret, ex necessitate
1396 naturae. Sed quia agit per voluntatem et intellectum, qui cognoscit
1397 rationes proprias omnium formarum, et non solum universales; inde
1398 est quod potest determinate hanc vel illam formam materiae
1399 imprimere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A1-p9">
1400 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes
1401 to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.
1402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32799] Iª q. 105 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1403 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod causae secundae ordinantur ad
1404 determinatos effectus est illis a Deo. Unde Deus, quia alias causas
1405 ordinat ad determinatos effectus, potest etiam determinatos
1406 effectus producere per seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A2-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 2. Whether God can move a body immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p2">
1407 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher
1408 says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between
1409 God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with God." Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
1410 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32800] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
1411 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit immediate movere aliquod
1412 corpus. Cum enim movens et motum oporteat esse simul, ut probatur
1413 in VII Physic., oportet esse contactum quendam moventis et moti.
1414 Sed non potest esse contactus Dei, et corporis alicuius, dicit enim
1415 Dionysius, in I cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Dei non est aliquis
1416 tactus</i>. Ergo Deus non potest immediate movere aliquod
1417 corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p3">
1418 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object
1419 of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal
1420 power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.
1421 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32801] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
1422 est movens non motum. Tale autem est appetibile apprehensum. Movet
1423 igitur Deus sicut desideratum et apprehensum. Sed non apprehenditur
1424 nisi ab intellectu, qui non est corpus, nec virtus corporis. Ergo
1425 Deus non potest movere aliquod corpus immediate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p4">
1426 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a
1427 body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist
1428 at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God's
1429 power is infinite, as we have explained (
1430 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q25_A2" id="FP_Q105_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore God
1431 cannot move a body immediately.
1432 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32802] Iª q. 105 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1433 philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod potentia infinita movet in
1434 instanti. Sed impossibile est aliquod corpus in instanti moveri,
1435 quia, cum omnis motus sit inter opposita, sequeretur quod duo
1436 opposita simul inessent eidem; quod est impossibile. Ergo corpus
1437 non potest immediate moveri a potentia infinita. Potentia autem Dei
1438 est infinita, ut supra habitum est. Ergo Deus non potest immediate
1439 movere aliquod corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5">
1440 <b>On the contrary,</b> God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from
1441 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.9" target="asv"> Gn. 1:9 </a>"Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore God alone can move a body immediately.
1442 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32803] Iª q. 105 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1443 opera sex dierum Deus fecit immediate; in quibus continetur motus
1444 corporum, ut patet per hoc quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>congregentur
1445 aquae in locum unum</i>. Ergo Deus immediate potest movere
1446 corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p6">
1447 <b>I answer that,</b> It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause.
1448 Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any
1449 bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated
1450 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A1" id="FP_Q105_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light
1451 result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else
1452 tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to
1453 that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and
1454 moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever
1455 in
1456 respect of any movement whatever.
1457 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 co."><a name="32804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32804] Iª q. 105 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1458 quod erroneum est dicere Deum non posse facere per seipsum omnes
1459 determinatos effectus qui fiunt per quamcumque causam creatam. Unde
1460 cum corpora moveantur immediate a causis creatis, nulli debet
1461 venire in dubium quin Deus possit movere immediate quodcumque
1462 corpus. Et hoc quidem consequens est ad ea quae supra dicta sunt.
1463 Nam omnis motus corporis cuiuscumque vel consequitur ad aliquam
1464 formam, sicut motus localis gravium et levium consequitur formam
1465 quae datur a generante, ratione cuius generans dicitur movens, vel
1466 est via ad formam aliquam, sicut calefactio est via ad formam
1467 ignis. Eiusdem autem est imprimere formam, et disponere ad formam,
1468 et dare motum consequentem formam, ignis enim non solum generat
1469 alium ignem, sed etiam calefacit, et sursum movet. Cum igitur Deus
1470 possit immediate formam materiae imprimere, consequens est ut
1471 possit, secundum quemcumque motum, corpus quodcumque movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p7">
1472 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of
1473 sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches,
1474 nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural
1475 power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the
1476 words, "There is no contact with God"; that is, so that God Himself be touched.
1477 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32805] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1478 dicendum quod duplex est tactus, scilicet corporalis, sicut duo
1479 corpora se tangunt; et virtualis, sicut dicitur quod contristans
1480 tangit contristatum. Secundum igitur primum contactum, Deus, cum
1481 sit incorporeus, nec tangit nec tangitur. Secundum autem virtualem
1482 contactum, tangit quidem movendo creaturas, sed non tangitur, quia
1483 nullius creaturae virtus naturalis potest ad ipsum pertingere. Et
1484 sic intellexit Dionysius quod non est tactus Dei, ut scilicet
1485 tangatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p8">
1486 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended
1487 by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.
1488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32806] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1489 dicendum quod movet Deus sicut desideratum et intellectum. Sed non
1490 oportet quod semper moveat sicut desideratum et intellectum ab eo
1491 quod movetur; sed sicut desideratum et notum a seipso; quia omnia
1492 operatur propter suam bonitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A2-p9">
1493 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover "of
1494 bulk," by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover
1495 can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power "of bulk," would move without time, which is impossible;
1496 therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is
1497 not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite
1498 power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an
1499 infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the
1500 velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does
1501 not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is
1502 not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and
1503 therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.
1504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32807] Iª q. 105 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1505 dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Physic. intendit probare quod
1506 virtus primi motoris non sit virtus in magnitudine, tali ratione,
1507 virtus primi motoris est infinita (quod probat per hoc quod potest
1508 movere tempore infinito); virtus autem infinita, si esset in aliqua
1509 magnitudine, moveret in non tempore, quod est impossibile; ergo
1510 oportet quod infinita virtus primi motoris sit non in magnitudine.
1511 Ex quo patet quod corpus moveri in non tempore, non consequitur
1512 nisi virtutem infinitam in magnitudine. Cuius ratio est, quia omnis
1513 virtus quae est in magnitudine, movet secundum se totam, cum moveat
1514 per necessitatem naturae. Potentia autem infinita
1515 improportionabiliter excedit quamlibet potentiam finitam. Quanto
1516 autem maior est potentia moventis, tanto est maior velocitas motus.
1517 Cum igitur potentia finita moveat tempore determinato, sequitur
1518 quod potentia infinita non moveat in aliquo tempore, quia
1519 cuiuscumque temporis ad aliud tempus est aliqua proportio. Sed
1520 virtus quae non est in magnitudine, est virtus alicuius
1521 intelligentis, qui operatur in effectibus secundum quod eis
1522 convenit. Et ideo, cum corpori non possit esse conveniens moveri in
1523 non tempore, non sequitur quod moveat in non tempore.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A3-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 3. Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p2">
1524 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its
1525 own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is
1526 moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another;
1527 and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect.
1528 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32808] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
1529 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non moveat immediate intellectum
1530 creatum. Actio enim intellectus est ab eo in quo est, non enim
1531 transit in exteriorem materiam, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Actio
1532 autem eius quod movetur ab alio, non est ab eo in quo est, sed a
1533 movente. Non ergo intellectus movetur ab alio. Et ita videtur quod
1534 Deus non possit movere intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p3">
1535 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the
1536 intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as
1537 the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle
1538 of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another.
1539 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32809] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
1540 quod habet in se principium sufficiens sui motus, non movetur ab
1541 alio. Sed motus intellectus est ipsum intelligere eius, sicut
1542 dicitur quod intelligere vel sentire est motus quidam, secundum
1543 philosophum, in III de anima. Sufficiens autem principium
1544 intelligendi est lumen intelligibile inditum intellectui. Ergo non
1545 movetur ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p4">
1546 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible
1547 to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.
1548 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32810] Iª q. 105 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1549 sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita intellectus ab intelligibili.
1550 Sed Deus non est intelligibilis nobis, sed nostrum intellectum
1551 excedit. Ergo Deus non potest movere nostrum intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5">
1552 <b>On the contrary,</b> The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (
1553 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>) that God "teaches man knowledge." Therefore God moves the human intellect.
1554 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32811] Iª q. 105 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
1555 docens movet intellectum addiscentis. Sed Deus docet hominem
1556 scientiam, sicut dicitur in Psalmo. Ergo Deus movet intellectum
1557 hominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A3-p6">
1558 <b>I answer that,</b> As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said
1559 to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement
1560 of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual
1561 power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality;
1562 while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands.
1563 So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses
1564 on him the likeness of the thing understood.
1565 </p><p id="FP_Q105_A3-p7"> Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result
1566 of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause
1567 of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First
1568 Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in
1569 Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived
1570 from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they
1571 may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural,
1572 or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and
1573 species in existence.
1574 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 co."><a name="32812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32812] Iª q. 105 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1575 quod, sicut in motibus corporalibus movens dicitur quod dat formam
1576 quae est principium motus; ita dicitur movere intellectum, quod
1577 causat formam quae est principium intellectualis operationis, quae
1578 dicitur motus intellectus. Operationis autem intellectus est duplex
1579 principium in intelligente, unum scilicet quod est ipsa virtus
1580 intellectualis, quod quidem principium est etiam in intelligente in
1581 potentia; aliud autem est principium intelligendi in actu, scilicet
1582 similitudo rei intellectae in intelligente. Dicitur ergo aliquid
1583 movere intellectum, sive det intelligenti virtutem ad
1584 intelligendum, sive imprimat ei similitudinem rei intellectae.
1585 Utroque autem modo Deus movet intellectum creatum. Ipse enim est
1586 primum ens immateriale. Et quia intellectualitas consequitur
1587 immaterialitatem, sequitur quod ipse sit primum intelligens. Unde
1588 cum primum in quolibet ordine sit causa eorum quae consequuntur,
1589 sequitur quod ab ipso sit omnis virtus intelligendi. Similiter cum
1590 ipse sit primum ens, et omnia entia praeexistant in ipso sicut in
1591 prima causa, oportet quod sint in eo intelligibiliter secundum
1592 modum eius. Sicut enim omnes rationes rerum intelligibiles primo
1593 existunt in Deo, et ab derivantur in alios intellectus, ut actu
1594 intelligant; sic etiam derivantur in creaturas ut subsistant. Sic
1595 igitur Deus movet intellectum creatum, inquantum dat ei virtutem ad
1596 intelligendum, vel naturalem vel superadditam; et inquantum
1597 imprimit ei species intelligibiles; et utrumque tenet et conservat
1598 in esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p8">
1599 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from
1600 God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.
1601 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32813] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1602 dicendum quod operatio intellectualis est quidem ab intellectu in
1603 quo est, sicut a causa secunda, sed a Deo sicut a causa prima. Ab
1604 ipso enim datur intelligenti quod intelligere possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p9">
1605 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but
1606 it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.
1607 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32814] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1608 dicendum quod lumen intellectuale, simul cum similitudine rei
1609 intellectae, est sufficiens principium intelligendi; secundarium
1610 tamen, et a primo principio dependens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10">
1611 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of
1612 which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient
1613 to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above (
1614 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[2]</a>;
1615 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q56_A3" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[56], A[3]</a>). Hence He moves the created
1616 intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained (
1617 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q105_A3-p10.3" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>).
1618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32815] Iª q. 105 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1619 dicendum quod intelligibile movet intellectum nostrum, inquantum
1620 quodammodo imprimit ei suam similitudinem, per quam intelligi
1621 potest. Sed similitudines quas Deus imprimit intellectui creato,
1622 non sufficiunt ad ipsum Deum intelligendum per essentiam, ut supra
1623 habitum est. Unde movet intellectum creatum, cum tamen non sit ei
1624 intelligibilis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A4-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 4. Whether God can move the created will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p2">
1625 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be
1626 forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God.
1627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32816] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
1628 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit movere voluntatem creatam.
1629 Omne enim quod movetur ab extrinseco, cogitur. Sed voluntas non
1630 potest cogi. Ergo non movetur ab aliquo extrinseco. Et ita non
1631 potest moveri a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p3">
1632 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for
1633 to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will.
1634 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32817] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
1635 non potest facere quod contradictoria sint simul vera. Hoc autem
1636 sequeretur, si voluntatem moveret, nam voluntarie moveri est ex se
1637 moveri, et non ab alio. Ergo Deus non potest voluntatem movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p4">
1638 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone,
1639 but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward
1640 or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.
1641 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32818] Iª q. 105 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1642 motus magis attribuitur moventi quam mobili, unde homicidium non
1643 attribuitur lapidi, sed proiicienti. Si igitur Deus moveat
1644 voluntatem, sequitur quod opera voluntaria non imputentur homini ad
1645 meritum vel demeritum. Hoc autem est falsum. Non igitur Deus movet
1646 voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5">
1647 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
1648 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate---'you'] both to will and to accomplish."
1649 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32819] Iª q. 105 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1650 quod dicitur ad Philipp. II, <i>Deus est qui operatur in nobis
1651 velle et perficere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p6">
1652 <b>I answer that,</b> As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above
1653 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A3" id="FP_Q105_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved
1654 by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently
1655 unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the
1656 potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal
1657 good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone
1658 is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner
1659 the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the
1660 will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate
1661 end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects
1662 to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior
1663 inclination of the will.
1664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 co."><a name="32820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32820] Iª q. 105 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1665 quod, sicut intellectus, ut dictum est, movetur ab obiecto, et ab
1666 eo qui dedit virtutem intelligendi; ita voluntas movetur ab
1667 obiecto, quod est bonum, et ab eo qui creat virtutem volendi.
1668 Potest autem voluntas moveri sicut ab obiecto, a quocumque bono;
1669 non tamen sufficienter et efficaciter nisi a Deo. Non enim
1670 sufficienter aliquid potest movere aliquod mobile, nisi virtus
1671 activa moventis excedat, vel saltem adaequet virtutem passivam
1672 mobilis. Virtus autem passiva voluntatis se extendit ad bonum in
1673 universali, est enim eius obiectum bonum universale, sicut et
1674 intellectus obiectum est ens universale. Quodlibet autem bonum
1675 creatum est quoddam particulare bonum, solus autem Deus est bonum
1676 universale. Unde ipse solus implet voluntatem, et sufficienter eam
1677 movet ut obiectum. Similiter autem et virtus volendi a solo Deo
1678 causatur. Velle enim nihil aliud est quam inclinatio quaedam in
1679 obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum universale. Inclinare autem in
1680 bonum universale est primi moventis cui proportionatur ultimus
1681 finis, sicut in rebus humanis dirigere ad bonum commune est eius
1682 qui praeest multitudini. Unde utroque modo proprium est Dei movere
1683 voluntatem, sed maxime secundo modo, interius eam inclinando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p7">
1684 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the
1685 proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then
1686 it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural
1687 inclination.
1688 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32821] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1689 dicendum quod illud quod movetur ab altero dicitur cogi, si
1690 moveatur contra inclinationem propriam, sed si moveatur ab alio
1691 quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi; sicut
1692 grave, cum movetur deorsum a generante, non cogitur. Sic igitur
1693 Deus, movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam, quia dat ei eius
1694 propriam inclinationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p8">
1695 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be
1696 caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.
1697 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32822] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1698 dicendum quod moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, idest a principio
1699 intrinseco, sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio
1700 principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod
1701 movetur ab alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A4-p9">
1702 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed
1703 for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have
1704 stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.
1705 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32823] Iª q. 105 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1706 dicendum quod, si voluntas ita moveretur ab alio quod ex se
1707 nullatenus moveretur, opera voluntatis non imputarentur ad meritum
1708 vel demeritum. Sed quia per hoc quod movetur ab alio, non
1709 excluditur quin moveatur ex se, ut dictum est; ideo per consequens
1710 non tollitur ratio meriti vel demeriti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A5-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 5. Whether God works in every agent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p2">
1711 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God
1712 works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.
1713 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32824] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
1714 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non operetur in omni operante. Nulla
1715 enim insufficientia est Deo attribuenda. Si igitur Deus operatur in
1716 omni operante, sufficienter in quolibet operatur. Superfluum igitur
1717 esset quod agens creatum aliquid operaretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p3">
1718 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong
1719 to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same
1720 time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.
1721 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32825] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, una
1722 operatio non est simul a duobus operantibus, sicut nec unus numero
1723 motus potest esse duorum mobilium. Si igitur operatio creaturae est
1724 a Deo in creatura operante, non potest esse simul a creatura. Et
1725 ita nulla creatura aliquid operatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p4">
1726 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore,
1727 if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating.
1728 But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.
1729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32826] Iª q. 105 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1730 faciens dicitur esse causa operationis facti, inquantum dat ei
1731 formam qua operatur. Si igitur Deus est causa operationis rerum
1732 factarum ab ipso, hoc erit inquantum dat eis virtutem operandi. Sed
1733 hoc est a principio, quando rem facit. Ergo videtur quod ulterius
1734 non operetur in creatura operante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5">
1735 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
1736 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv">Is. 26:12</a>): "Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us."
1737 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32827] Iª q. 105 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1738 quod dicitur Isaiae XXVI, <i>omnia opera nostra operatus es in
1739 nobis, domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p6">
1740 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God
1741 alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire,
1742 and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things:
1743 and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause,
1744 that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be
1745 bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way,
1746 to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less
1747 perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form
1748 which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature.
1749 We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.
1750 </p><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p7"> In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action,
1751 but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles
1752 of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent;
1753 the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own
1754 form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought,
1755 for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.
1756 </p><p id="FP_Q105_A5-p8"> Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for
1757 the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates
1758 in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again
1759 it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the
1760 first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is
1761 the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying
1762 their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the
1763 axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action
1764 not
1765 only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy
1766 and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation
1767 of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is
1768 within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things
1769 God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works
1770 intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according
1771 to
1772 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.10.11" target="asv"> Job 10:11</a>: "Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews."
1773 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 co."><a name="32828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32828] Iª q. 105 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1774 quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt,
1775 quod nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus, sed solus
1776 Deus immediate omnia operaretur; puta quod ignis non calefaceret,
1777 sed Deus in igne, et similiter de omnibus aliis. Hoc autem est
1778 impossibile. Primo quidem, quia sic subtraheretur ordo causae et
1779 causati a rebus creatis. Quod pertinet ad impotentiam creantis, ex
1780 virtute enim agentis est, quod suo effectui det virtutem agendi.
1781 Secundo, quia virtutes operativae quae in rebus inveniuntur,
1782 frustra essent rebus attributae, si per eas nihil operarentur.
1783 Quinimmo omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo esse frustra, si
1784 propria operatione destituerentur, cum omnis res sit propter suam
1785 operationem. Semper enim imperfectum est propter perfectius, sicut
1786 igitur materia est propter formam, ita forma, quae est actus
1787 primus, est propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et
1788 sic operatio est finis rei creatae. Sic igitur intelligendum est
1789 Deum operari in rebus, quod tamen ipsae res propriam habeant
1790 operationem. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum sint
1791 causarum quatuor genera, materia quidem non est principium
1792 actionis, sed se habet ut subiectum recipiens actionis effectum.
1793 Finis vero et agens et forma se habent ut actionis principium, sed
1794 ordine quodam. Nam primo quidem, principium actionis est finis, qui
1795 movet agentem; secundo vero, agens; tertio autem, forma eius quod
1796 ab agente applicatur ad agendum (quamvis et ipsum agens per formam
1797 suam agat); ut patet in artificialibus. Artifex enim movetur ad
1798 agendum a fine, qui est ipsum operatum, puta arca vel lectus; et
1799 applicat ad actionem securim quae incidit per suum acumen. Sic
1800 igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur. Primo
1801 quidem, secundum rationem finis. Cum enim omnis operatio sit
1802 propter aliquod bonum verum vel apparens; nihil autem est vel
1803 apparet bonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquam similitudinem
1804 summi boni, quod est Deus; sequitur quod ipse Deus sit cuiuslibet
1805 operationis causa ut finis. Similiter etiam considerandum est quod,
1806 si sint multa agentia ordinata, semper secundum agens agit in
1807 virtute primi, nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum. Et
1808 secundum hoc, omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei; et ita ipse est
1809 causa actionum omnium agentium. Tertio, considerandum est quod Deus
1810 movet non solum res ad operandum, quasi applicando formas et
1811 virtutes rerum ad operationem, sicut etiam artifex applicat securim
1812 ad scindendum, qui tamen interdum formam securi non tribuit; sed
1813 etiam dat formam creaturis agentibus, et eas tenet in esse. Unde
1814 non solum est causa actionum inquantum dat formam quae est
1815 principium actionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa motus
1816 gravium et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et virtutes
1817 rerum; prout sol dicitur esse causa manifestationis colorum,
1818 inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo manifestantur colores. Et
1819 quia forma rei est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur ut
1820 prior et universalior; et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse
1821 universalis in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum
1822 rebus; sequitur quod Deus in omnibus intime operetur. Et propter
1823 hoc in sacra Scriptura operationes naturae Deo attribuuntur quasi
1824 operanti in natura; secundum illud Iob X, <i>pelle et carnibus
1825 vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p9">
1826 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents
1827 is superfluous.
1828 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32829] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1829 dicendum quod Deus sufficienter operatur in rebus ad modum primi
1830 agentis, nec propter hoc superfluit operatio secundorum
1831 agentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p10">
1832 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a
1833 primary and a secondary agent.
1834 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32830] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1835 dicendum quod una actio non procedit a duobus agentibus unius
1836 ordinis, sed nihil prohibet quin una et eadem actio procedat a
1837 primo et secundo agente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A5-p11">
1838 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the
1839 end of every action, as above explained.
1840 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32831] Iª q. 105 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1841 dicendum quod Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat
1842 eas in esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium
1843 actionum, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A6-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 6. Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p2">
1844 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)
1845 says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order
1846 seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.
1847 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32832] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
1848 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere aliquid praeter
1849 ordinem rebus inditum. Dicit enim Augustinus, XXVI contra Faustum,
1850 <i>Deus, conditor et creator omnium naturarum, nihil contra naturam
1851 facit</i>. Sed hoc videtur esse contra naturam, quod est praeter
1852 ordinem naturaliter rebus inditum. Ergo Deus non potest facere
1853 aliquid praeter ordinem rebus inditum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p3">
1854 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of
1855 justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.
1856 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32833] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1857 sicut ordo iustitiae est a Deo, ita et ordo naturae. Sed Deus non
1858 potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem iustitiae, faceret enim tunc
1859 aliquid iniustum. Ergo non potest facere aliquid praeter ordinem
1860 naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p4">
1861 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that
1862 He is changeable; which cannot be said.
1863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32834] Iª q. 105 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1864 ordinem naturae Deus instituit. Si igitur praeter ordinem naturae
1865 Deus aliquid faciat, videtur quod ipse sit mutabilis. Quod est
1866 inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p5">
1867 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."
1868 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32835] Iª q. 105 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1869 quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod <i>Deus aliquando
1870 aliquid facit contra solitum cursum naturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q105_A6-p6">
1871 <b>I answer that,</b> From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the
1872 multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause.
1873 Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human
1874 affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is
1875 contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that
1876 of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.
1877 </p><p id="FP_Q105_A6-p7"> If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for,
1878 if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things
1879 depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary
1880 causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural
1881 necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something
1882 outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them,
1883 or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "God acts
1884 against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against
1885 Himself."
1886 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 co."><a name="32836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32836] Iª q. 105 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1887 quod a qualibet causa derivatur aliquis ordo in suos effectus, cum
1888 quaelibet causa habeat rationem principii. Et ideo secundum
1889 multiplicationem causarum, multiplicantur et ordines, quorum unus
1890 continetur sub altero, sicut et causa continetur sub causa. Unde
1891 causa superior non continetur sub ordine causae inferioris, sed e
1892 converso. Cuius exemplum apparet in rebus humanis, nam ex
1893 patrefamilias dependet ordo domus, qui continetur sub ordine
1894 civitatis, qui procedit a civitatis rectore, cum et hic contineatur
1895 sub ordine regis, a quo totum regnum ordinatur. Si ergo ordo rerum
1896 consideretur prout dependet a prima causa, sic contra rerum ordinem
1897 Deus facere non potest, sic enim si faceret, faceret contra suam
1898 praescientiam aut voluntatem aut bonitatem. Si vero consideretur
1899 rerum ordo prout dependet a qualibet secundarum causarum, sic Deus
1900 potest facere praeter ordinem rerum. Quia ordini secundarum
1901 causarum ipse non est subiectus, sed talis ordo ei subiicitur,
1902 quasi ab eo procedens non per necessitatem naturae, sed per
1903 arbitrium voluntatis, potuisset enim et alium ordinem rerum
1904 instituere. Unde et potest praeter hunc ordinem institutum agere,
1905 cum voluerit; puta agendo effectus secundarum causarum sine ipsis,
1906 vel producendo aliquos effectus ad quos causae secundae non se
1907 extendunt. Unde et Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod
1908 <i>Deus contra solitum cursum naturae facit; sed contra summam
1909 legem tam nullo modo facit, quam contra seipsum non facit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p8">
1910 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which
1911 did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to
1912 him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent
1913 on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is
1914 clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in
1915 a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies
1916 depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not
1917 against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from
1918 Whom
1919 is all mode, number, and order in nature."
1920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32837] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1921 dicendum quod, cum aliquid contingit in rebus naturalibus praeter
1922 naturam inditam, hoc potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, per
1923 actionem agentis qui inclinationem naturalem non dedit, sicut cum
1924 homo movet corpus grave sursum, quod non habet ab eo ut moveatur
1925 deorsum, et hoc est contra naturam. Alio modo, per actionem illius
1926 agentis a quo dependet actio naturalis. Et hoc non est contra
1927 naturam, ut patet in fluxu et refluxu maris, qui non est contra
1928 naturam, quamvis sit praeter motum naturalem aquae, quae movetur
1929 deorsum; est enim ex impressione caelestis corporis, a quo dependet
1930 naturalis inclinatio inferiorum corporum. Cum igitur naturae ordo
1931 sit a Deo rebus inditus, si quid praeter hunc ordinem faciat, non
1932 est contra naturam. Unde Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum,
1933 quod <i>id est cuique rei naturale, quod ille fecerit a quo est
1934 omnis modus, numerus et ordo naturae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p9">
1935 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing
1936 against such order.
1937 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32838] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1938 dicendum quod ordo iustitiae est secundum relationem ad causam
1939 primam, quae est regula omnis iustitiae. Et ideo praeter hunc
1940 ordinem, Deus nihil facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A6-p10">
1941 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do
1942 otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.
1943 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32839] Iª q. 105 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1944 dicendum quod Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi
1945 reservaret quid ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset facturus. Unde
1946 cum praeter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A7-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 7. Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p2">
1947 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of
1948 the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being
1949 accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God
1950 does outside the natural order is a miracle.
1951 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32840] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
1952 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia quae Deus facit praeter ordinem
1953 naturalem rerum, sint miracula. Creatio enim mundi, et etiam
1954 animarum, et iustificatio impii fiunt a Deo praeter ordinem
1955 naturalem, non enim fiunt per actionem alicuius causae naturalis.
1956 Et tamen haec miracula non dicuntur. Ergo non omnia quae facit Deus
1957 praeter ordinem naturalem rerum, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3">
1958 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a miracle is "something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond
1959 our hopes as to compel our astonishment" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of
1960 nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare
1961 occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be
1962 healed by the shadow of Peter (
1963 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.15" target="asv">Acts 5:15</a>). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we
1964 all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things
1965 are outside the course of natur are miraculous.
1966 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32841] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1967 miraculum dicitur aliquid arduum et insolitum supra facultatem
1968 naturae et spem admirantis proveniens. Sed quaedam fiunt praeter
1969 naturae ordinem, quae tamen non sunt ardua, sunt enim in minimis
1970 rebus, sicut in restauratione gemmarum, vel sanatione aegrorum. Nec
1971 etiam sunt insolita, cum frequenter eveniant, sicut cum infirmi in
1972 plateis ponebantur ut ad umbram Petri sanarentur. Nec etiam sunt
1973 supra facultatem naturae, ut cum aliqui sanantur a febribus. Nec
1974 etiam supra spem, sicut resurrectionem mortuorum omnes speramus,
1975 quae tamen fiet praeter ordinem naturae. Ergo non omnia quae fiunt
1976 praeter naturae ordinem, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p4">
1977 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes
1978 things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge
1979 without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous.
1980 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32842] Iª q. 105 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1981 miraculi nomen ab admiratione sumitur. Sed admiratio est de rebus
1982 sensui manifestis. Sed quandoque aliqua accidunt praeter ordinem
1983 naturalem in rebus sensui non manifestis, sicut cum apostoli facti
1984 sunt scientes, neque invenientes neque discentes. Ergo non omnia
1985 quae fiunt praeter ordinem naturae, sunt miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p5">
1986 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed
1987 to observe, we call it a miracle."
1988 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32843] Iª q. 105 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1989 quod Augustinus dicit, XXVI contra Faustum, quod <i>cum Deus
1990 aliquid facit contra cognitum nobis cursum solitumque naturae,
1991 magnalia, vel mirabilia nominantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p6">
1992 <b>I answer that,</b> The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when
1993 a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause
1994 of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all
1995 to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so
1996 called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things
1997 which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.
1998 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 co."><a name="32844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32844] Iª q. 105 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1999 quod nomen miraculi ab admiratione sumitur. Admiratio autem
2000 consurgit, cum effectus sunt manifesti et causa occulta; sicut
2001 aliquis admiratur cum videt eclipsim solis et ignorat causam, ut
2002 dicitur in principio Metaphys. Potest autem causa effectus alicuius
2003 apparentis alicui esse nota, quae tamen est aliis incognita. Unde
2004 aliquid est mirum uni, quod non est mirum aliis; sicut eclipsim
2005 solis miratur rusticus, non autem astrologus. Miraculum autem
2006 dicitur quasi admiratione plenum, quod scilicet habet causam
2007 simpliciter et omnibus occultam. Haec autem est Deus. Unde illa
2008 quae a Deo fiunt praeter causas nobis notas, miracula dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p7">
2009 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because
2010 they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do
2011 not belong to that order.
2012 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32845] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2013 dicendum quod creatio, et iustificatio impii, etsi a solo Deo
2014 fiant, non tamen, proprie loquendo, miracula dicuntur. Quia non
2015 sunt nata fieri per alias causas, et ita non contingunt praeter
2016 ordinem naturae, cum haec ad ordinem naturae non pertineant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p8">
2017 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses
2018 the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside
2019 the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of
2020 the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in
2021 which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope "of nature," not above the hope "of grace," which hope comes
2022 from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.
2023 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32846] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2024 dicendum quod arduum dicitur miraculum, non propter dignitatem rei
2025 in qua fit; sed quia excedit facultatem naturae. Similiter etiam
2026 insolitum dicitur, non quia frequenter non eveniat sed quia est
2027 praeter naturalem consuetudinem. Supra facultatem autem naturae
2028 dicitur aliquid, non solum propter substantiam facti sed etiam
2029 propter modum et ordinem faciendi. Supra spem etiam naturae
2030 miraculum esse dicitur; non supra spem gratiae, quae est ex fide,
2031 per quam credimus resurrectionem futuram.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A7-p9">
2032 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown
2033 to be wonderful.
2034 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32847] Iª q. 105 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2035 dicendum quod scientia apostolorum, quamvis secundum se non fuerit
2036 manifesta, manifestabatur tamen in effectibus, ex quibus mirabilis
2037 apparebat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q105_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q105_A8-p0.1">Q. 105. A. 8. Whether one miracle is greater than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p2">
2038 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): "In miraculous
2039 deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer." But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore
2040 one miracle is not greater than another.
2041 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32848] Iª q. 105 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
2042 proceditur. Videtur quod unum miraculum non sit maius alio. Dicit
2043 enim Augustinus, in epistola ad Volusianum, <i>in rebus mirabiliter
2044 factis tota ratio facti est potentia facientis</i>. Sed eadem
2045 potentia, scilicet Dei, fiunt omnia miracula. Ergo unum non est
2046 maius alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p3">
2047 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason
2048 exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.
2049 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32849] Iª q. 105 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2050 potentia Dei est infinita. Sed infinitum improportionabiliter
2051 excedit omne finitum. Ergo non magis est mirandum quod faciat hunc
2052 effectum, quam illum. Ergo unum miraculum non est maius altero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4">
2053 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (
2054 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.12" target="asv">Jn. 14:12</a>): "The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do."
2055 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32850] Iª q. 105 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2056 quod dominus dicit, Ioan. XIV, de operibus miraculosis loquens,
2057 <i>opera quae ego facio, et ipse faciet, et maiora horum
2058 faciet</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5">
2059 <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power
2060 of God, according to
2061 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q105_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.15" target="asv"> Is. 40:15</a>: "Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called
2062 a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater
2063 the miracle. Now the power of
2064 nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place,
2065 or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold
2066 the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it
2067 is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the
2068 dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which
2069 it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air
2070 is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias;
2071 and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different
2072 ways
2073 in which the power of nature is surpassed.
2074 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 co."><a name="32851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32851] Iª q. 105 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2075 quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae,
2076 quia quodcumque factum, divinae potentiae comparatum, est minimum;
2077 secundum illud Isaiae XL, <i>ecce gentes quasi stilla situlae, et
2078 quasi momentum staterae reputatae sunt</i>. Sed dicitur aliquid
2079 miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit. Et
2080 ideo secundum quod magis excedit facultatem naturae, secundum hoc
2081 maius miraculum dicitur. Excedit autem aliquid facultatem naturae
2082 tripliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam facti, sicut quod duo
2083 corpora sint simul, vel quod sol retrocedat, aut quod corpus
2084 humanum glorificetur; quod nullo modo natura facere potest. Et ista
2085 tenent summum gradum in miraculis. Secundo aliquid excedit
2086 facultatem naturae, non quantum ad id quod fit, sed quantum ad id
2087 in quo fit, sicut resuscitatio mortuorum, et illuminatio caecorum,
2088 et similia. Potest enim natura causare vitam, sed non in mortuo, et
2089 potest praestare visum, sed non caeco. Et haec tenent secundum
2090 locum in miraculis. Tertio modo excedit aliquid facultatem naturae,
2091 quantum ad modum et ordinem faciendi, sicut cum aliquis subito per
2092 virtutem divinam a febre curatur absque curatione et consueto
2093 processu naturae in talibus, et cum statim aer divina virtute in
2094 pluvias densatur absque naturalibus causis, sicut factum est ad
2095 preces Samuelis et Eliae. Et huiusmodi tenent infimum locum in
2096 miraculis. Quaelibet tamen horum habent diversos gradus, secundum
2097 quod diversimode excedunt facultatem naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q105_A8-p6"> From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 105 a. 8 ad arg."><a name="32852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32852] Iª q. 105 a. 8 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
2098 patet solutio ad obiecta, quae procedunt ex parte divinae
2099 potentiae.</p></div></div></div></div>
2100 <div id="FP_Q106" class="div3">
2101 <h3 id="FP_Q106-p0.1">Q. 106. HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
2102 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
2103 <p id="FP_Q106-p2"> We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely
2104 spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.
2105 </p><p id="FP_Q106-p3"> Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel
2106 acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.
2107 </p><p id="FP_Q106-p4"> The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both
2108 of the good and of the bad angels.
2109 </p><p id="FP_Q106-p5"> Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q106-p6"><a href="#FP_Q106_A1"> (1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p7"><a href="#FP_Q106_A2"> (2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p8"><a href="#FP_Q106_A3"> (3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q106-p9"><a href="#FP_Q106_A4"> (4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?</a></p>
2110 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 pr."><a name="32853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32853]
2111 Iª q. 106 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est quomodo una
2112 creatura moveat aliam. Erit autem haec consideratio tripartita, ut
2113 primo consideremus quomodo Angeli moveant, qui sunt creaturae pure
2114 spirituales; secundo, quomodo corpora moveant; tertio, quomodo
2115 homines, qui sunt ex spirituali et corporali natura compositi.
2116 Circa primum tria consideranda occurrunt, primo, quomodo Angelus
2117 agat in Angelum; secundo, quomodo in creaturam corporalem; tertio,
2118 quomodo in homines. Circa primum, considerare oportet de
2119 illuminatione, et locutione Angelorum, et ordinatione eorum ad
2120 invicem, tam bonorum, quam malorum. Circa illuminationem quaeruntur
2121 quatuor. Primo, utrum unus Angelus moveat intellectum alterius
2122 illuminando. Secundo, utrum unus moveat voluntatem alterius.
2123 Tertio, utrum inferior Angelus possit illuminare superiorem.
2124 Quarto, utrum superior Angelus illuminet inferiorem de omnibus quae
2125 cognoscit.</p></div></div></div>
2126 <div id="FP_Q106_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A1-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 1. Whether one angel enlightens another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2">
2127 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.
2128 But one man will not then enlighten another, according to
2129 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.34" target="asv"> Jer. 31:34</a>: "They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother." Therefore neither does an angel enlighten
2130 another now.
2131 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32854] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
2132 proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus non illuminet alium. Angeli
2133 enim eandem beatitudinem possident nunc, quam nos in futuro
2134 expectamus. Sed tunc unus homo non illuminabit alium; secundum
2135 illud Ierem. XXXI, <i>non docebit ultra vir proximum suum, et vir
2136 fratrem suum</i>. Ergo etiam neque nunc unus Angelus illuminat
2137 alium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p3">
2138 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of
2139 nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes
2140 from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.
2141 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32855] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2142 triplex est lumen in Angelis, naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Sed
2143 Angelus illuminatur lumine naturae, a creante; lumine gratiae, a
2144 iustificante; lumine gloriae, a beatificante; quod totum Dei est.
2145 Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat alium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p4">
2146 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as
2147 Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.
2148 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32856] Iª q. 106 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2149 lumen est forma quaedam mentis. Sed mens rationalis a solo Deo
2150 formatur, nulla interposita creatura, ut Augustinus dicit in libro
2151 octoginta trium quaest. Ergo unus Angelus non illuminat mentem
2152 alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p5">
2153 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the
2154 angels of the first hierarchy."
2155 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32857] Iª q. 106 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2156 quod dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>Angeli
2157 secundae hierarchiae purgantur et illuminantur et perficiuntur per
2158 Angelos primae hierarchiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A1-p6">
2159 <b>I answer that,</b> One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation
2160 of truth, according to
2161 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv"> Eph. 5:13</a>: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation
2162 of the known truth; according to the Apostle (
2163 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.8" target="asv">Eph. 3:8</a>): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all
2164 men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one
2165 angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii):
2166 "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds."
2167 </p><p id="FP_Q106_A1-p7"> Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said (
2168 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A3" id="FP_Q106_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[3]</a>), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known
2169 truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened
2170 by the neighborhood of a more perfect body ---for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is
2171 hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual
2172 things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the
2173 truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by
2174 a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is
2175 natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth
2176 which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge.
2177 Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he
2178 possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): "Every intellectual substance with provident
2179 power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards
2180 by analogy."
2181 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 co."><a name="32858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32858] Iª q. 106 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2182 quod unus Angelus illuminat alium. Ad cuius evidentiam,
2183 considerandum est quod lumen, secundum quod ad intellectum
2184 pertinet, nihil est aliud quam quaedam manifestatio veritatis;
2185 secundum illud ad Ephes. V, <i>omne quod manifestatur, lumen
2186 est</i>. Unde illuminare nihil aliud est quam manifestationem
2187 cognitae veritatis alteri tradere; secundum quem modum apostolus
2188 dicit, ad Ephes. III, <i>mihi, omnium sanctorum minimo, data est
2189 gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit dispensatio sacramenti
2190 absconditi a saeculis in Deo</i>. Sic igitur unus Angelus dicitur
2191 illuminare alium, inquantum ei manifestat veritatem quam ipse
2192 cognoscit. Unde Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod
2193 <i>theologi plane monstrant caelestium substantiarum ornatus a
2194 supremis mentibus doceri deificas scientias</i>. Cum autem ad
2195 intelligendum duo concurrant, ut supra diximus, scilicet virtus
2196 intellectiva, et similitudo rei intellectae; secundum haec duo unus
2197 Angelus alteri veritatem notam notificare potest. Primo quidem,
2198 fortificando virtutem intellectivam eius. Sicut enim virtus
2199 imperfectioris corporis confortatur ex situali propinquitate
2200 perfectioris corporis, ut minus calidum crescit in calore ex
2201 praesentia magis calidi; ita virtus intellectiva inferioris Angeli
2202 confortatur ex conversione superioris Angeli ad ipsum. Hoc enim
2203 facit in spiritualibus ordo conversionis, quod facit in
2204 corporalibus ordo localis propinquitatis. Secundo autem unus
2205 Angelus alteri manifestat veritatem, ex parte similitudinis
2206 intellectae. Superior enim Angelus notitiam veritatis accipit in
2207 universali quadam conceptione, ad quam capiendam inferioris Angeli
2208 intellectus non esset sufficiens, sed est ei connaturale ut magis
2209 particulariter veritatem accipiat. Superior ergo Angelus veritatem
2210 quam universaliter concipit, quodammodo distinguit, ut ab inferiori
2211 capi possit; et sic eam cognoscendam illi proponit. Sicut etiam
2212 apud nos, doctores, quod in summa capiunt, multipliciter
2213 distinguunt, providentes capacitati aliorum. Et hoc est quod
2214 Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>unaquaeque substantia
2215 intellectualis datam sibi a diviniore uniformem intelligentiam,
2216 provida virtute dividit et multiplicat, ad inferioris sursum
2217 ductricem analogiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p8">
2218 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another.
2219 It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: "They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know
2220 the Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest." But all the types of the Divine works, which
2221 are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He
2222 comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior
2223 angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the
2224 latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels "are enlightened by the types of existing things."
2225 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32859] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2226 dicendum quod omnes Angeli, tam superiores quam inferiores,
2227 immediate vident Dei essentiam; et quantum ad hoc, unus non docet
2228 alium. De hac enim doctrina propheta loquitur, unde dicit <i>non
2229 docebit vir fratrem suum, dicens, cognosce dominum. Omnes enim
2230 cognoscent me, a minimo eorum usque ad maximum</i>. Sed rationes
2231 divinorum operum, quae in Deo cognoscuntur sicut in causa, omnes
2232 quidem Deus in seipso cognoscit, quia seipsum comprehendit, aliorum
2233 vero Deum videntium tanto unusquisque in Deo plures rationes
2234 cognoscit, quanto eum perfectius videt. Unde superior Angelus plura
2235 in Deo de rationibus divinorum operum cognoscit quam inferior; et
2236 de his eum illuminat. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de
2237 Div. Nom., quod <i>Angeli existentium illuminantur
2238 rationibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p9">
2239 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural
2240 light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.
2241 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32860] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2242 dicendum quod unus Angelus non illuminat alium tradendo ei lumen
2243 naturae vel gratiae vel gloriae; sed confortando lumen naturale
2244 ipsius, et manifestando ei veritatem de his quae pertinent ad
2245 statum naturae, gratiae et gloriae, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A1-p10">
2246 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image
2247 of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed,
2248 except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were,
2249 dispositions to this ultimate form.
2250 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32861] Iª q. 106 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2251 dicendum quod rationalis mens formatur immediate a Deo, vel sicut
2252 imago ab exemplari, quia non est facta ad alterius imaginem quam
2253 Dei, vel sicut subiectum ab ultima forma completiva, quia semper
2254 mens creata reputatur informis, nisi ipsi primae veritati
2255 inhaereat. Aliae vero illuminationes, quae sunt ab homine vel
2256 Angelo, sunt quasi dispositiones ad ultimam formam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A2-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 2. Whether one angel moves another angel's will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p2">
2257 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel can move another angel's will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above
2258 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to
2259 the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an
2260 end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel's
2261 will.
2262 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32862] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
2263 proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus possit movere voluntatem
2264 alterius. Quia secundum Dionysium, sicut unus Angelus illuminat
2265 alium, ita purgat et perficit; ut patet ex auctoritate supra
2266 inducta. Sed purgatio et perfectio videntur pertinere ad
2267 voluntatem, nam purgatio videtur esse a sordibus culpae, quae
2268 pertinet ad voluntatem; perfectio autem videtur esse per
2269 consecutionem finis, qui est obiectum voluntatis. Ergo unus Angelus
2270 potest movere voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p3">
2271 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "The names of the angels designate their properties." Now the Seraphim are
2272 so called because they "kindle" or "give heat": and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another
2273 angel's will.
2274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32863] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2275 sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier., <i>nomina Angelorum
2276 designant eorum proprietates</i>. Seraphim autem incendentes
2277 dicuntur, aut calefacientes, quod est per amorem, qui ad voluntatem
2278 pertinet. Unus ergo Angelus movet voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p4">
2279 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior
2280 angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel.
2281 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32864] Iª q. 106 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2282 philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod appetitus superior movet
2283 appetitum inferiorem. Sed sicut intellectus Angeli superioris
2284 superior est, ita etiam appetitus. Ergo videtur quod superior
2285 Angelus possit immutare voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p5">
2286 <b>On the contrary,</b> To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the
2287 will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will.
2288 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32865] Iª q. 106 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, eius
2289 est immutare voluntatem, cuius est iustificare, cum iustitia sit
2290 rectitudo voluntatis. Sed solus Deus est qui iustificat. Ergo unus
2291 Angelus non potest mutare voluntatem alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A2-p6">
2292 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
2293 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A4" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[4]</a>), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both
2294 the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out
2295 the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above (
2296 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A4" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[105], A[4]</a>), other goods in a
2297 measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good
2298 He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: "Show me Thy glory," answered: "I will show thee
2299 all good" (
2300 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.18" target="asv">Ex. 33:18,19</a>). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines
2301 the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God's
2302 goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.
2303 </p><p id="FP_Q106_A2-p7"> But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination
2304 of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will:
2305 just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination.
2306 Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the
2307 intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will.
2308 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 co."><a name="32866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32866] Iª q. 106 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2309 quod, sicut supra dictum est, voluntas immutatur dupliciter, uno
2310 modo, ex parte obiecti; alio modo ex parte ipsius potentiae. Ex
2311 parte quidem obiecti, movet voluntatem et ipsum bonum quod est
2312 voluntatis obiectum, sicut appetibile movet appetitum; et ille qui
2313 demonstrat obiectum, puta qui demonstrat aliquid esse bonum. Sed
2314 sicut supra dictum est, alia quidem bona aliqualiter inclinant
2315 voluntatem; sed nihil sufficienter movet voluntatem, nisi bonum
2316 universale, quod est Deus. Et hoc bonum solus ipse ostendit, ut per
2317 essentiam videatur a beatis, qui dicenti Moysi, <i>ostende mihi
2318 gloriam tuam</i>, respondit, <i>ego ostendam tibi omne bonum</i>,
2319 ut habetur Exod. XXXIII. Angelus ergo non sufficienter movet
2320 voluntatem, neque ut obiectum, neque ut ostendens obiectum. Sed
2321 inclinat eam, ut amabile quoddam, et ut manifestans aliqua bona
2322 creata ordinata in Dei bonitatem. Et per hoc inclinare potest ad
2323 amorem creaturae vel Dei, per modum suadentis. Ex parte vero ipsius
2324 potentiae, voluntas nullo modo potest moveri nisi a Deo. Operatio
2325 enim voluntatis est inclinatio quaedam volentis in volitum. Hanc
2326 autem inclinationem solus ille immutare potest, qui virtutem
2327 volendi creaturae contulit, sicut et naturalem inclinationem solum
2328 illud agens potest mutare, quod potest dare virtutem quam
2329 consequitur inclinatio naturalis. Solus autem Deus est qui
2330 potentiam volendi tribuit creaturae, quia ipse solus est auctor
2331 intellectualis naturae. Unde unus Angelus voluntatem alterius
2332 movere non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p8">
2333 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing
2334 the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect
2335 and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above
2336 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience
2337 in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius
2338 says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that "in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things
2339 unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge." For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal
2340 of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored
2341 object.
2342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32867] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2343 dicendum quod secundum modum illuminationis, est accipienda et
2344 purgatio et perfectio. Et quia Deus illuminat immutando intellectum
2345 et voluntatem, purgat a defectibus intellectus et voluntatis, et
2346 perficit in finem intellectus et voluntatis. Angeli autem
2347 illuminatio refertur ad intellectum, ut dictum est. Et ideo etiam
2348 purgatio Angeli intelligitur a defectu intellectus, qui est
2349 nescientia; perfectio autem est consummatio in finem intellectus,
2350 qui est veritas cognita. Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap.
2351 Eccl. Hier., quod <i>in caelesti hierarchia purgatio est in
2352 subiectis essentiis tanquam ignotorum illuminatio in perfectiorem
2353 eas scientiam ducens</i>. Sicut si dicamus visum corporalem
2354 purgari, inquantum removentur tenebrae; illuminari vero, inquantum
2355 perfunditur lumine; perfici vero, secundum quod perducitur ad
2356 cognitionem colorati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p9">
2357 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above.
2358 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32868] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2359 dicendum quod unus Angelus potest inducere alium ad amorem Dei per
2360 modum persuadentis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A2-p10">
2361 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because
2362 it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does
2363 not apply to the angels.
2364 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32869] Iª q. 106 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2365 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de appetitu inferiori sensitivo,
2366 qui potest moveri a superiori intellectivo, quia pertinet ad eandem
2367 naturam animae, et quia inferior appetitus est virtus in organo
2368 corporali. Quod in Angelis locum non habet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A3-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 3. Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2">
2369 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and
2370 represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called "our mother" (
2371 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.26" target="asv">Gal. 4:26</a>). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (
2372 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:31</a>): "You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted."
2373 Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.
2374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32870] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
2375 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus inferior superiorem illuminare
2376 possit. Ecclesiastica enim hierarchia derivata est a caelesti, et
2377 eam repraesentat, unde et superna Ierusalem dicitur mater nostra,
2378 Gal. IV. Sed in Ecclesia etiam superiores illuminantur ab
2379 inferioribus et docentur; secundum illud apostoli, I ad Cor. XIV,
2380 <i>potestis omnes per singulos prophetare, ut omnes discant, et
2381 omnes exhortentur</i>. Ergo et in caelesti hierarchia superiores ab
2382 inferioribus possunt illuminari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p3">
2383 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances.
2384 But, as was said above (
2385 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q106_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual
2386 substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened
2387 by God can enlighten
2388 superiors.
2389 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32871] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2390 sicut ordo corporalium substantiarum dependet ex Dei voluntate, ita
2391 et ordo substantiarum spiritualium. Sed sicut dictum est, Deus
2392 quandoque praeter ordinem substantiarum corporalium operatur. Ergo
2393 quandoque etiam operatur praeter ordinem spiritualium
2394 substantiarum, illuminando inferiores non per medios superiores.
2395 Sic ergo inferiores illuminati a Deo, possunt superiores
2396 illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p4">
2397 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained
2398 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore
2399 he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors.
2400 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32872] Iª q. 106 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unus
2401 Angelus alium illuminat, ad quem se convertit, ut supra dictum est.
2402 Sed cum ista conversio sit voluntaria, potest supremus Angelus ad
2403 infimum se convertere, mediis praetermissis. Ergo potest eum
2404 immediate illuminare, et ita potest illuminare superiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p5">
2405 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that "this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior" (Coel. Hier.
2406 iv; Eccl. Hier. v).
2407 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32873] Iª q. 106 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2408 quod Dionysius dicit <i>hanc legem esse divinitatis immobiliter
2409 firmatam, ut inferiora reducantur in Deum per superiora</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p6">
2410 <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained
2411 (
2412 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A6" id="FP_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[6]</a>), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore
2413 there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior
2414 cause, as in human affairs the command of
2415 the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of
2416 corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual
2417 substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are
2418 the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that
2419 the
2420 inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.
2421 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 co."><a name="32874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32874] Iª q. 106 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2422 quod inferiores Angeli nunquam illuminant superiores, sed semper ab
2423 eis illuminantur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra dictum est,
2424 ordo continetur sub ordine, sicut causa continetur sub causa. Unde
2425 sicut ordinatur causa ad causam, ita ordo ad ordinem. Et ideo non
2426 est inconveniens, si aliquando aliquid fiat praeter ordinem
2427 inferioris causae, ad ordinandum in superiorem causam, sicut in
2428 rebus humanis praetermittitur mandatum praesidis, ut obediatur
2429 principi. Et ita contingit ut praeter ordinem naturae corporalis,
2430 aliquid Deus miraculose operetur, ad ordinandum homines in eius
2431 cognitionem. Sed praetermissio ordinis qui debetur spiritualibus
2432 substantiis, in nullo pertinet ad ordinationem hominum in Deum, cum
2433 operationes Angelorum non sint nobis manifestae, sicut operationes
2434 visibilium corporum. Et ideo ordo qui convenit spiritualibus
2435 substantiis, nunquam a Deo praetermittitur, quin semper inferiora
2436 moveantur per superiora, et non e converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p7">
2437 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy
2438 the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more
2439 sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas
2440 in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in
2441 sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science,
2442 and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.
2443 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32875] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2444 dicendum quod ecclesiastica hierarchia imitatur caelestem
2445 aliqualiter, sed non perfecte consequitur eius similitudinem. In
2446 caelesti enim hierarchia tota ratio ordinis est ex propinquitate ad
2447 Deum. Et ideo illi qui sunt Deo propinquiores, sunt et gradu
2448 sublimiores, et scientia clariores, et propter hoc superiores
2449 nunquam ab inferioribus illuminantur. Sed in ecclesiastica
2450 hierarchia, interdum qui sunt Deo per sanctitatem propinquiores,
2451 sunt gradu infimi, et scientia non eminentes, et quidam in uno
2452 etiam secundum scientiam eminent, et in alio deficiunt. Et propter
2453 hoc superiores ab inferioribus doceri possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p8">
2454 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual
2455 nature. Hence the argument does not hold.
2456 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32876] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2457 dicendum quod non est similis ratio de hoc quod Deus agat praeter
2458 ordinem naturae corporalis, et naturae spiritualis, ut dictum est.
2459 Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A3-p9">
2460 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made
2461 the order in the angels.
2462 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32877] Iª q. 106 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2463 dicendum quod Angelus voluntate convertitur ad alium Angelum
2464 illuminandum; sed voluntas Angeli semper regulatur lege divina,
2465 quae ordinem in Angelis instituit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q106_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q106_A4-p0.1">Q. 106. A. 4. Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p2">
2466 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says
2467 (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual
2468 knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the
2469 superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the
2470 former.
2471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32878] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
2472 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus superior non illuminet inferiorem
2473 de omnibus quae ipse novit. Dicit enim Dionysius, XII cap. Cael.
2474 Hier., quod Angeli superiores habent scientiam magis universalem,
2475 inferiores vero magis particularem et subiectam. Sed plura
2476 continentur sub scientia universali quam sub particulari. Ergo non
2477 omnia quae sciunt superiores Angeli, cognoscunt inferiores per
2478 superiorum illuminationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p3">
2479 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,
2480 whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring,
2481 as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King
2482 of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior
2483 angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so.
2484 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32879] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2485 Magister dicit, in XI distinctione II Sent., quod superiores Angeli
2486 cognoverunt a saeculis mysterium incarnationis, inferioribus vero
2487 ignotum fuit usquequo completum est. Quod videtur per hoc quod,
2488 quibusdam Angelis quaerentibus, quis est iste rex gloriae? Quasi
2489 ignorantibus, alii respondent, quasi scientes, dominus virtutum
2490 ipse est rex gloriae, ut Dionysius exponit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc
2491 autem non esset, si superiores Angeli illuminarent inferiores de
2492 omnibus quae ipsi cognoscunt. Non ergo eos illuminant de omnibus
2493 sibi notis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p4">
2494 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be
2495 unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears
2496 open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things.
2497 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32880] Iª q. 106 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
2498 omnia superiores Angeli inferioribus annuntiant quae cognoscunt,
2499 nihil inferioribus ignotum remanet, quod superiores cognoscant. Non
2500 ergo de cetero superiores poterunt illuminare inferiores. Quod
2501 videtur inconveniens. Non ergo superiores de omnibus inferiores
2502 illuminant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p5">
2503 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there
2504 are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the
2505 inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above
2506 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q106_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>.
2507 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32881] Iª q. 106 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2508 quod Gregorius dicit, quod <i>in illa caelesti patria, licet
2509 quaedam data sint excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur
2510 singulariter</i>. Et Dionysius dicit, XV cap. Cael. Hier., quod
2511 <i>unaquaeque caelestis essentia intelligentiam sibi a superiori
2512 datam, inferiori communicat</i>; ut patet ex auctoritate supra
2513 inducta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q106_A4-p6">
2514 <b>I answer that,</b> Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature
2515 of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So
2516 the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections
2517 to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace
2518 share in the Divine goodness; saying: "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards
2519 of the manifold grace of God" (
2520 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10</a>). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same
2521 to those below them.
2522 </p><p id="FP_Q106_A4-p7"> Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior
2523 ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the
2524 pupil who learns from him.
2525 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 co."><a name="32882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32882] Iª q. 106 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2526 quod omnes creaturae ex divina bonitate participant ut bonum quod
2527 habent, in alia diffundant, nam de ratione boni est quod se aliis
2528 communicet. Et inde est etiam quod agentia corporalia similitudinem
2529 suam aliis tradunt, quantum possibile est. Quanto igitur aliqua
2530 agentia magis in participatione divinae bonitatis constituuntur,
2531 tanto magis perfectiones suas nituntur in alios transfundere,
2532 quantum possibile est. Unde beatus Petrus monet eos qui divinam
2533 bonitatem per gratiam participant, dicens, I Petr. IV,
2534 <i>unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam
2535 administrantes, sicut boni dispensatores multiformis gratiae
2536 Dei</i>. Multo igitur magis sancti Angeli, qui sunt in plenissima
2537 participatione divinae bonitatis, quidquid a Deo percipiunt,
2538 subiectis impartiuntur. Non tamen recipitur ab inferioribus ita
2539 excellenter sicut est in superioribus. Et ideo superiores semper
2540 remanent in altiori ordine, et perfectiorem scientiam habentes.
2541 Sicut unam et eandem rem plenius intelligit magister, quam
2542 discipulus qui ab eo addiscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p8">
2543 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.
2544 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32883] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2545 dicendum quod superiorum Angelorum scientia dicitur esse
2546 universalior, quantum ad eminentiorem modum intelligendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p9">
2547 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation
2548 but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards
2549 when the Mystery was accomplished.
2550 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32884] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2551 dicendum quod verbum Magistri non sic est intelligendum, quod
2552 inferiores Angeli penitus ignoraverint mysterium incarnationis; sed
2553 quia non ita plene cognoverunt sicut superiores, et in eius
2554 cognitione postmodum profecerunt, dum illud mysterium
2555 impleretur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q106_A4-p10">
2556 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the
2557 world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to
2558 the inferior.
2559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 106 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="32885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32885] Iª q. 106 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2560 dicendum quod, usque ad diem iudicii, semper nova aliqua supremis
2561 Angelis revelantur divinitus de his quae pertinent ad dispositionem
2562 mundi, et praecipue ad salutem electorum. Unde semper remanet unde
2563 superiores Angeli inferiores illuminent.</p></div></div></div></div>
2564 <div id="FP_Q107" class="div3">
2565 <h3 id="FP_Q107-p0.1">Q. 107. THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
2566 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
2567 <p id="FP_Q107-p2"> We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q107-p3"><a href="#FP_Q107_A1"> (1) Whether one angel speaks to another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p4"><a href="#FP_Q107_A2"> (2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p5"><a href="#FP_Q107_A3"> (3) Whether an angel speaks to God?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p6"><a href="#FP_Q107_A4"> (4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?</a></p><p id="FP_Q107-p7"><a href="#FP_Q107_A5"> (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?</a></p>
2568 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 pr."><a name="32886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32886]
2569 Iª q. 107 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
2570 locutionibus Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo,
2571 utrum unus Angelus loquatur alii. Secundo, utrum inferior
2572 superiori. Tertio, utrum Angelus Deo. Quarto, utrum in locutione
2573 Angeli aliquid distantia localis operetur. Quinto, utrum locutionem
2574 unius Angeli ad alterum omnes cognoscant.</p></div></div></div>
2575 <div id="FP_Q107_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A1-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 1. Whether one angel speaks to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p2">
2576 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection
2577 "each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows." Much less, therefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another.
2578 But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to
2579 another.
2580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32887] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
2581 proceditur. Videtur quod unus Angelus alteri non loquatur. Dicit
2582 enim Gregorius, XVIII Moral., quod <i>in statu resurrectionis
2583 uniuscuiusque mentem ab alterius oculis membrorum corpulentia non
2584 abscondit</i>. Multo igitur minus mens unius Angeli absconditur ab
2585 altero. Sed locutio est ad manifestandum alteri quod latet in
2586 mente. Non igitur oportet quod unus Angelus alteri loquatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p3">
2587 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior
2588 speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and
2589 this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
2590 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32888] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2591 duplex est locutio, interior, per quam aliquis sibi ipsi loquitur;
2592 et exterior, per quam aliquis loquitur alteri. Exterior autem
2593 locutio fit per aliquod sensibile signum, puta voce vel nutu vel
2594 aliquo corporis membro, puta lingua vel digito, quae Angelis
2595 competere non possunt. Ergo unus Angelus alteri non loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p4">
2596 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another
2597 to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.
2598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32889] Iª q. 107 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2599 loquens excitat audientem ut attendat suae locutioni. Sed non
2600 videtur per quid unus Angelus excitet alium ad attendendum, hoc
2601 enim fit apud nos aliquo sensibili signo. Ergo unus Angelus non
2602 loquitur alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5">
2603 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
2604 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>): "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels."
2605 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32890] Iª q. 107 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2606 quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, <i>si linguis hominum loquar et
2607 Angelorum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q107_A1-p6">
2608 <b>I answer that,</b> The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): "It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties
2609 of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech."
2610 </p><p id="FP_Q107_A1-p7"> To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above (
2611 <a href="#FP_Q82_A4" id="FP_Q107_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[82], A[4]</a>), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible
2612 object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7);
2613 secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear
2614 that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition
2615 of habit these words occur, "which anyone uses when he wills." So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second
2616 to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either
2617 to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual
2618 consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called "the interior
2619 word." And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel
2620 himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another
2621 only means to make known the mental concept to another.
2622 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 co."><a name="32891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32891] Iª q. 107 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2623 quod in Angelis est aliqua locutio, sed, sicut dicit Gregorius II
2624 Moral., <i>dignum est ut mens nostra, qualitatem corporeae
2625 locutionis excedens, ad sublimes atque incognitos modos locutionis
2626 intimae suspendatur</i>. Ad intelligendum igitur qualiter unus
2627 Angelus alii loquatur, considerandum est quod, sicut supra diximus
2628 cum de actibus et potentiis animae ageretur, voluntas movet
2629 intellectum ad suam operationem. Intelligibile autem est in
2630 intellectu tripliciter, primo quidem, habitualiter, vel secundum
2631 memoriam, ut Augustinus dicit; secundo autem, ut in actu
2632 consideratum vel conceptum; tertio, ut ad aliud relatum. Manifestum
2633 est autem quod de primo gradu in secundum transfertur intelligibile
2634 per imperium voluntatis, unde in definitione habitus dicitur, quo
2635 quis utitur cum voluerit. Similiter autem et de secundo gradu
2636 transfertur in tertium per voluntatem, nam per voluntatem conceptus
2637 mentis ordinatur ad alterum, puta vel ad agendum aliquid, vel ad
2638 manifestandum alteri. Quando autem mens convertit se ad actu
2639 considerandum quod habet in habitu, loquitur aliquis sibi ipsi, nam
2640 ipse conceptus mentis interius verbum vocatur. Ex hoc vero quod
2641 conceptus mentis angelicae ordinatur ad manifestandum alteri, per
2642 voluntatem ipsius Angeli, conceptus mentis unius Angeli innotescit
2643 alteri, et sic loquitur unus Angelus alteri. Nihil est enim aliud
2644 loqui ad alterum, quam conceptum mentis alteri manifestare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8">
2645 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within,
2646 or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to
2647 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?" The other obstacle whereby the mental concept
2648 is excluded from another one's knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens
2649 that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but
2650 some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): "To other eyes we seem to stand aloof
2651 as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the
2652 tongue to show what we really are." But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another
2653 at
2654 once.
2655 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32892] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2656 dicendum quod in nobis interior mentis conceptus quasi duplici
2657 obstaculo clauditur. Primo quidem, ipsa voluntate, quae conceptum
2658 intellectus potest retinere interius, vel ad extra ordinare. Et
2659 quantum ad hoc, mentem unius nullus alius potest videre nisi solus
2660 Deus; secundum illud I Cor. II, <i>quae sunt hominis, nemo novit
2661 nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est</i>. Secundo autem clauditur
2662 mens hominis ab alio homine per grossitiem corporis. Unde cum etiam
2663 voluntas ordinat conceptum mentis ad manifestandum alteri, non
2664 statim cognoscitur ab alio, sed oportet aliquod signum sensibile
2665 adhibere. Et hoc est quod Gregorius dicit, II Moral., <i>alienis
2666 oculis intra secretum mentis, quasi post parietem corporis stamus,
2667 sed cum manifestare nosmetipsos cupimus, quasi per linguae ianuam
2668 egredimur, ut quales sumus intrinsecus, ostendamus</i>. Hoc autem
2669 obstaculum non habet Angelus. Et ideo quam cito vult manifestare
2670 suum conceptum, statim alius cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p9">
2671 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit
2672 an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also
2673 its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power,
2674 whereby he manifests his mental concept.
2675 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32893] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2676 dicendum quod locutio exterior quae fit per vocem, est nobis
2677 necessaria propter obstaculum corporis. Unde non convenit Angelo,
2678 sed sola locutio interior; ad quam pertinet non solum quod loquatur
2679 sibi interius concipiendo, sed etiam quod ordinet per voluntatem ad
2680 alterius manifestationem. Et sic lingua Angelorum metaphorice
2681 dicitur ipsa virtus Angeli, qua conceptum suum manifestat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A1-p10">
2682 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one
2683 ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other,
2684 and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as
2685 sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the
2686 sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.
2687 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32894] Iª q. 107 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2688 dicendum quod, quantum ad Angelos bonos, qui semper se invicem
2689 vident in verbo, non esset necessarium ponere aliquid excitativum,
2690 quia sicut unus semper videt alium, ita semper videt quidquid in eo
2691 est ad se ordinatum. Sed quia etiam in statu naturae conditae sibi
2692 invicem loqui poterant, et mali Angeli etiam nunc sibi invicem
2693 loquuntur; dicendum est quod, sicut sensus movetur a sensibili, ita
2694 intellectus movetur ab intelligibili. Sicut ergo per signum
2695 sensibile excitatur sensus, ita per aliquam virtutem intelligibilem
2696 potest excitari mens Angeli ad attendendum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A2-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 2. Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2">
2697 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (
2698 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.1" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:1</a>), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby
2699 the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained (
2700 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q107_A2-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.
2701 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32895] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
2702 proceditur. Videtur quod inferior Angelus superiori non loquatur.
2703 Quia super illud I Cor. XIII, <i>si linguis hominum loquar et
2704 Angelorum</i>, dicit Glossa quod locutiones Angelorum sunt
2705 illuminationes, quibus superiores illuminant inferiores. Sed
2706 inferiores nunquam illuminant superiores, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
2707 nec inferiores superioribus loquuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p3">
2708 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as was said above (
2709 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q107_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and
2710 to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows.
2711 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32896] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2712 supra dictum est quod illuminare nihil est aliud quam illud quod
2713 est alicui manifestum, alteri manifestare. Sed hoc idem est loqui.
2714 Ergo idem est loqui, et illuminare, et sic idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p4">
2715 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): "God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and
2716 invisible things." But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic
2717 speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.
2718 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32897] Iª q. 107 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2719 Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod <i>Deus ad Angelos loquitur, eo
2720 ipso quod eorum cordibus occulta sua invisibilia ostendit</i>. Sed
2721 hoc ipsum est illuminare. Ergo omnis Dei locutio est illuminatio.
2722 Pari ergo ratione, omnis Angeli locutio est illuminatio. Nullo ergo
2723 modo Angelus inferior superiori loqui potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p5">
2724 <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: "Who is this King of
2725 Glory?"
2726 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32898] Iª q. 107 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2727 quod, sicut Dionysius exponit VII Cael. Hier., inferiores Angeli
2728 superioribus dixerunt, quis est iste rex gloriae?</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q107_A2-p6">
2729 <b>I answer that,</b> The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an
2730 angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said
2731 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such
2732 a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be
2733 reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby
2734 we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth;
2735 the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for
2736 example, when one man says to another: "Heaven was created by God"; or, "Man is an animal." The manifestation, however, of
2737 what
2738 depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when
2739 one says to another: "I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that." The reason is that the created will is not a light,
2740 nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an
2741 enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect;
2742 but
2743 only to know the truth in reality.
2744 </p><p id="FP_Q107_A2-p7"> Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment,
2745 which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will
2746 as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed
2747 to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and
2748 the inferior speak to the superior.
2749 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 co."><a name="32899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32899] Iª q. 107 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2750 quod Angeli inferiores superioribus loqui possunt. Ad cuius
2751 evidentiam, considerandum est quod omnis illuminatio est locutio in
2752 Angelis, sed non omnis locutio est illuminatio. Quia sicut dictum
2753 est, Angelum loqui Angelo nihil aliud est quam conceptum suum
2754 ordinare ad hoc ut ei innotescat, per propriam voluntatem. Ea vero
2755 quae mente concipiuntur, ad duplex principium referri possunt,
2756 scilicet ad ipsum Deum, qui est prima veritas; et ad voluntatem
2757 intelligentis, per quam aliquid actu consideramus. Quia vero
2758 veritas est lumen intellectus, et regula omnis veritatis est ipse
2759 Deus; manifestatio eius quod mente concipitur, secundum quod
2760 dependet a prima veritate, et locutio est et illuminatio; puta si
2761 unus homo dicat alii, caelum est a Deo creatum, vel, homo est
2762 animal. Sed manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate
2763 intelligentis, non potest dici illuminatio, sed locutio tantum;
2764 puta si aliquis alteri dicat, volo hoc addiscere, volo hoc vel
2765 illud facere. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas creata non est lux,
2766 nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem, unde communicare ea
2767 quae sunt a voluntate creata, inquantum huiusmodi, non est
2768 illuminare. Non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quid
2769 tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere, sed solum quid rei
2770 veritas habeat. Manifestum est autem quod Angeli dicuntur
2771 superiores vel inferiores per comparationem ad hoc principium quod
2772 est Deus. Et ideo illuminatio, quae dependet a principio quod est
2773 Deus, solum per superiores Angelos ad inferiores deducitur. Sed in
2774 ordine ad principium quod est voluntas, ipse volens est primus et
2775 supremus. Et ideo manifestatio eorum quae ad voluntatem pertinent,
2776 per ipsum volentem deducitur ad alios quoscumque. Et quantum ad
2777 hoc, et superiores inferioribus, et inferiores superioribus
2778 loquuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p8"> <b>Reply to Objections 1
2779 &amp; 2:</b> From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32900] Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
2780 solutio ad primum, et ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A2-p9">
2781 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the
2782 perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the
2783 angels, as was explained above.
2784 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32901] Iª q. 107 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2785 dicendum quod omnis Dei locutio ad Angelos est illuminatio, quia
2786 cum voluntas Dei sit regula veritatis, etiam scire quid Deus velit,
2787 pertinet ad perfectionem et illuminationem mentis creatae. Sed non
2788 est eadem ratio de voluntate Angeli, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A3-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 3. Whether an angel speaks to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p2">
2789 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make
2790 known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.
2791 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32902] Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
2792 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus Deo non loquatur. Locutio enim est
2793 ad manifestandum aliquid alteri. Sed Angelus nihil potest
2794 manifestare Deo, qui omnia novit. Ergo Angelus non loquitur
2795 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p3">
2796 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above
2797 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways
2798 appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks
2799 to God.
2800 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32903] Iª q. 107 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2801 loqui est ordinare conceptum intellectus ad alterum, ut dictum est.
2802 Sed Angelus semper conceptum suae mentis ordinat in Deum. Si ergo
2803 aliquando Deo loquitur, semper Deo loquitur, quod potest videri
2804 alicui inconveniens, cum aliquando Angelus Angelo loquatur. Videtur
2805 ergo quod Angelus nunquam loquatur Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4">
2806 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
2807 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.12" target="asv">Zech. 1:12</a>): "The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem." Therefore an
2808 angel speaks to God.
2809 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32904] Iª q. 107 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2810 quod dicitur Zachar. I, <i>respondit Angelus domini, et dixit,
2811 domine exercituum, usquequo non misereberis Ierusalem?</i> Loquitur
2812 ergo Angelus Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p5">
2813 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
2814 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner.
2815 In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in
2816 human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns
2817 the truth, or of whatever
2818 depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing
2819 is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech
2820 the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to
2821 be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
2822 speak
2823 to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration."
2824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 co."><a name="32905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32905] Iª q. 107 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2825 quod, sicut dictum est, locutio Angeli est per hoc, quod conceptus
2826 mentis ordinatur ad alterum. Sed aliquid ordinatur ad alterum
2827 dupliciter. Uno modo, ad hoc quod communicet alteri; sicut in rebus
2828 naturalibus agens ordinatur ad patiens et in locutione humana
2829 doctor ordinatur ad discipulum. Et quantum ad hoc, nullo modo
2830 Angelus loquitur Deo, neque de his quae ad rerum veritatem
2831 pertinent, neque de his quae dependent a voluntate creata, quia
2832 Deus est omnis veritatis et omnis voluntatis principium et
2833 conditor. Alio modo ordinatur aliquid ad alterum, ut ab eo aliquid
2834 accipiat; sicut in rebus naturalibus passivum ad agens, et in
2835 locutione humana discipulus ad magistrum. Et hoc modo Angelus
2836 loquitur Deo, vel consultando divinam voluntatem de agendis; vel
2837 eius excellentiam, quam nunquam comprehendit, admirando; sicut
2838 Gregorius dicit, II Moral., quod <i>Angeli loquuntur Deo, cum per
2839 hoc quod super semetipsos respiciunt, in motum admirationis
2840 surgunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p6">
2841 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose
2842 of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.
2843 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32906] Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2844 dicendum quod locutio non semper est ad manifestandum alteri; sed
2845 quandoque ad hoc ordinatur finaliter, ut loquenti aliquid
2846 manifestetur; sicut cum discipulus quaerit aliquid a magistro.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A3-p7">
2847 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting
2848 Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.
2849 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32907] Iª q. 107 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2850 dicendum quod locutione qua Angeli loquuntur Deo laudantes ipsum et
2851 admirantes, semper Angeli Deo loquuntur. Sed locutione qua eius
2852 sapientiam consulunt super agendis, tunc ei loquuntur, quando
2853 aliquod novum per eos agendum occurrit, super quo desiderant
2854 illuminari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A4-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 4. Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p2">
2855 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): "An angel works
2856 where he is." But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's
2857 speech is limited by the bounds of that place.
2858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32908] Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
2859 proceditur. Videtur quod localis distantia operetur aliquid in
2860 locutione angelica. Sicut enim dicit Damascenus, <i>Angelus ubi
2861 est, ibi operatur</i>. Locutio autem est quaedam operatio Angeli.
2862 Cum ergo Angelus sit in determinato loco, videtur quod usque ad
2863 determinatam loci distantiam Angelus loqui possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3">
2864 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that "they cried one
2865 to another" (
2866 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.
2867 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32909] Iª q. 107 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2868 clamor loquentis fit propter distantiam audientis. Sed Isaiae VI
2869 dicitur de Seraphim, quod clamabat alter ad alterum. Ergo videtur
2870 quod in locutione Angelorum aliquid operetur localis distantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4">
2871 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (
2872 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.24" target="asv">Lk. 16:24</a>). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.
2873 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32910] Iª q. 107 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2874 quod, sicut dicitur Luc. XVI, dives in Inferno positus loquebatur
2875 Abrahae, non impediente locali distantia. Multo igitur minus
2876 localis distantia potest impedire locutionem unius Angeli ad
2877 alterum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p5">
2878 <b>I answer that,</b> The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above (
2879 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the "here and now." For even our own intellectual operation
2880 takes place by abstraction from the "here and now," except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at
2881 all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from "here and now," neither difference of time
2882 nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.
2883 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 co."><a name="32911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32911] Iª q. 107 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2884 quod locutio Angeli in intellectuali operatione consistit, ut ex
2885 dictis patet. Intellectualis autem operatio Angeli omnino abstracta
2886 est a loco et tempore, nam etiam nostra intellectualis operatio est
2887 per abstractionem ab hic et nunc, nisi per accidens ex parte
2888 phantasmatum, quae in Angelis nulla sunt. In eo autem quod est
2889 omnino abstractum a loco et tempore, nihil operatur neque temporis
2890 diversitas, neque loci distantia. Unde in locutione Angeli nullum
2891 impedimentum facit distantia loci.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p6">
2892 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists
2893 in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel
2894 seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is
2895 to perceive his speech.
2896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="32912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32912] Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
2897 dicendum quod locutio Angeli, sicut dictum est, est locutio
2898 interior, quae tamen ab alio percipitur, et ideo est in Angelo
2899 loquente, et per consequens ubi est Angelus loquens. Sed sicut
2900 distantia localis non impedit quin unus Angelus alium videre
2901 possit; ita etiam non impedit quin percipiat quod in eo ad se
2902 ordinatur, quod est eius locutionem percipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A4-p7">
2903 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of
2904 what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): "The less one desires, the less
2905 one cries out."
2906 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="32913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32913] Iª q. 107 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2907 dicendum quod clamor ille non est vocis corporeae, qui fit propter
2908 distantiam loci; sed significat magnitudinem rei quae dicebatur,
2909 vel magnitudinem affectus, secundum quod dicit Gregorius, II
2910 Moral., <i>tanto quisque minus clamat, quanto minus
2911 desiderat</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q107_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q107_A5-p0.1">Q. 107. A. 5. Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p2">
2912 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do
2913 not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained
2914 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A4" id="FP_Q107_A5-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another.
2915 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32914] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
2916 proceditur. Videtur quod locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum omnes
2917 cognoscant. Quod enim unius hominis locutionem non omnes audiant,
2918 facit inaequalis loci distantia. Sed in locutione Angeli nihil
2919 operatur localis distantia, ut dictum est. Ergo uno Angelo loquente
2920 ad alterum, omnes percipiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p3">
2921 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known
2922 by one, it is for the same reason known by all.
2923 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32915] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2924 omnes Angeli communicant in virtute intelligendi. Si ergo conceptus
2925 mentis unius ordinatus ad alterum cognoscitur ab uno, pari ratione
2926 cognoscitur ab aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p4">
2927 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because,
2928 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): "Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others." Therefore
2929 the speech of one angel to another extends to all.
2930 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32916] Iª q. 107 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2931 illuminatio est quaedam species locutionis. Sed illuminatio unius
2932 Angeli ab altero, pervenit ad omnes Angelos, quia, ut Dionysius
2933 dicit XV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>unaquaeque caelestis essentia
2934 intelligentiam sibi traditam aliis communicat</i>. Ergo et locutio
2935 unius Angeli ad alterum, ad omnes perducitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p5">
2936 <b>On the contrary,</b> One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.
2937 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32917] Iª q. 107 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
2938 quod unus homo potest alteri soli loqui. Multo igitur magis hoc in
2939 Angelis esse potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p6">
2940 <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained (
2941 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A1" id="FP_Q107_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his
2942 will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of
2943 one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another;
2944 whereas others do not, not through the
2945 obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.
2946 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 co."><a name="32918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32918] Iª q. 107 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2947 quod, sicut supra dictum est, conceptus mentis unius Angeli percipi
2948 potest ab altero, per hoc quod ille cuius est conceptus, sua
2949 voluntate ordinat ipsum ad alterum. Potest autem ex aliqua causa
2950 ordinari aliquid ad unum, et non ad alterum. Et ideo potest
2951 conceptus unius ab aliquo uno cognosci, et non ab aliis. Et sic
2952 locutionem unius Angeli ad alterum potest percipere unus absque
2953 aliis, non quidem impediente distantia locali, sed hoc faciente
2954 voluntaria ordinatione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p7"> From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32919] Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Unde patet
2955 responsio ad primum et secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q107_A5-p8">
2956 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels;
2957 and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created
2958 will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.
2959 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 107 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32920] Iª q. 107 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
2960 dicendum quod illuminatio est de his quae emanant a prima regula
2961 veritatis, quae est principium commune omnium Angelorum, et ideo
2962 illuminationes sunt omnibus communes. Sed locutio potest esse de
2963 his quae ordinantur ad principium voluntatis creatae, quod est
2964 proprium unicuique Angelo, et ideo non oportet quod huiusmodi
2965 locutiones sint omnibus communes.</p></div></div></div></div>
2966 <div id="FP_Q108" class="div3">
2967 <h3 id="FP_Q108-p0.1">Q. 108. OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
2968 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
2969 <p id="FP_Q108-p2"> We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above (
2970 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q108-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.
2971 </p><p id="FP_Q108-p3"> Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q108-p4"><a href="#FP_Q108_A1"> (1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p5"><a href="#FP_Q108_A2"> (2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p6"><a href="#FP_Q108_A3"> (3) Whether in one order there are many angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p7"><a href="#FP_Q108_A4"> (4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p8"><a href="#FP_Q108_A5"> (5) Of the names and properties of each order.</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p9"><a href="#FP_Q108_A6"> (6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p10"><a href="#FP_Q108_A7"> (7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</a></p><p id="FP_Q108-p11"><a href="#FP_Q108_A8"> (8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</a></p>
2972 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 pr."><a name="32921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32921]
2973 Iª q. 108 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
2974 ordinatione Angelorum secundum hierarchias et ordines, dictum est
2975 enim quod superiores inferiores illuminant, et non e converso. Et
2976 circa hoc quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum omnes Angeli sint unius
2977 hierarchiae. Secundo, utrum in una hierarchia sit unus tantum ordo.
2978 Tertio, utrum in uno ordine sint plures Angeli. Quarto, utrum
2979 distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum sit a natura. Quinto, de
2980 nominibus et proprietatibus singulorum ordinum. Sexto, de
2981 comparatione ordinum ad invicem. Septimo, utrum ordines durent post
2982 diem iudicii. Octavo, utrum homines assumantur ad ordines
2983 Angelorum.</p></div></div></div>
2984 <div id="FP_Q108_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A1-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 1. Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p2">
2985 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident
2986 that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the
2987 Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality,
2988 it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
2989 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32922] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
2990 proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius hierarchiae. Cum
2991 enim Angeli sint supremi inter creaturas, oportet dicere quod sint
2992 optime dispositi. Sed optima dispositio est multitudinis secundum
2993 quod continetur sub uno principatu; ut patet per philosophum, XII
2994 Metaphys., et in III Politic. Cum ergo hierarchia nihil sit aliud
2995 quam sacer principatus, videtur quod omnes Angeli sint unius
2996 hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p3">
2997 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that "hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action." But all the angels agree in one
2998 order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.
2999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32923] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3000 Dionysius dicit, in III cap. Cael. Hier., quod <i>hierarchia est
3001 ordo, scientia et actio</i>. Sed omnes Angeli conveniunt in uno
3002 ordine ad Deum, quem cognoscunt, et a quo in suis actionibus
3003 regulantur. Ergo omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p4">
3004 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy.
3005 Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.
3006 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32924] Iª q. 108 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3007 sacer principatus, qui dicitur hierarchia, invenitur in hominibus
3008 et Angelis. Sed omnes homines sunt unius hierarchiae. Ergo etiam
3009 omnes Angeli sunt unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p5">
3010 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.
3011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32925] Iª q. 108 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
3012 quod Dionysius, VI cap. Cael. Hier., distinguit tres hierarchias
3013 Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A1-p6">
3014 <b>I answer that,</b> Hierarchy means a "sacred" principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and
3015 the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also
3016 of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can
3017 be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): "There are
3018 two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked." But if we consider the principality
3019 on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be "one" accordingly as the multitude
3020 can be subject in "one" way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince
3021 belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws
3022 and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels;
3023 for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says
3024 (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner
3025 we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above (
3026 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A3" id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a>), in treating of the
3027 angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal
3028 knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be
3029 considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs
3030 to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, "as it were, placed in the vestibule of God," as Dionysius
3031 says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already
3032 multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things
3033 as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat
3034 of each of the orders
3035 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q108_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the
3036 multitude of subjects.
3037 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A1-p7"> Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons,
3038 and call it the "supercelestial" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is
3039 no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): "The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed,
3040 enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect"; which far be it from us to apply to
3041 the Divine Persons.
3042 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 co."><a name="32926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32926] Iª q. 108 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3043 quod hierarchia est sacer principatus, ut dictum est. In nomine
3044 autem principatus duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipse princeps, et
3045 multitudo ordinata sub principe. Quia igitur unus est Deus princeps
3046 non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam hominum, et totius creaturae;
3047 ideo non solum omnium Angelorum, sed etiam totius rationalis
3048 creaturae, quae sacrorum particeps esse potest, una est hierarchia,
3049 secundum quod Augustinus dicit, in XII de Civ. Dei <i>duas esse
3050 civitates, hoc est societates, unam in bonis Angelis et hominibus,
3051 alteram in malis</i>. Sed si consideretur principatus ex parte
3052 multitudinis ordinatae sub principe, sic unus principatus dicitur
3053 secundum quod multitudo uno et eodem modo potest gubernationem
3054 principis recipere. Quae vero non possunt secundum eundem modum
3055 gubernari a principe, ad diversos principatus pertinent, sicut sub
3056 uno rege sunt diversae civitates, quae diversis reguntur legibus et
3057 ministris. Manifestum est autem quod homines alio modo divinas
3058 illuminationes percipiunt quam Angeli, nam Angeli percipiunt eas in
3059 intelligibili puritate, homines vero percipiunt eas sub sensibilium
3060 similitudinibus, ut Dionysius dicit I cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo
3061 oportuit distingui humanam hierarchiam ab angelica. Et per eundem
3062 modum in Angelis tres hierarchiae distinguuntur. Dictum est enim
3063 supra, dum de cognitione Angelorum ageretur, quod superiores Angeli
3064 habent universaliorem cognitionem veritatis quam inferiores.
3065 Huiusmodi autem universalis acceptio cognitionis secundum tres
3066 gradus in Angelis distingui potest. Possunt enim rationes rerum de
3067 quibus Angeli illuminantur, considerari tripliciter. Primo quidem,
3068 secundum quod procedunt a primo principio universali, quod est
3069 Deus, et iste modus convenit primae hierarchiae, quae immediate ad
3070 Deum extenditur, et quasi in vestibulis Dei collocatur, ut
3071 Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Secundo vero, prout huiusmodi
3072 rationes dependent ab universalibus causis creatis, quae iam aliquo
3073 modo multiplicantur, et hic modus convenit secundae hierarchiae.
3074 Tertio autem modo, secundum quod huiusmodi rationes applicantur
3075 singulis rebus, et prout dependent a propriis causis, et hic modus
3076 convenit infimae hierarchiae. Quod plenius patebit, cum de singulis
3077 ordinibus agetur. Sic igitur distinguuntur hierarchiae ex parte
3078 multitudinis subiectae. Unde manifestum est eos errare, et contra
3079 intentionem Dionysii loqui, qui ponunt in divinis personis
3080 hierarchiam quam vocant supercaelestem. In divinis enim personis
3081 est quidam ordo naturae, sed non hierarchiae. Nam, ut Dionysius
3082 dicit III cap. Cael. Hier., <i>ordo hierarchiae est alios quidem
3083 purgari et illuminari et perfici, alios autem purgare et illuminare
3084 et perficere</i>. Quod absit ut in divinis personis ponamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p8">
3085 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the
3086 Philosopher asserts in those passages.
3087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32927] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3088 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de principatu ex parte principis,
3089 quia optimum est quod multitudo regatur ab uno principe, ut
3090 philosophus in praedictis locis intendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p9">
3091 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way---that is, in His essence---there is no hierarchical distinction
3092 among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained.
3093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32928] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3094 dicendum quod, quantum ad cognitionem ipsius Dei, quem omnes uno
3095 modo, scilicet per essentiam, vident, non distinguuntur in Angelis
3096 hierarchiae, sed quantum ad rationes rerum creatarum, ut dictum
3097 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A1-p10">
3098 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence
3099 the same argument does not apply to both.
3100 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="32929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32929] Iª q. 108 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3101 dicendum quod omnes homines sunt unius speciei, et unus modus
3102 intelligendi est eis connaturalis, non sic autem est in Angelis.
3103 Unde non est similis ratio.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A2-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 2. Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p2">
3104 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined
3105 is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there
3106 is not one hierarchy only, but many.
3107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="32930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32930] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
3108 proceditur. Videtur quod in una hierarchia non sint plures ordines.
3109 Multiplicata enim definitione, multiplicatur et definitum. Sed
3110 hierarchia, ut Dionysius dicit, est ordo. Si ergo sunt multi
3111 ordines, non erit una hierarchia, sed multae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p3">
3112 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But
3113 among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for "nothing is possessed individually" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore
3114 there are not different orders of angels.
3115 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="32931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32931] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3116 diversi ordines sunt diversi gradus. Sed gradus in spiritualibus
3117 constituuntur secundum diversa dona spiritualia. Sed in Angelis
3118 omnia dona spiritualia sunt communia, quia nihil ibi singulariter
3119 possidetur. Ergo non sunt diversi ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p4">
3120 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of "cleansing," "enlightening,"
3121 and "perfecting." For the order of deacons is "cleansing," the order of priests, is "enlightening," and of bishops "perfecting,"
3122 as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction
3123 of orders among the angels.
3124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="32932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32932] Iª q. 108 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in
3125 ecclesiastica hierarchia distinguuntur ordines secundum purgare,
3126 illuminare et perficere, nam ordo diaconorum est purgativus,
3127 sacerdotum illuminativus, episcoporum perfectivus, ut Dionysius
3128 dicit V cap. Eccles. Hier. Sed quilibet Angelus purgat, illuminat
3129 et perficit. Non ergo est distinctio ordinum in Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5">
3130 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
3131 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) that "God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion": which are the various orders
3132 of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained
3133 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q108_A2-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>.
3134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 s. c."><a name="32933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32933] Iª q. 108 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
3135 quod apostolus dicit ad Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit Christum
3136 hominem supra <i>omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et
3137 dominationem</i>; qui sunt diversi ordines Angelorum, et quidam
3138 eorum ad unam hierarchiam pertinent, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p6">
3139 <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality---that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince.
3140 Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy
3141 requires diversity of orders.
3142 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p7"> This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different
3143 orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and
3144 another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth.
3145 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A2-p8"> But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has
3146 a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as
3147 the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus
3148 honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their
3149 actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three---namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so
3150 in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).
3151 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 co."><a name="32934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32934] Iª q. 108 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3152 quod, sicut dictum est, una hierarchia est unus principatus, idest
3153 una multitudo ordinata uno modo sub principis gubernatione. Non
3154 autem esset multitudo ordinata, sed confusa, si in multitudine
3155 diversi ordines non essent. Ipsa ergo ratio hierarchiae requirit
3156 ordinum diversitatem. Quae quidem diversitas ordinum secundum
3157 diversa officia et actus consideratur. Sicut patet quod in una
3158 civitate sunt diversi ordines secundum diversos actus, nam alius
3159 est ordo iudicantium, alius pugnantium, alius laborantium in agris,
3160 et sic de aliis. Sed quamvis multi sint unius civitatis ordines,
3161 omnes tamen ad tres possunt reduci, secundum quod quaelibet
3162 multitudo perfecta habet principium, medium et finem. Unde et in
3163 civitatibus triplex ordo hominum invenitur, quidam enim sunt
3164 supremi, ut optimates; quidam autem sunt infimi, ut vilis populus;
3165 quidam autem sunt medii, ut populus honorabilis. Sic igitur et in
3166 qualibet hierarchia angelica ordines distinguuntur secundum
3167 diversos actus et officia; et omnis ista diversitas ad tria
3168 reducitur, scilicet ad summum, medium et infimum. Et propter hoc in
3169 qualibet hierarchia Dionysius ponit tres ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p9">
3170 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy
3171 is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are
3172 so called.
3173 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="32935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32935] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3174 dicendum quod ordo dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, ipsa ordinatio
3175 comprehendens sub se diversos gradus, et hoc modo hierarchia
3176 dicitur ordo. Alio modo dicitur ordo gradus unus, et sic dicuntur
3177 plures ordines unius hierarchiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p10">
3178 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than
3179 by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate
3180 it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone
3181 can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect
3182 grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among
3183 the angels, according to their different offices and actions.
3184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="32936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32936] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3185 dicendum quod in societate Angelorum omnia possidentur communiter;
3186 sed tamen quaedam excellentius habentur a quibusdam quam ab aliis.
3187 Unumquodque autem perfectius habetur ab eo qui potest illud
3188 communicare, quam ab eo qui non potest, sicut perfectius est
3189 calidum quod potest calefacere, quam quod non potest; et perfectius
3190 scit qui potest docere, quam qui non potest. Et quanto perfectius
3191 donum aliquis communicare potest, tanto in perfectiori gradu est,
3192 sicut in perfectiori gradu magisterii est qui potest docere
3193 altiorem scientiam. Et secundum hanc similitudinem consideranda est
3194 diversitas graduum vel ordinum in Angelis, secundum diversa officia
3195 et actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11">
3196 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, "He that is the lesser in the
3197 kingdom of heaven, is greater than he"---namely, John the Baptist, than whom "there hath not risen a greater among them that
3198 are born of women" (
3199 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher
3200 way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the
3201 heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.
3202 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="32937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32937] Iª q. 108 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3203 dicendum quod inferior Angelus est superior supremo homine nostrae
3204 hierarchiae; secundum illud Matth. XI, <i>qui minor est in regno
3205 caelorum, maior est illo</i>, scilicet Ioanne Baptista, quo nullus
3206 maior inter natos mulierum surrexit. Unde minor Angelus caelestis
3207 hierarchiae potest non solum purgare sed illuminare et perficere,
3208 et altiori modo quam ordines nostrae hierarchiae. Et sic secundum
3209 distinctionem harum actionum non distinguuntur caelestes ordines;
3210 sed secundum alias differentias actionum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A3-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 3. Whether there are many angels in one order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p2">
3211 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above (
3212 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q108_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order.
3213 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="32938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32938] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
3214 proceditur. Videtur quod in uno ordine non sint plures Angeli.
3215 Dictum est enim supra omnes Angelos inaequales esse ad invicem. Sed
3216 unius ordinis esse dicuntur quae sunt aequalia. Ergo plures Angeli
3217 non sunt unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p3">
3218 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs
3219 to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs
3220 to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by
3221 their offices, as stated above
3222 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, several angels in one order
3223 would be superfluous.
3224 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="32939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32939] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod
3225 potest sufficienter fieri per unum, superfluum est quod fiat per
3226 multa. Sed illud quod pertinet ad unum officium angelicum,
3227 sufficienter potest fieri per unum Angelum; multo magis quam per
3228 unum solem sufficienter fit quod pertinet ad officium solis, quanto
3229 perfectior est Angelus caelesti corpore. Si ergo ordines
3230 distinguuntur secundum officia, ut dictum est, superfluum est quod
3231 sint plures Angeli unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p4">
3232 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or
3233 four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than
3234 with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former.
3235 Therefore there are not many angels of one order.
3236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="32940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32940] Iª q. 108 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3237 supra dictum est quod omnes Angeli sunt inaequales. Si ergo plures
3238 Angeli sint unius ordinis, puta tres vel quatuor, infimus
3239 superioris ordinis magis conveniet cum supremo inferioris quam cum
3240 supremo sui ordinis. Et sic non videtur quod magis sit unius
3241 ordinis cum hoc, quam cum illo. Non igitur sunt plures Angeli unius
3242 ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5">
3243 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Seraphim cried to one another" (
3244 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">Is. 6:3</a>). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim.
3245 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 s. c."><a name="32941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32941] Iª q. 108 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
3246 quod Isaiae VI dicitur, quod Seraphim clamabant alter ad alterum.
3247 Sunt ergo plures Angeli in uno ordine Seraphim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A3-p6">
3248 <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas
3249 he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus,
3250 one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one
3251 order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another;
3252 whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and
3253 in each of the other orders.
3254 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A3-p7"> Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic
3255 offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions
3256 of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much
3257 more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.
3258 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 co."><a name="32942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32942] Iª q. 108 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3259 quod ille qui perfecte cognoscit res aliquas, potest usque ad
3260 minima et actus et virtutes et naturas earum distinguere. Qui autem
3261 cognoscit eas imperfecte, non potest distinguere nisi in
3262 universali, quae quidem distinctio fit per pauciora. Sicut qui
3263 imperfecte cognoscit res naturales, distinguit earum ordines in
3264 universali, ponens in uno ordine caelestia corpora, in alio corpora
3265 inferiora inanimata, in alio plantas, in alio animalia, qui autem
3266 perfectius cognosceret res naturales, posset distinguere et in
3267 ipsis corporibus caelestibus diversos ordines, et in singulis
3268 aliorum. Nos autem imperfecte Angelos cognoscimus, et eorum
3269 officia, ut Dionysius dicit VI cap. Cael. Hier. Unde non possumus
3270 distinguere officia et ordines Angelorum, nisi in communi; secundum
3271 quem modum, multi Angeli sub uno ordine continentur. Si autem
3272 perfecte cognosceremus officia Angelorum, et eorum distinctiones,
3273 perfecte sciremus quod quilibet Angelus habet suum proprium
3274 officium et suum proprium ordinem in rebus, multo magis quam
3275 quaelibet stella, etsi nos lateat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p8">
3276 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely
3277 speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those
3278 who are first, middle, and last.
3279 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="32943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32943] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3280 dicendum quod omnes Angeli unius ordinis sunt aliquo modo aequales,
3281 quantum ad communem similitudinem secundum quam constituuntur in
3282 uno ordine, sed simpliciter non sunt aequales. Unde Dionysius
3283 dicit, X cap. Cael. Hier., quod in uno et eodem ordine Angelorum,
3284 est accipere primos, medios et ultimos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p9">
3285 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.
3286 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="32944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32944] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3287 dicendum quod illa specialis distinctio ordinum et officiorum
3288 secundum quam quilibet Angelus habet proprium officium et ordinem,
3289 est nobis ignota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A3-p10">
3290 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as
3291 regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary
3292 of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin
3293 in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite
3294 limit.
3295 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="32945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32945] Iª q. 108 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3296 dicendum quod, sicut in superficie quae partim est alba et partim
3297 nigra, duae partes quae sunt in confinio albi et nigri, magis
3298 conveniunt secundum situm quam aliquae duae partes albae, minus
3299 tamen secundum qualitatem; ita duo Angeli qui sunt in terminis
3300 duorum ordinum, magis secum conveniunt secundum propinquitatem
3301 naturae, quam unus eorum cum aliquibus aliis sui ordinis; minus
3302 autem secundum idoneitatem ad similia officia, quae quidem
3303 idoneitas usque ad aliquem certum terminum protenditur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A4-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 4. Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p2">
3304 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is "a
3305 sacred principality," and Dionysius places in its definition that it "approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be" (Coel.
3306 Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of
3307 hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.
3308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="32946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32946] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
3309 proceditur. Videtur quod distinctio hierarchiarum et ordinum non
3310 sit a natura in Angelis. Hierarchia enim dicitur sacer principatus,
3311 et in definitione eius Dionysius ponit quod <i>deiforme, quantum
3312 possibile est, similat</i>. Sed sanctitas et deiformitas est in
3313 Angelis per gratiam, non per naturam. Ergo distinctio hierarchiarum
3314 et ordinum in Angelis est per gratiam, non per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3">
3315 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Seraphim are called "burning" or "kindling," as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which
3316 comes not from nature but from grace; for "it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (
3317 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>): "which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic
3318 orders are not from nature, but from grace.
3319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="32947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32947] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3320 Seraphim dicuntur ardentes, vel incendentes, ut Dionysius dicit VII
3321 cap. Cael. Hier. Hoc autem videtur ad caritatem pertinere, quae non
3322 est a natura, sed a gratia, <i>diffunditur enim in cordibus nostris
3323 per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis</i>, ut dicitur ad Rom.
3324 V. <i>Quod non solum ad sanctos homines pertinet, sed etiam de
3325 sanctis Angelis dici potest</i>, ut Augustinus dicit XII de Civ.
3326 Dei. Ergo ordines in Angelis non sunt a natura, sed a gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p4">
3327 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the
3328 gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore
3329 neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.
3330 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="32948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32948] Iª q. 108 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3331 hierarchia ecclesiastica exemplatur a caelesti. Sed ordines in
3332 hominibus non sunt per naturam, sed per donum gratiae, non enim est
3333 a natura quod unus est episcopus, et alius est sacerdos, et alius
3334 diaconus. Ergo neque in Angelis sunt ordines a natura, sed a gratia
3335 tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p5">
3336 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Master says (ii, D. 9) that "an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some
3337 gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts." Therefore the distinction of orders among the
3338 angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.
3339 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 s. c."><a name="32949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32949] Iª q. 108 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
3340 quod Magister dicit, IX dist. II Sent., quod <i>ordo Angelorum
3341 dicitur multitudo caelestium spirituum, qui inter se aliquo munere
3342 gratiae similantur, sicut et naturalium datorum participatione
3343 conveniunt</i>. Distinctio ergo ordinum in Angelis est non solum
3344 secundum dona gratuita, sed etiam secundum dona naturalia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p6">
3345 <b>I answer that,</b> The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels
3346 may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge
3347 and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly,
3348 the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural
3349 powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end
3350 they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the
3351 gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the
3352 capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (
3353 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A6" id="FP_Q108_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[6]</a>). Hence
3354 among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.
3355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 co."><a name="32950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32950] Iª q. 108 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3356 quod ordo gubernationis, qui est ordo multitudinis sub principatu
3357 existentis, attenditur per respectum ad finem. Finis autem
3358 Angelorum potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum facultatem
3359 suae naturae, ut scilicet cognoscant et ament Deum naturali
3360 cognitione et amore. Et secundum respectum ad hunc finem,
3361 distinguuntur ordines Angelorum secundum naturalia dona. Alio modo
3362 potest accipi finis angelicae multitudinis supra naturalem
3363 facultatem eorum, qui consistit in visione divinae essentiae, et in
3364 immobili fruitione bonitatis ipsius; ad quem finem pertingere non
3365 possunt nisi per gratiam. Unde secundum respectum ad hunc finem,
3366 ordines distinguuntur in Angelis completive quidem secundum dona
3367 gratuita, dispositive autem secundum dona naturalia, quia Angelis
3368 data sunt dona gratuita secundum capacitatem naturalium, quod non
3369 est in hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Unde in hominibus
3370 distinguuntur ordines secundum dona gratuita tantum, et non
3371 secundum naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A4-p7"> From the above the replies to the objections are evident.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="32951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32951] Iª q. 108 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
3372 patet responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A5-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 5. Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p2">
3373 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly
3374 virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly
3375 named.
3376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="32952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32952] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
3377 proceditur. Videtur quod ordines Angelorum non convenienter
3378 nominentur. Omnes enim caelestes spiritus dicuntur et Angeli et
3379 virtutes caelestes. Sed nomina communia inconvenienter aliquibus
3380 appropriantur. Ergo inconvenienter nominatur unus ordo Angelorum,
3381 et alius virtutum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3">
3382 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, "Know ye that the Lord He is God" (
3383 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.3" target="asv">Ps. 99:3</a>). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called "Dominations."
3384 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="32953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32953] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, esse
3385 dominum est proprium Dei; secundum illud Psal. XCIX <i>scitote
3386 quoniam dominus ipse est Deus</i>. Ergo inconvenienter unus ordo
3387 caelestium spirituum dominationes vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p4">
3388 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the name "Domination" seems to imply government and likewise the names "Principalities" and "Powers." Therefore
3389 these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.
3390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="32954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32954] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3391 nomen dominationis ad gubernationem pertinere videtur. Similiter
3392 autem et nomen principatuum, et potestatum. Inconvenienter ergo
3393 tribus ordinibus haec tria nomina imponuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p5">
3394 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the
3395 "Principalities."
3396 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="32955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32955] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
3397 Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli. Non ergo hoc nomen
3398 debet imponi alii ordini quam ordini principatuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p6">
3399 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the name "Seraphim" is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name "Cherubim" from knowledge. But
3400 charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders.
3401 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="32956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32956] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
3402 nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore qui ad caritatem pertinet, nomen
3403 autem Cherubim imponitur a scientia. Caritas autem et scientia sunt
3404 dona communia omnibus Angelis. Non ergo debent esse nomina
3405 specialium ordinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p7">
3406 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.
3407 Therefore there ought not to be any order of "Thrones" besides the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim." Therefore it appears that the
3408 orders of angels are not properly styled.
3409 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 arg. 6"><a name="32957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32957] Iª q. 108 a. 5 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
3410 throni dicuntur sedes. Sed ex hoc ipso Deus in creatura rationali
3411 sedere dicitur, quod ipsum cognoscit et amat. Non ergo debet esse
3412 alius ordo thronorum ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Sic igitur
3413 videtur quod inconvenienter ordines Angelorum nominentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8"> <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name "Seraphim" is found in
3414 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.2" target="asv"> Is. 6:2</a>; the name "Cherubim" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); "Thrones" in
3415 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Col.1.16" target="asv"> Col. 1:16</a>; "Dominations," "Virtues," "Powers," and "Principalities" are mentioned in
3416 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.21" target="asv"> Eph. 1:21</a>; the name "Archangels" in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name "Angels" is found in many places of
3417 Scripture.
3418 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 s. c."><a name="32958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32958] Iª q. 108 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
3419 auctoritas sacrae Scripturae, quae sic eos nominat. Nomen enim
3420 Seraphim ponitur Isaiae VI; nomen Cherubim Ezech. I; nomen
3421 thronorum, Coloss. I; dominationes autem et virtutes et potestates
3422 et principatus ponuntur Ephes. I; nomen autem Archangeli ponitur in
3423 canonica Iudae, nomina autem Angelorum in pluribus Scripturae
3424 locis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p9">
3425 <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of
3426 each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things,
3427 something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is
3428 said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its
3429 nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner,
3430 as we have stated (
3431 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q108_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[2]</a>) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not
3432 fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating
3433 its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates
3434 imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we
3435 wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter
3436 is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation;
3437 nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of
3438 a man,
3439 and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.
3440 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p10"> So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are
3441 all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior
3442 perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely
3443 the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of
3444 excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.
3445 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p11"> So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections
3446 they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior
3447 ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest;
3448 by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities
3449 preside over the good spirits themselves."
3450 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 co."><a name="32959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32959] Iª q. 108 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3451 quod in nominatione angelicorum ordinum, considerare oportet quod
3452 <i>propria nomina singulorum ordinum proprietates eorum
3453 designant</i>, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ad videndum
3454 autem quae sit proprietas cuiuslibet ordinis, considerare oportet
3455 quod in rebus ordinatis tripliciter aliquid esse contingit,
3456 scilicet per proprietatem, per excessum, et per participationem.
3457 Per proprietatem autem dicitur esse aliquid in re aliqua, quod
3458 adaequatur et proportionatur naturae ipsius. Per excessum autem,
3459 quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, est minus quam res cui
3460 attribuitur, sed tamen convenit illi rei per quendam excessum;
3461 sicut dictum est de omnibus nominibus quae attribuuntur Deo. Per
3462 participationem autem, quando illud quod attribuitur alicui, non
3463 plenarie invenitur in eo, sed deficienter; sicut sancti homines
3464 participative dicuntur dii. Si ergo aliquid nominari debeat nomine
3465 designante proprietatem ipsius, non debet nominari ab eo quod
3466 imperfecte participat, neque ab eo quod excedenter habet; sed ab eo
3467 quod est sibi quasi coaequatum. Sicut si quis velit proprie
3468 nominare hominem, dicet eum substantiam rationalem, non autem
3469 substantiam intellectualem, quod est proprium nomen Angeli, quia
3470 simplex intelligentia convenit Angelo per proprietatem, homini vero
3471 per participationem; neque substantiam sensibilem, quod est nomen
3472 bruti proprium, quia sensus est minus quam id quod est proprium
3473 homini, et convenit homini excedenter prae aliis animalibus. Sic
3474 igitur considerandum est in ordinibus Angelorum, quod omnes
3475 spirituales perfectiones sunt omnibus Angelis communes et quod
3476 omnes abundantius existunt in superioribus quam in inferioribus.
3477 Sed cum in ipsis etiam perfectionibus sit quidam gradus, superior
3478 perfectio attribuitur superiori ordini per proprietatem, inferiori
3479 vero per participationem, e converso autem inferior attribuitur
3480 inferiori per proprietatem, superiori autem per excessum. Et ita
3481 superior ordo a superiori perfectione nominatur. Sic igitur
3482 Dionysius exponit ordinum nomina secundum convenientiam ad
3483 spirituales perfectiones eorum. Gregorius vero, in expositione
3484 horum nominum, magis attendere videtur exteriora ministeria. Dicit
3485 enim, quod <i>Angeli dicuntur qui minima nuntiant; Archangeli, qui
3486 summa; virtutes per quas miracula fiunt; potestates quibus adversae
3487 potestates repelluntur; principatus, qui ipsis bonis spiritibus
3488 praesunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p12">
3489 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angel means "messenger." So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called "angels." But the
3490 superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated.
3491 The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation
3492 only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest
3493 order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of "angels,"
3494 forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.
3495 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p13"> "Virtue" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in
3496 that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also "heavenly essences." Secondly, as meaning a certain
3497 excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the
3498 "name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength"; first, in regard of those Divine
3499 operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly
3500 the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.
3501 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="32960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32960] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3502 dicendum quod Angelus nuntius dicitur. Omnes ergo caelestes
3503 spiritus, inquantum sunt manifestatores divinorum, Angeli vocantur.
3504 Sed superiores Angeli habent quandam excellentiam in hac
3505 manifestatione, a qua superiores ordines nominantur. Infimus autem
3506 Angelorum ordo nullam excellentiam supra communem manifestationem
3507 addit, et ideo a simplici manifestatione nominatur. Et sic nomen
3508 commune remanet infimo ordini quasi proprium, ut dicit Dionysius V
3509 cap. Cael. Hier. Vel potest dici quod infimus ordo specialiter
3510 dicitur ordo Angelorum, quia immediate nobis annuntiant. Virtus
3511 autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod
3512 est media inter essentiam et operationem, et sic omnes caelestes
3513 spiritus nominantur caelestes virtutes, sicut et caelestes
3514 essentiae. Alio modo, secundum quod importat quendam excessum
3515 fortitudinis, et sic est proprium nomen ordinis. Unde Dionysius
3516 dicit, VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen virtutum significat
3517 quandam virilem et inconcussam fortitudinem, primo quidem ad omnes
3518 operationes divinas eis convenientes; secundo, ad suscipiendum
3519 divina. Et ita significat quod sine aliquo timore aggrediuntur
3520 divina quae ad eos pertinent, quod videtur ad fortitudinem animi
3521 pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p14">
3522 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word
3523 gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the
3524 Divine gifts." Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Domination" means first "a certain liberty, free
3525 from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and
3526 from tyrannical oppression," endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies "a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy
3527 which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants." Thirdly, it signifies
3528 "the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God." Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation
3529 of what belongs to God; as the name "Virtues" signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the
3530 same principle applies to the rest.
3531 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="32961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32961] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3532 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius XII cap. de Div. Nom.,
3533 <i>dominatio laudatur in Deo singulariter per quendam excessum, sed
3534 per participationem, divina eloquia vocant dominos principaliores
3535 ornatus, per quos inferiores ex donis eius accipiunt</i>. Unde et
3536 Dionysius dicit in VIII cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen dominationum
3537 primo quidem significat quandam libertatem, quae est a servili
3538 conditione et pedestri subiectione, sicut plebs subiicitur, et a
3539 tyrannica oppressione, quam interdum etiam maiores patiuntur.
3540 Secundo significat quandam rigidam et inflexibilem gubernationem,
3541 quae ad nullum servilem actum inclinatur, neque ad aliquem actum
3542 subiectorum vel oppressorum a tyrannis. Tertio significat appetitum
3543 et participationem veri dominii, quod est in Deo. Et similiter
3544 nomen cuiuslibet ordinis significat participationem eius quod est
3545 in Deo; sicut nomen virtutum significat participationem divinae
3546 virtutis; et sic de aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15">
3547 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The names "Domination," "Power," and "Principality" belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to
3548 prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Evang.), that "some companies of the angels, because others are
3549 subject to obedience to them, are called dominations." The name "Power" points out a kind of order, according to what the
3550 Apostle says, "He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God"
3551 (
3552 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.2" target="asv">Rom. 13:2</a>). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name "Power" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception
3553 of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above.
3554 Therefore, to the order of "Powers" it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside
3555 [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is "to be first among others," as being first
3556 in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of "Principalities" signifies
3557 "one who leads in a sacred order." For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called "princes," according
3558 to the words, "Princes went before joined with singers" (
3559 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.26" target="asv">Ps. 67:26</a>).
3560 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="32962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32962] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3561 dicendum quod nomen dominationis, et potestatis, et principatus,
3562 diversimode ad gubernationem pertinet. Nam domini est solummodo
3563 praecipere de agendis. Et ideo Gregorius dicit quod <i>quaedam
3564 Angelorum agmina, pro eo quod eis cetera ad obediendum subiecta
3565 sunt, dominationes vocantur</i>. Nomen vero potestatis ordinationem
3566 quandam designat; secundum illud apostoli ad Rom. XIII, <i>qui
3567 potestati resistit, Dei ordinationi resistit</i>. Et ideo Dionysius
3568 dicit quod nomen potestatis significat quandam ordinationem et
3569 circa susceptionem divinorum, et circa actiones divinas quas
3570 superiores in inferiores agunt, eas sursum ducendo. Ad ordinem ergo
3571 potestatum pertinet ordinare quae a subditis sint agenda.
3572 Principari vero, ut Gregorius dicit, est inter reliquos priorem
3573 existere, quasi primi sint in executione eorum quae imperantur. Et
3574 ideo Dionysius dicit, IX cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen principatuum
3575 significat ductivum cum ordine sacro. Illi enim qui alios ducunt,
3576 primi inter eos existentes, principes proprie vocantur secundum
3577 illud Psalmi LXVII, <i>praevenerunt principes coniuncti
3578 psallentibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p16">
3579 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The "Archangels," according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the "Principalities" and the "Angels." A medium compared
3580 to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot,
3581 and hot compared to cold. So the "Archangels" are called the "angel princes"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the
3582 "Angels," and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory
3583 (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called "Archangels," because they preside over the one order of the "Angels"; as it were, announcing
3584 greater things: and the "Principalities" are so called as presiding over all the heavenly "Virtues" who fulfil the Divine
3585 commands.
3586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="32963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32963] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
3587 dicendum quod Archangeli, secundum Dionysium, medii sunt inter
3588 principatus et Angelos. Medium autem comparatum uni extremo,
3589 videtur alterum, inquantum participat naturam utriusque, sicut
3590 tepidum respectu calidi est frigidum, respectu vero frigidi est
3591 calidum. Sic et Archangeli dicuntur quasi principes Angeli, quia
3592 respectu Angelorum sunt principes, respectu vero principatuum sunt
3593 Angeli. Secundum Gregorium autem, dicuntur Archangeli ex eo quod
3594 principantur soli ordini Angelorum, quasi magna nuntiantes.
3595 Principatus autem dicuntur ex eo quod principantur omnibus
3596 caelestibus virtutibus divinas iussiones explentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p17">
3597 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The name "Seraphim" does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire.
3598 Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name "Seraphim" according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of
3599 heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they
3600 are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is "heat," which
3601 is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to
3602 the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised
3603 powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly
3604 we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an
3605 inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.
3606 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A5-p18"> In the same way the name "Cherubim" comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted "fulness of knowledge,"
3607 which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the
3608 Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this
3609 knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others.
3610 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="32964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32964] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
3611 dicendum quod nomen Seraphim non imponitur tantum a caritate, sed a
3612 caritatis excessu, quem importat nomen ardoris vel incendii. Unde
3613 Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier., exponit nomen Seraphim secundum
3614 proprietates ignis, in quo est excessus caliditatis. In igne autem
3615 tria possumus considerare. Primo quidem, motum, qui est sursum, et
3616 qui est continuus. Per quod significatur quod indeclinabiliter
3617 moventur in Deum. Secundo vero, virtutem activam eius, quae est
3618 calidum. Quod quidem non simpliciter invenitur in igne, sed cum
3619 quadam acuitate, quia maxime est penetrativus in agendo, et
3620 pertingit usque ad minima; et iterum cum quodam superexcedenti
3621 fervore. Et per hoc significatur actio huiusmodi Angelorum, quam in
3622 subditos potenter exercent, eos in similem fervorem excitantes, et
3623 totaliter eos per incendium purgantes. Tertio consideratur in igne
3624 claritas eius. Et hoc significat quod huiusmodi Angeli in seipsis
3625 habent inextinguibilem lucem, et quod alios perfecte illuminant.
3626 Similiter etiam nomen Cherubim imponitur a quodam excessu
3627 scientiae, unde interpretatur plenitudo scientiae. Quod Dionysius
3628 exponit quantum ad quatuor, primo quidem, quantum ad perfectam Dei
3629 visionem; secundo, quantum ad plenam susceptionem divini luminis;
3630 tertio, quantum ad hoc, quod in ipso Deo contemplantur
3631 pulchritudinem ordinis rerum a Deo derivatam; quarto, quantum ad
3632 hoc, quod ipsi pleni existentes huiusmodi cognitione, eam copiose
3633 in alios effundunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A5-p19">
3634 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The order of the "Thrones" excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works;
3635 whereas the "Cherubim" have the excellence of knowledge and the "Seraphim" the excellence of ardor. And although these two
3636 excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the "Thrones" does not include the other two; and so the
3637 order of the "Thrones" is distinguished from the orders of the "Cherubim" and the
3638 "Seraphim." For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not
3639 conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name "Thrones" by its relation to material seats, in which we may
3640 consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called "Thrones"
3641 are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed
3642 strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made
3643 firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive
3644 God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open
3645 on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.
3646 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 5 ad 6"><a name="32965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32965] Iª q. 108 a. 5 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum
3647 dicendum quod ordo thronorum habet excellentiam prae inferioribus
3648 ordinibus in hoc, quod immediate in Deo rationes divinorum operum
3649 cognoscere possunt. Sed Cherubim habent excellentiam scientiae;
3650 Seraphim vero excellentiam ardoris. Et licet in his duabus
3651 excellentiis includatur tertia, non tamen in illa quae est
3652 thronorum, includuntur aliae duae. Et ideo ordo thronorum
3653 distinguitur ab ordine Cherubim et Seraphim. Hoc enim est commune
3654 in omnibus, quod excellentia inferioris continetur in excellentia
3655 superioris, et non e converso. Exponit autem Dionysius nomen
3656 thronorum, per convenientiam ad materiales sedes. In quibus est
3657 quatuor considerare. Primo quidem, situm, quia sedes supra terram
3658 elevantur. Et sic ipsi Angeli qui throni dicuntur, elevantur usque
3659 ad hoc, quod in Deo immediate rationes rerum cognoscant. Secundo in
3660 materialibus sedibus consideratur firmitas, quia in ipsis aliquis
3661 firmiter sedet. Hic autem est e converso, nam ipsi Angeli firmantur
3662 per Deum. Tertio, quia sedes suscipit sedentem, et in ea deferri
3663 potest. Sic et isti Angeli suscipiunt Deum in seipsis, et eum
3664 quodammodo ad inferiores ferunt. Quarto, ex figura, quia sedes ex
3665 una parte est aperta ad suscipiendum sedentem. Ita et isti Angeli
3666 sunt per promptitudinem aperti ad suscipiendum Deum, et famulandum
3667 ipsi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A6-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 6. Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p2">
3668 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the
3669 names of "Dominations," "Principalities," and "Powers" of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be
3670 supreme.
3671 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="32966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32966] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
3672 proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter gradus ordinum assignentur.
3673 Ordo enim praelatorum videtur esse supremus. Sed dominationes,
3674 principatus et potestates ex ipsis nominibus praelationem quandam
3675 habent. Ergo isti ordines debent esse inter omnes supremi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p3">
3676 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to God; for nothing is
3677 nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest.
3678 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="32967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32967] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
3679 quanto aliquis ordo est Deo propinquior, tanto est superior. Sed
3680 ordo thronorum videtur esse Deo propinquissimus, nihil enim
3681 coniungitur propinquius sedenti, quam sua sedes. Ergo ordo
3682 thronorum est altissimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p4">
3683 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of "Cherubim" seems to be higher
3684 than the "Seraphim."
3685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="32968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32968] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3686 scientia est prior quam amor; et intellectus videtur esse altior
3687 quam voluntas. Ergo et ordo Cherubim videtur esse altior quam ordo
3688 Seraphim.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p5">
3689 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the "Principalities" above the "Powers." These therefore are not placed immediately
3690 above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).
3691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="32969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32969] Iª q. 108 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
3692 Gregorius ponit principatus supra potestates. Non ergo collocantur
3693 immediate supra Archangelos, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p6">
3694 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the "Seraphim" as the first, the "Cherubim" as the middle, the
3695 "Thrones" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the "Dominations," as the first, the "Virtues" in the middle, the
3696 "Powers" last; in the lowest hierarchy the "Principalities" first, then the "Archangels," and lastly the "Angels."
3697 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 s. c."><a name="32970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32970] Iª q. 108 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
3698 quod Dionysius ponit, in prima quidem hierarchia. Seraphim ut
3699 primos, Cherubim ut medios, thronos ut ultimos; in media vero,
3700 dominationes ut primos, virtutes ut medios, potestates ut ultimos;
3701 in ultima, principatus ut primos, Archangelos ut medios, Angelos ut
3702 ultimos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p7">
3703 <b>I answer that,</b> The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as
3704 regards all except the "Principalities" and "Virtues." For Dionysius places the "Virtues" beneath the "Dominations," and above
3705 the "Powers"; the "Principalities" beneath the "Powers" and above the "Archangels." Gregory, however, places the "Principalities"
3706 between the "Dominations" and the "Powers"; and the "Virtues" between the "Powers"
3707 and the "Archangels." Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who (
3708 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.20" target="asv">Eph. 1:20,21</a>) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that "God set Him," i.e. Christ, "on His right hand in the
3709 heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion." Here he places "Virtues" between "Powers" and
3710 "Dominations," according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same
3711 orders from the highest, he says: "Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created
3712 by Him and in Him." Here he places the "Principalities" between "Dominations" and "Powers," as does also Gregory.
3713 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p8"> Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above
3714 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A1" id="FP_Q108_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in
3715 their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the
3716 whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the
3717 universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which
3718 is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering
3719 the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are
3720 taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy
3721 those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition---the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers";
3722 and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels,"
3723 and "Archangels."
3724 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p9"> As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of
3725 the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition
3726 to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii,
3727 Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the
3728 dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets;
3729 and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition
3730 in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves,
3731 in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first
3732 hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence
3733 of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones";
3734 as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels."
3735 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p10"> As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be
3736 done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs
3737 to the "Virtues"; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which
3738 belongs to the "Powers."
3739 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p11"> The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there
3740 are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the "Principalities."
3741 There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the "Angels." Others hold a middle place; and these
3742 are the "Archangels," as above explained.
3743 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p12"> This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the
3744 lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons,
3745 which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity,
3746 denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the "Thrones,"
3747 who in their own order are akin to the "Dominations"; for the "Thrones," according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called
3748 "because through them God accomplishes His judgments," since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate
3749 enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the "Powers"
3750 is akin to the order of the "Principalities"; for as it belongs to the "Powers" to impose order on those subject to
3751 them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of "Principalities," who, as presiding over the government of peoples
3752 and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof;
3753 "for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man" (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, "The prince of
3754 the kingdom of the Persians resisted me" (
3755 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>).
3756 </p><p id="FP_Q108_A6-p13"> The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the "Dominations" appoint and order
3757 what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things
3758 in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), "bodies are ruled in a certain order;
3759 the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good
3760 spirit." So the first order after the "Dominations" is called that of "Principalities," who rule even over good spirits; then
3761 the "Powers," who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (
3762 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.3" target="asv">Rom. 13:3,4</a>). After these come the "Virtues," which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the
3763 "Angels" and the "Archangels," who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within
3764 the purview of reason.
3765 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 co."><a name="32971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32971] Iª q. 108 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3766 quod gradus angelicorum ordinum assignant et Gregorius et
3767 Dionysius, quantum ad alia quidem convenienter, sed quantum ad
3768 principatus et virtutes differenter. Nam Dionysius collocat
3769 virtutes sub dominationibus et supra potestates, principatus autem
3770 sub potestatibus et supra Archangelos, Gregorius autem ponit
3771 principatus in medio dominationum et potestatum, virtutes vero in
3772 medio potestatum et Archangelorum. Et utraque assignatio
3773 fulcimentum habere potest ex auctoritate apostoli. Qui, medios
3774 ordines ascendendo enumerans, dicit, Ephes. I, quod Deus constituit
3775 illum, scilicet Christum, ad dexteram suam in caelestibus, supra
3776 omnem principatum et potestatem et virtutem et dominationem, ubi
3777 virtutem ponit inter potestatem et dominationem, secundum
3778 assignationem Dionysii. Sed ad Coloss. I, enumerans eosdem ordines
3779 descendendo, dicit, sive throni, sive dominationes, sive
3780 principatus, sive potestates, omnia per ipsum et in ipso creata
3781 sunt, ubi principatus ponit medios inter dominationes et
3782 potestates, secundum assignationem Gregorii. Primo igitur videamus
3783 rationem assignationis Dionysii. In qua considerandum est quod,
3784 sicut supra dictum est, prima hierarchia accipit rationes rerum in
3785 ipso Deo; secunda vero in causis universalibus; tertia vero
3786 secundum determinationem ad speciales effectus. Et quia Deus est
3787 finis non solum angelicorum ministeriorum, sed etiam totius
3788 creaturae, ad primam hierarchiam pertinet consideratio finis; ad
3789 mediam vero dispositio universalis de agendis; ad ultimam autem
3790 applicatio dispositionis ad effectum, quae est operis executio;
3791 haec enim tria manifestum est in qualibet operatione inveniri. Et
3792 ideo Dionysius, ex nominibus ordinum proprietates illorum
3793 considerans, illos ordines in prima hierarchia posuit, quorum
3794 nomina imponuntur per respectum ad Deum, scilicet Seraphim et
3795 Cherubim et thronos. Illos vero ordines posuit in media hierarchia,
3796 quorum nomina designant communem quandam gubernationem sive
3797 dispositionem, scilicet dominationes, virtutes et potestates. Illos
3798 vero ordines posuit in tertia hierarchia, quorum nomina designant
3799 operis executionem, scilicet principatus, Angelos et Archangelos.
3800 In respectu autem ad finem, tria considerari possunt, nam primo,
3801 aliquis considerat finem; secundo vero, perfectam finis cognitionem
3802 accipit; tertio vero, intentionem suam in ipso defigit; quorum
3803 secundum ex additione se habet ad primum, et tertium ad utrumque.
3804 Et quia Deus est finis creaturarum sicut dux est finis exercitus,
3805 ut dicitur in XII Metaphys., potest aliquid simile huius ordinis
3806 considerari in rebus humanis, nam quidam sunt qui hoc habent
3807 dignitatis, ut per seipsos familiariter accedere possunt ad regem
3808 vel ducem; quidam vero super hoc habent, ut etiam secreta eius
3809 cognoscant; alii vero insuper circa ipsum semper inhaerent, quasi
3810 ei coniuncti. Et secundum hanc similitudinem accipere possumus
3811 dispositionem ordinum primae hierarchiae. Nam throni elevantur ad
3812 hoc, quod Deum familiariter in seipsis recipiant, secundum quod
3813 rationes rerum in ipso immediate cognoscere possunt, quod est
3814 proprium totius primae hierarchiae. Cherubim vero supereminenter
3815 divina secreta cognoscunt. Seraphim vero excellunt in hoc quod est
3816 omnium supremum, scilicet Deo ipsi uniri. Ut sic ab eo quod est
3817 commune toti hierarchiae, denominetur ordo thronorum; sicut ab eo
3818 quod est commune omnibus caelestibus spiritibus, denominatur ordo
3819 Angelorum. Ad gubernationis autem rationem tria pertinent. Quorum
3820 primum est definitio eorum quae agenda sunt, quod est proprium
3821 dominationum. Secundum autem est praebere facultatem ad implendum,
3822 quod pertinet ad virtutes. Tertium autem est ordinare qualiter ea
3823 quae praecepta vel definita sunt, impleri possint, ut aliqui
3824 exequantur, et hoc pertinet ad potestates. Executio autem
3825 angelicorum ministeriorum consistit in annuntiando divina. In
3826 executione autem cuiuslibet actus, sunt quidam quasi incipientes
3827 actionem et alios ducentes, sicut in cantu praecentores, et in
3828 bello illi qui alios ducunt et dirigunt, et hoc pertinet ad
3829 principatus. Alii vero sunt qui simpliciter exequuntur, et hoc
3830 pertinet ad Angelos. Alii vero medio modo se habent, quod ad
3831 Archangelos pertinet, ut supra dictum est. Invenitur autem congrua
3832 haec ordinum assignatio. Nam semper summum inferioris ordinis
3833 affinitatem habet cum ultimo superioris; sicut infima animalia
3834 parum distant a plantis. Primus autem ordo est divinarum
3835 personarum, qui terminatur ad spiritum sanctum, qui est amor
3836 procedens, cum quo affinitatem habet supremus ordo primae
3837 hierarchiae, ab incendio amoris denominatus. Infimus autem ordo
3838 primae hierarchiae est thronorum, qui ex suo nomine habent quandam
3839 affinitatem cum dominationibus, nam throni dicuntur, secundum
3840 Gregorium, per quos Deus sua iudicia exercet; accipiunt enim
3841 divinas illuminationes per convenientiam ad immediate illuminandum
3842 secundam hierarchiam, ad quam pertinet dispositio divinorum
3843 ministeriorum. Ordo vero potestatum affinitatem habet cum ordine
3844 principatuum, nam cum potestatum sit ordinationem subiectis
3845 imponere, haec ordinatio statim in nomine principatuum designatur,
3846 qui sunt primi in executione divinorum ministeriorum, utpote
3847 praesidentes gubernationi gentium et regnorum, quod est primum et
3848 praecipuum in divinis ministeriis; nam bonum gentis est divinius
3849 quam bonum unius hominis. Unde dicitur Dan. X, <i>princeps regni
3850 Persarum restitit mihi</i>. Dispositio etiam ordinum quam Gregorius
3851 ponit, congruitatem habet. Nam cum dominationes sint definientes et
3852 praecipientes ea quae ad divina ministeria pertinent, ordines eis
3853 subiecti disponuntur secundum dispositionem eorum in quos divina
3854 ministeria exercentur ut autem Augustinus dicit in III de Trin.,
3855 <i>corpora quodam ordine reguntur, inferiora per superiora, et
3856 omnia per spiritualem creaturam; et spiritus malus per spiritum
3857 bonum</i>. Primus ergo ordo post dominationes dicitur principatuum,
3858 qui etiam bonis spiritibus principantur. Deinde potestates, per
3859 quas arcentur mali spiritus, sicut per potestates terrenas arcentur
3860 malefactores, ut habetur Rom. XIII. Post quas sunt virtutes, quae
3861 habent potestatem super corporalem naturam in operatione
3862 miraculorum. Post quas sunt Archangeli et Angeli, qui nuntiant
3863 hominibus vel magna, quae sunt supra rationem; vel parva, ad quae
3864 ratio se extendere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p14">
3865 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angel's subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former.
3866 Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their
3867 name from their nearness and relation to God.
3868 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="32972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32972] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3869 dicendum quod in Angelis potius est quod subiiciuntur Deo, quam
3870 quod inferioribus praesident, et hoc derivatur ex illo. Et ideo
3871 ordines nominati a praelatione non sunt supremi, sed magis ordines
3872 nominati a conversione ad Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p15">
3873 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nearness to God designated by the name of the "Thrones," belongs also to the "Cherubim" and "Seraphim," and in a more
3874 excellent way, as above explained.
3875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="32973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32973] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3876 dicendum quod illa propinquitas ad Deum quae designatur nomine
3877 thronorum, convenit etiam Cherubim et Seraphim, et excellentius, ut
3878 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p16">
3879 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As above explained (
3880 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q27_A3" id="FP_Q108_A6-p16.1" shape="rect">Q[27], A[3]</a>), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved.
3881 Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler
3882 way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things,
3883 God above all, is
3884 better than to know them.
3885 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="32974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32974] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
3886 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio est secundum quod
3887 cognita sunt in cognoscente; amor autem secundum quod amans unitur
3888 rei amatae. Superiora autem nobiliori modo sunt in seipsis quam in
3889 inferioribus, inferiora vero nobiliori modo in superioribus quam in
3890 seipsis. Et ideo inferiorum quidem cognitio praeeminet dilectioni,
3891 superiorum autem dilectio, et praecipue Dei, praeeminet
3892 cognitioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A6-p17">
3893 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according
3894 to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name "Principalities" from their "presiding over good spirits," which also
3895 agrees with the "Virtues" accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in
3896 the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the
3897 "Virtues" seem to be the same as "Principalities" of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations;
3898 since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the "Archangels" and the "Angels."
3899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="32975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32975] Iª q. 108 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
3900 dicendum quod, si quis diligenter consideret dispositiones ordinum
3901 secundum Dionysium et Gregorium, parum vel nihil differunt, si ad
3902 rem referantur. Exponit enim Gregorius principatuum nomen ex hoc,
3903 quod bonis spiritibus praesunt, et hoc convenit virtutibus,
3904 secundum quod in nomine virtutum intelligitur quaedam fortitudo
3905 dans efficaciam inferioribus spiritibus ad exequenda divina
3906 ministeria. Rursus virtutes, secundum Gregorium, videntur esse idem
3907 quod principatus secundum Dionysium. Nam hoc est primum in divinis
3908 ministeriis, miracula facere, per hoc enim paratur via
3909 Annuntiationi Archangelorum et Angelorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A7-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 7. Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2">
3910 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (
3911 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24</a>), that Christ will "bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the
3912 Father," and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state.
3913 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="32976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32976] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
3914 proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non remanebunt post diem iudicii.
3915 Dicit enim apostolus, I ad Cor. XV, quod Christus evacuabit omnem
3916 principatum et potestatem, cum tradiderit regnum Deo et patri, quod
3917 erit in ultima consummatione. Pari ergo ratione, in illo statu
3918 omnes alii ordines evacuabuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p3">
3919 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment
3920 one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore
3921 the angelic orders would remain for no purpose.
3922 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="32977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32977] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
3923 officium angelicorum ordinum pertinet purgare, illuminare et
3924 perficere. Sed post diem iudicii unus Angelus non purgabit aut
3925 illuminabit aut perficiet alium, quia non proficient amplius in
3926 scientia. Ergo frustra ordines angelici remanerent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4">
3927 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says of the angels (
3928 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>), that "they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation"; whence
3929 it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit
3930 of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.
3931 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="32978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32978] Iª q. 108 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
3932 apostolus dicit, ad Heb. I, de Angelis, quod <i>omnes sunt
3933 administratorii spiritus, in ministerium missi propter eos qui
3934 haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, ex quo patet quod officia
3935 Angelorum ordinantur ad hoc, quod homines ad salutem adducantur.
3936 Sed omnes electi usque ad diem iudicii salutem consequuntur. Non
3937 ergo post diem iudicii remanebunt officia et ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5">
3938 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
3939 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Judg.5.20" target="asv">Judges 5:20</a>): "Stars remaining in their order and courses," which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in
3940 their orders.
3941 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 s. c."><a name="32979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32979] Iª q. 108 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
3942 quod dicitur Iudic. V, stellae manentes in ordine et cursu suo,
3943 quod exponitur de Angelis. Ergo Angeli semper in suis ordinibus
3944 remanebunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p6">
3945 <b>I answer that,</b> In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction
3946 of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained
3947 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless
3948 they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever
3949 remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain
3950 degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are
3951 directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end.
3952 Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.
3953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 co."><a name="32980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32980] Iª q. 108 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3954 quod in ordinibus angelicis duo possunt considerari, scilicet
3955 distinctio graduum, et executio officiorum. Distinctio autem
3956 graduum est in Angelis secundum differentiam gratiae et naturae, ut
3957 supra dictum est. Et utraque differentia semper in Angelis
3958 remanebit. Non enim posset naturarum differentia ab eis auferri,
3959 nisi eis corruptis, differentia etiam gloriae erit in eis semper,
3960 secundum differentiam meriti praecedentis. Executio autem
3961 officiorum angelicorum aliquo modo remanebit post diem iudicii, et
3962 aliquo modo cessabit. Cessabit quidem, secundum quod eorum officia
3963 ordinantur ad perducendum aliquos ad finem, remanebit autem,
3964 secundum quod convenit in ultima finis consecutione. Sicut etiam
3965 alia sunt officia militarium ordinum in pugna, et in triumpho.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p7">
3966 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to
3967 their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words
3968 of the Apostle, "When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father," i.e. when He shall have led the faithful
3969 to the enjoyment of God Himself.
3970 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="32981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32981] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
3971 dicendum quod principatus et potestates evacuabuntur in illa finali
3972 consummatione quantum ad hoc, quod alios ad finem perducant, quia
3973 consecuto iam fine, non est necessarium tendere in finem. Et haec
3974 ratio intelligitur ex verbis apostoli, dicentis, cum tradiderit
3975 regnum Deo et patri, idest, cum perduxerit fideles ad fruendum ipso
3976 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p8">
3977 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions.
3978 In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually
3979 arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding
3980 middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as
3981 regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms
3982 he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since
3983 the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the
3984 light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the
3985 knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things,
3986 still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.
3987 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="32982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32982] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
3988 dicendum quod actiones Angelorum super alios Angelos considerandae
3989 sunt secundum similitudinem actionum intelligibilium quae sunt in
3990 nobis. Inveniuntur autem in nobis multae intelligibiles actiones
3991 quae sunt ordinatae secundum ordinem causae et causati; sicut cum
3992 per multa media gradatim in unam conclusionem devenimus. Manifestum
3993 est autem quod cognitio conclusionis dependet ex omnibus mediis
3994 praecedentibus, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae,
3995 sed etiam quantum ad scientiae conservationem. Cuius signum est
3996 quod, si quis oblivisceretur aliquod praecedentium mediorum,
3997 opinionem quidem vel fidem de conclusione posset habere, sed non
3998 scientiam, ordine causarum ignorato. Sic igitur, cum inferiores
3999 Angeli rationes divinorum operum cognoscant per lumen superiorum
4000 Angelorum, dependet eorum cognitio ex lumine superiorum, non solum
4001 quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad
4002 cognitionis conservationem. Licet ergo post iudicium non proficiant
4003 inferiores Angeli in cognitione aliquarum rerum, non tamen propter
4004 hoc excluditur quin a superioribus illuminentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A7-p9">
4005 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who
4006 are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.
4007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="32983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32983] Iª q. 108 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4008 dicendum quod, etsi post diem iudicii homines non sint ulterius ad
4009 salutem adducendi per ministerium Angelorum; tamen illi qui iam
4010 salutem erunt consecuti, aliquam illustrationem habebunt per
4011 Angelorum officia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q108_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q108_A8-p0.1">Q. 108. A. 8. Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p2">
4012 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest
4013 heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest
4014 hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders.
4015 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="32984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32984] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
4016 proceditur. Videtur quod homines non assumantur ad ordines
4017 Angelorum. Hierarchia enim humana continetur sub infima
4018 hierarchiarum caelestium, sicut infima sub media, et media sub
4019 prima. Sed Angeli infimae hierarchiae nunquam transferentur in
4020 mediam aut in primam. Ergo neque homines transferentur ad ordines
4021 Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p3">
4022 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the
4023 like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.
4024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="32985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32985] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4025 ordinibus Angelorum aliqua officia competunt, utpote custodire,
4026 miracula facere, Daemones arcere, et huiusmodi, quae non videntur
4027 convenire animabus sanctorum. Ergo non transferentur ad ordines
4028 Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p4">
4029 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls
4030 of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the
4031 souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.
4032 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="32986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32986] Iª q. 108 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4033 sicut boni Angeli inducunt ad bonum, ita Daemones inducunt ad
4034 malum. Sed erroneum est dicere quod animae hominum malorum
4035 convertantur in Daemones, hoc enim Chrysostomus reprobat, super
4036 Matth. Ergo non videtur quod animae sanctorum transferantur ad
4037 ordines Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5">
4038 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Lord says of the saints that, "they will be as the angels of God" (
4039 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>).</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 s. c."><a name="32987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32987] Iª q. 108 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4040 quod dominus dicit, Matth. XXII, de sanctis, quod <i>erunt sicut
4041 Angeli Dei in caelo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5a"> <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained (
4042 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.2" shape="rect">AA[4]</a>,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.
4043 Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction
4044 will always remain. In view of this
4045 distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting
4046 as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (
4047 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q108_A8-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.20.36" target="asv">Lk. 20:36</a>). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends
4048 on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men
4049 can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are
4050 taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders,
4051 but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole
4052 society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that "there will not be two societies
4053 of
4054 men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone."
4055 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 co."><a name="32988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32988] Iª q. 108 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4056 quod, sicut supra dictum est, ordines Angelorum distinguuntur et
4057 secundum conditionem naturae, et secundum dona gratiae. Si ergo
4058 considerentur Angelorum ordines solum quantum ad gradum naturae,
4059 sic homines nullo modo assumi possunt ad ordines Angelorum, quia
4060 semper remanebit naturarum distinctio. Quam quidam considerantes,
4061 posuerunt quod nullo modo homines transferri possunt ad
4062 aequalitatem Angelorum. Quod est erroneum, repugnat enim
4063 promissioni Christi, dicentis, Lucae XX, quod filii resurrectionis
4064 erunt aequales Angelis in caelis. Illud enim quod est ex parte
4065 naturae, se habet ut materiale in ratione ordinis, completivum vero
4066 est quod est ex dono gratiae, quae dependet ex liberalitate Dei,
4067 non ex ordine naturae. Et ideo per donum gratiae homines mereri
4068 possunt tantam gloriam, ut Angelis aequentur secundum singulos
4069 Angelorum gradus. Quod est homines ad ordines Angelorum assumi.
4070 Quidam tamen dicunt quod ad ordines Angelorum non assumuntur omnes
4071 qui salvantur, sed soli virgines vel perfecti; alii vero suum
4072 ordinem constituent, quasi condivisum toti societati Angelorum. Sed
4073 hoc est contra Augustinum, qui dicit XII de Civ. Dei, quod non
4074 erunt duae societates hominum et Angelorum, sed una, quia omnium
4075 beatitudo est adhaerere uni Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6">
4076 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained
4077
4078 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4];</a>
4079 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A6" id="FP_Q108_A8-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[62], A[6]</a>). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred
4080 to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.
4081 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="32989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32989] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4082 dicendum quod gratia Angelis datur secundum proportionem
4083 naturalium; non autem sic est de hominibus, ut supra dictum est. Et
4084 ideo sicut inferiores Angeli non possunt transferri ad naturalem
4085 gradum superiorum, ita nec ad gratuitum. Homines vero possunt ad
4086 gratuitum conscendere, sed non ad naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p7">
4087 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human
4088 affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature
4089 with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, "nor do they interfere in the
4090 things of the living," as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a
4091 certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles,
4092 by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi).
4093 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="32990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32990] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4094 dicendum quod Angeli, secundum naturae ordinem, medii sunt inter
4095 nos et Deum. Et ideo, secundum legem communem, per eos
4096 administrantur non solum res humanae, sed etiam omnia corporalia.
4097 Homines autem sancti, etiam post hanc vitam, sunt eiusdem naturae
4098 nobiscum. Unde secundum legem communem, non administrant humana,
4099 nec rebus vivorum intersunt, ut Augustinus dicit in libro de cura
4100 pro mortuis agenda. Ex quadam tamen speciali dispensatione interdum
4101 aliquibus sanctis conceditur, vel vivis vel mortuis, huiusmodi
4102 officia exercere, vel miracula faciendo, vel Daemones arcendo, vel
4103 aliquid huiusmodi; sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q108_A8-p8">
4104 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons
4105 are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.
4106 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 108 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="32991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32991] Iª q. 108 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4107 dicendum quod homines ad poenam Daemonum transferri, non est
4108 erroneum, sed quidam erronee posuerunt Daemones nihil aliud esse
4109 quam animas defunctorum. Et hoc Chrysostomus reprobat.</p></div></div></div></div>
4110 <div id="FP_Q109" class="div3">
4111 <h3 id="FP_Q109-p0.1">Q. 109. THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
4112 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
4113 <p id="FP_Q109-p2"> We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q109-p3"><a href="#FP_Q109_A1"> (1) Whether there are orders among the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p4"><a href="#FP_Q109_A2"> (2) Whether among them there is precedence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p5"><a href="#FP_Q109_A3"> (3) Whether one enlightens another?</a></p><p id="FP_Q109-p6"><a href="#FP_Q109_A4"> (4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?</a></p>
4114 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 pr."><a name="32992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32992]
4115 Iª q. 109 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
4116 ordinatione malorum Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
4117 Primo, utrum ordines sint in Daemonibus. Secundo, utrum in eis sit
4118 praelatio. Tertio, utrum unus illuminet alium. Quarto, utrum
4119 subiiciantur praelationi bonorum Angelorum.</p></div></div></div>
4120 <div id="FP_Q109_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A1-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 1. Whether there are orders among the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p2">
4121 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine
4122 says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels.
4123 Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders.
4124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="32993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32993] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
4125 proceditur. Videtur quod ordines non sint in Daemonibus. Ordo enim
4126 pertinet ad rationem boni, sicut et modus et species, ut Augustinus
4127 dicit in libro de natura boni; et e contrario inordinatio pertinet
4128 ad rationem mali. Sed in bonis Angelis nihil est inordinatum. Ergo
4129 in malis Angelis non sunt aliqui ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p3">
4130 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a
4131 holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.
4132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="32994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32994] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4133 ordines angelici sub aliqua hierarchia continentur. Sed Daemones
4134 non sunt sub aliqua hierarchia, quae est sacer principatus, cum ab
4135 omni sanctitate sint vacui. Ergo in Daemonibus non sunt
4136 ordines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p4">
4137 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said
4138 to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders.
4139 But we never find that they are called "Seraphim," or "Thrones," or "Dominations." Therefore on the same ground they are not
4140 to be placed in any other order.
4141 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="32995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32995] Iª q. 109 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4142 Daemones de singulis ordinibus Angelorum ceciderunt, ut communiter
4143 dicitur. Si ergo aliqui Daemones dicuntur esse alicuius ordinis,
4144 quia de illo ordine ceciderunt; videtur quod deberent eis attribui
4145 nomina singulorum ordinum. Nunquam autem invenitur quod dicantur
4146 Seraphim, vel throni, vel dominationes. Ergo, pari ratione, non
4147 sunt in aliquibus ordinibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5">
4148 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
4149 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness."
4150 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 s. c."><a name="32996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32996] Iª q. 109 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4151 quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. ult., quod <i>est nobis colluctatio
4152 adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundi rectores
4153 tenebrarum harum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q109_A1-p6">
4154 <b>I answer that,</b> As explained above (
4155 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A4" id="FP_Q109_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[108], AA[4]</a>,7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace
4156 has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.
4157 </p><p id="FP_Q109_A1-p7"> If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic
4158 orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in
4159 the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above (
4160 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q62_A3" id="FP_Q109_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[62], A[3]</a>), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are
4161 still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
4162 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 co."><a name="32997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32997] Iª q. 109 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4163 quod, sicut iam dictum est, ordo angelicus consideratur et secundum
4164 gradum naturae, et secundum gradum gratiae. Gratia vero habet
4165 duplicem statum, scilicet imperfectum, qui est status merendi; et
4166 perfectum, qui est status gloriae consummatae. Si ergo
4167 considerentur ordines angelici quantum ad perfectionem gloriae, sic
4168 Daemones neque sunt in ordinibus angelicis, neque unquam fuerunt.
4169 Si autem considerentur quantum ad id quod est gratiae imperfectae,
4170 sic Daemones fuerunt quidem aliquando in ordinibus Angelorum, sed
4171 ab eis ceciderunt; secundum illud quod supra posuimus, omnes
4172 Angelos in gratia creatos fuisse. Si autem considerentur quantum ad
4173 id quod est naturae, sic adhuc sunt in ordinibus, quia data
4174 naturalia non amiserunt, ut Dionysius dicit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p8">
4175 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good (
4176 <a href="FP_vi.html#FP_Q49_A3" id="FP_Q109_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[49], A[3]</a>); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.
4177 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="32998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32998] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4178 dicendum quod bonum potest inveniri sine malo; sed malum non potest
4179 inveniri sine bono, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo Daemones,
4180 inquantum habent naturam bonam, ordinati sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p9">
4181 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself;
4182 but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.
4183 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="32999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[32999] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4184 dicendum quod ordinatio Daemonum, si consideretur ex parte Dei
4185 ordinantis, est sacra, utitur enim Daemonibus propter seipsum. Sed
4186 ex parte voluntatis Daemonum, non est sacra, quia abutuntur sua
4187 natura ad malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A1-p10">
4188 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The name "Seraphim" is given from the ardor of charity; and the name "Thrones" from the Divine indwelling; and the name "Dominations"
4189 imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.
4190 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33000] Iª q. 109 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4191 dicendum quod nomen Seraphim imponitur ab ardore caritatis, nomen
4192 autem thronorum ab inhabitatione divina, nomen autem dominationum
4193 importat libertatem quandam, quae omnia opponuntur peccato. Et ideo
4194 peccantibus Angelis huiusmodi nomina non attribuuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A2-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 2. Whether among the demons there is precedence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p2">
4195 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But
4196 the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them.
4197 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33001] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
4198 proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus non sit praelatio. Omnis
4199 enim praelatio est secundum aliquem ordinem iustitiae. Sed Daemones
4200 totaliter a iustitia ceciderunt. Ergo in eis non est praelatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3">
4201 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is
4202 not to be found among the demons, according to the text, "Among the proud there are always contentions" (
4203 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
4204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33002] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
4205 non est obedientia et subiectio, non est praelatio. Haec autem sine
4206 concordia esse non possunt; quae in Daemonibus nulla est, secundum
4207 illud Prov. XIII, <i>inter superbos semper sunt iurgia</i>. Ergo in
4208 Daemonibus non est praelatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p4">
4209 <b>Objection 3:</b> If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not
4210 according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according
4211 to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the
4212 inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.
4213 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33003] Iª q. 109 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
4214 in eis est aliqua praelatio, aut hoc pertinet ad eorum naturam, aut
4215 ad eorum culpam vel poenam. Sed non ad eorum naturam, quia
4216 subiectio et servitus non est ex natura, sed est ex peccato
4217 subsecuta. Nec pertinet ad culpam vel poenam, quia sic superiores
4218 Daemones, qui magis peccaverunt, inferioribus subderentur. Non ergo
4219 est praelatio in Daemonibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5">
4220 <b>On the contrary,</b> On
4221 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.24" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:24 </a>the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons."
4222 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33004] Iª q. 109 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4223 quod dicit Glossa, I ad Cor. XV, <i>quandiu durat mundus, Angeli
4224 Angelis, homines hominibus, et Daemones Daemonibus
4225 praesunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6">
4226 <b>I answer that,</b> Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other.
4227 Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and
4228 movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said
4229 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A1" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence
4230 their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence---that the action of the
4231 subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should
4232 be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to
4233 end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (
4234 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>).
4235 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 co."><a name="33005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33005] Iª q. 109 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4236 quod, cum actio sequatur naturam rei, quorumcumque naturae sunt
4237 ordinatae, oportet quod etiam actiones sub invicem ordinentur.
4238 Sicut patet in rebus corporalibus, quia enim inferiora corpora
4239 naturali ordine sunt infra corpora caelestia actiones et motus
4240 eorum subduntur actionibus et motibus caelestium corporum.
4241 Manifestum est autem ex praemissis quod Daemonum quidam naturali
4242 ordine sub aliis constituuntur. Unde et actiones eorum sub
4243 actionibus superiorum sunt. Et hoc est quod rationem praelationis
4244 facit, ut scilicet actio subditi subdatur actioni praelati. Sic
4245 igitur ipsa naturalis dispositio Daemonum requirit quod sit in eis
4246 praelatio. Convenit etiam hoc divinae sapientiae, quae nihil in
4247 universo inordinatum relinquit, <i>quae attingit a fine usque ad
4248 finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter</i>, ut dicitur Sap.
4249 VIII.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p7">
4250 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.
4251 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33006] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4252 dicendum quod praelatio Daemonum non fundatur super eorum iustitia,
4253 sed super iustitia Dei cuncta ordinantis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p8">
4254 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness
4255 whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those
4256 whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.
4257 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33007] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4258 dicendum quod concordia Daemonum, qua quidam aliis obediunt, non
4259 est ex amicitia quam inter se habeant; sed ex communi nequitia, qua
4260 homines odiunt, et Dei iustitiae repugnant. Est enim proprium
4261 hominum impiorum, ut eis se adiungant et subiiciant, ad propriam
4262 nequitiam exequendam, quos potiores viribus vident.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A2-p9">
4263 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men,
4264 who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather
4265 to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in
4266 evil is to be more unhappy.
4267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33008] Iª q. 109 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4268 dicendum quod Daemones non sunt aequales secundum naturam, unde in
4269 eis est naturalis praelatio. Quod in hominibus non contingit, qui
4270 natura sunt pares. Quod autem superioribus inferiores subdantur,
4271 non est ad bonum superiorum, sed magis ad malum eorum; quia cum
4272 mala facere maxime ad miseriam pertineat, praeesse in malis est
4273 esse magis miserum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A3-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 3. Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p2">
4274 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon
4275 can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten
4276 the inferior.
4277 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33009] Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
4278 proceditur. Videtur quod in Daemonibus sit illuminatio. Illuminatio
4279 enim consistit in manifestatione veritatis. Sed unus Daemon potest
4280 alteri veritatem manifestare, quia superiores magis acumine
4281 naturalis scientiae vigent. Ergo superiores Daemones possunt
4282 inferiores illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p3">
4283 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior
4284 demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.
4285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33010] Iª q. 109 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4286 corpus quod superabundat in lumine, potest illuminare corpus quod
4287 in lumine deficit; sicut sol lunam. Sed superiores Daemones magis
4288 abundant in participatione luminis naturalis. Ergo videtur quod
4289 superiores Daemones possunt inferiores illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4">
4290 <b>On the contrary,</b> Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above (
4291 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: "What can be made clean by the unclean?" (
4292 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>). Therefore neither can they enlighten.
4293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33011] Iª q. 109 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
4294 illuminatio cum purgatione est et perfectione, ut supra dictum est.
4295 Sed purgare non convenit Daemonibus; secundum illud Eccli. XXXIV,
4296 <i>ab immundo quid mundabitur?</i> Ergo etiam neque illuminare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p5">
4297 <b>I answer that,</b> There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained (
4298 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[107], A[2]</a>), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect.
4299 Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon's
4300 perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the
4301 Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of
4302 speech.
4303 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 co."><a name="33012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33012] Iª q. 109 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4304 quod in Daemonibus non potest esse illuminatio proprie. Dictum est
4305 enim supra quod illuminatio proprie est manifestatio veritatis,
4306 secundum quod habet ordinem ad Deum, qui illuminat omnem
4307 intellectum. Alia autem manifestatio veritatis potest esse locutio;
4308 sicut cum unus Angelus alteri suum conceptum manifestat.
4309 Perversitas autem Daemonum hoc habet, quod unus alium non intendit
4310 ordinare ad Deum, sed magis ab ordine divino abducere. Et ideo unus
4311 Daemon alium non illuminat; sed unus alii suum conceptum per modum
4312 locutionis intimare potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p6">
4313 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described.
4314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33013] Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4315 dicendum quod non quaelibet veritatis manifestatio habet rationem
4316 illuminationis, sed solum quae dicta est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7">
4317 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or
4318 in the demons, because, as above explained (
4319 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>;
4320 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q58_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[58], A[2]</a>;
4321 <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q109_A3-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior
4322 demons does not prove that they can enlighten
4323 others.
4324 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33014] Iª q. 109 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4325 dicendum quod secundum ea quae ad naturalem cognitionem pertinent,
4326 non est necessaria manifestatio veritatis neque in Angelis neque in
4327 Daemonibus, quia, sicut supra dictum est, statim a principio suae
4328 conditionis omnia cognoverunt quae ad naturalem cognitionem
4329 pertinent. Et ideo maior plenitudo naturalis luminis quae est in
4330 superioribus Daemonibus, non potest esse ratio illuminationis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q109_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q109_A4-p0.1">Q. 109. A. 4. Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p2">
4331 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially connected
4332 with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels
4333 do not rule over the bad.
4334 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33015] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
4335 proceditur. Videtur quod boni Angeli non habeant praelationem super
4336 malos. Praelatio enim Angelorum praecipue attenditur secundum
4337 illuminationes. Sed mali Angeli, cum sint tenebrae, non
4338 illuminantur a bonis. Ergo boni Angeli non habent praelationem
4339 super malos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p3">
4340 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.
4341 Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot
4342 be admitted.
4343 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33016] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
4344 negligentiam praesidentis pertinere videntur ea quae per subditos
4345 male fiunt. Sed Daemones multa mala faciunt. Si igitur subsunt
4346 praelationi bonorum Angelorum, videtur in Angelis bonis esse aliqua
4347 negligentia. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p4">
4348 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained
4349 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FP_Q109_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the
4350 natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels.
4351 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33017] Iª q. 109 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4352 praelatio Angelorum sequitur naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est.
4353 Sed si Daemones de singulis ordinibus ceciderunt, ut communiter
4354 dicitur, multi Daemones multis bonis Angelis sunt superiores ordine
4355 naturae. Non ergo boni Angeli praelationem habent super omnes
4356 malos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p5">
4357 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that "the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just
4358 spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that "the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers."
4359 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33018] Iª q. 109 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4360 quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>spiritus vitae
4361 desertor atque peccator regitur per spiritum vitae rationalem, pium
4362 et iustum</i>. Et Gregorius dicit quod <i>potestates dicuntur
4363 Angeli quorum ditioni virtutes adversae subiectae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p6">
4364 <b>I answer that,</b> The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer
4365 to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection
4366 and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection
4367 the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the
4368 bad, and these are ruled by them.
4369 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 co."><a name="33019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33019] Iª q. 109 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4370 quod totus ordo praelationis primo et originaliter est in Deo, et
4371 participatur a creaturis secundum quod Deo magis appropinquant,
4372 illae enim creaturae super alias influentiam habent, quae sunt
4373 perfectiores et Deo propinquiores. Maxima autem perfectio, et per
4374 quam maxime Deo appropinquatur, est creaturarum fruentium Deo,
4375 sicut sunt sancti Angeli, qua perfectione Daemones privantur. Et
4376 ideo boni Angeli super malos praelationem habent, et per eos
4377 reguntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p7">
4378 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice
4379 requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's
4380 assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called
4381 an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an
4382 enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness.
4383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33020] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4384 dicendum quod per sanctos Angelos multa de divinis mysteriis
4385 Daemonibus revelantur, cum divina iustitia exigit ut per Daemones
4386 aliqua fiant vel ad punitionem malorum, vel ad exercitationem
4387 bonorum, sicut in rebus humanis assessores iudicis revelant
4388 tortoribus eius sententiam. Huiusmodi autem revelationes, si ad
4389 Angelos revelantes comparentur, illuminationes sunt, quia ordinant
4390 eas ad Deum. Ex parte vero Daemonum, non sunt illuminationes, quia
4391 eas in Deum non ordinant, sed ad expletionem propriae
4392 iniquitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p8">
4393 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels
4394 or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.
4395 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33021] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4396 dicendum quod sancti Angeli sunt ministri divinae sapientiae. Unde
4397 sicut divina sapientia permittit aliqua mala fieri per malos
4398 Angelos vel homines, propter bona quae ex eis elicit; ita et boni
4399 Angeli non totaliter cohibent malos a nocendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9">
4400 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the
4401 power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise
4402 among men, "the spiritual man judgeth all things" (
4403 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q109_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that "the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts."
4404 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 109 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33022] Iª q. 109 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4405 dicendum quod Angelus qui est inferior ordine naturae, praeest
4406 Daemonibus, quamvis superioribus ordine naturae; quia virtus
4407 divinae iustitiae, cui inhaerent boni Angeli, potior est quam
4408 virtus naturalis Angelorum. Unde et apud homines, spiritualis
4409 iudicat omnia, ut dicitur I ad Cor. II. Et philosophus dicit, in
4410 libro Ethic., quod <i>virtuosus est regula et mensura omnium
4411 humanorum actuum</i>.</p></div></div></div></div>
4412 <div id="FP_Q110" class="div3">
4413 <h3 id="FP_Q110-p0.1">Q. 110. HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
4414 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
4415 <p id="FP_Q110-p2"> We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q110-p3"><a href="#FP_Q110_A1"> (1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p4"><a href="#FP_Q110_A2"> (2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p5"><a href="#FP_Q110_A3"> (3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?</a></p><p id="FP_Q110-p6"><a href="#FP_Q110_A4"> (4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?</a></p>
4416 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 pr."><a name="33023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33023]
4417 Iª q. 110 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
4418 praesidentia Angelorum super creaturam corporalem. Et circa hoc
4419 quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum creatura corporalis administretur
4420 per Angelos. Secundo, utrum creatura corporalis obediat Angelis ad
4421 nutum. Tertio, utrum Angeli sua virtute possint immediate movere
4422 corpora localiter. Quarto, utrum Angeli boni vel mali possint
4423 facere miracula.</p></div></div></div>
4424 <div id="FP_Q110_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A1-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 1. Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p2">
4425 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action,
4426 needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal
4427 things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government
4428 of angels.
4429 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33024] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
4430 proceditur. Videtur quod creatura corporalis non administretur per
4431 Angelos. Res enim quae habent determinatum modum operandi, non
4432 indigent gubernari ab aliquo praesidente, ideo enim indigemus
4433 gubernari, ne aliter operemur quam oporteat. Sed res corporales
4434 habent determinatas actiones ex naturis sibi divinitus datis. Non
4435 ergo indigent gubernatione Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p3">
4436 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore
4437 they need not be governed by the angels.
4438 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33025] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4439 inferiora in entibus gubernantur per superiora. Sed in corporibus
4440 quaedam dicuntur inferiora, quaedam superiora. Inferiora igitur
4441 gubernantur per superiora. Non ergo est necessarium quod
4442 gubernentur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p4">
4443 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled
4444 by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders
4445 of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above (
4446 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q110_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[2]</a>). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.
4447 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33026] Iª q. 110 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4448 diversi ordines Angelorum distinguuntur secundum diversa officia.
4449 Sed si creaturae corporales administrantur per Angelos, tot erunt
4450 officia Angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Ergo etiam tot erunt
4451 ordines Angelorum, quot sunt species rerum. Quod est contra supra
4452 dicta. Non ergo corporalis creatura administratur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p5">
4453 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life"; and Gregory says (Dial. iv,
4454 6), that "in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature."
4455 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33027] Iª q. 110 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4456 quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>omnia corpora reguntur
4457 per spiritum vitae rationalem</i>. Et Gregorius dicit, in IV Dial.,
4458 quod <i>in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per creaturam invisibilem
4459 disponi potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6">
4460 <b>I answer that,</b> It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the
4461 universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained
4462 above (
4463 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A3" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[55], A[3]</a> ;
4464 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A1" id="FP_Q110_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[108], A[1]</a>), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power
4465 of
4466 any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized
4467 by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the
4468 inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels.
4469 This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal
4470 substances.
4471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 co."><a name="33028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33028] Iª q. 110 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4472 quod tam in rebus humanis quam in rebus naturalibus, hoc communiter
4473 invenitur, quod potestas particularis gubernatur et regitur a
4474 potestate universali; sicut potestas ballivi gubernatur per
4475 potestatem regis. Et in Angelis etiam est dictum quod superiores
4476 Angeli, qui praesunt inferioribus, habent scientiam magis
4477 universalem. Manifestum est autem quod virtus cuiuslibet corporis
4478 est magis particularis quam virtus spiritualis substantiae, nam
4479 omnis forma corporalis est forma individuata per materiam, et
4480 determinata ad hic et nunc; formae autem immateriales sunt
4481 absolutae et intelligibiles. Et ideo sicut inferiores Angeli, qui
4482 habent formas minus universales, reguntur per superiores; ita omnia
4483 corporalia reguntur per Angelos et hoc non solum a sanctis
4484 doctoribus ponitur, sed etiam ab omnibus philosophis qui
4485 incorporeas substantias posuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p7">
4486 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs
4487 to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.
4488 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33029] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4489 dicendum quod res corporales habent determinatas actiones, sed has
4490 actiones non exercent nisi secundum quod moventur, quia proprium
4491 corporis est quod non agat nisi motum. Et ideo oportet quod
4492 creatura corporalis a spirituali moveatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A1-p8">
4493 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved
4494 by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly
4495 bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps
4496 human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any
4497 operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed.
4498 But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the
4499 movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate
4500 presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.
4501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33030] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4502 dicendum quod ratio ista procedit secundum opinionem Aristotelis,
4503 qui posuit quod corpora caelestia moventur a substantiis
4504 spiritualibus; quarum numerum conatus fuit assignare secundum
4505 numerum motuum qui apparent in corporibus caelestibus. Sed non
4506 posuit quod essent aliquae substantiae spirituales quae haberent
4507 immediatam praesidentiam supra inferiora corpora, nisi forte animas
4508 humanas. Et hoc ideo, quia non consideravit aliquas operationes in
4509 inferioribus corporibus exerceri nisi naturales, ad quas
4510 sufficiebat motus corporum caelestium. Sed quia nos ponimus multa
4511 in corporibus inferioribus fieri praeter naturales actiones
4512 corporum, ad quae non sufficiunt virtutes caelestium corporum; ideo
4513 secundum nos, necesse est ponere quod Angeli habeant immediatam
4514 praesidentiam non solum supra caelestia corpora, sed etiam supra
4515 corpora inferiora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q110_A1-p9">
4516 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were
4517 types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances
4518 preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial
4519 substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more
4520 universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents,
4521 the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to
4522 preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these
4523 sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial
4524 substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the "active intelligence."
4525 </p><p id="FP_Q110_A1-p10"> The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine
4526 says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it"; and Damascene says (De Fide
4527 Orth. ii, 4): "The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order"; and Origen says on the text,
4528 "When the ass saw the angel" (
4529 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.22.23" target="asv">Num. 22:23</a>), that "the world has need of angels who
4530 preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things" (Hom.
4531 xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than
4532 over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things:
4533 the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow
4534 that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded (
4535 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A2" id="FP_Q110_A1-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[108], A[2]</a>), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office
4536 it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the "powers"; so to the order of the "virtues" do those angels seem to
4537 belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.
4538 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33031] Iª q. 110 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4539 dicendum quod de substantiis immaterialibus diversimode philosophi
4540 sunt locuti. Plato enim posuit substantias immateriales esse
4541 rationes et species sensibilium corporum, et quasdam aliis
4542 universaliores, et ideo posuit substantias immateriales habere
4543 praesidentiam immediatam circa omnia sensibilia corpora, et
4544 diversas circa diversa. Aristoteles autem posuit quod substantiae
4545 immateriales non sunt species corporum sensibilium, sed aliquid
4546 altius et universalius, et ideo non attribuit eis immediatam
4547 praesidentiam supra singula corpora, sed solum supra universalia
4548 agentia, quae sunt corpora caelestia. Avicenna vero mediam viam
4549 secutus est. Posuit enim cum Platone, aliquam substantiam
4550 spiritualem praesidentem immediate sphaerae activorum et
4551 passivorum; eo quod, sicut Plato ponebat quod formae horum
4552 sensibilium derivantur a substantiis immaterialibus, ita etiam
4553 Avicenna hoc posuit. Sed in hoc a Platone differt, quod posuit unam
4554 tantum substantiam immaterialem praesidentem omnibus corporibus
4555 inferioribus, quam vocavit intelligentiam agentem. Doctores autem
4556 sancti posuerunt, sicut et Platonici, diversis rebus corporeis
4557 diversas substantias spirituales esse praepositas. Dicit enim
4558 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>unaquaeque res
4559 visibilis in hoc mundo habet angelicam potestatem sibi
4560 praepositam</i>. Et Damascenus dicit, <i>Diabolus erat ex iis
4561 angelicis virtutibus quae praeerant terrestri ordini</i>. Et
4562 Origenes dicit, super illud Num. XXII, <i>cum vidisset asina
4563 Angelum, quod opus est mundo Angelis, qui praesunt super bestias,
4564 et praesunt animalium nativitati, et virgultorum et plantationum et
4565 ceterarum rerum incrementis</i>. Sed hoc non est ponendum propter
4566 hoc, quod secundum suam naturam unus Angelus magis se habeat ad
4567 praesidendum animalibus quam plantis, quia quilibet Angelus, etiam
4568 minimus, habet altiorem virtutem et universaliorem quam aliquod
4569 genus corporalium. Sed est ex ordine divinae sapientiae, quae
4570 diversis rebus diversos rectores praeposuit. Nec tamen propter hoc
4571 sequitur quod sint plures ordines Angelorum quam novem, quia, sicut
4572 supra dictum est, ordines distinguuntur secundum generalia officia.
4573 Unde sicut, secundum Gregorium, ad ordinem potestatum pertinent
4574 omnes Angeli qui habent proprie praesidentiam super Daemones; ita
4575 ad ordinem virtutum pertinere videntur omnes Angeli qui habent
4576 praesidentiam super res pure corporeas; horum enim ministerio
4577 interdum etiam miracula fiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A2-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 2. Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p2">
4578 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul.
4579 But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards
4580 heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception
4581 of an angel.
4582 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33032] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
4583 proceditur. Videtur quod materia corporalis obediat Angelis ad
4584 nutum. Maior est enim virtus Angeli quam virtus animae. Sed
4585 conceptioni animae obedit materia corporalis, immutatur enim corpus
4586 hominis ex conceptione animae, ad calorem et frigus, et quandoque
4587 usque ad sanitatem et aegritudinem. Ergo multo magis secundum
4588 conceptionem Angeli, materia corporalis transmutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p3">
4589 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior
4590 to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore
4591 much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
4592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33033] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4593 quidquid potest virtus inferior, potest virtus superior. Sed virtus
4594 Angeli est superior quam virtus corporalis. Corpus autem sua
4595 virtute potest transmutare materiam corporalem ad formam aliquam;
4596 sicut cum ignis generat ignem. Ergo multo fortius virtute sua
4597 Angeli possunt materiam corporalem transmutare ad aliquam
4598 formam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p4">
4599 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above
4600 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q110_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in
4601 effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the
4602 instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to
4603 the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to
4604 the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is
4605 from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects,
4606 is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.
4607 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33034] Iª q. 110 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, tota
4608 natura corporalis administratur per Angelos, ut dictum est, et sic
4609 videtur quod corpora se habet ad Angelos sicut instrumenta; nam
4610 ratio instrumenti est quod sit movens motum. Sed in effectibus
4611 aliquid invenitur ex virtute principalium agentium, quod non potest
4612 esse per virtutem instrumenti; et hoc est id quod est principalius
4613 in effectu. Sicut digestio nutrimenti est per virtutem caloris
4614 naturalis, qui est instrumentum animae nutritivae; sed quod
4615 generetur caro viva, est ex virtute animae. Similiter quod secetur
4616 lignum, pertinet ad serram; sed quod perveniatur ad formam lecti,
4617 est ex ratione artis. Ergo forma substantialis, quae est
4618 principalius in effectibus corporalibus, est ex virtute Angelorum.
4619 Materia ergo obedit, ad sui informationem, Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p5">
4620 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."
4621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33035] Iª q. 110 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4622 quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., <i>non est putandum istis
4623 transgressoribus Angelis ad nutum servire hanc visibilium rerum
4624 materiam, sed soli Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q110_A2-p6">
4625 <b>I answer that,</b> The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial
4626 forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion
4627 to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal
4628 agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on
4629 this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle.
4630 But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly
4631 speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something
4632 is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but
4633 the way to existence.
4634 </p><p id="FP_Q110_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural
4635 things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole
4636 "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter
4637 is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
4638 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 co."><a name="33036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33036] Iª q. 110 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4639 quod Platonici posuerunt formas quae sunt in materia, causari ex
4640 immaterialibus formis, quia formas materiales ponebant esse
4641 participationes quasdam immaterialium formarum. Et hos, quantum ad
4642 aliquid, secutus est Avicenna, qui posuit omnes formas quae sunt in
4643 materia, procedere a conceptione intelligentiae, et quod agentia
4644 corporalia sunt solum disponentia ad formas. Qui in hoc videntur
4645 fuisse decepti, quia existimaverunt formam quasi aliquid per se
4646 factum, ut sic ab aliquo formali principio procederet. Sed sicut
4647 philosophus probat in VII Metaphys., hoc quod proprie fit, est
4648 compositum, hoc enim proprie est quasi subsistens. Forma autem non
4649 dicitur ens quasi ipsa sit, sed sicut quo aliquid est, et sic per
4650 consequens nec forma proprie fit; eius enim est fieri, cuius est
4651 esse, cum fieri nihil aliud sit quam via in esse. Manifestum est
4652 autem quod factum est simile facienti, quia omne agens agit sibi
4653 simile. Et ideo id quod facit res naturales, habet similitudinem
4654 cum composito, vel quia est compositum, sicut ignis generat ignem;
4655 vel quia totum compositum, et quantum ad materiam et quantum ad
4656 formam, est in virtute ipsius; quod est proprium Dei. Sic igitur
4657 omnis informatio materiae vel est a Deo immediate, vel ab aliquo
4658 agente corporali; non autem immediate ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p8">
4659 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's
4660 concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject
4661 to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does
4662 not hold.
4663 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33037] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4664 dicendum quod anima nostra unitur corpori ut forma; et sic non est
4665 mirum, si formaliter transmutatur ex conceptione ipsius; praesertim
4666 cum motus sensitivi appetitus, qui fit cum quadam transmutatione
4667 corporali, subdatur imperio rationis. Angelus autem non sic se
4668 habet ad corpora naturalia. Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p9">
4669 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example,
4670 the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter
4671 in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior
4672 cause.
4673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33038] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4674 dicendum quod id quod potest virtus inferior, potest superior non
4675 eodem, sed excellentiori modo, sicut intellectus cognoscit
4676 sensibilia excellentiori modo quam sensus. Et sic Angelus
4677 excellentiori modo transmutat materiam corporalem quam agentia
4678 corporalia, scilicet movendo ipsa agentia corporalia, tanquam causa
4679 superior.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A2-p10">
4680 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would
4681 not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating
4682 the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since
4683 to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the
4684 power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
4685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33039] Iª q. 110 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4686 dicendum quod nihil prohibet ex virtute Angelorum aliquos effectus
4687 sequi in rebus naturalibus, ad quae agentia corporalia non
4688 sufficerent. Sed hoc non est obedire materiam Angelis ad nutum;
4689 sicut nec coquis obedit materia ad nutum, quia aliquem modum
4690 decoctionis operantur per ignem secundum aliquam artis
4691 moderationem, quam ignis per se non faceret, cum reducere materiam
4692 in actum formae substantialis, non excedat virtutem corporalis
4693 agentis, quia simile natum est sibi simile facere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A3-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 3. Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p2">
4694 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their
4695 forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above
4696 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q110_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.
4697 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33040] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
4698 proceditur. Videtur quod corpora non obediant Angelis ad motum
4699 localem. Motus enim localis corporum naturalium sequitur formas
4700 eorum. Sed Angeli non causant formas corporum naturalium, ut dictum
4701 est. Ergo neque possunt causare in eis motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p3">
4702 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause
4703 other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion.
4704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33041] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
4705 VIII Physic. probatur quod motus localis est primus motuum. Sed
4706 Angeli non possunt causare alios motus, transmutando materiam
4707 formaliter. Ergo neque etiam possunt causare motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p4">
4708 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle
4709 of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.
4710 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33042] Iª q. 110 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4711 membra corporalia obediunt conceptioni animae ad motum localem,
4712 inquantum habent in seipsis aliquod principium vitae. In corporibus
4713 autem naturalibus non est aliquod principium vitae. Ergo non
4714 obediunt Angelis ad motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p5">
4715 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this
4716 without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.
4717 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33043] Iª q. 110 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4718 quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Angeli adhibent semina
4719 corporalia ad aliquos effectus producendos. Sed hoc non possunt
4720 facere nisi localiter movendo. Ergo corpora obediunt eis ad motum
4721 localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p6">
4722 <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second." Hence
4723 it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is
4724 below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves
4725 (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in
4726 potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic---that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has
4727 a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted
4728 that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and
4729 chiefly by a local motion.
4730 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 co."><a name="33044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33044] Iª q. 110 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4731 quod, sicut Dionysius dicit VII cap. de Div. Nom., <i>divina
4732 sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum</i>, ex
4733 quo patet quod natura inferior in sui supremo attingitur a natura
4734 superiori. Natura autem corporalis est infra naturam spiritualem.
4735 Inter omnes autem motus corporeos perfectior est motus localis, ut
4736 probatur in VIII Physic., cuius ratio est, quia mobile secundum
4737 locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsecum, inquantum
4738 huiusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet ad locum. Et
4739 ideo natura corporalis nata est moveri immediate a natura
4740 spirituali secundum locum. Unde et philosophi posuerunt suprema
4741 corpora moveri localiter a spiritualibus substantiis. Unde videmus
4742 quod anima movet corpus primo et principaliter locali motu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p7">
4743 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the
4744 sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements
4745 result from the power of spiritual substances.
4746 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33045] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4747 dicendum quod in corporibus sunt alii motus locales praeter eos qui
4748 consequuntur formas, sicut fluxus et refluxus maris non consequitur
4749 formam substantialem aquae, sed virtutem lunae. Et multo magis
4750 aliqui motus locales consequi possunt virtutem spiritualium
4751 substantiarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p8">
4752 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal
4753 agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.
4754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33046] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4755 dicendum quod Angeli, causando motum localem tanquam priorem, per
4756 eum causare possunt alios motus, adhibendo scilicet agentia
4757 corporalia ad huiusmodi effectus producendos; sicut faber adhibet
4758 ignem ad emollitionem ferri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A3-p9">
4759 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the
4760 body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to
4761 any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.
4762 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33047] Iª q. 110 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4763 dicendum quod Angeli habent virtutem minus contractam quam animae.
4764 Unde virtus motiva animae contrahitur ad corpus unitum, quod per
4765 eam vivificatur, quo mediante alia potest movere. Sed virtus Angeli
4766 non est contracta ad aliquod corpus. Unde potest corpora non
4767 coniuncta localiter movere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q110_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q110_A4-p0.1">Q. 110. A. 4. Whether angels can work miracles?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p2">
4768 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues
4769 by whom signs and miracles are usually done."
4770 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33048] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
4771 proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possunt facere miracula. Dicit enim
4772 Gregorius, <i>virtutes vocantur illi spiritus, per quos signa et
4773 miracula frequentius fiunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p3">
4774 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice,
4775 bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he
4776 says elsewhere in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore
4777 the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.
4778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33049] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4779 Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaestionum, <i>quod
4780 magi faciunt miracula per privatos contractus, boni Christiani per
4781 publicam iustitiam, mali Christiani per signa publicae
4782 iustitiae</i>. Sed magi faciunt miracula per hoc quod exaudiuntur a
4783 Daemonibus, ut ipse alibi in eodem libro dicit. Ergo Daemones
4784 miracula possunt facere. Ergo multo magis Angeli boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p4">
4785 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]
4786 that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in
4787 our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle,
4788 as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature.
4789 Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.
4790 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33050] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4791 Augustinus in eodem libro dicit quod <i>omnia quae visibiliter
4792 fiunt, etiam per inferiores potestates aeris huius non absurde
4793 fieri posse creduntur</i>. Sed quando effectus aliquis naturalium
4794 causarum producitur absque ordine naturalis causae, hoc dicimus
4795 esse miraculum; puta cum aliquis sanatur a febre, non per
4796 operationem naturae. Ergo Angeli et Daemones possunt facere
4797 miracula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p5">
4798 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore
4799 an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles.
4800 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="33051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33051] Iª q. 110 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
4801 virtus superior non subditur ordini inferioris causae. Sed natura
4802 corporalis est inferior Angelo. Ergo Angelus potest operari praeter
4803 ordinem corporalium agentium. Quod est miracula facere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6">
4804 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written of God (
4805 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q110_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.135.4" target="asv">Ps. 135:4</a>): "Who alone doth great wonders."
4806 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33052] Iª q. 110 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4807 quod de Deo dicitur in Psalmo, <i>qui facit mirabilia magna
4808 solus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p7">
4809 <b>I answer that,</b> A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if
4810 something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone
4811 upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order
4812 of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or
4813 any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence
4814 God alone can work miracles.
4815 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 co."><a name="33053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33053] Iª q. 110 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4816 quod miraculum proprie dicitur, cum aliquid fit praeter ordinem
4817 naturae. Sed non sufficit ad rationem miraculi si aliquid fiat
4818 praeter ordinem naturae alicuius particularis, quia sic, cum
4819 aliquis proiicit lapidem sursum, miraculum faceret, cum hoc sit
4820 praeter ordinem naturae lapidis. Ex hoc ergo aliquid dicitur esse
4821 miraculum, quod fit praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Hoc
4822 autem non potest facere nisi Deus, quia quidquid facit Angelus, vel
4823 quaecumque alia creatura, propria virtute, hoc fit secundum ordinem
4824 naturae creatae; et sic non est miraculum. Unde relinquitur quod
4825 solus Deus miracula facere possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p8">
4826 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are
4827 said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the
4828 dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.
4829 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33054] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4830 dicendum quod Angeli aliqui dicuntur miracula facere, vel quia ad
4831 eorum desiderium Deus miracula facit, sicut et sancti homines
4832 dicuntur miracula facere. Vel quia aliquod ministerium exhibent in
4833 miraculis quae fiunt; sicut colligendo pulveres in resurrectione
4834 communi, vel huiusmodi aliquid agendo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p9">
4835 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature.
4836 But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created
4837 nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own
4838 natural power, these things are called "miracles" not in an absolute sense, but in
4839 reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by "private
4840 contracts," forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in
4841 a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the
4842 other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far
4843 as
4844 they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by "public justice": but bad Christians by the "signs of public
4845 justice," as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.
4846 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33055] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4847 dicendum quod miracula simpliciter loquendo, dicuntur, ut dictum
4848 est, cum aliqua fiunt praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Sed
4849 quia non omnis virtus naturae creatae est nota nobis, ideo cum
4850 aliquid fit praeter ordinem naturae creatae nobis notae, per
4851 virtutem creatam nobis ignotam, est miraculum quoad nos. Sic igitur
4852 cum Daemones aliquid faciunt sua virtute naturali, miracula
4853 dicuntur non simpliciter, sed quoad nos. Et hoc modo magi per
4854 Daemones miracula faciunt. Et dicuntur fieri per privatos
4855 contractus, quia quaelibet virtus creaturae in universo se habet ut
4856 virtus alicuius privatae personae in civitate; unde cum magus
4857 aliquid facit per pactum initum cum Daemone, hoc fit quasi per
4858 quendam privatum contractum. Sed iustitia divina est in toto
4859 universo sicut lex publica in civitate. Et ideo boni Christiani,
4860 inquantum per iustitiam divinam miracula faciunt, dicuntur facere
4861 miracula per publicam iustitiam. Mali autem Christiani per signa
4862 publicae iustitiae, sicut invocando nomen Christi, vel exhibendo
4863 aliqua sacramenta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p10">
4864 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.
4865 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33056] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
4866 dicendum quod spirituales potestates possunt facere ea quae
4867 visibiliter fiunt in hoc mundo, adhibendo corporalia semina per
4868 motum localem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q110_A4-p11">
4869 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside
4870 the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.
4871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 110 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="33057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33057] Iª q. 110 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
4872 dicendum quod, licet Angeli possint aliquid facere praeter ordinem
4873 naturae corporalis, non tamen possunt aliquid facere praeter
4874 ordinem totius creaturae, quod exigitur ad rationem miraculi, ut
4875 dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
4876 <div id="FP_Q111" class="div3">
4877 <h3 id="FP_Q111-p0.1">Q. 111. THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
4878 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
4879 <p id="FP_Q111-p2"> We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power;
4880 (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.
4881 </p><p id="FP_Q111-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q111-p4"><a href="#FP_Q111_A1"> (1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p5"><a href="#FP_Q111_A2"> (2) Whether he can change man's will?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p6"><a href="#FP_Q111_A3"> (3) Whether he can change man's imagination?</a></p><p id="FP_Q111-p7"><a href="#FP_Q111_A4"> (4) Whether he can change man's senses?</a></p>
4882 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 pr."><a name="33058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33058]
4883 Iª q. 111 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de actione
4884 Angelorum in homines. Et primo, quantum possint eos immutare sua
4885 virtute naturali; secundo, quomodo mittantur a Deo ad ministerium
4886 hominum; tertio, quomodo custodiant homines. Circa primum
4887 quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Angelus possit illuminare
4888 intellectum hominis. Secundo, utrum possit immutare affectum eius.
4889 Tertio, utrum possit immutare imaginationem eius. Quarto, utrum
4890 possit immutare sensum eius.</p></div></div></div>
4891 <div id="FP_Q111_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A1-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 1. Whether an angel can enlighten man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2">
4892 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes
4893 enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to
4894 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.8" target="asv"> Eph. 2:8</a>: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened
4895 by an angel; but immediately by God.
4896 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33059] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
4897 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit illuminare hominem.
4898 Homo enim illuminatur per fidem, unde Dionysius, in Eccles. Hier.,
4899 illuminationem attribuit Baptismo, qui est fidei sacramentum. Sed
4900 fides immediate est a Deo; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, <i>gratia
4901 estis salvati per fidem, et non ex vobis; Dei enim donum est</i>.
4902 Ergo homo non illuminatur ab Angelo, sed immediate a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3">
4903 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (
4904 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed
4905 them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God---that is, natural reason and the creature.
4906 Therefore God enlightens man immediately.
4907 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33060] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
4908 super illud Rom. I, <i>Deus illis manifestavit</i>, dicit Glossa
4909 quod <i>non solum ratio naturalis ad hoc profuit ut divina
4910 hominibus manifestarentur, sed etiam Deus illis revelavit per opus
4911 suum</i>, scilicet per creaturam. Sed utrumque est a Deo immediate,
4912 scilicet ratio naturalis, et creatura. Ergo Deus immediate
4913 illuminat hominem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p4">
4914 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.
4915 Therefore he is not enlightened by them.
4916 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33061] Iª q. 111 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
4917 quicumque illuminatur, cognoscit suam illuminationem. Sed homines
4918 non percipiunt se ab Angelis illuminari. Ergo non illuminantur ab
4919 eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5">
4920 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But
4921 such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated (
4922 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>;
4923 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q107_A2" id="FP_Q111_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[107], A[2]</a>). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.
4924 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33062] Iª q. 111 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
4925 quod Dionysius probat, in IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod revelationes
4926 divinorum perveniunt ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Huiusmodi
4927 autem revelationes sunt illuminationes, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
4928 homines illuminantur per Angelos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p6">
4929 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above (
4930 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q109_A2" id="FP_Q111_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[109], A[2]</a>); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.
4931 </p><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p7"> The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above
4932 (
4933 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect
4934 is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior
4935 intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby.
4936 This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity
4937 of the inferior angel, as explained above (
4938 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q111_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>).
4939 </p><p id="FP_Q111_A1-p8"> The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand
4940 by turning to the phantasms, as above explained (
4941 <a href="#FP_Q84_A7" id="FP_Q111_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[7]</a>). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius
4942 says (Coel. Hier. i), that, "It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of
4943 the sacred veils." On the
4944 other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two
4945 ways man is enlightened by an angel.
4946 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 co."><a name="33063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33063] Iª q. 111 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4947 quod, cum divinae providentiae ordo habeat ut actionibus superiorum
4948 inferiora subdantur, ut supra dictum est; sicut inferiores Angeli
4949 illuminantur per superiores, ita homines qui sunt Angelis
4950 inferiores, per eos illuminantur. Sed modus utriusque
4951 illuminationis quodammodo est similis, et quodammodo diversus.
4952 Dictum est enim supra quod illuminatio, quae est manifestatio
4953 divinae veritatis, secundum duo attenditur, scilicet secundum quod
4954 intellectus inferior confortatur per actionem intellectus
4955 superioris; et secundum quod proponuntur intellectui inferiori
4956 species intelligibiles quae sunt in superiori, ut capi possint ab
4957 inferiori. Et hoc quidem in Angelis fit, secundum quod superior
4958 Angelus veritatem universalem conceptam dividit secundum
4959 capacitatem inferioris Angeli, ut supra dictum est. Sed intellectus
4960 humanus non potest ipsam intelligibilem veritatem nudam capere,
4961 quia connaturale est ei ut intelligat per conversionem ad
4962 phantasmata, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo intelligibilem veritatem
4963 proponunt Angeli hominibus sub similitudinibus sensibilium;
4964 secundum illud quod dicit Dionysius, I cap. Cael. Hier., quod
4965 <i>impossibile est aliter nobis lucere divinum radium, nisi
4966 varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum</i>. Ex alia vero parte,
4967 intellectus humanus, tanquam inferior, fortificatur per actionem
4968 intellectus angelici. Et secundum haec duo attenditur illuminatio
4969 qua homo illuminatur ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9">
4970 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will
4971 tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded
4972 by the will; hence Augustine says, "No one believes except willingly." In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly,
4973 faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is
4974 accomplished by man, according to
4975 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.17" target="asv">Rom. 10:17</a>, "Faith cometh by hearing"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels
4976 have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be
4977 believed; but also as regards what is to be done.
4978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33064] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
4979 dicendum quod ad fidem duo concurrunt. Primo quidem habitus
4980 intellectus, quo disponitur ad obediendum voluntati tendenti in
4981 divinam veritatem, intellectus enim assentit veritati fidei, non
4982 quasi convictus ratione, sed quasi imperatus a voluntate; nullus
4983 enim credit nisi volens, ut Augustinus dicit. Et quantum ad hoc,
4984 fides est a solo Deo. Secundo requiritur ad fidem, quod credibilia
4985 proponantur credenti. Et hoc quidem fit per hominem, secundum quod
4986 fides est ex auditu, ut dicitur Rom. X; sed per Angelos
4987 principaliter, per quos hominibus revelantur divina. Unde Angeli
4988 operantur aliquid ad illuminationem fidei. Et tamen homines
4989 illuminantur ab Angelis non solum de credendis, sed etiam de
4990 agendis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p10">
4991 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the
4992 human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures.
4993 Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.
4994 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33065] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4995 dicendum quod ratio naturalis, quae est immediate a Deo, potest per
4996 Angelum confortari, ut dictum est. Et similiter ex speciebus a
4997 creaturis acceptis, tanto altior elicitur intelligibilis veritas,
4998 quanto intellectus humanus fuerit fortior. Et sic per Angelum
4999 adiuvatur homo, ut ex creaturis perfectius in divinam cognitionem
5000 deveniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A1-p11">
5001 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus
5002 whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made
5003 known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows
5004 what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like
5005 manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.
5006 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33066] Iª q. 111 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5007 dicendum quod operatio intellectualis, et illuminatio, dupliciter
5008 possunt considerari. Uno modo, ex parte rei intellectae, et sic
5009 quicumque intelligit vel illuminatur, cognoscit se intelligere vel
5010 illuminari; quia cognoscit rem sibi esse manifestam. Alio modo, ex
5011 parte principii, et sic non quicumque intelligit aliquam veritatem,
5012 cognoscit quid sit intellectus, qui est principium intellectualis
5013 operationis. Et similiter non quicumque illuminatur ab Angelo,
5014 cognoscit se ab Angelo illuminari.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A2-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 2. Whether the angels can change the will of man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2">
5015 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, "Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers
5016 a flame of fire" (
5017 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.7" target="asv">Heb. 1:7</a>), the gloss notes that "they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices." This could not be, however,
5018 unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will.
5019 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33067] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
5020 proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli possint immutare voluntatem
5021 hominis. Quia super illud Heb. I, <i>qui facit Angelos suos
5022 spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis</i>, dicit Glossa quod
5023 <i>ignis sunt, dum spiritu fervent, et vitia nostra urunt</i>. Sed
5024 hoc non esset, nisi voluntatem immutarent. Ergo Angeli possunt
5025 immutare voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p3">
5026 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, "the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them." Damascene, however,
5027 says that he also sends them; for he remarks that "every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and
5028 put into men" (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could
5029 only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them.
5030 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33068] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Beda
5031 dicit quod <i>Diabolus non est immissor malarum cogitationum, sed
5032 incensor</i>. Damascenus autem ulterius dicit quod etiam est
5033 immissor, dicit enim in II libro, quod <i>omnis malitia et immundae
5034 passiones ex Daemonibus excogitatae sunt, et immittere homini sunt
5035 concessi</i>. Et pari ratione, Angeli boni immittunt et incendunt
5036 bonas cogitationes. Sed hoc non possent facere, nisi immutarent
5037 voluntatem. Ergo immutant voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p4">
5038 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination
5039 which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also
5040 is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will.
5041 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33069] Iª q. 111 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5042 Angelus, sicut est dictum, illuminat intellectum hominis
5043 mediantibus phantasmatibus. Sed sicut phantasia, quae deservit
5044 intellectui, potest immutari ab Angelo; ita et appetitus sensitivus
5045 qui deservit voluntati, quia et ipse etiam est vis utens organo
5046 corporali. Ergo sicut illuminat intellectum, ita potest immutare
5047 voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5">
5048 <b>On the contrary,</b> To change the will belongs to God alone, according to
5049 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it."
5050 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33070] Iª q. 111 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5051 quod immutare voluntatem est proprium Dei; secundum illud Prov.
5052 XXI, <i>cor regis in manu domini; quocumque voluerit, vertet
5053 illud</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p6">
5054 <b>I answer that,</b> The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the
5055 inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination
5056 to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the
5057 will is from God alone, Who causes the will.
5058 </p><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p7"> Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way---by the good apprehended by the
5059 intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move
5060 the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion,
5061 as above explained (
5062 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A2" id="FP_Q111_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[2]</a>).
5063 </p><p id="FP_Q111_A2-p8"> In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the
5064 sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being
5065 able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or
5066 to resist, the passion.
5067 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 co."><a name="33071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33071] Iª q. 111 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5068 quod voluntas potest immutari dupliciter. Uno modo, ab interiori.
5069 Et sic cum motus voluntatis non sit aliud quam inclinatio
5070 voluntatis in rem volitam, solius Dei est sic immutare voluntatem,
5071 qui dat naturae intellectuali virtutem talis inclinationis. Sicut
5072 enim inclinatio naturalis non est nisi a Deo qui dat naturam; ita
5073 inclinatio voluntaria non est nisi a Deo, qui causat voluntatem.
5074 Alio modo movetur voluntas ab exteriori. Et hoc in Angelo est
5075 quidem uno modo tantum, scilicet a bono apprehenso per intellectum.
5076 Unde secundum quod aliquis est causa quod aliquid apprehendatur ut
5077 bonum ad appetendum, secundum hoc movet voluntatem. Et sic etiam
5078 solus Deus efficaciter potest movere voluntatem; Angelus autem et
5079 homo per modum suadentis, ut supra dictum est. Sed praeter hunc
5080 modum, etiam aliter movetur in hominibus voluntas ab exteriori,
5081 scilicet ex passione existente circa appetitum sensitivum; sicut ex
5082 concupiscentia vel ira inclinatur voluntas ad aliquid volendum. Et
5083 sic etiam Angeli, inquantum possunt concitare huiusmodi passiones,
5084 possunt voluntatem movere. Non tamen ex necessitate, quia voluntas
5085 semper remanet libera ad consentiendum vel resistendum
5086 passioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p9">
5087 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.
5088 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33072] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5089 dicendum quod ministri Dei, vel homines vel Angeli, dicuntur urere
5090 vitia, et inflammare ad virtutes, per modum persuasionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p10">
5091 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject
5092 to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of
5093 the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling "a putting in" because
5094 such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher
5095 principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.
5096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33073] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5097 dicendum quod Daemones non possunt immittere cogitationes, interius
5098 eas causando, cum usus cogitativae virtutis subiaceat voluntati.
5099 Dicitur tamen Diabolus incensor cogitationum, inquantum incitat ad
5100 cogitandum, vel ad appetendum cogitata, per modum persuadentis, vel
5101 passionem concitantis. Et hoc ipsum incendere Damascenus vocat
5102 immittere, quia talis operatio interius fit. Sed bonae cogitationes
5103 attribuuntur altiori principio, scilicet Deo; licet Angelorum
5104 ministerio procurentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A2-p11">
5105 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something
5106 following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.
5107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33074] Iª q. 111 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5108 dicendum quod intellectus humanus, secundum praesentem statum, non
5109 potest intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata; sed voluntas
5110 humana potest aliquid velle ex iudicio rationis, non sequendo
5111 passionem appetitus sensitivi. Unde non est simile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A3-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 3. Whether an angel can change man's imagination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p2">
5112 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is "a motion caused
5113 by the sense in act." But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it
5114 is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.
5115 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33075] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
5116 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare imaginationem
5117 hominis. Phantasia enim, ut dicitur in libro de anima, est motus
5118 factus a sensu secundum actum. Sed si fieret per immutationem
5119 Angeli, non fieret a sensu secundum actum. Ergo est contra rationem
5120 phantasiae, quae est actus imaginativae virtutis, ut sit per
5121 immutationem Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p3">
5122 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But
5123 an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (
5124 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q111_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.
5125 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33076] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5126 formae quae sunt in imaginatione, cum sint spirituales, sunt
5127 nobiliores formis quae sunt in materia sensibili. Sed Angelus non
5128 potest imprimere formas in materia sensibili, ut dictum est. Ergo
5129 non potest imprimere formas in imaginatione. Et ita non potest eam
5130 immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p4">
5131 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): "One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to
5132 the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other."
5133 But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge
5134 of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.
5135 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33077] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5136 secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., <i>commixtione
5137 alterius spiritus fieri potest ut ea quae ipse scit, per huiusmodi
5138 imagines ei cui miscetur ostendat, sive intelligenti, sive ut ab
5139 alio intellecta pandantur</i>. Sed non videtur quod Angelus possit
5140 misceri imaginationi humanae; neque quod imaginatio possit capere
5141 intelligibilia, quae Angelus cognoscit. Ergo videtur quod Angelus
5142 non possit mutare imaginationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p5">
5143 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this
5144 there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision,
5145 by changing the imagination.
5146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="33078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33078] Iª q. 111 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
5147 visione imaginaria homo adhaeret similitudinibus rerum quasi ipsis
5148 rebus. Sed in hoc est quaedam deceptio. Cum ergo Angelus bonus non
5149 possit esse causa deceptionis, videtur quod non possit causare
5150 imaginariam visionem, imaginationem immutando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6">
5151 <b>On the contrary,</b> Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears
5152 from
5153 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.20" target="asv"> Mat. 1:20</a>;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.
5154 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33079] Iª q. 111 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5155 quod ea quae apparent in somnis, videntur imaginaria visione. Sed
5156 Angeli revelant aliqua in somnis; ut patet Matth. I et II, de
5157 Angelo qui Ioseph in somnis apparuit. Ergo Angelus potest
5158 imaginationem movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p7">
5159 <b>I answer that,</b> Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows.
5160 For it was said above (
5161 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FP_Q111_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[3]</a>), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of
5162 bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused
5163 in us by the local movement of
5164 animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions
5165 in dreams, that "when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend
5166 with it," that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, "and move the sensitive principle";
5167 so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects
5168 themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those
5169 who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes
5170 also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power
5171 of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.
5172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 co."><a name="33080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33080] Iª q. 111 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5173 quod Angelus, tam bonus quam malus, virtute naturae suae potest
5174 movere imaginationem hominis. Quod quidem sic considerari potest.
5175 Dictum est enim supra quod natura corporalis obedit Angelo ad motum
5176 localem. Illa ergo quae ex motu locali aliquorum corporum possunt
5177 causari, subsunt virtuti naturali Angelorum. Manifestum est autem
5178 quod apparitiones imaginariae causantur interdum in nobis ex locali
5179 mutatione corporalium spirituum et humorum. Unde Aristoteles, in
5180 Lib. de Somn. et Vig., assignans causam apparitionis somniorum,
5181 dicit quod, cum animal dormit, descendente plurimo sanguine ad
5182 principium sensitivum, simul descendunt motus, idest impressiones
5183 relictae ex sensibilium motionibus, quae in spiritibus sensualibus
5184 conservantur, et movent principium sensitivum, ita quod fit quaedam
5185 apparitio, ac si tunc principium sensitivum a rebus ipsis
5186 exterioribus mutaretur. Et tanta potest esse commotio spirituum et
5187 humorum, quod huiusmodi apparitiones etiam vigilantibus fiant;
5188 sicut patet in phreneticis, et in aliis huiusmodi. Sicut igitur hoc
5189 fit per naturalem commotionem humorum; et quandoque etiam per
5190 voluntatem hominis, qui voluntarie imaginatur quod prius senserat,
5191 ita etiam hoc potest fieri virtute Angeli boni vel mali, quandoque
5192 quidem cum alienatione a corporeis sensibus, quandoque autem absque
5193 tali alienatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p8">
5194 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the
5195 senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed
5196 in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.
5197 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33081] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5198 dicendum quod primum principium phantasiae est a sensu secundum
5199 actum, non enim possumus imaginari quae nullo modo sensimus, vel
5200 secundum totum vel secundum partem; sicut caecus natus non potest
5201 imaginari colorem. Sed aliquando imaginatio informatur, ut actus
5202 phantastici motus consurgat, ab impressionibus interius
5203 conservatis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p9">
5204 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from
5205 the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above
5206 explained.
5207 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33082] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5208 dicendum quod Angelus transmutat imaginationem, non quidem
5209 imprimendo aliquam formam imaginariam nullo modo per sensum prius
5210 acceptam (non enim posset facere quod caecus imaginaretur colores),
5211 sed hoc facit per motum localem spirituum et humorum, ut dictum
5212 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p10">
5213 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect
5214 which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the
5215 way he knows.
5216 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33083] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5217 dicendum quod commixtio illa spiritus angelici ad imaginationem
5218 humanam, non est per essentiam, sed per effectum quem praedicto
5219 modo in imaginatione facit; cui demonstrat quae ipse novit, non
5220 tamen eo modo quo ipse novit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A3-p11">
5221 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these
5222 images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear
5223 in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things
5224 appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to
5225 the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.
5226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33084] Iª q. 111 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
5227 dicendum quod Angelus causans aliquam imaginariam visionem,
5228 quandoque quidem simul intellectum illuminat, ut cognoscat quid per
5229 huiusmodi similitudines significetur, et tunc nulla est deceptio.
5230 Quandoque vero per operationem Angeli solummodo similitudines rerum
5231 apparent in imaginatione, nec tamen tunc causatur deceptio ab
5232 Angelo, sed ex defectu intellectus eius cui talia apparent. Sicut
5233 nec Christus fuit causa deceptionis in hoc quod multa turbis in
5234 parabolis proposuit, quae non exposuit eis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q111_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q111_A4-p0.1">Q. 111. A. 4. Whether an angel can change the human senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p2">
5235 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation
5236 does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.
5237 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33085] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
5238 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non possit immutare sensum
5239 humanum. Operatio enim sensitiva est operatio vitae. Huiusmodi
5240 autem operatio non est a principio extrinseco. Non ergo operatio
5241 sensitiva potest causari ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p3">
5242 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other
5243 natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.
5244 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33086] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5245 virtus sensitiva est nobilior quam nutritiva. Sed Angelus, ut
5246 videtur, non potest mutare virtutem nutritivam; sicut nec alias
5247 formas naturales. Ergo neque virtutem sensitivam immutare
5248 potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p4">
5249 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (
5250 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FP_Q111_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object.
5251 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33087] Iª q. 111 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5252 sensus naturaliter movetur a sensibili. Sed Angelus non potest
5253 immutare naturae ordinem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo Angelus non
5254 potest immutare sensum, sed semper sensus a sensibili
5255 immutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5">
5256 <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels who overturned Sodom, "struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the
5257 door" (
5258 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19.11" target="asv">Gn. 19:11</a>). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses,
5259 in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom---namely, dazzling (French version, "eblouissement"), which the Latin
5260 "caecitas" (blindness) does not necessarily
5261 imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (
5262 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q111_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:18</a>).
5263 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33088] Iª q. 111 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5264 quod Angeli qui subverterunt Sodomam, <i>percusserunt Sodomitas
5265 caecitate (vel aorasia), ut ostium domus invenire non possent</i>,
5266 ut dicitur Gen. XIX. Et simile legitur IV Reg. VI, de Syris quos
5267 Elisaeus duxit in Samariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p6">
5268 <b>I answer that,</b> The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for
5269 we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged
5270 with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power,
5271 can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object
5272 from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above (
5273 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q51_A2" id="FP_Q111_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[51], A[2]</a>). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways.
5274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 co."><a name="33089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33089] Iª q. 111 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5275 quod sensus immutatur dupliciter. Uno modo, ab exteriori; sicut cum
5276 mutatur a sensibili. Alio modo, ab interiori, videmus enim quod,
5277 perturbatis spiritibus et humoribus immutatur sensus; lingua enim
5278 infirmi, quia plena est cholerico humore, omnia sentit ut amara; et
5279 simile contingit in aliis sensibus. Utroque autem modo Angelus
5280 potest immutare sensum hominis sua naturali virtute. Potest enim
5281 Angelus opponere exterius sensui sensibile aliquod, vel a natura
5282 formatum, vel aliquod de novo formando; sicut facit dum corpus
5283 assumit, ut supra dictum est. Similiter etiam potest interius
5284 commovere spiritus et humores, ut supra dictum est, ex quibus
5285 sensus diversimode immutentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p7">
5286 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this
5287 interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained.
5288 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33090] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5289 dicendum quod principium sensitivae operationis non potest esse
5290 absque principio interiori, quod est potentia sensitiva, sed illud
5291 interius principium potest multipliciter ab exteriori principio
5292 commoveri, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p8">
5293 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power,
5294 and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ.
5295 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33091] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5296 dicendum quod etiam per commotionem interiorem spirituum et
5297 humorum, potest Angelus aliquid operari ad immutandum actum
5298 potentiae nutritivae. Et similiter potentiae appetitivae, et
5299 sensitivae, et cuiuscumque potentiae corporali organo utentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q111_A4-p9">
5300 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since
5301 he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode
5302 of nature.
5303 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 111 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33092] Iª q. 111 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5304 dicendum quod praeter ordinem totius creaturae Angelus facere non
5305 potest, sed praeter ordinem alicuius particularis naturae facere
5306 potest, cum tali ordini non subdatur. Et sic quodam singulari modo
5307 potest sensum immutare, praeter modum communem.</p></div></div></div></div>
5308 <div id="FP_Q112" class="div3">
5309 <h3 id="FP_Q112-p0.1">Q. 112. THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
5310 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
5311 <p id="FP_Q112-p2"> We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q112-p3"><a href="#FP_Q112_A1"> (1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p4"><a href="#FP_Q112_A2"> (2) Whether all are sent?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p5"><a href="#FP_Q112_A3"> (3) Whether those who are sent, assist?</a></p><p id="FP_Q112-p6"><a href="#FP_Q112_A4"> (4) From what orders they are sent.</a></p>
5312 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 pr."><a name="33093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33093]
5313 Iª q. 112 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de missione
5314 Angelorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum aliqui
5315 Angeli mittantur in ministerium. Secundo, utrum omnes mittantur.
5316 Tertio, utrum illi qui mittuntur, assistant. Quarto, de quibus
5317 ordinibus mittantur.</p></div></div></div>
5318 <div id="FP_Q112_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A1-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 1. Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p2">
5319 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual
5320 actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are
5321 intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions.
5322 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33094] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
5323 proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli in ministerium non mittantur. Omnis
5324 enim missio est ad aliquem determinatum locum. Sed actiones
5325 intellectuales non determinant aliquem locum, quia intellectus
5326 abstrahit ab hic et nunc. Cum igitur actiones angelicae sint
5327 intellectuales, videtur quod Angeli ad suas actiones agendas non
5328 mittantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p3">
5329 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry,
5330 it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.
5331 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33095] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5332 caelum Empyreum est locus pertinens ad dignitatem Angelorum. Si
5333 igitur ad nos mittantur in ministerium, videtur quod eorum
5334 dignitati aliquid depereat. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4">
5335 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive
5336 wisdom" (
5337 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:25</a>). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole
5338 of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is
5339 unfitting.
5340 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33096] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5341 exterior occupatio impedit sapientiae contemplationem, unde dicitur
5342 Eccli. XXXVIII, <i>qui minoratur actu, percipiet sapientiam</i>. Si
5343 igitur Angeli aliqui mittuntur ad exteriora ministeria, videtur
5344 quod retardentur a contemplatione. Sed tota eorum beatitudo in
5345 contemplatione Dei consistit. Si ergo mitterentur, eorum beatitudo
5346 minueretur. Quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5">
5347 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written (
5348 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.27" target="asv">Lk. 22:27</a>): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are
5349 naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us.
5350 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33097] Iª q. 112 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
5351 ministrare est inferioris, unde dicitur Lucae XXII, <i>quis maior
5352 est, qui recumbit, an ille qui ministrat? Nonne qui recumbit?</i>
5353 Sed Angeli sunt maiores nobis ordine naturae. Ergo non mittuntur in
5354 ministerium nostrum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6">
5355 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
5356 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.20" target="asv">Ex. 23:20</a>): "Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee."
5357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33098] Iª q. 112 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5358 quod dicitur Exod. XXIII, <i>ecce ego mittam Angelum meum, qui
5359 praecedat te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q112_A1-p7">
5360 <b>I answer that,</b> From what has been said above (
5361 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[6]</a>), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated (
5362 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q43_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[43], A[1]</a>), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin
5363 to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent
5364 as
5365 proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before
5366 by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent,
5367 His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (
5368 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q8_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[8], A[1]</a>). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such
5369 a way as not to reach
5370 another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was above stated (
5371 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q112_A1-p7.4" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal
5372 creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this
5373 takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.
5374 </p><p id="FP_Q112_A1-p8"> Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose
5375 authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister
5376 is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels'
5377 actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.
5378 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 co."><a name="33099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33099] Iª q. 112 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5379 quod ex supra dictis manifestum esse potest quod aliqui Angeli in
5380 ministerium mittuntur a Deo. Ut enim supra dictum est, cum de
5381 missione divinarum personarum ageretur, ille mitti dicitur, qui
5382 aliquo modo ab alio procedit, ut incipiat esse ubi prius non erat,
5383 vel ubi prius erat, per alium modum. Filius enim aut spiritus
5384 sanctus mitti dicitur, ut a patre procedens per originem; et
5385 incipit esse novo modo, idest per gratiam vel per naturam
5386 assumptam, ubi prius erat per deitatis praesentiam. Dei enim
5387 proprium est ubique esse, quia cum sit universale agens, eius
5388 virtus attingit omnia entia; unde est in omnibus rebus, ut supra
5389 dictum est. Virtus autem Angeli, cum sit particulare agens, non
5390 attingit totum universum; sed sic attingit unum, quod non attingit
5391 aliud. Et ideo ita est hic, quod non alibi. Manifestum est autem
5392 per supra dicta, quod creatura corporalis per Angelos
5393 administratur. Cum igitur aliquid est fiendum per aliquem Angelum
5394 circa aliquam creaturam corpoream, de novo applicatur Angelus illi
5395 corpori sua virtute; et sic Angelus de novo incipit ibi esse. Et
5396 hoc totum procedit ex imperio divino. Unde sequitur, secundum
5397 praemissa, quod Angelus a Deo mittatur. Sed actio quam Angelus
5398 missus exercet, procedit a Deo sicut a primo principio, cuius nutu
5399 et auctoritate Angeli operantur; et in Deum reducitur sicut in
5400 ultimum finem. Et hoc facit rationem ministri, nam minister est
5401 sicut instrumentum intelligens; instrumentum autem ab alio movetur,
5402 et eius actio ad aliud ordinatur. Unde actiones Angelorum
5403 ministeria vocantur; et propter hoc dicuntur in ministerium
5404 mitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p9">
5405 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an
5406 operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting
5407 something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and
5408 commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently
5409 have sometimes a determinate place.
5410 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33100] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5411 dicendum quod aliqua operatio dupliciter dicitur intellectualis.
5412 Uno modo, quasi in ipso intellectu consistens, ut contemplatio. Et
5413 talis operatio non determinat sibi locum, immo, ut Augustinus dicit
5414 IV de Trin., <i>etiam nos, secundum quod aliquid aeternum mente
5415 sapimus, non in hoc mundo sumus</i>. Alio modo dicitur aliqua actio
5416 intellectualis, quia est ab aliquo intellectu regulata et imperata.
5417 Et sic manifestum est quod operationes intellectuales interdum
5418 determinant sibi loca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p10">
5419 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body
5420 should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the
5421 empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king
5422 lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his
5423 dignity.
5424 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33101] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5425 dicendum quod caelum Empyreum pertinet ad dignitatem Angeli
5426 secundum congruentiam quandam, quia congruum est ut supremum
5427 corporum naturae quae est supra omnia corpora, attribuatur. Non
5428 tamen Angelus aliquid dignitatis accipit a caelo Empyreo. Et ideo
5429 quando actu non est in caelo Empyreo, nihil eius dignitati
5430 subtrahitur, sicut nec regi, quando non actu sedet in regali solio,
5431 quod congruit eius dignitati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p11">
5432 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through
5433 the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the
5434 contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in
5435 no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule
5436 and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that "the angels
5437 do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation."
5438 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33102] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5439 dicendum quod in nobis exterior occupatio puritatem contemplationis
5440 impedit, quia actioni insistimus secundum sensitivas vires, quarum
5441 actiones cum intenduntur, retardantur actiones intellectivae
5442 virtutis. Sed Angelus per solam intellectualem operationem regulat
5443 suas actiones exteriores. Unde actiones exteriores in nullo
5444 impediunt eius contemplationem, quia duarum actionum quarum una est
5445 regula et ratio alterius, una non impedit, sed iuvat aliam. Unde
5446 Gregorius dicit, in II Moral., quod <i>Angeli non sic foris exeunt,
5447 ut internae contemplationis gaudiis priventur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12">
5448 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them,
5449 absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior
5450 to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (
5451 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.3" target="asv">Phil. 2:3</a>): "Esteeming others better than themselves."
5452 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33103] Iª q. 112 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
5453 dicendum quod Angeli in suis actionibus exterioribus ministrant
5454 principaliter Deo, et secundario nobis. Non quia nos sumus
5455 superiores eis, simpliciter loquendo, sed quilibet homo vel
5456 Angelus, inquantum adhaerendo Deo fit unus spiritus cum Deo, est
5457 superior omni creatura. Unde apostolus, ad Philipp. II, dicit,
5458 <i>superiores sibi invicem arbitrantes</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q112_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A2-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 2. Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2">
5459 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says (
5460 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>): "All are ministering spirits, sent to minister" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].
5461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33104] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
5462 proceditur. Videtur quod omnes Angeli in ministerium mittantur.
5463 Dicit enim apostolus, ad Heb. I, <i>omnes sunt administratorii
5464 spiritus, in ministerium missi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3">
5465 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above (
5466 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q108_A6" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[108], A[6]</a>). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (
5467 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.6" target="asv">Is. 6:6,7</a>). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent.
5468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33105] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5469 inter ordines supremus est ordo Seraphim, ut ex supra dictis patet.
5470 Sed Seraphim est missus ad purgandum labia prophetae, ut habetur
5471 Isaiae VI. Ergo multo magis inferiores Angeli mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p4">
5472 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more
5473 are even the highest angels sent.
5474 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33106] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5475 divinae personae in infinitum excedunt omnes ordines Angelorum. Sed
5476 divinae personae mittuntur, ut supra dictum est. Ergo multo magis
5477 quicumque supremi Angeli.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5">
5478 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute
5479 the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above (
5480 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry;
5481 which contradicts the words, "Thousands of thousands ministered to
5482 Him" (
5483 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>).
5484 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33107] Iª q. 112 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
5485 superiores Angeli non mittuntur ad exterius ministerium, hoc non
5486 est nisi quia superiores Angeli exequuntur divina ministeria per
5487 inferiores. Sed cum omnes Angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum
5488 est, quilibet Angelus habet inferiorem Angelum, praeter ultimum.
5489 Ergo unus Angelus solus ministraret in ministerium missus. Quod est
5490 contra id quod dicitur Daniel VII, <i>millia millium ministrabant
5491 ei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p6">
5492 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that "the higher ranks fulfil
5493 no exterior service."
5494 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33108] Iª q. 112 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5495 quod Gregorius dicit, referens sententiam Dionysii, <i>superiora
5496 agmina usum exterioris ministerii nequaquam habent</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7">
5497 <b>I answer that,</b> As appears from what has been said above (
5498 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A3" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[3]</a>;
5499 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q112_A2-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior
5500 things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards
5501 corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for
5502 the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished
5503 immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these
5504 bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects.
5505 Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels
5506 without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent,
5507 but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.
5508 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 co."><a name="33109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33109] Iª q. 112 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5509 quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, hoc habet ordo divinae
5510 providentiae, non solum in Angelis, sed etiam in toto universo,
5511 quod inferiora per superiora administrantur, sed ab hoc ordine in
5512 rebus corporalibus aliquando ex divina dispensatione receditur,
5513 propter altiorem ordinem, secundum scilicet quod expedit ad gratiae
5514 manifestationem. Quod enim caecus natus fuit illuminatus, quod
5515 Lazarus fuit suscitatus, immediate a Deo factum est, absque aliqua
5516 actione caelestium corporum. Sed et Angeli boni et mali possunt
5517 aliquid in istis corporibus operari praeter actionem caelestium
5518 corporum, condensando nubes in pluvias, et aliqua huiusmodi
5519 faciendo. Neque alicui debet esse dubium quin Deus immediate
5520 hominibus aliqua revelare posset, non mediantibus Angelis; et
5521 superiores Angeli, non mediantibus inferioribus. Et secundum hanc
5522 considerationem, quidam dixerunt quod, secundum communem legem,
5523 superiores non mittuntur, sed inferiores tantum; sed ex aliqua
5524 dispensatione divina, interdum etiam superiores mittuntur. Sed hoc
5525 non videtur rationabile. Quia ordo angelicus attenditur secundum
5526 dona gratiarum. Ordo autem gratiae non habet alium superiorem
5527 ordinem, propter quem praetermitti debeat, sicut praetermittitur
5528 ordo naturae propter ordinem gratiae. Considerandum est etiam quod
5529 ordo naturae in operationibus miraculorum praetermittitur, propter
5530 fidei confirmationem. Ad quam nihil valeret, si praetermitteretur
5531 ordo angelicus, quia hoc a nobis percipi non posset. Nihil etiam
5532 est ita magnum in ministeriis divinis, quod per inferiores ordines
5533 exerceri non possit. Unde Gregorius dicit quod <i>qui summa
5534 annuntiant, Archangeli vocantur. Hinc est quod ad virginem Mariam
5535 Gabriel Archangelus mittitur</i>. Quod tamen fuit summum inter
5536 omnia divina ministeria, ut ibidem subditur. Et ideo simpliciter
5537 dicendum est, cum Dionysio, quod superiores Angeli nunquam ad
5538 exterius ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p8"> It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers
5539 of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to
5540 any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law.
5541 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33110] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5542 dicendum quod, sicut in missionibus divinarum personarum aliqua est
5543 visibilis, quae attenditur secundum creaturam corpoream; aliqua
5544 invisibilis, quae fit secundum spiritualem effectum, ita in
5545 missionibus Angelorum aliqua dicitur exterior, quae scilicet est ad
5546 aliquod ministerium circa corporalia exhibendum, et secundum hanc
5547 missionem non omnes mittuntur; alia est interior, secundum
5548 intellectuales effectus, prout scilicet unus Angelus illuminat
5549 alium, et sic omnes Angeli mittuntur. Vel aliter dicendum quod
5550 apostolus inducit illud ad probandum quod Christus sit maior
5551 Angelis per quos data est lex; ut sic ostendat excellentiam novae
5552 legis ad veterem. Unde non oportet quod intelligatur nisi de
5553 Angelis ministerii, per quos data est lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p9">
5554 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order;
5555 but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to "kindle" the lips of the prophet.
5556 It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the
5557 ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying
5558 by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope
5559 is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.
5560 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33111] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5561 dicendum, secundum Dionysium, quod ille Angelus qui missus est ad
5562 purgandum labia prophetae, fuit de inferioribus Angelis; sed dictus
5563 est Seraphim, idest incendens, aequivoce, propter hoc quod venerat
5564 ad incendendum labia prophetae. Vel dicendum quod superiores Angeli
5565 communicant propria dona, a quibus denominantur, mediantibus
5566 inferioribus Angelis. Sic igitur unus de Seraphim dictus est
5567 purgasse incendio labia prophetae, non quia hoc ipse immediate
5568 fecerit, sed quia inferior Angelus virtute eius hoc fecit. Sicut
5569 Papa dicitur absolvere aliquem, etiam si per alium officium
5570 absolutionis impendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p10">
5571 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been
5572 said (
5573 <a href="FP_iii.html#FP_Q43_A1" id="FP_Q112_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[43], A[1]</a>).
5574 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33112] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5575 dicendum quod divinae personae non mittuntur in ministerium, sed
5576 aequivoce mitti dicuntur; ut ex praedictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A2-p11">
5577 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent
5578 immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the
5579 inferior ministries.
5580 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33113] Iª q. 112 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
5581 dicendum quod in divinis ministeriis est multiplex gradus. Unde
5582 nihil prohibet etiam inaequales Angelos immediate ad ministeria
5583 mitti; ita tamen quod superiores mittantur ad altiora ministeria,
5584 inferiores vero ad inferiora.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q112_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q112_A4-p0.1">Q. 112. A. 4. Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2">
5585 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according
5586 to
5587 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as
5588 Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.
5589 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33123] Iª q. 112 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
5590 proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli secundae hierarchiae omnes
5591 mittantur. Angeli enim omnes vel assistunt vel ministrant; secundum
5592 quod habetur Dan. VII. Sed Angeli secundae hierarchiae non
5593 assistunt, illuminantur enim per Angelos primae hierarchiae, sicut
5594 dicit Dionysius VIII cap. Cael. Hier. Omnes ergo Angeli secundae
5595 hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p3">
5596 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that "there are more who minister than who assist." This would not be the case if the
5597 angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.
5598 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33124] Iª q. 112 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5599 Gregorius dicit, XVII Moral., quod <i>plures sunt qui ministrant,
5600 quam qui assistunt</i>. Sed hoc non esset, si Angeli secundae
5601 hierarchiae in ministerium non mitterentur. Ergo omnes Angeli
5602 secundae hierarchiae in ministerium mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p4">
5603 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the "Dominations are above all subjection." But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore
5604 the dominations are not sent to minister.
5605 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33125] Iª q. 112 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5606 quod Dionysius dicit, quod <i>dominationes sunt maiores omni
5607 subiectione</i>. Sed mitti in ministerium, ad subiectionem
5608 pertinet. Ergo dominationes in ministerium non mittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p5">
5609 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated
5610 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A1" id="FP_Q112_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal
5611 creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names,
5612 as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify
5613 some kind of administration. But
5614 the name "dominations" does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the
5615 other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the "Angels" and "Archangels" are so called from "announcing";
5616 the "Virtues" and "Powers" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the "Prince," according to what Gregory
5617 says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), "be first among the workers." Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to
5618 external ministry; not to the four superior orders.
5619 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 co."><a name="33126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33126] Iª q. 112 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5620 quod, sicut supra dictum est, mitti ad exterius ministerium proprie
5621 convenit Angelo, secundum quod ex divino imperio operatur circa
5622 aliquam creaturam corporalem; quod quidem pertinet ad executionem
5623 divini ministerii. Proprietates autem Angelorum ex eorum nominibus
5624 manifestantur, ut Dionysius dicit VII cap. Cael. Hier. Et ideo
5625 Angeli illorum ordinum ad exterius ministerium mittuntur, ex quorum
5626 nominibus aliqua executio datur intelligi. In nomine autem
5627 dominationum non importatur aliqua executio, sed sola dispositio et
5628 imperium de exequendis. Sed in nominibus inferiorum ordinum
5629 intelligitur aliqua executio, nam Angeli et Archangeli denominantur
5630 a denuntiando; virtutes et potestates dicuntur per respectum ad
5631 aliquem actum; principis etiam est, ut Gregorius dicit, inter alios
5632 operantes priorem existere. Unde ad hos quinque ordines pertinet in
5633 exterius ministerium mitti, non autem ad quatuor superiores.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q112_A4-p6">
5634 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be
5635 done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others
5636 are to do.
5637 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33127] Iª q. 112 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5638 dicendum quod dominationes computantur quidem inter Angelos
5639 ministrantes, non sicut exequentes ministerium, sed sicut
5640 disponentes et mandantes quid per alios fieri debeat. Sicut
5641 architectores in artificiis nihil manu operantur, sed solum
5642 disponunt et praecipiunt quid alii debeant operari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q112_A4-p7">
5643 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those
5644 who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (
5645 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q112_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.7.10" target="asv">Dan. 7:10</a>) "thousands of thousands ministered to Him," not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean "thousands out of thousands";
5646 thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number
5647 of assistants is finite as in the words added, "and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him." This explanation
5648 rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are
5649 in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number
5650 of orders, as six administer and three assist.
5651 </p><p id="FP_Q112_A4-p8"> Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things;
5652 so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures
5653 surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence,
5654 as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way,
5655 the words "thousands of thousands" are taken by way of multiplication, to signify "a thousand times a thousand." And because
5656 ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said "ten times a hundred thousand" it would mean that there are as many assistants
5657 as ministers: but since it is written "ten thousand times a hundred thousand," we are given to understand that the assistants
5658 are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but
5659 rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together
5660 of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.
5661 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 112 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33128] Iª q. 112 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5662 dicendum quod de numero assistentium et ministrantium duplex ratio
5663 haberi potest. Gregorius enim dicit plures esse ministrantes quam
5664 assistentes. Intelligit enim quod dicitur, millia millium
5665 ministrabant ei, non esse dictum multiplicative, sed partitive; ac
5666 si diceretur, millia de numero millium. Et sic ministrantium
5667 numerus ponitur indefinitus, ad significandum excessum;
5668 assistentium vero finitus, cum subditur, et decies millies centena
5669 millia assistebant ei. Et hoc procedit secundum rationem
5670 Platonicorum, qui dicebant quod quanto aliqua sunt uni primo
5671 principio propinquiora, tanto sunt minoris multitudinis, sicut
5672 quanto numerus est propinquior unitati, tanto est multitudine
5673 minor. Et haec opinio salvatur quantum ad numerum ordinum, dum sex
5674 ministrant, et tres assistunt. Sed Dionysius ponit, XIV cap. Cael.
5675 Hier., quod multitudo Angelorum transcendit omnem materialem
5676 multitudinem; ut scilicet, sicut corpora superiora transcendunt
5677 corpora inferiora magnitudine quasi in immensum, ita superiores
5678 naturae incorporeae transcendunt multitudine omnes naturas
5679 corporeas; quia quod est melius, est magis a Deo intentum et
5680 multiplicatum. Et secundum hoc, cum assistentes sint superiores
5681 ministrantibus, plures erunt assistentes quam ministrantes. Unde
5682 secundum hoc, millia millium legitur multiplicativae, ac si
5683 diceretur, millies millia. Et quia decies centum sunt mille, si
5684 diceretur, decies centena millia, daretur intelligi quod tot essent
5685 assistentes, quot ministrantes, sed quia dicitur, decies millies
5686 centena millia, multo plures dicuntur esse assistentes quam
5687 ministrantes. Nec tamen hoc pro tanto dicitur, quia tantus solum
5688 sit Angelorum numerus, sed multo maior, quia omnem materialem
5689 multitudinem excedit. Quod significatur per multiplicationem
5690 maximorum numerorum supra seipsos, scilicet denarii, centenarii et
5691 millenarii; ut Dionysius ibidem dicit.</p></div></div></div></div>
5692 <div id="FP_Q113" class="div3">
5693 <h3 id="FP_Q113-p0.1">Q. 113. OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
5694 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
5695 <p id="FP_Q113-p2"> We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first
5696 head eight points of inquiry arise:
5697 </p><p id="FP_Q113-p3"><a href="#FP_Q113_A1"> (1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p4"><a href="#FP_Q113_A2"> (2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p5"><a href="#FP_Q113_A3"> (3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p6"><a href="#FP_Q113_A4"> (4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p7"><a href="#FP_Q113_A5"> (5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p8"><a href="#FP_Q113_A6"> (6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p9"><a href="#FP_Q113_A7"> (7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?</a></p><p id="FP_Q113-p10"><a href="#FP_Q113_A8"> (8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?</a></p>
5698 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 pr."><a name="33129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33129]
5699 Iª q. 113 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de custodia
5700 bonorum Angelorum, et de impugnatione malorum. Et circa primum
5701 quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum homines ab Angelis custodiantur.
5702 Secundo, utrum singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam
5703 deputentur. Tertio, utrum custodia pertineat solum ad ultimum
5704 ordinem Angelorum. Quarto, utrum omni homini conveniat habere
5705 Angelum custodem. Quinto, quando incipiat custodia Angeli circa
5706 hominem. Sexto, utrum Angelus semper custodiat hominem. Septimo,
5707 utrum doleat de perditione custoditi. Octavo, utrum inter Angelos
5708 sit pugna ratione custodiae.</p></div></div></div>
5709 <div id="FP_Q113_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A1-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 1. Whether men are guarded by the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p2">
5710 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how,
5711 or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows
5712 how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.
5713 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33130] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
5714 proceditur. Videtur quod homines non custodiantur ab Angelis.
5715 Custodes enim deputantur aliquibus vel quia nesciunt, vel quia non
5716 possunt custodire seipsos; sicut pueris et infirmis. Sed homo
5717 potest custodire seipsum per liberum arbitrium; et scit, per
5718 naturalem cognitionem legis naturalis. Ergo homo non custoditur ab
5719 Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3">
5720 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to
5721 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.120.4" target="asv"> Ps. 120:4</a>: "He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel." Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel.
5722 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33131] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ubi
5723 adest fortior custodia, infirmior superfluere videtur. Sed homines
5724 custodiuntur a Deo; secundum illud Psalmi CXX, <i>non dormitabit
5725 neque dormiet qui custodit Israel</i>. Ergo non est necessarium
5726 quod homo custodiatur ab Angelo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4">
5727 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: "Keep this
5728 man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life" (
5729 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 20:39</a>). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in
5730 some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly
5731 false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.
5732 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33132] Iª q. 113 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5733 perditio custoditi redundat in negligentiam custodis, unde dicitur
5734 cuidam, III Reg. XX, <i>custodi virum istum, qui si lapsus fuerit,
5735 erit anima tua pro anima eius</i>. Sed multi homines quotidie
5736 pereunt, in peccatum cadentes, quibus Angeli subvenire possent vel
5737 visibiliter apparendo, vel miracula faciendo, vel aliquo simili
5738 modo. Essent ergo negligentes Angeli, si eorum custodiae homines
5739 essent commissi, quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur Angeli sunt
5740 hominum custodes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5">
5741 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
5742 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.90.11" target="asv">Ps. 90:11</a>): "He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways."
5743 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33133] Iª q. 113 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5744 quod dicitur in Psalmo, <i>Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut
5745 custodiant te in omnibus viis tuis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p6">
5746 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by
5747 the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior
5748 which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various
5749 opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover
5750 manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so
5751 it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.
5752 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 co."><a name="33134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33134] Iª q. 113 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5753 quod, secundum rationem divinae providentiae, hoc in rebus omnibus
5754 invenitur, quod mobilia et variabilia per immobilia et invariabilia
5755 moventur et regulantur; sicut omnia corporalia per substantias
5756 spirituales immobiles, et corpora inferiora per corpora superiora,
5757 quae sunt invariabilia secundum substantiam. Sed et nos ipsi
5758 regulamur circa conclusiones in quibus possumus diversimode
5759 opinari, per principia quae invariabiliter tenemus. Manifestum est
5760 autem quod in rebus agendis cognitio et affectus hominis
5761 multipliciter variari et deficere possunt a bono. Et ideo
5762 necessarium fuit quod hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputarentur,
5763 per quos regularentur et moverentur ad bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7">
5764 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection
5765 towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature
5766 belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the
5767 universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in
5768 many ways. Hence it is written (
5769 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv">Wis. 9:14</a>): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.
5770 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33135] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5771 dicendum quod per liberum arbitrium potest homo aliqualiter malum
5772 vitare, sed non sufficienter, quia infirmatur circa affectum boni,
5773 propter multiplices animae passiones. Similiter etiam universalis
5774 cognitio naturalis legis, quae homini naturaliter adest,
5775 aliqualiter dirigit hominem ad bonum, sed non sufficienter, quia in
5776 applicando universalia principia iuris ad particularia opera,
5777 contingit hominem multipliciter deficere. Unde dicitur Sap. IX,
5778 <i>cogitationes mortalium timidae, et incertae providentiae
5779 nostrae</i>. Et ideo necessaria fuit homini custodia Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p8">
5780 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the
5781 habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this
5782 the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him
5783 grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor,
5784 Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (
5785 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FP_Q113_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[111], A[1]</a>).
5786 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33136] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5787 dicendum quod ad bene operandum duo requiruntur. Primo quidem, quod
5788 affectus inclinetur ad bonum, quod quidem fit in nobis per habitum
5789 virtutis moralis. Secundo autem, quod ratio inveniat congruas vias
5790 ad perficiendum bonum virtutis, quod quidem philosophus attribuit
5791 prudentiae. Quantum ergo ad primum, Deus immediate custodit
5792 hominem, infundendo ei gratiam et virtutes. Quantum autem ad
5793 secundum, Deus custodit hominem sicut universalis instructor, cuius
5794 instructio ad hominem provenit mediantibus Angelis, ut supra
5795 habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A1-p9">
5796 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation
5797 of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish
5798 is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside
5799 the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise
5800 that miracles occur outside the order of nature.
5801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33137] Iª q. 113 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5802 dicendum quod, sicut homines a naturali instinctu boni discedunt
5803 propter passionem peccati; ita etiam discedunt ab instigatione
5804 bonorum Angelorum, quae fit invisibiliter per hoc quod homines
5805 illuminant ad bene agendum. Unde quod homines pereunt, non est
5806 imputandum negligentiae Angelorum, sed malitiae hominum. Quod autem
5807 aliquando, praeter legem communem, hominibus visibiliter apparent,
5808 ex speciali Dei gratia est, sicut etiam quod praeter ordinem
5809 naturae miracula fiunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A2-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 2. Whether each man is guarded by an angel?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p2">
5810 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard
5811 many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.
5812 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33138] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
5813 proceditur. Videtur quod non singuli homines a singulis Angelis
5814 custodiantur. Angelus enim est virtuosior quam homo. Sed unus homo
5815 sufficit ad custodiam multorum hominum. Ergo multo magis unus
5816 Angelus multos homines potest custodire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p3">
5817 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii).
5818 But as all the angels are unequal (
5819 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q50_A4" id="FP_Q113_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[50], A[4]</a>), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps
5820 men.
5821 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33139] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5822 inferiora reducuntur in Deum a superioribus per media, ut Dionysius
5823 dicit. Sed cum omnes Angeli sint inaequales, ut supra dictum est,
5824 solus unus Angelus est inter quem et homines non est aliquis
5825 medius. Ergo unus Angelus solus est qui immediate custodit
5826 homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p4">
5827 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than
5828 another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says
5829 (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels.
5830 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33140] Iª q. 113 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5831 maiores Angeli maioribus officiis deputantur. Sed non est maius
5832 officium custodire unum hominem quam alium, cum omnes homines
5833 natura sint pares. Cum ergo omnium Angelorum sit unus maior alio,
5834 secundum Dionysium, videtur quod diversi homines non custodiantur a
5835 diversis Angelis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5">
5836 <b>On the contrary,</b> On the text, "Their angels in heaven," etc. (
5837 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.10" target="asv">Mat. 8:10</a>), Jerome says: "Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth."
5838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33141] Iª q. 113 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5839 quod Hieronymus, exponens illud Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in
5840 caelis</i>, dicit, <i>magna est dignitas animarum, ut unaquaeque
5841 habeat, ab ortu nativitatis, in custodiam sui Angelum
5842 delegatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p6">
5843 <b>I answer that,</b> Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the
5844 execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible
5845 creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species,
5846 but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which
5847 cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what
5848 remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to
5849 the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things
5850 corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different "genera"
5851 of
5852 things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable
5853 that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose
5854 that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.
5855 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 co."><a name="33142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33142] Iª q. 113 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5856 quod singulis hominibus singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.
5857 Cuius ratio est, quia Angelorum custodia est quaedam executio
5858 divinae providentiae circa homines. Providentia autem Dei aliter se
5859 habet ad homines, et ad alias corruptibiles creaturas, quia aliter
5860 se habent ad incorruptibilitatem. Homines enim non solum sunt
5861 incorruptibiles quantum ad communem speciem, sed etiam quantum ad
5862 proprias formas singulorum, quae sunt animae rationales, quod de
5863 aliis rebus corruptibilibus dici non potest. Manifestum est autem
5864 quod providentia Dei principaliter est circa illa quae perpetuo
5865 manent, circa ea vero quae transeunt, providentia Dei est inquantum
5866 ordinat ipsa ad res perpetuas. Sic igitur providentia Dei
5867 comparatur ad singulos homines, sicut comparatur ad singula genera
5868 vel species corruptibilium rerum. Sed secundum Gregorium, diversi
5869 ordines deputantur diversis rerum generibus; puta potestates ad
5870 arcendos Daemones, virtutes ad miracula facienda in rebus
5871 corporeis. Et probabile est quod diversis speciebus rerum diversi
5872 Angeli eiusdem ordinis praeficiantur. Unde etiam rationabile est ut
5873 diversis hominibus diversi Angeli ad custodiam deputentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p7">
5874 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian
5875 is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one
5876 man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to
5877 the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or
5878 weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation
5879 of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men.
5880 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33143] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5881 dicendum quod alicui homini adhibetur custos dupliciter. Uno modo,
5882 inquantum est homo singularis, et sic uni homini debetur unus
5883 custos, et interdum plures deputantur ad custodiam unius. Alio
5884 modo, inquantum est pars alicuius collegii, et sic toti collegio
5885 unus homo ad custodiam praeponitur, ad quem pertinet providere ea
5886 quae pertinent ad unum hominem in ordine ad totum collegium; sicut
5887 sunt ea quae exterius aguntur, de quibus alii aedificantur vel
5888 scandalizantur. Angelorum autem custodia deputatur hominibus etiam
5889 quantum ad invisibilia et occulta, quae pertinent ad singulorum
5890 salutem secundum seipsos. Unde singulis hominibus singuli Angeli
5891 deputantur ad custodiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p8">
5892 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As above stated (
5893 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A3" id="FP_Q113_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[112], A[3]</a>, ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things,
5894 only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the
5895 inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one
5896 immediately above him. Thus it
5897 is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens.
5898 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33144] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5899 dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Angeli primae hierarchiae omnes
5900 quantum ad aliqua illuminantur immediate a Deo, sed quaedam sunt de
5901 quibus illuminantur superiores tantum immediate a Deo, quae
5902 inferioribus revelant. Et idem etiam in inferioribus ordinibus
5903 considerandum est, nam aliquis infimus Angelus illuminatur quantum
5904 ad quaedam ab aliquo supremo, et quantum ad aliqua ab eo qui
5905 immediate sibi praefertur. Et sic etiam possibile est quod aliquis
5906 Angelus immediate illuminet hominem, qui tamen habet aliquos
5907 Angelos sub se, quos illuminat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9">
5908 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater,
5909 and others to the lesser things, according to
5910 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.33.11" target="asv"> Ecclus. 33:11,12</a>: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and
5911 some of them hath He cursed and brought low." Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.
5912 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33145] Iª q. 113 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
5913 dicendum quod, quamvis homines natura sint pares, tamen
5914 inaequalitas in eis invenitur, secundum quod ex divina providentia
5915 quidam ordinantur ad maius, et quidam ad minus; secundum illud quod
5916 dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, <i>in multitudine disciplinae domini
5917 separavit eos, ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, ex ipsis maledixit
5918 et humiliavit</i>. Et sic maius officium est custodire unum hominem
5919 quam alium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A3-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 3. Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2">
5920 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that
5921 the text (
5922 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv">Mat. 18:10</a>), "Their angels in heaven," etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels
5923 guard men.
5924 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33146] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
5925 proceditur. Videtur quod custodire homines non pertineat solum ad
5926 infimum ordinem Angelorum. Dicit enim Chrysostomus quod hoc quod
5927 dicitur Matth. XVIII, <i>Angeli eorum in caelo etc., intelligitur
5928 non de quibuscumque Angelis, sed de supereminentibus</i>. Ergo
5929 supereminentes Angeli custodiunt homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3">
5930 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says that angels "are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (
5931 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external
5932 ministry (
5933 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A4" id="FP_Q113_A3-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[112], A[4]</a>). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.
5934 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33147] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
5935 apostolus, ad Heb. I, dicit quod <i>Angeli sunt in ministerium
5936 missi propter eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, et sic
5937 videtur quod missio Angelorum ad custodiam hominum ordinetur. Sed
5938 quinque ordines in exterius ministerium mittuntur, ut supra dictum
5939 est. Ergo omnes Angeli quinque ordinum custodiae hominum
5940 deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p4">
5941 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the
5942 Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders
5943 are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.
5944 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33148] Iª q. 113 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
5945 custodiam hominum maxime videtur esse necessarium arcere Daemones,
5946 quod pertinet ad potestates, secundum Gregorium; et miracula
5947 facere, quod pertinet ad virtutes. Ergo illi etiam ordines
5948 deputantur ad custodiam, et non solum infimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p5">
5949 <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius
5950 (Coel. Hier. v, ix).
5951 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33149] Iª q. 113 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
5952 quod in Psalmo custodia hominum attribuitur Angelis; quorum ordo
5953 est infimus, secundum Dionysium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6">
5954 <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated
5955 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard
5956 him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce
5957 the "lesser things"; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one
5958 man. The other kind of guardianship is
5959 universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship
5960 of the human race belongs to the order of "Principalities," or perhaps to the "Archangels," whom we call the angel princes.
5961 Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled "one of the princes" (
5962 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.10.13" target="asv">Dan. 10:13</a>). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the "Virtues"; and likewise the demons by the "Powers," and the good spirits
5963 by
5964 the "Principalities," according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).
5965 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 co."><a name="33150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33150] Iª q. 113 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5966 quod, sicut supra dictum est, homini custodia dupliciter adhibetur.
5967 Uno modo custodia particularis, secundum quod singulis hominibus
5968 singuli Angeli ad custodiam deputantur. Et talis custodia pertinet
5969 ad infimum ordinem Angelorum, quorum, secundum Gregorium, est
5970 minima nuntiare; hoc autem videtur esse minimum in officiis
5971 Angelorum, procurare ea quae ad unius hominis tantum salutem
5972 pertinent. Alia vero est custodia universalis. Et haec
5973 multiplicatur secundum diversos ordines, nam quanto agens fuerit
5974 universalius, tanto est superius. Sic igitur custodia humanae
5975 multitudinis pertinet ad ordinem principatuum, vel forte ad
5976 Archangelos, qui dicuntur principes Angeli, unde et Michael, quem
5977 Archangelum dicimus, unus de principibus dicitur Dan. X. Ulterius
5978 autem super omnes naturas corporeas habent custodiam virtutes. Et
5979 ulterius etiam super Daemones habent custodiam potestates. Et
5980 ulterius etiam super bonos spiritus habent custodiam principatus,
5981 secundum Gregorium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p7">
5982 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each
5983 order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen
5984 by God for the higher degree of glory.
5985 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33151] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5986 dicendum quod verbum Chrysostomi potest intelligi, ut loquatur de
5987 supremis in ordine infimo Angelorum, quia, ut Dionysius dicit, in
5988 quolibet ordine sunt primi, medii et ultimi. Est autem probabile
5989 quod maiores Angeli deputentur ad custodiam eorum qui sunt ad
5990 maiorem gradum gloriae a Deo electi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p8">
5991 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater
5992 or less, as above explained.
5993 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33152] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
5994 dicendum quod non omnes Angeli qui mittuntur, habent particularem
5995 custodiam super singulos homines; sed quidam ordines habent
5996 universalem custodiam, magis vel minus, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A3-p9">
5997 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors'
5998 power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles.
5999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33153] Iª q. 113 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6000 dicendum quod etiam inferiores Angeli exercent officia superiorum,
6001 inquantum aliquid de dono eorum participant, et se habent ad
6002 superiores sicut executores virtutis eorum. Et per hunc modum etiam
6003 Angeli infimi ordinis possunt et arcere Daemones, et miracula
6004 facere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A4-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 4. Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2">
6005 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (
6006 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.7" target="asv">Phil. 2:7</a>) that "He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship
6007 of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels.
6008 Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
6009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33154] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
6010 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam
6011 deputentur. Dicitur enim de Christo, Philipp. II, quod est <i>in
6012 similitudinem hominum factus, et habitu inventus ut homo</i>. Si
6013 igitur omnibus hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, etiam
6014 Christus Angelum custodem habuisset. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens,
6015 cum Christus sit maior omnibus Angelis. Non ergo omnibus hominibus
6016 Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p3">
6017 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state
6018 of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.
6019 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33155] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6020 omnium hominum primus fuit Adam. Sed sibi non competebat habere
6021 Angelum custodem, ad minus in statu innocentiae, quia tunc nullis
6022 periculis angustiabatur. Ergo Angeli non praeficiuntur ad custodiam
6023 omnibus hominibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4">
6024 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life,
6025 encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation,
6026 never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they
6027 have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in
6028
6029 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.31" target="asv">Ps. 31</a>). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is written (
6030 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.
6031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33156] Iª q. 113 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6032 hominibus Angeli ad custodiam deputantur, ut per eos manuducantur
6033 ad vitam aeternam, et incitentur ad bene operandum, et muniantur
6034 contra insultus Daemonum. Sed homines praesciti ad damnationem,
6035 nunquam perveniunt ad vitam aeternam. Infideles etiam, etsi
6036 interdum bona opera faciant, non tamen bene faciunt, quia non recta
6037 intentione faciunt, fides enim intentionem dirigit, ut Augustinus
6038 dicit. Antichristi etiam adventus erit secundum operationem
6039 Satanae, ut dicitur II ad Thessal. II. Non ergo omnibus hominibus
6040 Angeli ad custodiam deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p5">
6041 <b>On the contrary,</b> is the authority of Jerome quoted above
6042 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, for he says that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it."
6043 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33157] Iª q. 113 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6044 auctoritas Hieronymi supra inducta, qui dicit quod <i>unaquaeque
6045 anima ad sui custodiam habet Angelum deputatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6">
6046 <b>I answer that,</b> Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is
6047 threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to
6048 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.159.4" target="asv"> Ps. 159:4</a>: "In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me." And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have
6049 to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When,
6050 however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign
6051 with him, in hell a demon to punish him.
6052 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 co."><a name="33158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33158] Iª q. 113 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6053 quod homo in statu vitae istius constitutus, est quasi in quadam
6054 via, qua debet tendere ad patriam. In qua quidem via multa pericula
6055 homini imminent, tum ab interiori, tum ab exteriori; secundum illud
6056 Psalmi CXLI, <i>in via hac qua ambulabam, absconderunt laqueum
6057 mihi</i>. Et ideo sicut hominibus per viam non tutam ambulantibus
6058 dantur custodes, ita et cuilibet homini, quandiu viator est, custos
6059 Angelus deputatur. Quando autem iam ad terminum viae pervenerit,
6060 iam non habebit Angelum custodem; sed habebit in regno Angelum
6061 conregnantem, in Inferno Daemonem punientem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7">
6062 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards
6063 His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was
6064 right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is
6065 written (
6066 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>) that "angels came and ministered to Him."
6067 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33159] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6068 dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod homo, immediate regulabatur a
6069 verbo Dei, unde non indigebat custodia Angelorum. Et iterum
6070 secundum animam erat comprehensor; sed ratione passibilitatis
6071 corporis, erat viator. Et secundum hoc, non debebatur ei Angelus
6072 custos, tanquam superior; sed Angelus minister, tanquam inferior.
6073 Unde dicitur Matth. IV, quod <i>accesserunt Angeli et ministrabant
6074 ei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p8">
6075 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we
6076 have said above (
6077 <a href="#FP_Q95_A1" id="FP_Q113_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[95], AA[1]</a>,3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason
6078 he needed a guardian angel.
6079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33160] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6080 dicendum quod homo in statu innocentiae non patiebatur aliquod
6081 periculum ab interiori, quia interius erant omnia ordinata, ut
6082 supra dictum est, sed imminebat ei periculum ab exteriori, propter
6083 insidias Daemonum; ut rei probavit eventus. Et ideo indigebat
6084 custodia Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A4-p9">
6085 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Anti-christ, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither
6086 are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race---namely the guardianship of the angels. And
6087 although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless
6088 conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both
6089 themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like
6090 manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.
6091 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33161] Iª q. 113 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6092 dicendum quod, sicut praesciti et infideles, et etiam Antichristus,
6093 non privantur interiori auxilio naturalis rationis; ita etiam non
6094 privantur exteriori auxilio toti naturae humanae divinitus
6095 concesso, scilicet custodia Angelorum. Per quam etsi non iuventur
6096 quantum ad hoc quod vitam aeternam bonis operibus mereantur,
6097 iuvantur tamen quantum ad hoc, quod ab aliquibus malis retrahuntur,
6098 quibus et sibi ipsis et aliis nocere possunt. Nam et ipsi Daemones
6099 arcentur per bonos Angelos, ne noceant quantum volunt. Et similiter
6100 Antichristus non tantum nocebit, quantum vellet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A5-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 5. Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2">
6101 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are "sent to minister for them who
6102 shall receive the inheritance of salvation," as the Apostle says (
6103 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv">Heb. 1:14</a>). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard
6104 a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.
6105 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33162] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
6106 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus non deputetur homini ad custodiam
6107 a sua nativitate. Angeli enim mittuntur <i>in ministerium, propter
6108 eos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis</i>, ut apostolus, ad Heb.
6109 dicit. Sed homines incipiunt haereditatem capere salutis, quando
6110 baptizantur. Ergo Angelus deputatur homini ad custodiam a tempore
6111 Baptismi, et non a tempore nativitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p3">
6112 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction
6113 as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon
6114 as they are born.
6115 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33163] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6116 homines ab Angelis custodiuntur, inquantum ab eis illuminantur per
6117 modum doctrinae. Sed pueri mox nati non sunt capaces doctrinae,
6118 quia non habent usum rationis. Ergo pueris mox natis non deputantur
6119 Angeli custodes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p4">
6120 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel
6121 is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore
6122 angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.
6123 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33164] Iª q. 113 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6124 pueri in materno utero existentes habent animam rationalem aliquo
6125 tempore, sicut et post nativitatem ex utero. Sed cum sunt in
6126 materno utero, non deputantur eis Angeli ad custodiam, ut videtur,
6127 quia neque etiam ministri Ecclesiae eos sacramentis imbuunt. Non
6128 ergo statim a nativitate hominibus Angeli ad custodiam
6129 deputantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p5">
6130 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (vide A, 4) that "each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth."
6131 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33165] Iª q. 113 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6132 quod Hieronymus dicit, quod <i>unaquaeque anima, ab ortu
6133 nativitatis, habet in custodiam sui Angelum deputatum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p6">
6134 <b>I answer that,</b> as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian
6135 is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves
6136 (vide A, 4), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism;
6137 such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man
6138 as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits
6139 we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above (
6140 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A1" id="FP_Q113_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him.
6141 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 co."><a name="33166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33166] Iª q. 113 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6142 quod, sicut Origenes dicit super Matthaeum, super hoc est duplex
6143 opinio. Quidam enim dixerunt quod Angelus ad custodiam homini
6144 deputatur a tempore Baptismi, alii vero quod a tempore nativitatis.
6145 Et hanc opinionem Hieronymus approbat; et rationabiliter. Beneficia
6146 enim quae dantur homini divinitus ex eo quod est Christianus,
6147 incipiunt a tempore Baptismi; sicut perceptio Eucharistiae, et alia
6148 huiusmodi. Sed ea quae providentur homini a Deo, inquantum habet
6149 naturam rationalem, ex tunc ei exhibentur, ex quo nascendo talem
6150 naturam accipit. Et tale beneficium est custodia Angelorum, ut ex
6151 praemissis patet. Unde statim a nativitate habet homo Angelum ad
6152 sui custodiam deputatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p7">
6153 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if
6154 we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic
6155 ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious,
6156 nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.
6157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33167] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6158 dicendum quod Angeli mittuntur in ministerium, efficaciter quidem
6159 propter eos solos qui haereditatem capiunt salutis, si consideretur
6160 ultimus effectus custodiae, qui est perceptio haereditatis.
6161 Nihilominus tamen et aliis ministerium Angelorum non subtrahitur,
6162 quamvis in eis hanc efficaciam non habeat, quod perducantur ad
6163 salutem. Efficax tamen est circa eos Angelorum ministerium,
6164 inquantum a multis malis retrahuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p8">
6165 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many
6166 other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.
6167 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33168] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6168 dicendum quod officium custodiae ordinatur quidem ad illuminationem
6169 doctrinae, sicut ad ultimum et principalem effectum. Nihilominus
6170 tamen multos alios effectus habet, qui pueris competunt, scilicet
6171 arcere Daemones, et alia nocumenta tam corporalia quam spiritualia
6172 prohibere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A5-p9">
6173 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still
6174 part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree
6175 of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes
6176 separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above
6177 quoted, says.
6178 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33169] Iª q. 113 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6179 dicendum quod puer quandiu est in materno utero, non totaliter est
6180 a matre separatus, sed per quandam colligationem est quodammodo
6181 adhuc aliquid eius, sicut et fructus pendens in arbore, est aliquid
6182 arboris. Et ideo probabiliter dici potest quod Angelus qui est in
6183 custodia matris, custodiat prolem in matris utero existentem. Sed
6184 in nativitate, quando separatur a matre, Angelus ei ad custodiam
6185 deputatur, ut Hieronymus dicit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A6-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 6. Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2">
6186 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (
6187 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.51.9" target="asv">Jer. 51:9</a>) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her." And (
6188 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.5" target="asv">Is. 5:5</a>) it is written: "I will take away the hedge"---that is, "the guardianship of the angels" [gloss]---"and it shall be wasted."
6189 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33170] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
6190 proceditur. Videtur quod Angelus custos quandoque deserat hominem
6191 cuius custodiae deputatur. Dicitur enim Ierem. li, ex persona
6192 Angelorum, <i>curavimus Babylonem, et non est curata, derelinquamus
6193 ergo eam</i>. Et Isaiae V, <i>auferam sepem eius, et erit in
6194 conculcationem</i>; Glossa, <i>idest Angelorum custodiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3">
6195 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to
6196 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.21.2" target="asv"> Ps. 21:2</a>: "O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?" Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man.
6197 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33171] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6198 principalius custodit Deus quam Angelus. Sed Deus aliquando hominem
6199 derelinquit; secundum illud Psalmi XXI, <i>Deus, Deus meus, respice
6200 in me, quare me dereliquisti?</i> Ergo multo magis Angelus custos
6201 hominem derelinquit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p4">
6202 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), "When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven." But sometimes
6203 they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.
6204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33172] Iª q. 113 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6205 sicut dicit Damascenus, <i>Angeli, cum sunt hic nobiscum, non sunt
6206 in caelo</i>. Sed aliquando sunt in caelo. Ergo aliquando nos
6207 derelinquunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5">
6208 <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are ever assailing us, according to
6209 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.5.8" target="asv">1 Pet. 5:8</a>: "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour." Much more therefore do the good
6210 angels ever guard us.
6211 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33173] Iª q. 113 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
6212 Daemones nos semper impugnant; secundum illud I Petri V,
6213 <i>adversarius vester Diabolus tanquam leo rugiens circuit,
6214 quaerens quem devoret</i>. Ergo multo magis boni Angeli semper nos
6215 custodiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p6">
6216 <b>I answer that,</b> As appears above
6217 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113_A2" id="FP_Q113_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor
6218 anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is
6219 it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of
6220 His providence, but only in so far as He
6221 allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes
6222 a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some
6223 trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House
6224 of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being
6225 subject to tribulation.
6226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 co."><a name="33174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33174] Iª q. 113 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6227 quod custodia Angelorum, ut ex supra dictis patet, est quaedam
6228 executio divinae providentiae circa homines facta. Manifestum est
6229 autem quod nec homo, nec res aliqua, totaliter divinae providentiae
6230 subtrahitur, inquantum enim aliquid participat de esse, intantum
6231 subditur universali providentiae entium. Sed intantum Deus,
6232 secundum ordinem suae providentiae, dicitur hominem derelinquere,
6233 inquantum permittit hominem pati aliquem defectum vel poenae vel
6234 culpae. Similiter etiam dicendum est quod Angelus custos nunquam
6235 totaliter dimittit hominem, sed ad aliquid interdum eum dimittit;
6236 prout scilicet non impedit quin subdatur alicui tribulationi, vel
6237 etiam quin cadat in peccatum, secundum ordinem divinorum
6238 iudiciorum. Et secundum hoc Babylon et domus Israel ab Angelis
6239 derelictae dicuntur, quia Angeli earum custodes non impediverunt
6240 quin tribulationibus subderentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p7"> From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33175] Iª q. 113 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet
6241 solutio ad primum et secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A6-p8">
6242 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship:
6243 for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be
6244 with man in an instant.
6245 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33176] Iª q. 113 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6246 dicendum quod Angelus, etsi interdum derelinquat hominem loco, non
6247 tamen derelinquit eum quantum ad effectum custodiae, quia etiam cum
6248 est in caelo, cognoscit quid circa hominem agatur; nec indiget mora
6249 temporis ad motum localem, sed statim potest adesse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q113_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q113_A7-p0.1">Q. 113. A. 7. Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2">
6250 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (
6251 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.33.7" target="asv">Is. 33:7</a>): "The angels of peace shall weep bitterly." But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills
6252 of those whom they guard.
6253 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="33177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33177] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
6254 proceditur. Videtur quod Angeli doleant de malis eorum quos
6255 custodiunt. Dicitur enim Isaiae XXXIII, <i>Angeli pacis amare
6256 flebunt</i>. Sed fletus est signum doloris et tristitiae. Ergo
6257 Angeli tristantur de malis hominum quos custodiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p3">
6258 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is for those things that happen against our will." But the
6259 loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.
6260 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="33178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33178] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6261 tristitia est, ut Augustinus dicit, <i>de his quae nobis nolentibus
6262 accidunt</i>. Sed perditio hominis custoditi est contra voluntatem
6263 Angeli custodis. Ergo tristantur Angeli de perditione hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4">
6264 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance,
6265 as we are told,
6266 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv"> Lk. 15:7.</a> Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.
6267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="33179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33179] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6268 sicut gaudio contrariatur tristitia, ita poenitentiae contrariatur
6269 peccatum. Sed Angeli gaudent de peccatore poenitentiam agente, ut
6270 habetur Lucae XV. Ergo tristantur de iusto in peccatum cadente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5">
6271 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, on
6272 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Num.18.12" target="asv"> Numbers 18:12</a>: "Whatsoever first-fruits they offer," etc. the gloss of Origen says: "The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men
6273 have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault." But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which
6274 have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men's sins.
6275 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="33180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33180] Iª q. 113 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
6276 super illud Num. XVIII; quidquid offerunt primitiarum etc., dicit
6277 Glossa Origenis; <i>trahuntur Angeli in iudicium, utrum ex ipsorum
6278 negligentia, an hominum ignavia lapsi sint</i>. Sed quilibet
6279 rationabiliter dolet de malis propter quae in iudicium tractus est.
6280 Ergo Angeli dolent de peccatis hominum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6">
6281 <b>On the contrary,</b> Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (
6282 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv">Apoc. 21:4</a>): "Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow." But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have
6283 no cause for grief.
6284 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 s. c."><a name="33181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33181] Iª q. 113 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ubi
6285 est tristitia et dolor, non est perfecta felicitas, unde dicitur
6286 Apoc. XXI, <i>mors ultra non erit, neque luctus, neque clamor,
6287 neque ullus dolor</i>. Sed Angeli sunt perfecte beati. Ergo de
6288 nullo dolent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p7">
6289 <b>I answer that,</b> Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De
6290 Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will
6291 of the angels and the other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens
6292 in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply
6293 speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is
6294 called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances;
6295 although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo
6296 into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it.
6297 Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking
6298 the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine
6299 justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.
6300 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 co."><a name="33182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33182] Iª q. 113 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6301 quod Angeli non dolent neque de peccatis, neque de poenis hominum.
6302 Tristitia enim et dolor, secundum Augustinum, non est nisi de his
6303 quae contrariantur voluntati. Nihil autem accidit in mundo quod sit
6304 contrarium voluntati Angelorum et aliorum beatorum, quia voluntas
6305 eorum totaliter inhaeret ordini divinae iustitiae; nihil autem fit
6306 in mundo, nisi quod per divinam iustitiam fit aut permittitur. Et
6307 ideo, simpliciter loquendo, nihil fit in mundo contra voluntatem
6308 beatorum. Ut enim philosophus dicit in III Ethic. illud dicitur
6309 simpliciter voluntarium, quod aliquis vult in particulari, secundum
6310 quod agitur, consideratis scilicet omnibus quae circumstant,
6311 quamvis in universali consideratum non esset voluntarium, sicut
6312 nauta non vult proiectionem mercium in mare, absolute et
6313 universaliter considerando, sed imminente periculo salutis hoc
6314 vult. Unde magis est hoc voluntarium quam involuntarium, ut ibidem
6315 dicitur. Sic igitur Angeli peccata et poenas hominum, universaliter
6316 et absolute loquendo, non volunt, volunt tamen quod circa hoc ordo
6317 divinae iustitiae servetur, secundum quem quidam poenis subduntur,
6318 et peccare permittuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8">
6319 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words
6320 of Rabsaces, as related
6321 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q113_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.37.2" target="asv"> Is. 37:2 </a>seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the "angels of peace" are the apostles and preachers
6322 who weep for men's sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression
6323 is metaphorical, and
6324 signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God
6325 and the angels.
6326 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="33183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33183] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6327 dicendum quod verbum illud Isaiae potest intelligi de Angelis,
6328 idest nuntiis, Ezechiae, qui fleverunt propter verba Rabsacis; de
6329 quibus habetur Isaiae XXXVII. Et hoc secundum litteralem sensum.
6330 Secundum vero allegoricum, Angeli pacis sunt apostoli et alii
6331 praedicatores, qui flent pro peccatis hominum. Si vero secundum
6332 sensum anagogicum exponatur de Angelis beatis, tunc metaphorica
6333 erit locutio, ad designandum quod Angeli volunt in universali
6334 hominum salutem. Sic enim Deo et Angelis huiusmodi passiones
6335 attribuuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p9"> The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="33184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33184] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum patet
6336 solutio per ea quae dicta sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p10">
6337 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering
6338 of the Divine Providence.
6339 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="33185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33185] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6340 dicendum quod tam in poenitentia hominum, quam in peccato, manet
6341 una ratio gaudii Angelis, scilicet impletio ordinis divinae
6342 providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q113_A7-p11">
6343 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.
6344 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 113 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="33186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33186] Iª q. 113 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
6345 dicendum quod Angeli ducuntur in iudicium pro peccatis hominum, non
6346 quasi rei, sed quasi testes, ad convincendum homines de eorum
6347 ignavia.</p></div></div></div></div>
6348 <div id="FP_Q114" class="div3">
6349 <h3 id="FP_Q114-p0.1">Q. 114. OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES) </h3>
6350 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
6351 <p id="FP_Q114-p2"> We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q114-p3"><a href="#FP_Q114_A1"> (1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p4"><a href="#FP_Q114_A2"> (2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p5"><a href="#FP_Q114_A3"> (3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p6"><a href="#FP_Q114_A4"> (4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?</a></p><p id="FP_Q114-p7"><a href="#FP_Q114_A5"> (5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?</a></p>
6352 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 pr."><a name="33193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33193]
6353 Iª q. 114 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
6354 impugnatione Daemonum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo,
6355 utrum homines a Daemonibus impugnentur. Secundo, utrum tentare sit
6356 proprium Diaboli. Tertio, utrum omnia peccata hominum ex
6357 impugnatione sive tentatione Daemonum proveniant. Quarto, utrum
6358 possint vera miracula facere ad seducendum. Quinto, utrum Daemones
6359 qui ab hominibus superantur, ab impugnatione hominum arceantur.</p></div></div></div>
6360 <div id="FP_Q114_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A1-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 1. Whether men are assailed by the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p2">
6361 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by
6362 God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed
6363 to assail man.
6364 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33194] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
6365 proceditur. Videtur quod homines non impugnentur a Daemonibus.
6366 Angeli enim deputantur ad hominum custodiam, missi a Deo. Sed
6367 Daemones non mittuntur a Deo, cum Daemonum intentio sit perdere
6368 animas, Dei autem salvare. Ergo Daemones non deputantur ad hominum
6369 impugnationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p3">
6370 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men
6371 are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of
6372 all justice, that men should be assailed by demons.
6373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33195] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, non
6374 est aequa conditio pugnae, ut infirmus contra fortem, ignarus
6375 contra astutum exponatur ad bellum. Sed homines sunt infirmi et
6376 ignari; Daemones autem potentes et astuti. Non est ergo
6377 permittendum a Deo, qui est omnis iustitiae auctor, ut homines a
6378 Daemonibus impugnentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p4">
6379 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed
6380 that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.
6381 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33196] Iª q. 114 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
6382 exercitium hominum sufficit impugnatio carnis et mundi. Sed Deus
6383 permittit electos suos impugnari propter eorum exercitium. Ergo non
6384 videtur necessarium quod a Daemonibus impugnentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5">
6385 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
6386 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.6.12" target="asv">Eph. 6:12</a>): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of
6387 this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places."
6388 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33197] Iª q. 114 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6389 quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. VI, quod <i>non est nobis
6390 colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed adversus principes et
6391 potestates, adversus mundi rectores tenebrarum harum, contra
6392 spiritualia nequitiae in caelestibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p6">
6393 <b>I answer that,</b> Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons---the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself
6394 is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance
6395 of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's
6396 salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly
6397 use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof
6398 are to be referred to God as their first author.
6399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 co."><a name="33198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33198] Iª q. 114 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6400 quod circa impugnationem Daemonum duo est considerare, scilicet
6401 ipsam impugnationem, et impugnationis ordinem. Impugnatio quidem
6402 ipsa ex Daemonum malitia procedit, qui propter invidiam profectum
6403 hominum impedire nituntur; et propter superbiam divinae potestatis
6404 similitudinem usurpant, deputando sibi ministros determinatos ad
6405 hominum impugnationem, sicut et Angeli Deo ministrant in
6406 determinatis officiis ad hominum salutem. Sed ordo impugnationis
6407 ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis uti, ad bona ea
6408 ordinando. Sed ex parte Angelorum, tam ipsa custodia quam ordo
6409 custodiae reducitur ad Deum, sicut ad primum auctorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7">
6410 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail
6411 us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to
6412 man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in
6413 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 22:20.</a> For punishment is referred to God as its first author.
6414 Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they
6415 punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.
6416 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33199] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6417 dicendum quod mali Angeli impugnant homines dupliciter. Uno modo,
6418 instigando ad peccatum. Et sic non mittuntur a Deo ad impugnandum,
6419 sed aliquando permittuntur, secundum Dei iusta iudicia. Aliquando
6420 autem impugnant homines puniendo. Et sic mittuntur a Deo; sicut
6421 missus est spiritus mendax ad puniendum Achab regem Israel, ut
6422 dicitur III Reg. ult. Poena enim refertur in Deum, sicut in primum
6423 auctorem. Et tamen Daemones ad puniendum missi, alia intentione
6424 puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia;
6425 mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8">
6426 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally
6427 through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (
6428 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 6:16</a>), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."
6429 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33200] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6430 dicendum quod ad hoc quod non sit inaequalis pugnae conditio, fit
6431 ex parte hominis recompensatio, principaliter quidem per auxilium
6432 divinae gratiae; secundario autem per custodiam Angelorum. Unde IV
6433 Reg., Elisaeus dixit ad ministrum suum, <i>noli timere, plures enim
6434 nobiscum sunt, quam cum illis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A1-p9">
6435 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the
6436 demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of
6437 the elect.
6438 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33201] Iª q. 114 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6439 dicendum quod infirmitati humanae sufficeret ad exercitium
6440 impugnatio quae est a carne et mundo, sed malitiae Daemonum non
6441 sufficit, quae utroque utitur ad hominum impugnationem. Sed tamen
6442 ex divina ordinatione hoc provenit in gloriam electorum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q114_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A4-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 4. Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2">
6443 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show
6444 itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (
6445 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiThess.2.9" target="asv">2 Thess. 2:9</a>), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other
6446 times do the demons perform lying wonders.
6447 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33218] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
6448 proceditur. Videtur quod Daemones non possint homines seducere per
6449 aliqua miracula vera. Operatio enim Daemonum maxime vigebit in
6450 operibus Antichristi. Sed sicut apostolus dicit II ad Thessal. II,
6451 <i>eius adventus est secundum operationem Satanae, in omni virtute
6452 et signis et prodigiis mendacibus</i>. Ergo multo magis alio
6453 tempore per Daemones non fiunt nisi signa mendacia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p3">
6454 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine
6455 says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's
6456 art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.
6457 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33219] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vera
6458 miracula per aliquam corporum immutationem fiunt. Sed Daemones non
6459 possunt immutare corpus in aliam naturam, dicit enim Augustinus,
6460 XVIII de Civ. Dei, <i>nec corpus quidem humanum ulla ratione
6461 crediderim Daemonum arte vel potestate in membra bestialia posse
6462 converti</i>. Ergo Daemones vera miracula facere non possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4">
6463 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade
6464 one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (
6465 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Mark.16.20" target="asv">Mk. 16:20</a>): "The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed."
6466 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33220] Iª q. 114 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6467 argumentum efficaciam non habet, quod se habet ad opposita. Si ergo
6468 miracula vera possunt fieri a Daemonibus ad falsitatem
6469 persuadendam, non erunt efficacia ad veritatem fidei confirmandam.
6470 Quod est inconveniens, cum dicatur Marci ult., <i>domino
6471 cooperante, et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p5">
6472 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says
6473 <a href="#FP_Q83" id="FP_Q114_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(Q[83];</a> [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "Often by means of the magic art miracles are
6474 wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God."
6475 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33221] Iª q. 114 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6476 quod Augustinus dicit, libro octoginta trium quaest., quod
6477 <i>magicis artibus fiunt miracula plerumque similia illis miraculis
6478 quae fiunt per servos Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p6">
6479 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said above (
6480 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A4" id="FP_Q114_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[4]</a>), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in
6481 the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power
6482 of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience.
6483 And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power
6484 and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him
6485 to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.
6486 </p><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p7"> It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they
6487 are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs.
6488 And "when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house
6489 and with it his children---these were the work of Satan, not phantoms"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx,
6490 19).
6491 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 co."><a name="33222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33222] Iª q. 114 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6492 quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, si miraculum proprie accipiatur,
6493 Daemones miracula facere non possunt, nec aliqua creatura, sed
6494 solus Deus, quia miraculum proprie dicitur quod fit praeter ordinem
6495 totius naturae creatae, sub quo ordine continetur omnis virtus
6496 creaturae. Dicitur tamen quandoque miraculum large, quod excedit
6497 humanam facultatem et considerationem. Et sic Daemones possunt
6498 facere miracula, quae scilicet homines mirantur, inquantum eorum
6499 facultatem et cognitionem excedunt. Nam et unus homo, inquantum
6500 facit aliquid quod est supra facultatem et cognitionem alterius,
6501 ducit alium in admirationem sui operis, ut quodammodo miraculum
6502 videatur operari. Sciendum est tamen quod, quamvis huiusmodi opera
6503 Daemonum, quae nobis miracula videntur, ad veram rationem miraculi
6504 non pertingant; sunt tamen quandoque verae res. Sicut magi
6505 Pharaonis per virtutem Daemonum veros serpentes et ranas fecerunt.
6506 <i>Et quando ignis de caelo cecidit et familiam Iob cum gregibus
6507 pecorum uno impetu consumpsit, et turbo domum deiiciens filios eius
6508 occidit, quae fuerunt opera Satanae, phantasmata non fuerunt</i>,
6509 ut Augustinus dicit, XX de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p8">
6510 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, "either because he will deceive
6511 men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies,
6512 they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him."
6513 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33223] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6514 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit ibidem, Antichristi opera
6515 possunt dici esse signa mendacii, <i>vel quia mortales sensus per
6516 phantasmata decepturus est, ut quod non facit, videatur facere, vel
6517 quia, si sint vera prodigia, ad mendacium tamen pertrahent
6518 credituros</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p9">
6519 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As we have said above (
6520 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q114_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute
6521 matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce
6522 these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal
6523 things which
6524 can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the
6525 operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs,
6526 which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature,
6527 cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body
6528 of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by
6529 the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality.
6530 </p><p id="FP_Q114_A4-p10"> Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his
6531 corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (
6532 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A3" id="FP_Q114_A4-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[111], AA[3]</a>,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as
6533 he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same
6534 way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ.
6535 Dei xviii, 18): "Man's imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things,
6536 appears to other men's senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal." This not to be understood as though the
6537 imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another
6538 man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's senses.
6539 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33224] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6540 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, materia corporalis non
6541 obedit Angelis bonis seu malis ad nutum, ut Daemones sua virtute
6542 possint transmutare materiam de forma in formam, sed possunt
6543 adhibere quaedam semina quae in elementis mundi inveniuntur, ad
6544 huiusmodi effectus complendos, ut Augustinus dicit III de Trin. Et
6545 ideo dicendum est quod omnes transmutationes corporalium rerum quae
6546 possunt fieri per aliquas virtutes naturales, ad quas pertinent
6547 praedicta semina, possunt fieri per operationem Daemonum, huiusmodi
6548 seminibus adhibitis; sicut cum aliquae res transmutantur in
6549 serpentes vel ranas, quae per putrefactionem generari possunt.
6550 Illae vero transmutationes corporalium rerum quae non possunt
6551 virtute naturae fieri, nullo modo operatione Daemonum, secundum rei
6552 veritatem, perfici possunt; sicut quod corpus humanum mutetur in
6553 corpus bestiale, aut quod corpus hominis mortuum reviviscat. Et si
6554 aliquando aliquid tale operatione Daemonum fieri videatur, hoc non
6555 est secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum apparentiam tantum. Quod
6556 quidem potest dupliciter contingere. Uno modo, ab interiori;
6557 secundum quod Daemon potest mutare phantasiam hominis, et etiam
6558 sensus corporeos, ut aliquid videatur aliter quam sit, sicut supra
6559 dictum est. Et hoc etiam interdum fieri dicitur virtute aliquarum
6560 rerum corporalium. Alio modo, ab exteriori. Cum enim ipse possit
6561 formare corpus ex aere cuiuscumque formae et figurae, ut illud
6562 assumens in eo visibiliter appareat; potest eadem ratione
6563 circumponere cuicumque rei corporeae quamcumque formam corpoream,
6564 ut in eius specie videatur. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit XVIII
6565 de Civ. Dei, quod <i>phantasticum hominis, quod etiam cogitando
6566 sive somniando per rerum innumerabilium genera variatur, velut
6567 corporatum in alicuius animalis effigie, sensibus apparet
6568 alienis</i>. Quod non est sic intelligendum, quod ipsa vis
6569 phantastica hominis, aut species eius, eadem numero incorporata
6570 alterius sensibus ostendatur, sed quia Daemon qui in phantasia
6571 unius hominis format aliquam speciem, ipse etiam potest similem
6572 speciem alterius sensibus offerre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A4-p11">
6573 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): "When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different
6574 right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the
6575 latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject."
6576 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33225] Iª q. 114 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6577 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium
6578 quaest., <i>cum talia faciunt magi qualia sancti, diverso fine et
6579 diverso iure fiunt. Illi enim faciunt, quaerentes gloriam suam,
6580 isti, quaerentes gloriam Dei. Et illi faciunt per quaedam privata
6581 commercia; isti autem publica administratione, et iussu Dei, cui
6582 cuncta creatura subiecta est</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q114_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q114_A5-p0.1">Q. 114. A. 5. Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p2">
6583 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ
6584 overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore
6585 it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.
6586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33226] Iª q. 114 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
6587 proceditur. Videtur quod Daemon qui superatur ab aliquo, non
6588 propter hoc ab impugnatione arceatur. Christus enim efficacissime
6589 suum tentatorem vicit. Sed tamen postea eum impugnavit, ad
6590 occisionem eius Iudaeos incitando. Ergo non est verum quod Diabolus
6591 victus ab impugnatione cesset.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p3">
6592 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is
6593 not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults.
6594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33227] Iª q. 114 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6595 infligere poenam ei qui in pugna succumbit, est incitare ad acrius
6596 impugnandum. Hoc autem non pertinet ad Dei misericordiam. Ergo
6597 Daemones superati non arcentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4">
6598 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
6599 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.11" target="asv">Mat. 4:11</a>): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.
6600 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33228] Iª q. 114 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6601 quod dicitur Matth. IV, tunc reliquit eum Diabolus, scilicet
6602 Christum superantem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5">
6603 <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other
6604 sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to
6605 be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (
6606 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv">Lk. 4:13</a>) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One
6607 is on the part
6608 of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works],
6609 "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt
6610 for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil.
6611 As to this, Ambrose says on
6612 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.4.13" target="asv"> Lk. 4:13</a>: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from
6613 frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from
6614 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q114_A5-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.44" target="asv"> Mat. 12:44</a>: "I will return into my house from whence I came out."
6615 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 co."><a name="33229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33229] Iª q. 114 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6616 quod quidam dicunt quod Daemon superatus nullum hominum potest de
6617 cetero tentare, nec de eodem nec de alio peccato. Quidam autem
6618 dicunt quod potest alios tentare, sed non eundem. Et hoc
6619 probabilius dicitur, si tamen intelligatur usque ad aliquod tempus,
6620 unde et Lucae IV dicitur quod, <i>consummata omni tentatione,
6621 Diabolus recessit a Christo usque ad tempus</i>. Et huius ratio est
6622 duplex. Una est ex parte divinae clementiae, quia, ut Chrysostomus
6623 dicit, super Matth., <i>non tandiu homines Diabolus tentat, quandiu
6624 vult, sed quandiu Deus permittit; quia etsi permittat paulisper
6625 tentare, tamen repellit, propter infirmam naturam</i>. Alia ratio
6626 sumitur ex astutia Diaboli, unde Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam, quod
6627 <i>Diabolus instare formidat, quia frequentius refugit
6628 triumphari</i>. Quod tamen aliquando Diabolus redeat ad eum quem
6629 dimisit, patet per illud quod dicitur Matth. XII, <i>revertar in
6630 domum meam, unde exivi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q114_A5-p6"> From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 114 a. 5 ad arg."><a name="33230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33230] Iª q. 114 a. 5 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
6631 patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div>
6632 <div id="FP_Q115" class="div3">
6633 <h3 id="FP_Q115-p0.1">Q. 115. OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
6634 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
6635 <p id="FP_Q115-p2"> We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal
6636 actions there are six points of inquiry:
6637 </p><p id="FP_Q115-p3"><a href="#FP_Q115_A1"> (1) Whether a body can be active?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p4"><a href="#FP_Q115_A2"> (2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p5"><a href="#FP_Q115_A3"> (3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p6"><a href="#FP_Q115_A4"> (4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p7"><a href="#FP_Q115_A5"> (5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?</a></p><p id="FP_Q115-p8"><a href="#FP_Q115_A6"> (6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?</a></p>
6638 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 pr."><a name="33231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33231]
6639 Iª q. 115 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de
6640 actione corporalis creaturae; et fato, quod aliquibus corporibus
6641 attribuitur. Circa actiones corporales quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum
6642 aliquod corpus sit activum. Secundo, utrum in corporibus sint
6643 aliquae seminales rationes. Tertio, utrum corpora caelestia sint
6644 causa eorum quae hic per inferiora corpora fiunt. Quarto, utrum
6645 sint causa humanorum actuum. Quinto, utrum eorum actionibus
6646 Daemones subdantur. Sexto, utrum caelestia corpora imponant
6647 necessitatem his quae eorum actionibus subduntur.</p></div></div></div>
6648 <div id="FP_Q115_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A2-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 2. Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p2">
6649 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual
6650 order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in
6651 which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
6652 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33244] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
6653 proceditur. Videtur quod in materia corporali non sint aliquae
6654 rationes seminales. Ratio enim importat aliquid secundum esse
6655 spirituale. Sed in materia corporali non est aliquid spiritualiter,
6656 sed materialiter tantum, secundum scilicet modum eius in quo est.
6657 Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p3">
6658 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain
6659 seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable
6660 to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
6661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33245] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
6662 Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod Daemones quaedam opera faciunt
6663 adhibendo occultis motibus quaedam semina, quae in elementis
6664 cognoscunt. Sed ea quae per motum localem adhibentur, sunt corpora,
6665 non rationes. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur quod sunt in corporali
6666 materia seminales rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p4">
6667 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above,
6668 matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
6669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33246] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6670 semen est principium activum. Sed in materia corporali non est
6671 aliquod principium activum, cum materiae non competat agere, ut
6672 dictum est. Ergo in materia corporali non sunt seminales
6673 rationes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p5">
6674 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production
6675 of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal
6676 virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.
6677 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33247] Iª q. 115 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
6678 materia corporali dicuntur esse quaedam causales rationes, quae
6679 videntur sufficere ad rerum productionem. Sed seminales rationes
6680 sunt aliae a causalibus, quia praeter seminales rationes fiunt
6681 miracula, non autem praeter causales. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur
6682 quod seminales rationes sunt in materia corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p6">
6683 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds
6684 lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."
6685 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33248] Iª q. 115 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6686 quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., <i>omnium rerum quae
6687 corporaliter visibiliterque nascuntur, occulta quaedam semina in
6688 istis corporeis mundi huius elementis latent</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A2-p7">
6689 <b>I answer that,</b> It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal
6690 nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural
6691 things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation
6692 of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are
6693 generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united,
6694 consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is
6695 manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things
6696 are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and
6697 passive
6698 virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.
6699 </p><p id="FP_Q115_A2-p8"> These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad
6700 lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements
6701 of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things
6702 which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that
6703 animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are
6704 compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.
6705 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 co."><a name="33249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33249] Iª q. 115 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6706 quod denominationes consueverunt fieri a perfectiori, ut dicitur in
6707 II de anima. In tota autem natura corporea perfectiora sunt corpora
6708 viva, unde et ipsum nomen naturae translatum est a rebus viventibus
6709 ad omnes res naturales. Nam ipsum nomen naturae, ut philosophus
6710 dicit in V Metaphys., primo impositum fuit ad significandum
6711 generationem viventium, quae nativitas dicitur, et quia viventia
6712 generantur ex principio coniuncto, sicut fructus ex arbore, et
6713 foetus ex matre, cui colligatur, consequenter tractum est nomen
6714 naturae ad omne principium motus quod est in eo quod movetur.
6715 Manifestum est autem quod principium activum et passivum
6716 generationis rerum viventium sunt semina ex quibus viventia
6717 generantur. Et ideo convenienter Augustinus omnes virtutes activas
6718 et passivas quae sunt principia generationum et motuum naturalium,
6719 seminales rationes vocat. Huiusmodi autem virtutes activae et
6720 passivae in multiplici ordine considerari possunt. Nam primo
6721 quidem, ut Augustinus dicit VI super Gen. ad Litt., sunt
6722 principaliter et originaliter in ipso verbo Dei, secundum rationes
6723 ideales. Secundo vero, sunt in elementis mundi, ubi simul a
6724 principio productae sunt, sicut in universalibus causis. Tertio
6725 vero modo, sunt in iis quae ex universalibus causis secundum
6726 successiones temporum producuntur, sicut in hac planta et in hoc
6727 animali, tanquam in particularibus causis. Quarto modo, sunt in
6728 seminibus quae ex animalibus et plantis producuntur. Quae iterum
6729 comparantur ad alios effectus particulares, sicut primordiales
6730 causae universales ad primos effectus productos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p9">
6731 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal
6732 matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes
6733 ideales].
6734 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33250] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6735 dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae et passivae rerum
6736 naturalium, etsi non possint dici rationes secundum quod sunt in
6737 materia corporali; possunt tamen dici rationes per comparationem ad
6738 suam originem, secundum quod deducuntur a rationibus idealibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p10">
6739 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement
6740 for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.
6741 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33251] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6742 dicendum quod huiusmodi virtutes activae vel passivae sunt in
6743 aliquibus partibus corporalibus; quae dum adhibentur per motum
6744 localem ad aliquos effectus complendos, dicuntur semina adhiberi
6745 per Daemones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p11">
6746 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female
6747 contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles.
6748 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33252] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6749 dicendum quod semen maris est principium activum in generatione
6750 animalis. Sed potest etiam dici semen id quod est ex parte feminae,
6751 quod est principium passivum. Et sic sub semine comprehendi possunt
6752 vires activae et passivae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A2-p12">
6753 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues,
6754 just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so
6755 is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues,"
6756 but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate
6757 principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought
6758 outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God
6759 commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities
6760 which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of
6761 seminal virtues.
6762 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33253] Iª q. 115 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
6763 dicendum quod ex verbis Augustini de huiusmodi rationibus
6764 seminalibus loquentis, satis accipi potest quod ipsae rationes
6765 seminales sunt etiam rationes causales, sicut et semen est quaedam
6766 causa, dicit enim in III de Trin., quod <i>sicut matres gravidae
6767 sunt foetibus, sic ipse mundus est gravidus causis nascentium</i>.
6768 Sed tamen rationes ideales possunt dici causales, non autem proprie
6769 loquendo seminales, quia semen non est principium separatum, et
6770 praeter huiusmodi rationes non fiunt miracula. Similiter etiam
6771 neque praeter virtutes passivas creaturae inditas, ut ex ea fieri
6772 possit quidquid Deus mandaverit. Sed praeter virtutes activas
6773 naturales, et potentias passivas quae ordinantur ad huiusmodi
6774 virtutes activas, dicuntur fieri miracula, dum dicitur quod fiunt
6775 praeter rationes seminales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A3-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 3. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p2">
6776 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De
6777 Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"---namely, the heavenly bodies---"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they
6778 are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes."
6779 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33254] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
6780 proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia non sint causa eorum
6781 quae hic in inferioribus corporibus fiunt. Dicit enim Damascenus,
6782 nos autem dicimus quoniam ipsa, scilicet corpora caelestia, <i>non
6783 sunt causa alicuius eorum quae fiunt, neque corruptionis eorum quae
6784 corrumpuntur, signa autem sunt magis imbrium et aeris
6785 transmutationis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p3">
6786 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and
6787 there are contrary agents---heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need
6788 to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.
6789 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33255] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
6790 faciendum aliquid, sufficit agens et materia. Sed in istis
6791 inferioribus invenitur materia patiens, inveniuntur etiam contraria
6792 agentia, scilicet calidum et frigidum et huiusmodi. Ergo non est
6793 necessarium, ad causandum ea quae hic inferius fiunt, causalitatem
6794 caelestibus corporibus attribuere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p4">
6795 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through
6796 the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore
6797 the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.
6798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33256] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6799 agens agit sibi simile. Sed videmus quod omnia quae fiunt hic
6800 inferius, fiunt per hoc quod calefiunt et frigidantur, et
6801 humectantur et desiccantur, et aliis huiusmodi qualitatibus
6802 alterantur, quae non inveniuntur in corporibus caelestibus. Ergo
6803 corpora caelestia non sunt causa eorum quae hic fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p5">
6804 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): "Nothing is more corporeal than sex." But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies:
6805 a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly
6806 bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.
6807 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="33257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33257] Iª q. 115 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
6808 sicut Augustinus dicit V de Civ. Dei, <i>nihil est magis corporeum
6809 quam corporis sexus</i>. Sed corporis sexus non causatur ex
6810 corporibus caelestibus, cuius signum esse videtur, quod duorum
6811 geminorum sub una constellatione natorum, unus est masculus et
6812 alter est femina. Ergo corpora caelestia non sunt causa rerum
6813 corporalium quae hic fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p6">
6814 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): "Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more
6815 subtle and powerful nature." And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that "the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible
6816 bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection."
6817 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33258] Iª q. 115 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6818 quod Augustinus dicit, III de Trin., quod <i>corpora crassiora et
6819 inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur</i>.
6820 Et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>lumen solis ad
6821 generationem sensibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsa movet,
6822 et nutrit et auget et perficit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p7">
6823 <b>I answer that,</b> Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is
6824 moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable.
6825 Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the
6826 heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save
6827 locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of
6828 the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.
6829 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 co."><a name="33259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33259] Iª q. 115 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6830 quod, cum omnis multitudo ab unitate procedat; quod autem immobile
6831 est, uno modo se habet, quod vero movetur, multiformiter,
6832 considerandum est, in tota natura, quod omnis motus ab immobili
6833 procedit. Et ideo quanto aliqua sunt immobiliora, tanto sunt magis
6834 causa eorum quae sunt magis mobilia. Corpora autem caelestia sunt
6835 inter alia corpora magis immobilia, non enim moventur nisi motu
6836 locali. Et ideo motus horum inferiorum corporum qui sunt varii et
6837 multiformes, reducuntur in motum corporis caelestis, sicut in
6838 causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p8">
6839 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption
6840 here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods.
6841 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33260] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6842 dicendum quod dictum Damasceni intelligendum est, quod corpora
6843 caelestia non sunt prima causa generationis et corruptionis eorum
6844 quae hic fiunt; sicut dicebant illi qui ponebant corpora caelestia
6845 esse deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p9">
6846 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like.
6847 If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles
6848 of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle
6849 above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves
6850 sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions
6851 in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary
6852 to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions.
6853 </p><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p10"> This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive
6854 their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable,
6855 would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior
6856 bodies: which is clearly false.
6857 </p><p id="FP_Q115_A3-p11"> Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of
6858 its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies.
6859 Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body:
6860 thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."
6861 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33261] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6862 dicendum quod principia activa in istis inferioribus corporibus non
6863 inveniuntur nisi qualitates activae elementorum, quae sunt calidum
6864 et frigidum et huiusmodi. Et si sic esset quod formae substantiales
6865 inferiorum corporum non diversificarentur nisi secundum huiusmodi
6866 accidentia, quorum principia rarum et densum antiqui naturales
6867 posuerunt; non oporteret super haec inferiora corpora aliquod
6868 principium activum ponere, sed ipsa sufficerent ad agendum. Sed
6869 recte considerantibus apparet quod huiusmodi accidentia se habent
6870 sicut materiales dispositiones ad formas substantiales naturalium
6871 corporum. Materia autem non sufficit ad agendum. Et ideo oportet
6872 super has materiales dispositiones ponere aliquod principium
6873 activum. Unde Platonici posuerunt species separatas, secundum
6874 quarum participationem inferiora corpora substantiales formas
6875 consequuntur. Sed hoc non videtur sufficere. Quia species separatae
6876 semper eodem modo se haberent, cum ponantur immobiles, et sic
6877 sequeretur quod non esset aliqua variatio circa generationem et
6878 corruptionem inferiorum corporum; quod patet esse falsum. Unde
6879 secundum philosophum, in II de Gen., necesse est ponere aliquod
6880 principium activum mobile, quod per sui praesentiam et absentiam
6881 causet varietatem circa generationem et corruptionem inferiorum
6882 corporum. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia. Et ideo quidquid in
6883 istis inferioribus generat, movet ad speciem sicut instrumentum
6884 caelestis corporis; secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quod
6885 <i>homo generat hominem, et sol</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p12">
6886 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason
6887 of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all
6888 things are like God.
6889 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33262] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
6890 dicendum quod corpora caelestia inferioribus corporibus non sunt
6891 similia similitudine speciei; sed inquantum sua universali virtute
6892 continent in se quidquid in inferioribus corporibus generatur;
6893 secundum quem modum dicimus etiam omnia esse Deo similia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A3-p13">
6894 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter.
6895 Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed
6896 sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because
6897 the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the
6898 various dispositions of matter.
6899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="33263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33263] Iª q. 115 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
6900 dicendum quod actiones corporum caelestium diversimode recipiuntur
6901 in inferioribus corporibus secundum diversam materiae
6902 dispositionem. Contingit autem quandoque quod materia conceptus
6903 humani non est disposita totaliter ad masculinum sexum; unde partim
6904 formatur in masculum, partim in feminam. Unde ad hoc introducitur
6905 ab Augustino, ad repellendum scilicet divinationem quae fit per
6906 astra, quia effectus astrorum variantur etiam in rebus corporeis,
6907 secundum diversam materiae dispositionem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A4-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 4. Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p2">
6908 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual
6909 substances, as stated above (
6910 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A3" id="FP_Q115_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[3]</a>), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it
6911 seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.
6912 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33264] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
6913 proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum
6914 actuum. Corpora enim caelestia, cum moveantur a spiritualibus
6915 substantiis, sicut supra dictum est, agunt in virtute earum quasi
6916 instrumenta. Sed illae substantiae spirituales sunt superiores
6917 animabus nostris. Ergo videtur quod possint imprimere in animas
6918 nostras, et sic causare actus humanos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p3">
6919 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems
6920 that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles.
6921 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33265] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
6922 multiforme reducitur in aliquod uniforme principium. Sed actus
6923 humani sunt varii et multiformes. Ergo videtur quod reducantur in
6924 uniformes motus caelestium corporum, sicut in sua principia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p4">
6925 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect
6926 and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human
6927 actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.
6928 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33266] Iª q. 115 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
6929 astrologi frequenter vera annuntiant de eventibus bellorum, et
6930 aliis humanis actibus, quorum principia sunt intellectus et
6931 voluntas. Quod facere non possent secundum caelestia corpora, nisi
6932 essent humanorum actuum causa. Sunt ergo corpora caelestia
6933 humanorum actuum causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p5">
6934 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions."
6935 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33267] Iª q. 115 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
6936 quod Damascenus dicit, quod <i>corpora caelestia humanorum actuum
6937 nequaquam sunt causa</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A4-p6">
6938 <b>I answer that,</b> The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above
6939 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A3" id="FP_Q115_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because
6940 the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore
6941 if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding
6942 that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice
6943 and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there
6944 are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action
6945 of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate
6946 actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however,
6947 that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely,
6948 as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the
6949 intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive
6950 powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity,
6951 disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although
6952 the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains
6953 the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue
6954 of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions,
6955 than on the intellect.
6956 </p><p id="FP_Q115_A4-p7"> To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does
6957 not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that "such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and
6958 of gods brings on" (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal
6959 organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.
6960 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 co."><a name="33268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33268] Iª q. 115 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6961 quod corpora caelestia in corpora quidem imprimunt directe et per
6962 se, sicut iam dictum est. In vires autem animae quae sunt actus
6963 organorum corporeorum, directe quidem, sed per accidens, quia
6964 necesse est huiusmodi actus harum potentiarum impediri secundum
6965 impedimenta organorum, sicut oculus turbatus non bene videt. Unde
6966 si intellectus et voluntas essent vires corporeis organis
6967 alligatae, sicut posuerunt aliqui, dicentes quod intellectus non
6968 differt a sensu; ex necessitate sequeretur quod corpora caelestia
6969 essent causa electionum et actuum humanorum. Et ex hoc sequeretur
6970 quod homo naturali instinctu ageretur ad suas actiones, sicut
6971 cetera animalia, in quibus non sunt nisi vires animae corporeis
6972 organis alligatae, nam illud quod fit in istis inferioribus ex
6973 impressione corporum caelestium, naturaliter agitur. Et ita
6974 sequeretur quod homo non esset liberi arbitrii, sed haberet
6975 actiones determinatas, sicut et ceterae res naturales. Quae
6976 manifeste sunt falsa, et conversationi humanae contraria. Sciendum
6977 est tamen quod indirecte et per accidens impressiones corporum
6978 caelestium ad intellectum et voluntatem pertingere possunt;
6979 inquantum scilicet tam intellectus quam voluntas aliquo modo ab
6980 inferioribus viribus accipiunt, quae organis corporeis alligantur.
6981 Sed circa hoc diversimode se habent intellectus et voluntas. Nam
6982 intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus
6983 apprehensivis, unde turbata vi imaginativa vel cogitativa vel
6984 memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur actio intellectus. Sed voluntas
6985 non ex necessitate sequitur inclinationem appetitus inferioris,
6986 licet enim passiones quae sunt in irascibili et concupiscibili,
6987 habeant quandam vim ad inclinandam voluntatem; tamen in potestate
6988 voluntatis remanet sequi passiones, vel eas refutare. Et ideo
6989 impressio caelestium corporum, secundum quam immutari possunt
6990 inferiores vires, minus pertingit ad voluntatem, quae est proxima
6991 causa humanorum actuum, quam ad intellectum. Ponere igitur
6992 caelestia corpora esse causam humanorum actuum, est proprium
6993 illorum qui dicunt intellectum non differre a sensu. Unde quidam
6994 eorum dicebant quod <i>talis est voluntas in hominibus, qualem in
6995 diem inducit pater virorum deorumque</i>. Quia ergo constat
6996 intellectum et voluntatem non esse actus organorum corporeorum,
6997 impossibile est quod corpora caelestia sint causa humanorum
6998 actuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p8">
6999 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies;
7000 but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated
7001 above (
7002 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A2" id="FP_Q115_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[111], A[2]</a>).
7003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33269] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7004 dicendum quod spirituales substantiae quae caelestia corpora
7005 movent, in corporalia quidem agunt mediantibus caelestibus
7006 corporibus, sed in intellectum humanum agunt immediate illuminando.
7007 Voluntatem autem immutare non possunt, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p9">
7008 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause:
7009 so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine
7010 intellect and will.
7011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33270] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7012 dicendum quod, sicut multiformitas corporalium motuum reducitur
7013 sicut in causam in uniformitatem motuum caelestium; ita
7014 multiformitas actuum qui sunt ab intellectu et voluntate, reducitur
7015 in principium uniforme quod est intellectus et voluntas divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A4-p10">
7016 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly
7017 bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the
7018 truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting
7019 his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say
7020 that "the wise man is stronger than the stars" [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.
7021 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33271] Iª q. 115 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7022 dicendum quod plures hominum sequuntur passiones, quae sunt motus
7023 sensitivi appetitus, ad quas cooperari possunt corpora caelestia,
7024 pauci autem sunt sapientes, qui huiusmodi passionibus resistant. Et
7025 ideo astrologi ut in pluribus vera possunt praedicere, et maxime in
7026 communi. Non autem in speciali, quia nihil prohibet aliquem hominem
7027 per liberum arbitrium passionibus resistere. Unde et ipsi astrologi
7028 dicunt quod sapiens homo dominatur astris, inquantum scilicet
7029 dominatur suis passionibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A5-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 5. Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2">
7030 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass
7031 men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from
7032 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q115_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.24" target="asv"> Mat. 4:24 </a>and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.
7033 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="33272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33272] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
7034 proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia possint imprimere in
7035 ipsos Daemones. Daemones enim secundum certa augmenta lunae aliquos
7036 homines vexant, qui et propter hoc lunatici dicuntur; ut patet
7037 Matth. IV et XVII. Sed hoc non esset, nisi corporibus caelestibus
7038 subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium
7039 corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p3">
7040 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through
7041 the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them.
7042 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="33273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33273] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7043 necromantici observant certas constellationes ad invocandos
7044 Daemones. Non autem per corpora caelestia invocarentur, si non eis
7045 subiacerent. Ergo Daemones subiacent actionibus caelestium
7046 corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p4">
7047 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies,
7048 namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine
7049 (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
7050 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="33274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33274] Iª q. 115 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7051 corpora caelestia virtuosiora sunt quam corpora inferiora. Sed
7052 quibusdam inferioribus corporibus Daemones arcentur, scilicet
7053 herbis et lapidibus et animantibus, et quibusdam <i>sonis certis ac
7054 vocibus, et figurationibus atque figmentis</i>, ut a Porphyrio
7055 dictum Augustinus introducit in X de Civ. Dei. Ergo multo magis
7056 Daemones subduntur actioni caelestium corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p5">
7057 <b>On the contrary,</b> The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine
7058 says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies.
7059 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 s. c."><a name="33275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33275] Iª q. 115 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
7060 quod Daemones sunt superiores ordine naturae quam corpora
7061 caelestia. Agens autem est superius patiente, ut Augustinus dicit
7062 XII super Gen. ad Litt. Ergo Daemones non subiiciuntur actioni
7063 corporum caelestium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A5-p6">
7064 <b>I answer that,</b> There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and
7065 held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies.
7066 This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain
7067 powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is
7068 manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would
7069 in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors
7070 of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.
7071 </p><p id="FP_Q115_A5-p7"> For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius
7072 says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which
7073 it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto
7074 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A4" id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above (
7075 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q51_A1" id="FP_Q115_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[51], A[1]</a>): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action
7076 of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.
7077 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 co."><a name="33276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33276] Iª q. 115 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7078 quod circa Daemones fuit triplex opinio. Prima Peripateticorum, qui
7079 posuerunt Daemones non esse; sed ea quae attribuuntur Daemonibus,
7080 secundum artem necromanticam, fiunt virtute caelestium corporum. Et
7081 hoc est quod Augustinus, X de Civ. Dei, introducit dictum a
7082 Porphyrio, quod <i>fabricantur in terra ab hominibus potestates
7083 idoneae siderum variis effectibus exequendis</i>. Sed haec positio
7084 est manifeste falsa. Experimento enim scitur multa per Daemones
7085 fieri, ad quae nullo modo virtus caelestium corporum sufficeret;
7086 puta quod arreptitii loquuntur lingua ignota, quod recitant versus
7087 et auctoritates quas nunquam sciverunt, quod necromantici faciunt
7088 statuas loqui et moveri, et similia. Ex quibus Platonici moti
7089 fuerunt ut ponerent Daemones esse animalia corpore aerea, animo
7090 passiva; ut ab Apuleio dictum Augustinus introducit VIII de Civ.
7091 Dei. Et haec est secunda opinio, secundum quam dici posset quod
7092 Daemones hoc modo subduntur corporibus caelestibus, sicut et de
7093 hominibus dictum est. Sed haec opinio ex superioribus patet esse
7094 falsa, dicimus enim Daemones esse substantias intellectuales
7095 corporibus non unitas. Unde patet quod non subduntur actioni
7096 caelestium corporum, nec per se nec per accidens, nec directe nec
7097 indirecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p8">
7098 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to "defame
7099 God's creature," namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because
7100 as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above (
7101 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q114_A4" id="FP_Q115_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[114], A[4]</a>, ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended
7102 result. Now it is manifest that "the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body," as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal.
7103 ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property
7104 of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according
7105 to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto
7106 disposed.
7107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="33277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33277] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7108 dicendum quod hoc quod Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae
7109 homines vexant, contingit propter duo. Primo quidem, ad hoc quod
7110 infament creaturam Dei, scilicet lunam, ut Hieronymus et
7111 Chrysostomus dicunt. Secundo quia, cum non possint operari nisi
7112 mediantibus naturalibus virtutibus, ut supra dictum est; in suis
7113 operibus considerant corporum aptitudines ad effectus intentos.
7114 Manifestum est autem quod <i>cerebrum humidissimum est omnium
7115 partium corporis</i>, ut Aristoteles dicit, et ideo maxime
7116 subiicitur operationi lunae, quae ex sua proprietate habet movere
7117 humorem. In cerebro autem perficiuntur vires animales, et ideo
7118 Daemones secundum certa augmenta lunae perturbant hominis
7119 phantasiam, quando considerant cerebrum ad hoc esse dispositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p9">
7120 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of
7121 believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations
7122 corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.
7123 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="33278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33278] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7124 dicendum quod Daemones advocati in certis constellationibus,
7125 propter duo veniunt. Primo quidem, ut homines in hunc errorem
7126 inducant, quod credant aliquod numen esse in stellis. Secundo, quia
7127 considerant secundum aliquas certas constellationes materiam
7128 corporalem magis esse dispositam ad effectus pro quibus
7129 advocantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A5-p10">
7130 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the "demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs,
7131 rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered
7132 to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.
7133 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="33279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33279] Iª q. 115 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7134 dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit XXI de Civ. Dei, <i>Daemones
7135 alliciuntur per varia genera lapidum, herbarum, lignorum,
7136 animalium, carminum, rituum, non ut animalia cibis, sed ut spiritus
7137 signis</i>; inquantum scilicet haec eis exhibentur in signum divini
7138 honoris, cuius ipsi sunt cupidi.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q115_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q115_A6-p0.1">Q. 115. A. 6. Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p2">
7139 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the
7140 effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies,
7141 with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity.
7142 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="33280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33280] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
7143 proceditur. Videtur quod corpora caelestia imponant necessitatem
7144 iis quae eorum actioni subduntur. Causa enim sufficienti posita,
7145 necesse est effectum poni. Sed corpora caelestia sunt sufficiens
7146 causa suorum effectuum. Cum igitur corpora caelestia, cum suis
7147 motibus et dispositionibus, ponantur sicut ex necessitate entia;
7148 videtur quod effectus eorum ex necessitate consequantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p3">
7149 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter
7150 to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher
7151 power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter.
7152 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="33281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33281] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7153 effectus agentis ex necessitate sequitur in materia, quando virtus
7154 agentis tanta fuerit quod possit sibi subiicere totaliter materiam.
7155 Sed tota materia inferiorum corporum subiicitur virtuti caelestium
7156 corporum, tanquam excellentiori. Ergo ex necessitate effectus
7157 caelestium corporum recipitur in materia corporali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p4">
7158 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal
7159 cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle:
7160 since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle
7161 is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.
7162 Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.
7163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="33282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33282] Iª q. 115 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
7164 effectus caelestis corporis non ex necessitate proveniat, hoc est
7165 propter aliquam causam impedientem. Sed quamlibet causam corpoream
7166 quae impedire posset effectum caelestis corporis, necesse est
7167 reduci in aliquod caeleste principium, cum caelestia corpora sint
7168 causa omnium quae hic fiunt. Ergo, cum et illud caeleste principium
7169 sit necessarium, sequitur quod necesse sit impediri effectum
7170 alterius corporis caelestis. Et sic omnia quae hic contingunt, ex
7171 necessitate eveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p5">
7172 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): "It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed
7173 in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled." Therefore not all the effects of
7174 heavenly bodies take place of necessity.
7175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 s. c."><a name="33283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33283] Iª q. 115 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
7176 quod philosophus dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., <i>quod neque
7177 eorum quae in corporibus sunt signorum caelestium, velut aquarum et
7178 ventorum, inconveniens est multa non evenire</i>. Sic ergo non
7179 omnes effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p6">
7180 <b>I answer that,</b> This question is partly solved by what was said above
7181 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A4" id="FP_Q115_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>; and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations
7182 in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to
7183 prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other
7184 things to which human action extends.
7185 </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p7"> But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced
7186 by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning
7187 of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows
7188 of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph.
7189 vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.
7190 </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p8"> For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes
7191 are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to
7192 fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently
7193 the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.
7194 </p><p id="FP_Q115_A6-p9"> Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being "per se," has a cause; but what is accidentally,
7195 has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, likewise
7196 (that a man is) "musical" has not a cause, but (that a being is) "white-musical" has not a cause, because it is not truly
7197 a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to
7198 its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these
7199 two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be
7200 reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take
7201 fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the
7202 surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight
7203 on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of
7204 heavenly bodies result of necessity.
7205 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 co."><a name="33284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33284] Iª q. 115 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7206 quod ista quaestio partim quidem absoluta est, secundum praemissa;
7207 partim autem difficultatem habet. Ostensum enim est quod, quamvis
7208 ex impressione corporum caelestium fiant aliquae inclinationes in
7209 natura corporali, voluntas tamen non ex necessitate sequitur has
7210 inclinationes. Et ideo nihil prohibet per voluntariam actionem
7211 impediri effectum caelestium corporum, non solum in ipso homine,
7212 sed etiam in aliis rebus ad quas hominum operatio se extendit. Sed
7213 nullum tale principium invenitur in rebus naturalibus, quod habeat
7214 libertatem sequendi vel non sequendi impressiones caelestes. Unde
7215 videtur quod in talibus, ad minus, omnia ex necessitate proveniant,
7216 secundum antiquam quorundam rationem, qui, supponentes omne quod
7217 est causam habere, et quod, posita causa, ex necessitate ponitur
7218 effectus, concludebant, quod omnia ex necessitate contingant. Quam
7219 quidem opinionem repellit Aristoteles in VI Metaphys., secundum duo
7220 quae ipsi supponunt. Primo enim, non est verum quod, posita
7221 quacumque causa, necesse sit effectum poni. Sunt enim quaedam
7222 causae quae ordinantur ad suos effectus non ex necessitate, sed ut
7223 in pluribus, quae quandoque deficiunt in minori parte. Sed quia
7224 huiusmodi causae non deficiunt in minori parte, nisi propter
7225 aliquam causam impedientem, videtur adhuc praedictum inconveniens
7226 non vitari, quia et ipsum impedimentum talis causae ex necessitate
7227 contingit. Et ideo, secundo, oportet dicere quod omne quod est per
7228 se, habet causam, quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam,
7229 quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam
7230 habet, similiter et musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam,
7231 quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum. Manifestum est autem quod
7232 causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum
7233 ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens, unde talis
7234 concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens. Et propter
7235 hoc, id quod ex tali concursu sequitur, non reducitur in aliquam
7236 causam praeexistentem, ex qua ex necessitate sequatur. Sicut quod
7237 aliquod corpus terrestre ignitum in superiori parte aeris generetur
7238 et deorsum cadat, habet causam aliquam virtutem caelestem, et
7239 similiter etiam quod in superficie terrae sit aliqua materia
7240 combustibilis, potest reduci in aliquod caeleste principium. Sed
7241 quod ignis cadens huic materiae occurrat et comburat eam, non habet
7242 causam aliquod caeleste corpus, sed est per accidens. Et sic patet
7243 quod non omnes effectus caelestium corporum sunt ex
7244 necessitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p10">
7245 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which
7246 can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.
7247 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="33285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33285] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7248 dicendum quod corpora caelestia sunt causa inferiorum effectuum
7249 mediantibus causis particularibus inferioribus, quae deficere
7250 possunt in minori parte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p11">
7251 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local
7252 distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly
7253 body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature
7254 or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly
7255 body.
7256 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="33286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33286] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7257 dicendum quod virtus corporis caelestis non est infinita. Unde
7258 requirit determinatam dispositionem in materia ad inducendum suum
7259 effectum, et quantum ad distantiam loci, et quantum ad alias
7260 conditiones. Et ideo sicut distantia loci impedit effectum
7261 caelestis corporis (non enim sol eundem caloris effectum habet in
7262 Dacia, quem habet in Aethiopia); ita et grossities materiae, vel
7263 frigiditas aut caliditas, aut alia huiusmodi dispositio, impedire
7264 potest effectum corporis caelestis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q115_A6-p12">
7265 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless
7266 the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.
7267 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 115 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="33287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33287] Iª q. 115 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7268 dicendum quod licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae,
7269 reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam; tamen
7270 concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in
7271 causam caelestem, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
7272 <div id="FP_Q116" class="div3">
7273 <h3 id="FP_Q116-p0.1">Q. 116. ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
7274 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
7275 <p id="FP_Q116-p2"> We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q116-p3"><a href="#FP_Q116_A1"> (1) Is there such a thing as fate?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p4"><a href="#FP_Q116_A2"> (2) Where is it?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p5"><a href="#FP_Q116_A3"> (3) Is it unchangeable?</a></p><p id="FP_Q116-p6"><a href="#FP_Q116_A4"> (4) Are all things subject to fate?</a></p>
7276 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 pr."><a name="33288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33288]
7277 Iª q. 116 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de fato. Et
7278 circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, an fatum sit. Secundo, in quo
7279 sit. Tertio, utrum sit immobile. Quarto, utrum omnia subsint
7280 fato.</p></div></div></div>
7281 <div id="FP_Q116_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q116_A2-p0.1">Q. 116. A. 2. Whether fate is in created things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p2">
7282 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the "Divine will or power is
7283 called fate." But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.
7284 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33295] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
7285 proceditur. Videtur quod fatum non sit in rebus creatis. Dicit enim
7286 Augustinus, V de Civ. Dei, quod <i>ipsa Dei voluntas vel potestas
7287 fati nomine appellatur</i>. Sed voluntas et potestas Dei non est in
7288 creaturis, sed in Deo. Ergo fatum non est in rebus creatis, sed in
7289 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p3">
7290 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal
7291 cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above
7292 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.
7293 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33296] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7294 fatum comparatur ad ea quae ex fato aguntur, ut causa; ut ipse
7295 modus loquendi ostendit. Sed causa universalis per se eorum quae
7296 hic per accidens aguntur, est solus Deus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo
7297 fatum est in Deo, et non in rebus creatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p4">
7298 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according
7299 to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but
7300 in God.
7301 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33297] Iª q. 116 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si
7302 fatum est in creaturis, aut est substantia, aut accidens, et
7303 quodcumque horum detur, oportet quod multiplicetur secundum
7304 creaturarum multitudinem. Cum ergo fatum videatur esse unum tantum,
7305 videtur quod fatum non sit in creaturis, sed in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p5">
7306 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things."
7307 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33298] Iª q. 116 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
7308 quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol. quod <i>fatum est dispositio
7309 rebus mobilibus inhaerens</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6">
7310 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been stated above (
7311 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>;
7312 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q103_A6" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[103], A[6]</a>), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two
7313 ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this
7314 ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects,
7315 thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is
7316 served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements
7317 of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain
7318 of fate is forged." Of each of these things we have spoken above
7319 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">(A[1];</a>
7320 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q104_A2" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[104],
7321 A[2]
7322 </a>;
7323 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>;
7324 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q113" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.6" shape="rect">Q[113];</a>
7325 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q114" id="FP_Q116_A2-p6.7" shape="rect">Q[114])</a>. It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.
7326 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 co."><a name="33299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33299] Iª q. 116 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7327 quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, divina providentia per causas
7328 medias suos effectus exequitur. Potest ergo ipsa ordinatio
7329 effectuum dupliciter considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod est in
7330 ipso Deo, et sic ipsa ordinatio effectuum vocatur providentia.
7331 Secundum vero quod praedicta ordinatio consideratur in mediis
7332 causis a Deo ordinatis ad aliquos effectus producendos, sic habet
7333 rationem fati. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit, IV de Consol.,
7334 <i>sive famulantibus quibusdam providentiae divinae spiritibus
7335 fatum exercetur; seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, sive
7336 caelestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu Daemonum
7337 varia solertia, seu aliquibus eorum, seu omnibus, fatalis series
7338 texitur</i>, de quibus omnibus per singula in praecedentibus dictum
7339 est. Sic ergo est manifestum quod fatum est in ipsis causis
7340 creatis, inquantum sunt ordinatae a Deo ad effectus
7341 producendos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p7">
7342 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the "series of causes," has not the nature
7343 of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But
7344 essentially fate is the very disposition or "series," i.e. order, of second causes.
7345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33300] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7346 dicendum quod ipsa ordinatio causarum secundarum, quam Augustinus
7347 seriem causarum nominat, non habet rationem fati, nisi secundum
7348 quod dependet a Deo. Et ideo causaliter Dei potestas vel voluntas
7349 dici potest fatum. Essentialiter vero fatum est ipsa dispositio seu
7350 series, idest ordo, causarum secundarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p8">
7351 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.
7352 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33301] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7353 dicendum quod intantum fatum habet rationem causae, inquantum et
7354 ipsae causae secundae, quarum ordinatio fatum vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A2-p9">
7355 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies
7356 order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one;
7357 and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple.
7358 In this sense the poet wrote: "Thy fate draws thee."
7359 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33302] Iª q. 116 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7360 dicendum quod fatum dicitur dispositio, non quae est in genere
7361 qualitatis; sed secundum quod dispositio designat ordinem, qui non
7362 est substantia, sed relatio. Qui quidem ordo, si consideretur per
7363 comparationem ad suum principium, est unus, et sic dicitur unum
7364 fatum. Si autem consideretur per comparationem ad effectus, vel ad
7365 ipsas causas medias, sic multiplicatur, per quem modum poeta dixit,
7366 <i>te tua fata trahunt</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q116_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q116_A4-p0.1">Q. 116. A. 4. Whether all things are subject to fate?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p2">
7367 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and
7368 the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are
7369 born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed." Nothing therefore seems to be
7370 excluded from the domain of fate.
7371 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33309] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
7372 proceditur. Videtur quod omnia fato subdantur. Dicit enim Boetius,
7373 in IV de Consol., <i>series fati caelum et sidera movet, elementa
7374 in se invicem temperat, et alterna format transmutatione; eadem
7375 nascentia occidentiaque omnia per similes foetuum seminumque
7376 renovat progressus; haec actus fortunasque hominum indissolubili
7377 causarum connexione constringit</i>. Nihil ergo excipi videtur,
7378 quod sub fati serie non contineatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p3">
7379 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the
7380 Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject
7381 to fate.
7382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33310] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7383 Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod fatum aliquid est,
7384 secundum quod ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei refertur. Sed
7385 voluntas Dei est causa omnium quae fiunt, ut Augustinus dicit in
7386 III de Trin. Ergo omnia subduntur fato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p4">
7387 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are
7388 changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above (
7389 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q9_A2" id="FP_Q116_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[2]</a>). Therefore fate is in all things.
7390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="33311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33311] Iª q. 116 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7391 fatum, secundum Boetium, est <i>dispositio rebus mobilibus
7392 inhaerens</i>. Sed omnes creaturae sunt mutabiles, et solus Deus
7393 vere immutabilis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in omnibus creaturis
7394 est fatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p5">
7395 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."
7396 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33312] Iª q. 116 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
7397 quod Boetius dicit, in IV de Consol., quod <i>quaedam quae sub
7398 providentia locata sunt, fati seriem superant</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p6">
7399 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
7400 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A2" id="FP_Q116_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject
7401 also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to
7402 fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol.
7403 iv): viz. that "those things which are
7404 nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing
7405 is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.
7406 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 co."><a name="33313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33313] Iª q. 116 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7407 quod, sicut supra dictum est, fatum est ordinatio secundarum
7408 causarum ad effectus divinitus provisos. Quaecumque igitur causis
7409 secundis subduntur, ea subduntur et fato. Si qua vero sunt quae
7410 immediate a Deo fiunt, cum non subdantur secundis causis, non
7411 subduntur fato; sicut creatio rerum, glorificatio spiritualium
7412 substantiarum, et alia huiusmodi. Et hoc est quod Boetius dicit,
7413 quod <i>ea quae sunt primae divinitati propinqua, stabiliter fixa,
7414 fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Ex quo etiam patet quod
7415 quanto aliquid longius a prima mente discedit, nexibus fati
7416 maioribus implicatur</i>; quia magis subiicitur necessitati
7417 secundarum causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p7">
7418 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in
7419 the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.
7420 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33314] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7421 dicendum quod omnia illa quae ibi tanguntur, fiunt a Deo
7422 mediantibus causis secundis; et ideo sub fati serie continentur.
7423 Sed non est eadem ratio de omnibus aliis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p8">
7424 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever
7425 is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.
7426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33315] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7427 dicendum quod fatum refertur ad voluntatem et potestatem Dei, sicut
7428 ad primum principium. Unde non oportet quod quidquid subiicitur
7429 voluntati divinae vel potestati, subiiciatur fato, ut dictum
7430 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q116_A4-p9">
7431 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these,
7432 therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.
7433 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 116 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="33316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33316] Iª q. 116 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7434 dicendum quod, quamvis omnes creaturae sint aliquo modo mutabiles,
7435 tamen aliquae earum non procedunt a causis creatis mutabilibus. Et
7436 ideo non subiiciuntur fato, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div></div>
7437 <div id="FP_Q117" class="div3">
7438 <h3 id="FP_Q117-p0.1">Q. 117. OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
7439 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
7440 <p id="FP_Q117-p2"> We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual
7441 nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from
7442 man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry:
7443 </p><p id="FP_Q117-p3"><a href="#FP_Q117_A1"> (1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p4"><a href="#FP_Q117_A2"> (2) Whether man can teach an angel?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p5"><a href="#FP_Q117_A3"> (3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?</a></p><p id="FP_Q117-p6"><a href="#FP_Q117_A4"> (4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?</a></p>
7444 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 pr."><a name="33317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33317]
7445 Iª q. 117 pr.</span></a> Postea considerandum est de his quae
7446 pertinent ad actionem hominis, qui est compositus ex spirituali et
7447 corporali creatura. Et primo considerandum est de actione hominis;
7448 secundo, de propagatione hominis ex homine. Circa primum quaeruntur
7449 quatuor. Primo, utrum unus homo possit docere alium, causando in
7450 ipso scientiam. Secundo, utrum homo possit docere Angelum. Tertio,
7451 utrum homo per virtutem suae animae possit immutare materiam
7452 corporalem. Quarto, utrum anima hominis separata possit movere
7453 corpora motu locali.</p></div></div></div>
7454 <div id="FP_Q117_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A1-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 1. Whether one man can teach another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2">
7455 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (
7456 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.8" target="asv">Mat. 22:8</a>): "Be not you called Rabbi": on which the gloss of Jerome says, "Lest you give to men the honor due to God." Therefore to
7457 be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is
7458 proper to God.
7459 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33318] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
7460 proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit alium docere. Dicit enim
7461 dominus, Matth. XXIII, <i>nolite vocari Rabbi</i>; ubi dicit Glossa
7462 Hieronymi, <i>ne divinum honorem hominibus tribuatis</i>. Esse ergo
7463 magistrum pertinet proprie ad divinum honorem. Sed docere est
7464 proprium magistri. Homo ergo non potest docere, sed hoc est
7465 proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p3">
7466 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge
7467 in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows
7468 that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.
7469 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33319] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si
7470 homo alium docet, hoc non est nisi inquantum agit per scientiam
7471 suam ad causandum scientiam in alio. Sed qualitas per quam aliquis
7472 agit ad faciendum sibi simile, est qualitas activa. Ergo sequitur
7473 quod scientia sit qualitas activa, sicut et calor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p4">
7474 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either
7475 of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.
7476 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33320] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
7477 scientiam requiritur lumen intelligibile, et species rei
7478 intellectae. Sed neutrum istorum potest causare unus homo in alio.
7479 Ergo unus homo non potest docendo causare scientiam in alio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p5">
7480 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something
7481 by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him.
7482 For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom
7483 these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from
7484 the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to
7485 speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in
7486 another by teaching him.
7487 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33321] Iª q. 117 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
7488 doctor nihil agit ad discipulum nisi quod proponit ei quaedam
7489 signa, vel vocibus aliquid significando, vel nutibus. Sed
7490 proponendo signa non potest aliquis alium docere, causando in eo
7491 scientiam. Quia aut proponit signa rerum notarum; aut rerum
7492 ignotarum. Si rerum notarum, ille ergo cui signa proponuntur, iam
7493 habet scientiam, et eam non acquirit a magistro. Si autem rerum
7494 ignotarum, per huiusmodi signa nihil addiscit, sicut si aliquis
7495 proponeret alicui Latino verba Graeca, quorum significationem
7496 ignoraret, per hoc eum docere non posset. Nullo ergo modo unus homo
7497 potest, alium docendo, scientiam in eo causare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6">
7498 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
7499 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.7" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:7</a>): "Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth."
7500 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33322] Iª q. 117 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
7501 quod apostolus dicit, I ad Tim. II, <i>in quo positus sum ego
7502 praedicator et apostolus, doctor gentium in fide et
7503 veritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p7">
7504 <b>I answer that,</b> On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have
7505 one passive intellect in common, as stated above (
7506 <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause
7507 another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which
7508 he
7509 has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension.
7510 This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known:
7511 for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect,
7512 and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above
7513 (
7514 <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>).
7515 </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p8"> Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning,
7516 through the participation of separate forms, as stated above (
7517 <a href="#FP_Q84_A3" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[84], AA[3]</a>,4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it
7518 knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider
7519 what he
7520 knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose
7521 (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved
7522 above (
7523 <a href="#FP_Q79_A2" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[79], A[2]</a>;
7524 <a href="#FP_Q84_A3" id="FP_Q117_A1-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[84], A[3]</a>) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima
7525 iii, 4).
7526 </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p9"> We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing
7527 him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of
7528 effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused
7529 to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes
7530 from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical
7531 art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things
7532 must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection
7533 of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not
7534 as
7535 principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle,
7536 by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing
7537 the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended
7538 end.
7539 </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p10"> Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research;
7540 and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle
7541 of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are
7542 naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal
7543 principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own
7544 research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches,
7545 leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what
7546 the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): "All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge."
7547 </p><p id="FP_Q117_A1-p11"> Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing
7548 to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he
7549 may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous
7550 knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or
7551 something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly,
7552 by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above
7553 (
7554 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q106_A1" id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[106], A[1]</a>;
7555 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q111_A1" id="FP_Q117_A1-p11.2" shape="rect">Q[111], A[1]</a>) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes
7556 to the disciple the order of principles to
7557 conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles.
7558 Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that "a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge." In this way a demonstrator
7559 causes his hearer to know.
7560 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 co."><a name="33323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33323] Iª q. 117 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7561 quod circa hoc diversae fuerunt opiniones. Averroes enim, in
7562 Comment. III de anima, posuit unum intellectum possibilem esse
7563 omnium hominum, ut supra dictum est. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod
7564 eaedem species intelligibiles sint omnium hominum. Et secundum hoc,
7565 ponit quod unus homo per doctrinam non causat aliam scientiam in
7566 altero ab ea quam ipse habet; sed communicat ei eandem scientiam
7567 quam ipse habet, per hoc quod movet eum ad ordinandum phantasmata
7568 in anima sua, ad hoc quod sint disposita convenienter ad
7569 intelligibilem apprehensionem. Quae quidem opinio quantum ad hoc
7570 vera est, quod est eadem scientia in discipulo et magistro, si
7571 consideretur identitas secundum unitatem rei scitae, eadem enim rei
7572 veritas est quam cognoscit et discipulus et magister. Sed quantum
7573 ad hoc quod ponit esse unum intellectum possibilem omnium hominum,
7574 et easdem species intelligibiles, differentes solum secundum
7575 diversa phantasmata; falsa est eius opinio, ut supra habitum est.
7576 Alia est opinio Platonicorum, qui posuerunt quod scientia inest a
7577 principio animabus nostris per participationem formarum
7578 separatarum, sicut supra habitum est; sed anima ex unione corporis
7579 impeditur ne possit considerare libere ea quorum scientiam habet.
7580 Et secundum hoc, discipulus a magistro non acquirit scientiam de
7581 novo, sed ab eo excitatur ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam
7582 habet; ut sic addiscere nihil aliud sit quam reminisci. Sicut etiam
7583 ponebant quod agentia naturalia solummodo disponunt ad susceptionem
7584 formarum, quas acquirit materia corporalis per participationem
7585 specierum separatarum. Sed contra hoc supra ostensum est quod
7586 intellectus possibilis animae humanae est in potentia pura ad
7587 intelligibilia, secundum quod Aristoteles dicit in III de anima. Et
7588 ideo aliter dicendum est, quod docens causat scientiam in
7589 addiscente, reducendo ipsum de potentia in actum, sicut dicitur in
7590 VIII Physic. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod effectuum
7591 qui sunt ab exteriori principio, aliquis est ab exteriori principio
7592 tantum; sicut forma domus causatur in materia solum ab arte.
7593 Aliquis autem effectus est quandoque quidem ab exteriori principio,
7594 quandoque autem ab interiori; sicut sanitas causatur in infirmo
7595 quandoque ab exteriori principio, scilicet ab arte medicinae;
7596 quandoque autem ab interiori principio ut cum aliquis sanatur per
7597 virtutem naturae. Et in talibus effectibus sunt duo attendenda.
7598 Primo quidem, quod ars imitatur naturam in sua operatione, sicut
7599 enim natura sanat infirmum alterando, digerendo, et expellendo
7600 materiam quae causat morbum, ita et ars. Secundo attendendum est,
7601 quod principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operatur sicut
7602 principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est
7603 principium interius, confortando ipsum, et ministrando ei
7604 instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum,
7605 sicut medicus confortat naturam, et adhibet ei cibos et medicinas,
7606 quibus natura utatur ad finem intentum. Scientia autem acquiritur
7607 in homine et ab interiori principio, ut patet in eo qui per
7608 inventionem propriam scientiam acquirit; et a principio exteriori,
7609 ut patet in eo qui addiscit. Inest enim unicuique homini quoddam
7610 principium scientiae, scilicet lumen intellectus agentis, per quod
7611 cognoscuntur statim a principio naturaliter quaedam universalia
7612 principia omnium scientiarum. Cum autem aliquis huiusmodi
7613 universalia principia applicat ad aliqua particularia, quorum
7614 memoriam et experimentum per sensum accipit; per inventionem
7615 propriam acquirit scientiam eorum quae nesciebat, ex notis ad
7616 ignota procedens. Unde et quilibet docens, ex his quae discipulus
7617 novit, ducit eum in cognitionem eorum quae ignorabat; secundum quod
7618 dicitur in I Poster., quod <i>omnis doctrina et omnis disciplina ex
7619 praeexistenti fit cognitione</i>. Ducit autem magister discipulum
7620 ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem,
7621 proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus
7622 eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam, puta cum proponit ei aliquas
7623 propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis
7624 discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia
7625 exempla, vel similia, vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus
7626 intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis
7627 ignotae. Alio modo, cum confortat intellectum addiscentis; non
7628 quidem aliqua virtute activa quasi superioris naturae, sicut supra
7629 dictum est de Angelis illuminantibus, quia omnes humani intellectus
7630 sunt unius gradus in ordine naturae; sed inquantum proponit
7631 discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones, qui forte per
7632 seipsum non haberet tantam virtutem collativam, ut ex principiis
7633 posset conclusiones deducere. Et ideo dicitur in I Poster., quod
7634 demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Et per hunc modum ille
7635 qui demonstrat, auditorem scientem facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12">
7636 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the
7637 principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these
7638 are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: "Who healeth all thy diseases" (
7639 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.3" target="asv">Ps. 102:3</a>); so of Him is it written: "He that teacheth man knowledge" (
7640 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.10" target="asv">Ps. 93:10</a>),
7641 inasmuch as "the light of His countenance is signed upon us" (
7642 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A1-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), through which light all things are shown to us.
7643 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33324] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7644 dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, homo docens solummodo exterius
7645 ministerium adhibet, sicut medicus sanans, sed sicut natura
7646 interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen
7647 intellectus est principalis causa scientiae. Utrumque autem horum
7648 est a Deo. Et ideo sicut de Deo dicitur, qui sanat omnes
7649 infirmitates tuas; ita de eo dicitur, qui docet hominem scientiam,
7650 inquantum lumen vultus eius super nos signatur, per quod nobis
7651 omnia ostenduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p13">
7652 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore
7653 knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle
7654 by which one is directed in working.
7655 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33325] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7656 dicendum quod doctor non causat scientiam in discipulo per modum
7657 agentis naturalis, ut Averroes obiicit. Unde non oportet quod
7658 scientia sit qualitas activa, sed est principium quo aliquis
7659 dirigitur in docendo, sicut ars est principium quo aliquis
7660 dirigitur in operando.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p14">
7661 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but
7662 he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs
7663 of which are proposed to him from without.
7664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33326] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7665 dicendum quod magister non causat lumen intelligibile in discipulo,
7666 nec directe species intelligibiles, sed movet discipulum per suam
7667 doctrinam ad hoc, quod ipse per virtutem sui intellectus formet
7668 intelligibiles conceptiones, quarum signa sibi proponit
7669 exterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A1-p15">
7670 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail
7671 and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his
7672 own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.
7673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33327] Iª q. 117 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
7674 dicendum quod signa quae magister discipulo proponit, sunt rerum
7675 notarum in universali, et sub quadam confusione; sed ignotarum in
7676 particulari, et sub quadam distinctione. Et ideo cum quisque per
7677 seipsum scientiam acquirit, non potest dici docere seipsum, vel
7678 esse sui ipsius magister, quia non praeexistit in eo scientia
7679 completa, qualis requiritur in magistro.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A2-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 2. Whether man can teach the angels?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2">
7680 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (
7681 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.10" target="asv">Eph. 3:10</a>): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the
7682 Church." But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.
7683 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33328] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
7684 proceditur. Videtur quod homines possint docere Angelos. Dicit enim
7685 apostolus, ad Ephes. III, <i>ut innotescat principibus et
7686 potestatibus in caelestibus per Ecclesiam multiformis sapientia
7687 Dei</i>. Sed Ecclesia est congregatio hominum fidelium. Ergo
7688 Angelis per homines aliqua innotescunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3">
7689 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior
7690 angels, as stated above (
7691 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q116_A1" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[116], A[1]</a>;
7692 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q112_A3" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.2" shape="rect">Q[112], A[3]</a>). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God; as appears principally of the apostles
7693 from
7694 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.1" target="asv"> Heb. 1:1,2</a>: "Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son." Therefore
7695 some men have been able to teach the angels.
7696 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33329] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7697 Angeli superiores, qui immediate de divinis a Deo illuminantur,
7698 inferiores Angelos instruere possunt, ut supra dictum est. Sed
7699 aliqui homines immediate de divinis per Dei verbum sunt instructi;
7700 sicut maxime patet de apostolis, secundum illud ad Heb. I,
7701 <i>novissime, diebus istis, locutus est nobis in filio</i>. Ergo
7702 aliqui homines aliquos Angelos docere potuerunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p4">
7703 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are
7704 taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior
7705 angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.
7706 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33330] Iª q. 117 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7707 inferiores Angeli a superioribus instruuntur. Sed quidam homines
7708 superiores sunt aliquibus Angelis, cum ad supremos ordines
7709 Angelorum aliqui homines assumantur, ut Gregorius dicit in quadam
7710 homilia. Ergo aliqui inferiores Angeli per aliquos homines de
7711 divinis instrui possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5">
7712 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them;
7713 but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same
7714 way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from
7715 Our Lord's words (
7716 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.11" target="asv">Mat. 11:11</a>): "There hath not risen among them
7717 that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he."
7718 Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels
7719 the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.
7720 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33331] Iª q. 117 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
7721 quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod omnes divinae
7722 illuminationes perferuntur ad homines mediantibus Angelis. Non ergo
7723 Angeli instruuntur per homines de divinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p6">
7724 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: "To me, the least
7725 of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery
7726 which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities
7727 and powers in the heavenly places---that is, through the Church." As
7728 though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities
7729 and powers who knew it "from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection
7730 this Church composed of men will be gathered together."
7731 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 co."><a name="33332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33332] Iª q. 117 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7732 quod, sicut supra habitum est, inferiores Angeli loqui quidem
7733 possunt superioribus Angelis, manifestando eis suas cogitationes;
7734 sed de rebus divinis superiores ab inferioribus nunquam
7735 illuminantur. Manifestum est autem quod eo modo quo inferiores
7736 Angeli superioribus subduntur, supremi homines subduntur etiam
7737 infimis Angelorum. Quod patet per id quod dominus dicit, Matth. XI,
7738 <i>inter natos mulierum non surrexit maior Ioanne Baptista; sed qui
7739 minor est in regno caelorum, maior est illo</i>. Sic igitur de
7740 rebus divinis ab hominibus Angeli nunquam illuminantur.
7741 Cogitationes tamen suorum cordium homines Angelis per modum
7742 locutionis manifestare possunt, quia secreta cordium scire solius
7743 Dei est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p7"> It can also be explained otherwise that "what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when
7744 it takes place and is made public," as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and
7745 the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were
7746 hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)---that from
7747 the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles,
7748 the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which
7749 mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.
7750 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33333] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7751 dicendum quod Augustinus, V super Gen. ad Litt., sic exponit illam
7752 apostoli auctoritatem. Praemiserat enim apostolus, <i>mihi, omnium
7753 sanctorum minimo, data est gratia haec, illuminare omnes quae sit
7754 dispensatio sacramenti absconditi a saeculis in Deo. Ita dico
7755 absconditi, ut tamen innotesceret principibus et potestatibus in
7756 caelestibus, per Ecclesiam scilicet, multiformis sapientia Dei</i>.
7757 Quasi dicat, ita hoc sacramentum erat absconditum hominibus, ut
7758 tamen Ecclesiae caelesti, quae continetur in principibus et
7759 potestatibus, hoc sacramentum notum esset <i>a saeculis, non ante
7760 saecula, quia ibi primitus Ecclesia fuit, quo post resurrectionem
7761 et ista Ecclesia hominum congreganda est</i>. Potest tamen et
7762 aliter dici, quod <i>illud quod absconditum est, non tantum in Deo
7763 innotescit Angelis, verum etiam hic eis apparet, cum efficitur
7764 atque propalatur</i>, ut Augustinus ibidem subdit. Et sic dum per
7765 apostolos impleta sunt Christi et Ecclesiae mysteria, Angelis
7766 aliqua apparuerunt de huiusmodi mysteriis, quae ante erant eis
7767 occulta. Et per hunc modum potest intelligi quod Hieronymus dicit,
7768 quod, apostolis praedicantibus, Angeli aliqua mysteria cognoverunt,
7769 quia scilicet per praedicationem apostolorum huiusmodi mysteria
7770 explebantur in rebus ipsis, sicut praedicante Paulo convertebantur
7771 gentes; de quo apostolus ibi loquitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p8">
7772 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in
7773 His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.
7774 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33334] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7775 dicendum quod apostoli instruebantur immediate a verbo Dei, non
7776 secundum eius divinitatem, sed inquantum eius humanitas loquebatur.
7777 Unde ratio non sequitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A2-p9">
7778 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such
7779 great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might
7780 say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.
7781 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33335] Iª q. 117 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7782 dicendum quod aliqui homines, etiam in statu viae, sunt maiores
7783 aliquibus Angelis, non quidem actu, sed virtute; inquantum scilicet
7784 habent caritatem tantae virtutis, ut possint mereri maiorem
7785 beatitudinis gradum quam quidam Angeli habeant. Sicut si dicamus
7786 semen alicuius magnae arboris esse maius virtute quam aliquam
7787 parvam arborem, cum tamen multo minus sit in actu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A3-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 3. Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p2">
7788 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work
7789 miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his
7790 reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira." But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal
7791 matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.
7792 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33336] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
7793 proceditur. Videtur quod homo per virtutem animae possit corporalem
7794 materiam immutare. Dicit enim Gregorius, II Dialog., quod <i>sancti
7795 miracula aliquando ex prece faciunt, aliquando ex potestate, sicut
7796 Petrus, qui Tabitham mortuam orando suscitavit, Ananiam et Saphiram
7797 mentientes morti increpando tradidit</i>. Sed in operatione
7798 miraculorum fit aliqua immutatio materiae corporalis. Ergo homines
7799 virtute suae animae possunt materiam corporalem immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3">
7800 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on these words (
7801 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q117_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.1" target="asv">Gal. 3:1</a>): "Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?" the gloss says that "some have blazing eyes, who by a single
7802 look bewitch others, especially children." But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter.
7803 Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.
7804 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33337] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7805 super illud ad Gal. III, <i>quis vos fascinavit veritati non
7806 obedire?</i> Dicit Glossa quod <i>quidam habent</i> oculos urentes,
7807 qui solo aspectu inficiunt alios, et maxime pueros. Sed hoc non
7808 esset, nisi virtus animae posset materiam corporalem immutare. Ergo
7809 homo per virtutem suae animae potest materiam corporalem
7810 immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p4">
7811 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is
7812 changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on
7813 sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.
7814 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33338] Iª q. 117 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7815 corpus humanum est nobilius quam alia inferiora corpora. Sed per
7816 apprehensionem animae humanae immutatur corpus humanum ad calorem
7817 et frigus, ut patet in irascentibus et timentibus; et quandoque
7818 etiam haec immutatio pervenit usque ad aegritudinem et mortem. Ergo
7819 multo magis anima hominis potest sua virtute materiam corporalem
7820 immutare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p5">
7821 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will."
7822 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33339] Iª q. 117 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
7823 quod dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin., quod <i>materia corporalis
7824 soli Deo obedit ad nutum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6">
7825 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
7826 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or
7827 by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels
7828 also we have stated (
7829 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal
7830 agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter,
7831 except by means of bodies.
7832 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 co."><a name="33340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33340] Iª q. 117 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7833 quod, sicut supra dictum est materia corporalis non immutatur ad
7834 formam, nisi vel ab agente aliquo composito ex materia et forma;
7835 vel ab ipso Deo, in quo virtualiter et materia et forma
7836 praeexistit, sicut in primordiali causa utriusque. Unde et de
7837 Angelis supra dictum est quod materiam corporalem immutare non
7838 possunt naturali virtute, nisi applicando corporalia agentia ad
7839 effectus aliquos producendos. Multo igitur minus anima sua virtute
7840 naturali potest immutare materiam corporalem, nisi mediantibus
7841 aliquibus corporibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p7">
7842 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same
7843 place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says---what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"
7844 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33341] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7845 dicendum quod sancti dicuntur miracula facere ex potestate gratiae,
7846 non naturae. Quod patet per illud quod Gregorius ibidem dicit,
7847 <i>qui filii Dei ex potestate sunt, ut dicit Ioannes, quid mirum si
7848 signa facere ex potestate valeant?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p8">
7849 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance
7850 rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This
7851 he says is the cause of the "evil eye."
7852 </p><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p9"> But it has been shown above (
7853 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A2" id="FP_Q117_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[2]</a>) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say,
7854 that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits
7855 takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact
7856 with them to a certain distance: in the
7857 same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.;
7858 [*De Insomniis ii]).
7859 </p><p id="FP_Q117_A3-p10"> Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation,
7860 the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is
7861 also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may
7862 have some compact with them.
7863 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33342] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7864 dicendum quod fascinationis causam assignavit Avicenna ex hoc, quod
7865 materia corporalis nata est obedire spirituali substantiae magis
7866 quam contrariis agentibus in natura. Et ideo quando anima fuerit
7867 fortis in sua imaginatione, corporalis materia immutatur secundum
7868 eam. Et hanc dicit esse causam oculi fascinantis. Sed supra
7869 ostensum est quod materia corporalis non obedit substantiae
7870 spirituali ad nutum, nisi soli creatori. Et ideo melius dicendum
7871 est, quod ex forti imaginatione animae immutantur spiritus corporis
7872 coniuncti. Quae quidem immutatio spirituum maxime fit in oculis, ad
7873 quos subtiliores spiritus perveniunt. Oculi autem inficiunt aerem
7874 continuum usque ad determinatum spatium, per quem modum specula, si
7875 fuerint nova et pura, contrahunt quandam impuritatem ex aspectu
7876 mulieris menstruatae, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de Somn. et
7877 Vig. Sic igitur cum aliqua anima fuerit vehementer commota ad
7878 malitiam, sicut maxime in vetulabus contingit, efficitur secundum
7879 modum praedictum aspectus eius venenosus et noxius, et maxime
7880 pueris, qui habent corpus tenerum, et de facili receptivum
7881 impressionis. Possibile est etiam quod ex Dei permissione, vel
7882 etiam ex aliquo facto occulto, cooperetur ad hoc malignitas
7883 Daemonum, cum quibus vetulae sortilegae aliquod foedus habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A3-p11">
7884 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated
7885 above (
7886 <a href="#FP_Q81_A3" id="FP_Q117_A3-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[81], A[3]</a>), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs
7887 be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change
7888 in exterior bodies, except by means of a
7889 change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).
7890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33343] Iª q. 117 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
7891 dicendum quod anima corpori humano unitur ut forma, et appetitus
7892 sensitivus, qui obedit aliqualiter rationi, ut supra dictum est,
7893 est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et ideo oportet quod ad
7894 apprehensionem animae humanae, commoveatur appetitus sensitivus cum
7895 aliqua operatione corporali. Ad exteriora vero corpora immutanda
7896 apprehensio animae humanae non sufficit, nisi mediante immutatione
7897 proprii corporis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q117_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q117_A4-p0.1">Q. 117. A. 4. Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p2">
7898 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance
7899 as to local motion, as stated above (
7900 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A5" id="FP_Q117_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[110], A[5]</a>). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.
7901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="33344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33344] Iª q. 117 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
7902 proceditur. Videtur quod anima hominis separata possit corpora
7903 saltem localiter movere. Substantiae enim spirituali naturaliter
7904 obedit corpus ad motum localem, ut supra dictum est. Sed anima
7905 separata est substantia spiritualis. Ergo suo imperio potest
7906 exteriora corpora movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p3">
7907 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained
7908 power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not
7909 have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.
7910 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="33345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33345] Iª q. 117 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
7911 itinerario Clementis dicitur, narrante Niceta ad Petrum, quod Simon
7912 magus per magicas artes pueri a se interfecti animam retinebat, per
7913 quam magicas operationes efficiebat. Sed hoc esse non potuisset
7914 sine aliqua corporum transmutatione, ad minus locali. Ergo anima
7915 separata habet virtutem localiter movendi corpora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p4">
7916 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.
7917 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 s. c."><a name="33346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33346] Iª q. 117 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
7918 quod philosophus dicit, in libro de anima quod anima non potest
7919 movere quodcumque corpus, sed solummodo proprium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p5">
7920 <b>I answer that,</b> The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the
7921 body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey
7922 the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the
7923 limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though,
7924 by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.
7925 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 co."><a name="33347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33347] Iª q. 117 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7926 quod anima separata sua naturali virtute non potest movere aliquod
7927 corpus. Manifestum est enim quod, cum anima est corpori unita, non
7928 movet corpus nisi vivificatum, unde si aliquod membrum corporis
7929 mortificetur, non obedit animae ad motum localem. Manifestum est
7930 autem quod ab anima separata nullum corpus vivificatur. Unde nullum
7931 corpus obedit ei ad motum localem, quantum est ex virtute suae
7932 naturae, supra quam potest aliquid ei conferri virtute divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p6">
7933 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally
7934 unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance
7935 is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only
7936 one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower
7937 heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it
7938 is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.
7939 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="33348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33348] Iª q. 117 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
7940 dicendum quod substantiae quaedam spirituales sunt, quarum virtutes
7941 non determinantur ad aliqua corpora, sicut sunt Angeli, qui sunt
7942 naturaliter a corporibus absoluti, et ideo diversa corpora eis
7943 possunt obedire ad motum. Si tamen alicuius substantiae separatae
7944 virtus motiva determinetur naturaliter ad movendum aliquod corpus,
7945 non poterit illa substantia movere aliquod corpus maius, sed minus,
7946 sicut, secundum philosophos, motor inferioris caeli non posset
7947 movere caelum superius. Unde cum anima secundum suam naturam
7948 determinetur ad movendum corpus cuius est forma, nullum aliud
7949 corpus sua naturali virtute movere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q117_A4-p7">
7950 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the
7951 dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some
7952 demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.
7953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 117 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="33349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33349] Iª q. 117 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7954 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus X de Civ. Dei, et
7955 Chrysostomus super Matth., frequenter Daemones simulant se esse
7956 animas mortuorum, ad confirmandum gentilium errorem, qui hoc
7957 credebant. Et ideo credibile est quod Simon magus illudebatur ab
7958 aliquo Daemone, qui simulabat se esse animam pueri quem ipse
7959 occiderat.</p></div></div></div></div>
7960 <div id="FP_Q118" class="div3">
7961 <h3 id="FP_Q118-p0.1">Q. 118. OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
7962 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
7963 <p id="FP_Q118-p2"> We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.</p><p id="FP_Q118-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q118-p4"><a href="#FP_Q118_A1"> (1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</a></p><p id="FP_Q118-p5"><a href="#FP_Q118_A2"> (2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?</a></p><p id="FP_Q118-p6"><a href="#FP_Q118_A3"> (3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?</a></p>
7964 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 pr."><a name="33350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33350]
7965 Iª q. 118 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
7966 traductione hominis ex homine. Et primo, quantum ad animam;
7967 secundo, quantum ad corpus. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo,
7968 utrum anima sensitiva traducatur cum semine. Secundo, utrum anima
7969 intellectiva. Tertio, utrum omnes animae fuerint simul creatae.</p></div></div></div>
7970 <div id="FP_Q118_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A1-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 1. Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p2">
7971 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance,
7972 not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing
7973 is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since
7974 it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist
7975 not by generation but by creation.
7976 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33351] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
7977 proceditur. Videtur quod anima sensitiva non traducatur cum semine,
7978 sed sit per creationem a Deo. Omnis enim substantia perfecta quae
7979 non est composita ex materia et forma, si esse incipiat, hoc non
7980 est per generationem, sed per creationem, quia nihil generatur nisi
7981 ex materia. Sed anima sensitiva est substantia perfecta, alioquin
7982 non posset movere corpus, et cum sit forma corporis, non est ex
7983 materia et forma composita. Ergo non incipit esse per generationem,
7984 sed per creationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p3">
7985 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the
7986 vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive
7987 soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power.
7988 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33352] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7989 principium generationis in rebus viventibus est per potentiam
7990 generativam; quae, cum numeretur inter vires animae vegetabilis,
7991 est infra animam sensitivam. Nihil autem agit ultra suam speciem.
7992 Ergo anima sensitiva non potest causari per vim generativam
7993 animalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p4">
7994 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But
7995 neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere
7996 than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle
7997 of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the
7998 sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.
7999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33353] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8000 generans generat sibi simile, et sic oportet quod forma generati
8001 sit actu in causa generationis. Sed anima sensitiva non est actu in
8002 semine, nec ipsa nec aliqua pars eius, quia nulla pars animae
8003 sensitivae est nisi in aliqua parte corporis; in semine autem non
8004 est aliqua corporis particula, quia nulla particula corporis est
8005 quae non fiat ex semine, et per virtutem seminis. Ergo anima
8006 sensitiva non causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p5">
8007 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the
8008 animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul
8009 of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made:
8010 or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above
8011 (
8012 <a href="#FP_Q76_A4" id="FP_Q118_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[4]</a>) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does
8013 not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore
8014 the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.
8015 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33354] Iª q. 118 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
8016 in semine est aliquod principium activum animae sensitivae, aut
8017 illud principium manet, generato iam animali; aut non manet. Sed
8018 manere non potest. Quia vel esset idem cum anima sensitiva animalis
8019 generati, et hoc est impossibile, quia sic esset idem generans et
8020 generatum, faciens et factum. Vel esset aliquid aliud, et hoc etiam
8021 est impossibile, quia supra ostensum est quod in uno animali non
8022 est nisi unum principium formale, quod est una anima. Si autem non
8023 manet, hoc etiam videtur impossibile, quia sic aliquod agens ageret
8024 ad corruptionem sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Non ergo anima
8025 sensitiva potest generari ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6">
8026 <b>On the contrary,</b> The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced
8027 from these elements---for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power,
8028 according to
8029 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20</a>: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated
8030 are produced by the seminal power.
8031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33355] Iª q. 118 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ita
8032 se habet virtus quae est in semine, ad animalia quae ex semine
8033 generantur, sicut se habet virtus quae est in elementis mundi, ad
8034 animalia quae ex elementis mundi producuntur, sicut quae ex
8035 putrefactione generantur. Sed in huiusmodi animalibus animae
8036 producuntur ex virtute quae est in elementis; secundum illud Gen.
8037 I, <i>producant aquae reptile animae viventis</i>. Ergo et
8038 animalium quae generantur ex semine, animae producuntur ex virtute
8039 quae est in semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p7">
8040 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God (
8041 <a href="FP_viii.html#FP_Q65_A4" id="FP_Q118_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[65], A[4]</a>). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having
8042 being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made
8043 except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.
8044 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p8"> But this principle is false---namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above
8045 (
8046 <a href="#FP_Q75_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[3]</a>): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to
8047 existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist
8048 forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.
8049 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p9"> Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that
8050 both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce
8051 the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.
8052 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A1-p10"> Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance
8053 to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their
8054 like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful,
8055 act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium---in the work of
8056 nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium---in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant
8057 derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from
8058 the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent,
8059 so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some
8060 seminal power derived therefrom.
8061 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 co."><a name="33356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33356] Iª q. 118 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
8062 quod quidam posuerunt animas sensitivas animalium a Deo creari.
8063 Quae quidem positio conveniens esset, si anima sensitiva esset res
8064 subsistens, habens per se esse et operationem. Sic enim, sicut per
8065 se haberet esse et operationem, ita per se deberetur ei fieri. Et
8066 cum res simplex et subsistens non possit fieri nisi per creationem,
8067 sequeretur quod anima sensitiva procederet in esse per creationem.
8068 Sed ista radix est falsa, scilicet quod anima sensitiva per se
8069 habeat esse et operationem, ut ex superioribus patet, non enim
8070 corrumperetur, corrupto corpore. Et ideo, cum non sit forma
8071 subsistens, habet se in essendo ad modum aliarum formarum
8072 corporalium, quibus per se non debetur esse, sed esse dicuntur
8073 inquantum composita subsistentia per eas sunt. Unde et ipsis
8074 compositis debetur fieri. Et quia generans est simile generato,
8075 necesse est quod naturaliter tam anima sensitiva, quam aliae
8076 huiusmodi formae, producantur in esse ab aliquibus corporalibus
8077 agentibus transmutantibus materiam de potentia in actum, per
8078 aliquam virtutem corpoream quae est in eis. Quanto autem aliquod
8079 agens est potentius, tanto potest suam actionem diffundere ad magis
8080 distans, sicut quanto aliquod corpus est magis calidum, tanto ad
8081 remotius calefactionem producit. Corpora igitur non viventia, quae
8082 sunt inferiora naturae ordine, generant quidem sibi simile, non per
8083 aliquod medium, sed per seipsa; sicut ignis per seipsum generat
8084 ignem. Sed corpora viventia, tanquam potentiora, agunt ad
8085 generandum sibi simile et sine medio, et per medium. Sine medio
8086 quidem, in opere nutritionis, in quo caro generat carnem, cum medio
8087 vero, in actu generationis, quia ex anima generantis derivatur
8088 quaedam virtus activa ad ipsum semen animalis vel plantae, sicut et
8089 a principali agente derivatur quaedam vis motiva ad instrumentum.
8090 Et sicut non refert dicere quod aliquid moveatur ab instrumento,
8091 vel a principali agente; ita non refert dicere quod anima generati
8092 causetur ab anima generantis, vel a virtute derivata ab ipsa, quae
8093 est in semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p11">
8094 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough (
8095 <a href="FP_ii.html#FP_Q25_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[25], A[3]</a>) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.
8096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33357] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
8097 dicendum quod anima sensitiva non est substantia perfecta per se
8098 subsistens. Et de hoc supra dictum est, nec oportet hic
8099 iterare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p12">
8100 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the
8101 generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to
8102 so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.
8103 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33358] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8104 dicendum quod virtus generativa non generat solum in virtute
8105 propria, sed in virtute totius animae, cuius est potentia. Et ideo
8106 virtus generativa plantae generat plantam; virtus vero generativa
8107 animalis generat animal. Quanto enim anima fuerit perfectior, tanto
8108 virtus eius generativa ordinatur ad perfectiorem effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p13">
8109 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement
8110 of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or
8111 the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ;
8112 but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is
8113 attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies,
8114 by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above (
8115 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q115_A3" id="FP_Q118_A1-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[115], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been
8116 said that "man and the sun generate man." Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's
8117 power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).
8118 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33359] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8119 dicendum quod illa vis activa quae est in semine, ex anima
8120 generantis derivata, est quasi quaedam motio ipsius animae
8121 generantis, nec est anima, aut pars animae, nisi in virtute; sicut
8122 in serra vel securi non est forma lecti, sed motio quaedam ad talem
8123 formam. Et ideo non oportet quod ista vis activa habeat aliquod
8124 organum in actu; sed fundatur in ipso spiritu incluso in semine,
8125 quod est spumosum, ut attestatur eius albedo. In quo etiam spiritu
8126 est quidam calor ex virtute caelestium corporum, quorum etiam
8127 virtute agentia inferiora agunt ad speciem, ut supra dictum est. Et
8128 quia in huiusmodi spiritu concurrit virtus animae cum virtute
8129 caelesti, dicitur quod homo generat hominem, et sol. Calidum autem
8130 elementare se habet instrumentaliter ad virtutem animae, sicut
8131 etiam ad virtutem nutritivam, ut dicitur in II de anima.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A1-p14">
8132 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener.
8133 Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very
8134 beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it
8135 begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore
8136 is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as
8137 though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would
8138 be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after
8139 the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of
8140 the
8141 thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body,
8142 by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved
8143 and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal
8144 but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.
8145 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33360] Iª q. 118 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
8146 dicendum quod in animalibus perfectis, quae generantur ex coitu,
8147 virtus activa est in semine maris, secundum philosophum in libro de
8148 Generat. Animal.; materia autem foetus est illud quod ministratur a
8149 femina. In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima
8150 vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum
8151 primum, sicut anima sensitiva est in dormientibus. Cum autem
8152 incipit attrahere alimentum, tunc iam actu operatur. Huiusmodi
8153 igitur materia transmutatur a virtute quae est in semine maris,
8154 quousque perducatur in actum animae sensitivae, non ita quod
8155 ipsamet vis quae erat in semine, fiat anima sensitiva; quia sic
8156 idem esset generans et generatum; et hoc magis esset simile
8157 nutritioni et augmento, quam generationi, ut philosophus dicit.
8158 Postquam autem per virtutem principii activi quod erat in semine,
8159 producta est anima sensitiva in generato quantum ad aliquam partem
8160 eius principalem, tunc iam illa anima sensitiva prolis incipit
8161 operari ad complementum proprii corporis, per modum nutritionis et
8162 augmenti. Virtus autem activa quae erat in semine, esse desinit,
8163 dissoluto semine, et evanescente spiritu qui inerat. Nec hoc est
8164 inconveniens, quia vis ista non est principale agens, sed
8165 instrumentale; motio autem instrumenti cessat, effectu iam producto
8166 in esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q118_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A2-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 2. Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2">
8167 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (
8168 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.46.26" target="asv">Gn. 46:26</a>): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six." But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from
8169 the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.
8170 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="33361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33361] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
8171 proceditur. Videtur quod anima intellectiva causetur ex semine.
8172 Dicitur enim Gen. XLVI, <i>cunctae animae quae egressae sunt de
8173 femore Iacob, sexaginta sex</i>. Sed nihil egreditur de femore
8174 hominis, nisi inquantum causatur ex semine. Ergo anima intellectiva
8175 causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p3">
8176 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as shown above (
8177 <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q118_A2-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[3]</a>), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated
8178 from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man
8179 are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual
8180 soul is produced from the
8181 semen.
8182 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="33362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33362] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8183 sicut supra ostensum est, in homine est una et eadem anima secundum
8184 substantiam, intellectiva, sensitiva et nutritiva. Sed anima
8185 sensitiva in homine generatur ex semine, sicut in aliis animalibus,
8186 unde et philosophus dicit in libro de Generat. Animal., quod non
8187 simul fit animal et homo, sed prius fit animal habens animam
8188 sensitivam. Ergo et anima intellectiva causatur ex semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p4">
8189 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the
8190 form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced
8191 by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.
8192 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="33363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33363] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum
8193 et idem agens, est cuius actio terminatur ad formam, et materiam,
8194 alioquin ex forma et materia non fieret unum simpliciter. Sed anima
8195 intellectiva est forma corporis humani, quod formatur per virtutem
8196 seminis. Ergo et anima intellectiva per virtutem seminis
8197 causatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p5">
8198 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational
8199 soul is from the begetter.
8200 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="33364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33364] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, homo
8201 generat sibi simile secundum speciem. Sed species humana
8202 constituitur per animam rationalem. Ergo anima rationalis est a
8203 generante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p6">
8204 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in
8205 the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created
8206 by God.
8207 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="33365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33365] Iª q. 118 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
8208 inconveniens est dicere quod Deus cooperetur peccantibus. Sed si
8209 animae rationales crearentur a Deo, Deus interdum cooperaretur
8210 adulteris, de quorum illicito coitu proles interdum generatur. Non
8211 ergo animae rationales creantur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p7">
8212 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that "the rational soul is not engendered by coition."
8213 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 s. c."><a name="33366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33366] Iª q. 118 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
8214 quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod <i>animae rationales
8215 non seminantur per coitum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p8">
8216 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now
8217 it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no
8218 part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.
8219 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p9"> Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the
8220 body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect.
8221 Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De
8222 Gener. Animal. ii, 3): "It follows that the intellect alone comes from without."
8223 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p10"> Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above (
8224 <a href="#FP_Q75_A2" id="FP_Q118_A2-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[2]</a>): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through
8225 generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing
8226 else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with
8227 the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.
8228 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 co."><a name="33367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33367] Iª q. 118 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
8229 quod impossibile est virtutem activam quae est in materia,
8230 extendere suam actionem ad producendum immaterialem effectum.
8231 Manifestum est autem quod principium intellectivum in homine est
8232 principium transcendens materiam, habet enim operationem in qua non
8233 communicat corpus. Et ideo impossibile est quod virtus quae est in
8234 semine, sit productiva intellectivi principii. Similiter etiam quia
8235 virtus quae est in semine agit in virtute animae generantis,
8236 secundum quod anima generantis est actus corporis, utens ipso
8237 corpore in sua operatione. In operatione autem intellectus non
8238 communicat corpus. Unde virtus intellectivi principii, prout
8239 intellectivum est, non potest ad semen pervenire. Et ideo
8240 philosophus, in libro de Generat. Animal., dicit, <i>relinquitur
8241 intellectus solus de foris advenire</i>. Similiter etiam anima
8242 intellectiva, cum habeat operationem sine corpore, est subsistens,
8243 ut supra habitum est, et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri. Et cum sit
8244 immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed
8245 solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo animam intellectivam a
8246 generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non
8247 subsistentem; et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. Et ideo
8248 haereticum est dicere quod anima intellectiva traducatur cum
8249 semine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p11">
8250 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.
8251 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="33368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33368] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
8252 dicendum quod in auctoritate illa ponitur per synecdochen pars pro
8253 toto, idest anima pro toto homine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p12">
8254 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from
8255 the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment,
8256 and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive
8257 soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.
8258 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p13"> Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes;
8259 and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one
8260 would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above (
8261 <a href="#FP_Q76_A3" id="FP_Q118_A2-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[3]</a>).
8262 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p14"> Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal
8263 power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power,
8264 but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says
8265 that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is
8266 susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity
8267 constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species.
8268 Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from
8269 the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an
8270 animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the
8271 beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further
8272 perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called.
8273 Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be
8274 essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those
8275 who held the existence of several souls in the body---or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul:
8276 and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.
8277 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p15"> There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has
8278 been disproved above (
8279 <a href="#FP_Q76_A2" id="FP_Q118_A2-p15.1" shape="rect">Q[76], A[2]</a>).
8280 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A2-p16"> We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both
8281 in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening
8282 form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations
8283 and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is
8284 apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created
8285 by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being
8286 corrupted.
8287 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="33369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33369] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8288 dicendum quod aliqui dixerunt quod operationes vitae quae apparent
8289 in embryone, non sunt ab anima eius, sed ab anima matris; vel a
8290 virtute formativa quae est in semine. Quorum utrumque falsum est,
8291 opera enim vitae non possunt esse a principio extrinseco, sicut
8292 sentire, nutriri et augeri. Et ideo dicendum est quod anima
8293 praeexistit in embryone a principio quidem nutritiva, postmodum
8294 autem sensitiva, et tandem intellectiva. Dicunt ergo quidam quod
8295 supra animam vegetabilem quae primo inerat, supervenit alia anima,
8296 quae est sensitiva; et supra illam iterum alia, quae est
8297 intellectiva. Et sic sunt in homine tres animae, quarum una est in
8298 potentia ad aliam. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo alii dicunt
8299 quod illa eadem anima quae primo fuit vegetativa tantum, postmodum,
8300 per actionem virtutis quae est in semine, perducitur ad hoc quod
8301 fiat etiam sensitiva; et tandem perducitur ad hoc ut ipsa eadem
8302 fiat intellectiva, non quidem per virtutem activam seminis, sed per
8303 virtutem superioris agentis, scilicet Dei deforis illustrantis. Et
8304 propter hoc dicit philosophus quod intellectus venit ab extrinseco.
8305 Sed hoc stare non potest. Primo quidem, quia nulla forma
8306 substantialis recipit magis et minus; sed superadditio maioris
8307 perfectionis facit aliam speciem, sicut additio unitatis facit
8308 aliam speciem in numeris. Non est autem possibile ut una et eadem
8309 forma numero sit diversarum specierum. Secundo, quia sequeretur
8310 quod generatio animalis esset motus continuus, paulatim procedens
8311 de imperfecto ad perfectum; sicut accidit in alteratione. Tertio,
8312 quia sequeretur quod generatio hominis aut animalis non sit
8313 generatio simpliciter, quia subiectum eius esset ens actu. Si enim
8314 a principio in materia prolis est anima vegetabilis, et postmodum
8315 usque ad perfectum paulatim perducitur; erit semper additio
8316 perfectionis sequentis sine corruptione perfectionis praecedentis.
8317 Quod est contra rationem generationis simpliciter. Quarto, quia aut
8318 id quod causatur ex actione Dei, est aliquid subsistens, et ita
8319 oportet quod sit aliud per essentiam a forma praeexistente, quae
8320 non erat subsistens; et sic redibit opinio ponentium plures animas
8321 in corpore. Aut non est aliquid subsistens, sed quaedam perfectio
8322 animae praeexistentis, et sic ex necessitate sequitur quod anima
8323 intellectiva corrumpatur, corrupto corpore; quod est impossibile.
8324 Est autem et alius modus dicendi, secundum eos qui ponunt unum
8325 intellectum in omnibus. Quod supra improbatum est. Et ideo dicendum
8326 est quod, cum generatio unius semper sit corruptio alterius,
8327 necesse est dicere quod tam in homine quam in animalibus aliis,
8328 quando perfectior forma advenit, fit corruptio prioris, ita tamen
8329 quod sequens forma habet quidquid habebat prima, et adhuc amplius.
8330 Et sic per multas generationes et corruptiones pervenitur ad
8331 ultimam formam substantialem, tam in homine quam in aliis
8332 animalibus. Et hoc ad sensum apparet in animalibus ex putrefactione
8333 generatis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod anima intellectiva creatur
8334 a Deo in fine generationis humanae, quae simul est et sensitiva et
8335 nutritiva, corruptis formis praeexistentibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17">
8336 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to
8337 one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior
8338 agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter,
8339 but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been
8340 said above (
8341 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q105_A5" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.1" shape="rect">Q[105], A[5]</a>;
8342 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q110_A1" id="FP_Q118_A2-p17.2" shape="rect">Q[110], A[1]</a>) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders
8343 the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.
8344 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="33370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33370] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8345 dicendum quod ratio illa locum habet in diversis agentibus non
8346 ordinatis ad invicem. Sed si sint multa agentia ordinata, nihil
8347 prohibet virtutem superioris agentis pertingere ad ultimam formam;
8348 virtutes autem inferiorum agentium pertingere solum ad aliquam
8349 materiae dispositionem; sicut virtus seminis disponit materiam,
8350 virtus autem animae dat formam, in generatione animalis. Manifestum
8351 est autem ex praemissis quod tota natura corporalis agit ut
8352 instrumentum spiritualis virtutis; et praecipue Dei. Et ideo nihil
8353 prohibet quin formatio corporis sit ab aliqua virtute corporali,
8354 anima autem intellectiva sit a solo Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p18">
8355 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.
8356 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="33371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33371] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
8357 dicendum quod homo generat sibi simile, inquantum per virtutem
8358 seminis eius disponitur materia ad susceptionem talis formae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A2-p19">
8359 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil;
8360 in this God does not concur.
8361 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="33372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33372] Iª q. 118 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
8362 dicendum quod in actione adulterorum, illud quod est naturae, bonum
8363 est, et huic cooperatur Deus. Quod vero est inordinatae voluptatis,
8364 malum est, et huic Deus non cooperatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q118_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q118_A3-p0.1">Q. 118. A. 3. Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2">
8365 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (
8366 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv">Gn. 2:2</a>): "God rested Him from all His work which He had done." This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore
8367 all souls were created at the same time.
8368 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="33373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33373] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
8369 proceditur. Videtur quod animae humanae fuerint creatae simul a
8370 principio mundi. Dicitur enim Gen. II, <i>requievit Deus ab omni
8371 opere quod patrarat</i>. Hoc autem non esset, si quotidie novas
8372 animas crearet. Ergo omnes animae sunt simul creatae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3">
8373 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created
8374 with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently
8375 at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to
8376 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv"> Gn. 2:2, </a> where it is said that "God ended" all "His work."
8377 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="33374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33374] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad
8378 perfectionem universi maxime pertinent substantiae spirituales. Si
8379 igitur animae simul crearentur cum corporibus, quotidie
8380 innumerabiles spirituales substantiae perfectioni universi
8381 adderentur, et sic universum a principio fuisset imperfectum. Quod
8382 est contra illud quod dicitur Gen. II, <i>Deum omne opus suum
8383 complesse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p4">
8384 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore
8385 it began to exist before the body.
8386 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="33375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33375] Iª q. 118 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
8387 finis rei respondet eius principio. Sed anima intellectiva remanet,
8388 destructo corpore. Ergo incoepit esse ante corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p5">
8389 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that "the soul is created together with the body."
8390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 s. c."><a name="33376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33376] Iª q. 118 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
8391 quod dicitur in libro de Eccles. Dogmat., quod <i>simul anima
8392 creatur cum corpore</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p6">
8393 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is
8394 of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of
8395 men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on
8396 which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would
8397 follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above
8398 (
8399 <a href="#FP_Q75_A4" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[75], A[4]</a>). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding,
8400 as shown above (
8401 <a href="FP_vii.html#FP_Q55_A2" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[55], A[2]</a>;
8402 <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[85], A[1]</a> ): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above (
8403 <a href="#FP_Q84_A6" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7;
8404 <a href="#FP_Q85_A1" id="FP_Q118_A3-p6.5" shape="rect">Q[85], A[1]</a>). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part:
8405 whereas this cannot be said of an angel.
8406 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p7"> Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body,
8407 it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection.
8408 Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without
8409 a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.
8410 </p><p id="FP_Q118_A3-p8"> But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united
8411 to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed
8412 it---this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did
8413 not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not
8414 fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the
8415 world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above
8416 time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance:
8417 since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur---to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the
8418 begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of
8419 some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion
8420 of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable,
8421 we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into
8422 them.
8423 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 co."><a name="33377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33377] Iª q. 118 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
8424 quod quidam posuerunt quod animae intellectivae accidat uniri
8425 corpori, ponentes eam esse eiusdem conditionis cum substantiis
8426 spiritualibus quae corpori non uniuntur. Et ideo posuerunt animas
8427 hominum simul a principio cum Angelis creatas. Sed haec opinio
8428 falsa est. Primo quidem, quantum ad radicem. Si enim accidentaliter
8429 conveniret animae corpori uniri, sequeretur quod homo, qui ex ista
8430 unione constituitur, esset ens per accidens; vel quod anima esset
8431 homo, quod falsum est, ut supra ostensum est. Quod etiam anima
8432 humana non sit eiusdem naturae cum Angelis, ipse diversus modus
8433 intelligendi ostendit, ut supra ostensum est, homo enim intelligit
8434 a sensibus accipiendo, et convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut supra
8435 ostensum est. Et ideo indiget uniri corpori, quo indiget ad
8436 operationem sensitivae partis. Quod de Angelo dici non potest.
8437 Secundo apparet falsitas in ipsa positione. Si enim animae naturale
8438 est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et
8439 sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit
8440 autem conveniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab
8441 his quae sunt praeter naturam, non enim fecit hominem sine manu aut
8442 sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales hominis. Multo igitur minus
8443 fecit animam sine corpore. Si vero aliquis dicat quod non est
8444 naturale animae corpori uniri, oportet inquirere causam quare sint
8445 corporibus unitae. Oportet autem dicere quod aut hoc sit factum ex
8446 eius voluntate; aut ex alia causa. Si ex eius voluntate, videtur
8447 hoc esse inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec voluntas
8448 irrationabilis esset, si non indigeret corpore, et vellet ei uniri,
8449 si enim eo indigeret, naturale esset ei quod corpori uniretur, quia
8450 natura non deficit in necessariis. Secundo, quia nulla ratio esset
8451 quare animae a principio mundi creatae, post tot tempora voluntas
8452 accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. Est enim substantia spiritualis
8453 supra tempus, utpote revolutiones caeli excedens. Tertio quia
8454 videretur a casu esse quod haec anima huic corpori uniretur, cum ad
8455 hoc requiratur concursus duarum voluntatum, scilicet animae
8456 advenientis, et hominis generantis. Si autem praeter voluntatem
8457 ipsius corpori unitur, et praeter eius naturam; oportet quod hoc
8458 sit ex causa violentiam inferente, et sic erit ei poenale et
8459 triste. Quod est secundum errorem Origenis, qui posuit animas
8460 incorporari propter poenam peccati. Unde cum haec omnia sint
8461 inconvenientia, simpliciter confitendum est quod animae non sunt
8462 creatae ante corpora, sed simul creantur cum corporibus
8463 infunduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9">
8464 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (
8465 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.17" target="asv">Jn. 5:17</a>): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed
8466 in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species,
8467 in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.
8468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="33378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33378] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
8469 dicendum quod Deus dicitur cessasse die septimo, non quidem ab omni
8470 opere, cum dicatur Ioan. V, <i>pater meus usque modo operatur</i>;
8471 sed a novis rerum generibus et speciebus condendis, quae in
8472 operibus primis non aliquo modo praeextiterint. Sic enim animae
8473 quae nunc creantur, praeextiterunt secundum similitudinem speciei
8474 in primis operibus, in quibus anima Adae creata fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p10">
8475 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number
8476 of species.
8477 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="33379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33379] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8478 dicendum quod perfectioni universi, quantum ad numerum
8479 individuorum, quotidie potest addi aliquid, non autem quantum ad
8480 numerum specierum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11">
8481 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was
8482 not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (
8483 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.13" target="asv">Wis. 1:13</a>,
8484 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q118_A3-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.16" target="asv">16</a>): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."
8485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 118 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="33380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33380] Iª q. 118 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8486 dicendum quod hoc quod anima remanet sine corpore, contingit per
8487 corporis corruptionem, quae consecuta est ex peccato. Unde non fuit
8488 conveniens quod ab hoc inciperent Dei opera, quia, sicut scriptum
8489 est Sap. I, <i>Deus mortem non fecit, sed impii manibus et verbis
8490 accersierunt eam</i>.</p></div></div></div></div>
8491 <div id="FP_Q119" class="div3">
8492 <h3 id="FP_Q119-p0.1">Q. 119. OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
8493 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
8494 <p id="FP_Q119-p2"> We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q119-p3"><a href="#FP_Q119_A1"> (1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?</a></p><p id="FP_Q119-p4"><a href="#FP_Q119_A2"> (2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?</a></p>
8495 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 pr."><a name="33381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33381]
8496 Iª q. 119 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de
8497 propagatione hominis quantum ad corpus. Et circa hoc quaeruntur
8498 duo. Primo, utrum aliquid de alimento convertatur in veritatem
8499 humanae naturae. Secundo, utrum semen, quod est humanae
8500 generationis principium, sit de superfluo alimenti.</p></div></div></div>
8501 <div id="FP_Q119_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q119_A1-p0.1">Q. 119. A. 1. Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2">
8502 <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (
8503 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q119_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>): "Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy." But what is cast out is not
8504 changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.
8505 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="33382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33382] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
8506 proceditur. Videtur quod nihil de alimento transeat in veritatem
8507 humanae naturae. Dicitur enim Matth. XV, <i>omne quod in os intrat,
8508 in ventrem vadit, et per secessum emittitur</i>. Sed quod
8509 emittitur, non transit in veritatem humanae naturae. Ergo nihil de
8510 alimento in veritatem humanae naturae transit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p3">
8511 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the "species" from flesh belonging to "matter";
8512 and says that the latter "comes and goes." Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food
8513 is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore
8514 the food is not changed into true human nature.
8515 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="33383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33383] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
8516 philosophus, in I de Generat., distinguit carnem secundum speciem,
8517 et secundum materiam; et dicit quod caro secundum materiam advenit
8518 et recedit. Quod autem ex alimento generatur, advenit et recedit.
8519 Ergo id in quod alimentum convertitur, est caro secundum materiam,
8520 non autem caro secundum speciem. Sed hoc pertinet ad veritatem
8521 humanae naturae, quod pertinet ad speciem eius. Ergo alimentum non
8522 transit in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p4">
8523 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "radical humor" seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according
8524 to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true
8525 human nature.
8526 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="33384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33384] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ad
8527 veritatem humanae naturae pertinere videtur humidum radicale; quod
8528 si deperdatur, restitui non potest, ut medici dicunt. Posset autem
8529 restitui, si alimentum converteretur in ipsum humidum. Ergo
8530 nutrimentum non convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p5">
8531 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due
8532 only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.
8533 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="33385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33385] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si
8534 alimentum transiret in veritatem humanae naturae, quidquid in
8535 homine deperditur, restaurari posset. Sed mors hominis non accidit
8536 nisi per deperditionem alicuius. Posset igitur homo per sumptionem
8537 alimenti in perpetuum se contra mortem tueri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p6">
8538 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for
8539 what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow
8540 that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically
8541 the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same,
8542 identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.
8543 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="33386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33386] Iª q. 119 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, si
8544 alimentum in veritatem humanae naturae transiret, nihil esset in
8545 homine quod non posset recedere et reparari, quia id quod in homine
8546 generatur ex alimento, et recedere et reparari potest. Si ergo homo
8547 diu viveret, sequeretur quod nihil quod in eo fuit materialiter in
8548 principio suae generationis, finaliter remaneret in ipso. Et sic
8549 non esset idem homo numero per totam vitam suam, cum ad hoc quod
8550 aliquid sit idem numero, requiratur identitas materiae. Hoc autem
8551 est inconveniens. Non ergo alimentum transit in veritatem humanae
8552 naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p7">
8553 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): "The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture
8554 of the members." But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality
8555 of human nature.
8556 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 s. c."><a name="33387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33387] Iª q. 119 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
8557 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>alimenta carnis
8558 corrupta, idest amittentia formam suam, in membrorum fabricam
8559 migrant</i>. Sed fabrica membrorum pertinet ad veritatem humanae
8560 naturae. Ergo alimenta transeunt in veritatem humanae naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p8">
8561 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), "The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being." Therefore
8562 that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered
8563 in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common
8564 matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate
8565 matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus
8566 a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul
8567 and this body.
8568 </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p9"> Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist
8569 save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain
8570 individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have
8571 been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human
8572 nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.
8573 </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p10"> But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in
8574 this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed
8575 into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent
8576 the consumption of the "radical humor"; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed
8577 by fire.
8578 </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p11"> But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter,
8579 or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely.
8580 Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human
8581 body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be
8582 changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is
8583 only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one
8584 individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect
8585 of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the
8586 substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied;
8587 for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore
8588 some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently
8589 no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other
8590 things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of
8591 matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect
8592 than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): "All things
8593 were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form." Consequently the multiplication of
8594 the
8595 human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does
8596 not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants
8597 do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which
8598 multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does
8599 anything
8600 increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of
8601 generation and nourishment, which are called "natural forces," would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.
8602 </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p12"> Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature
8603 in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain
8604 determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter
8605 until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true
8606 human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through
8607 the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase
8608 required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary
8609 existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does
8610 not
8611 belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of
8612 living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not
8613 the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore,
8614 would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly,
8615 because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above (
8616 <a href="FP_x.html#FP_Q118_A1" id="FP_Q119_A1-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[118], A[1]</a>). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power
8617 a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true
8618 form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for
8619 growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of
8620 natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore
8621 just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.
8622 </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p13"> Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its
8623 assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): "Food
8624 nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh."
8625 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 co."><a name="33388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33388] Iª q. 119 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
8626 quod, secundum philosophum, II Metaphys., <i>hoc modo se habet
8627 unumquodque ad veritatem, sicut se habet ad esse</i>. Illud ergo
8628 pertinet ad veritatem naturae alicuius, quod est de constitutione
8629 naturae ipsius. Sed natura dupliciter considerari potest, uno modo,
8630 in communi, secundum rationem speciei; alio modo, secundum quod est
8631 in hoc individuo. Ad veritatem igitur naturae alicuius in communi
8632 consideratae, pertinet forma et materia eius in communi accepta, ad
8633 veritatem autem naturae in hoc particulari consideratae, pertinet
8634 materia individualis signata, et forma per huiusmodi materiam
8635 individuata. Sicut de veritate humanae naturae in communi, est
8636 anima humana et corpus, sed de veritate humanae naturae in Petro et
8637 Martino, est haec anima et hoc corpus. Sunt autem quaedam, quorum
8638 formae non possunt salvari nisi in una materia signata, sicut forma
8639 solis non potest salvari nisi in materia quae actu sub ea
8640 continetur. Et secundum hunc modum, aliqui posuerunt quod forma
8641 humana non potest salvari nisi in materia quadam signata, quae
8642 scilicet a principio fuit tali forma formata in primo homine. Ita
8643 quod quidquid aliud praeter illud quod ex primo parente in posteros
8644 derivatur, additum fuerit, non pertinet ad veritatem humanae
8645 naturae, quasi non vere accipiat formam humanae naturae. Sed illa
8646 materia quae in primo homine formae humanae fuit subiecta, in
8647 seipsa multiplicatur, et hoc modo multitudo humanorum corporum a
8648 corpore primi hominis derivatur. Et secundum hos, alimentum non
8649 convertitur in veritatem humanae naturae, sed dicunt quod alimentum
8650 accipitur ut quoddam fomentum naturae, idest ut resistat actioni
8651 caloris naturalis, ne consumat humidum radicale; sicut plumbum vel
8652 stannum adiungitur argento, ne consumatur per ignem. Sed haec
8653 positio est multipliciter irrationabilis. Primo quidem, quia
8654 eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua forma possit fieri in alia
8655 materia, et quod possit propriam materiam deserere, et ideo omnia
8656 generabilia sunt corruptibilia, et e converso. Manifestum est autem
8657 quod forma humana potest deficere ab hac materia quae ei
8658 subiicitur, alioquin corpus humanum corruptibile non esset. Unde
8659 relinquitur quod et alii materiae advenire possit, aliquo alio in
8660 veritatem humanae naturae transeunte. Secundo, quia in omnibus
8661 quorum materia invenitur tota sub uno individuo, non est nisi unum
8662 individuum in una specie, sicut patet in sole et luna, et
8663 huiusmodi. Sic igitur non esset nisi unum individuum humanae
8664 speciei. Tertio, quia non est possibile quod multiplicatio materiae
8665 attendatur nisi vel secundum quantitatem tantum, sicut accidit in
8666 rarefactis, quorum materia suscipit maiores dimensiones; vel etiam
8667 secundum substantiam materiae. Sola autem eadem substantia materiae
8668 manente, non potest dici quod sit multiplicata, quia idem ad
8669 seipsum non constituit multitudinem, cum necesse sit omnem
8670 multitudinem ex aliqua divisione causari. Unde oportet quod aliqua
8671 alia substantia materiae adveniat, vel per creationem, vel per
8672 conversionem alterius in ipsam. Unde relinquitur quod non potest
8673 aliqua materia multiplicari, nisi vel per rarefactionem, sicut cum
8674 ex aqua fit aer; vel per conversionem alterius rei, sicut
8675 multiplicatur ignis per additionem lignorum; vel per creationem
8676 materiae. Sed manifestum est multiplicationem materiae in humanis
8677 corporibus non accidere per rarefactionem, quia sic corpora hominum
8678 perfectae aetatis essent imperfectiora quam corpora puerorum. Nec
8679 iterum per creationem novae materiae, quia secundum Gregorium,
8680 <i>omnia sunt simul creata secundum substantiam materiae, licet non
8681 secundum speciem formae</i>. Unde relinquitur quod multiplicatio
8682 corporis humani non fit nisi per hoc, quod alimentum convertitur in
8683 veritatem humani corporis. Quarto, quia cum homo non differat ab
8684 animalibus et plantis secundum animam vegetabilem, sequeretur quod
8685 etiam corpora animalium et plantarum non multiplicarentur per
8686 conversionem alimenti in corpus nutritum, sed per quandam
8687 multiplicationem. Quae non potest esse naturalis, cum materia
8688 secundum naturam non extendatur nisi usque ad certam quantitatem;
8689 nec iterum inveniatur aliquid naturaliter crescere, nisi per
8690 rarefactionem, vel conversionem alterius in ipsum. Et sic totum
8691 opus generativae et nutritivae, quae dicuntur vires naturales,
8692 esset miraculosum. Quod est omnino inconveniens. Unde alii dixerunt
8693 quod forma humana potest quidem fieri de novo in aliqua alia
8694 materia, si consideretur natura humana in communi, non autem si
8695 accipiatur prout est in hoc individuo, in quo forma humana fixa
8696 manet in quadam materia determinata, cui primo imprimitur in
8697 generatione huius individui, ita quod illam materiam nunquam
8698 deserit usque ad ultimam individui corruptionem. Et hanc materiam
8699 dicunt principaliter pertinere ad veritatem humanae naturae. Sed
8700 quia huiusmodi materia non sufficit ad quantitatem debitam,
8701 requiritur ut adveniat alia materia per conversionem alimenti in
8702 substantiam nutriti, quantum sufficiat ad debitum augmentum. Et
8703 hanc materiam dicunt secundario pertinere ad veritatem humanae
8704 naturae, quia non requiritur ad primum esse individui, sed ad
8705 quantitatem eius. Iam vero si quid aliud advenit ex alimento, non
8706 pertinet ad veritatem humanae naturae, proprie loquendo. Sed hoc
8707 etiam est inconveniens. Primo quidem, quia haec opinio iudicat de
8708 materia corporum viventium, ad modum corporum inanimatorum; in
8709 quibus etsi sit virtus ad generandum simile in specie, non tamen
8710 est virtus in eis ad generandum aliquid sibi simile secundum
8711 individuum; quae quidem virtus in corporibus viventibus est virtus
8712 nutritiva. Nihil ergo per virtutem nutritivam adderetur corporibus
8713 viventibus, si alimentum in veritatem naturae ipsorum non
8714 converteretur. Secundo quia virtus activa quae est in semine, est
8715 quaedam impressio derivata ab anima generantis, sicut supra dictum
8716 est. Unde non potest esse maioris virtutis in agendo, quam ipsa
8717 anima a qua derivatur. Si ergo ex virtute seminis vere assumit
8718 aliqua materia formam naturae humanae, multo magis anima in
8719 nutrimentum coniunctum poterit veram formam naturae humanae
8720 imprimere per potentiam nutritivam. Tertio, quia nutrimento
8721 indigetur non solum ad augmentum, alioquin terminato augmento
8722 necessarium non esset, sed etiam ad restaurandum illud quod
8723 deperditur per actionem caloris naturalis. Non autem esset
8724 restauratio, nisi id quod ex alimento generatur, succederet in
8725 locum deperditi. Unde sicut id quod primo inerat, est de veritate
8726 humanae naturae, ita et id quod ex alimento generatur. Et ideo,
8727 secundum alios, dicendum est quod alimentum vere convertitur in
8728 veritatem humanae naturae, inquantum vere accipit speciem carnis et
8729 ossis et huiusmodi partium. Et hoc est quod dicit philosophus in II
8730 de anima, quod <i>alimentum nutrit inquantum est potentia
8731 caro</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p14">
8732 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord does not say that the "whole" of what enters into the mouth, but "all"---because something from every kind of food
8733 is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and
8734 be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.
8735 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="33389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33389] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
8736 dicendum quod dominus non dicit quod totum quod in os intrat, per
8737 secessum emittatur, sed omne, quia de quolibet cibo aliquid impurum
8738 per secessum emittitur. Vel potest dici quod quidquid ex alimento
8739 generatur, potest etiam per calorem naturalem resolvi, et per poros
8740 quosdam occultos emitti, ut Hieronymus exponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p15">
8741 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from
8742 the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what
8743 is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the
8744 mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their
8745 species in matter"---for instance, wood or stone---"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something
8746 belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally,
8747 or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water
8748 is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added,
8749 cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying
8750 that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.
8751 </p><p id="FP_Q119_A1-p16"> It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh
8752 considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that
8753 which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition.
8754 But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and
8755 renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is
8756 substituted in its place.
8757 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="33390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33390] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8758 dicendum quod aliqui per carnem secundum speciem intellexerunt id
8759 quod primo accipit speciem humanam, quod sumitur a generante, et
8760 hoc dicunt semper manere, quousque individuum durat. Carnem vero
8761 secundum materiam dicunt esse quae generatur ex alimento, et hanc
8762 dicunt non semper permanere, sed quod sicut advenit, ita abscedit.
8763 Sed hoc est contra intentionem Aristotelis. Dicit enim ibi quod,
8764 sicut in unoquoque habentium speciem in materia, puta in ligno et
8765 lapide, <i>ita et in carne hoc est secundum speciem, et illud
8766 secundum materiam</i>. Manifestum est autem quod praedicta
8767 distinctio locum non habet in rebus inanimatis, quae non generantur
8768 ex semine, nec nutriuntur. Et iterum, cum id quod ex alimento
8769 generatur, adiungatur corpori nutrito per modum mixtionis, sicut
8770 aqua miscetur vino, ut ponit exemplum ibidem philosophus; non
8771 potest alia esse natura eius quod advenit, et eius cui advenit, cum
8772 iam sit factum unum per veram mixtionem. Unde nulla ratio est quod
8773 unum consumatur per calorem naturalem, et alterum maneat. Et ideo
8774 aliter dicendum est, quod haec distinctio philosophi non est
8775 secundum diversas carnes, sed est eiusdem carnis secundum diversam
8776 considerationem. Si enim consideretur caro secundum speciem, idest
8777 secundum id quod est formale in ipsa, sic semper manet, quia semper
8778 manet natura carnis, et dispositio naturalis ipsius. Sed si
8779 consideretur caro secundum materiam, sic non manet, sed paulatim
8780 consumitur et restauratur, sicut patet in igne fornacis, cuius
8781 forma manet, sed materia paulatim consumitur, et alia in locum eius
8782 substituitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p17">
8783 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot
8784 be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly
8785 the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue
8786 of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.
8787 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="33391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33391] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
8788 dicendum quod ad humidum radicale intelligitur pertinere totum id
8789 in quo fundatur virtus speciei. Quod si subtrahatur, restitui non
8790 potest, sicut si amputetur manus aut pes, vel aliquid huiusmodi.
8791 Sed humidum nutrimentale est quod nondum pervenit ad suscipiendum
8792 perfecte naturam speciei, sed est in via ad hoc; sicut est sanguis,
8793 et alia huiusmodi. Unde si talia subtrahantur, remanet adhuc virtus
8794 speciei in radice, quae non tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p18">
8795 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming
8796 virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth.
8797 Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this;
8798 and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether,
8799 the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water,
8800 so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).
8801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="33392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33392] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
8802 dicendum quod omnis virtus in corpore passibili per continuam
8803 actionem debilitatur, quia huiusmodi agentia etiam patiuntur. Et
8804 ideo virtus conversiva in principio quidem tam fortis est, ut
8805 possit convertere non solum quod sufficit ad restaurationem
8806 deperditi, sed etiam ad augmentum. Postea vero non potest
8807 convertere nisi quantum sufficit ad restaurationem deperditi, et
8808 tunc cessat augmentum. Demum nec hoc potest, et tunc fit diminutio.
8809 Deinde, deficiente huiusmodi virtute totaliter, animal moritur.
8810 Sicut virtus vini convertentis aquam admixtam, paulatim per
8811 admixtionem aquae debilitatur, ut tandem totum fiat aquosum, ut
8812 philosophus exemplificat in I de Generat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q119_A1-p19">
8813 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be
8814 generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the
8815 entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire.
8816 But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until
8817 the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes
8818 into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed
8819 by natural heat.
8820 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 119 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="33393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[33393] Iª q. 119 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
8821 dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in I de Generat. quando
8822 aliqua materia per se convertitur in ignem, tunc dicitur ignis de
8823 novo generari, quando vero aliqua materia convertitur in ignem
8824 praeexistentem, dicitur ignis nutriri. Unde si tota materia simul
8825 amittat speciem ignis, et alia materia convertatur in ignem, erit
8826 alius ignis numero. Si vero, paulatim combusto uno ligno, aliud
8827 substituatur, et sic deinceps quousque omnia prima consumantur,
8828 semper remanet idem ignis numero, quia semper quod additur, transit
8829 in praeexistens. Et similiter est intelligendum in corporibus
8830 viventibus, in quibus ex nutrimento restauratur id quod per calorem
8831 naturalem consumitur.</p></div></div></div></div>
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8835 </div>
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